FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.143989.July14,2003]

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously

referredtoasDR.MELVINS.LAHOM),respondent.
DECISION
VITUG,J.:

Theblissofmarriageandfamilywouldbetomostlessthancompletewithoutchildren.
The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
LahomtotakeintotheircareIsabelitasnephewJoseMelvinSibuloandtobringhimupas
theirown.Atthetenderageoftwo,JoseMelvinenjoyedthewarmth,loveandsupportofthe
couplewhotreatedthechildliketheirown.Indeed,foryears,Dr.andMrs.Lahomfanciedon
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption.On05May1972,anordergrantingthepetitionwasissuedthatmadeallthemore
intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the
courtorder,theCivilRegistrarofNagaCitychangedthenameJoseMelvinSibulotoJose
MelvinLahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs.
Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial
Court(RTC),Branch22,ofNagaCity.Inherpetition,sheaverred
7.Thatxxxdespitetheproddingsandpleadingsofsaidspouses,respondentrefusedtochangehis
surnamefromSibulotoLahom,tothefrustrationsofpetitionerparticularlyherhusbanduntilthe
latterdied,andevenbeforehisdeathhehadmadeknownhisdesiretorevokerespondentsadoption,
butwaspreventedbypetitionerssupplication,howeverwithhisfurtherrequestuponpetitionertogive
tocharitywhateverpropertiesorinterestmaypertaintorespondentinthefuture.
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10.ThatrespondentcontinuedusinghissurnameSibulototheutterdisregardofthefeelingsofherein
petitioner,andhisrecordswiththeProfessionalRegulationCommissionshowedhisnameasJose
MelvinM.Sibulooriginallyissuedin1978untilthepresent,andinallhisdealingsandactivitiesin
connectionwithhispracticeofhisprofession,heisJoseMelvinM.Sibulo.
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13.Thathereinpetitionerbeingawidow,andlivingaloneinthiscitywithonlyherhouseholdhelpsto
attendtoher,hasyearnedforthecareandshowofconcernfromason,butrespondentremained
indifferentandwouldonlycometoNagatoseeheronceayear.
14.Thatforthelastthreeorfouryears,themedicalcheckupofpetitionerinManilabecamemore
frequentinviewofalegailment,andthosewerethetimeswhenpetitionerwouldneedmostthecare
andsupportfromaloveone,butrespondentallthemoreremainedcallousandutterlyindifferent
towardspetitionerwhichisnotexpectedofason.
15.Thathereinrespondenthasrecentlybeenjealousofpetitionersnephewsandnieceswheneverthey

wouldfindtimetovisither,respondentallegingthattheywereonlymotivatedbytheirdesirefor
somematerialbenefitsfrompetitioner.
16.Thatinviewofrespondentsinsensibleattituderesultinginastrainedanduncomfortable
relationshipbetweenhimandpetitioner,thelatterhassufferedwoundedfeelings,knowingthatafter
allrespondentsonlymotivetohisadoptionishisexpectancyofhisallegedrightsovertheproperties
ofhereinpetitionerandherlatehusband,clearlyshownbyhisrecentfilingofCivilCaseNo.994463
forpartitionagainstpetitioner,therebytotallyerodingherloveandaffectiontowardsrespondent,
renderingthedecreeofadoption,consideringrespondenttobethechildofpetitioner,foralllegal
purposes,hasbeennegatedforwhichreasonthereisnomorebasisforitsexistence,hencethis
petitionforrevocation.[1]
Priortotheinstitutionofthecase,specificallyon22March1998,RepublicAct(R.A.)No.
8552,alsoknownastheDomesticAdoptionAct,wentintoeffect.The new statute deleted
fromthelawtherightofadopterstorescindadecreeofadoption.
Section19ofArticleVIofR.A.No.8552nowreads:
SEC.19.GroundsforRescissionofAdoption.Uponpetitionoftheadoptee,withtheassistanceofthe
Departmentifaminororifovereighteen(18)yearsofagebutisincapacitated,asguardian/counsel,
theadoptionmayberescindedonanyofthefollowinggroundscommittedbytheadopter(s):(a)
repeatedphysicalandverbalmaltreatmentbytheadopter(s)despitehavingundergonecounseling(b)
attemptonthelifeoftheadoptee(c)sexualassaultorviolenceor(d)abandonmentandfailureto
complywithparentalobligations.
Adoption,beinginthebestinterestofthechild,shallnotbesubjecttorescissionbythe
adopter(s).However,theadopter(s)maydisinherittheadopteeforcausesprovidedinArticle
919oftheCivilCode.(emphasissupplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the
trialcourthadnojurisdictionoverthecaseand(b)thatthepetitionerhadnocauseofaction
in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition,thattheproscriptioninR.A.No.8552shouldnotretroactivelyapply,i.e.,tocases
wherethegroundforrescissionoftheadoptionvestedundertheregimeofthenArticle348[2]
oftheCivilCodeandArticle192[3]oftheFamilyCode.
Inanorder,dated28April2000,thetrialcourtheldthusly:
Ontheissueofjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofthesuit,Section5(c)ofR.A.No.8369confers
jurisdictiontothisCourt,havingbeendesignatedFamilyCourtinA.M.No.991107SC.
Onthematterofnocauseofaction,thetestonthesufficiencyofthefactsallegedinthecomplaint,is
whetherornot,admittingthefactsalleged,theCourtcouldrenderavalidjudgmentinaccordance
withtheprayerofsaidcomplaint(DeJesus,etal.vs.Belarmino,etal.,95Phil.365).
Admittedly,Section19,ArticleVIofR.A.No.8552deletedtherightofanadoptertorescindan
adoptionearliergrantedundertheFamilyCode.Conformably,onthefaceofthepetition,indeedthere
islackofcauseofaction.
Petitionerhowever,insiststhatherrighttorescindlongacquiredundertheprovisionsoftheFamily
Codeshouldberespected.Assumingforthesakeofargument,thatpetitionerisentitledtorescindthe
adoptionofrespondentgrantedonMay5,1972,saidrightshouldhavebeenexercisedwithinthe
periodallowedbytheRules.Fromtheavermentsinthepetition,itappearsclearthatthelegalgrounds
forthepetitionhavebeendiscoveredandknowntopetitionerformorethanfive(5)years,priortothe
filingoftheinstantpetitiononDecember1,1999,hence,theactionifany,hadalreadyprescribed.
(Sec.5,Rule100RevisedRulesofCourt)

WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingconsideration,thepetitionisordereddismissed.[4]
ViaapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCourt,petitioner
raisesthefollowingquestionsviz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an
adopteraftertheeffectivityofR.A.No.8552?
2.Intheaffirmative,hastheadoptersactionprescribed?

Abriefbackgroundonthelawanditsoriginscouldprovidesomeinsightsonthesubject.
Inancienttimes,theRomansundertookadoptiontoassuremaleheirsinthefamily.[5]The
continuityoftheadoptersfamilywastheprimarypurposeofadoptionandallmattersrelating
toitbasicallyfocusedontherightsoftheadopter.Therewashardlyanymentionaboutthe
rights of the adopted.[6] Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to
preserveinheritancewithinthefamily,neitherallowednorrecognizedadoption.[7]Itwasonly
muchlaterwhenadoptionwasgivenanimpetusinlawandstilllaterwhenthewelfareofthe
child became a paramount concern.[8] Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption
ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently,
wastofinditswaytothearchipelago.TheAmericanscameandintroducedtheirownideas
on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an
overridingconsideration.[9]Intheearlypartofthecenturyjustpassed,therightsofchildren
invited universal attention the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,[10] followed by the United Nations
Declarations of the Rights of the Child,[11] were written instruments that would also protect
andsafeguardtherightsofadoptedchildren.TheCivilCodeofthePhilippines[12]of1950on
adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code[13] and then by the Family
Code of the Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted.In1989,theUnitedNationsinitiatedtheConventionoftheRightsoftheChild.The
Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was
impressedwithsocialandmoralresponsibility,andthatitsunderlyingintentwasgearedto
favortheadoptedchild.R.A.No.8552securedtheserightsandprivilegesfortheadopted.
Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
familybutalsointhesocietyaswell.Thenewlawwithdrewtherightofanadoptertorescind
the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties
createdbyadoption.
Petitioner,however,wouldinsistthatR.A.No.8552shouldnotadverselyaffectherright
to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case,
bothbeingvestedundertheCivilCodeandtheFamilyCode,thelawstheninforce.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process[15]thatexpressesapresentfixedinterestwhichinrightreasonandnaturaljustice
isprotectedagainstarbitrarystateaction[16]itincludesnotonlylegalorequitabletitletothe
enforcementofademandbutalsoexemptionsfromnewobligationscreatedaftertheright
has become vested.[17] Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
presentinterest,[18]absolute,unconditional,andperfect[19]orfixedandirrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by
Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code
(PresidentialDecreeNo.603)allowedanadoptiontobesoughtbyeitherspouseorbothof
them.Afterthetrialcourthadrendereditsdecisionandwhilethecasewasstillpendingon
appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint
adoptionby thehusband andwife,tookeffect.Petitioner Republic argued that the case
shouldbedismissedforhavingbeenfiledbyMrs.Bobilesaloneandwithoutbeingjoinedby

thehusband.TheCourtconcludedthatthejurisdictionofthecourtisdeterminedbythe
statuteinforceatthetimeofthecommencementoftheaction.Thepetitiontoadopt
Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband,
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21] spouses Claude and
JumrusMiller,bothaliens,soughttoadoptMichaelMadayag.On29July1988,thecouple
filedapetitiontoformalizeMichaelsadoptionhavingtheretoforebeentakenintotheircare.
At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the
decreeofadoptionandwhileonappealbeforetheCourtofAppeals,theFamilyCodewas
enactedintolawon08August1988disqualifyingaliensfromadoptingFilipinochildren.The
Republicthenprayedforthewithdrawaloftheadoptiondecree.Indiscardingtheargument
posedbytheRepublic,theSupremeCourtruledthatthecontroversyshouldberesolved
inthelightofthelawgoverningatthetimethepetitionwasfiled.
ItwasmonthsaftertheeffectivityofR.A.No.8552thathereinpetitionerfiledanactionto
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,[22] had already
abrogatedandrepealedtherightofanadopterundertheCivilCodeandtheFamilyCodeto
rescindadecreeofadoption.Consistentlywithitsearlierpronouncements,theCourtshould
now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitionerafterR.A.No.8552hadcomeintoforce,nolongercouldbepursued.
Interestingly,evenbeforethepassageofthestatute,anactiontosetasidetheadoption
is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the
adopterwouldlosetherighttorevoketheadoptiondecreeafterthelapseofthatperiod.The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
personhasnovestedrightinstatutoryprivileges.[24]Whileadoptionhasoftenbeenreferred
tointhecontextofaright,theprivilegetoadoptisitselfnotnaturallyinnateorfundamental
butratherarightmerelycreatedbystatute.[25]Itisaprivilegethatisgovernedbythestates
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.[26]
Mattersrelatingtoadoption,includingthewithdrawaloftherightofanadoptertonullifythe
adoptiondecree,aresubjecttoregulationbytheState.[27]Concomitantly,arightofaction
givenbystatutemaybetakenawayatanytimebeforeithasbeenexercised.[28]
WhileR.A.No.8552hasunqualifiedlywithdrawnfromanadopteraconsequentialright
torescindtheadoptiondecreeevenincaseswheretheadoptionmightclearlyturnouttobe
undesirable,itremains,nevertheless,theboundendutyoftheCourttoapplythelaw.Dura
lexsedlexwouldbethehackneyedtruismthatthosecaughtinthelawhavetolivewith.Itis
still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adoptermaydenytoanadoptedchildhislegitimeand,byawillandtestament,mayfreely
excludehimfromhavingashareinthedisposableportionofhisestate.
WHEREFORE,theassailedjudgmentofthecourtaquoisAFFIRMED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),YnaresSantiago,Carpio,andAzcuna,JJ.,concur.
[1]Rollo,pp.2526.
[2]Art.348.Theadoptermaypetitionthecourtforrevocationoftheadoptioninanyofthesecases:

(1)Iftheadoptedpersonhasattemptedagainstthelifeoftheadopter
(2)Whentheadoptedminorhasabandonedthehomeoftheadopterformorethanthreeyears

(3)Whenbyotheractstheadoptedpersonhasdefinitelyrepudiatedtheadoption.(n)
[3]Art.192.Theadoptersmaypetitionthecourtforthejudicialrescissionoftheadoptioninanyofthefollowing

cases:
(1)Iftheadoptedhascommittedanyactconstitutingagroundfordisinheritingadescendantor
(2)Whentheadoptedhasabandonedthehomeoftheadoptersduringminorityforatleastoneyear,or,bysome
otheracts,hasdefinitelyrepudiatedtheadoption.(41a,P.D.No.603)
[4]Rollo,pp.3334.
[5]TheLawofAdoption,MortonL.Leavy&ReyWeinbey,4thEdition(1979).
[6]TheLawonAdoptionandSurrogateParenting,IrvingJ.Sloan(1988).
[7]Ibid.,p.7.
[8] Id. The earliest adoption statute was reported in Mississippi in 1846. In 1850, Texas and Vermont, USA

passedtheirgeneraladoptionstatutes,followedbyMassachusettsandNewYorkin1851.
[9]AComparativeStudyoftheAdoptionLawundertheSpanishCivilCodeandtheCodeofCivilProcedure,4

Phil.L.J.313323(1918).
[10]UnitedNationGeneralAssembly,Resolutiondated10December1948.
[11]UnitedNationGeneralAssembly/44/49(1989).
[12]PresidentialDecreeNo.386.
[13]PresidentialDecreeNo.603(10June1975),asamendedbyP.D.No.1175(15August1977).
[14]ExecutiveOrder209(03August1988).
[15]16CJScitingCityofLosAngelesvs.Oliver,283P.298,102Cal.App.299.
[16]Ayogvs.Cusi,Jr.G.R.No.L46729,19November1982(118SCRA492).
[17]16Am.Jur.2d,ConstitutionalLaw,p.651.
[18]BenquetConsolidatedMiningCo.vs.Pineda,No.L7231,28March1956(98Phil.711)quotingPearsallvs.

GreatNorthernR.Co.,161U.S.646.
[19]Reyesvs.CommissiononAudit,G.R.No.125129,29March1999(305SCRA512)ascitedinBernabevs.

Alejo,G.R.No.140500,21January2002(374SCRA180).
[20]G.R.No.92326,24January1992(205SCRA356).
[21]G.R.No.125932,21April1999(306SCRA183).
[22]Section26.RepealingClause.Anylaw,presidentialdecreeorissuance,executiveorder,letterofinstruction,

administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is
herebyrepealed,ormodified,oramendedaccordingly.
[23]SEC.5.Time within which to file petition.A minor or other incapacitated person must file the petition for

rescissionorrevocationofadoptionwithinthefiveyearsfollowinghismajority,orifhewasincompetent
atthetimeoftheadoption,withinthefive(5)yearsfollowingtherecoveryfromsuchincompetency.
Theadoptermustalsofilethepetitiontosetasidetheadoptionwithinfive(5)yearsfromthetimethecauseor
causesgivingrisetotherescissionorrevocationofthesametookplace.(emphasissupplied)
[24] Id. at 24, citing Brearly School vs. Ward, 210 NY 358, 40 LRA NS. 1215 also, Cooley, Constitutional

Limitations,7thEd.p.546.
[25]Martinvs. Putman (Miss) 427 So 2d 1373 There is no right of adoption.It is the extension of a privilege.

Egglestonvs.Landrum210Miss645,50So2d364,23ALR2d696.
[26]Browdervs.Harmeyer(IndApp)ascitedinAmJur,2d,Vol.2.
[27]

Adoption has also been characterized as a status created by the state acting as parens patriae, the

sovereignparent.Douglasvs.Harrelson(AlaApp)454So2d984.
[28]16CJScitingRobinsonsvs.Mchugh,291P.330,158Wash.157.