Ritchelle Libon

G.R. No. 177148

June 30, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.RAUL NUEZ y
REVILLEZA,Appellant
FACTS:
In a search and seizure conducted based on reports of drug
possession, the appellants room was surveyed in hispresence while
his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the
living room. 31 packets of shabu,lighters, improvised burners, tooters,
and aluminium foil with shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing
P4,610 insideappellants dresser were found.
The group also
confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill,jigsaw,
electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they
were acquired in exchange for shabu.Following the search, SPO1
Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized6 and a Certification of
Orderly Search7 whichappellant signed.
The RTC convicted appellant guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended.Appellant elevated the
case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals where the Court ofAppeals rendered its decision
affirming appellants conviction.

ISSUE:
WON there was an irregularity in the seizure of personal property
conducted.

RULING:
SEC. 3. (Rule 126 of the Rules of Court) Personal property to be
seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search andseizure
of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offence
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense;
or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant
may be seized by the authorities. In the caseat bar, Search Warrant
No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) andparaphernalia(s) only.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search
conducted. Certainly, the ladys wallet,cash, grinder, camera,
component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws,
hammer, drill, and bolo were notencompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of
drugs. In seizing the saiditems then, the police officers exercised their
own discretion and determined for themselves which items in
appellantsresidence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or
"means of committing the offense." This is, in our view,
absolutelyimpermissible.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the warrantis to limit the things to
be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search
warrant -- to leave the officersof the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authorityempowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition

to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relatingto a

crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the
search warrant should be restored to appellant

Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay sought the assistance of

CIDG to recoverLPG cylinders allegedly in posession of Sun Gas.
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) conducted
surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at
Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to
take photographs of LPG cylinders (PO@ Demandara).
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the
premises with the allegation that Pryce LPG cylinders were tampered
and replaced with Sun Gas marking, averred also that Sun Gas is
distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of Pryce. RTC
issued the search warrant with the authority to seize the following
items:

G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007

Rowland Kim Santos, petitioner,
vs PRYCE Gas Inc., respondents

Facts:
This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to
reversed the twin orders of RTC Iloilo City quashing the warrant it
issued and ordering the return of LPG cylinders seized from petitioner.
Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and
distributing industrial gases and LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed
the decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce employees
suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed from market
circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whom is Sun Gas
and Santos as the manager.

1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in

different kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS
INC., trademark and embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS
cylinders. The authorities have seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.
Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the
grounds of lack of probable cause as well as deception and fraud in
obtaining evidence in support of the application, violating article 3,
section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.
On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of
City Prosecutor of Iloilo against Santos, charging him with violation of
RA No. 632.
After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the
probable cause as found by it at the time of the application for search

warrant fell short of the requisite probable cause necessary to sustain

the validity of the search warrant.
Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the
release of the seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration of
the 16 July 2002 Order but was denied in an Order dated 9 August
2002.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special
civil action for certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrant. The petition
essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite a
prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove
that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged
petitioners personality to file the motion to quash.
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision, which set aside the two orders of the trial court. The
appellate court also ordered the return of the seized items to
respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an
order dated 16 July 2004.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the
search warrant;
(2) who has proper custody of the seized items; and
(3) whether or not respondent correctly availed of the special civil
action for certiorari to assail the quashal of the search warrant.
Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial
courts quashal of the search warrant solely on the ground that
petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun Gas, Inc., failed to show his

authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore, had no

legal personality to question the validity of the search warrant. Thus, it
concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining and subsequently granting petitioners motion to quash.
Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court
had raised the standard of probable cause to whether there was
sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction.
3. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the
seized items to respondent. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the seized
items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in
custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against
petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued
the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly
verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution
of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search

warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for

(1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2)
delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified
true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing
constitutes contempt of court.
The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which
issued the search warrant pending the institution of criminal action
against petitioner.

Nala v Barroso
[G.R. No. 153087. August 7, 2003]
Facts:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Alcoser applied for a search warrant against
petitioner Nala, who was referred to in the application as Rumolo
Nala alias Long of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon for
illegal possession of firearms. On the same day, said search
warrant was granted.

At around 6:30 in the morning of July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other

police officers searched petitioner s house and allegedly seized
various firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the searc h warrant and filed an

Omnibus Motion to Quash but was denied by the judge.

 Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from
the deposition and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the
testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance
to confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items
seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not
invalidate the same because the items seized bear a direct relation
to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently
identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously
stated therein as Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the
warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable
against the person and residence of petitioner and no other.

Issues:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure
warrant? YES.
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and
seizure warrant against petitioner? NO.
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in
petitioners residence are admissible in evidence against him even
though said firearms were not listed in the search and seizure
warrant. Immaterial due to a void search warrant.
Held:
1. The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the
first name of petitioner,
which is Bernard and not Romulo or Rumolo, does not
invalidate the warrant because the additional description alias Lolong
Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,

Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify

the petitioner. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed
party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a descriptio
personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without
difficulty.
2. Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor
in PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers application for the issuance of a search
warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a
firearm. While Alcoser testified before the respondent judge that the
firearms in the possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not
qualify as personal knowledge but only personal belief because
neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification
from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not
licensed to possess a firearm. This could have been the best
evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no license to possess
firearms and ammunitions, but the police officers failed to present the
same. Hence, the search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of
the evidence presented is void.
3. The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be
searched was gained by virtue of a void search warrant, prohibited
articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible against the
accused. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the
search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid
search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was
not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who
entered the petitioners premises had no right to be there and
therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
The plain view doctrine finds no application here not only because
the police officers had no justification to search the house of
petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of probable

cause), but also because said officers failed to discharge the burden
of proving that subject articles were inadvertently found in
petitioners house

Ratio:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes
the person and place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The probable cause for a valid search warrant has been defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. This probable cause must
be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainantor
the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. In
determining its existence, the examining magistrate must make a
probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro forma
examination of the applicant and the witnesses.

The elements of illegal possession of firearms are (1) the

existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possess thesame.

Plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:

(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can

viewa particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.

RTC a Motion to quash Search Warrants alleging that the items are
being used in the conduct of the lawful business of respondents and
the same are not being used in refilling shellane and GAsul LPGs.
RTC denied the said petitioners Motion, and was affirmed by CA.
Hence, This Petition

ISSUE
Wether Petitioners are liable for trademark infringement

Yao Vs People
GR 168306
June 19, 2007
FACTS
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS
CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an entry engaged in the refilling, sale
and distribution of LPG products, while private respondents Petron
and pilipinas Shell are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers
of LPG in the Philippines. Their LPG products are sold under the
marks GASUL and SHELLANE respectively. They are authorized
to allow refillers and and distributors to refill, use sell and distribute
their respective LPG containers and products. NBI agent Oblanaca
filed applications for search warrant against petitioners and other
occupants of masagana compound on the ground that petitioners are
actually producing selling offering for sale and or distributing LPG
products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the trade names
, trade marks and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, Without
authority and in violation of the rights of said entities. presiding judge
of RTC Cavite found probable cause, hence, commanded the
immediate search and seizure of the items. Petitioners filled with the

HELD
YES , Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts
constituting trademark infringement. As can be gleaned in the section
155.1 mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered
trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of
goods or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistakes or
deception among the buyers/ consumers can b e considered as
trademark infringement.
In Obleanicas swom affidavits he started they before conducting an
investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he
reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the
Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Piulipinas
Shell: that he confirmed from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that
MASAGANA is not authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinder containers; that he and alajar monitored
the activities of MASAGANA in its refilling plan station located within
its compound at governors drive Barangay Lapidario Tirece Martires,
Cavite City; that using different names, they conducted twi test buys
therein where they purchased LPS cylinders bearing the trademarks
GASUL and SHELLANE; that the said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders were refiled in their presence by the MASAGANA

employees; that while they were inside MASAGANA compound, he

noticed stock piles of multi branded cylinders including GASUL AND
SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out of the MASAGANA
compound and making deliveries to various outlets

On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee

of Unifish PackagingCorporation (UPC) reported to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Hoalias Frank Uy,
manager of UPC, were engaged in activities constituting violations of
the NationalInternal Revenue Code (NIRC). On October 1, 1993, the
BIR requested and successfully secured,before the RTC of Cebu, a
search warrant. On the same day, a second warrant was issued
withcontents almost identical to that of the first warrant but consisted
of only one page. These warrantswere issued for the alleged violation
by Uy of Section 253. A third warrant, however, was issued no that
same day for Uys alleged violation of Section 238 in relation to
Section 263. On the strength ofthese warrants, agents of the BIR,
accompanied by members of the PNP searched the premises ofthe
UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the items as listed on the said
warrant. A return of saidsearch was duly made by Labaria with the
RTC of Cebu. Uy and UPC filed a motion to quash thewarrants before
the RTC. Said motion was denied. A petition for certiorari filed before
the Court ofAppeals was likewise dismissed as it is not the proper
remedy.

ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:

Uy vs. BIR
G.R. No. 129651
October 20, 2000
FACTS

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It sustained the validity of

the search warrantand comprehensively discussed each and every
defect alleged by petitioners.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements
of the constitutional andstatutory provisions. One of which is that,
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place tobe searched
and persons or things to be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies

in the descriptionof the place to be searched as indicated on said

warrants, the Court ruled that the description of theplace to be
searched is sufficient if the officers enforcing the warrant can, with
reasonable effort,ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Itwas
not
established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in
locating
the
premises
ofpetitioner
corporation,
hence,
inconsistency in identifying the city where the premises to
besearched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation
in this case.
The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched
one warrant wasdirected only against Uy while the other was against
Uy and UPC. The Court, however, ruled thatwhere the warrant was
issued not for search of the persons occupying the premises, but only
asearch of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be
declared unlawful or in violationof the constitutional rights of the
owner
or
occupants
of
the
premises,
because
of
theinconsistencies in stating their name. Furthermore, the Court said
that where the apparent intent inissuing another warrant was to
supersede an earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revokedby
the former.
Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge as
she used generic terms.As a rule, the use of a generic term or a
generic description in a warrant is acceptable only when amore
specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. But
where, however, by thenature of the goods to be seized, their
description must rather be general, it is not required that atechnical
description be given, as this would mean no warrant could issue. As
regards the termsunregistered
delivery
receipts
and
unregistered
purchase
and
sales
invoices,
the
SolicitorGeneral correctly argued that these documents need not be

specified as it is not possible to do soprecisely because they are

unregistered.
Lastly, general description of most of the documents listed in the
warrants does not renderthe entire warrant voidthe search warrant
is severable, and those items not particularly describedmay be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants
authorize thesearch and seizure of unregistered delivery
receipts and unregistered purchase and salesinvoices, the
warrants remain valid.

People vs Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 400)

FACTS
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge
Casanova which quashedsearch warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and
declared inadmissible for any purpose the itemsseized under the
warrant.
>An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes
against Mr. Azfar Hussainwho had allegedly in his possession
firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207Area F.
Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
The following daySearch Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was
served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No.1, immediately
adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani
nationalsand the seizure of a number of different explosives and
firearms.
ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the
apartment in which privaterespondents were then actually residing, or

more explicitly, WON that particular apartment hadbeen specifically

described in the warrant.
HELD:
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of
a meeting of minds as tothe place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing thesame; and what
was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written
down inthe warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not havebeen done. It is neither fair nor licit to
allow police officers to search a place different from thatstated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched

although not thatspecified in the warrant

is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrantand
had demarcated in their supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place
stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant.

warrant. It would open wide thedoor to abuse of the search process,

and grant to officers executing a search warrant thatdiscretion which
the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of thedescription of the place to be searched may
properly be done only by the Judge, and only in thewarrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be

amplified or modified by theofficers'
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly
describe the place to be searched as well as thepersons or things to
be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing
theplace to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the

SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 182010.
August 25, 2010.
FACTS:

PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas were sent to conduct surveillance on the
activities of analleged notorious snatcher operating in the Pasay area
known only as Ryan.
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and
PO2 Aguas to the targetarea, he glanced in the direction of petitioner
who was standing three meters away and seen placing inside a yellow
cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachetcontaining white substance. While PO1
Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he become
suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to
approach her. He then introducedhimself as a police officer to
petitioner and inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside
hercigarette case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner attempted
to flee to her house nearby but wastimely restrained by PO1 Cruzin
who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from
the cigarette case and thereafter arrested her. RTC found appellant
guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu. Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal
her arrest without warrant to thusrender any evidence obtained on the
occasion thereof inadmissible.
She assails the appellate
courtsapplication of the stop-and-frisk principle in light of PO1
Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that acrime was being
committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a
cigarette casewhich could hardly be deemed suspicious.
To
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked ifthere were overt
acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion
Issue:
Whether or not the stop-and-frisk principle was properly applied by
the CA.
Held:

In a stop-and-frisk, it is essential is that a genuine reason must

exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests
unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed
about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriatemanner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.The circumstances under which petitioner was
arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her person was
warranted: The police officers were on a surveillance operation as part
of their law enforcement efforts when PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner
placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her
cigarette case. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was
instinctive on hispart to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her.
That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced
himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the
plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.From these standards,
the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted avalid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of
the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitionerspossession - later
voluntarily
exhibited[24] to
the
police
operative - was
undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside
a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself topetitioner
as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was
exhibiting suspicious behaviour and in fact attempted to flee after the
police officer had identified himself. Absent any proof of motive
tofalsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of

regularity in the performance ofofficial duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of
petitioner

delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for

possessing, dangerous drugs.During the arraignment, appellant
pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTCrendered a Joint Judgment convicting
appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 butacquitted
him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On
appeal, the CA affirmedthe RTC decision. The appellant brought the
case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrestand the
validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted
through cellular phone withappellant for the purchase of shabu. The
agent reported the transaction to the police authorities
whoimmediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team
members posted themselves along thenational highway in Baler,
Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus
arrived inBaler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential
agent pointed to him as the person hetransacted with, and when the
latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and
invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying
shabu. When he pulled out his hands from hispants pocket, a white
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened
, yielded a small sachet containingthe suspected drug. The team then
brought appellant to the police station for investigation and
theconfiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant.
The field test and laboratory examinationson the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.Appellant was charged in two separate informations,
one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his
arrest.

Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information"
alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires,
in addition, that the accused perform some overt act thatwould
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense. Wefind no cogent reason to depart from this
well-established doctrine.Appellant herein was not committing a crime
in the presence of the police officers. Neither did thearresting officers
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested hadcommitted, was committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had justalighted from the
Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in
any suspiciousmanner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the police officers to suspect and conclude that hewas committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by
the informant,appellant would not have been apprehended and no

search would have been made, and consequently, thesachet of shabu

would not have been confiscated. Neither was the arresting officers
impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with there
quest warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a
member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped
information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the
informant not
only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it
was not certain that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that
he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had
ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

Judge Ignacio Salvador ordered SPO2 Antonio Disuanco to issue a

warrant of arrest against Senior Inspector Valeroso forkidnapping with
ransom. The team conducted surveillance. When the petitioner was
about to aboard into a tricycle, he was arrested and fire ammunition
was seized from him. Said fire arms werefound out that it was named
under a different person.They accostedValeroso. However, the latter in
his defense, contended that when the officers came to hischildrens
Boardinghouse in Sagana Homes, he was forced to the faucet while
the men ransackedthe room until one shouted that they found
something.He further stated that it was not done with a warrant.
Contrary to the prosecutions testimony, he was said to be arrested
near the INPCentral Police in Culiat. He was found guilty by the trial
court for the crime of illegal possession of firearms. On appeal, his
sentencewas lowered
Issue:
Whether or not there is a breach of Valerosos Constitutional rights.

Valeroso v. Court of Appeals

GR. no. 164815
Sept. 3, 2009

FACTS:

Held: Yes. The court favors the version of the Defense. Valerosos
appeal is anchored on the Constitutional right alleged to be
violatedthus making the evidence against him inadmissible.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution but with certainexceptions of
valid warrantless arrest. However, in this case, suchcannot be
justified. For one, the warrantless search could not bejustified as an
incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of theRules of Court.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to to
search and remove from the arrestee that may beused by him to effect
escape to the danger of the officer doing the arrest and the
concealment and destruction thereof. It is also theduty of the arresting

officer to search the area under his immediate control over any
weapon and also in his plain view.
In this case, it cannot be said that the area that the officers searched
is in their immediate control as the weapon was found ina locked
cabinet which needed force to be revealed. Also, it is not in plain view
which could not effectively merit a valid warrantlessarrest.

PEOPLE v. VINECARIO
G.R. No. 141137
January 20, 2004
FACTS
Acting upon an information that a jeepney at Atok, Benguet was
loaded with Benguet pine lumber, the Police officers of PNPTublay
Station swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.At
around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operativesspotted the
jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did
not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan,
La Trinidad where it finally halted. The driver and his companions
admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The
policeimmediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso
Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners
werecharged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry
Code Petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces
ofBenguet pine lumber were illegally seized. But it was denied, so as
their motion for reconsideration. On Appeal, the CA dismissed
thepetition and held that the search conducted without warrant by the
police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber
areadmissible in evidence against the accused. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was
denied,hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the officers are
valid.
Held: Yes.Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be
carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search
andseizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v.
Sarap, the exceptions where search and seizure may beconducted
without warrant, are:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of
customs laws;
(4) seizure of the evidence in plain view;
(5) search when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
The only requirement in these exceptions isthe presence of probable
cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable,discreet, and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense arein the place to be
searched. In People v. Aruta, it was ruled that in warrantless searches,
probable cause must only be based onreasonable ground of suspicion
or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
There is no hard and fast rule or
fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination
varies according to the facts of each case.Here, the search involved a

moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure

may be conducted by peaceofficers. There is also probable cause on
the part of the officers for the warrantless arrest because when they
flagged the jeepneydown, it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it
until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad . A search of the vehicle disclosed
several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce
the required DENR permit to cut and transport thesame.In People v.
Vinecarao, the Court ruled that where a vehicle sped away after
noticing a checkpoint and even after having beenflagged down by
police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from
proceeding with their inspection, there exists
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of
thelaw or that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of
some offense.

Judge Felimon Abelita III vs P/Supt German Doria & SPO3 Cesar
Ramirez
GR No. 170627
August 14, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner (Judge Abelita) filed a complaint for damages under Art.
32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against Respondents (Doria and
Ramirez). Petitioner alleged that he and his wife was on their home
when the respondents accompanied by 10 unidentified police

officers,requested them to proceed to the PNP headquarters.

Petitioner alleged that he would proceed to to the PNP HQ after he
had brought his wife home. Petitoner alleged that when she parked
his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him and took
his car keys, bared into the vehicle and conducted as search without a
warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun and
a unlicensed .45 caliber pistol allegedly found inside the vehicle.

the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior

justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area;
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
it is immediately apparent to the police officers that the firearm may be
an evidence of a crime.
Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.

However, the respondent has a different version of the case. Doria

alleged that they received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by Ramirez
to investigate the incident. Ramirez reported that a certain William Sia
is wounded while Petitioner and his wife just left the place of the
incident. Doria looked for the petitioner and when he found him, he
informed him about the incident, he requested Petitioner to go with
him in the PNP HQ but the petitioner suddenly sped up his vehicle
and proceeded to his residence, they caught up with petitioner as he
was about to run towards his house. The police offices saw a gun in
the form seat and a shotgun at the back. They confiscated the
firearms and charged Petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and
frustrated murder and an administrative case.

No, the court did not agree that petitioner was framed-up and that the
respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. They should not be held liable for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure was valid.
Whether or not the Respondents are liable for damages.
Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner is
conclusive in this case.
Ruling:
Yes, the seizure was valid under plain view doctrine, objects falling in
the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The requisites of plain view are:

While the present case and the administrative case are based on the
same essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata
will not apply. The requisites of res judicata are:
the former judgment must be final;
it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered
after a consideration of the evidence or stipulation submitted by the
parties at the trial of the case;
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties;
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of the
parties, of subject matter, and cause of action; this requisite is
satisfied f the two actions are substantially between the same parties.
A administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may
be incurred by the respondent for the commission of the acts
complained of. This case deals with the civil liability for damages of
the police officers. There is no identity of causes of action in the
cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the
application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of parties in
the first and second cases. There is no identity of parties since the
administrative case was filed by Bejamin Sia Lao against petitioner
and Benjamin is not a party to this case.