Marcos vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.

119976)
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the election."
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. On March 23, 1995,
private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives
on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 6and in her Certificate of Candidacy.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8
of the amended certificate. petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven"
in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
Issue: WON Imelda Marcos was able to satisfy the residence qualification as
required of her in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
Ruling: Yes.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return.
n Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business
or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in
the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes
the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain,
it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC
that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election
law purposes.

Domino vs. COMELEC (1999)

Facts: On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of
Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election.
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan
P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC
a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was
docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the
COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration
in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of
the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Issue: WON Domino has satisfied the residence requirement
Ruling: No.
What militates against respondents claim that he has met the residency
requirement for the position sought is his own Voters Registration Record No.
31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex B, Petition] and his address indicated as
24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence,
standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly
improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who previously ran for the same
position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995
to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent
registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May
11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement
provided for candidates for Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus
Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of
the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was
made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the
residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of
voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the
COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass
upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.[21] Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
[22]
Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time.[23]
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur [24] and
that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St.
Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy
for the position of representative of the 3 rd District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice at the
Province of Sarangani.
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel,
Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a
house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel,
Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a
house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen
petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINOs
intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.

Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is

further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in
Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a
strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered
in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate
public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided
preponderance is a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or
believes to be, his residence.[31] The fact that a party continuously voted in a
particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his
domicile.
Poe vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 221697) As to residence
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to
the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day
before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her
pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when
she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there;
and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. 152 To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of
petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because
she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started
being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC
as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date
required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted
that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006
which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to
the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent
after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a
COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the
required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement."

Torayno vs. COMELEC

Facts: During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and
proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive
term as governor of the province.In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12,
1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a
Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the
Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed 20
years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years
and five months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the
following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections;
(2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him
relating to the 1995 election, he had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of
governor until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998.
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically
resided in Cagayan de Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three
consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government was located at
the heart of that city.[13] He also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter of
intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the best position to
make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his
place of residence after the May 1995 elections.
Issue: (idk how to state. Focus nalang on the rationale of the residence
requirement! :3 )
Ruling: The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991,[18] which provides for the qualifications of local
elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x
x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino
or any other local language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the
area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to
prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from
[seeking] an elective office to serve that community." [19] Such provision is aimed
at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain." [20] Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals
who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have
been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental
and remains a geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of
the province; more important, it is itself the seat of the provincial
government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their
functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted
with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of
Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro
City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the
city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his
permanent place of residence.
lberto v. Comelec[27] that "election cases involve public interest; thus, laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections."
**Registration is not equivalent to Residence; Residence should
established 6 months prior to the day of elections
Maquera vs. Borra (G.R. No L24761)
Facts: This case involves the mandate of RA 4421 which requires "all
candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety
bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which
he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national,
provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when
declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to
which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4)
candidates for the same office.
In consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and the aforementioned action of
the Commission on Elections, every candidate has to pay the premium charged
by bonding companies, and, to offer thereto, either his own properties, worth, at

least, the amount of the surety bond, or properties of the same worth, belonging
to other persons willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of
said bonding companies.
Issue: WON RA 4421 is constitutional.
Ruling: Unconstitutional.
Republic Act No. 4421 prevents or disqualifies from running for President, VicePresident, Senator or Member of the House of Representatives those persons
who, although having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore,
cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to pay the premium
charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property necessary for said
counter-bond.
The said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of
the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social
justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet
that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned,
whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike,
and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
chance to be elected to public office.
**Congress passed this law in order to avoid nuisance candidates;
**Had this been allowed, it would have amended the Constitution as to
the qualifications for public office; The Constitution cannot be amended
by mere legislation.

Winner, defined.
Rulloda vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 154198)
Facts: In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and
Remegio L. Placido were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart
attack and passed away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.| His widow,
petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter to
the Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as
candidate for BarangayChairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late
husband.||| (Rulloda v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154198, [January 20,
2003], 443 PHIL 649-656) Based on the tally of petitioner's watchers who were
allowed to witness the canvass of votes during the July 15, 2002 elections,
petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290
votes. 5 Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the
Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.||
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul Section
9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar
as they prohibited petitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of her
deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent; and to proclaim
her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan|
Issue: WON petitioner can run in the elections in lieu of her husband
Ruling: Yes.
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected
officials which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is
the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast
in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic
idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.|||
Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. If after the last day of the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the

candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute

candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with
the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the
day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of
candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is nonpartisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party from
which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside from being non
sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voters. 12 It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear
and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt,
political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. 13
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in petitioner's favor can not
be counted because she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other words,
he was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the
Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the assailed
Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that petitioner's letterrequest to be allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her
late husband was treated as a certificate of candidacy. 14
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested
election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should
not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections.
|

Permanent disability of the President; Resignation of

the President; Vacancy in the office of the Vicepresident, how filed.
Estrada vs. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15)
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was
elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected VicePresident. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur

Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air
and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next
day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse."
He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the
petitioner took from Governor Singson 70 million on excise tax on cigarettes
intended for Ilocos Sur.
On December 7, the impeachment trial started.
At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. 28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family
hurriedly left Malacaang Palace and left a press statement.
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following
letter: 31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
|||After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of
the Ombudsman were set in motion.
|
Issue/s:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy,
whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the
negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President,
whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV

Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined

on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
Ruling:
I. Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political
questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation
of
certain
provisions
in
the 1987
Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II, 74 and section 8 75 of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section 11 76 of Article VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner
against prejudicial publicity.|||(Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15,
146738, [March 2, 2001], 406 PHIL 1-142)
II. The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should
be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her
oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level
legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It
can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it
must be given legal effect.||| (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15,
146738, [March 2, 2001], 406 PHIL 1-142)
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It
was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as
the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the presidentwhich he has given
up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he
did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.||| (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, [March 2,
2001], 406 PHIL 1-142)
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.||
III. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason
that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the

prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency.
Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." 109 Since
the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner
to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before
he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution.

||

Senators, number, how elected, term of office & term

limit
Tolentino vs. COMELEC (G.R. 148334)
Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of
Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001
passed Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy
through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on
14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected
in that election.[1] Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial
candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June
2004.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as
voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only
COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming
with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13 th highest number of votes
as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645
(R.A. No. 6645);[4] (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their
certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881;
[5]
and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify
in the Voters Information Sheet thecandidates seeking election under the special
or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646). [6] Petitioners add that
because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the
senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that
there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a
single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.

Issue: Whether or not a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate
seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
Ruling: Yes.
On mootness: Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a
tribunal or board to desist from committing an act threatened to be done without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[11] Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
[12]
However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. The
question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in
relation to COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such
special election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however,
may not be decided before the date of the election.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to
fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner
prescribed by law, thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special
election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645,
which provides in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months
or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular
election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of
a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall
hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official
communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by
the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired
term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety
(90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among
other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within
the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as follows:

Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a

permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at
least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call
and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor
longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in
case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001
elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance,
either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions [24] or even in its press
releases[25] did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single
three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the
senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special
election.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of
vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the
special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other
time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections
on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory
notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special
election to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the
holding of the special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the
vacancy should take place at least one year before the expiration of the
term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to
the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided
in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the
requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to call x x x
a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days after the
occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office to be filled. The
COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the
voters in the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the
special election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.

Senator, qualifications.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC (G.R. 161658)
Facts: The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as
it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private

offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,
among other personalities, is put in issue.
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results.
x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for
re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections, 1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Issue: WON Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes. The legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject
to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise
of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. 11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to
run for and serve as senator.

Number of Party-list
Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC (342 SCRA 244)
Facts: On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the
Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes.
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25,
1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having
garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with
the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the
twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further
claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the
three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only
25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the House.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus
total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives."

Issue/s:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of
a qualified party be determined?
Ruling: Petition is partly meritorious.
1. 20% is merely a ceiling; Considering the foregoing statutory requirements,
it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may
result in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress.[17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault
in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes,
but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.
2. Constitutional; The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence
of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen
by them.[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature
that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which
might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" [22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such
three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
3. Philippine Party-list system

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all partylist congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number
of votes.
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are
each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements
of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the
Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond
judicial review
BANAT vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 179271)
Facts: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties
under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the
Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers
that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners
in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan
Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),

Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural

Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
allocated to the appropriate parties.

Issue/s:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to

qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the
Constitution prohibit the
major political
parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Ruling:
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties

get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied partylist seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one guaranteed seat each.
3.
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking
in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4.
Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.

Term limit, purpose of.

Borja vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 133495) (succession from vice-mayo to
mayor)
Held: First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only
policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is
that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore,
only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office
whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard
one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much
concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a
proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local
and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running
for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the
third consecutive term.[4] Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from]
whom the people will choose asa result of the proposed absolute disqualification,
considering that the draft constitution provision recognizing peoples power
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply.
One Liner: The purpose of the three-term limit is not only to prevent
the monopolization of power but also to stress the importance of the
peoples freedom of choice.

Latasa vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829) (Conversion of Municipality of

Digos to City of Digos)
Facts: Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a
component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on
September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to be known
as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked
the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However,
under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a

hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as
the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive
terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time
for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for
city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due
Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification [1] against
petitioner Latasa.
Issue: WON Petitioner Latasa can still run as City Mayor of Digos after having
previously served three consecutive terms as Municipal Mayor of Digos.
Ruling: No;
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same
local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. [14]
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate
and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single entity and
must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the
Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he has already served
for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor. However, he asserts that when
Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical
personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor,
he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.
The charter of Digos emphasizes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of
the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by the Municipality of Digos. Also, the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of
applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor
would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office
of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City
of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of
the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor
for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he
held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as
mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having
involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of Digos from
municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his
office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due
to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal
mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office,
petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
One liner:

Succession, effect on term continuity

Borja vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133495)
Held: Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well

supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by
local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first
sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and
bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive
terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official
may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that
voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one
for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a
term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service
of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,

he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number
of times before the disqualification can apply.
One liner: Succession by operation of law in a local elective
position is excluded in counting his three-term limit. (IMPROVE)
Montebon vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 180444) (municipal councilor)
Facts: Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were
candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April 30, 2007,
petitioners and other candidates[4] for municipal councilor filed a petition for
disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent
had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for
the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive
term.
In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the service
of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he
succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the
position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.
Issue: WON Potenciosos succession as vice-mayor constituted voluntary
interruption so as to bar him from running for the 2007 elections.
Ruling: No;
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to
the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking
municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear therefore
that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a
voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
Thus, respondents assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an
involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an
interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.
One liner: Involuntary severance from office amounts to an interruption
in the continuity of service.

Preventive suspension, effect on term continuity.

Aldovino vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 184836) (preventive suspension)
Facts: The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor
of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term
of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the

Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions

of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served
for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term
limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA
7160.
Issue: WON preventive suspension can be considered as a valid interruption
which would allow Asilo to run on the fourth term.
Ruling: No.
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. This formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact
indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the
meaning is clear reference is to the term, not to the service that a public official
may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the
public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which
he
was
elected. This
declaration
complements
the term limitation mandated by the first branch.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To
renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is an act that emanates
from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with
the definition of a term in mind, renunciation, as mentioned under the second
branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in
cutting short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office.
Latasa instructively
highlights,
after
a
review
of Lonzanida,
Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period
or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post
intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen with no title to any
elective office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents lived as private citizens for
two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the
law contemplates a complete break from office during which the local elective
official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on
Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal councilor succeeded to the
position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he
subsequently ran for councilor was whether his assumption as vice-mayor was
an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the
operation of the three-term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had
intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates
from the results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official
continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during the

interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is
that the elective official vacated the office of councilor and assumed the higher
post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be
councilor an interruption that effectively placed him outside the ambit of the
three-term limit rule.
From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an
elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than
the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily
left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to
occur.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being
involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a term, as we held
in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the
loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office
holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his
office for a reason provided by law.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the
evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a
possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is
barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in
the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a
consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the
term.
One liner: In order for there to be valid interruption to disable the
application of the three-term limit, there must be a loss of office or a
break in the term. Thus, preventive suspension, being merely a
temporary incapacity in an unbroken term, cannot be considered a valid
interruption.

Disqualification prior to term end, effect of.

Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 135150)
Facts: Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged
the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then
opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court
of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of
elections. Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio,
Zambales is hereby declared vacant.

Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC
resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and reappreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes
as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued
a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed, and
Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely
filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in
the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in
the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
Issue: WON petitioner Lonzanida is disqualified due to the three-term limit
Ruling: No.
Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive
terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of
elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for more than three
consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective official
may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. The term served must therefore be one for which the the official
concerned was elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve.
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995
mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered
to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997
on the election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan
Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion
of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First,
the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in
the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 19951998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a reappreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections

and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a
valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held
by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation
at all[5] and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of
the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner
who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
[6]
Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he
merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in
the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Disqualification after term end, effect of

Ong vs. Alegre (G.R. No. 163295)
Rivera vs. COMELEC (G.R. 167591)
Facts: In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, respondent
Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for
the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or on January
5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.
On January 10, 2004, Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman,
petitioners, filed with the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition to cancel respondent Morales Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms
as mayor of Mabalacat.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Morales admitted that he was elected
mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (first
term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third term), but he served the second
term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a
"de facto officer" because of the following reasons:
a. He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 57, Angeles City in its Decision dated April 2, 2001 in
Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 98-131. The Decision became final and
executory on August 6, 2001; and
b. He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft
case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999.
On May 24, 2004, after respondent Morales was proclaimed the duly elected
mayor of Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007,
petitioner Anthony Dee, also a candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC, Branch
61, Angeles City a petition for quo warranto against the said respondent.
Petitioner alleged that respondent Morales, having served as mayor for three
consecutive terms, is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term.
Issue: WON Morales is disqualified to run in the 2004 elections considering that
he had previously served 3 consecutive terms.

Ruling: Yes.
Cites Ong vs. Alegre: For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive
terms.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern.
Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would-under the three-term rule-be
considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral
protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a
proclamation made in due course after an election.
It bears stressing that in Ong v. Alegre cited above, Francis Ong was elected and
assumed the duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was
declared void by the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte in its Decision dated July 4,
2001. As ruled by this Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full
term. Clearly, the three-term limit rule applies to him. Indeed, there is no reason
why this ruling should not also apply to respondent Morales who is similarly
situated.

Recall, effect on the three-term disqualification

Adormeo vs. COMELEC (426 Phil. 472)
Facts: Adormeo andTalaga were the only candidates who filed their certificates
of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private
respondent Talaga was then the incumbent mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full
term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to
Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and
served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the
latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms
as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in
the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the
recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of
Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election.
On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected City
Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He
pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the
consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship
was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that
his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and eighteen
(18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the law and the
Constitution.
On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private respondent
Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.. It reversed the First Divisions ruling and held that 1)
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not
win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by
reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall

elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term
disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive
terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in
the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
Issue: WON Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections
Ruling: No.
Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a
private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing
respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8
of 1987 Constitution.[5] To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in
interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.[6]
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas comment is pertinent
only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local government
officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress.
Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is
not.
Socrates vs. COMELEC (440 Phil. 106)
Facts: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent
barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall [2] of
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto
Princesas mayor on June 30, 2001.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution for
brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor
within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc[3] promulgated a resolution
dismissing for lack of merit Socrates petition. The COMELEC gave due course to
the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673
prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in
connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period
from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity) filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo
(Gilo for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that
Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.

Issue/s:
1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling
the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor
in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.
3. In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days
has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign
period as prayed for by petitioner.
Ruling:
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of
service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any
length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before
and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous
service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer

covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a
recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in
the continuity of service.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which
ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred
Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did
not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and
1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto
Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn
could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the
Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum
three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus,
Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. [16] Socrates ran and won as
mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be
mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office
interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive
terms. In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn
was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term
from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three
consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant case
is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the
first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the interruption happened after
the first three consecutive terms.In both cases, the respondents were seeking
election for a fourth term.
Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election
cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of
counting the consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.

Conversion of municipality to city, effect of.

Latasa vs. COMELEC

Election protest, effects of.

Abundo vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 201716)
Facts: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007
and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and
was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the

corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for
his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007
term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed
each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the formers
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo
ineligible to serve as municipal mayor. In so ruling, the trial court, citing
Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served three
consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010,
and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.

Issue: WON Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact
that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the second term as
a result of an election protest.
Ruling: No.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes:
succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension,
declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest,
declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election
contest, proclamation of a noncandidate as the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
(Court cited the cases of Borja, Adormeo, Socrates, Latasa, Aldovino, Lonzanida,
Ong, Rivera, Dizon in comparison with the present dispute)
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
monopolization of political power and prevent elected officials from breeding
proprietary interest in their position60 but also to enhance the peoples
freedom of choice.61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, while people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about,
care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
In the present case, the Court finds Abundos case meritorious and declares that
the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor
should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos
case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
A term, as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, 63 means, in a legal sense, a
fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold
an office. In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or
from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he

wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither
can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election
protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004 the
start of the termuntil May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually
assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels
while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as
having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration
would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo
did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position.
As to the applicability of the Aldovino case: For another, not having been
declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office
since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did
not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in
the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the
term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was
finally resolved in his favor.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundos case differs from other cases
involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the
final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and
opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of
an imperfect election system.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the
injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga,
Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the
framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We cannot arrogate unto
ourselves the right to decide what the people want and hence, should, as much
as possible, allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely
on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself. For
democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is
the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.

Party-List Representatives or Nominees, qualifications.

Bagong Bayani-OFW vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147589)
Facts: Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,
in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit

the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
non-marginalized or overrepresented.
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted
from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May
14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On
April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,

Issue: Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
Ruling: 1.) Yes
For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political
parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the
impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow
political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the partylist system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." 29
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count
their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that

is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list

system."
2) Yes
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941.
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
1. the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941
2. while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives.

3. in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay

Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be
represented in the party-list system.
4. Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59
5. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government.
6. Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. (Section 9 of RA 7941)
7. Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
BANAT vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 179271), Bayan Muna vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 179295)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided

the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising
the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition
of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. [33] In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party
or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties
will participate in the party-list elections.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity [34] as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the
sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he
or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or
she must be a senior citizen.

Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766)

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the

Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying

them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of
their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in
this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and
sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in
the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to
the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation."
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain
sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There
can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly
rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in
nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates
can garner in legislative district elections.
The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as
a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative
district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor
represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or

regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that
do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the
national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members
in the House of Representatives. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a
major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections
must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a
bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector .

Nature of Constitutional & Statutory enumeration of

sectors.
Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582)
Facts: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party applied for accreditation in the party-list system.
When they first applied in 2006, they were denied by the COMELEC because they
lacked substantial membership base. In 2009, they again sought registration
with the COMELEC but still they were denied, the latter invoking moral grounds.
COMELEC reasoned that the Ang Ladlad party cannot be granted accreditation
because their views offend religious beliefs, are in violation of the Revised Penal
Code which penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions
and indecent shows, and are considered nuisance (as defined under the Civil
Code).
The petitioner now seeks relief invoking the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion, their constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
Issue: WON Ang Ladlad Party can be accredited under our party-list system
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner
was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution.
At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due
process.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
[24]
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.[25] We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment

clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is
not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that
the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently,
therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient
reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate
state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang
Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.

Nature of list of nominees.

BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271)
Facts: In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay
Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UPLR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private
respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not
their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed
as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April
3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list
groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.
Issue/s: WON COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
public the names of said nominees.
Ruling:
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without
simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis.

Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a partylist nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the
names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941.
This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling
places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless
tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in
said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The COMELEC shall, not later than
sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have
manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute
copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election
day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the
public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized
as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to
respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime.16 Without a governments acceptance of the limitations
upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to
the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the peoples right to know is limited to "matters
of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by
law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving
"public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. If, as
in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons
employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service
eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should
be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of
personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed
non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of
invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. 20 While
the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit
in the House of Representatives.

Elective local officials, term of office & term of limit

David vs. COMELEC (G.R. 127116)

Elective local officials, qualifications.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (257 SCRA 727)
Facts: Frivaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of Governer of
Sorsogon for the May 1995 elections. His opponent, Lee, filed a disqualification
case against him questioning his citizenship as he had not yet been repatriated.
The COMELEC had already disqualified Frivaldo during the 1988 and 1992
elections for the same ground even when Frivaldo garnered the highest votes in
both. In the meantime, Lee posited that he should be the duly elected governor
as Frivaldo was disqualified and he obtained the second highest votes.
The COMELEC ruled that it is Frivaldo who should be elected.
Issue: WON Frivaldo possessed the citizenship qualification required of the
position he seeks to be elected.
Ruling: YES. Frivaldo applied for repatriation in 1994. But he was only able to
make his oath of allegiance / was validly repatriated on June 30, 1995, at the
time when his term would begin. The Supreme Court held that he has validly
acquired his citizenship through the following reasons:

The requirement of citizenship does not have any qualification as to when

it should be possessed unlike the residence requirement or the age
requirement.
To question the qualification of the incumbent, the Omnibus Election Code
provides that it should be done within ten days after proclamation; this
entails that even if Lee questioned the eligibility of Frivaldo, at the time he
does, Frivaldo was already a Filipino citizen
Laws of Curative/Remedial nature can be applied retroactively; PD 725
provides for a mode of reacquiring Filipino citizenship -> curative; hence,
retroactive. Frivaldo is deemed repatriated at the time he applied for
repatriation in 1994.

Labo vs. COMELEC (176 SCRA 1)

Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

SK officials, qualifications and disqualifications

Garvida vs. Sales (G.R. No. 124893)
Facts: Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She was not allowed to
register since she was then 21 years old and ten months. According to the Board
of Election Tellers, she exceeded the age limit. The Municipal Trial Court however
declared her qualified and ordered her registration.
In 1996, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman of
Sangguniang Kabataan in Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
COMELEC en banc, acting on the petition to disqualify Garvida, ordered the Board
of Election Tellers to suspend her proclamation if she garners the highest votes.
Garvida won by two votes (78 to 76). Garvida was later on proclaimed as winner
but the Board stipulated that it is without prejudice to any further action of the
COMELEC.
Issue: WON Garvida is qualified to run as SK Chairman.
Ruling: NO.
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid
down by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
"Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. The katipunan ng kabataan
shall be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually
residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are
fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and
who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or
in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary."

A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the

Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the following qualifications:
"Sec. 428. Qualifications. An elective official of the sangguniang
kabataan must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of
the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least
one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15)
years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on the day
of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local
dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude."
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age
of anelective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age
at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have
turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the
maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his
election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or
on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective
official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. The
distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. 31 The courts may distinguish when
there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or qualification.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification
of a barangay youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of
age or over but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the
youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction of
a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local
Government Code increased the age limit of members of the youth organization
to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth
"at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers was
to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so expressly
instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the
day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was
twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she
was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1,
1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10)
days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for
elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and
Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as
candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

Dual Citizenship
Valles vs. COMELEC
Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in
both the 1995 and 1998 local elections. On both elections, her citizenship was
questioned by her opponents. Lopez was born in Australia to a Australian mother
and Filipino father. The petitioner Valles, her opponent in the 1998 elections,
contended that Lopez was registered as an Australian national in the Bureau of
Immigration and also possessed an Australian Passport. This to his mind, did not
constitute renunciation on the part of Lopez of her Australian citizenship for her
to be qualified to run for public office.
Issue: WON Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is qualified to run for a local elective office.
Ruling: Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were
the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under
the 1973 4 and 1987 5 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most,
private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her
possession of dual citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. The acts of Lopez did not in any way constitute express renunciation of
her Filipino citizenship.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship. 10 The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. 11 This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated
her Australian citizenship.
Mercado vs. Manzano (307 SCRA 630)
Facts: Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the city of Makati in the May 1998 elections. In that election, Manzano

won. However, due to the pending petition for disqualification against him, the
proclamation was suspended. The ground based upon by the disqualification was
his dual citizenship. The COMELECs Second Division declared petitioner
disqualified. This decision was reversed by the COMELEC sitting en banc.
Issue: WON having dual citizenship automatically disqualifies a person from
running for public office.
Ruling: NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance, the latter being
inimical to the national interest. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.|||
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.||
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California
on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli,
the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines
and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by
participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
"effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he
is solely a Philippine national.
De Guzman vs. COMELEC (G.R. 180048)
Facts: De Guzman and Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 2007 elections. Dela Cruz filed a case for disqualification
of De Guzman by reason of the latters citizenship. Dela Cruz won the election.
De Guzman filed an election protest and was consequently declared the winner.
However, the COMELEC disqualified De Guzman.
Issues: WON the filing of a certificate of candidacy automatically confers upon a
candidate who reacquired Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 the right to
run for public office.
Ruling: No.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship
by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen
who lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American
citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6,

2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an

additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, as
follows: DcHSEa
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

Contrary to petitioner's claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does

not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No.
9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the
instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.