572

IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-102, No. 3, March 1983

MINIMUM SHTFIT WIRE SIZE - FAULT CURRENT CONSIDERATIONS

S. R. LanIert, Senior Menber, IEEE

Power Technologies, Inc.
Schenectady, N. Y.

Abstract - This paper presents results showing the

effect of various system parameters on shield wire
fault current requirements. The effect of tower
footing resistances, generator excitation systems, dc
offsets and fault location are shown.
Current
splitting between shield wires in one span is examined,
and shield wire capabilities are presented.

1. 61 km
16.1 km
V.-

160 km

Station A

Station B

INIRDUCTION

Fig. 1. Example Systel,m

When ground faults occur on a system, the 60 Hz

fault current returns fram the fault point via
SWs (shield wires)
as well as earth.
Current
distribution between the SWs and earth depends on the
tranasission line characteristics as well as the
TFRs (tower footing resistances) adjacent to the fault
and along the line. The fault current is a function of
system impedances, generator excitation characteristics, fault location, TFRs and the X/R ratio at the
fault point.

SW currents are highest in the spans adjacent to

the fault location. In subsequent spans, SW currents
decrease as one moves away fram the fault location
because more and more current is shunted through
towers-to-ground. Therefore, unless otherwise noted,
the SW currents presented in this analysis are the
currents in the first span adjacent- to the faulted
tower. Although the SW and fault currents are phasors,
it is the phasor magnitude which is important, and only
the magnitudes are reported.

When fault current levels are low, minimum SW size

is usually dictated by lightning considerations rather
than 60 Hz fault current. However, when fault levels
exceed about 20 kA, SW current can exceed current
carrying capabilities. When this occurs, larger
conductor sizes are necessary to prevent SW damage and
possible burndown.

EFFECT OF TFR AND FAULT LOCATION ON SW CURRENT

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect

of various system parameters on SW current magnitudes,
and to present information which can be used to more
accurately predict the expected SW currents. This
information can then be used to select SWs capable of
withstanding the current during faults.

SW current, like the fault current, varies as a

function of the fault location along the line (Figure
2). The effect of TFR varies depending on whether the
fault is located close to or remote from the station.
However, as will be discussed, care must be taken to
carefully consider possible TFR combinations around the
fault location before making a judgment as to their
effect on SW current.
I

SW Capability

CALCULATION PROCEDURE

Size

To determine the effect of various parameters on

SW current, a mathematical analysis was used to
simulate the system. Using an ABCD coefficients
approach, the phase conductors, shield wires, earth
effects, sources, station grounds and tower footing
resistances as well as faults were all represented.

For the examples a 500 kV line was investigated

(Appendix B). Ihe single line diagram indicating the
line, equivalent system and fault locations is shown on
Figure 1. The equivalent at Station A represents a
strong generating station while Station B reflects the
remainder of the system.

Faults were assumed to be single line-to-ground

and to occur at a tower. While mid-span flashovers are
possible, they are extremely rare and were not
considered.

82 SM 341-6
A paper recommended and approved by the
IEEE Transmission and Distribution Committee of the

IEEE Power Engineering Society for presentation at the

IEEE PES 1982 Summer Meeting, San Francisco, California,
July 18-23, 1982. Manuscript submitted February 27, 1982;
made available for printing April 14, 1982.

4-J

- A

0)

-B

SI

-C
=I

80 km

Station
A

Fig. 2.

Shield Wire Requirement

Faults Close to

Station
B

vs.

capability

Station

Figure 3 shows the currents around a faulted tower

located 1.61 km froan Station A. Similar results would
be obtained for a fault at the first tower away frcan
the station. Twenty ohm TFRs and 7#8 AW (Alumoweld)
SWs were simulated. The currents are given in percent
on a total fault current basis. As shown, each SW on
the station side carries about 46 percent of the total
fault current.
As the TFR increases in magnitude, more fault
current will return through the SWs than through the
tower and earth. Figure 4 shows the effect of TFR on
SW currents for three SW types - 3/8 inch EHS, 7#8 AW

0018-9510/83/0002-0572$01.00 ( 1983 IEEE

573

46%
C

Faults Remote Fram Station

4%

As the fault point moves out along the line and

away frcm the station, SW current tends to split more
evenly between the station and remote side of the
faulted tower. Figure 5 illustrates this effect for
7#8 AW SWs and 20 ohm TFRs. The conditions are
identical to those shown on Figure 3 except that the
fault is now located 16.1 km frcm the station. Similar
results would be obtained for faults located in the
middle of the line. Comparing the results for the
close-in fault (1.61 km) and the remote fault (16.1 km)
shows that the highest SW current, as a percent of
total fault current, is significantly reduced - frcm 46
percent to 26 percent. These results seem to imply
that a significant reduction in SW current carrying
requirements for SWs out on the line is possible.

*-

46%

-88%

4%

>S

12%

n,g.
ut

Fig. 3. Fault 1.6 km from Station A

and Minorca ACSR. The values indicated are the highest

current which occurred in any SW as a percent of total
fault current. The fault was located 1.61 km fran the
station. The results illustrated on Figure 3 are
included on Figure 4. On Figure 3 the highest SW
current is 46 percent of the total fault current. This
46 percent value is plotted on the 7#8 AW SW curve
opposite the 20 ohm TFR value.

However, for the preceding cases the TFR was

assumed to be a uniform 20 ohms all along the line.
Now consider the case where all the TFRs are 20 ohms
except for one or two towers having low TFRs. For
example, if two towers having 3 ohm TFRs immediately
preceded the faulted tower on the station side, the SW
currents would be as shown on Figure 6.
26%

20%
26%

50

81%

20%

hE

19%

Mirnorca ACSR
40

14

0 CL
05

20

Fig. 5. Fault 16.1 km from Station A

1

10

100

Tower Footing Resistance (0)

Fig. 4.

Shield Wire Current as a Function of TFR

The calculations show that the highest SW current

for this condition has now risen to 37 percent of the
total fault current. This is not a trivial case
because it is possible for there to be a few low TFRs
out along a line which predominately consists of high
TFRs. As the ratio between the high and low TFRs
increases, the SW current on the span between the
faulted tower and the the towers having low TFRs will
increase.

The results shown on Figure 3 and 4 illustrate

three important points.
1) For faults close to a station, most of the SW
current is carried in the SWs on the station side
of the fault.
2) For ACSR and AW the shield wire current is higher
than for EHS. This effect is more pronounced
with lower TFRs.
3) For TFRs higher than about 15 to 20 ohms, most of
the fault current is carried in the SWs.

The preceding results indicate the desirability of

lowering high TFRs close to the station. Lowering the
TFR fram 20 ohms to 3 ohms, for example, reduces the
3/8 inch EHS SW requirements by about 30 percent. This
could well make a difference in SW size requirements
near a

station.

Conversely, what are the SW currents when the TFRs

are low? Figure 7 illustrates this condition for 3 ohm
TFRs. As before the fault is at 16.1 km and 7#8 AW SWs
were simulated.
The highest SW current is now 24 percent of the
fault current as opposed to 34 percent for the same
configuration when the fault was 1.61 km away fram the
station (see Figure 4). Would the last case (low TFRs
along the line) be influenced by a few towers having
high TFRs?

No, the SW current would have to travel a few more

spans before being shunted by low TFRs, but the highest
current in the spans adjacent to the faulted tower
would be essentially no different than that shown in
Figure 7.

574
11%

37%

37%

81%

result in the SW current exceeding its capability and a

resultant SW burndown. But because there are so few
cases of SW failure attributable to this effect, there
is little reason to believe that large resistances
differences are cormmon. However, because there could
undoubtedly be other effects which would contribute to
a other than a 50/50 split, it seems prudent to use a
55/45 split to account for any other unknown effects.

11%

The current carrying capability of a

SW is
influenced by the magnitude and duration of the SW
current. The preceding sections have discussed what
portion of the fault current can be expected to be
carried by the SW. This section discusses the effect
of various parameters on the fault current magnitude
and duration.

4%

Fig. 6.

Faulted Tower (Higher TFR) Preceded by Towers

Having Low TIs

The results indicate that some benefit can be

derived from the more even SW current split between
With
spans immediately adjacent to the faulted tower.
low TFRs along the line the highest SW current is on
the order of 25 to 30 percent. With high TFRs along
the line, coupled with the possibility of an occasional
low TFR scattered along the line, the highest SW
current could be expected to be on the order of 35 to
45 percent of the total fault current.

24%

81%

20%

%%S

19%

Tower

of the fault
the effect of
fault clearing
it dictates the
Additionally,

Fault Clearing Time

EHV systems the fault clearing time can range
few cycles, for primary clearing time, to as
15 to 20 cycles, for backup clearing time.
It
considered prudent to base the required SW

On

fram

a
much as

is
capability

on

the backup clearing time.

(Low TFR) Preceded by

Having Low TFR Is

Subsequent to fault
occurrence,
generator
reactance changes with time. In the first few cycles
the generator
subtransient
following the fault,
reactance,
X"d, accurately reflects the generator
reactance. After a number of cycles have passed
(dependent on the machine time constant), the transient
reactance, X'd, can be used to represent the generator.
Historically, the SW has been rated for backup clearing
times and the X'd value has been used to determine the
fault current. There is some error in this approach
because the effective current applied to the SW should
reflect the higher fault current present during the
first few cycles.
However, if the machine time constant is low the error is small.
Fast Excitation Systems

12%

Faulted

Ihe fault current is a function

clearing time, system reactance and
generation excitation. Of these the
time is the most significant because
characteristic effect of the other two.
any dc offset is also important.

System Reactance

20%
24%

Fig. 7.

FAULT CURRENTS

19%

Towers

CURRENT SPLIT BEIWEEN SWS IN A SPAN

The SW currents shown on the preceding figures

indicate that the current being carried on one span
essentially splits evenly between the two SWs. The
tower resistances between the faulted conductor and the
two SWs were set equal, while the tower gecmetry was
accurately represented (see Appendix B).
Therefore,
the results indicate that tower geonetry and geanetric
nonsymetry due to fault location do not influence the
current split in the two SWs.

What would happen, however, if the resistances

between the SWs and the faulted phase
were
substantially different? In the extreme case, one SW
could be well isolated fran the tower (perhaps due to
corrosion). In that event the remaining SW would have
to carry all the current.
This event would likely

The increasing use of fast generation excitation

systems results in additional complications. With
older excitation systems the fault current did indeed
track the change in generator reactance. This was true
because although the machine reactance changed with
time, the voltage behind the generator reactance did
not change very rapidly. With fast exciters, however,
the generator voltage does increase rather rapidly with
time and, in fact, does contribute appreciably to the
effective fault current. This effect is illustrated in
Figure 8.
Figure 8 shows the results of a dynamic simulation
Two fault current curves are
following a fault.
shown - the lower one indicates the fault current when
fast exciters are not usedr while the upper curve shows
the influence of fast exciters on the fault current.
The

results

indicate

that

the

fast

exciters

do

significantly increase the fault current and hence the

current flowing in the SWs.
The

proper

approach

for

determining the effective

SW current would be to run dynamic simulations of the

system following a fault and accurately define the

575
1.8

1.7

I rms -

Fast Exciters

Fault Initiation

1.6

ac, rms

1.5.

---1-.onventional
Exciters

K
1. 4-

1.3

Time

30 Cycles

1.0_2

Fig. 8. Effect of Fast Exciters

fault current as a function of time. However, based on

I2R analysis of the fault current, it appears
reasonable, as an approximation, to simply calculate
the fault current using X'd to represent the generator
reactances. This approximation should result in an
effective current relatively close to the actual value.

100

10
Time (cycles)

Fig. 9.

Effect of DC on SW Current

an

DC Current Contribution

Fault currents can contain an appreciable amount

of dc offset. The magnitude of the offset is most
likely to be high near generating stations, however,
with very low resistance SWs the *effect could be
The
appreciable for quite a distance along the line.
dc contribution is a function of the X/R ratio as well
as the point on the voltage wave at which the fault was
initiated.

Previous results indicated that for faults near a

station most of the 60 Hz fault current flows in the
SWs. Although not rigorously analyzed, based' on
resistance.considerations around the fault and station,
it also seems reasonable to assume that most of the dc
will' also flow in the SWs. Thberefore, the curves shown
on Figure 9 indicate the effective SW current (current
applied to SW heating) as a function of X/R ratio and
fault duration. The derivation for the data presented
may be found in Appendix.A. It should be noted that
the data-is based on the assumption that the fault was
initiated at, the worst'possible time - the time which
results in the largest dc offset.
The results indicate,' for example,' that for a
fault clearing time of 10 cycles and an X/R of 20, the
ac, rms fault current should be multiplied by 1.15 to
determine the heating -current effectively applied to
the SWs. This current is actually the true rms current
reflecting..the SW heating contribution frdm the ac and
the dc' currents.

Summary
It is suggested that SW requirements be determined
based on backup clearing times. If fast exciters are
not used in the system, then the X'd value may be used
to determine the fault current, although the higher
fault current during the first few cycles should be
taken into' account. If fast exciters are used, then
accurate dynamic simulations should be used to
determine the fault current. Alternatively, the X"d
reactance value could be used to approximate the
results. It is further suggested that the effect of dc
offset be considered for faults near stations.

SW CURRENT CARRYING CAPABILITY

As current flows through SWs, the I2R losses cause

the SW material to heat. Above a certain temperature,
dependent on the material, the conductor will sustain
damage and/or lose mechanical strength.'. Therefore, the
purpose of capability calculations is to determine for
a given current the maximum fault duration beyond which
the conductor will be damaged or lose mechanical
capability.

Specifically, SW capability is a function of a

number of material characteristics including resistivity, mass,' specific heat, density and temperature
It is also a function of
coefficient of resistance.
the initial and final operating temperatures.
Ihe characteristic equation describing' SW current
carrying capability isl:
I

{JA2Ds/pct l/t

ln[l +

(0

0.)]} /2

(1)

where

I is the rms current in Amps

P is the resistivity in ohm-cm
J is a constant - 4.185 Joules/calorie
A is the conductor area in cm2
s is the specific heat in calories/gmvOC
D is the density in gn/cc
is the temperature coeff. of
resistance in /PC
# is the final temperature OC

00 is the initial temperature OC

1)
2)
3)
4)

In particular the assumptions are:

The conductor is infinitely long.'
The amount of radiated heat is negligible.
The specific heat is constant over the temperature range.
The

resistivity is

function of temperature.

To reflect
the effect -of specific heat as a
function of temperature would complicate the equation.
However, it 'is known that if specific heat as a

576

function of temperature were included, the conductor

would have a slightly higher capability than that
predicted by Equation 1. Therefore, the predicted
capabilities inherently contain some conservatism.

Equation 1 has been evaluated for selected AW, EHS

and ACSR SW types, and the'results are shown on Figure
10. Table 1 suggests parameters to be used' for
evaluating the expression, and these values were used
to generate data presented on Figure 10.
TABLE 1

A~W

8.53x10-6 15 .9xlO-6
0.0036
0.0035
400.
400.
40.
40.
6.66
7.86
0.118
0.118

P (ohm-cm)
a (/OC)

0 (OC)
go (OC)
D (gm/cc)
s (cal/grrC)

40

a'

- -

T = _

--

1o

1 1

0.01

_77

REFERENCES

1. Kesselring, The Elements of Switchgear Design,

1932.
2. L. F. Roehmann and E. Hazan, "Short-Time Annealing
Characteristics of Electrical Conductors,". IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems,
Vol. PAS-69, pp. 1061-1068, Dec, 1963.
3. "Current Carrying Capacity of Skywires," Ontario
Hydro Research Quarterly, Fourth Quarter, 1965.

~~IZ

For the circuit shown on Figure lA,

can be described by:
L

i(t) a VV2
.1..0

10

Fast generator excitation systems, as well as dc

contributions, can substantially increase SW currents
and requi red capability.

APPENDIX A
EFFECr OF DC COMPONENT

l-1

0.1
5

L~~~-4

_i:S

--

Assuming a 55/45 percent split between the two SW

currents in one span is prudent.

1(
A_ _ 1141-

a'

2.87xlO-6
0.0040
200.
40.
2.70
0.210

AST_

2- CGuinea

U4

ACSR

EHS

For faults remote fran a station, the highest SW

current is on the order of 40 percent of the total even
for the more critical cases. Required SW capabilities
out along the line may be significantly reduced fran
that necessary near a station. Thus, it may be
econamical to utilize two different SW sizes on one
line.

15 20

seconds
cycles

[sin (t + $) - sin(/)eat]

where a =

VIV

Fault Duration

Fig. 10.

SW Fault Current Capability

The parameters presented in Table 1 are based on

experimental data presented in Reference 3 and on
conductor manufacturer's literature. The EHS data is
essentially that normally used for steel. The data
suggested for AW represents -parameters reflecting a
combination of aluminum and steel. The ACSR data is
based on-aluminum since the steel core apparently plays
little part in the heating phenomenon.

For ENS SWs a temperature rise of 3600C over a

400C ambient was chosen because above about 4000C the
conductor galvanization is subject to melting.
Based
work presented in Reference '3,
on
the maximum
temperature allowed for AW and ACSR was set at 4000C
and 2000C. These values were selected' because the
conductors begin to lose significant strength when
heated above the selected levels.

R + jwL

+i

Fiqure 1A
The rms

current is:

value (the effective heating value) of the

irms - [ Vt i2 dt11/2
When , = f71/2 the fully offset dc
represented and the integral result is:

'rms

ac,rms

Close to a station most of the fault current is

carried in the SW's on the station side span. With low
TFR's (3 ohms), each SW carries about 30-40 percent of
the total fault current. With higher TFR's (20-100
ohms), each SW carries about 45-48 percent.

Vm sin ut

e2 -t

CONCLUSIONS

the current

condition

rut + Tr
f2w
-4

-eat

sin

is

2
t

a cost

wt)

=I
k
ac,rms
The value "k" has been evaluated for
a and T, and the results are given in

the paper.

various values of
the main body of

577
APPENDIX B
SYS[EM DATA
The source impedances used for the analysis were:

Station A
Station B

0.4 Percent
infinite bus

For the transmission line, individual towers and

transmission line spans were represented in the
vicinity of the fault. Tle number of represented
towers varied depending on the TFR. -For low TERs only
towers one to two.miles away fram the- fault location
were rigorously simulated.i With high TFRs many more
towers had to be represented in order to obtain .a
satisfactory representation. The number of towers
actually used was determined by increasing the number
represented until further additions-had no effect on
the SW current adjacent to the faulted tower.
For the transnission each conductor, phase and
ground, were individually represented 'in a span. A
typical 500 kV, horizontal tower configuration was used
which. consisting of three Cardinal ACSR conductors per
phase (457 inm bundle, spacing). At the tower the. phase
spacing-was 9.76m, and the pbase conductor height. was
27.9m. Shield wires were located at a height of 37.4m
with a spacing of -21.3m. .Tfhel
earth resistivity
represented was 100 ohm-i. For 3/8 ENS SW's, the characteristic series and shunt matrices are shown on Table
1B. ' The individual- conductors are numbered, to
correspond with the-numbering shown on Figure lB.
SW 5

<R
0

0 3

Tower footing resistances and faults were

represented as shown on Figure 1B. With switch "S"
open the representation is for a unfaulted tower while
with "S" closed a faulted tower was represented. RR
was varied.frcm 3 to 100 ohms.; RI and R2 were set-.to
the same value and varied from 0.1 ohms to about 1 ohm.
The lower values were used with low RTFR values while
the higher values were used when the RTFR was set at
100 ohms. Station grounds were represented in a manner
similar to towers. and with effective values of about
0.3 ohms. Snall variations in this value had no
significant effect on the results.
TABLE 1B

SERIES MATRIX (OHM/KM)

0.07752
jo.66073

0.05683 0.07753
jO.33937 jO .66071

0.05673 .0.05683 0.07752

jO .28723 jO.33937 jO.66073

0.05608 0.05608 0.05603 4.36126

jO.31321 jO .31152 jO.28587 jl.49740

0.05603 0.05608 0.05608 0.05514 4.36126

jO .28587 jO .31152 jO.31321 jO.33457 jl .4 9740

SHUNT MAIRIX (MOHM-KM)

SW 4
R2

1
0

S 0 1

0.2
>

RTFR

Figure 1B
Tower and Fault Representation

CONDUCTOR

CDNDUCIOR

-jO .25838

-jO .06034 - jO .25837

-jO.03240 -jO.06034 -jO.25838

-jO.05750 -jO.05653 -jO.04236 -jO.45184

-jO.04236 -jO.05653 -jO.05750 -jO.08282 -jO.45184

578
Discussions
Donald T. Jones (Copperweld Bimetallics Group, Pittsburgh, PA): The
capability of a shield wire to carry fault currents safely is becoming increasingly important as fault current magnitudes increase. The author,
therefore, is to be commended for undertaking his study and sharing his
findings in this paper.
The values of fault current vs. fault duration for EHS steel obtained
by the use of equation (I) in the paper do not, in the opinion of the discusser, seem to agree with the values shown in Figure 10. It appears that
the calculated values are appreciably lower than Figure 10 indicates.
The author's comments regarding this apparent difference between
equation (1) values and Figure 10 values for steel will be appreciated.
Also, reference (3) of this paper provides fault current data resulting
from tests performed on steel, aluminum-clad steel and ACSR shield
wires. The test values for the aluminum-clad steel agree fairly closely
with those values shown in Figure 10 of the paper. However, the values
provided for the EHS steel in reference (3) are significantly lower than
those shown in Figure 10. This difference would seem to confirm the
discrepancy between the values calculated by equation (1) and the plotted values of Figure 10. The author's comments would also be welcomed on this point.
Manuscript received August 12, 1982.

G. B. Niles (Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Baltimore, MD):

The author has done. a fine job of relating several parameters to consider for shield wire size and fault current aspects. My first question
deals with Figure 3 of the paper and the illustration of 0% fault current
going to ground through the structure. It is true that small amounts of
fault current do go to ground especially near stations, but in making a
similar computation as the author did and trying to use all of his
parameters as possible, then the 0% current to the structure base was
not realized. The input and results are given in Table A and this shows
that the minimum percentage going into the structure for a 20 ohm
tower is about 41/2%. The computer program used was part of an EPRI
research program.1 There was also disagreement with percent flowing
to generating station A vs. flowing to station B via the overhead shield
wires. Using Rudenberg's method2 then there also is shown to be a
small percentage going to the structure base and not 0% as indicated by
the author in Figure 3.
The case of Figure 5 was also duplicated but the results are very
similar to the author's results.
In Figure 8 there is no value given for the fault current values. Is this
a general case that is true in all situations or was this case particular for
only one system?
Would the author elaborate on the quantitative aspect of significant
strength loss when shield wires are heated above 2000 or 400 (ACSR,
AW). The reason for this is that many shield wires are never subjected
to their ultimate strength in operation and many times can afford to
have some loss of strength incorporated into the design. This loss of
strength can be as much as 30/40% depending upon the ultimate
strength of the conductor and the original design. Would the author
comment on his coice of 40C ambient temperature for the shield wires
as this appears unrealistic for most considerations.
In the author's Appendix B dealing with system data he lists the RI
and R2 terms from .1 to 1 ohms in connection with low footing
resistance and high footing resistance. The author's comments on why
they chose this particular variation would be useful. Does the author
have a basis for the values of the resistance values of Rl and R2 based
on any actual tests?

Results
TFR Case
20 ohm
10 ohm
3 ohm

Sta. Impedance (ohms)

.300 + j .010
.100 + j .010

RI andR2 = .20 + j .001 ohm

Self-Impedance Phase Conductors .079 + j .667 ohms/km
Self-Impedance 3/8" AW (twc) .812 + j .667 ohms/km
Source Terminal Voltage 500 kV

To Sta. B
7532
8193
8197

km from Sta. A

1) Transmission Line Grounding, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI Project RP

1494-1 Final Report, prepared by Safe Engineering Services Ltd.

August 1982.
2) R. Rudenberg, Transient Performance of Electric Power Systems,
Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1967, pp. 355-366.
Manuscript received August 17, 1982.

S. R. Lambert: The interest and effort expended by the two discussers is

sincerely appreciated. Regarding Mr. Niles' comments, the current
through the tower (Figure 3) is not identically zero. Obviously there is
some flow, however, the physics of the problem certainly indicates it to
be small for close in faults. Notwithstanding the difference between the
results in the paper and that of Mr. Niles, a few percent is not significant to the conclusions especially considering all the possible unknowns
existing in the field.
The results shown on Figure 8 can indeed be considered general,
assuming that fast excitation systems are used. Such results not only
have an impact on shield wire selection but also on other station equipment, switchgear in particular.
Regarding Mr. Niles' comment on raising the acceptable upper shield
wire temperature limit and accepting a loss of strength, the approach
could result in disastrous consequences if not carefully considered.
Because some conductors lose strength rapidly while others demonstrate a more gradual degradation, caution should be observed before
attempting such an approach. Furthermore, EHS shield wire galvanization melts at about 4000C, occurring rather as a step function. More detailed information may be found in Reference 3 of the paper. The 40C
may be excessive for some applications but not for others. This is ultimately a decision to be made by the engineer.
Regarding Mr. Niles' last comment on contact resistance, the values
were selected based on the opinion of the author and others
knowledgeable in the field. No actual test data is available.
Mr. Jones' comment is most appreciated, and he is correct. When the
paper was being prepared, EHS data was computed with conductor
areas taken from Table 3.3.11 of the "Red Bookl." Unfortunately, the
conductor area column (Table 3.3.11) is in error. The correct area may
be calculated by multiplying the number of strands by the strand area
obtained from the strand diameter column in the same table. (Note that
the strand diameter for 2 inch EHS is 0.165 inches not 0.105 inches.)
These results yield the data shown in a corrected Figure 10 below.
30
^ 40
30

-~~~i
I

Guinea

.,,

20

-Minorca,-

111711Y6A

11]

~~~~7#6AW

LI

II

_
inc

1.

EH

10

iI

Lu8
______

f~~~
T

inch
3/j inc
1: EHS3

0.1

EFault Duration

Eq. Source Impedance (ohms)

.800 + j 10.0
1.6 + j 20.1

To Sta. A
16481
15165
12988

REFERENCES

0.01

TABLE A

To Structure
1145
1922
4304

NOTE: Fault current in amperes - magnitude only 1.6

with tower spacing 322m.

4i

Input
Gen A
Gen B

Total Fault
25111
25245
25413

10

15 20

1.0 secads

cycles

Figure 10

REFERENCE
1. Transmission Line Reference Book, 345 kV and Above, Electric
Power Research Institute, 1975.
Manuscript received September 16, 1982.