Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena(???).

Reviewed by Ken Goss (Hist 5040 - Spring 1999).

For the title of this collection of essays, Pierre Duhem borrowed a phrase from Plato's definition of the
goal of the astronomer: "to save the phenomena." In Plato's opinion, the role of the astronomer was to find
the means to successfully record and predict cosmic phenomena. It was not important that these means be
related to the real physical mechanism that caused the phenomena. Therefore, Plato felt that it was
completely acceptable for astronomers to rely on theoretical constructs that bore no relation to real
physical constructs as long as they provided a means to "save the phenomena," i.e. they bore a strict
alignment with observations.
Aristotle, though Plato's student, stood in direct opposition to Plato's opinion. For Aristotle, the real
physical constructs were more important than constructing purely theoretical models that served only for
tracking celestial occurrences. Aristotle was not content to merely observe the heavens, he wasted to
understand them.
These two contrasting notions for the basis for the collection of articles that make up "To Save the
Phenomena" by Pierre Duhem. Duhem traces the conflict between what he terms astronomy, the search
for a purely mathematical understanding of the movement of the stars, and physics, the search for a
physical understanding of the heavens. The articles follow the relationship between these two sides from
there start with Plato and Aristotle, till they are finally brought together in the person of Galileo.
To understand the tone of voice that Duhem assumes throughout the work, an introductory essay has been
added by Stanley L. Jaki. For Duhem the dispute between the priority of theory and physical proof is
close to his heart. Though noted as a historian of science, Duhem's real passion is theoretical physics.
Antagonistic relations with more physical minded leaders in France's scientific community led Duhem to
self-exile in the French provinces. His sympathies lie with the theorists, the astronomers, and are scarcely
concealed below the surface.
For the Greek successors to Plato and Aristotle, the debate between the two methods of thinking about the
heavens focused on two key points. The first was that different mathematical models could describe, and
save, the astral phenomena equally well. Hipparchus pointed out that epicycles and eccentrics were just as
efficient in tracking the movement of the stars. For the realists this was unacceptable. There must be a
single, real mechanism that controls the stars and the fact that differing mathematical models were
possible proved that neither was the exclusive, "right" answer. The physicists wanted the cause, the
astronomer simply wanted a solution that provided the best fit for his data. The second key issue was their
common belief that the physics observable on Earth, or sub-lunar, was completely different from celestial
physics. Given this, the physicists were limited to nearly complete guesswork, and a vastly limited chance
for success.
Duhem gloats over the inability of the realists to find an acceptable physical solution that corresponded to
given data. Greek physics proved inflexible, in part because it was bound by the limits of Greek
knowledge, but also because of the weight of Aristotle's opinion. The Greeks lacked the spirit of
experimentation, which Duhem thought could have allowed them to formulate a more realistic physical
theory. And, just as Aristotle would weigh on Medieval science, and Newton on post-Enlightenment
science, Aristotle bound most of the Greek physicists by his cosmology. Therefore, it was not the
physicists that constituted the Greek legacy to the West, but its astronomers. The ultimate of that line,
Ptolemy knew well that the epicycles and eccentrics that composed his model were purely theoretical
constructs. They permitted close alignment with known data, and were thus the astronomer's ideal.
From the Greeks the debate moves forward in time to the Arabic and Jewish scholars that preserved the
Greek teachings. Duhem scorns the limited "geometric ingenuity" and the lack of "precise logical sense"
in the Arabs. These lead the Arabs toward the realist side of the camp. He believes that they failed to

grasp the distinction made by the Greeks between the purely theoretical models and the attempted
physical models. This led them to postulate on real physical contrivances that equated to the epicycles and
eccentrics used by Ptolemy.
From this period Duhem draws the lesson that would be repeated later: it is dangerous to attempt to
extract from astronomical models more than the data they intended to mimic. Mathematical models are
simply meant for the convenience of the astronomer, they are not intended as physical models from which
true causes can be expostulated. This argument would gain more significance in the period following
Copernicus.
The next step on the journey is the Paris of Medieval Christendom. For those familiar with Duhem's
favorite cause, it would not come as a surprise that he finds the Parisians comfortably in his own camp
with the theorists. Bernard of Verdun conducted a comparison between Ptolemy and the state-of-the-art of
Arabic physics al-Bitrogi. He found that since al-Bitrogi's could not withstand the test of matching with
observed phenomena, it was inferior to the much more accurate model proposed by Ptolemy. It was
accuracy that mattered, not adherence to the rules of nature.
Duhem breaks the renaissance into two periods, one before the publication of De revolutionibus by
Copernicus, the other in its aftermath. The pre-Copernicus period is one of extremes: one side rallying to
Aristotle, the other to Ptolemy. Duhem carefully stakes his own position again: "it is not possible for a
finite understanding to appropriate any exact truth." For him, the Aristotelians lacked the knowledge and
experience to make good their desire to explain the causes of the universe. It would be better, in his
opinion, for them to have accepted their limitations that to pursue the folly of explaining what was beyond
their knowledge.
The line between astronomer and physicists blurred dramatically with the publication of De
revolutionibus. Despite the claim made by Copernicus in his letter to the Pope, that his was purely a
mathematical model, and notwithstanding the preface added after-the-fact by one of his students, it seems
clear that Copernicus believed that what he was proposing was physical fact, not hypothetical
construction. Erasmus Rheinhold, a close associate of Copernicus, describe his efforts as one of
explaining the causes of the phenomena, not of saving them.
In the wake of Copernicus' theory emerged two new criteria for astronomy: compatibility with natural
causes, and, more importantly, compatibility with the scriptures. Osiander's preface to De revolutionibus
perhaps can be explained as a defensive effort to save Copernicus from scientific ridicule and religious
persecution. Opposing scientists scoffed at the idea that the Earth could be in motion since it contradicted
their own senses. Likewise, the Bible's position was clear: the Earth was the center of the universe, calm
and unmoving. Copernican theory, though it eased mathematics was argued to be unsuitable even for
theory since it was in obvious contradiction with both experience and the Bible.
The person who would become the defender of the Copernican idea, and who unabashedly treated it as
demonstrating not a model but reality was Galileo. Galileo placed his experimental skills on the line to
prove that Copernicus' ideas were more than mathematical fancy. For daring to favor De revolutionibus
over the Bible, Galileo was persecuted by the Church. For many historians of the Scientific Revolution,
the ultimate vindication of Copernicus' ideas would have made the Church's efforts a ridiculous, last gasp
for the power of authority, but not Pierre Duhem. Duhem's love of both theory and the Church place him
squarely on the side of the Church. Galileo had overstepped the bounds of theory, extrapolating too much
from theory, just as had the Medieval Arabic scientists.
The conclusion of the book is a shock. Colored by the author's personal experiences, the Scientific
Revolution is turned upside down. The Medieval Parisians had not only led the way to the Scientific
Revolution, but had trumped it! Their love of theory proved firmer ground than the speculation that led to
the new cosmology.
Despite the surprise conclusion the book is very interesting to read, though somewhat dependent on prior

knowledge of the subject. Though the translator's note claims that this edition was meant for a general
audience, Duhem's terminology assumes a working knowledge of the competing cosmological theories.
Duhem's extensive use of citations from important figures across the ages really gives the reader a feel for
the changing balance between theory and practice.