Allegheny Power Planning Criteria

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1 EHV & Transmission Planning 1
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The three Allegheny Power companies are direct subsidiaries of Allegheny Energy, Inc.
TrAILCo is a direct subsidiary of Allegheny Energy Transmission, LLC, which is a direct
subsidiary of Allegheny Energy, Inc. PATH-WV and PATH-Allegheny are direct
subsidiaries of AET PATH Company, which is a direct subsidiary of Allegheny Energy
Transmission, LLC. Because of their common ownership by Allegheny Energy, Inc., the
transmission facilities of Allegheny Power, TrAILCo, PATH-WV and PATH-Allegheny,
collectively referred to in this document as the Allegheny Energy Transmission Owners
(“AETO”), are managed, operated, and subjected to the same planning standards.
TrAILCo, PATH-WV and PATH-Allegheny have also adopted all other planning criteria
established by Allegheny Power.
Bulk Electric System (“BES”) planning and operating procedures consistently include
reliability as one of the essential measures of system performance. The AETO meet the
need to expand and/or upgrade their transmission facilities by developing plans using
criteria that provide for continued reliable operation consistent with economic and
regulatory constraints.
This document presents the reliability criteria used by the AETO to determine the need to
expand and/or upgrade their BES. Allegheny Power transferred functional control of its
transmission facilities to, and became a member of, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (“PJM”)
on April 1, 2002. All of TrAILCo’s transmission facilities have been designated for
installation by PJM’s Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (“RTEP”). TrAILCo and
PATH –Allegheny became members of PJM on March 28, 2007 and January 2, 2008
respectively, and all of its transmission facilities are subject to the functional control of
PJM. Through membership in PJM, the AETO work together with PJM in regards to
planning and operating to ensure continued reliability and system performance.
Specifically, planning and operations related to the AETO transmission facilities are subject
to the PJM Operating Agreement, the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff and the
policies, procedures, practices and interpretations developed by PJM thereunder.
Source: Transmission Planning

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Transmission system expansion plans are developed with the goal of minimizing revenue
requirements, which include both capital and operating costs, while meeting planning
criteria that deal with maintaining acceptable system performance. The proper application
of transmission planning criteria requires substantial engineering judgment based upon
numerous and extensive studies of the transmission system by the planning engineer.
Prudently managed utilities rely on the knowledge, experience, and judgment of their
planning engineers in applying the criteria to specific circumstances on the transmission
system. For this reason, it is simply not possible to document all the criteria that may be
used to decide the way in which a transmission system is developed and expanded.
To understand reliability in transmission system performance requires an understanding of

how reliability affects a transmission system. The primary reliability objectives are
adequacy and security. They can be defined as follows:
Adequacy - the capacity to meet transmission system demand within major

component ratings in the presence of scheduled and unscheduled outages of
generation and transmission components or facilities, and
Security - the transmission system's capability to withstand disturbances

arising from faults and unscheduled removal of BES elements without further
loss of facilities or cascading outages.
In order to evaluate the reliability of a transmission system, it is necessary to have

benchmarks or criteria to determine the levels of adequacy and security in that system.
The criteria in this document are based on the experience of the AETO along with industry
experience with equipment performance. It also acknowledges the need to provide
operating flexibility for maintenance or forced outages while limiting the frequency and
duration of customer interruptions. Thus, various segments of the supply system will have
increasingly stringent reliability criteria as one moves from lower to higher system voltages
involving greater numbers of customers. Determination of the level of reliability that is
acceptable depends primarily upon regulatory standards in conjunction with what

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regulatory commissions are willing to provide through granting construction licenses and
rate increases.
The following general transmission system planning objectives have evolved and been
refined through years of experience to achieve the objectives of maintaining acceptable
transmission system performance through an adequate and secure system for the least
cost. These objectives define the conditions used to identify the need for transmission
facility reinforcement.
! The reinforcement must represent an economical method to provide dependable

service to our customers within the constraints of regulatory, environmental, and
political guidelines.
! The reinforcement should be sized to meet projected growth needs according to the
Allegheny Power and PJM load forecasts while providing an optimum level of reserve
capability.
! The reinforcement installation should be timed to maintain reliability and minimize cost.
! Reasonable feasible alternatives should be considered in planning new facility

reinforcements. This includes, but is not limited to, new technology, innovative
applications of existing technology, managing load growth, and automation of controls.
Interconnected transmission facilities, in addition to meeting the AETO and PJM criteria,
must meet or exceed reliability criteria as established by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) Reliability Standards. These documents provide reliability
criteria that are designed to test the ability of ReliabilityFirst member systems to withstand
certain contingencies without triggering a breakup and collapse of any major part of the
BES.
ReliabilityFirst Corporation (“RFC”) was approved by the NERC to become one of eight
Regional Reliability Councils in North America and began operations on January 1, 2006.
RFC is the successor organization to three former NERC Regional Reliability Councils: the

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Mid-Atlantic Area Council (MAAC), the East Central Area Reliability Coordination
Agreement (ECAR), and the Mid-American Interconnected Network organizations (MAIN).
The NERC Transmission Planning (“TPL”) Standards along with Modeling, Data and
Analysis ("MOD") Standards MOD-011 & MOD-013 have superseded ECAR Document
No. 1 since October 25, 2007.
Existing regulatory and environmental constraints such as the inability to obtain right-of-
way, permitting, or regulatory approval can lead to conditions exacerbating violations of
transmission reliability standards. The degradation of reliability levels caused by these
conditions must be recognized as such and not used as examples to justify subversion of
reliability levels in other areas of the system.
The testing done on the transmission system is by mathematically modeling the

transmission system and solving the various simulated conditions on a computer using
power flow, short circuit and dynamic stability models.
The following represent the AETO transmission planning criteria and are discussed in
detail in Sections 2 through 5.
! Thermal and Voltage Criteria
! System Stability Criteria
! System Performance Criteria
! Line and Substation Configuration Criteria
2.0 THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA
2.1 Transmission System Facility Ratings
The AETO transmission line facilities are rated for both summer and winter,
continuous, 4-hour, and ¼-hour periods of service, while transformers use a

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continuous, 4-hour, and one-hour rating. Real-time thermal ratings are implemented
at 9"F (5"C) intervals as directed by PJM. The ratings make use of manufacturers'
recommendations and industry standards. The methodology used to determine
overhead conductor ratings is provided in Section 9, Subject Index 2.0 of the
Engineering Manual.
Transformer ratings are determined using a program from the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI). The ratings that are developed take into account all of
the elements which make up the facility including conductors, transformers,
structures, terminal facilities, hardware, as well as protective relaying facilities and
their settings.
The AETO use a summer ambient temperature of 90"F (32.2"C), and winter
ambient of 50"F (10"C). A continuous wind speed of two feet per second at a right
angle to the conductor is assumed for both winter and summer ratings. The ratings
needed to analyze the system are supplied as part of the power flow data.
2.2 Normal System Conditions
Normal system conditions are defined as all transmission and generation facilities in
service except those known to be unavailable due to scheduled maintenance or a
prolonged outage. All scheduled firm power sales and purchases with and between
other systems are assumed to be in effect, as are outside inter-system transfers that
affect the AETO transmission systems. Normal conditions for the seasonal
operating base cases will differ somewhat from planning cases in that they will
typically include some assumed non-firm economy sales in addition to firm sales.
Computer power flow transmission system analyses are conducted for peak load
conditions since that is the likely critical period for the transmission system. The
AETO adhere to the criteria provided in the PJM Base Line Voltage Limits table
located in PJM Manual 3: Transmission Operations, Section 3, Voltage & Stability
Operating Guidelines. For normal system condition voltage limits, refer to the “High”
and “Normal Low” values corresponding to the voltage level.

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(Link to table: http://pjm.com/documents/~/media/documents/manuals/m03.ashx).

The criteria for acceptable system performance during normal system conditions
apply to:
2.2.1 Generation
All available generators are fully dispatchable to their normal seasonal

operating capacity and can regulate to the scheduled voltage.
2.2.2 Extra-High Voltage (“EHV”) Transmission System

(765 kV and 500 kV lines and associated step-down substations)
All EHV transmission system facilities operate within their normal continuous
seasonal thermal capabilities and within the High and Normal Low values
provided in the PJM Base Line Voltage Limits table. Nominal voltages are
765 kV and 500 kV.
2.2.3 Area Transmission System

(345 kV, 230 kV, 138 kV, and 115 kV lines and associated step-down
substations)
All area transmission system facilities operate within their normal continuous
seasonal thermal capabilities and within the High and Normal Low values
provided in the PJM Base Line Voltage Limits table. Nominal voltages are
345 kV, 230 kV, 138 kV, and 115 kV.
2.3 Single Contingency Testing
A single contingency is the sudden outage of any single generation or transmission

branch element (generator, line, or transformer) while performing a transmission
system function during normal system conditions.
The AETO adhere to the criteria provided in the PJM Base Line Voltage Limits table
located in PJM Manual 3: Transmission Operations, Section 3, Voltage & Stability
Operating Guidelines. For single contingency voltage limits, refer to the “High” and

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“Emergency Low” values corresponding to the voltage level. (Link to table:

http://pjm.com/documents/~/media/documents/manuals/m03.ashx).
The criteria for acceptable transmission system performance during single
contingency outages apply to:
2.3.1 Generation and Interconnections
No generator output restrictions are caused by the contingency unless the

generator or its associated facilities are the contingency element outaged.
Generators and interconnections have sufficient capability to compensate for
power loss until the loss can be restored by rescheduling internal generation
or outside purchases can be arranged.
2.3.2 EHV Transmission System

(765 kV and 500 kV lines and associated step-down substations)
All EHV transmission system lines shall remain within their 4-hour seasonal
thermal capabilities and within the High and Emergency Low values provided
in the PJM Base Line Voltage Limits table. EHV transmission system
voltages must remain within 8% of their pre-contingency values for 765 kV
voltages, and within 5% for 500 kV voltages.
2.3.3 Area Transmission System

(345 kV, 230 kV, 138 kV, and 115 kV lines and associated step-down
substations)
All area transmission system facilities must remain within their 4-hour
seasonal thermal capabilities and within the High and Emergency Low values
provided in the PJM Base Line Voltage Limits table. Area transmission
system voltages must remain within 5% of their pre-contingency values.
2.3.4 Customer Loads
No customer should be interrupted by the contingency unless directly

connected to the outaged facility.

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2.4 Double Contingency Testing
A double contingency is the outage of any combination of two lines, transformers, or

generators. The outages may be simultaneous or sequential; however, the second
outage may occur before system adjustments can be made. While the probability of
a double contingency is less than a single contingency, the consequences, such as
the effect on system reliability, can be much more severe.
The AETO transmission systems are designed to withstand the single contingency
conditions described under Section 2.3. However, double contingency tests are
also used to assess the strength of the transmission system. If the double
contingency tests indicate severe overloading or precipitous voltage drops that
extend beyond the immediate area of the outage, then a reinforcement to the
transmission system is considered.
2.5 Multiple Contingency Testing
Multiple contingencies are a combination outage of more than two lines,

transformers, or generators. Such events are less probable than single or double
contingencies, but because they are credible, multiple contingencies must be
considered in any analysis of transmission system reliability to demonstrate the
basic strength of a transmission system. In some cases, it is the consequence of
multiple contingency testing that determines whether transmission system
reinforcements can be justified.
Since the Allegheny Power companies are members of RFC, the AETO BES is
planned to meet NERC Transmission Planning (“TPL”) Standards. The NERC TPL-
003 and TPL-004 describe the criteria to be used for simulated testing of multiple
contingency conditions. These criteria are intended to ensure that the RFC BES will
be able to withstand credible multiple contingencies and not suffer cascading
outages that could cause uncontrolled area-wide power interruptions.
Multiple contingencies listed in the NERC TPL-003 & -004 Standards include, but
are not limited to:

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! Outage of a transmission line, including a double circuit tower line, when various
generators are unavailable.
! Outage of a substation, including loss of any directly connected generation.
! Sudden outage of a major load center.
! Outage of all lines on a common right-of-way.
2.6 Transmission Constraint Mitigation
PJM utilizes several methods to mitigate transmission constraints:
! Pre-contingency reconfiguration of the transmission system is used where

possible to eliminate the potential contingency overload.
! Off-cost re-dispatch of generation is used on a pre-contingency basis to mitigate

transmission constraints where local generation dispatch is effective in reducing
flows on the constrained facility.
! The NERC Transmission Loading Relief (“TLR”) procedure may be used if other
methods are not effective in controlling flows that cause the overloads. The TLR
procedure provides the means by which off-system parallel transactions can be
identified and curtailed to maintain transmission system security.
2.7 Reactive Power Requirements
Although the primary function of the transmission system is the transport of real
power (megawatts), the transmission planner must be cognizant of the equally
important reactive power (megavars) requirements of the system. Without an
adequate reactive power supply, the ability of the transmission system to carry real
power may be severely limited. In extreme cases of deficient reactive power supply,

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rapidly deteriorating voltage conditions could trigger a cascading blackout over a

wide area.
The reactive power sources commonly available to supply the reactive loads and
losses include generators, the capacitive line charging component of transmission
lines, static capacitors, synchronous condensers, and static VAr compensators.
The following criteria generally describe the AETO reactive planning philosophy:
2.7.1 The AETO BES will have reactive compensation with adequate controls to
supply the reactive load and loss requirements of the transmission system
and to maintain acceptable voltage profiles as defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3
above for:
! Normal conditions.
! Single contingency outage conditions.
2.7.2 Transmission system VAr requirements are currently supplied by shunt

capacitors in conjunction with generators and line charging reactance.
Static VAr compensators and synchronous condensers may be used if

instantaneous reactive response is required for widely varying VAr load and
where the increased costs of these devices can be justified.
2.7.3 Each transmission zone should supply its own reactive load and loss
requirements under normal operating conditions.
2.7.4 Switched capacitors should not cause more than a 3% voltage rise under
normal system conditions.

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2.7.5 Switched capacitors should not cause more than a 10% voltage rise under
contingency conditions, as outlined in Section 2.3 above.
3.0 SYSTEM STABILITY CRITERIA
The BES is designed to meet the NERC TPL Standards such that no uncontrolled
cascading outages take place.
In addition, it is also designed so that the generating units remain in synchronism and all
generator power swings are well damped following credible contingencies such as
electrical faults and sudden network changes caused by fault clearing and successful or
unsuccessful line reclosing. These criteria should be met for all operating load levels,
giving due consideration to the relaying and automatic switching practices.
The following criteria are used to test system stability:
3.1 System Normal Criteria
Generating units at any power output level before the disturbance should remain
stable for the following tests of normal clearing:
3.1.1 A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on any line or

transformer cleared by the primary protective relaying scheme and where
applicable for line faults, followed by an unsuccessful high speed reclosure.
3.1.2 Breaker failure: A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on

any line or transformer cleared by backup breakers due to the failure of the
primary breaker to interrupt the fault.
3.1.3 Protective relaying overtrip: A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-

ground fault on any line or transformer cleared by the primary protective relay
and any adjacent line trip due to relaying overtrip followed where applicable
by appropriate reclosing.

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3.1.4 Primary protective relaying scheme inoperative: A permanent three-phase or

single-phase-to-ground fault on any line or transformer cleared by primary
protective relaying at one end of the line or transformer, and backup or
slower relaying at the other end.
3.2 Line Out Criteria
With one critical line or transformer out of service, and the system at peak load,
generating units at any power output level before disturbance should remain stable
for:
3.2.1 A permanent three-phase fault on any line or transformer cleared by primary

protective relaying scheme followed where applicable by an unsuccessful
high speed reclosure for line faults except for a fault that separates a unit
from the power system without an accompanying load island. Operating
restrictions, such as limiting predisturbance real power output of a generator
or generating stations, may be considered for extraordinary situations to
satisfy this criterion.
4.0 ADDITIONAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
4.1 Transfer Capability
Transfer capability is used to assess and test the ability of the interconnected
transmission network to move power between entities, companies, regions,
subregions, pools, etc. Sufficient transfer capability is typically based on the ability
to receive support from non-affiliates during a generation capacity emergency.
Transfer capability of the AETO systems are determined by PJM in conjunction with
the capability of the overall PJM footprint.
The criteria used by Allegheny Power were adopted from the NERC transfer
capability definition as recommended in the NERC publication, “North American
Electric Reliability Council Transmission Transfer Capability”. These criteria also
were commonly used by interregional study groups such as the VACAR-ECAR-

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MAAC (VEM) and MAAC-ECAR-NPCC (MEN) study committees. The First

Contingency Incremental Transfer Capability (FCITC) is defined by NERC as the
power, incremental above base transfers that can be transferred in a reliable
manner under the following conditions:
4.1.1 With all transmission facilities in service, all facility loadings are within normal
ratings, and all voltages are within normal limits.
4.1.2 The BES is capable of absorbing the dynamic power swings and remaining
stable following a disturbance resulting in the loss of any single generation
unit, transmission circuit, or transformer.
4.1.3 After the dynamic power swings following a disturbance resulting in the loss
of any single generating unit, transmission circuit, or transformer, but before
operator-directed system adjustments are made, all transmission facility
loadings are within emergency ratings and all voltages are within emergency
limits.
4.2 Fault Currents
Three-phase and single-line-to-ground short circuit currents and sequence voltages

during faults are calculated for each bus on the transmission system. Fault current
values are used to check the short circuit adequacy of equipment for system
protection and protective coordination, and to determine electrical system strength
at various locations on the system.
4.3 Switching Surges
Switching surge studies are performed to determine transient and dynamic

overvoltages and circuit breaker transient recovery voltages during switching.
These studies provide recommendations for switching devices and allowable
switching sequences which limit overvoltages on transmission system components
to levels within the equipment manufacturer's specified operating range. The

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studies also facilitate selection of surge protection devices that provide proper
protection and have adequate power dissipation capacity.
Existing equipment capabilities and insulation coordination requirements also

determine acceptable transient and dynamic overvoltage limits.
4.4 Power Quality
The transmission system is designed to provide acceptable power quality. In

addition to optimal adequacy and security of the power supply, the system is
designed so that voltage fluctuations or total harmonic distortions of voltages are
limited to the following levels:
4.4.1 Voltage Fluctuations
Voltage fluctuations or voltage flicker due to rapidly changing load is limited

to a level, which will not exceed the company guidelines documented in
Section 46 of this manual.
4.4.2 Harmonic Limits
The harmonic currents that an individual customer injects into or draws from
the AETO transmission systems, as measured at the point of common
coupling, shall not exceed the limits established by the companies as
documented in Section 46 of this manual.
4.4.3 Negative Sequence Currents
Negative sequence current studies are conducted so that damage to

equipment resulting from negative sequence currents can be avoided.
Unbalanced currents are caused by nonsymmetrical phase arrangements in
transmission lines, unbalanced loads, or unequal transformer impedance.
Negative sequence currents can produce excessive heating in the metallic
wedges and retaining rings of turbine-generator rotors.

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Due to the close proximity and strong influence of adjacent company

interconnected EHV systems, negative sequence current studies for the EHV
network are normally conducted on a multi-company basis. Negative
sequence currents in generators should be limited to less than 5% of the
positive sequence currents.
4.4.4 Negative Sequence Voltages
Negative sequence voltages should not exceed 2.5% of positive sequence

voltages. A customer's load directly supplied from the transmission system
should not cause more than 2.5% voltage unbalance.
4.4.5 Facility Outages
Lower levels of power quality can be tolerated when significant elements of

the supporting transmission system are out of service.
5.0 LINE AND SUBSTATION CONFIGURATION CRITERIA
5.1 Extra High Voltage (“EHV”)
5.1.1 Lines
a) For reliability reasons, the AETO prefer to use only single circuit tower
construction for 500 kV lines, however double circuit construction will
be considered when other options are not feasible.
b) The AETO prefer to route EHV lines on exclusive right-of-way in which

any parallel lines are of a lower voltage class, the exception being the
approach to a substation. However, parallel EHV lines on common
right-of-way will be considered as the need arises.
c) Line crossings should be avoided and EHV lines should always

occupy the highest position when crossing lower voltage lines.

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5.1.2 Substations
a) The preferred bus configuration for EHV substations is "breaker and a

half" when more than two lines terminate on the bus. Most stations
start out as ring buses and evolve to "breaker and a half" as terminal
positions are added. “Double breaker-double bus” configurations will
be utilized at substations where needed to maintain system stability
and reliability.
b) Transformer positions can be located on the buses, in the "string," or

split between the two, but no more than one transformer should be
located at each location.
c) Source lines and load lines should occupy alternate positions around a
ring bus or be paired together on a "breaker and a half string."
d) Transformer loading is controlled as follows:
! The second transformer is added when the first transformer loads

above its emergency rating during single contingency events or
when the lines that supply the local area experience loading
above their emergency rating when the transformer is removed.
! Third and fourth transformers are added when the loss of one
transformer causes any of the remaining transformers to load
above its emergency rating.
5.2 Area Transmission
5.2.1 Line Configuration
a) Optimum Line Supply to Substations

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When possible, a substation is supplied with two separate

transmission lines with individual terminal facilities located within the
substation.
b) Double Circuit Lines
Consistent with sound engineering, economic and environmental

considerations, double circuit transmission supply sources may be
justified based on the unavailability of a suitable separate line supply
as a second source. The length of a double circuit line is minimized
for reliability reasons.
c) Radial Lines
A radial or a single transmission line supply to a substation may be

justified for an interim period when existing lower voltage lines can
supply the substation load for the outage of the radial transmission
line.
When the substation load exceeds the capability of the lower voltage
supply to provide backup for loss of the transmission supply, a second
transmission supply is evaluated. Justification of a second
transmission line is based on reliability versus economic constraints,
with consideration given to the probability and timing of future area
loads.
d) Multiple Rights-of-Way and Tower Lines
Whenever possible, it is preferable to have separate rights-of-way for

critical transmission supply lines in an area. In cases where it is
necessary to have multiple circuits on the same right-of-way, the
consequence of a structure failure or an outage that forces both
circuits out of service must be weighed against the probability of such

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an event occurring and the cost and environmental impact of alternate

routing configurations.
5.2.2 Substation Configuration
Substations are an integral part of the area transmission network. They

interface the transmission system with the subtransmission and distribution
systems. Substations are developed in coordination with the area
transmission system to meet thermal, voltage, and other reliability criteria.
a) Optimum Design
An area transmission substation is designed for two or more

transmission line terminals, multiple bus sections, and at least four
transformers to serve a minimum of 100 MVA load. The load may be
served from local distribution circuits, the area subtransmission
system, or a combination of both. In special cases, the number of
transformers planned for a substation may need to be reduced to two
to serve a minimum of 50 MVA, if local governmental, environmental
and public factors dictate.
b) Line and Transformer Terminals
Terminal switching facilities for the transmission lines are automatic

switches, circuit switchers, or circuit breakers as determined by
system configuration and the ability of the protective relaying scheme
to isolate a faulted line, bus section, or transformer. In the case of line
terminals, circuit breakers will be installed on all terminal positions in
substations with three transmission lines or more, where justified by
reliability and economics. In the case of transformer terminals, only
circuit switchers or circuit breakers should be installed on the high side
of transformers supplied from the transmission system.

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c) Bus Sections
Bus sections are connected by automatic or manual bus tie switches

or circuit breakers as determined by system configuration and the
ability of the protective relaying system to isolate a faulted line, bus
section, or transformer. An effort is made to minimize the number of
lines and transformers connected to each bus section. In the case of
substations supplied by two transmission lines, a circuit breaker will be
installed in the bus-tie position.
d) Transformers and Sizing
Each transmission substation will have from four to six transformers

when fully developed. The transformers will be protected on the high
side by an automatic switch, circuit switcher, or breaker, and on the
low side by a manual switch or breaker as required to isolate a faulted
unit. Additional transformers are added as required for reliability and
economic reasons.
Transformers supplying the subtransmission system are standard

impedance triple-rated ONAN/ONAF/ONAF units. Depending on the
location of the transformer(s) on the subtransmission system, the
transformer(s) may require automatic load-tap changing equipment.
Transformers serving distribution loads are triple-rated

ONAN/ONAF/ONAF units with automatic load-tap changing
equipment. Some units may require nonstandard impedance in order
to limit fault current.

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ENGINEERING MANUAL

REPLACES SECTION NO. SECTION TITLE SECTION NO.

Source: Transmission Planning

To understand reliability in transmission system performance requires an understanding of

Adequacy - the capacity to meet transmission system demand within major

Security - the transmission system's capability to withstand disturbances

In order to evaluate the reliability of a transmission system, it is necessary to have

Source: Transmission Planning

! The reinforcement must represent an economical method to provide dependable

! Reasonable feasible alternatives should be considered in planning new facility

Source: Transmission Planning

The testing done on the transmission system is by mathematically modeling the

! Thermal and Voltage Criteria

! System Stability Criteria

! System Performance Criteria

! Line and Substation Configuration Criteria

2.0 THERMAL AND VOLTAGE CRITERIA

2.1 Transmission System Facility Ratings

Source: Transmission Planning

2.2 Normal System Conditions

Source: Transmission Planning

(Link to table: http://pjm.com/documents/~/media/documents/manuals/m03.ashx).

All available generators are fully dispatchable to their normal seasonal

2.2.2 Extra-High Voltage (“EHV”) Transmission System

2.2.3 Area Transmission System

2.3 Single Contingency Testing

A single contingency is the sudden outage of any single generation or transmission

Source: Transmission Planning

“Emergency Low” values corresponding to the voltage level. (Link to table:

2.3.1 Generation and Interconnections

No generator output restrictions are caused by the contingency unless the

2.3.2 EHV Transmission System

2.3.3 Area Transmission System

2.3.4 Customer Loads

No customer should be interrupted by the contingency unless directly

Source: Transmission Planning

2.4 Double Contingency Testing

A double contingency is the outage of any combination of two lines, transformers, or

2.5 Multiple Contingency Testing

Multiple contingencies are a combination outage of more than two lines,

Source: Transmission Planning

! Outage of a substation, including loss of any directly connected generation.

! Sudden outage of a major load center.

! Outage of all lines on a common right-of-way.

2.6 Transmission Constraint Mitigation

PJM utilizes several methods to mitigate transmission constraints:

! Pre-contingency reconfiguration of the transmission system is used where

! Off-cost re-dispatch of generation is used on a pre-contingency basis to mitigate

2.7 Reactive Power Requirements

Source: Transmission Planning

rapidly deteriorating voltage conditions could trigger a cascading blackout over a

! Single contingency outage conditions.

2.7.2 Transmission system VAr requirements are currently supplied by shunt

Static VAr compensators and synchronous condensers may be used if

Source: Transmission Planning

3.0 SYSTEM STABILITY CRITERIA

The following criteria are used to test system stability:

3.1 System Normal Criteria

3.1.1 A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on any line or

3.1.2 Breaker failure: A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-ground fault on

3.1.3 Protective relaying overtrip: A permanent three-phase or single-phase-to-

Source: Transmission Planning

3.1.4 Primary protective relaying scheme inoperative: A permanent three-phase or