Compromising Westphalia

Author(s): Stephen D. Krasner

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp. 115-151
Published by: The MIT Press
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Compromising Stephen
D. Krasner
Westphalia
The

Peace of West-

phalia, which ended the ThirtyYears War in 1648,is taken to mark the beginning of the modern internationalsystemas a universecomposed of sovereign
states, each with exclusive authoritywithin its own geographic boundaries.
The Westphalianmodel, based on the principlesof autonomy and territory,
offersa simple, arresting,and elegant image. It orders the minds of policymakers.It is an analyticassumptionforneo-realismand neo-liberalinstitutionalism,bothofwhichposit thatstatescan be treatedas iftheywere autonomous,
unified,rationalactors.It is an empiricalregularityforvarious sociologicaland
constructivist
theoriesof internationalpolitics.Moreover,it is a benchmarkfor
observers who discern a basic erosion of sovereigntyin the contemporary
world.
This articledemonstrates,however,that the Westphalianmodel has never
been an accuratedescriptionofmanyoftheentitiesthathave been called states.
The assumption thatstates are independentrationalactors can be misleading
because it marginalizesmany situationsin which rulershave, in fact,not been
autonomous. Moreover,the conclusion that sovereigntyis now being altered
because the principles of Westphalia are being transgressedis historically
myopic. Breaches of the Westphalian model have been an enduring characteristicof the internationalenvironmentbecause thereis nothingto prevent
them.Rulers have chosen or been forcedto accept otherprinciples,including
human rights,minorityrights,democracy,communism,and fiscalresponsibility There has never been some golden age of the Westphalian state. The
Westphalianmodel has neverbeen morethana referencepointor a convention;
it has neverbeen some deeply confiningstructurefromwhich actorscould not
escape.
The Westphalianstate is a systemof political authoritybased on territory
means thatpolitical authorityis exercisedover a
and autonomy.Territoriality
Relationsin theDepartnentofPolitical
ofInternational
StephenD. Krasneris GrahamH. StuartProfessor
Scienceat StanfordUniversity.
Thanks to David Abernethy,Michael Bratman,Ellen Comisso, JohnFerejohn,Martha Finnemore,
GeoffreyGarrett,JudithGoldstein,JosephLepgold, MargaretLevi, Lisa Martin,Condoleezza Rice,
Duncan Snidal, Georg Sorensen,and Monika Wohlfeldfortheir
Philip Roeder,Philippe Schmitter,
comments,to Daniel Froatsand JaySmithfortheirsuggestionsand researchassistance,and to the
two anonymous reviewersforexceptionallyhelpfulcriticisms.
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter1995/96),pp. 115-151
Initerinational
Secutity,
? 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology

115

Security20:3 1116
International

definedgeographicspace ratherthan,forinstance,overpeople,as would be

thecase in a tribalformofpoliticalorder.Autonomymeansthatno external
violationsof
withinthebordersof thestate.Territorial
actorenjoysauthority
structures
thatarenot
modelinvolvethecreation
ofauthority
theWestphalian
Commonwithgeographic
borders.ExamplesincludetheBritish
coterminous
are cotermiand territory
wealth(butnotcolonialempiresin whichauthority
theEuropeanUnion,Antarctica,
nous,eveniftractsoflandarenotcontiguous),
and theExclusiveEconomicZone (EEZ) fortheoceans.SomeauthoriAndorra,
aredecidedbyactorswithinthatterritory,
tativeactionswithina giventerritory
entities,
suchas theEuropeanCourt.
butothersaredecidedbyextra-territorial
structures
thattranscend
territory
have
Mostoftheseefforts
to createauthority
frominventing
new institutional
failed,but thathas not deterredstatesmen
theimagination.
forms:theWestphalian
modelhas notconstrained
in whichan external
actoris able to
Violationsoftheprinciple
ofautonomy,
controlwithintheterritory
of a state,have been
exercisesome authoritative
butnotalwaysas obvious.Themost
thanthoseofterritoriality,
morefrequent
is ifsomeexternal
actor
modestway in whichautonomycanbe compromised
of legitimate
actionthatare heldby groupswithina given
altersconceptions
ifrulersagreeto governance
struccan also be transgressed
polity.'Autonomy
turesthatare controlled
by externalactors,or ifmorepowerfulactorsimpose
institutions,
policies,orpersonnelon weakerstates.Examplesoftransgressions
of theCatholicChurchon attitudesabout
of autonomyincludetheinfluence
that
of
birth
control
and
abortion,bondholders'committees
the legitimacy
in someBalkanstatesand elsewherein thenineactivities
regulatedfinancial
Fund (IMF) conditionality
teenthcentury,
International
acceptedby
Monetary
in whichmajorpowsincethe1960s,protectorates
somedevelopingcountries
of
ers controlforeignbut not domesticpolicy,provisionsforthe treatment
Balkan
minorities
imposedon centraland easternEuropeanstatesafterthefirst
of regimesin Soviet
structure
Warsand WorldWarI, and theconstitutional
satellitesduringtheCold War.
Compromisesof Westphaliahave occurredin fourways-throughconcoercion,and imposition.These fourmodalitiesare
ventions,contracting,
1. For example, the influenceof the Catholic Church,AmnestyInternational,pan-Islamicmovements,or ethnicgroups is sometimesdescribed as compromisingthe sovereigntyof states.However, I would not want to push this particularpoint because such influencedoes not involve
authoritativecontrol.

Westphalia
Compromising
I 117

distinguished
bywhether
thebehaviorofone actordependson thatofanother
and by whetherat leastone of theactorsis betteroffand noneworseoff.In
rulersenterintoagreements,
suchas humanrightsaccords,from
conventions,
whichtheyexpectsome gain,but theirbehavioris not contingent
on what
but
rulersagreeto violateWestphalian
principles,
othersdo. In contracting,
the
suchas a foreign
loan.In coercion,
onlyiftheyare providedsomebenefit,
rulersof stronger
statesmakeweakerones worseoffby engagingin credible
the
threatsto whichthe targetmightor mightnot acquiesce.In imposition,
of
targetis so weak thatit has no optionbut to complywiththepreferences
thestronger.
coercion,and impositionhave all been enduring
Conventions,
contracts,
ofbehaviorin theinternational
and thusmanystateshavenot
system,
patterns
model.Everymajorpeace treatysince1648conformed
to theWestphalian
and Helsinki-has violatedtheWestWestphalia,
Utrecht,
Vienna,Versailles,
theWestphalian
model
Compromising
phalianmodelin one way or another.
is alwaysavailableas a policyoptionbecausethereis no authority
structure
to preventit: nothingcan precluderulersfromtransgressing
againstthedoauthority
structures
thattranscend
mesticautonomyofotherstatesor creating
territory.
In theinternational
arelessconstraining
and morefluid,
system,
institutions
The
moresubjectto challengeand changethanin moresettledcircumstances.
forlockingin particular
suchas socialization,
mechanisms
institutional
forms,
betweenstructures
and agents,or path-dependent
propositivereinforcement
levelthanin well-established
domestic
cesses,are weakerat theinternational
statewhichis takento be the
polities.Thisis even truefortheWestphalian
formof the moderninternational
core institutional
system.In international
politics,nothingis everoffthetable.
in whichterritoriality
Ratherthanbeingregardedas an empiricalregularity
of mostif not all states,or as an
and autonomyare accuratedescriptions
as capableof indeanalyticassumptionthatregardscentraldecision-makers
imposedby the
pendentlyformulating
policiessubjectonly to constraints
international
system,the Westphalianmodel is betterconceptualizedas a
thebehavior
convention
or reference
pointthatmightor mightnotdetermine
and
who are also motivatedby materialinterests,
of policymakers
security,
outcomesdependsupon their
nationalideals,and whoseabilityto influence
theWestpower.All statesare notthesame.Somehave closelyapproximated
formsof political
phalian model. Othershave not. Some non-Westphalian

International
Security20:3 1118

suchas empires,tribes,and tradingleagues,have disappeared,

organization,
ofWestphalia
are frequently
ignored.2
butat thesame timetheprinciples
aboutthe
The followingsectionofthisarticletracessome oftheconfusion
natureofsovereignty
tothefactthatthetermhas beenused inseveraldifferent
ways. Then the mechanismsthroughwhichthe principlesof territoriality
and autonomyhave been violated-conventions,
contracting,
coercion,and
imposition-areexplicated.Thisis followedby a discussionofwhytheWestviolated.In theconcluphalianmodelhas bothpersistedand beenfrequently
it
to recognizehow fragilethe
sion, I argue that would be constructive
modelhas been,notonlybecauseviolationsof theprinciplesof
Westphalian
territoriality
and autonomywill take place in any event,but also because
compromising
Westphaliais sometimesthe best way to achievepeace and
stability.

TheWestphalian
Modeland OtherVersions
ofSovereignty
One of thereasonsthatobservershave been so quickto pointto changesin
is thatthe termhas been used in at least three
the natureof sovereignty
model.First,studentsof comdifferent
ways in additionto theWestphalian
bypublic
parativepoliticshavefocusedon boththedegreeofcontrolexercised
entitiesand the organization
of authority
withinterritorial
boundaries.For
to regulateeconomicactivities
instance,
theinability
ofthecentralinstitutions
The siteof
or to maintainorderhas been describedas a loss of sovereignty.
withthepopulace,a hereditary
or an
monarch,
publicauthority-for
instance,
oligarchy-hasbeendefinedas thelocationofsovereignty.
has beencomprehended
as ifitweresynonymous
with
Second,sovereignty
movethedegreeof controlexercisedby publicauthorities
overtransborder
ments.This is a meaningfrequently
employedby scholarsworkingfroma
liberalinterdependence
The inabilityto regulatethe flow of
perspective.3
boundarieshas been describedas
goods,persons,and ideas acrossterritorial
a loss ofsovereignty
2. Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capitaland EuropeanStates,AD 990-1990 (Cambridge,Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Hendrik Spruyt,The SovereignStateand Its Competitors:
An Analysisof SystemsChange
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994); and David Strang,"Anomalyand Commonplace
in European PoliticalExpansion:Realistand InstitutionalAccounts,"International
Organization,
Vol.
45, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 143-162.
3. See, forinstance,RichardCooper,TheEconomicsofInterdependence:
EconomicPolicyin theAtlantic
Community
(New York:McGraw-Hill,1968).

Compromising
Westphalia
I 119

Third,sovereignty
has beenunderstood
as therightofcertainactorsto enter
intointernational
agreements.
This is theconceptused in international
legal
scholarship.
Sovereignstatescan maketreaties.4
Finally,sovereignty
has been understoodas the Westphalianmodel: an
institutional
arrangement
fororganizing
politicallifethatis based on territoriWithintheseterritories,
alityand autonomyStatesexistin specificterritories.
domesticpoliticalauthorities
are the onlyarbitersof legitimate
behavior.A
Westphalian
statesystemis different
froman empire,in whichthereis only
one authority
itis different
inwhichauthority
is claimed
structure;
fromtribes,
overgroupsofindividualsbutnotnecessarily
overspecificgeographicareas;
it is different
fromEuropeanfeudalism,
wheretheCatholicChurchclaimed
over some kindsof activitiesregardlessof theirlocation;and it is
authority
different
froma systemin whichauthority
structures
overdifferent
issueareas
are notgeographically
one possibledescription
oftheEuropean
coterminous,
Union.
These fourconceptions
of sovereignty
are distinct,
but changesin the parameters
ofone can lead to changesin theparameters
ofothers.Forinstance,
if centralauthorities
in a statehave lost controlover activitieswithintheir
boundaries(a loss ofsovereignty
as understood
bysomestudentsofcomparativepolitics),
itis morelikelythatexternal
actorswouldbe abletocompromise
theautonomyof thestate(a loss ofsovereignty
accordingto theWestphalian
and sense of
model).Actorsin otherstatescould influencetheexpectations
of groupswithinthecivilsocietyoftheweakerstate.Rulerscould
legitimacy
surrender
controlin exchangeforexternalsupport.Rulersin more
legitimate
powerfulstatescouldcoerceor imposechangeson rulerswho wereno longer
able to extractresourcesfromtheirdomesticpopulation.
In anotherexample,an inabilityto controltransborder
flows(a loss of
could
as understoodfroma liberalinterdependence
sovereignty
perspective)
thatcompromise
theautonomyof thestate
lead to contractual
arrangements
(a violationof the Westphalianmodel). Changes in technology,
especially
and communication,
have createda
reductionsin the cost of transportation
moreintegrated
forstatesto reguglobaleconomyand made it moredifficult
ofgoods,capital,ideas,and labor.To enhance
latetheinternational
movement
inwhich
theirregulatory
rulersmayenterintocontractual
capacity,
agreements
see Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System:Sov4. For a similardiscussion of sovereignty,
ereignty,Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-unioncirca 1787-1861,"
Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 198.
International
Organization,

International
Security20:3 1120

on theirown behaviorin exchangeforsimilaroblitheyassentto constraints

gationsbeingacceptedby others.5
Autonomy(one principleof Westphalian
sovereignty)
mayor maynotbe transgressed
by suchconstraints,
depending
on whetherattitudesaboutlegitimate
behaviorare changedor whetherinstitutions,personnel,and policybecomesubjectto externalauthority.
For inof1987,whichspecifiedthewaysin whichcapital
stance,theBasleagreement
would be calculatedwithinthebankingsystemsof the majorindustrialized
did not compromise
even thoughit did alterdomestic
countries,
autonomy,
In contrast,
withintheEuropeanUnionsuchas mutual
policy.6
arrangements
in one stateto be governedbythe
recognition,
whichallowsentities
operating
laws ofanother,
haveviolatedtheWestphalian
model.7Individualstatesretain
theformalrightto renouncetheUnion(thusthereis no breachoftheinternationallegalunderstanding
ofsovereignty),
butthecostswouldbe veryhigh.
Moregenerally,
agreements
thatare voluntarily
enteredintobyrulers,what
I havetermedcontracts
and conventions,
wouldneverviolatetheinternational
ofsovereignty,
law definition
but couldviolatetheWestphalian
modelifthey
theautonomyofthestate,whetherin modestwaysby altering
compromised
domesticviews of legitimate
behavior,as did theHelsinkiaccordsin eastern
Europe,orin moredecisivewaysbysubjecting
domesticinstitutional
arrangements,personnel,
or policiesto thescrutiny
ofor controlby external
actors,as
has been the case forsome IMF stand-byagreements.8
Whetheror not a
voluntaryagreement,
a contract,
or a conventionviolatesthe Westphalian
modelis an empiricalquestion.
5. The abilityto conclude such contractualagreementscould, however,depend on the domestic
organizationof the polity.It is easier forpolicymakersin liberaldemocraticstatesto make credible
commitmentsbecause they are constrainedby domestic constituenciesthan forautocraticstates
whose policies are more subjectto the capriciousand arbitrarygoals of theirrulers.See Robert0.
Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma and InstitutionalChange in World Politics:Sovereigntyin International Society,"in Hans-Henrik Hohm and Georg Sorensen, eds., Whose WorldOrder? Uneven
Globalization
and theEnd oftheCold War(Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1995), pp. 170-172.
6. For a discussion of the Basle accord, see Ethan Kapstein, "Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma:
InternationalCoordination of Banking Regulations," InternationalOrganization,Vol. 43, No. 2
(Spring 1989), pp. 323-347.
7. See Kalypso Nicolaides, "Mutual Recognitionand the Meaning of Sovereignty,"unpublished
paper, Kennedy School of Government,Harvard University,February18, 1994, foran insightful
discussion of the way in which mutual recognitioncompromisesconventionalnotions of sovereignty,termedhere the Westphalianmodel.
8. For a discussion of the impact of the Helsinki accords, see Daniel Thomas, "Social Movements
and InternationalInstitutions:A PreliminaryFramework,"paper presentedat theAmericanPolitical Science Association Annual Convention,Washington,D.C., 1991; forone example of how IMF
accords changed domesticinstitutionsand personnel,see Robin Broad, UnequalAlliance:The World
Bank,TheInternational
MonetaryFund,and thePhilippines(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,
1988), pp. 61-75.

Compromising
Westphalia| 121

Finally,situationsin whichrulersin one countryhave been compelledby

coercionorimposition
toaltertheirdomesticinstitutions,
personnel,
orpolicies
wouldviolatebothinternational
law conceptions
ofsovereignty
and theWestphalianmodel.Forexample,thewould-berulersofeasternEuropeafterWorld
WarI had no choicebuttoaccepttheconditions
forthetreatment
ofminorities
thatwereimposedon thembythevictorious
powers.LatinAmerican
countries
subjectedto gunboatdiplomacyaroundtheturnofthecentury
had no choice
butto dedicatesomeoftheirstaterevenuesto refunding
international
obligations.
is understoodas theorganization
Whethersovereignty
and efficacy
of domesticauthority
structures,
the abilityto exercisecontrolover transborder
therightto enterintointernational
movements,
agreements,
or an institutional
structure
characterized
and autonomydependsupon theanaby territoriality
and empirical
concernsofparticular
lyticconstructs
analysts.Thereis no single
of sovereignty
definition
because the meaningof the termdependson the
theoretical
contextwithinwhichit is beingused.
The Westphalian
modelis a basic conceptforsomeofthemajortheoretical
and neo-liberal
approachesto international
relations,includingneo-realism
forboth of whichit is an analyticassumption,as well as
institutionalism,
forwhichit is an empiricalregularity.
international
societyperspectives,
For
theontological
neo-realism,
givensin theinternational
systemareWestphalian
states,understoodas unitaryrationalactorsoperatingin an anarchicsetting
and strivingto enhancetheirwell-beingand securityThese statesare constrainedonlybytheexternal
thatis,bythepowerofotherstates.
environment,
Realismdoes not suppose thatall statescan guaranteetheirautonomy.If,
forinstance,
itspoliticalstructures
and
a statelosesitsautonomy-if,
however,
to
chosen
others-then
has
about
neo-realism nothing say
personnelare
by
how suchpenetrated
statesmightact.The relations
between
non-Westphalian
Czechoslovakiaand the SovietUnion afterthe Prague Springof 1968,for
was notrespondarenotamenabletorealistanalysis.Czechoslovakia
instance,
as an autonomousor Westphalian
statemight.Its
ing to externalconstraints,
structures
and
policieswere dictatedby externally
imposed constitutional
personnel.
theWestphalian
model is an analyticassumptionforneo-liberal
Similarly,
The actorsare assumed to be Westphalianstates,unified
institutionalism.9
9. Robert 0. Keohane, AfterHegemony:Cooperationand Discord in the WorldPoliticalEconomy
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984), is the seminal expositionof thisperspective.

International
Security20:3 1122

rationalautonomousentitiesstriving
to maximizetheirutilityin thefaceof
constraints
that emanatefroman anarchicalthoughinterdependent
internationalenvironment.
fromneo-realism
is
Whatdistinguishes
neo-liberalism
itsdifferent
understanding
ofthecharacteristic
problemfortheseWestphalian
states:forneo-liberal
institutionalism,
theproblemis theresolution
ofmarket
it is security
whereasforneo-realism
and distributional
conflicts.10
failures,
The Westphalian
modelis also a coreconceptforinternational
societyapproaches,most notablythe Englishschool and various constructivist
approaches.11Here the Westphalianmodel is understoodas a behavioral
regularity
based on sharedunderstandings
ratherthanas an analyticassumption. All participantsin international
society-publicofficials,diplomats,
statesmen,
politicalleaders-hold thesame fundamental
viewsaboutthenatureof the system,the actors,and how theybehave.Moderninternational
unitswithinwhichpublicinstitutions
societyis composedofterritorial
exercise
exclusiveauthority.
Actionsfollowparticularpatternsnot because theyare
dictatedby some higherauthority,
or coercedby thethreatof force,or constrainedby the power of otherstates,but because playershave a shared
The consequencesofanarchyitselfare socially
intersubjective
understanding.
constructed.
The roleof sovereignstatespermitssome kindsof activities
but
not others.The rulesof sovereignty
give statesfullautonomyoveractivities
withintheirown bordersand prohibitintervention
in theinternalaffairsof
otherstates.
The Westphalianmodel is an excellentstartingpointforanalyzing(neorealismor neo-liberal
or understanding
institutionalism)
(international
society
muchofwhatgoes on in theinternational
environment.
A great
perspectives)
10. For the classic expositionof the problemscaused by interdependence,see Cooper, TheEconomFor a discussion of the distinctionbetweenmarketfailureand distributional
ics ofInterdependence.
issues, see Stephen D. Krasner,"Global Communicationsand National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier,"WorldPolitics,Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-367.
11. Hedley Bull, TheAnarchicalSociety(London: Macmillan, 1977); JohnG. Ruggie, "Territoriality
and Beyond: ProblematizingModernityin InternationalRelations,"International
Organization,
Vol.
47, No. 1 (Winter1993), pp. 139-174; Alexander Wendt,"Anarchyis What States Make of It: The
Social Constructionof State Politics," InternationalOrganization,Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992),
Vol. 20,
pp. 391-425; AlexanderWendt,"ConstructingInternationalPolitics,"International
Security,
No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81; J.Samuel Barkinand Bruce Cronin,"The State and the Nation:
Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereigntyin InternationalRelations,"International
Organization,Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter1994),pp. 107-130; Hedley Bull and Adam Watson,eds., The Expansion
of International
Society(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1984); Adam Watson, The Evolutionof
International
Society(London: Routledge,1992). See BarryBuzan, "From InternationalRealism to
InternationalSociety: StructuralRealism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," InternaVol. 47, No. 3 (Summer1993),pp. 327-352,fora comparisonof U.S. and British
tionalOrganization,
approaches to internationalrelations.

Compromising
Westphalia| 123

deal ofwhattakesplaceis completely

consistent
withtheWestphalian
model,
whetheritis treatedas an analyticassumptionor behavioralregularity
generatedby intersubjective
sharedunderstanding:
theclaimsofexternal
actorsare
rebuffed;
authoritative
decision-makers
declarewar,formalliances,enterinto
tradeagreements,
and regulatemigration.
As thisarticledemonstrates,
however,thereare manyothersituationsin
whichterritoriality
or autonomyhas been violated.Some are theresultofan
inability
tocontrol
eithertransborder
flowsordomesticbehavior,
leadingrulers
to concludecontractual
arrangements
thatare consistent
withinternational
legalunderstandings
ofsovereignty,
butwhichviolatetheWestphalian
model
domesticautonomyor establishing
new institutional
by compromising
arrangements
thattranscend
territoriality
Some are theresultof majorpowers
on weakerstates,a situationthat
imposingpersonnel,
policies,or institutions
violatesboththeWestphalian
modeland theviewofstatesas entitiescapable
ofentering
intovoluntary
accords.
Rulershave alwayshad theoptionofviolatingWestphalian
principles.
The
assertionthatthecontemporary
bea basic transformation
systemrepresents
cause sovereignty
seemsto be so muchat riskis notwell-founded:
it ignores
the factthatviolationsof theprinciplesof territoriality
and autonomyhave
been an enduringcharacteristic
of the international
systembothbeforeand
afterthePeace ofWestphalia.

and Autonomy
Compromising
Territoriality
The principlesofautonomyor territoriality
can be breachedthrough
convenThe fourmodalitiesthroughwhich
tions,contracts,
coercion,or imposition.
can be compromised
aredistinguished
autonomyand territoriality
bywhether
or not.Conventionsand
theyare paretoimprovingor not,and contingent
contracts
are pareto-improving,
thatis,theymakeat leastone partybetteroff
withoutmakinganyoneworseoff.Rulersare not forcedintosuch arrangements.Theyenterthemvoluntarily
becausecompromising
Westphalian
printhanhonoring
them.Coercionand imposition
ciplesis moreattractive
leaveat
leastone oftheactorsworseoff;theyarethusnotpareto-improving.
Contracts
and coercioninvolvecontingent
behavior;theactionsofonerulerdependupon
whattheotherdoes. Conventions
and impositiondo notinvolvecontingent
behavior.Giventhemanyopportunities
and incentives
to violateWestphalian
it is notsurprising
thatmanystateshave existedwitheithertheir
principles,
or autonomycompromised.
territoriality

International
Security20:3 | 124

CONVENTIONS

in whichrulersmakecommitments
thatexpose
Conventionsare agreements
theirown policiesto some kind of externalscrutiny
by agreeingto follow
certaindomesticpractices.12
Signatoriesmight,forinstance,endorseliberal
conceptionsof humanrights,or agreeto hold regularelections,or stipulate
would notaffect
thefranchise
or opportunities
thatreligiousor ethnicidentity
foremployment,
or thatrefugeeswould be entitledto specificsocialsecurity
benefits
and educationalopportunities.
Conventions
areenteredintovoluntarily
Theymakeat leastone actorbetter
offwithoutmakinganyworseoff;iftheydid not,rulerswouldnotsignthem,
do notusually
sincethestatusquo would stillbe available.The signatories
secureany directgain exceptthepledgefromotherpartiesto theagreement
ofa particular
thattheywillbehavein thesameway.The willingness
stateto
is notcontingent
on thebehaviorofothers.Somerulers
abidebya convention
can violatea convention
withoutprompting
anychangein thedomesticpolicies or institutions
ofothers.
In thecontemporary
is thatof
world,themostobviousclassofconventions
betweenrulers
humanrights
accords.Humanrights
agreements
coverrelations
and ruled,includingbothcitizensand non-citizens.
Theyinvolvepledgesby
to treatindividualswithintheirterritory
in a certainway.
nationalauthorities
As of 1993theUnitedNationslistedtwenty-five
suchinstruments.13
Another
records
those
with
associated
compendium
forty-seven
compactsincluding
and specializedagencies.14
regionalorganizations
Theseconventions
covera wide rangeofissuesincludinggenocide,torture,
statelesspersons,women'srights,
chilracialdiscrimination,
slavery,
refugees,
dren'srights,
forcedlabor,and therightoflabortoorganize.In someinstances,
humanrightsagreements
broadprinciples,
butinothers
specify
onlyrelatively
the1953Convention
on thePoliticalRights
theyareveryprecise.Forinstance,
of Women,whichhas been ratified
providesfor
by morethan100 countries,
The 1979
equal votingrightsforwomenand equal rightsto hold office.15
ofall FormsofDiscrimination
Convention
on theElimination
AgainstWomen,
whichhas been ratified
by morethan120 states,obligatespartiesto takeall
legalmeasuresnecessary
toassuretheequalityofmenand women,to "modify
12. I am indebted to JaySmithforsuggestingthe term"conventions."
13. United Nations,Human Rights:International
Instruments:
ChartofRatifications
as of31 December
1993, ST/HR/4/Rev.9,New York,1994.
14. Ian Brownhle,Basic Documentson Human Rights,3rd ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1992).
15. Ibid., pp. 106-108; UN, Human Rights,p. 10.

Compromising
Westphalia
1125

the social and culturalpatternsof conductof menand women,"to provide

equal accessto education,to takemeasuresto assure"thesame opportunities
to participate
activelyin sportsand physicaleducation,"to assureequal work
opportunities
includingpromotion
and job security,
to introduce
paid maternityleave,and to offeradequateprenataland postnatalcareincluding"free
16 The 1951 ConventionRelatingto the Statusof
serviceswherenecessary."
Refugees,
endorsedbymorethan120states,providesthateach signatory
will
notdiscriminate
or country
of
amongrefugeeson thebases of race,religion,
origin;will providefreedomof religionequal to thatprovidedfornationals;
and willallow refugeesaccessto itslegalsystem.17
The enforcement
and monitoring
mechanismsfortheseagreements
vary
ofHumanRights,
do not
enormously
Some,suchas theUniversalDeclaration
have thestatusofa formaltreaty
and are devoidofmonitoring
provisions.
At
best,such conventionscan specifyobjectivesand expressgood intentions.
Otherconventions
thestatusof refugees,
(forexamplethoseon slavery,
and
to theInternapoliticalrightsofwomen)providethatdisputescan be referred
beenreferred
to
tionalCourtofJustice.
No humanrightscaseshave,however,
thisCourt.A numberof conventions
(suchas thoseon racialdiscrimination,
apartheid,and therightsof thechild)provideforthecreationof committees
thatreceiveinformation
and can,withtheapprovalof theconcernedstates,
investigate
allegedviolations.
The EuropeanConventionon Human Rights,whichenteredintoforcein
1953,and subsequentprotocolsprovidethe most far-reaching
exampleof
on theWestphalian
model.The Europeanhumanrightsregime
infringements
has elaboratemonitoring
and enforcement
procedures.The EuropeanCommissionon Human Rightscan receivecomplaintsfromindividuals,nongovernmental
organizations
(NGOs), and states;it receivesabout4,000communications
a year.The EuropeanCourtofHumanRightscan makedecisions
Thejurisdiction
of theCommission
thatare bindingon nationaljurisdictions.
(composedofindependent
experts)and oftheCourthavebeenrecognized
by
to the Convention.Decisionsof the Commission
the twenty-two
signatories
and the Courthave led to changesin detentionpracticesin Belgiumand
alienlaw in Switzerland,
and trialproceduresin Sweden.18Greece,
Germany,
16. Convention on the Eliminationof all Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, in Brownlie,
Basic Documents,pp. 106-108,Art 5.a.; Art. lOf;Art.13.2.

17. Ibid.,pp. 64-81,169-181;UN, HumanRights,

p. 10.

18. JackDonnelly,International
HumanRights(Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1992),pp. 82-83; David P
Forsythe,Human Rightsand WorldPolitics(Lincoln: Universityof Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 19.

International
Security20:3 1126

withexpulsion,withdrewfromthe Councilof Europe afteran

confronted
investigation
by the EuropeanHuman RightsCommissionfoundthatthe
military
regimehad violatedhumanrights.19
Thereis no singleexplanationforwhy countriessign conventions.
The
EuropeanConvention,
withits significant
enforcement
and monitoring
capabilities,
couldbe concludedand strengthened
overtimebecausethesignatories
werecommitted
totheprinciples
and rulesspecified
intheagreement.
Initially,
when the futureof democracyand humanrightsin Europewas uncertain,
rulersmighthavewantedtotiethehandsoftheirsuccessors.
Theeffectiveness
oftheEuropeanregimeis,as AndrewMoravcsikhas argued,20
moretheresult
ofshareddomesticvaluesin thesignatory
statesthanofformalcommitments.
In someways,theinstitutions
createdbyLatinAmericanhumanrightsagreementshave evenmoreextensiveformalpower,buttheyhave beenless effectivebecauseactorsin civilsocietyand thestatehave been less committed
to
humanrights.
In contrast,
conventions
withno monitoring
orenforcement
provisions,
such
as theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,
orwithonlylimitedprovisions
fornationalreporting
couldbe signedevenby countries
withabysmalhuman
rightsrecords.Whenenforcement
and monitoring
mechanisms
areweak,and
wherethereis,in fact,limiteddomesticsupportforhumanrights,
signingmay
have no consequencesforstatesengagingin repressivedomesticpolicies.21
Such situationswould be consistent
withtheWestphalian
model.The Soviet
bloc countries
ratified
human
routinely
rightsagreements.
As ofSeptember
1,
1987,theSovietUnion,Bulgaria,Czechoslovakia,
and Romaniahad all ratified
fourteenout of the twenty-two
extantUN humanrightsinstruments,
East
For theindustrialized
Germanysixteen,and Poland thirteen.
countriesthere
TheUnitedStateshad ratified
sixconventions,
was widevariation.
Switzerland
eight,Italyand theUnitedKingdomfifteen
each,Franceand WestGermany
sixteeneach,Swedeneighteen,
and Norwaynineteen.22
19. Andrew Moravcsik, "Lessons fromthe European Human RightsRegime," in Inter-American
Dialogue, AdvancingDemocracyand Human Rightsin theAmericas:WhatRolefortheOAS? (Washington,D.C.: Inter-American
Dialogue, 1994), p. 47.
20. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
21. Even in situationswhere thereis limitedmonitoringand enforcement,
joining an accord can
impose costs on rulers.If the principlesenunciatedin an accord become a rallyingpoint forlocal
resistanceto a repressiveregime,or if joining an agreementopens possibilitiesfortransnational
linksbetween internationaland domestichuman rightsgroups,theneven a weak accord could be
consequential.For a discussion of the impact of the CSCE agreementson protestmovementsin
easternEurope, see Thomas, "Social Movementsand InternationalInstitutions";Moravcsik,"Lessons," pp. 48-49.
22. Derived frominformationin United Nations,Human Rights:StatusofInternational
Instruments
as at 1 September
1987,n.d.

Compromising
Westphalia| 127

Whywould rulersbotherto joinagreements

withno intention
ofhonoring
them,even if monitoring
and enforcement
provisionsare weak?The policies
oftheSovietbloccouldbe written
offas eithercynicism
orself-delusion.
States
mayalso signbecauseparticipation
is understood
as something
thata modern
statedoes. For manyThirdWorldstates,clues to appropriatebehaviorare
signaledby the international
environment,
especiallyinternational
organizationsand morepowerfulstates.23
Regardlessof the motivationfor signing,humanrightsagreementscan
violatetheWestphalian
model.Whether
ornotsucha violationoccursdepends
oflegitimacy
heldbydomestic
theconvention
altersconceptions
uponwhether
or even enforcement
mechanisms
thatcomprogroupsor createsmonitoring
mise domesticautonomy.
If,forinstance,signingan agreement
on thetreatmentofminorities
does notalterdomesticviewsaboutthisissue,and does not
createanymonitoring
and enforcement
thentherewould be no
mechanisms,
violationof the Westphalian
model.A rulerwould have agreedto act in a
theruler'sabilityto exerciseexclusive
specificway,but domesticautonomy,
withina giventerritory,
would nothavebeen altered.In contrast,
if
authority
structures
or even
signingsuchan agreement
providesforexternalauthority
ifit justchangesconceptions
of legitimate
behavioramongdomesticgroups,
thentheWestphalian
modelwould be violated.Ideas aboutlegitimacy
would
havebeeninfluenced
byexternal
factors
and notjustdomesticones.Dissenting
groupscould organizemoreeffectively
and appeal to external
actors.In some
oflegitimacy
wouldbe anticipated
and
cases,changesin domesticconceptions
even welcomedby rulersenteringinto accords,as was the case forsome
advocatesof the EuropeanConventionon Human Rights.In othercases,
from
statebehaviorresulting
changesin domesticattitudesabout legitimate
signinga convention
mightnotbe accurately
predictedby rulers.

23. JohnMeyer and othershave argued thatmany of the formalstances of rulers(not necessarily
such as thelevel ofsocio-economic
theiractual behavior)are dictatednotby internalcharacteristics,
development, but ratherby expectations that are generated in the internationalsystem. For
example, states create science agencies, even if theyhave no scientists.See JohnW. Meyer,John
Boli, and George M. Thomas, "Ontologyand Rationalizationin the WesternCulturalAccount,"in
Structure:
George M. Thomas, JohnW. Meyer,Francisco 0. Ramirez,and JohnBoli, Institutional
Constituting
State,Society,and theIndividual(Newbury Park,Calif.: Sage, 1987), pp. 12-13; Strang,
"Anomalyand Commonplace in European PoliticalExpansion"; MarthaFinnemore,"International
Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific,and Cultural
Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn1993),pp. 565Organizationand Science Policy,"International
Organization,
597; Paul J. DiMaggio and WalterW. Powell, "Introduction,"in Dimaggio and Powell, eds., The
New Institutionalism
in Organizational
Analysis(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1991),pp. 1315; and JohnW. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "InstitutionalizedOrganizations:Formal Structurein
pp. 41-60.
Myth and Ceremony,"in Dimaggio and Powell, TheNew Institutionalism,

International
Security20:3 1128

CONTRACTS

A contract
is an agreement
betweenthelegitimate
in two or more
authorities
statesor stateauthorities
and anotherinternational
actor,suchas an internationalfinancial
institution,
thatis mutuallyacceptable,pareto-improving,
and
A contract
contingent.
can violatetheWestphalian
modelifit altersdomestic
conceptions
of legitimate
behavior,
subjectsdomesticinstitutions
and personnel to externalinfluence,
or createsinstitutional
arrangements
thattranscend
nationalboundaries.Obviously,manycontracts
betweenstatesdo nottransgresstheWestphalian
model.An international
agreement
thatobligatesa state
only to changesome specificaspect of its foreignpolicywould not be a
violationof autonomy,
nor would a treatythatinvolvedonly a changein
domesticpolicybuthad no otherconsequences.
Rulersmustbelievethata contract
makesthembetteroff;otherwisethey
wouldnotenterintoitin thefirst
place,sincethestatusquo remainsavailable.
The behaviorofone oftheactorsis contingent
on thebehavioroftheothers.
In contractual
rulerswould notcompromise
arrangements,
theautonomyor
territorial
oftheirstateunlessthebehaviorofothersalso changed:if
authority
one actorabrogatesthecontract
theotherwould preferto do so as well.
COMPROMISING AUTONOMY: SOVEREIGN LENDING. Historically,
lendsovereign
ing,especiallyto weakerstates,has frequently
involvedcontractual
arrangementsthatcompromisethe autonomyalthoughnot the territoriality
of the
borrower.
Borrowershave not simplyagreedto repaytheirobligations,
an
thatwould have no impacton autonomy.Rathertheyhave
arrangement
frequently
agreedto dedicatespecificrevenues,or to acceptoversight
of domesticpolicies,or to permitrevenuesto be collectedby foreign
or to
entities,
changetheirdomesticinstitutional
structures.
Sovereignlendingposes uniqueproblems.In lendingbetweenprivateparties,it is possibleto appeal to a courtsystemif theborrowerfailsto repay;
lenderscan also seek collateralthatcan be seized if theborrowerdefaults.
However,loans to sovereignsprecludereviewby any authoritative
judicial
future
fundsmaybe the
systemand collateralis hardto comeby.Withholding
onlysanctionavailableto lenders.Therehave beenmanydefaults.24
24. For a review of defaultsin the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,see Peter H. Lindertand
PeterJ.Morton,"How SovereignLending Has Worked,"in Jeffrey
D. Sachs, ed., DevelopingCountry
Debtand EconomicPerformance
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1989),pp. 41-43. For a review
of experiencesin Latin America, see Carlos Marichal, A Centuryof Debt Crisesin Latin America:
FromIndependence
to the GreatDepression1820-1930 (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1989). Lending to thesovereigncan also be a problemdomestically,
notjustinternationally.
Efficient

| 129
Compromising
Westphalia

ratesto compensatefortherisks
One approachis to chargehighinterest
thedomestic
creditto sovereigns,
butnotto compromise
inherent
in extending
This was the typicalpracticeduringtheRenaisautonomyof theborrower.
rates,and soverbankersdid chargehighinterest
sance:privateinternational
more
eignsdid default.Thisregimeforsovereignlendingwas, paradoxically,
becauseit
modelthanmorerecentpractices,
consistent
withtheWestphalian
25
did notinvolveefforts
to compromise
domesticautonomy
High interestratesand frequentdefaults,however,may not be the best
solutionforeitherborrowersor lenders.Sovereignborrowerswould prefer
lowerinterest
rates,but theycan onlysecuresuchtermsiftheycan in some
so thatpotential
providway tietheirown hands,thatis,limittheirdiscretion
of beingrepaid.One strategy
is forborers of capitalhave moreconfidence
rowersto violate theirown domesticautonomyby givinglenderssome
withintheirown borders.
overfiscal,and sometimes
activities
other,
authority
and twentieth
centuries,
International
sovereignlendingin the nineteenth
by contractsin which
especiallyto weakerstates,has been characterized
willbe honored
borrowers
lendersthatobligations
securefundsbyreassuring
modelis violated:lenderspartwiththeirfundsat
because theWestphalian
lowerinterestratesbecause theyare givensome controlover the domestic
oftheborrower.
activities
and institutional
arrangements
sovereign
involving
century,
contractual
arrangements
Duringthenineteenth
more
sometimesin the initialcontract,
loans frequently
violatedautonomy,
to default.Greece,thefirststate
expostifthesovereignthreatened
frequently
fromtheOttomanEmpire,offers
examplesofseveral
to becomeindependent
thatinvolvedcompromising
autonomyto secure
contractual
arrangements
statein 1832,
funds.WhenGreecewas recognizedas an independent
foreign
itreceiveda sixtymillionfrancloanfromBritain,
France,and Russia,butonly
pledgingthatthe"actualreceiptsoftheGreektreasby signingan agreement
ofall,tothepaymentofthesaid interest
and sinking
uryshallbe devoted,first
fund,and shallnotbe employedforanyotherpurpose,untilthosepayments
domestic financialinstitutionsrequired the creation of an institutionalstructurethat provided
lenderswith the confidencethattheywould be repaid iftheylentmoney to theirown sovereigns.
See Douglass North and BarryWeingast,"Constitutionand Commitment:The Evolution of InstiVol.
ofEconomicHistory,
tutionsGoverningPublic Choice in SeventeenthCenturyEngland,"Journal
49, No. 4 (September1989), pp. 803-833.
1955), p. 59; Edward W.
25. GarrettMattingly,RenaissanceDiplomacy(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
Fox, Historyin GeographicPerspective:The OtherFrance (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 60-61;
Bankingand AmericanForeignPolicy(New Haven,
International
BenjaminJ.Cohen, In WhoseInterest?
Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 84-90.

Security20:3 | 130
International

of theloan raisedundertheguaranteeof the

on accountof theinstallments
In 1838
year."26
securedforthecurrent
threeCourts,shallhavebeencompletely
theentirefinancesofGreecewereplacedundera Frenchadministrator.27
Greececould not securenew loans duringthe middleof the nineteenth
After1878its
in partbecauseit was in defaulton its1832obligations.
century
butto securethesefundsGreececommitted
borrowing
increasedsubstantially,
specificrevenues,includingthecustomsat Athens,Piraeus,Patras,and Zante
and the revenuesfromthe state monopolieson salt,petroleum,matches,
playingcards,and cigarette
paper.The loan of1887gave thelenderstheright
to organizea companythatwould supervisetherevenuesthatwereassigned
fortheloan.28
In 1897,aftera disastrouswar withTurkeyover Crete,Greece'sfinances
debtorto paythewarindemnity
collapsed.It was unableto serviceitsforeign
Germanyand France,alongwithprivatedebtthatwas demandedby Turkey.
Greeceaccededwhen
commission
of control.
ors,pressedforan international
itbecameclearthatthiswas theonlyway to securenewfunding,
and Britain,
whichhad been moresympathetic
to preserving
thenacGreekautonomy,
ceptedthe ControlCommission.The Commission,whichconsistedof one
representative
appointedby each majorpower,had absolutecontroloverthe
and foreigndebt.The
sourcesof revenueneededto fundthewar indemnity
Commissionchosetherevenuesourcesthatit would control.Theyincluded
statemonopolieson salt,petroleum,
paper,
matches,playingcards,cigarette
tobaccoduties,and thecustomsrevenuesofPiraeus.Disputesthatmightarise
wereto be
betweenthe Commissionand agenciesof theGreekgovernment
weregiventhe
Themembers
oftheCommission
settledbybindingarbitration.
samestandingas diplomats.One memberoftheGreekparliament
arguedthat
of
theestablishment
oftheControlCommissionsuspendedtheindependence
Greece.29

Greece'sexperiencewithforeignlendingis not unique.Duringthe nineteenthcentury,

the domesticautonomyof all of the successorstatesto the
was compromised
OttomanEmpireas well as manyLatinAmericancountries
throughcontractualarrangementsinvolvinginternationalloans. When
26. Quoted in JohnA. Levandis, TheGreekForeignDebtand theGreatPowers,1821-1898(New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1944), p. 36.
27. Charles Jelavichand Barbara Jelavich,The Establishment
of theBalkanNationalStates(Seattle:
Universityof WashingtonPress, 1977), p. 75.
28. Levandis, The GreekForeignDebt,p. 67.
29. Ibid., pp. 97-112.

Compromising
Westphalia
1131

countrieswent into default,lendersset up controlcommittees

to oversee
restructuring
ofthegovernment's
financesand otheractivities.
Suchcommittees wereestablishedforBulgaria,Greece,Serbia,the OttomanEmpire,and
withimminent
Argentina.30
Confronted
default,theOttomanEmpireagreed
in 1881 to put some of its revenuesunder the controlof creditors.
These
includedthesaltand tobaccomonopolies;stamp,spirit,
and fishing
taxes;and
theannualtributefromBulgaria(whichwas neverpaid). A separateadministration
controlled
was createdto collectrevenues.By1912
bythebondholders
it had overeightthousandemployees.31
In returnfora loan consolidationin 1895,Serbia createda monopolies
commissionthatwas chargedwith overseeingthe revenuefromthe state
monopolieson tobacco,salt,and petroleum;
liquortaxes;some stamptaxes;
and some railwayand customsrevenues.Revenuesfromthesemonopolies
werecommitted
to payingoffforeign
loansand did notflowintotheSerbian
TheMonopoliesCommission
was composedoffourSerbiansand one
treasury.
Germanand one Frenchrepresentative
offoreign
bondholders.32
SinceWorldWarII, contractual
arrangements
thatviolateautonomyhave
becomeroutineforinternational
institutions
financial
(IFIs).Theconditionality
of theseorganizations
requirements
can violatethe Westphalianmodel,alwiththe formallegalisticconceptof sovereignty
thoughtheyare consistent
employedby international
legal scholars:lenderscan specifychangesin domestic policy,modifydomesticconceptionsof legitimatepractices,and
influence
structures.
institutional
Woodsagreements.
Conditionality
was notpartof theBretton
Duringthe
Fundand theWorldBank,
negotiations
thatcreatedtheInternational
Monetary
resistedU.S. efforts
to givethenew
theEuropeanrepresentatives
successfully
institutions
significant
supervisorypowers. Potentialdebtorcountries,the
whereasthemajorworldcrediEuropeans,wantedto defendtheirautonomy,
model.
tor,theUnitedStates,was perfectly
willingto violatetheWestphalian
theUnitedStates
TheUnitedStates,however,
had themoneyand ultimately
was acceptedin principleby theexecutive
prevailed.In 1950,conditionality
30. Cohen, In WhoseInterest?,
p. 103.
31. HerbertFeis, Europe,The World'sBanker1870-1914:An AccountofEuropeanForeignInvestment
and theConnectionof WorldFinancewithDiplomacyBeforeWorldWarI (New York:W.W. Norton,
1965), pp. 332-334; Donald C. Blaisdell, EuropeanFinancialControlin theOttomanEmpire:A Study
oftheEstablishment,
Activities,
and Significance
oftheAdministration
oftheOttomanPublicDebt (New
York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1929).
32. Feis, Europe,theWorld'sBanker,pp. 266-268.

International
Security20:3 | 132

oftheIMF becauseit was theonlyway to induceU.S. policymakers,

directors
who had blockedvirtually
forseveralyears,to allow operations
all activities
to resume.Conditionality
formally
becamepartoftheIMF ArticlesofAgreementby amendment
in 1969.33
The conditionsattachedto IMF lendinghave covereda wide range of
domesticactivitiesincludingaggregatecreditexpansion;subsidiesforstateowned enterprises;
the numberof government
employees;theindexationof
salaries;subsidieson food,petroleum,
and fertilizers;
government
investment;
personal,payroll,and corporate
taxes;excisetaxeson beerand cigarettes;
and
energyprices;theyhave also touchedon issuesthatare explicitly
concerned
withinternational
transactions
includingexchangerateand tradepolicies.34
TheWorldBankinitiated
structural
adjustment
inthe1970sthatwere
programs
to
designed changewhole sectorsof the economy.Theywere distinctfrom
specificprojectlending,whichhad beenthecentralfocusofthebank'slending
activities.
Structural
adjustment
programsinvolvedgeneraleconomicreforms,
suchas changingtaxes,tariffs,
subsidies,and interest
rates;budgetary
reforms;
and institution
building.35
International
financialinstitutions
have triedto alterdomesticinstitutional
notjustpolicies.Theyhavesupportedparticular
structures,
actorsand agencies
in borrowingcountries.They have placed theirown personnelin key bureaus.36Finally,
and mostambitiously,
theEuropeanBankforReconstruction
and Developmentis the firstIFI to explicitly
includepoliticalconditionality.
Thepreambletothebank'sArticles
ofAgreement
statesthatcontracting
parties
shouldbe "committed
to thefundamental
principles
ofmultiparty
democracy,
theruleoflaw,[and]respectforhumanrightsand marketeconomies."
A government
enteringintonegotiations
withan IFI can expectthatany
itsignswillcompromise
contract
itsdomesticautonomy,
albeitsometimes
only
in modestways. International
financialinstitutions
do not simplyrequire
repayment.
Theydemandchangesofpolicy.Oftenthesedemandscompromise
the autonomyof the stateby alteringdomesticexpectations
of legitimate

33. Sidney Dell, On BeingGrandmotherly:

TheEvolutionofIMF Conditionality,
Essays in International
Finance No. 144 (Princeton,N.J.:InternationalFinance Section,Departmentof Economics,Princeton University,
October 1981), pp. 8-10; Broad, UnequalAlliance,pp. 24-25.
34. InternationalMonetaryFund, Fiscal AffairsDepartment,Fund-Supported
Programs,
FiscalPolicy,
and IncomeDistribution,
Occasional Paper No. 46 (Washington,D.C.: InternationalMonetaryFund,
1986), p. 40, and Table 12.
35. Broad, UnequalAlliance,pp. 51-53.
36. For a discussion of the Philippines,see ibid., pp. 61-72.

Compromising
Westphalia
| 133

behavioror changinginstitutional
arrangements
withinborrowing
countries,
suchas theroleofstate-owned
enterprises.
is now acceptedeven thoughit can pose politicaland ecoConditionality
nomicproblemsforrulers.One studyby IMF officials
concluded:"In retrospect,theWorldBankand theIMF staff,
as wellas theauthorities,
havetended
to underestimate
thetimerequiredto designand implement
reforms."37
Structuraladjustment
programscan depriverulersin centralized
butweakstatesof
thepossibility
ofpatronage
bywayofpubliccorporations
and importlicenses,
and oftheabilityto exploittheagricultural
sectorto subsidizemorepolitically
volatileurban areas. The conditionality
imposedby international
financial
institutions
thepositionsof rulerswhosecountries
has threatened
are subject
to largeswingsin theirtermsof tradeand lack adequate social safetynets.
Borrowing
countries
enterintostand-by
agreements
becausetheyarebetteroff
withthemthanwithoutthem,but some have had to accepttroubling
constraints
on theirdomesticautonomy38
In sum,sovereignlendinghas, sincethenineteenth
been characcentury,
terizedby contractualarrangements
thathave compromisedthe domestic
The motivations
oflendershave varied.In thenineautonomyof borrowers.
teenthcentury
lendersfrequently
actedsimplyto enhancetheprobability
that
theywouldbe repaid,althoughinboththeBalkansand LatinAmericasecurity
considerations
(balancingagainstothergreatpowers)werealso involved.In
morerecentyearslendershavebeenconcerned
notsimplywithrepayment
but
also witheconomicreform
forhumanitarian,
reasons.
ideological,or security
modelhave been the
Regardlessof motivation,
violationsof theWestphalian
normforsovereignlendingto weak statessincetheNapoleonicwars.39
CONTRACTS COMPROMISING TERRITORIALITY. Contracts
have also been used
to violatethe principleof territoriality,
thatis, to establishexplicitpolitical
37. Susan Schadler,Franek Rozwadowski, SiddharthTiwari,and David 0. Robinson,"Economic
Adjustmentin Low-Income Countries: Experience Under the Enhanced StructuralAdjustment
Facility,"Occasional Paper No. 106 (Washington,D.C.: InternationalMonetaryFund, 1993), pp. 1314.
Vol. 18,
38. Jeffrey
Herbst,"The StructuralAdjustmentof Politics in Africa,"WorldDevelopment,
"Riskand Trade
No. 7 (July1990),pp. 949-958; RobertH. Bates,Philip Brock,and JillTienfenthaler,
Regimes: AnotherExploration,"International
Organization,
Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter1991), pp. 1-18;
RobertH. Bates,Marketsand Statesin TropicalAfrica(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1981).
39. Strongstateshave not had theirautonomycompromisedin the same way. Many statesof the
United States defaulted in the 1830s and 1840s without sufferingthe kinds of constraintson
autonomy thatbefellthe Balkan and Latin American defaulters.The conditionalityrequirements
imposed by internationalfinancialinstitutionshave been less stringentfor more industrialized
states.

Security
20:3 | 134
International

The European
withterritory.
in whichauthority
is notcoterminous
structures
twoexamUnionand theExclusiveEconomicZone (EEZ) fortheoceansoffer
ples.In bothofthesecases,rulerschosetoacceptorestablisha systeminwhich
In thecase of
withterritory.
structures
wereno longercoterminous
authority
theEuropeanUnion,autonomywas also violated.
that
worldthemostdramaticexampleof contracting
In thecontemporary
is theEuropeanUnion.
and authority
theidentity
ofterritory
has compromised
TheultimateshapeoftheUnionis notyetvisible.It couldjustbecomea larger
with
state,one in whichtheboundarieshave changedbutwhichis consistent
thatlooksmorelike
model.It couldalso revertto something
theWestphalian
inwhichexisting
territorial
boundaries
international
agreement,
a conventional
of theUnion,suchas theCourtand
structures
remainand theauthoritative
however,
The thirdalternative,
theCommissionare weakenedor abolished.40
structures
govin whichdifferent
authority
would be a politicalarrangement
policymightbe
areas.Foreigntradeand monetary
functional
erneddifferent
issues mightbe decidedby
at the Union level. Environmental
determined
boundaries.Socialpolicymight
territorial
thatcrossedexisting
regionalentities
fromthe
would be different
be set by the nationalstate.Such a structure
withterritory.
At some
is coterminous
statein whichauthority
Westphalian
it
by
defined
as
is
de
violate
sovereignty
facto
such
would
also
system
a
point,
reserve
mightformally
law. Althoughnationaldecision-makers
international
the rightto abrogatethetreatieson whichtheUnionis based,it would,in
practice,be impossibleforthemto do so becausethe economic,social,and
high.
electoralcostswould be extremely
oftheExclusiveEconomicZone fortheoceansis another
The establishment
model.The EEZ is an
whichviolatestheWestphalian
exampleof a structure
area between12 and 200 milesfromthe coast in whichstatescan exercise
offishingand mineralsbutnotovershipping.41
controlovertheexploitation
are subjectto thelittoralstatesbutothersare not,the
Becausesomeactivities
is broken.The EEZ does notviolatethe
linkbetweenterritory
and authority
shipping.
principleof autonomy:no actorhas a rightto regulatecommercial
40. For instance,while Maastrichthas the very ambitious aim of establishinga single European
monetarysystem,it also explicitlylimitsthe authorityof the European Court in several areas and
gives Britainthe rightto opt out of the social provisions of the treaty.See Andrew Moravcsik,
"Idealism and Interestin the European Community:The Case of the FrenchReferendum,"French
Politicsand Society,Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter1993), pp. 46-47.
41. The area to twelve miles out is the territorialsea over which the littoralstate exercisesfull
control.

Compromising
Westphalia| 135

The EEZ was definedin the 1982 Law of the Seas TreatyWhile the Treatyitself
was initiallyrejectedby the United States and otherindustrializedcountries,
the provisionsforthe EEZ were implementedby individual states including
the United States,and a revised treatywas ratifiedby major statesin the early
1990s.
The European Union and the EEZ are examples of contractsin which rulers
have broken the relationshipbetween territory
and authority,conditionalon
other actors providing them with some specific benefit(including mutual
recognitionof the EEZ). The motivationshave varied. For therulersof Europe,
securityconsiderations(especiallytheintegrationofGermanyintoEurope) and
economicinterestsled themto compromisetheirauthorityin a numberofissue
areas. The EEZ was a way to increase the economic reach of littoralstates
without threateningthe freemovement of commercialand naval ships; this
outcome was ideal for the United States, which has not only the longest
coastlineof any country,but also the largestnavy.
POWER AND CONTRACTING. Power considerationscan be consequential for
contractualarrangementsby determiningthe range of possible options and
which actors can come to the table.42For example, the United States wanted
conditionalityfor InternationalMonetary Fund loans. Although it failed to
carryits point at the BrettonWoods negotiations,it later cut offfundingfor
the IMF, a move which led other member states to accept the U.S. position.
U.S. decision-makerscould alter the terms of the contractgoverning IMF
activitiesbecause theycontrolledthe only significantpool of available capital.
In another example, the major industrializedcountriesrefusedto accept the
termsof the 1982 Law of the Seas Treaty,which would have established an
InternationalSeabed Authorityfor the exploitationof deep seabed nodules
containingcobaltand nickel,an institutionalstructurethatwould have violated
the principleof territoriality
Only the industrializedcountriespossessed the
technologynecessaryto dredge the nodules; the developing countries,which
lacked the capabilityto move ahead on their
supported the Seabed Authority,
own. Similarly,in 1898 the major powers were able to forceGreece to accept
externalcontrolof its tax collectionbecause it was the only way that Greece
could get the loans thatit needed to pay the war indemnityto Turkeyand to
remove Turkishtroops fromGreek soil.
In sum, contractualarrangementscan compromisethe Westphalianmodel if
theyalterdomesticconceptionsof legitimacy,
change institutionalstructuresor
42. Krasner,"Global Communications."

International
Security20:3 | 136

thatsupersede territorial
boundapersonnel,or createauthoritativeinstitutions
ries. Rulers have enteredinto such arrangementsfor security,economic,and
ideological reasons. Power can be consequentialin settingthe range of available options and determiningwhich actorscan sit at the bargainingtable.
COERCION AND IMPOSITION

Coercion and impositionexist along a continuumdeterminedby the costs of

refusalforthe targetstate. Coercion occurs when rulersin one state threaten
to impose sanctions unless their counterpartsin another compromise their
domesticautonomy The targetcan acquiesce or resist.Impositionoccurswhen
the rulersor would-be rulersof a targetstatehave no choice; theyare so weak
that theymust accept domestic structures,policies, or personnelpreferredby
more powerfulactors or else be eliminated.The higherthe cost, the more a
particular situation moves toward the pole of imposition. When applied
against alreadyestablishedstates,coercionand impositionare violationsof the
internationallaw, as well as the Westphalian,conceptionof sovereigntyWhen
applied against the would-be rulers of not yet created states, coercion and
impositionare violations of the Westphalianmodel because the autonomy of
any statethatdoes emergehas been constrainedby externalactors,but are not
which only apply once
violationsof internationallaw conceptsof sovereignty,
a state has secured internationalrecognitionallowing it to enterinto agreementswith otherstates.
Unlike eitherconventionsor contracts,coercionand impositionleave at least
one actor worse off.The status quo, which the targetprefers,is eliminatedas
an option by the initiatingactor.
If one statesuccessfullycoercesor imposes on anotherchangesin thelatter's
institutions,policies, or personnel,then the targetis no longer a Westphalian
state:its policy is constrainednot simplyby the externalpower of otherstates,
but also by the abilityof othersto change the nature of the target'sinternal
politics.(It is empiricallyunlikelythatcoerciveactivitywould lead to changes
in conceptsoflegitimacyheld by domesticgroups,somethingthatdoes happen
in the case of contractsand conventions.)Political leaders in the targetstate
are notfreeto considerall possible policies because some optionsare precluded
by externallyimposed domestic structures,policies, or personnel.Indeed the
rulersthemselvesmightsimplybe the quislings of the dominantstate.
Coercion and imposition,unlike conventionsand contracts,always involve
Impositionentailsforcingthe targetto do somethingthatit
power asymmetry.
would not otherwisedo. Coercion requires threatsof sanctions.The initiator

| 137
Compromising
Westphalia

must be betteroffifthe targetresistsand the sanctionsare imposed than ifno

threatswere made at all, or else the threatwould not be credible.Obviously,
it is even more attractiveforthe sender if the targetcapitulates.The initiator
has the abilityto removethe statusquo fromthe set of optionsavailable to the
target.
Economic sanctionsaimed at domesticinstitutions,
policies,or personnelare
an example of coercion.Out of the 106 specificcases of economic sanctions
duringthe twentiethcenturypresentedby Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,seventeen involved effortsto protecthuman rights,and sixteen were attemptsto
change the characterof the domesticregimeof the targetby eitherremoving
the ruler or changing the institutionalstructure.For example, the United
Kingdom used economicpressureto tryto removethe Bolshevikregimein the
Soviet Union afterWorldWar I. The United Statesattemptedto eliminateJuan
Peron in Argentinaduringand afterWorldWar II. Collectivesanctionsagainst
South Africawith the aim of ending apartheidwere authorizedby the United
Nations from1962 until 1994. The United Kingdom enacted sanctionsagainst
Uganda from1972 to 1979 to forceout Idi Amin. The European Community
used economicpressureagainstTurkeyin 1981-82to encouragetherestoration
of democracy.Between 1970 and 1990 the United States imposed sanctions
against more than a dozen countriesfor human rightsviolations.43In all of
these cases the target,even if it did not comply with the sanctions,was worse
offthanit had been because it could not,at thesame time,bothavoid sanctions
and maintainits ex antepolicies. Eitherit sufferedsanctions,at least forsome
period of time,or it had to change its policies.
Impositionis thelogical extremeof coercion.It is a situationwherethetarget
is so weak thatithas no choicebut to accept thedemands ofthemorepowerful
state.Force is the most obvious instrumentof imposition.Greatpowers, however,have been cautious about attemptingto impose violations of the Westphalian model when such policies have been opposed by theirmajor rivals.If
the major powers pursue opposing policies thenimpositionis veryunlikely,if
not impossible. Mutual antagonismamong the major powers is likelyto give
the targetsome options. Imposition has generallyoccurred when there has
been either a condominium among the major powers or the acceptance of
spheres of influence.

43. Gary C. Hufbauer,Jeffrey

J. Schott,and KimberlyA. Elliot, EconomicSanctionsReconsidered:
Historyand CurrentPolicy,2nd ed. (Washington,D.C.: InstituteforInternationalEconomics,1990).

International
Security20:3 | 138

Examples of impositionwithinspheresof influenceinclude the U.S. military

occupation of a numberof Caribbean and CentralAmericanstates.The United
Stateshas senttroopsto Cuba, the Dominican Republic,Nicaragua, Haiti (nine
times), and Grenada in response to civil unrest,loan defaults,or threatsof
and has imposed constitutions,
customsreceiverships,and
foreignintervention
judicial control.South Africaused militarypressure to secure compliant regimes in Lesotho both beforeand afterthe end of apartheid.During the Cold
War, the Soviet Union dictated the domestic institutionalstructureand the
policies of its east European satellites:Poland, Hungary,Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria were not Westphalianstates.For a timePoland's minister
of defense was a marshal in the Soviet army.The militariesof the eastern
European states were penetratedby the Soviet militaryand by their own
communist parties, which were themselves penetrated by the Communist
Partyof the Soviet Union.44The foreignpolicy of Poland in 1958, or Cuba in
1908,could hardlybe analyzed fromany perspectivethatused theWestphalian
model as a startingpoint.
One of the more enduringexamples of coercionand sometimesimposition
under greatpower condominiumhas involved efforts
to secureminorityrights
in easternand centralEurope during the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies.
All of the states thatemerged fromthe Ottomanand Habsburg empireswere
compelled to accept provisionsforminorityprotectionas a conditionof international recognition.In 1832, the British,French,and Russians imposed on
Greece its constitutionalstructure(monarchy),its monarch(Otto,theunderage
second son of the King of Bavaria), and specificpolicies includingprotection
for religious minorities.Greece had no bargaining leverage because its resources were so limited, not least because of dissention among the Greek
revolutionariesthemselves.In the Treatyof Berlinof 1878, the followinglanguage was applied to Montenegro,Serbia,and Bulgaria:
The differenceof religiouscreeds and confessionsshall not be alleged against
any person as a ground forexclusion or incapacityin mattersrelatingto the
enjoymentof civil and political rights,admission to public employments,
functions,and honours,or the exerciseof the various professionsand industriesin any localitywhatsoever.The freedomand outwardexerciseof all forms
of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to [Montenegro,Serbia,
44. Condoleezza Rice, The Soviet Union and the CzechoslovakArmy(Princeton,N.J.: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1984), chap. 1.

Compromising
Westphalia
| 139

and Bulgaria],as well as to foreigners,

and no hindranceshall be offeredeither
to the hierarchicalorganizationof the different
communions,or to theirrelations with theirspiritualchiefs.45
The Treatyalso included provisions for the protectionof minorityrightsin
Romania and in the Ottoman Empire itself.46
The 1878 Berlin Treatysettlementswere examples of coercion ratherthan
imposition. The would-be rulers of the targetstates did not want to grant
minorityrights,and they did have some leverage. Their first-best
outcome
would have been recognitionand no constraintson theirdomesticautonomy.
They acquiesced, however,to European demands because internationalrecognitionwithminorityrightsprovisions,whichmightbe evaded, was betterthan
no recognitionat all.
The would-be leaders of all of the statesthatwere createdafterWorldWar I
(or were successorsto thedefeatedempires)had to accept extensiveprovisions
for the protectionof minorities.As in Greece in 1832, these would-be rulers
had limitedbargainingleverage.Austria,Hungary,Bulgaria,and Turkeywere
defeatedstates,and minorityprotectionswere writteninto theirpeace treaties.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Greece were new or enlarged states.They signed minorityrightstreatieswith the Allied and Associated Powers. Albania, Lithuania,Latvia, Estonia, and Iraq made declarations
as a resultof pressurefromthe victoriouspowers when theyapplied to join
the League of Nations.47
The protectionsaccorded to minoritieswere detailed and extensive. The
Polish MinorityTreaty,forinstance,provided that "Poland undertakesto assure fulland completeprotectionof lifeand libertyto all inhabitantsof Poland
withoutdistinctionof birth,nationality,language, race or religion."Religious
were not to affectpublic or professionalemployment.Where there
differences
were a considerablenumberof non-Polishspeakers,theywould be educated
in theirown language in primaryschool,althoughthe statecould mandate the
teachingofPolish. Jewswould notbe obligatedto performany act thatviolated
45. Treatyof Berlin,July13, 1878, in Fred L. Israel, ed., Major Peace TreatiesofModernHistory,
1648-1967,Vol. I (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), ArticlesV, XXVII, XLIV. See also Jelavichand
Jelavich,Establishment
ofBalkanNationalStates,pp. 50-52, 68-72, 156; and A.C. Macartney,National
Statesand NationalMinorities(London: OxfordUniversityPress,1934), pp. 166, 168.
46. Treatyof Berlin,ArticlesLXIV and LXII.
Problem(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard
47. Inis L. Claude, Jr.,NationalMinorities:An International
UniversityPress, 1955), p. 16; and DorothyV. Jones,Code ofPeace: Ethicsand Securityin theWorld
oftheWarlordStates(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1991), p. 45.

International
Security20:3 | 140

theJewishsabbathand therefore
electionswould notbe held on Saturday.48
The Treatywas made partofthefundamental
law ofPoland.
The minorities
rightstreatiesof Versaillesare examplesof imposition.
For
therulersor would-berulersofthesestates,thestatusquo was non-existence.
Theywould not have statesto ruleunlesstheyacceptedtheconditionsimposed by the victorsin WorldWar I. They lacked material,military,
and
diplomaticresourcesto bargainor resist.
The implications
thatcan be drawnfromthedata presentedthusfarabout
the empiricalvalidityof theWestphalian
model are modestbecause I have
selectedon thedependentvariable.Nevertheless,
severalinferences
arereasonable. The Westphalian
modelhas neverbeen takenforgranted;rulershave
exploredinstitutional
alternatives.
In someareasoftheworld,notablycentral
and easternEurope,therehaveneverbeenanysmallerWestphalian
states,that
is, entitiesthatenjoyedfullautonomy.
Manydevelopingcountriesthathave
withinternational
signedstand-by
agreements
financial
institutions
have had
toagreeto changesand on-goingsupervision
oftheirdomesticinstitutions
and
policies.The 200 or so statesthathave signedat least one humanrights
convention
haveopenedtherelationship
betweenrulersand ruledwithintheir
own territory
to some degreeof externalscrutiny
and in some cases have
In
domesticconceptsof legitimacy.
altered,eitherwillinglyor unknowingly,
one way or another-as a resultofconventions,
contracts,
coercion,
or imposition-mostofthestatesinthecontemporary
international
systemdo notfully
conform
withtheWestphalian
model.
PEACE

SETTLEMENTS

tothepresentoffer
anotherbody
Themajorpeace settlements
fromWestphalia
ofdata,one notselectedon thedependentvariable,withwhichtoexaminethe
or lack thereof,
of the Westphalianmodel. Major peace
actual functioning,
treatiesembodythesharedunderstanding
of rulers,or at leastthedeals that
with
theyhavefoundmutuallyacceptable.All ofthemajortreaties,
beginning
the
Westphalia,includeviolationsof the "Westphalian"
model,specifically
principleofautonomy.
Infractions
againsttheWestphalian
model,whetherin
the formof conventions,
have not been
contracts,
coercion,or imposition,
hidden,coveredup, or explainedaway On the contrary,
theyhave been
withautonomy,
thatare inconsistent
suchas
justified
by alternative
principles
48. Article 2; Article 7; Article 8; Article 11. The text of the Treatyis reprintedin Macartney,
Minorities,
pp. 502-506.

Compromising
Westphalia| 141

humanrights,
minority
rights,
fiscalresponsibility,
domesticstability,
or external balance.
The Peace of Westphaliaof 1648 (comprising
the two separatetreatiesof
Munsterand Osnabruck),the mythological
beginningof the modernstate
system,includeda numberof provisionsregarding
religiouspracticesin the
model.Whilerhetorically
Holy RomanEmpirethatviolatedtheWestphalian
endorsingtheAugsburgprinciplethattheprincecould setthereligionofhis
subjects,theactualprovisionsofthePeace constrained
sovereignprerogatives
inGermany
infavorofsomeformsofreligioustoleration.
ThoseCatholicswho
livedin Lutheranstatesor Lutheranswho livedin Catholicstatesweregiven
therighttopracticein theprivacyoftheirhomes,and toeducatetheirchildren
at homeor to send themto foreignschools.Five citieswithmixedLutheran
and Catholicpopulationswereto have freedomof religiouspracticeforboth
groups.In fourof thesecities,officeswere to be divided equallybetween
TheTreaty
ofOsnabruckprovidedthatCatholicsand
Catholicsand Lutherans.
in the assembliesof the Empire.
Lutheransshould be equally represented
Religiousissuesweretobe decidedbya consensusthatincludedbothCatholics
and Protestants.
to the imperialcourtswere also to include
Representatives
Ifthejudgesdividedalongreligiouslines,thenthe
membersofbothreligions.
case couldbe appealedtotheDietoftheHolyRomanEmpire,wherea decision
also requireda consensusof Protestants
(onlyLutheransand Calvinistswere
included)and Catholics.49
The Treatiesof Munsterand Osnabruck,one or the otherof whichwas
signedby almostall thegreatpowers,did notsanctiontherightof German
princesto do whatevertheypleased withregardto the practiceof religion
withintheirown territories.
The Peace dictateda setof internalpracticesfor
wereguaranteed
muchoftheHolyRomanEmpire.TheTreaties
byFranceand
50 In the
forchallengesto Germanautonomy
Sweden,providinglegitimation
area of religion,thecentralpoliticalquestionof theseventeenth
the
century,
withtheWestphalian
Peace ofWestphalia
was less consistent
modelthanwas
earlier.51
thePeace ofAugsburg,concludedalmosta century
49. Stephen D. Krasner,"Westphaliaand All That," in JudithGoldstein and Robert0. Keohane,
and PoliticalChange(Ithaca,N.Y: CornellUniversity
Institutions,
eds., Ideasand ForeignPolicy:Beliefs,
Press, 1993).
50. Michael Hughes, EarlyModernGernany,1477-1806 (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 97-98.
51. Even the Peace of Augsburg provided forreligioustolerationin several Germancitiesthathad
mixed Catholic and Lutheran populations. See JohnGagliardo, GermanyUnderthe Old Regime,
1600-1790 (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 16-21.

International
Security20:3 1142

The Habsburgmonarch
The Peace ofWestphaliais an exampleofcontract.
He refusedto accepttoleration
in the
did notwantto sanctionProtestantism.
but thatwereoutsidetheHoly RomanEmpire.
areas thathe ruleddirectly
Endingthe ThirtyYears War withprovisionsforreligioustolerationwas,
to morefighting.
however,preferable
The Peace ofUtrecht
was signedin 1713.It broughtan end to warbetween
France,the majorpowerin Europe,and an alliancethatincludedEngland,
Holland,Sweden,theAustrianHabsburgs,the Holy RomanEmpire,Savoy,
and manyGermanprincipalities.
Thewarhad beenprecipitated
byLouisXIV's
to extendhis controlto Spain and even Austria.The Peace provided
efforts
thatPhilipV,a Bourbon,would be recognizedas theKingofSpain,butonly
if the BourbonfamilyagreedthatFranceand Spain would neverbe united
undera singleruler.Utrechtwas a contract
betweenBritainand Francein
which,in exchangeforpeace and someterritorial
aggrandizement,
Louis XIV
on thedomesticpoliticalarrangements
and personnel
acceptedconstraints
that
could governFranceand Spain.52
One outcomeof the peace settlements
reachedat the conclusionof the
Napoleonicwars,althoughnot the onlyone, was the creationof the Holy
Alliance.The aim of theHoly Alliance,establishedby Prussia,Austria,and
Russia,was topreventtheriseofrepublican
Themembers
ofthe
governments.
Alliancepledgedtoresistsuchdevelopments
domestically
and torepressthem
A protocolsignedat theConference
ofTroppauin 1820stated:
internationally.
due to revolution,
Stateswhichhave undergonea changeof government
the
resultsof whichthreaten
otherstates,ipsofactocease to be membersof the
EuropeanAlliance,and remainexcludedfromit untiltheirsituationgives
forlegalorderand stability
immediate
guarantees
If,owingto suchalterations,
otherstates,thepartiesbindthemselves,
dangerthreatens
by peacefulmeans,
orifneedbe byarms,tobringbacktheguiltystateintothebosomoftheGreat
Alliance.53
The rulersofthepowerfulconservative
statesofEuropehad no compunction
modelin the
againstusingcoercionor impositionto violatetheWestphalian
52. Mark Trachtenberg,"Interventionin Historical Perspective," in Laura W. Reed and Carl
Kaysen, eds., EmergingNormsof Justified
Intervention:
A Collectionof Essaysfroma Projectof the
AmericanAcademyofArtsand Sciences(Cambridge,Mass.: AmericanAcademy ofArtsand Sciences,
1993), p. 17; W.E. Lingelbach,"The Doctrineand Practiceof Interventionin Europe," Annalsofthe
AmericanAcademyofPoliticaland Social Science,Vol. 16, No. 1 (July1900), p. 5; Andreas Osiander,
The States Systemof Europe 1640-1990: Peacemakingand the Conditionsof InternationalStability
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1994), pp. 123-133.
53. Quoted in Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr.,Non-Intervention:
The Law and Its
Importin theAmericas(Dallas: SouthernMethodistUniversityPress, 1956), p. 8.

Compromising
Westphalia| 143

name of an alternativeprinciple,the preservationof peace throughthe repression of republicangovernments,althoughthe Holy Alliance had only limited
success partlybecause of Britishresistance.Austria received internationalapproval for the repressionof republican governmentsin some German states
and in Naples. At the Congress of Veronain 1822,France secured the support
of Russia, Prussia, and Austria to intervenein support of the monarchyin
Spain, which it did in 1823. The Alliance functioneduntil 1825,when it broke
up over the question of whetherto interveneto aid the rebellionin Greece.54
The Holy Alliance was not only an instrumentof coercion and imposition
vis-a'-vispotential republican governments,but also a conventionamong the
signatorieswho committedthemselves to maintain their own conservative
regimes.
Provisions of the Treatyof Versaillesand other agreementsreached at the
end of World War I were explicitlydesigned to alter the domestic political
arrangementsof the new statesthatemergedaftertheconflict.The treatiesand
the League of Nations embodied Wilsonian conceptions of the relationship
among the rightsof minorities,national self-determination,
democracy,and
internationalpeace. Collective securitycould only be enacted by democratic
states. Democratic states had to respectnational self-determination.
National
self-determination,
however, could not resolve the problem of minorities.
therightsof minoritieshad to be protectedso thattheywould accept
Therefore,
and supportthe democraticpolitieswithinwhich theyresided. The minorities
treaties associated with the Versailles settlementviolated the Westphalian
model. They were imposed on the would-be rulers of new and powerless
states, and were repudiated when it later became apparent that neitherthe
great powers nor the League of Nations could or would enforcethem. Symmetricalconditionsconcerningthetreatmentof minoritieswere neveraccepted
by the victoriouspowers. There were no internationalagreementsabout the
treatmentof the Irish by the Britishgovernment,or of Asians and blacks by
federalor state authoritiesin the United States.55
There was no generalpeace settlementafterWorldWar II; rather,the United
States and the Soviet Union coerced or contractedto encourage political regimes that were consonantwith theirown preferences.In 1975, however,the
54. GoronwyJ.Jones,The UnitedNationsand theDomesticJurisdiction
of States:Interpretations
and
Applications
oftheNon-Intervention
Principle(Cardiff:Universityof Wales Press, 1979),pp. 3-4; R.J.
Vincent,Nonintervention
and International
Order(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1974),
pp. 77-79, 86-87; StanleyHoffmann,"The Problemof Intervention,"
in Hedley Bull, ed., Interventionin WorldPolitics(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 12.
55. Jones,Code ofPeace,p. 45.

International
Security20:3 | 144

on Security
majorpowersdid concludetheFinalActoftheHelsinkiConference
and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was a contractbetweenthe
Sovietsand theWestin whichtheSovietsnominallyacceptedsome human
rightsprinciplesand the Westrecognizedexistingbordersand regimesin
Europe.The CSCE reflected
the Sovieteffort
to securelegitimation
of their
dominanceof easternEurope,and thedesireof theWestto gettheSovietsto
acceptsome liberalprecepts.PrincipleVI of the "Declarationon Principles
States"endorsednon-intervention,
GuidingRelationsbetweenParticipating
while PrincipleVII endorsedhumanrightsincludingfreedomof thought,
conscience,and religion.The Westused theHelsinkiaccordto pressurethe
SovietUnion on humanrights,rejectingthe chargethatthisamountedto
in internal
affairs
interference
by claimingthathumanrightswereuniversally
to dictateto other
recognizedand thatnon-interference
referred
onlyto efforts
countries.The UnitedStatesjustifiedits impositionof sanctionsagainstthe
SovietUnion in 1979 partlyin termsof Sovietviolationsof humanrights.
Daniel Thomashas shownthatthe Helsinkiaccordsalteredconceptionsof
humanrightsand legitimate
statebehaviorthatwereheldbygroupsin eastern
theprincipleofautonomy.56
Europe,and in thisway compromised
Hence,everymajorpeace settlement
fromWestphaliato Helsinkihas inmodel.At Utrechtand Helsinki,rulers
volved violationsof theWestphalian
enteredintocontracts
thatcompromised,
eitherimmediately
orpotentially,
the
domesticautonomy
ofsomestates.In theHolyAllianceand atVersailles,
rulers
in themostpowerfulstatesimposedtheirpreferences
regarding
specificdoevenconstitutional
structures.
Therewas always
mesticpoliciesand sometimes
some competingprinciple-theneed forreligiouspeace at Westphalia,for
forinternational
balanceof powerat Utrecht,
peace at Viennaand Versailles
kindsofdomesticregimes),
for
different
(assumedto emergefromcompletely
the Weststabilityat Helsinki-thatwas invokedto justifycompromising
phalianmodel.

Weaknessand Persistence
modelhas persistedfora longperiodof timebut has been
The Westphalian
frequently
defeated.It has been bothenduringand flimsyIn someinstances,
56. R.J.Vincent,HumanRightsand International
Relations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1986),pp. 66-70; Brownlie,BasicDocuments,
pp. 454-473,fortextof theagreement;Thomas, "Social
Movements and InternationalInstitutions."

Compromising
Westphalia| 145

actors have merelygiven it lip service,sometimesnot even that;in others,it

has guided and constrainedbehavior.Yet it has not been replaced by some
alternativeconceptionof how the internationalsystemmightbe organized.
The Westphalianmodel is not a stable equilibrium:actors have frequently
had both the incentiveand power to deviate fromit. It is not a generative
grammar,producingindividual entities(states)thatreplicateand reinforcethe
generalmodel. It is not a constitutiverule like the rules of chess (iftwo players
agree thatbishops will move in a straightline, theyare not playing chess): if
a ruleragrees thatdomesticethnicminoritieswill be given specificrightsand
thatbehaviorwill be monitoredby externalactors,or thatfinancialaffairswill
be managed by a committeeappointed by foreignbondholders,or thatexternal
groups can oversee elections,this has not been viewed as an indicationthat
some new formof political orderhas been developed.
The most prominenttheoriesof internationalpolitics,includingneo-realism,
neo-liberalinstitutionalism,
and sociological approaches, such as the British
work in the United States,all of which utilize
School or recentconstructivist
differing
generaltheoriesabout institutions,
do not provide much guidance for
understandingthe patternof weakness and persistencethathas characterized
how the Westphalianmodel has actuallyworked. For sociological approaches,
institutionsare the structuresthatconstituteactorsand channelbehavior.They
are the startingpoint of the analysis, the ontological givens. As JohnMeyer,
JohnBoli, and George Thomas state,"Institutionalizedrules definethe meaning and identityof the individuals and the patternsof appropriateeconomic,
political,and culturalactivityengaged in by those individuals. They similarly
constitutethe purposes and legitimacyof organizations,professions,interest
groups, and states, while delineating lines of activityappropriate to these
entities."57
Institutionsprovide theirmemberswithclassificatory
schemes;they
reinforcesome kinds of activitiesand encourage the forgettingof others.58
Sociological approaches emphasize descriptionand understanding(verstehen)
ratherthanexplanation.Workguided by a sociological orientationattemptsto
demonstratehow observed behavior is a reflectionof underlyingstructures.
The most highlyinstitutionalizedpatternsare those thatare takenforgranted;
theyare dignifiedby traditionor become identifiedwithcommonsense. Actors
cannot conceive of an alternativeformof behavior or,even if theycan reflect
57. Meyer,Boli, and Thomas, "Ontologyand Rationalization,"p. 12.
58. Dimaggio and Powell, "Introduction,"pp. 10, 13-15, 29; Meyer and Rowan, "Institutionalized
Organizations,"pp. 41, 43-46; Mary Douglas, How InstitutionsThink(Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse
UniversityPress, 1986), chaps. 5-6.

International
Security20:3 | 146

upon alternatives,regard the existing constraintsas absolute and fixed in

nature.59In internationalrelationstheory,theBritishSchool and otherconstructivistshave argued that the Westphalianstate is a manifestationof a larger
internationalsociety in which the intersubjectiveshared understandingof
statesmenreinforcesauthoritystructuresbased upon territoriality
and autonomy
Both neo-realismand neo-liberalinstitutionalism
are examples of the actororientedapproaches thatcharacterizeall economic and some political science
reasoning.They emphasize explanationand causalityratherthan description
or verstehen.
Actors are the ontological givens. Actors create institutionsto
promotetheirinterests.For neo-liberaland neo-realisttheories,the actorsare
assumed to be Westphalian states: unified,rational,autonomous, territorial
entities.Neo-liberal theorysees marketfailureas the exemplaryproblem in
internationalrelations,and sees internationalorganizationsor institutionsas
the mechanisms that are created to make it possible for states to reach the
where all possible gains fromexchange have been achieved,
"pareto frontier,"
and it is impossibleto make one partybetteroffwithoutmakingsomeone else
worse off.By providing information,monitoring,generatingshared understanding,building mutual trust,establishingsalient solutions,and reducing
transactioncosts, institutionspreventsub-optimaloutcomes. Neo-realism,in
contrast,sees distributionalor even zero-sum conflictas the exemplaryproblem in internationalrelations,and internationalorganizationsas constraints
thatare establishedby the strongto reinforcetheirdesired patternof returns.
For neo-realists,internationalinstitutionsare not likelybe very consequential
since they can easily be changed if the interestsand capabilities of states
change. Neverthelessneo-realism,too, uses the Westphalianmodel as an analyticstartingpoint.60
59. Ronald L. Jepperson,"Institutions,
InstitutionalEffects,
in Dimaggio and
and Institutionalism,"
Powell, TheNew Institutionalism,
p. 147; Ann Swidler,"Culturein Action:Symbolsand Strategies,"
AmericanSociologicalReview,Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 1986), pp. 278-280.
60. See David Baldwin, ed., Neorealismand Neoliberalism:
The Contemporary
Debate (New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1993),fora discussion of the neo-liberal-neo-realist
debate. An economist who has been sensitiveto the distributionalconsequences of institutionshas written:
Institutionsare not necessarilyor even usually createdto be socially efficient;
ratherthey,or at
least the formalrules, are created to serve the interestsof those with the bargainingpower to
devise the rules.... If economies realize the gains fromtrade by creatingrelativelyefficient
institutions,it is because under certaincircumstancesthe private objectivesof those with the
bargainingstrengthto alter institutionsproduce institutionalsolutions that turn out to be or
evolve into socially efficient
ones.
Douglass North,Institutions,
Institutional
Change,and EconomicPerformance
(Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1990),p. 16. For a discussion of sovereigntyas a focal point,see BarryWeingast,

Compromising
Westphalia| 147

Neithersociological,nor neo-realist,nor neo-liberalperspectivesprovide an

adequate understandingof the state as it has existed,because the Westphalian
model has been so frequentlycompromised.Sociological perspectivesare empiricallyinaccurate:territoriality
and especiallyautonomyhave been trumped
by otherprinciplesand interests.While neo-realistand neo-liberalperspectives
may be adequate forunderstandingmanymajorissues in internationalpolitics,
such as greatpower wars and tradeagreements,theycannotanalyze questions
involving political entitiesthat are not fully autonomous, much less those
where territoryand authoritystructuresare not coterminous.Such entities,
even if they are called states,are constrainednot just by the power of other
states but also by externallyimposed domestic conditions.The principle of
autonomyin particularhas frequentlybeen challengedby alternativesincluding nationalsecurity,
financialresponsibility,
internationalstability,
and human
rights.
Ratherthanbeing treatedas an empiricalregularityor as an analyticassumption, the Westphalianmodel can be more usefullyunderstood as a reference
point or convention.The Westphalianmodel has become common knowledge,
but it has never been taken forgrantedin the sense of precludingthe exploration or implementationof alternativearrangements.The autonomy of states
has been compromisedin a wide varietyof ways because thereis no structure
of authorityin the internationalsystemthatcan preventstrongeractorsfrom
their
engagingin impositionor coercion,or rulersin generalfromtransgressing
own autonomy,as well as that of others,by enteringinto contractsand conventions.These violations of Westphalianprinciplesare not a reflectionof a
breakdown of order; they are not like widespread criminalityin the face of
officialimpotence and corruption.Rather,transgressionsagainst Westphalia
have reflectedthe attractionof alternativeprinciplesas well as asymmetriesof
power. Violationsof the Westphalianmodel, as well as the model itself,have
been enduringcharacteristicof internationalrelations.
In practice,the stronghave been betterable to maintain their territorial
integrityand autonomy than the weak. The United States, a powerful state
almost fromits inception,has closely conformedwith the Westphalianmodel.
The institutionalstructuresand policies thatemerged fromthe Revolutionary
War were indigenouslydetermined.The United Stateswas too powerfulto be

"A Rational Choice Perspectiveon the Role of Ideas: Shared BeliefSystemsand StateSovereignty
in InternationalCooperation," Politicsand Society,Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1995). For a realist
critiqueof internationalinstitutions,
see JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International
Institutions,"International
Security,
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter1994/95),pp. 5-50.

International
Security20:3 | 148

even thoughsome
subjectto gunboat diplomacyduringthenineteenthcentury,
ofitspublic entitiesdefaultedon theirinternationalobligations.Minorityrights
protectionsimposed on easternEurope at the conclusionof WorldWar I were
not reciprocallyaccepted by U.S. policymakers.The United States has signed
relativelyfew human rightsconventions,even thoughthe highlyindividualistic conceptions of human rightsdeveloped afterWorld War II reflectedU.S.
values.
In contrast,weaker stateshave been more subjectto externalimpositionand
coercionand have been more likelyto enterintocontractualarrangementsthat
violate theirautonomybut not thatof the otherparties.All of the statesthat
emerged from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires in the nineteenthand
twentiethcenturies were subject to some constraintson their institutional
structuresor policies. Whetherforcedto accept the minorities'protectionsof
the Treatyof Berlinof 1878 or the VersaillessettlementafterWorldWar I, the
impositionof communistrule, or the political conditionalityof the European
Bank,not one of the statesof easternEurope createdsince theNapoleonic Wars
has ever conformedwith the Westphalianmodel.
The internationalsystemis a less stable and less institutionalizedenvironmentthan establisheddomesticpolities.Authoritystructurescannotdominate
power asymmetries.At the internationallevel, different
rulerscan champion
different
principlesnot only because theirinterestsvarybut also because their
normativeframesof reference,primarilyderived fromtheirdomestic experiences and constituencies,also vary.Rulers mightendorse autonomy,but then
again theymightfindthatinterveningin the domesticaffairsof anotherstate
or even jeopardizing the autonomyof theirown state offersa more attractive
policy option. New problemscan be solved with new solutions.For instance,
the Exclusive Economic Zone for the oceans, which violates the principleof
territoriality-someactivitiesin the same geographicarea (the exploitationof
mineral and marine life) are subject to the authorityof the littoralstate but
others(naval and commercialshipping) are not-was inventedwhen technological changes opened new commercialopportunitiesforlittoralstates.These
opportunitiescould only be fully realized if the concerns of major states,
especially the United States,about freedomof navigationwere satisfied.Minorityprotectioncould be imposed on new statesafterWorldWarI in response
to concerns about stabilityand collective security,and then forgottenafter
World War II, only to be revived again in response to ethnicconflictsin the
1990s.

Compromising
Westphalia| 149

It is very difficultfora single set of principlesto become embedded in the

internationalenvironmentand marginalizealternatives,because the kinds of
institutionalizing
mechanismsthatcan work so powerfullyin domesticpolities
are not available. Path-dependentprocesses, which can lock in principles
throughscale economies, the sunk costs of creatingnew institutions,
complementarities,or networkexternalitiesoperate only weakly at the international
level. Differentactorsrespond to different
normativeframesof reference;processes of socializationare weak.61Thereis no higherauthorityto dictatepolicy
to rulers. If there is no way to preclude some policies, then compromising
Westphaliais always an available option.
Nevertheless,the model has persisted because it does serve some of the
interestsof some actors.It has traditionallybeen most vigorouslychampioned
by weaker states since they are the ones that are most subject to imposition,
It has also been attractivefor
coercion,or limitedcontractualopportunities.62
rulers in more powerful states because mutual recognitionof the rule of
non-intervention
among the strong (but not necessarilywith regard to the
weak) has made it easier forthem to maintaintheirdomesticcontrol.63
Given the anarchic nature of the internationalsystem,violations of the
Westphalianmodel, or any otherinstitutionalformforthat matter,ought not
to be surprising,even ifthe formpersistsover a long period of time.Territory
and autonomyare part of common knowledge,but theyhave neverbeen able
to exclude alternativeprinciples and practices. The Westphalian model has
never been takenforgranted;it has not generatedidenticalactorsall of which
enjoy exclusive authoritywithin theirboundaries; it has not prevented the
powerful from violating its precepts; but it has been a point of common
referencethatrulershave honored or supplanted depending upon theirinterests, values, and power.

61. If there really is an end of history,and democracy and capitalism are the only available
institutionalforms,then socialization could become more powerfulat the internationallevel. See
No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.
Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?"The NationalInterest,
62. Even here thereare exceptions.The Third World stronglysupported internationalsanctions
designed to end apartheid in South Africabecause the eliminationof a racistregime was more
in the internalaffairsof
compelling than universallyadhering to the norm of non-intervention
states.
63. Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma," p. 172. The extentto which even strong states have been
willing to honor each other's autonomy has depended on the resources they have had for
intervention.
The United Statesand especiallytheSoviet Union,which could employ theattraction
of communistideology,attemptedto undermineeach other's domesticautonomy.

International
Security20:3 | 150

Conclusions
In the contemporaryworld, peace and stabilitywould be betterserved by
explicitlyrecognizingthat the Westphalianmodel has, in fact and in theory,
always been contested.It is historicallymyopicto take the Westphalianmodel
as a benchmarkthat accuratelydescribes some golden age when all states
exercised exclusive authoritywithin theirown borders. Weaker states have
frequentlybeen subjectto coercionand impositionand been unable to defend
theirautonomy Strongerones have enteredintoconventionsand contractsthat
violate theirautonomy and even territoriality.
Some analysts have suggested that the basic nature of the international
systemis changing:sovereigntyis dramaticallyeroding;domesticand internationalpoliticscannotbe distinguished;rulerscannotunilaterallygoverncritical
statefunctionssuch as monetarypolicy;multilateralismis comingto dominate
otherformsof diplomacy.64
Violationsof Westphalia,however,are an old problem,not a new one, even
though contractualarrangementspromptedby greaterglobalizationhave become more prominent.The activitiesof contemporaryinternationalfinancial
institutionshave theiranalogs in foreigncontrolledcommitteesthatgoverned
financein some weaker states in the nineteenthcentury.Concerns about minorityrightsgeneratedby the Balkan war of the 1990s resemblesimilarissues
thatarose afterearlierBalkan wars and WorldWar I. Coercion and imposition
have almost always involved a multilateralcomponent,because greatpowers
have recognized that mutuallyantagonisticattemptsto forceothersto act in
specificways can be costly.The gold exchangestandardoperated by Britainin
the late nineteenthcenturyarguably imposed more rigid constraintson the
domestic monetaryautonomy of states than do contemporaryfinancialflows
and agreements.
Given the asymmetriesof power,diversityof interests,and the weakness of
institutionalizingmechanisms in the internationalsystem,it would be more
productiveto stop thinkingof theWestphalianmodel as some ideal or historical realityand to treatit as a referencepoint or conventionthat is useful in
some circumstancesbut not others.Some states have the power to preserve
64. See forinstance,JamesRosenau, Turbulence
in WorldPolitics:A TheoryofChangeand Continuity
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990); Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen,"Introduction:What Has Changed?" in Holm and Sorensen, WhoseWorldOrder?,pp. 5-6; JohnG.
Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism
Matters:The Theoryand Praxis of an InstitutionalForm (New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1993).

Compromising
Westphalia| 151

theirterritory
and autonomy;
othersdo not.f5
Someoftheweak are incapable
of governing
theirown populations,and are threatsto international
stability
as well.The populationsofthesestates,ifnottheirrulers,wouldbe betteroff
if Westphaliawerecompromised.
Many ThirdWorldstatesare incapableof
independently
implementing
reasonableeconomicpolicies.For themcondiis a good thing,evenifitis inconsistent
tionality
withtheWestphalian
model.
Given the configuration
of power in the Middle East-the existenceof a
numberof large Arab statesthatwill always be in one way or anothera
potentialthreatto Israel-the Palestinianquestioncannotbe resolvedby the
creation
ofa Westphalian
state:theautonomy
ofanyPalestinian
statewillhave
to be compromised
in one way or another.
At the same time,relationsamong the major powers-entitiesthatare
theirterritory
capableofdefending
and autonomy-arestabilizedbyrecognizing the Westphalian
model unless,as is the case in Europe,theyhave contractedotherwise.Russia may be able to compromisethe autonomyof the
membersoftheCommonwealth
ofIndependent
are
States,butothercountries
unlikelyto be able to compromisethe autonomyof Russia.A Panamanian
forcewillnotinvadetheUnitedStates,arrestitspresident,
military
and return
himor herto Panama fortrialregardlessof how perverseU.S. drugpolicies
mightbe. ManuelNoriega,however,suffered
exactlythisfate.
The entitiesthatare now calledstatesvaryenormously
in theircapabilities.
a sovereign
stateis no guaranteethatitwillbe able todefend
Callingan entity
itsautonomyCompromising
it can also be
Westphaliais notonlyinevitable,
thatdifferent
good. Explicitly
recognizing
principlesoughtto varywiththe
capacityand behaviorofstateswouldnotonlymakenormative
discoursemore
consistent
withempiricalreality,
itwould also contribute
to themoreimaginativeconstruction
ofinstitutional
forms-forms
thatcompromise
Westphaliathatcould createa morestableand peacefulinternational
system.
65. RobertJacksonhas pointed out thatthe nineteenth-century
rule of basing internationalrecognitionon the abilityto maintaininternalcontrolwas abandoned afterWorld War II. See Jackson,
Quasi-States:Sovereignty,
International
Relationsand theThirdWorld(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990).