La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc.

Vs Ramos
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 127882;

January 27, 2004

FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995),
its implementing rules and regulations and the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the government with
Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service
contract and is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our
natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements
involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Philippine Mining Law, its implementing rules and regulations insofar as
they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject
Financial
and
Technical
Assistance
Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,
provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to
set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of
full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a
private corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial,
marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or
given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the
business.

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision
granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed
between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are

service

contracts

prohibited

by

the

1987

Constitution.

The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were
subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty
over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited
to technical or financial assistance only?
Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be
entered into, and only for large-scale activities. Full control is not
anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the
State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or
modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar
to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation:
the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other
functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual
entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.

G.R. Nos. 152613 & 152628

APEX MINING CO., INC., vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.,(SEM)et.
Al
G.R. No. 152619-20
BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE
vs. southeast mindanao gold mining corp.
G.R. No. 152870-71
THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON. VICTOR O.
RAMOS Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO (Member) and
DIRECTORHORACIO RAMOS (Member) vs. southeast mindanao gold mining
corporation

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration was filed by SEM. The Assailed
Decision held that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of
SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit. t also ruled that
the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires
that the assignment of a mining right be made with the prior approval of the
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Environment
and
Natural
Resources (DENR). Moreover, the Assailed Decision pointed out that EP
133expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or after its
expiration. It likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent
any question against its validity. In view of this, and considering that under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act
of1995, mining operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken
directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of
ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area
as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it was held in
the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive
Department to undertake directly the mining operations of the disputed area
or to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and
Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that
these private entities are qualified.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed
Decision, praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement
that mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State
through the executive branch. Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the
Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an
exploration permit. Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the
actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to
the exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to
direct MGB to accept its application for an exploration permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration
and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them. In the
Resolution, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the instant cases.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the transfer or assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 by MMC
to SEM was validly made without violating any of the terms and conditions
set forth in Presidential Decree No. 463 and EP 133 itself.
2. Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. acquired a vested right over
the disputed area, which constitutes a property right protected by
the Constitution.
3. Whether the assailed Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Third Division in
this case is contrary and overturns the earlier Decision of this Court in Apex
v. Garcia (G.R. No. 92605, 16 July1991, 199 SCRA 278).
4. Whether the issuance of Proclamation No. 297 declaring the disputed area
as mineral reservation outweighs the claims of SEM, Apex Mining Co. Inc. and
Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative over the Diwalwal Gold
Rush Area.

5. Whether the issue of the legality/constitutionality of Proclamation No. 297

was belatedly raised.
HELD:
1. The assailed Decision did not overturn the 16 July 1991 Decision in Apex
Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia. The former was decided on facts and issues that
were not attendant in the latter, such as the expiration of EP 133, the
violation of the condition embodied in EP 133 prohibiting its assignment, and
e unauthorized and invalid assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since this
assignment was effected without the approval of the Secretary of DENR;
2. SEM did not acquire vested right over the disputed area because its
supposed right was extinguished by the expiration of its exploration permit
and by its violation of the condition prohibiting the assignment of EP 133 by
MMC to SEM. In addition, even assuming that SEM has a valid exploration
permit, such is a mere license that can be withdrawn by the State. In fact,
the same has been withdrawn by the issuance of Proclamation No. 297,
which places the disputed area under the full control of the State through the
Executive Department;
3. The approval requirement under Section 97 of Presidential Decree No. 463
applies to the assignment of EP 133 by MMC to SEM, since the exploration
permit is an interest in a mining lease contract;
4. The issue of the constitutionality and the legality of Proclamation No. 297
was raised belatedly, as SEM questions the same for the first time in its
Motion for Reconsideration. Even if the issue were to be entertained, the
said proclamation is found to be in harmony with the Constitution and
other existing statutes;
5. The motion for reconsideration of Camilo Banad, et al. cannot be passed
upon because they are not parties to the instant cases;
6. The prayers of Apex and Balite asking the Court to direct the MGB to
accept their applications for exploration permits cannot be granted, since it
is the Executive Department that has the prerogative to accept such
applications, if ever it decides to award the mining operations in the disputed
area to a private entity

G.R. No. 163101

BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY
AND MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with
Option to Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the
owner of four mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The
parties also executed a Supplemental Agreement.The mining claims were
covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No.
APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as
operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N.
Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the
mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan,
then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the latter that it was
terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of
the provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and
non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.
J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the
RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental
Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA
Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent MR was denied. Said
decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.
Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:
proper.

Whether or no the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is

HELD:
No. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet
resorted to an improper Remedy.
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and
question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform
rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from
their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on
a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been
defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the
other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the
introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91among these agencies
areindicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct
resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained,
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower
tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the
decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On this ground alone,
the instant petition must be denied.

[G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002]

ARMANDO C. CARPIO vs. SULU RESOURCES
CORPORATION,

DEVELOPMENT

FACTS:
A petition filed by respondent for Mines Production Sharing
Agreement(MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal.
Petitioner filed an opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging that his
landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents
claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and extract the quarry
resources on his properties. The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and GeoSciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioners
opposition/adverse claim.
Respondent appealed. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
appeal on the ground of respondents failure to comply with the
requirements of the New Mining Acts Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed
Order dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the
MAB Decision was filed. Citing Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the CA ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB).
The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative
in nature.Under Section 79 of RA 7942, the findings of fact by the MAB
as well as its decision or order shall be final and executory. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the
Mines Adjudication Board should be made directly to the Supreme Court as
contended by the respondent and the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be
first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
We clarify. Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative
actions; and the CA is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this
Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. i In Metro Construction, we
observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC
decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of
fact and law.ii At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are
challenged or alleged to have been made in grave abuse of discretion as in
the present case, the CA may review them, consistent with the constitutional
dutyiii of the judiciary.

To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the

MAB Decision under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that [n]o law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and consent. On the other hand, Section 79
of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this
Court on a petition for review by certiorari. This provision is obviously an
expansion of the Courts appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this
Court has not consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily burden it. iv
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power,
transfers to the CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial
bodys decisions, such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does not
impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The aggrieved
partys right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by
which the appeal is to be made or decided. v The parties still have a remedy
and a competent tribunal to grant this remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a
uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.vi Under the rule,
appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought
to the CA on a verified petition for review. vii A quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making.viii MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no
different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43.
Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 -- among
these agencies are -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies
which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.ix
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 x as
amended by RA No. 7902,xi factual controversies are usually involved in
decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to
resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them. By including
questions of factxii among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken
to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on
questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that
direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be
entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction. In brief, appeals from decisions of the
MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED

G.R. No. 169080

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION, vs.

MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION),BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION,
and LEBACH MINING
FACTS:The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta
Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease
Contract V-1050.
Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings
Corporation and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.
After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease
contracts and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by
Mining Lease Contract No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of
the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of the DENR.
Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to
seek cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of
Macroasia and another entity, Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining
areas in Brookes Point.
Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas
contiguous to Infantas (now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also
holds an MPSA with the government which covers 2,835 hectares located at
Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending applications covering
another 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.
Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts. Macroasia
refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.
Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field
investigations, the POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining
Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and found the claims of the others indubitably
meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasias mining
areas.1 It upheld Blue Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease
Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared
automatically abandoned. It gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid
Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and Macroasia appealed before
the MAB.
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of
appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and
executory.
The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the
Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia. However, the MAB, subsequently
issued a resolution vacating its previous decision, holding that neither the
POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly entered
into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or
revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.

The CA Special12thDivision affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the

exclusive authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke
mineral agreements. The CA also denied Celestials Motion for
Reconsideration.
While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges petition; reversed
and set aside the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a
mining lease agreement as a mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that the power to resolve
mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes the lesser
power to cancel mining agreements.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the
jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to
cancel mining contracts and privileges.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its
implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we
rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel
existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the
following reasons:
The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates
from his administrative authority, supervision, management, and control
over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987.
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and
regulates the use and development of all mineral resources of the country. It
has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain,
which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the
power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include
mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR
and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to
approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel
said agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary
over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly
demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the
cancellation of mineral agreements.
The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or agreements through
the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on
cancellation,
revocation,
and
termination
of
a
permit/mineral
agreement/FTAA.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.,vs. WMC RESOURCES INTL.
PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.,
FACTS:
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local whollyowned subsidiary of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources)
executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as
the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large
scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible

mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the

provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North
Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department
Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under
various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining
Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
(collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in accordance with the
Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the
Tampakan Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory
Agreement dated 15 July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining
claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other
things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the Tampakan
Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and
interests in the mining claims covering the area subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the
ColumbioFTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase
Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC
Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of
their right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000,
petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR
Secretary.
In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement
between petitioner and WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet
the necessary preconditions for its validity, WMC Resources and the
Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and Purchase Agreement,
where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle
which would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA
activities.
On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its
authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently, WMC Resources and
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of Stocks
on 23 January 2001.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical
qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the
transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
in the assailed Order. According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of
Department Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines,
Inc. meets the qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA
No. 02-95-XI, and that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the
procedure and other requirements set forth under the law.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines,
Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary
with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18
December 2001 Order of the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application for and the
consequent registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc.on the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional
right of Lepanto to due process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial
legal issues pending with the regular courts; and 3) it blatantly violates
Section 40 of the Mining Act.

In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the
petition
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly
Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the President of the assignment
or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements should have a
retroactive application to the Columbio FTAA.
HELD:
NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict
the established legal doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having
only a prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or
necessarily implied from the language used in the law.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an
implication in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law
shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must
be made to apply only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought
not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words
used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be
annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be
otherwise satisfied.

G.R. No. 152644

JOHN ERIC LONEY,STEVEN PAUL REID andPEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS:
Petitioners are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in
mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing tailings 2
from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit
ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears
that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March
1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt.
Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in
the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067), the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), the
2

Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations.
The MTC is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are
concerned, only the Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act (RA
7942) should be maintained and the Information for violation of Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and heard in a full blown
trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence
resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the
law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the
prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. 3
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same
court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984.
RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion and contends that they should only be
prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.4
Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling. The appellate court held:
The doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the
case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
This Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that
would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing
the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against the petitioners
for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in
the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.5
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their
motion.
ISSUE:
1 Whether or not the decision of the CA contravenes People v.
Relova.
HELD:
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
1. The contention has no merit.
3
4
5

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure
the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog
and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the
accused satisfactorily
proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they
will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised
Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In
particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law
seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for
offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
This contention is also without merit
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power
under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City
Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring,
violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but
because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and
a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas
City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal
Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct.
This is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision
involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act. x xx
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the terms
of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first
sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged
in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second

offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses
spring from the same act or set of acts. x xx 6 (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double
jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as theCourt of Appeals held,
petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III
which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense ,and not, as in
Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163509
December 6, 2006TINGA, J.:
FACTS:In 1987,the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation
entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and
DevelopmentCorporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator
for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial Operation of
CMMCI's 18 mining claims located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to the terms of
the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease
Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On
April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary
Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within
its mining claims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims
was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del
Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a MOA whereby
petitioner
PICOP
allowed
Banahaw
Mining
an access to its
mining
claims.
In
1991,Banahaw
Mining
converted
its
mining
claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA for brevity). While the MPSA
were
pending,
Banahaw
Mining,
on
December
18,
1996,
decided tosell/assign its
rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent
Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation. The transfer included
those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon
being
informed
of
the
development, CMMCI,
as
claim
owner,
immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw Mining in Favor of
private respondent Base
Metals,
thereby
recognizing
private
respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On March
10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's
pending MPSA
applications
with
the
Bureau
of Mines to
substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in
support of
the
application.
Area
clearances
from
the
6

DENR
Regional Director
and Superintendent
of
the
Agusan
Marsh
and
Wildlife Sanctuary
were
submitted, as required. On
November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines GeoSciences
Bureau(MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base
Metals' application because it violate the non-impairment clause and will be
prejudicial to herein petitioner. The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for
petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was
in favor of respondent, CA affirmed stating that the Presidential
Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted
the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment
of
its
concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the
Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber
license agreement.
The Presidential
Warranty
did
not
convert
PICOP's
timber
license
into a contract because it did
not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of
PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.
ISSUE: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities.
RULING: Negative. Timber license agreement is not a contract, but a mere
privilege. We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use
is enshrined in our laws towards the end that
the
country's
natural
resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized and
conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance
between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to
enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the surface
owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage
done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. Firstly,
assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a
government reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands for
specific purposes other than mineral reservations, such does not
necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec. 15(b) of
DAO96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining
applications upon prior written clearance by the government agency
having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec. 6 of RA7942 also
provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral
reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations.
Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest
reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. There
is
no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals'
MPSA
has
been proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. DENR
Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance
of area status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant
to RA 7942, provides that timber or forestlands,
military
and
other
government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other
than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas
within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among
others, are open to mining applications subject to area status and clearance.
Lastly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the
MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of
the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or
executive order as required by RA 7586.

G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al.,
FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims
in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to
October 12, 1982. Private respondents Alberto G. Bumolo and others
registered their mining claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22
September 1988, which claims were subsequently converted into Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the
mining. Under the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and
irrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years with
provision for extension.
On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting
Permit Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on
the alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by the mining claims
was within the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26,
1969 and with DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion
within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11
September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners
Prospecting Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of
July 08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed
that the area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect
claim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been
extensively explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel
Paragas recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for
reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining
claim
holders be respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized.
As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued
a clearance to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines
Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner maintained that subject area was within
the Magat River Forest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the rejection of the
PPA was affirmed whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G.
Bumolo et al. that had been converted into a MPSA, subject to
compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given due course.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
motion .

Respondent MAB denied petitioners

ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of
the PPA was outside the Magat River Forest Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional
Executive Director Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate from a
single recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that
as early as May 31, 1989 x xx the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which
Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of
claims x xxx was confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the
region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national
parks and existing government reforestation projects x xxx
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is
outside the Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established
by the following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the
Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991
Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c)
plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the
Regional Executive Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area
subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on
the alleged "typographical error committed by somebody in the Engineering
Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have
anything to support it, the aforementioned documents which the Regional
Executive Directors relied upon in denying the PPA had already settled the
issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of
petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR
Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in
the Land Use map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed
outside any government reservation.

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY VS. JOSE LEIDO, JR.

L-49109 December 1, 1987
FACTS:
Presidential Decree No.1214 was issued requiring holders of
subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease of application within one (1)

year from the approval of the Decree. To protect its rights, petitioner Santa
Rosa Mining Company files a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
confronting the said Decree as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Subsequently, three (3) days after, petitioner filed a mining lease application,
but under protest, with a reservation that it is not waiving its rights over
its mining claims until the validity of the Decree shall have been passed upon
by the Court. The respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file
the instant petition and question the Decree as it failed to fully exhaust
administrative remedies.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners was not bound to exhaust administrative
remedies for its mining claims to be valid in the outset. It is a valid exercise
of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over the lands of the public
domain, of which
petitioners mining claims still form a part. Moreover, Presidential Decree
No. 1214 is in accord with Sec.8, Art XIV of the 1937 Constitution

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE

PORTALMINING COOP.
G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) w
as grantedExploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of
land, which included the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress
enacted
Republic
Act
No.
7076,
or
the
People's
Small
Scale Mining Act.

T h e l a w e s t a b l i s h e d a Pe o p l e ' s S m a l l
S c a l e M i n i n g P r o g r a m t o b e implemented by the Secretary of the
DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the
DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission
of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal
was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED
Mines Case.
On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper
assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the
land covered by the permit. In due time, the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Regional Offi ce No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and
registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter,
several MAC cases were filed.
On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act,
was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a
Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving
conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the
RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No.
97-03whichprovided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively
the option of diret state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal
Gold-Rush Area.
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRBDavao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused
therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and
that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted
condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental
laws are enforced by the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme"
espoused in MO 97-03 divested petitioner of its vested right to the gold
rush area under its EP No. 133.
HELD:
No. MO 97-03 did not conclus ively a dopt "direc t
sta te utiliza tion" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The
terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed
hereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profitsharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter,
but simply instructed the DENR offi cials concerned to undertake studies
to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by
petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133,
whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A

reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of
EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents
therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which
purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually
has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite
and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made
by the appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot
be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the
issuance of MO 97-03. It must likewise be pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total
and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely
evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended,
modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is
necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of
the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great
public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in
the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the
non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution,
since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter,
modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general
welfare. Additiona lly, the re can
be no valid opposition ra ise d
aga inst a me re study of an alternative which the State, through the
DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII,
Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995. Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of
full control and supervision of the exploration, development and
utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by either directly
undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered
a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in
accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.
Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct
takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the
gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush

G.R. No. 119619

December 13, 1996

HIZON et al. V. CA
FACTS:
Hizon et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing
without the use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that
some fishing boats were fishing by "muroami" led to the apprehension of
such boat (F/BRobinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP
Maritime Command and the Task Force BantayDagat) directed the boat
captain to get random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The
initial results tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the
basis of the information against Hizon et al.However, a second set of fish
samples yielded a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced them
to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this decision.
Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question the
admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless
search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.

ISSUES: (1) Whether fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson
without a search warrant admissible in evidence.
(2) Whether Hizon et al.,
poisonous substances.

are

guilty of

illegal fishing with

the

use of

RULING:(1) Yes. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial

warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, subject to certain exceptions.
Search
and seizure
without
search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have
been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels
and boats breaching our fishery laws.
(2) Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33
and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for
possession of explosives or poisonous substances. However, this
presumption is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to present
evidence to rebut this presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with
poisonous substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four
fish specimens.
The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did not find
any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance. Neither did
they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen or in the
fish cage itself.
Under the circumstances of the case, however, this finding does not warrant
the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B Robinson, or even the same
four specimens, were caught with the use of sodium cyanide
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No 170180 November 23, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower
courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of
dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession
by three barangay tanods who made a search on him
Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the
bus when one of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see
the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three
tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the
bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on
appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the
warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a
warrant supporting the arrest and the search.
Held:
The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower
courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only
occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)
When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of
the arrest.
The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
None of the petitioners actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged
fleeing upon approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of
criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.
However, the Courts decision was not only hinged on this premise but also
on the fact that the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized
items by virtue of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting
testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.
Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused
was thus acquitted.
The Court added that the petitioners lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. MINES ADJUDICATION

BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES,
ET AL
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws engaged in the business of
mining. On
31 March
2000, petitioners Application
for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement(MPSA), for the exploration, development and
commercial utilization of certain pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a
4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was approved and MPSA No.
153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.
Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines andengaged in the business of mining. Private
respondent filed an Application for Exploration Permit with MGB covering the
same properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-SF-000089
and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified
Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of the private
respondent. It was allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August
2005 and was received by the latter on 5 September 2005.Prior, however, to
petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the private respondents
Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was
cancelled, a Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. The MGB issued
EP No. 05-001 to private respondent. Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu
proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner. Petitioner elevated by
appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed. The case was elevated to the
Court of appeals but judgment was rendered against the petitioner. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny
and/or revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent.
HELD:
NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel,
deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001issued by MGB to private respondent
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel
of Arbitrators, thus:Sec. 77.Panel of Arbitrators.
x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear and decide on the following:
1. Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
2. Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
3.
Disputes
involving
surface
owners,
occupants
and
claimholders/concessionaires; and
4. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of
the effectivity of this Act. The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over
adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the
grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already

granted and existing. As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing

exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96 40explicitly provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit .
TheDirector/concernedRegional Director may cancel the Exploration Permit fo
r failure o the Permittee tocomply with any of the requirements and for violati
on(s) of the termsandconditions under which the Permit is issued. Forrenewe
d ExplorationPermits,the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director
shall cause the cancellationof the same.According to Section 5 of DAO No.
96-40, Director means the Director of the MGB Central Office,while
Regional Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional
Office. As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB,
then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw
or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel
EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not
with the Panel of Arbitrators.

Chavez v. NHA
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez,
filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by
National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order
No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive
and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this

time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made

residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the
dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-OperateTransfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private
sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same
MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation
of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the
bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for
eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development
of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay
Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey
Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is
revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by
mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual
expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not
exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the
date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be
agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the
on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the
JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design
changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the
project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to
2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the
119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made
the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at
Smokey Mountain necessary.
On August 1, 1998, the project was
suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of

Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary
housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned
over by RBI.

ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power
and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner.
RULING: Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean
that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal
reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for
by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of
its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or
entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a
government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279)

MMDA v. Jancom
FACTS:
After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA,
Jancom won a contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste management
project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec
19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by
the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR
Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA
chair Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too
close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada
refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air
Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure of the
dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste
management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig
RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater

Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the

BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management
contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of
appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA went to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not binding
because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the
contract were not complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal
instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only apply in cases where
there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the petition did not
allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from the final decision.
Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and
gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the
court took it up just the same, if only to put the petitioners mind to rest.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the
Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only
allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract does not bear the
signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in the contract
were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault; though
the President did not sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was
only necessary for the effectivity of the contract, not its perfection; and that
the two-month period within which Jancom should comply with the conditions
had not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect,
precisely because of the absence of the Presidents signature.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in declaring the existence of valid and
perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and Jancom.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence
of a valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent
of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still ineffective or
un implementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom
Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their

dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in

the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be
rendered only by the Supreme Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says: A
decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a
majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme
Court (Sec 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

Henares v. LTFRB
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG
as alternative fuel?
RULING: YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring
their case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of
the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand
that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e.,
a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use
CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to

a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein
petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

Azucena O. Salalima vs. ECC and SSS, G.R. No. 146360, May 20,
2004.
Facts:
Petitioners husband, Juancho Salalima, was employed as a
route helper and subsequently as route salesman for the Meycauayan Plant
of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. In 1989, Juancho was diagnosed with
minimal pulmonary tuberculosis. In February 1995, he was found to be
suffering from pneumonia. After he died, a claim for compensation benefits
under P.D. 626 as amended was filed by his surviving wife, Azucena,
petitioner herein, with the SSS. The claim was denied on the ground that
cancer of the lungs had no causal relationship with Juanchos job as a route
salesman. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. The ECC
affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC argued that lung cancer is not an
occupational disease nor is the risk of contracting lung cancer increased by
Juanchos working conditions.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners claim should be allowed.
Held: Yes. Under the present law, Adenocarcinoma of the lungs which was
the immediate cause of Juanchos death as stated in his death certificate,
while listed as an occupational disease, is compensable only among vinyl
chloride workers and plastic workers. This, however, would not automatically
bar petitioners claim for as long as she could prove that Juanchos risk of
contracting the disease was increased by the latters working conditions. The
degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence,
which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation. Juanchos job required long
hours on the streets as well as his carrying of cases of soft drinks during
sales calls. The combination of fatigue and the pollutants that abound in his
work environment verily contributed to the worsening of his already weak

respiratory system. His continuous exposure to these factors may have led to
the development of his cancer of the lungs.

SJS V Atienza
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within
six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the
Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled
down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their operations.
In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective
only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to
2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance
8027. Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been
superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was more of a
guideline to 8027.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting

from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined,

clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the
clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a
duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless
the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct interest in
the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent
the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He
has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect
only until April 30, 2003.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality
of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly
and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a
cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate
the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water
Quality. Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may benecessary to upgrade the
quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the
polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at
his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged
against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal,
and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to
a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 &
20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and

scope that it is
well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a
specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by
Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial
discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created
through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or
activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.

Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities
in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly
passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is
concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the
charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The
said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is
basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which
is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence
of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power
for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as
opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to
municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC

FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The
story begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on the northern section
of his existing property. His current registered property is bounded on the
east by Talisay River, on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the
Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of constantly
flowing water, extra land of about 17hectares (thats about the size of Disney
Park!) formed in the northern most section of the property. It is this property
he sought to register.
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of
public domain (remember, accretion formed by the sea is public dominion).
His Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted

registry again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more
silt resulting on accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. The
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray
opposing the same application, stating the he leased part of the property
sought to be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the
same property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr.
Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a
portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed.
During the appeal, his original land registration case was consolidated and
tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and
therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual
for ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration request.
Pascuals heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate
court granted petition for registration! The reason? The accretion was caused
by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasnt foreshore land. (BUT the
confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay
which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration
(Government insists it is foreshore and hence, public domain). The Apellate
court denied all motions of the Director and the Government.
The matter went to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent
to the sea can be registered under the Torrens system.
HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain.
Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the
disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the
Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring
property and requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is
misplaced. If theres any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to
the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land
along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of
land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land
and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be
registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for
public use and declared as private property capable of alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside.
Registration cannot be allowed.

NATURAL RESOURCES
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CASE DIGESTS

SUBMITTED BY: AMAPOLA M. DINCOG

SUBMITTED TO: ATTY CLEO SABADO-ANDRADA

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