EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-22257. May 25, 1977.]

GO YU TAK WAI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, VIRGILIO
GASTON and MARCIAL RAOLA, in their capacity as Commissioner
and Associate Commissioners, respectively, composing the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, respondents-appellants.
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
On November 8, 1961 Go Yu Tak Wai arrived in Manila on board a plane
of the Cathay Pacific Airways. She is a widow. She was provided with a
passport issued by the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of China stationed at Macao. Stamped on that passport was her
immigration non quota visa issued by the Philippine consulate at Hongkong.
On March 22, 1962 a Board of Special Inquiry, investigated the application of
Go Yu Tak Wai for admission as a returning resident.
The Board found that the applicant arrived in the Philippines for the first
time in 1930 with her late husband, Jose Go, a permanent resident who
operated a store at Villalobos Street, Manila. In 1941 the spouses left for
China. Jose Go died in 1948 in Amoy, China. Due to the war and the
occupation of China by the communists, the applicant was not able to return
to the Philippines. Chua Guat, a Chinese resident who allegedly managed
Go's store in his absence, and Arsenio Clarin, a Filipino who allegedly
prepared the travel papers of the Go spouses in October, 1941, corroborated
the claim of Go Yu Tak Wai that she was a returning resident.
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that Go Yu Tak Wai had
satisfactorily proven her right to admission as a returning resident
notwithstanding her twenty-year absence from the Philippines and the fact
that she had no re-entry permit. After due deliberation, they voted to exclude
Go Yu Tak Wai.
ISSUE:
Whether, for purposes of section 27(b) of the Immigration Law, a
resolution of the Commissioners which reversed the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry and which was adopted within one year from the
promulgation of the said decision is sufficient.
HELD:
This Court had already held that "the operative date of the
Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and

adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in

extenso was prepared, written and signed" because "the decision in extenso
must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted.
Necessarily, the extended opinion had to be posterior to the day when the
Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the Board of
Special inquiry".
It follows that the trial court's decision should be reversed. However,
only six (6) Justices (Fernando, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Concepcion Jr.,
Martin, JJ. and the writer) voted for reversal.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Section 27(b) specifies that as a rule the decision of the Board of
Special
Inquiry
"shall
be
promulgated
and
the
findings
and
recommendations, in proper cases, submitted not later than two days from
the date of the deliberation". The absence of such a requirement with
respect to the decision of the Board of Commissioners supports the view that
such decision need not be promulgated within the one-year period. It suffices
that the Commissioners should review the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry and deliberate upon it within one year from the promulgation of the
Board of Special Inquiry's decision and that the minutes of their deliberation
should reflect the action which they took within the said statutory period.
OBITER DICTUM:
As noted by the Solicitor General, section 27(c) expressly requires that
the decision of the Commissioners in case of an appeal from the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry, excluding an alien, should "be put in writing and
promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted
for decision". In contrast, no such requirement is provided for in section 27(b)
with respect to the Commissioners' decision in case they motu proprio review
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. The trial court erred in holding
that under section 27(b) a written decision should be signed and
promulgated by the Commissioners within one year from the promulgation of
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
WHEREFORE, for lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial court's decision,
the same is considered affirmed. The Court has found it unnecessary to hold
a rehearing. No costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent on the ground that it is patent from section 21 (b) of the
Immigration Act as cited on pages 4-5 of the decision penned by Mr. Justice
Aquino that "the decision of any two members of the Board [of Special

Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the
Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal,
unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu
proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of
said decision."
The Act's provisions as well as public policy support such a construction
that requires that a resolution or decision of the Board of Commissioners on
a review motu proprio of the special inquiry board's decision (whether of
admission or exclusion) must be put in writing and promulgated with due
notice on the party affected within the statutory one-year period of finality.
On the provisions of law involved, section 27 (b) of the Act provides
mandatorily that "the decision of the board of special inquiry shall be
promulgated and the findings and recommendation, in proper cases,
submitted not later than two days from the date of deliberation." Section 27
(c) likewise provides for a summary period of seven days from submittal for
decision within which the Board of Commissioners shall put in writing and
promulgate its decision on an appeal of the alien or of a dissenting member
of the board of special inquiry. Read in context, it seems obvious that the
decision on a review motu proprio by the Board of Commissioners must be
no less than a decision on appeal by either party, viz, it must be duly put in
writing and promulgated within the more than adequate one year period
fixed by the Act.
Public policy and due process buttress such a construction. Where the
alien has appealed from an adverse decision or a dissenting special inquiry
board member has appealed a favorable decision, the applicant for
admission knows as mandated by the law that a final decision must be
handed down within seven days from submittal of the appeal for decision.
Where there has been no appeal and the Board of Commissioners conducts a
review motu proprio of which the applicant is likely unaware, both public
policy and due process demand that where no adverse decision is
promulgated within the statutory one-year period of finality, the decision of
the special inquiry board shall have become final and beyond the
Commissioners' authority to reverse or set aside thereafter.
Such a view is certainly in consonance with law's policy of a definite
date of fixed finality of the special inquiry board's decision be it of
inclusion or exclusion of an alien and to reduce to the minimum any
opportunity or occasion for anomalies and irregularities in the admission or
exclusion of aliens and applicants for admission under the procedures for
appeal or review motu proprio established by the Act.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28107. March 15, 1977.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff , vs. TOMAS NAVASCA,
FLORENCIO GERALDES, LORENZO SOBERANO and MANUEL
MARQUEZ, defendants.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
On December 18, 1962, Tomas Navasca, Florencio Geraldes, Lorenzo
Soberano and Manuel Marquez were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide committed by a band before the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch III, the information reading as follows:
That on or about March 17, 1959, in the Municipality of Bansalan,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above mentioned accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, and with intent to gain and
by means of force upon things and violence against persons, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take, steal and carry away the sum of
One Thousand Eight Hundred (P1,800.00) Pesos belonging to Go So alias
OWA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount, and
on the same occasion thereof, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, the
above mentioned accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and shoot said GO SO alias OWA,
thereby inflicting upon him injuries which caused his death.
Before arraignment, the commitment of the accused Tomas Navasca to
the National Mental Hospital was ordered and proceedings against him
suspended after the court had adjudged him as suffering from mental
disorder, on the strength of the report and recommendation of a courtappointed doctor, and after the court had satisfied itself "that he cannot
understand the nature of the proceedings to be conducted against him."

Due trial proceeded against the remaining accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused are guilty of the crime robbery with homicide
committed by a band.
HELD:
The evidence for the prosecution clearly established that the members
of the band committed the crime of robbery on the occasion of which a
homicide was committed, thus classifying the crime as one of robbery with
homicide. It has also been established that the aggravating circumstance of
band attended the commission of the crime and none of the members
thereof attempted to prevent the same. The state of the evidence for the
prosecution being such, we now assay the defense of the accused.
The defense of all the accused is anchored on the inadmissibility of the
extra-judicial confession of Florencio Geraldes and the extra-judicial
admission of Lorenzo Soberano on the ground that these were obtained by
force and promise of freedom and hence, involuntary. As we have mentioned
earlier, it does not behoove this Court to determine the voluntariness or
involuntariness of both extra-judicial statements, it being enough that other
evidence adduced at the trial fulfill the required quantum of evidence to
convict the accused. Likewise, we have found that the extra-judicial
statement of Soberano contains the indicia of voluntariness and his
testimony in the court as prosecution witness negates the suspicion of a
promise of freedom. Woven together with the other evidence of the
prosecution, the pattern for the crime has thus been formed, and the claim
of Soberano as to the involuntariness of his admission as well as that of his
testimony must fall.
Considering the length of time that has elapsed from the time the
accused Tomas Navasca was committed to the National Mental Hospital, the
Director of the said hospital should now conduct a full-blown examination of
the mental state of the said accused for the purpose of determining his
mental capacity to stand trial, and thereafter submit the proper report and
recommendations to this Court.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The crime established by the evidence for the prosecution is robbery
with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstance of band.
The penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua
to death. The crime having been committed by a band, all the members
thereof are liable for each of the assaults committed. No evidence was
adduced by any of the accused that he had attempted to prevent the
commission of the crime, hence all must be held liable for the crime of

robbery with homicide. There being one aggravating circumstance and no

mitigating circumstance to offset the same in the case of Florencio Geraldes
and Manuel Marquez, the penalty of death was correctly imposed on them.
The act of testifying for the prosecution, by Lorenzo Soberano should be
considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to a plea of
guilty, hence there exist in the case of Lorenzo Soberano, one mitigating
circumstance and one aggravating circumstance which offset each other.
Consequently, Lorenzo Soberano was properly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
OBITER DICTUM:
In the case of People vs. Apduhan, it is held that if the crime of robbery
with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be
robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstance of band and not
robbery in band with homicide.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-44323. March 2, 1977.]
ELENA GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and ANTONIO LAYOS, respondents.
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
Antonio Layos sued Elena Genobiagon in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu for the partition of a lot located at Cebu City with an area of 403 square
meters, together with the building thereon.
Layos alleged that he owned nine-tenths (9/10) of the property because
he purchased that portion from Elena's mother, two brothers and sister, and
that Elena owned one-tenth (1/10) thereof. Elena Genobiagon alleged in her
answer that she owned more than one-tenth of the land and that Layos has
no cause of action against her. She assumed that her parents, Flavia Sosas
and Felipe Genobiagon, were married.
The trial court in its decision found that Flavia Sosas bought the lot in
1953 on the installment basis. After paying all the installments, she secured

in 1960 a title in her name for the said lot. She sold the property to Layos in
1973.
The trial court also found that when Flavia Sosas acquired the lot she
was no longer living with Felipe Genobiagon. The trial court concluded that
the lot in question belonged exclusively to Flavia Sosas and was not jointly
owned by her and her common-law husband, Felipe, and that Layos acquired
full ownership thereof when he purchased it from Flavia.
From the trial court's adverse decision, Elena Genobiagon perfected an
appeal to the Court of Appeals. That Court, on Layos' motion, dismissed her
appeal on the ground that her eight-page mimeographed brief does not
contain any page references to the record and does not even have any
statement of facts.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal of the petitioner.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals acted within its jurisdiction in dismissing the
appeal of Elena Genobiagon because her brief does not contain a statement
of facts with page references to the record. It would be absurd to say that the
Court of Appeals, in applying section 1[g] of Rule 50, gravely abused its
discretion.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Elena Genobiagon's appeal by certiorari to this Court is devoid of merit.
The dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is based on section 16[d]
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides that the appellant's brief shall
contain in the "'statement of facts', a clear and concise statement in a
narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in
controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in
sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page reference to the
record."
Section 1[g], Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may
be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, for want "of page references to the record as required in section
16[d] of Rule 46."
OBITER DICTUM:
Elena Genobiagon's eight-page brief shows that her counsel has not
understood the trial court's decision. For example, in the first assignment of

error, her counsel argues that the trial court erred in not declaring that Flavia
Sosas and Felipe Genobiagon were not legally married. That contention is
wrong because, as already noted, the trial court found that neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant had presented in evidence any marriage contract
or marriage certificate of Flavia (Sosas) Genobiagon and Felipe Genobiagon.
That means that the trial court found that Flavia Sosas and Felipe
Genobiagon were not married.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Reading Section 1 (g) of Rule 50, on Dismissal of Appeal, together with
Section 16 (d) of Rule 46, which states that among other requisites, the
appellant's brief shall contain a Statement of Facts, with page references to
the record, it is very clear that even if a Statement of Facts is made in
appellant's brief, omission of the corresponding page references to the
record is a ground for dismissal addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. I hold that this ground of dismissal is not mandatory and may be
overlooked when the circumstances of any given case demand a different
course of action in order not to defeat the ends of justice. But when there is a
complete omission of the Statement of Facts, the rule should be otherwise. In
such a situation, it is obvious that there is not only a literal violation of the
rules there is manifest evidence of gross indifference of counsel to the
lawyer's duty to duly present the case of his client in a brief, simple and
comprehensible manner that would enable the court to have adequate basis
for action, without having to meander by itself into the mazy labyrinths of
the records without chart or compass, spending in doing so precious time
and effort which it could otherwise devote to other cases, with the
consequent corresponding impairment of the interests of justice as to
everyone concerned. prLL
Because of the fact that petitioner's one-tenth interest in the land in
controversy was annotated in the title, her ownership of such fraction thereof
may not be ignored as part of the indefeasibility of the title itself. By her own
acts at the pre-trial, as recounted in the main opinion, she has laid whatever
right could spring in her favor from such annotation open, to doubt, and with
the fatal faults above-discussed of her brief, it stands to reason that no
inequity can result even if the controversy were laid to rest where the Court
of Appeals has buried it.