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HELD:
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code reads
that Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
Is
it
final
judgment
contradistinguished
from
interlocutory order? Or,
as
an
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio
Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
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(The
medical
certificate
cannot
be
considered because it was not admitted in
evidence)
(3) Her testimonial evidence.
(Dra. Dela Llanas opinion that Joels
negligence caused her whiplash injury has
no probative value)
FACTS:
This case originated from libel suit filed by
Antonio V. Raquiza against Manila Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly
imputed to him acts constituting violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on several
August 1968 through;
a) A speech before the Lionos Club of
Malasiqui, Pangasinan on August 10;
b) Public Statements in Manila on August
13;
c) In Davao on August 17, which was
coupled with a radio-TV interview; and
d) A public statement shortly prior to his
appearance
ebfore
the
Senate
Committee on Public Works Committee
on August 20.
The Committee observed that all allegations in
the complaint was based on the testimony of
Pedro U. Fernandez. Villegas also failed to
submit the original copies of his documentary
evidence. Thus, after investigation, Raquiza
was cleared of all charged by the Committee.
On July 25, 1969, information for libel was filed
before the Fiscal of Manila against Villegas who
denied the charge. After losing the 1971
election, Villegas left for the United Stated
where he stayed until he died on November 16,
1984. Nevertheless, trial proceeded on
absentia. The prosecution had already rested
SO ORDERED.
The heirs of Villegas appealed the decision.
On March 15, 1988, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming the trial court's
judgment modified only with respect to the
award of damages which was reduced to P2
million representing P1.5 million, P300,000.00,
and P200,000.00 in moral exemplary and actual
damages, respectively. Both parties elevated
said decision to this Court for review.
ISSUE:
WON death of the accused before final
judgement extinguishes Civil Liability?
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HELD:
NO. Applying the rule on the Bayotas case:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.
2.
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HELD:
In this case, the lifting of the restraining order
paved the way for the possession of the
fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their
representatives pending the resolution of the
main action for injunction. In other words, the
main issue of whether or not private respondent
may be considered a sublessee or a transferee
of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond
under the circumstances of the case had yet to
be resolved when the restraining order was
lifted.
Art. 1168 of the Civil Code provides that when
an obligation "consists in not doing and the
obligor does what has been forbidden him, it
shall also be undone at his expense." The lease
contract prohibited petitioner Luis Keh, as
lessee, from subleasing the fishpond. In
entering into the agreement for pakiao-buwis
with private respondent, not to mention the
apparent artifice that was his written agreement
with petitioner Lee on January 9, 1978,
petitioner Keh did exactly what was prohibited
of him under the contract to sublease the
fishpond to a third party.
That the agreement for pakiao-buwis was
actually a sublease is borne out by the fact that
private respondent paid petitioners Luis Keh
and Juan Perez, through petitioner Tansinsin
the amount of annual rental agreed upon in the
lease contract between the usufructuaries and
petitioner Keh. Petitioner Keh led private
respondent to unwittingly incur expenses to
improve the operation of the fishpond. By
operation of law, therefore, petitioner Keh shall
be liable to private respondent for the value of
the improvements he had made in the fishpond
or for P486,562.65 with interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the rendition of the
decision of the trial court on September 6, 1989.
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WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing
premises, the decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED insofar as it
a) directs the release to private respondent of
the
amounts
of
P128,572.00
and
P123,993.85 deposited with the Paluwagan
ng Bayan Savings Bank in Paombong,
Bulacan and
b) requires private respondent Crisostomo to
pay petitioner Juan Perez the rental for the
period June 1979 to January 1980 at the
rate of P150,000.00 per annum less the
amount of P21,428.00 already paid to
usufructuary Maria Perez.
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Reasoning:
As a result of the incident, the plaintiff was
unable to properly attend his professional labors
for 3 months and suspend his practice for that
period. By testimonial evidence, his customary
income, as a physician, was about P300/month.
So the trial judge accordingly allowed P900 as
damages for loss of earnings.
5.2 YES. The trial judge erred in awarding such
damages.
Ratio:
Damage of this character could not, at the time
of the accident, have been foreseen by the
delinquent party as a probable consequence of
the injury inflicted.
Reasoning:
The representative from Negros Occidental has
supposedly asked Dr. Montinola to nominate
the plaintiff as district health officer of Negros
Occidental for two years, with a salary
of P1,600 per annum and a possible outside
practice worth of P350. However, even if true,
the damages were too speculative to be the
basis of recovery in a civil action.
5.3 NO. The trial court was fully justified in
rejecting the exaggerated estimate of damages
allegedly created.
Ratio/ Reasoning
The plaintiff alleged, even showing testimonial
evidences from numerous medical experts, that
he developed infarct of the liver and traumatic
neurosis, accompanied by nervousness,
vertigo, and other disturbing symptoms of a
serious and permanent character, and these
manifestations of disorder rendered him liable
to a host of other dangerous diseases, and that
restoration
to
health
could
only
be
accomplished after long years of complete
repose.-The medical experts introduced by the
defendant testified however that the plaintiffs
injuries, considered in their physical effects,
were trivial and that the attendant nervous
derangement, with its complicated train of
ailments, was merely simulated.
According to the court, the evidence showed
that immediately after the incident the plaintiff,
sensing in the situation a possibility of profit,
devoted himself with great assiduity to the
promotion of this litigation; and with the aid of
his own professional knowledge, supplemented
by suggestions obtained from his professional
friends and associates, he enveloped himself
more or less unconsciously in an atmosphere of
delusion which rendered him incapable of
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ISSUE:
WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.
RULING:
Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract
due to negligence, or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its
depositor is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on simple loan. Article 1980 of the
Civil Code expressly provides that x x x
savings x x x deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions shall be governed by the
provisions concerning simple loan. There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank
and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and
the depositor is the creditor. The depositor
lends the bank money and the bank agrees to
pay the depositor on demand. The savings
deposit agreement between the bank and the
depositor is the contract that determines the
rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in
view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The
bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of
its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship.
This fiduciary relationship means that the
banks obligation to observe high standards of
integrity and performance is deemed written
into every deposit agreement between a bank
and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of
banking requires banks to assume a degree of
diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that
the degree of diligence required of an obligor is
that prescribed by law or contract, and absent
such stipulation then the diligence of a good
father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791
prescribes the statutory diligence required from
banks that banks must observe high
standards of integrity and performance in
servicing their depositors.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bankdepositor relationship does not convert the
contract between the bank and its depositors
from a simple loan to a trust agreement,
whether express or implied. Failure by the bank
to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple
loan, and not a breach of trust. The law simply
imposes on the bank a higher standard of
integrity and performance in complying with its
obligations under the contract of simple loan,
beyond those required of non-bank debtors
under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not
convert a simple loan into a trust agreement
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of
the
Unauthorized
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Father de la Pea is liable for
the loss of the money under his trust?
RULINGS:
No. The court, therefore, finds and declares that
the money which is the subject matter of this
action was deposited by Father De la Pea in
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation of Iloilo; that said money was
forcibly taken from the bank by the armed
forces of the United States during the war of the
insurrection; and that said Father De la Pea
was not responsible for its loss.
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Issue:
Issue:
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VS.
SPS.
NO.
170942,