G.R. No.

176838

June 13, 2013

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her

capacity as the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR-Laguna, Petitioner,
vs.
PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM,
SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE and STEWART C. LIM, Respondents.
FACTS: A petition sought to nullify the sale to the respondents of several parcels of land was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. In this case, the PARO argued that
the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without DAR Clearance as
required under R.A. No. 6657.
Allegedly, the PARO came to know of the transactions only after he had received a directive
from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to investigate the matter, following the latters receipt of a
letter-request from persons who claimed to be the tenant-farmers of the properties previous
owners.
The respondents opposed the petition, contending that since the matter involves an
administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, the case is cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, not the DARAB.
On October 16, 2002, Provincial Adjudicator Virgilio M. Sorita (PA Sorita) issued a
Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. According to him, the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board does not include the sale, disposition or
alienation of private lands not administered by the DAR to private individuals such as in this
instant case.
On Appeal, contrary to the findings of PA Sorita, the DARAB ruled that it has the jurisdiction over
the case, since its jurisdiction under Circular No. 2 covers the cancellation of deeds of
conveyance and corresponding transfer certificates of title over agricultural lands.
CA reversed the ruling of the DARAB ruling that since the action was essentially for the
nullification of the subject properties sale, it did not involve an agrarian suit that is within the
DARABs jurisdiction. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute that seeks the nullification of the
subject properties sale.
HELD: The Court answers in the negative.
The SC emphasized in Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, that the jurisdiction of the
PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents
arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an
agrarian dispute in this manner:

(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
Upon the Courts perusal of the records, it has determined that the PAROs petition with the
PARAD failed to indicate an agrarian dispute. Specifically, the PAROs petition failed to
sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land.
Although it mentioned a pending petition for coverage filed with DAR by supposed farmerstillers, there was neither such claim as a fact from DAR, nor a categorical statement or
allegation as to a determined tenancy relationship by the PARO or the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
It is also undisputed, that even the petition filed with the PARAD failed to indicate otherwise, that
the subject parcels of land had not been the subject of any notice of coverage under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Clearly, the PAROs cause of action was
merely founded on the absence of a clearance to cover the sale and registration of the subject
parcels of land, which were claimed in the petition to be agricultural.
Given the foregoing, the CA correctly ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the PAROs
petition.
G.R. No, 170018

September 23, 2013

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY OIC-SECRETARY NASSER

C. PANGANDAMAN,Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION
(BATCO),Respondents.
FACTS: BATCO was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land, with an aggregate area of
206.5694 hectares (has.), situated in Malo-ong Canal, Lamitan, Province of Basilan. On
September 20, 1989, theaforesaid lands were voluntarily offered for sale (VOS) to the
government pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657. In 1992, BATCO was
notified that the 153.8801 hectare portion of the subject lands, consisting of Lot Nos.3, 4, and 5,
was being placed under the compulsory acquisition scheme by the DAR. Thereafter, then DAR
Secretary Ernesto Garilao directed Director Tamin and the PARO to proceed with the
registration and distribution of the CLOAs to the said identified beneficiaries.
On May 6, 1998, BATCO filed before the DAR Regional Office a petition for the exemption of
the subject portion from the coverage of the government's CARP. It alleged that almost all of the
entire subject lands have been devoted to cattle and livestock production since their acquisition
in1987, warranting their exemption from CARP coverage in accordance with the ruling in Luz
Farms and the provisions of DAR AO 09-93. It claimed that as of March 15, 1998, there were
150 heads of cattle, 50 heads of swine, and 50 heads of goats in the subject portion.

Meanwhile, BATCO's certificates of title over the foregoing were cancelled and new titles were
issued in the name of the Republic on July 17, 1998.
On August 12, 1998, Director Tamin issued an Order dismissing BATCO's petition, holding that
based on the DAR's ocular inspection/investigation, the subject portion was "not exclusively,
directly and actually used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June15, 1988, the date
of effectivity of RA 6657, and contrary to the spirit and intent of DAR AO 09-93." Hence, the
subject portion is not exempt from CARP coverage.
BATCO appealed to the Office of the DAR Secretary, reiterating its claim. However, then DAR
Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. issued an Order, denying the appeal on the ground that
BATCO failed: 1) to present substantial evidence to show that the subject portion was
exclusively, directly and actually used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising prior to June 15,
1988;and 2) to comply with the livestock and infrastructure requirements under DAR AO 09-93
On September 6, 2005, the CA issued a Decision reversing and setting aside Secretary
Morales February 25, 1999 Order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in excluding/exempting the subject lands
from CARP coverage despite BATCO's admission that only a portion thereof was devoted to
livestock raising and considering its previous voluntary offer of the lands to the government
under the VOS scheme.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
The determination of the lands classification as either an agricultural or industrial land and, in
turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption must be preliminarily
threshed out before the DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary. Verily, issues of exclusion
or exemption partake the nature of Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)cases which are well
within the competence and jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Towards this end, the latter is
ordained to exercise his legal mandate of excluding or exempting a property from CARP
coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with the law and
applicable jurisprudence. Thus, considering too his technical expertise on the matter, courts
cannot simply brush aside his pronouncements regarding the status of the land in dispute, i.e.,
as to whether or not it falls under CARP coverage.
It is settled that in order to be entitled to exclusion/exemption, it must be shown that the land is
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine or poultry raising. The land must be shown to have been
used for such purposes as of the effectivity of RA 6657, or on June 15, 1988, in order to prevent
any fraudulent declaration of areas supposedly used for these purposes as well as to protect the
rights of agrarian beneficiaries therein. This is in consonance with Section 73(c) of RA 6657
which prohibits the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural
use with intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to his landholdings and to dispossess his
tenant farmers of the land tilled by them.
A thorough review of the records reveals no substantial evidence to show that the entirety of the
subject lands were exclusively devoted to livestock production since June 15, 1988 so as to
warrant their exclusion/exemption from CARP coverage and the consequent cancellation of
MCFARMCO's certificates of title. BATCO subsequently admitted in its Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 25 February 1999 that only a portion of the subject lands

was actually devoted to livestock raising, for which the exemption of not less than 100 has. was
sought. On this score alone, the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring the subject lands
as exempt from CARP coverage and ordering the cancellation of MCFARMCO's certificates of
title and the issuance of new titles in BATCO's favor.
G.R. No. 185821

June 13, 2013

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Ricardo D. Gonzalez is the registered owner of two contiguous
parcels of land devoted to coconut production located at Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan
del Norte. Pursuant to CARP, respondent voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the
DAR for P250,000.00 per hectare.
Pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR A.O.
No. 11, series of 1994, the DAR and the LBP valued the subject property at P150,795.51 or
at P50,265.17 per hectare. Respondent rejected the valuation but the LBP
deposited P60,318.20 of the said sum in cash and P90,477.31 thereof in bonds the name of
respondent. Respondent acknowledged the receipt thereof. RARAD affirmed the valuation
made by the DAR.
Disappointed with the low valuation, respondent filed before the SAC a petition for just
compensation against the LBP, the DAR and the tenants of the subject property. The SAC
opined that P143,904.25 per hectare was the fair valuation of the subject property. The SAC
took judicial notice of the fact that "the value of the Philippine peso had nose-dived ever since
from a low of P2.00 to a dollar to P55.00 to a dollar."
Both the DAR and LBP sought reconsideration of the decision but the SAC denied their
respective motion in a Resolution. Aggrieved, LBP appealed the decision to the CA. The CA
affirmed the findings and the ruling of the SAC.Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN DISREGARD THE VALUATION
FACTORS UNDER SECTION 17 OF R.A. 6657 AS TRANSLATED INTO A BASIC FORMULA IN
DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 05, SERIES OF 1998, AS AMENDED, IN FIXING THE
JUST COMPENSATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT?
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC
acting as a SAC, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the
factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. SACs are not at liberty to disregard
the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative
order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. Simply put, courts cannot ignore,
without violating the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination
of just compensation.
We emphasize anew that while the SAC actually used the formula provided in DAR AO No. 5,
series of 1998, no reliable and verified production data was cited as basis of AGP. Instead, the

SAC simply declared that it "took judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso
had nose dived ever since - from a low of P2.00 to a dollar to P55 to a dollar today." However,
the devaluation of the Philippine currency is not among those factors enumerated in Section 17
of R.A. No. 6657, which the trial court is required to consider in determining the amount of just
compensation. In sum, we find LBPs valuation sufficiently substantiated and in accordance with
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.
G.R. No. 192890

June 17, 2013

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
VIRGINIA PALMARES, LERMA P. AVELINO, MELILIA P. VILLA, NINIAN P. CATEQUISTA,
LUIS PALMARES, JR., SALVE P. VALENZUELA, GEORGE P. PALMARES, AND DENCEL P.
PALMARES HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LERMA P.
AVELINO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondents inherited a 19.98-hectare agricultural land located in Barangay
Tagubang, Passi City, Iloilo. In 1995, they voluntarily offered the land for sale to the government
pursuant to RA 6657. Accordingly, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) acquired 19.1071
hectares of the entire area, which was valued by LBP at P440,355.92. Respondents, however,
rejected said amount. Consequently, the DARAB adopted LBP's valuation. Hence, the same
amount was deposited to respondents' credit as provisional compensation for the land.
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation before the
RTC of Iloilo City. During the pendency of said petition, the trial court directed LBP to recompute
the value of the land. The trial court arrived at its own computation by getting the average of (1)
the price per hectare as computed by LBP in accordance with DAR guidelines; and (2) the
market value of the land per hectare as shown in the 1997 tax declaration.
LBP appealed to the CA arguing that the computation made by the RTC failed to consider the
factors in determining just compensation enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657. The
appellate court affirmed the just compensation fixed by the RTC as having been arrived at in
consonance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and pertinent DAR Administrative Orders. It
emphasized that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function and, in the exercise thereof, courts should be given ample
discretion and should not be delimited by mathematical formulas.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2006 AND ORDER
DATED MAY 12, 2006 OF THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT (SAC), THE COMPENSATION
FIXED BY THE SAC NOT BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LEGALLY PRESCRIBED
VALUATION FACTORS UNDER SECTION 17 OF R.A. 6657 AS TRANSLATED INTO A BASIC
FORMULA IN DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 05, SERIES OF 1998 AND AS RULED BY
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF SPS. BANAL, G.R. NO. 143276 (JULY 20, 2004);
CELADA, G.R. NO. 164876 (JANUARY 23, 2006); AND LUZ LIM, G.R. NO. 171941 (AUGUST
2, 2007).
HELD: There is merit in the instant petition.

The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which
enumerates the following factors to guide the special agrarian courts in the determination
thereof: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature,
actual use, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the
assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the
nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any.Pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR
translated these factors into a basic formula.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido, where the RTC adopted a different formula, as in this
case, by considering the average between the findings of the DAR using the formula laid down
in Executive Order No. 228 and the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration,
we declared it to be an obvious departure from the mandate of the law and the DAR
administrative order.We emphasized therein that, while the determination of just compensation
is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a special agrarian court, the judge
cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified
by law and implementing rules.
G.R. No. 180476

June 26, 2013

RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, as represented by his Attorney-In-Fact, MARLON M.

CODERIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF JUAN CIDOCO, represented by its Administrator, DR. RAUL R.
CARAG, Respondent.
FACTS: The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija
(the farm). As tiller of the farm, petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.
In 1980, individuals connected with Chioco who was a former Governor of Nueva Ecija
threatened to kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing crops (corn and vegetables)
and house were bulldozed. For fear of his life, petitioner, together with his family, left the farm.
In 1993 upon learning of Chiocos death, petitioner and his family re-established themselves on
the farm. On March 9, 1995 petitioner filed with the DARAB in Talavera, Nueva Ecija a Petition
against respondent Chiocos estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the farm be
respected; that the corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between them be executed;
that he be awarded actual damages for the destruction of his house, his standing crops,
unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993, attorneys fees and costs of litigation.
Respondent moved to dismiss the Petition, contending that petitioners cause of action has
prescribed under Section 38 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended, since the alleged
dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or beyond the statutory
three-year period for filing such claims.

On September 10, 1996, the PARAD issued a Decision dismissing the Petition on the ground of
prescription. It adopted respondents argument, adding that although petitioner was forcibly
evicted from the farm, he was not without remedy under the law to assert his rights. Yet, he filed
the Petition only after 14 years, or in 1995. He is thus guilty of laches and is deemed to have
abandoned his rights and privileges under the agrarian laws.
On December 8, 2003, the DARAB issued an Order reversing the said decision. On Appeal, the
CA held that undoubtedly, a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner under RA
3844. Nevertheless, it found that petitioners action had prescribed. Petitioner thus timely filed
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT PRESCRIPTION HAD SET IN SINCE IT DISREGARD [sic] THE PRINCIPLE
LAID DOWN IN SECTIONS 3, 3.1, AND 3.2, RULE I OF THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
HELD: The Court grants the Petition.
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under the coverage of RA 3844.
It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a
CLT had been issued in favor of the petitioner; thus, petitioner already had an expectant right to
the farm. A CLT serves as "a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot
owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an
amortizing owner. This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily
devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land
he was tilling."32 Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of
the land reform law,33Chioco had no right to evict petitioner and enter the property. More
significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that petitioners cause of action had prescribed.
To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the
agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the
legal possession of the landholding. With unyielding consistency, we have held that transactions
involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change
of ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession, will not terminate the rights of the
agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against
the transferee or the landowner's successor in interest. x x x
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such
that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for
causes provided by law. x x x Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees
which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation
of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can take
place only for causes provided by law. x x x The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris,
this juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to
respect.

G.R. No. 170245

July 1, 2013

THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA AND CONSORCIA CAMANO

TRIA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: During their lifetime, the deceased spouses Domingo Tria and Consorcia Camano
owned a parcel of agricultural land located at Sangay, Camarines Sur, with an area of 32.3503
hectares. By virtue of PD No. 27, which mandated the emancipation of tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil, the Government, sometime in 1972, took a sizeable portion of the
deceased spouses property with a total area of 25.3830 hectares. Thereafter, respondent
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) undertook the distribution and eventual transfer of the
property to thirty tenant-beneficiaries. In due time, individual Emancipation Patents were issued
by respondent DAR in favor of the tenant-beneficiaries.
Pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order (EO) No. 228, respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) made an offer on November 23, 1990 to pay petitioners, by way of
compensation for the land, the total amount of P182,549.98. Not satisfied with the LBPs
valuation of their property, petitioners rejected their offer and filed a Complaint before the RTC
of Naga City claiming that the just compensation for their property isP2,700,000.00.
Resultantly, in a Decision dated August 23, 1995, the RTC made its own computation by using
the formula used by the Commissioner representing the LBP with the slight modification that it
used the government support price (GSP) for one cavan of palay in 1994 as multiplier.
Not in conformity with the RTCs ruling, respondents interposed an appeal before the CA. The
CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTCs ruling. It held that the formula and computation
adopted by the RTC are well in accord with the working principles of fairness and equity, and
likewise finds ample support from the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the
matter of determination of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the valuation of the property for purposes of
determining just compensation should be based on the GSP at the time the property was taken
in 1972, in accordance with the Gabatin case.
HELD: YES. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc., the SC ruled that since the Gabatin case, the Court had already decided several cases in
which it found more equitable to determine just compensation based on the GSP of palay at the
current price or the value of said property at the time of payment. In this case, the Court used
the standard laid down in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 66571 (RA No. 6657) as a guidepost in
the determination of just compensation in relation to the GSP of palay.

It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline

provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined
in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that
just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
Additionally, in the more recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Maximo Puyat
and Gloria Puyat,15the Court again adhered to the ruling laid down in the abovementioned case.
Here, the Court ruled that when the government takes property pursuant to PD No. 27, but does
not pay the landowner his just compensation until after RA No. 6657 has taken effect in 1998, it
becomes more equitable to determine just compensation using RA No. 6657 and not EO No.
228. Hence, the valuation of the GSP of palay should be based on its value at the time it was
ordered paid by the SAC.
Considering that the present case involves a similar factual milieu as the aforementioned cases,
the Court deems it more equitable to determine just compensation due the petitioners using
values pursuant to the standard laid down in Section 17 of RA No. 6657.
Here, the property of the deceased spouses was placed under the land reform program in
October 1972, and since then the land was parceled out and distributed to some 30 tenantbeneficiaries by respondents without effecting immediate and prompt payment. Clearly, the
tenant-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land, while petitioners wait in vain to be
paid. Unfortunately, it was only 19 years after the land was distributed by respondents that there
was an action on the part of respondents to pay petitioners.
Needless to say, petitioners have been deprived of the use and dominion over their
landholdings for a substantial period of time, while respondents abjectly failed to pay the just
compensation due the petitioners.

G.R. No. 173926

March 6, 2013

HEIRS OF LORENZO BUENSUCESO, represented by German Buensuceso, as

substituted by IluminadaBuensuceso, Ryan Buensuceso and Philip Buensuceso,
Petitioners,
vs.
LOVY PEREZ, substituted by Erlinda Perez-Hernandez, Teodoro G. Perez and Candida
Perez-Atacador, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:

German was the son and heir of Lorenzo Buensuceso, the farmer-beneficiary of an
agricultural lot, one point thirty-seven (1.37) hectares in area, situated in Sto. Cristo, Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. The disputed lot was awarded toLorenzo pursuant to Operation Land Transfer
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, and covered by Certificate of Land Transfer No.
049645 (CLT) issued on July 28, 1973. Upon Lorenzos death, German allegedly immediately
occupied the disputed lot and had been cultivating and residing within its premises since then.
German claimed that, in 1989, Lovy Perez forcibly entered the disputed lot, thus, compelling him
to file a petition for recovery of possession with the PARAD.
In her answer with counterclaim, Lovy argued that she is the real and lawful tenant of the
disputed lot as evidenced by: (1) the duly acknowledged and registered contract of leasehold
(lease contract)dated October 5, 1988, between her and the landowner, Joaquin Garces, which
Lorenzo signed as a witness; and (2) the certifications issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and by the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Council stating that she is the disputed lots registered agricultural
lessee. She also claimed that she has been paying the lease rentals to Garces, as shown by
receipts, and the irrigation services beginning 1984 as certified to by the National Irrigation
Administration, and that she is a bona fide member of the SamahangNayon.
On July 31, 1997, the PARAD dismissed the petition, ruling that German failed to prove
that he or his father, Lorenzo, was the farm helper or the regular tenant-lessee of the disputed
lot. In contrast, Lovy successfully proved that she was the lawful tenant-lessee from all of her
documentary evidence, particularly the lease contract, which established the tenancy relation
between her and Garces. German appealed the dismissal to the DARAB.On January 16, 2001,
the DARAB affirmed in toto the PARADs decision. German sought reconsideration, which he
obtained in due course.
The CA granted Lovys appeal and reversed the DARAB resolution. As the decisions of
the PARAD and the DARAB earlier did, the CA ruled that Lorenzo had long abandoned the
disputed lot, which he confirmed when he signed as a witness to the lease contract between
Garces and Lovy; that, with the execution of the lease contract, Lovy became the qualified
farmer-beneficiary, who then cultivated the disputed lot on her own account.

Issue:
Whether LorenzoBuensucesoabandoned the subject landholding.
Ruling:
Yes, Lorenzo abandoned the subject landholding.
In the present case, Lorenzo, in allowing and acquiescing to the execution of the lease
contract through his signature, with presumed full awareness of its implications, effectively
surrendered his rights over the disputed lot. His signing of the lease contract constitutes the
external act of abandonment. Notably, neither Lorenzo nor German impugned the existence or

the execution of the lease contract or the validity of Lorenzos signature on it during the
proceedings before the PARAD and the DARAB. Additionally, German did not present any
evidence to support his position that Lovy forcibly entered the disputed property, thus depriving
them of its possession and actual cultivation.

G.R. No. 180843

April 17, 2013

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and

CRISTINA SALAMAT, Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS, Respondent.
FACTS:
Flora Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam, Malolos,
Bulacan covered by (TCT) RT-65932 (T-25198) and being tilled by Eugenio Caparas as
agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Before she passed away, Makapugay
appointed her niece Amandadela Paz-Perlasas her attorney-in-fact. On the other hand,
Eugenios children Modesta Garcia, Cristina Salamat and Pedro succeeded him.
After Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled
"KasunduansaBuwisan",followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract, covering
the land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone agricultural lessee
and cultivator of the land.Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein respondent Dominga
Robles Vda. deCaparas, took over as agricultural lessee.
On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for
nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedros heirs,
represented by his surviving spouse and herein respondent Dominga.
Garcia and Salamat claimed that when their father Eugenio died, they entered into an
agreement with their brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the land on a "per-season
basis. The landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement and that when Makapugay passed
away, Pedro reneged on their agreement and cultivated the land all by himself, deliberately
excluding them and misrepresenting to Amanda that he is Eugenios sole heir.
When Amanda learned of Pedros misrepresentations, she executed on July 10, 1996 an
Affidavit stating among others that Pedro assured her that he would not deprive Garcia and
Salamat of their "cultivatory rights". In order to correct matters, Amanda and the other heirs of
Makapugay executed in their favor the 1996 "KasunduansaBuwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them
as Pedros co-lessees.
Issue:

Whether the Affidavit of Amanda to prove the agreement between Pedro and the
petitioners is admissible.

Ruling:
No, it is not admissible.
The complaint which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedros death in 1984, has no leg to
stand on other than Amandas declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro falsely
represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the land, and that when
she confronted him about this and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and
petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters had an understanding about it
and he did not have the intention of depriving them of their cultivatory rights."
Amandas declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedros alleged admission and recognition
of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Mans
Statute,which provides that "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying
by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus,
since Pedro is deceased, and Amandas declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement
affects the 1996 "KasunduansaBuwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with
petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedros
surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be
admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being
unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedros
prior death.