INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION

COMMISSION, petitioner vs. HON. PURA

CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND
TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents.
FACTS:
ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in
Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency involved in
international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is
duly registered with the United Nations Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys
Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel
to those of the International Committee for Migrtion
(ICM) and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC).

diplomatic immunity is essentially a political

question and courts should refuse to look beyond
a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the
executive branch of the government as in the case
at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by
the principal law officer of the government . . . or
other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in
adherence to the settled principle that courts may
not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine
that in such cases the judicial department of (this)
government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
BASIS:

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines

and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank and file
members employed by the ICMC. The latter
opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys
diplomatic immunity.
On Februaury 5, 1987 Med Arbiter Anastacio L.
Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition
of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations reversed the Med Arbiters
Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a
certification election.
This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction assailing the BLR Order.

Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement

between the Philippine Government and ICMC
provides that ICMC shall have a status similar to
that of a specialized agency.
Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies,
their property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every
form of legal process except in so far as in any
particular case they have expressly waived their
immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver
of immunity shall extend to any measure of
execution.
DFA vs. NLRC
Facts:

The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau

of Labor Relations for Certification election is SET
ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order
earlier issued is made PERMANENT.

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi

filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB. Two
summonses were served, one sent directly to the
ADB and the other through the Department of
Foreign Affairs ("DFA"). ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as
its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to
Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement
Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the
"Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44
of the Agreement Between The Bank And The
Government Of The Philippines Regarding The
Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters
Agreement").

It is a recognized principle of international law and

under our system of separation of powers that

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint

on the impression that the ADB had waived its

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges
and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from
the application of Philippine labor laws.
HELD:

diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time,

rendered a decision in favour Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on
03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to
the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal
vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to
obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed
a petition for certiorari.
Issues:1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service
contracts with different private companies, ADB
has descended to the level of an ordinary party to
a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of
its immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing
to file the present petition
4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is proper in this case
Held:1. Under the Charter and Headquarters
Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form, except in the specified
cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as
well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of
securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy
immunity in respect of all acts performed by them
in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these
immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and
commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been
extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law.

"One of the basic immunities of an international

organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,
that it is immune from the legal writs and
processes issued by the tribunals of the country
where it is found. The obvious reason for this is
that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or
even influence or control its policies and decisions
of the organization; besides, such subjection to
local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such
body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on
behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an

ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which
should have constituted a waiver of its immunity
from suit, by entering into service contracts with
different private companies. There are two
conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to
the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign
cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent
in the Courts of another sovereign. According to
the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a
foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of
the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is
not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by
its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private
respondent have not been intended by the ADB for
profit or gain but are official acts over which a
waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its
other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a
determination which, when challenged, entitles it to
seek relief from the court so as not to seriously
impair the conduct of the country's foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its
case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it
to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community.
When international agreements are concluded, the
parties thereto are deemed to have likewise
accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their
agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this
task falls principally on the DFA as being the
highest executive department with the competence
and authority to so act in this aspect of the
international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario,
Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good
detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or
international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests

the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to

convey to the court that said defendant is entitled
to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the

process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or
the international organization sued in an American
court requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled to
immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks
the Attorney General to submit to the court a
'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to
immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign
government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of
sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
(1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a
letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent-employer could not be sued because it
enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a
telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57
SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make, in behalf of the Commander of
the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge.
The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in
a manifestation and memorandum as amicus
curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved
with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the
side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said
Department to file its memorandum in support of
petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign
immunity was submitted directly to the local courts
by the respondents through their private counsels.
In cases where the foreign states bypass the
Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts
and make their own determination as to the nature
of the acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the

extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has,
under special circumstances, so allowed and
entertained such a petition when (a) the
questioned order or decision is issued in excess of
or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or
decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the
circumstances that can be said to obtain in the
present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of
jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that
assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August
1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Petitioner is an economist working with the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). He was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation for uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
MeTC. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an
advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that
petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes
under Section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement)
dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to
the prosecution. On a petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled and set
aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
dismissing the criminal cases. After the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is covered by
immunity.
Ruling: The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only preliminary
which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
propio dismissing the two criminal cases without
notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due
process was violated. Furthermore, the immunity

mentioned under Section 45 of the Agreement is

not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
act was done in "official capacity." It should have
been determined first if the case falls within the
ambit of Section 45(a) thus, the prosecutor should
have been given the chance to rebut the DFA
Protocol. Finally, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty. Hence, the petitioner is covered by immunity.
G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR.
LEONCE VERSTUYFT vs. HON. BENJAMIN H.
AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court
of First Instance of Rizal
Facts: The present petition is an original action
for certiorari and prohibition to set aside
respondent judge's refusal to quash a search
warrant issued by him at the instance of
respondents Constabulary Offshore Action Center
(COSAC) officers for the search and seizure of the
personal effects of Verstuyft of the WHO (World
Health Organization) notwithstanding his being
entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized
by the Executive branch of the government and to
prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings
in the matter.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR.

LEONCE VERSTUYFT vs. HON. BENJAMIN H.
AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court
of First Instance of Rizal
Facts: The present petition is an original action
for certiorari and prohibition to set aside
respondent judge's refusal to quash a search
warrant issued by him at the instance of
respondents Constabulary Offshore Action Center
(COSAC) officers for the search and seizure of the
personal effects of Verstuyft of the WHO (World
Health Organization) notwithstanding his being
entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized
by the Executive branch of the government and to
prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings
in the matter.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo
pleaded to Hon. Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled
to immunity from search in respect for his personal
baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and
further requested for the suspension of the search

warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined

the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant
but respondent judge nevertheless summarily
denied the quash hence, the petition at bar.
Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO
Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search
and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has
expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of
the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised
respondent judge of the Philippine Government's
official position. The Solicitor General, as principal
law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly
affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic
immunity and asked for the quashal of the search
warrant.
The unfortunate fact remains that respondent
judge chose to rely on the suspicion of
respondents COSAC officers "that the other
remaining crates unopened contain contraband
items"
The provisions of Republic Act 75 declares as null
and void writs or processes sued out or
prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an
ambassador or public minister is arrested or
imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or
attached and makes it a penal offense for "every
person by whom the same is obtained or
prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and
every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or
enforce such writ or process.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge
acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. The
writs of certiorari and prohibition from the
petitioners were granted.
G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION
COMMISSION vs. HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS
FACTS:

As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of

Vietnamese refugees fleeing from South Vietnam's
communist rule confronted the international
community.
In response to this crisis, on 23 February 1981, an
Agreement was forged between the Philippine
Government and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating
center for processing Indo-Chinese refugees for
eventual resettlement to other countries was to be
established in Bataan .
ICMC was one of those accredited by the
Philippine Government to operate the refugee
processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was
incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of
the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in
international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is
duly registered with the United Nations Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys
Consultative Status, Category II. As an
international organization rendering voluntary and
humanitarian services in the Philippines, its
activities are parallel to those of the International
Committee for Migration (ICM) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross
On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank and file
members employed by ICMC The latter opposed
the petition on the ground that it is an international
organization registered with the United Nations
and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of diplomatic
privileges and immunites to ICMC extends to
immunity from the application of Philippine labor
laws?
HELD:
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to
ICMC is clearly necessitated by their international
character and respective purposes. The objective
is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference
by the host country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor
in these instances would defeat the very purpose
of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations, in accordance with
international practice, from political pressure or
control by the host country to the prejudice of
member States of the organization, and to ensure
the unhampered performance of their functions

ICMC employees are not without recourse

whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section
31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized
agency shall make provision for appropriate
modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of
contracts or other disputes of private character to
which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover,
pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine
Government, whenever there is any abuse of
privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to
withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be
standard provisions in the constitutions of
international Organizations. "The immunity covers
the organization concerned, its property and its
assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in
personam and proceedings in rem.
ICMC did not invoke its immunity and, therefore,
may be deemed to have waived it, assuming that
during that period (1983-1985) it was tacitly
recognized as enjoying such immunity.
Petition is GRANTED, the Order of the Bureau of
Labor Relations for certification election is SET
ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order
earlier issued is made