Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447,
473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 18421847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173,
180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615,

641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,11801278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 16301649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 19862028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or

some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is

material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall

within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of
the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and
instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442;
Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall
have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/apr1985/gr_l63915_1985.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report
dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m.
of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together
with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator

core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of
channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable
wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin
which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the
whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D
of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions
who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform
but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED

NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT

PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.
The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to
the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not
testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same.
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error
and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best
brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion. 7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes
evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination. 8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official records.
Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran,
enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last
requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial
court. InRodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who
signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination,
the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his
perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as
well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of
Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were
gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to
prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain
utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule
are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed
from official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many
others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his
report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the

sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no
showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3
Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his personal
knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3
Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the morgue, 12 making the latters death beyond dispute.
PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it
was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall
of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of
the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions, 18 the opinion of a witness is generally
not admissible.19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by
the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for
itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or
at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was
under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury
was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendants want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent
or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon
the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff
complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof
of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some court add to the three

prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means
of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has
superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of
the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies
where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule
of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and
human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to
the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellants negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but
argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendants negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements,
the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for the defendant to explain or
prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of
say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before
the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn statement, the
company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the
leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing
that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also assails
the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of
opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly
known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care
any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably,
1wphi1.nt

petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence
arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds employer
damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee,
his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act,
provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as
under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of
the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under
the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled thatan injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor
for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under
the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmens Compensation
Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation
to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the
motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
claims were filed under the Workmens Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of

the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and
violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive
Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael
Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp.
vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under
the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all
further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that
the claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil
Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits
under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the
Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received
a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal
complaint against petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to
the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at
all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early
as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigators report. The appellee merely executed
her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellants employees. It was the investigator who
recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutors office.
This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have even
known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x
are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible
that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred
from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law
waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public
prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the

Prosecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein
that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at
all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the
foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation that she learned about appellants
negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact
that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of
her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than
from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her
complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or
mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear
or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as
early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991,
two months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a
resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioners employees, the
case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the
ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two
choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on
the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single
wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one
remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses
not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against
whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
the partys rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated
on the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to

burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who
ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; 41 otherwise, the defense is
waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husbands death
and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the
"fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating
that there may be civil liability. InFloresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and
regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but aconclusion of law, over which only the courts
have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears,
therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware
of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Courts ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the
total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit
"K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from
November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was
P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by
the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments
already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'
award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed
by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/apr2001/gr_137873_2001.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19826

March 31, 1923

LUCIANO DELGADO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EDUARDO ALONSO DUQUE VALGONA, defendant-appellee.
Manuel Gallego and Gibbs and McDonough for appellant.
Cavanna, Aboitiz and Agan for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The parties to this action are residents of the municipality of Goa, in the Province of Camarines Sur,
the plaintiff, Luciano Delgado, being a planter of local prominence, while the defendant, Eduardo
Alonso Duque Valgona, is a business man and storekeeper in Goa. In November of the year 1917
Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the municipality of Goa from one Stickney, who was then
about to leave the Philippine Islands, paying the sum of P15,000 therefor. This purchase was
apparently made by Alonso as an investment; and at the time of acquiring the property he probably
expects, from certain conversations that he had had with Delgado, to be able to sell the property on
advantageous terms to the latter. Alonso indeed claims that the property was purchased by him at
the instance and request of Delgado, under circumstances that virtually made him the agent of
Delgado in the purchase. Be this as it may, the money that was used to buy the land from Stickney
was certainly supplied by Alonso, and the property was conveyed by Stickney directly to him. On
February 1, 1918, Alonso conveyed the same property to Luciano Delgado; and in order to secure
the payment of the purchase money Delgado contemporaneously executed a mortgage in favor of
the defendant upon the same land and also upon two other large parcels already owned by the
plaintiff situated in the municipality of Tinambac, of the Province of Camarines Sur.
The deed of conveyance by which the defendant transferred to the plaintiff the title to the twelve
parcels purchased from Stickney has not been introduced in evidence, but the conveyance by way
of mortgage executed by Delgado to secure the payment of the purchase price is before us; and it is
this instrument which supplies the principal basis of controversy. The stipulations of this mortgage,
so far as material to be here noted, are contained in clauses A to E, inclusive, of paragraph 2; and in
substance they are as follows: (A) The debtor-mortgagor (Delgado) promises to pay to the creditormortgagee (Alonso) the sum of P15,000 in a single payment. (B) To secure this sum the debtor
creates a mortgage in favor of the creditor on the fourteen parcels of land described in paragraph 1

of the same instrument. (C) So long as the indebtedness subsists the debtor obligates himself for
interest in the amount of P2,250, to be paid in two semi-annual installments of P1,175 each, which, it
will be observed, make an amount larger by P100 than the other quantity. (D) The creditor concedes
to the debtor the period of twelve years from the date of the instrument within which the latter may
make payment of the P15,000 aforesaid. Finally, in clause (E), it is stipulated that, if the debtor
should not make payment within twelve years, the creditor may, at the end of that period, enter into
possession of the mortgaged property.
A simple calculation shows that the interest agreed to be paid in clause C upon the purchase price of
the land which had thus been bought by Delgado was at a rate well above fifteen per centum per
annum. This mortgage therefore offends against the provisions of the Usury Law, which limits the
rate that can ordinarily be secured by mortgage upon real property to twelve per centum per annum
(Act No. 2655-2).
The trial judge found that, back in November, 1917, Delgado had taken over the possession of the
twelve parcels directly from Stickney's overseer. Alonso therefore probably at no time exercised
possession over the property; and on February 1, 1919, when Delgado made payment of P2,625
upon interest account, the interest was calculated from December 1, 1917, instead of February 1,
1918. (See receipt, Exhibit A.)
During the year 1919 and thereafter, owing to the financial stringency resulting from the fall in the
price of agricultural products, Delgado seems to have been unable to make further payment of
interest, and when Alonso began to press him about the matter, recourse to legal advise was had by
the former; and on February 3, 1920, this action was instituted by Delgado in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur.
By the amended complaint, bearing date of October 21, 1920, the plaintiff seeks to enforce the right
of action given in section 6 of Act No. 2655 and thereby to recover from the defendant Alonso the
sum of P2,625 paid upon February 1, 1919, by way of interest, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee, alleged to be in the amount of P2,500. In the same complaint the plaintiff seeks to obtain a
declaration of nullity as to the stipulations contained in clauses A, C, and E of the mortgage.
To this complaint the defendant answered with a general denial; and by way of special defense he
alleged that the contract in question had been entered into by him innocently and in total ignorance
on his part of the existence of the Usury Law and, further, that he had been maliciously inveigled into
said contract by the plaintiff, with full knowledge on the part of the latter of the illegality of the
stipulation for usurious interest, and with the design of taking advantages of the Usury Law to the
prejudice of the defendant.
The defendant, therefore, on his part, and by way of cross-complaint, prayed the court to set the
contract of mortgage aside; but instead of asking for a restoration of the twelve parcels of land,
subject of the sale, he asked that the plaintiff be adjudged to pay to him the sum of P15,000, alleged
to have been advanced by the defendant to the plaintiff for the purchase of said land from Stickney,
after deducting the sum of P2,625, admittedly received in payment of usurious interest.

Upon these pleadings, and upon consideration of the proof, both oral and documentary, the trial
judge found that the mortgage in question was in fact usurious, and he therefore declared the same
to be void. He further awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P2,625 to be recovered of the defendant by
way of restriction of the whole interest paid, in conformity with section 6 of Act No. 2655, with interest
to be calculated upon said sum at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date of the filing of
the original complaint. His Honor refused, however, to award any amount to the plaintiff by way of
attorney's fee, observing that the plaintiff appeared to have acted with more malice in the transaction
than the defendant.
Upon the cross-complaint his Honor gave judgment in favor of the defendant to recover of the
plaintiff the sum of P15,000, being the price of the twelve lots transferred by the defendant to the
plaintiff contemporaneously with the execution of the mortgage, together with interest on said sum to
be calculated at the lawful rate of six per centum per annum from December 1, 1917. From this
judgment both parties appealed, but error has been here assigned in behalf of the plaintiff only.
In our opinion the trial judge did not err in holding that this mortgage is usurious, since it purports on
its face to obligate the debtor to pay interest on the mortgage debt at a rate in excess of that allowed
by law. The attorney for the defendant, however, takes the position that the obligation of the
mortgagor in its entirely, including both his promise to pay the principal of P15,000 within twelve
years and the promise to pay interest thereon at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum so long as
the debt should continue to subsist, represented in the minds of the contracting parties the price
which was agreed upon as the value of the property sold; and from this the conclusion is drawn that
the contract does not truly represent a loan or forbearance at an unlawful rate. In support of this
proposition decisions are cited from certain courts in the United States to the effect that the seller
may fix one price as the cash price of the property to be sold and a higher price if sold upon credit;
and the circumstance that these prices may differ by an amount exceeding the lawful rate of interest
for the period over which credit extends does not make the contract usurious. Upon that proposition
we have no criticism to make, and it will suffice in this connection to quote the following passage
from an opinion written by Mr. Justice Grier in the Supreme Court of the United States in which he
said:
But it is manifest that if A purpose to sell to B a tract of land for $10,000 in cash, or for $20,000
payable in ten annual installments, and if B prefers to pay the larger sum to gain time, the contract
cannot be called usurious. A vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy, and a
purchaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit; and one who will not distinguish
between things that differ, may say, with apparent truth, that B prays a hundred per cent for
forbearance, and may assert that such a contract is usurious; but whatever truth there may be in the
premises, the conclusion is manifestly erroneous. Such a contract has none of the characteristic of
usury; it is not for the loan of money, or forbearance of a debt. (Ruffner vs. Hogg, 1 Black [U. S.],
115; 17 L. ed., 38.)
However, the case before us does not exhibit the features indicated in the passage quoted. Here we
have a present sale at the case price of P15,000 and forbearance in respect to the collection of that
sum for an indefinite period within the limits of twelve years, in consideration of an agreement to pay
interest at a usurious rate so long as the indebtedness should subsist. It will be noted that credit was

not extended for a definite time, and the debtor was left at liberty to pay off the whole debt at any
time within the twelve-year limit that he chose.
This case in our opinion more properly falls within the rule stated in 39 Cyc., page 927, to the effect
that: ". . . Where the sale is made on a cash basis and for a cash price and the vendor forbears to
require the cash payments agreed upon in consideration of the vendee's promising to pay at a future
day a sum greater than such agreed cash value with lawful interest, in such case there is a
forbearance to collect an existing debt, and the excessive charge therefor is usurious."
The mortgage in question being clearly usurious, the trial judge committed no error in declaring that
instrument void; and this, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff limited his prayer for relief to those
features of the mortgage which were unfavorable to himself, without asking that the whole contract
be annulled. It was not erroneous for the court, upon being appealed to for relief against the unlawful
contract, to eradicate the evil root and branch, and more particularly as the defendant had also
asked that the mortgage be annulled.
Under the conditions above stated it was also inevitable that the plaintiff should be permitted to
recover the interest paid by him to the extent of P2,625 upon this usurious contract, this right of
action being expressly recognized in section 6 of the Usury Law.
Whether the plaintiff was entitled to have something awarded to him in the character of attorney's fee
in connection with this recovery is a point which requires some consideration. As to this statute in
effect says that any person who has paid upon any usurious contract a higher rate than is allowed by
law may recover the whole interest paid "with costs and attorney's fees in such sum as may be
allowed by the court." This language undoubtedly recognizes a discretion in the court in respect to
fixing the amount of the fees, but it is not so clear that the court has a discretion to deny the
allowance altogether. On the contrary, we incline to the view that when the right of action to recover
interest paid upon a usurious contract is established, a reasonable attorney's fee should be allowed
as a matter of course, the same as costs are awarded. The purpose of the law is to encourage
persons who have suffered from contracts of this character to come into court and vindicate their
rights, and the imposition upon the userer of the obligation to pay the attorney's fee will serve at
once as an encouragement to the oppressed and as a wholesome deterrent to the taking of usurious
interest.
In the case before us the trial judge considered that he was justified in disallowing the attorney's fee
on the ground that the plaintiff had acted with more malice than the defendant in respect to the
making of the contract in question. Upon examining the proof bearing on this point, we are of the
opinion that this imputation is not altogether warranted. We are quite prepared to believe the
defendant when he says that the entered into the contract in total ignorance of the law against usury
and it is not improbable that the plaintiff, stimulated by the desire to purchase the property, had
suggested the terms upon which he was willing to take it; but it is not proved that he had the Usury
Law in mind at the time or maliciously intended to entrap the defendant into the making of this
contract and then to take advantage of the law. Both parties were, in our opinion, victims, at once of
their own ignorance and of economic practices inherited from the past; and ignorance of the
provisions of the Usuary Law does not relieve either from the legal consequences of the contract into
which they voluntarily entered.

Upon due consideration of the amount involved and the character and extent of the litigation that has
resulted, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff should be allowed the sum of P1,000 as his
reasonable attorney's fees in this court and the court of origin in connection with the cause of action
founded on section 6 of Act No. 2655.
Upon the second branch of the case, arising upon the defendant's cross-complaint, we are of the
opinion that the trial judge erred in giving judgment in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff's for
the sum of P15,000, the agreed price of the property purchased by the latter. It is obvious that he
transfer of the land to the plaintiff and the contemporaneous act of mortgaging it (with two additional
parcels) to the defendant should be viewed in equity as a single transaction. The true consideration
for the mortgage was therefore the land, not its price. It follows that if the restitution was to be
ordered at all, the thing to be restored was the land. The appealed judgment must, therefore, be
reversed in so far as it requires the plaintiff to pay the sum of P15,000 to the defendant.
The question whether it is now proper for this court, upon the state of facts before it, to order the
restriction of the land must be answered in the affirmative, upon the ground that the plaintiff, having
seen fit to appeal to the court for relief from a usurious contract, will be required to do equity by
placing his adversary so far as practicable in his former condition.
The law upon this point has been lately considered by the Supreme Court of Rhode Islands, under a
statute in all material respects like that now in force in this country. It there appeared that a bill in
equity had been filed, praying that a note made by the plaintiff to the defendant for money loaned
should be declared usurious and void and be surrendered to the plaintiff, and that a mortgage
executed by the plaintiff as security for the payment of said note should be canceled and that the
defendant should be restrained from alienating said note and from foreclosing the mortgage. Upon
demurrer it was held that relief would not be granted upon the facts stated in the bill without
repayment, or a tender of repayment of the capital. In discussing the law pertinent to the case, the
court, among other things, said:
The provisions of the Rhode Island statute with reference to usury are drastic. Chapter 434, Public
Laws 1909, amended by chapter 838, Public Laws 1912. The violation of the act is punishable as a
misdemeanor, every contract made in violation of it is not, and the borrower may be recover in an
action at law, not only the interest, but any portion of the principal paid by him upon such usurious
contract. The complainant's solicitor has presented to us a very comprehensive and able argument
in support of his contention that equity should recognize the view of public policy emphatically
expressed in the legislative act, and should cancel the usurious and void contract. This argument
would have more persuasive force if the question were a new one. The settled and nearly universal
practice of courts of equity is opposed to the complainant's contention. The statutes of different
states have various provisions directed towards the prevention of the extortion and oppression of
usury. Whatever may be the method adopted by the legislature, however, although the legislative
provision may go to the limit of our state and declare the contract void and unenforceable,
nevertheless courts of equity, in the absence of statute specifically constraining them to act
differently, have insisted upon the equitable principle that he "who seeks equity must do equity," and
have required the borrower, before he can be given the relief of cancellation of the contract, to
perform the moral obligation resting upon him, and pay or offer to pay the principal of the loan with
legal interest. (Moncrief vs. Palmer, 114 Atl., 181; 17 A. L. R., 119.)

The doctrine of that case we consider applicable here; and without expressing any opinion upon the
broader question whether capital lent upon a usurious contract can be recovered in an aggressive
action by the creditor, we are content to hold that when the debtor in a usurious contract sees fit, or
finds it necessary to apply to the court for equitable relief, he will, as a condition to the granting of
such relief, be required to restore what he received from the other party. In the present case both
parties are before the court in the attitude of suppliants, each asking for relief from the contract in
question; and in order to avoid the possibility of further litigation, as well as to secure complete
justice, an order will be entered requiring the plaintiff, as a condition of the satisfaction of the
judgment in his favor, to reconvey to the defendant the same twelve parcels acquired by the plaintiff
from the defendant.
In his answer to the defendant's cross-complaint, the plaintiff stated a claim based on a receipt for
P1,937.10, given by the defendant for a sum of money lent to him by the plaintiff on October 1, 1918.
At the trial his Honor refused to admit proof tending to establish this claim, on the ground that it had
not been stated in the complaint, and he intimated that it might be made the subject of an
independent action.
We do not think that this ruling constitutes reversible error, if erred in any sense; and the plaintiff
must, as suggested by the trial judge, be content with his remedy by separate action, if recourse to
judicial measures should be necessary. If desirous of incorporating this claim into the present
litigation, the plaintiff should have amended his complaint (sec, 104, Code of Civ. Proc.) and though
the trial judge might perhaps in a liberal spirit have treated the plaintiff's answer to the crosscomplaint as an amendment to the original complaint on this point, his attention does not appear to
have been called to this aspect of the matter, and he should not be put in error in having excluded
the evidence relative to said claim.
In the light of what has been said, it becomes necessary to affirm the judgment in so far as it
decrees the nullity of the mortgage (Exhibit B) and in so far as it awards to the plaintiff the sum of
P2,625, to be recovered of the defendant, with interest at six per centum per annum from February
3, 1920, until paid. In addition to the foregoing the plaintiff will recover of the defendant the sum of
P1,000, in the character of attorney's fees, as already explained. The judgment will be reversed in so
far as it awards to the defendant the sum of P15,000 to be recovered from the plaintiff with interest
at six per centum per annum from December 1, 1917, until paid. The plaintiff will, however, be
required, upon satisfaction of the judgment for the sums awarded to him, to reconvey to the
defendant the twelve parcels which were the subject of the sale. No special pronouncement will be
made as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Malcolm, Avancea, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1923/mar1923/gr_l-19826_1923.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14406

June 30, 1961

MARCELINO BUYCO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH, Iloilo City, respondent-appellant.
Efrain B. Treas for petitioner-appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes and Nemesio C. Vargas for respondent-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
Mandamus case filed by petitioner Marcelino Buyco praying that the respondent Philippine National
Bank be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, as payment of his
obligation with said respondent.
The case was submitted on an agreed stipulation of facts, with the pertinent documents as annexes.
On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in the amount of
P5,102.90 plus interest thereon, which represented petitioner's deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with
respondent bank. The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of
Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955, under Rep. Act No. 897 in the
amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years. On April 24, 1956, petitioner offered to pay
respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the abovementioned crop year 1952-53 with his said
backpay acknowledgment certificate, but on July 18, 1956, respondent answered petitioner that
since respondent's motion for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino v. Philippine
National Bank, L-8782, (52 O.G. 2522) was still under consideration by this Court (S.C.) respondent
"cannot yet grant" petitioner's request (Annex A, amended petition). On February 15, 1957, and after
this Court had denied respondent's motion for reconsideration in said case No. L-8782, petitioner,
again wrote respondent, reiterating his request to pay the obligation with said certificate (Annex B).
On February 19, 1957, respondent answered petitioner that in view of the amendment of its charter
on June 16, 1956 by R.A. No. 1576, it could not accept petitioner's certificate (Annex C). Petitioner
requested respondent to reconsider its decision, in a letter dated March 26, 1957 (Annex D), which
was referred to the respondent's Legal Department. In an opinion rendered on April 23, 1957, said
department expressed the view that notwithstanding the decision of this Court, the respondent could
not accept the certificate because of the amendment of its Charter heretofore mentioned.
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on July 24, 1958, granted the petition and ordered the
respondent bank "to give due course on the vested right of the petitioner acquired previous to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1576 by accepting his backpay acknowledgment certificate as

payment of the obligation of the petitioner with respondent Bank with costs of the proceedings
against respondent." Hence, this appeal by the respondent Bank.
In spousing the cause of the petitioner-appellee, the trial court made the following findings and
conclusions:
(1) That in the letter Annex A, dated July 18, 1956, the respondent has impliedly admitted the right of
petitioner to apply or offer his certificate in payment of his obligation to respondent.
(2) That the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Florentino case filed by respondentappellant, did not affect the petitioner's vested right already created and acquired at the time he
offered to pay his obligation with his certificate on April 24, 1956, and before the passage of Rep. Act
No. 1576.
(3) That Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of the petitioner to pay his obligation with his
backpay certificate.
(4) That the writ of mandamus would lie against the appellant.
The above findings and conclusions are assigned as errors, alleged to have been committed by the
trial court.
In the light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Florentino case, the respondent Philippine
National Bank therein was declared authorized to accept backpay acknowledgment certificate as
payment of the obligation of any holder thereof. Although the Florentino case was promulgated on
April 28, 1956, four (4) days after April 24, 1956, the date the appellee offered to pay with his
backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is nevertheless obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956,
the right to have his certificate applied for the payment of his obligation with the appellant already
existed by virtue of Republic Act No. 897, which was merely construed and clarified by this Court in
the said Florentino case. So that when the appellant in its letter of July 18, 1956. replied that "in the
meantime that our motion for reconsideration of the said decision is still pending the resolution of the
Supreme Court, we regret to advise that we cannot yet grant your request", the said appellant
already knew or should have known that a right was vested, only that its enforcement had to wait the
resolution of this Court which it handed on February 15, 1957, by maintaining its decision. A vested
right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become
fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham v. Great Falls Water
Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden, 10 Fed.
293, 44 CCA 464 L.R.A. 900). Considering the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case, we
agree with the lower court that the appellant herein had impliedly admitted the right of the petitioner
to apply his backpay certificate in payment of his obligation. This notwithstanding, whether implied or
expressed the admission by the appellant of appellee's right, has already lost momentum or
importance because the law on the matter on April 25, 1956, when the offer to pay the obligation
with the certificate was made, or the law before the amendatory Act of June 16, 1956, was that the
PNB was compelled to receive petitioner's backpay certificate..

Section 9-A of Republic Act No. 1576, passed on June 17, 1956, amending the Charter of the
respondent-appellant bank, provides:
The Board of Directors shall have the power and authority:.
. . . (d) In its discretion, to accept assignment of payments certificate of indebtedness of the
government or other such similar securities: Provided, however, that the authority herein granted
shall not be used as regards backpay certificates.
What would be the effect of this law upon the case at bar? "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). It is said that the law looks to the future
only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some
legal provisions (Lopez, et al. v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997, 1007); that all statutes are to be construed as
having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that
every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect (Montilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24
Phil. 220). These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not
contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply
states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the
present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is
familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights
that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild v. U.S., 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99 F. 534).
It is true that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity" (Art. 5, New Civil Code). It should be recalled,
however, that since the prohibitive amendment of the appellant's charter should not be given
retroactive effect; and that the law, at the time appellee made his offer, allowed, in fact compelled,
the respondent bank to accept the appellee's certificate, the above provision finds no application
herein.
IN VIEW HEREOF, mandamus is the proper remedy (Florentino case, supra), and the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the respondent-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/jun1961/gr_l-14406_1961.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV, respondents.
Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners.
Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.

ESGUERRA, J.:p
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private respondent
Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated
October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The question before Us
involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known as the
Rental Law.
The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, now
petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for
the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against said
respondent, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 338-M. In the said Court private respondent sought to amend his Answer filed in the
Municipal Court on the grounds that (1) for lack of time he was not able to disclose to his former
counsel all the material facts surrounding his case and, therefore, he was not able to fully determine
his defenses; and (2) that prior to the hearing of the case in the lower court he wanted to cause the
filing of an amended answer but was not able to do so for his alleged failure to contact his counsel.
The motion to file amended answer was denied by the Court. The parties eventually submitted a
stipulation of facts, the salient provisions of which read as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant since 1954;
2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease;

3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then
payable at or before the end of the year;
4. The following are the rates of rentals:
(a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year
(b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year
(c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year
(d) 1962 P16.00 a year
(e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year
(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year
5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was
increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;
6. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present;
7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate;
8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and received by,
defendant.
On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving
private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on
July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision
of Republic Act 6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which
Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof.
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1970,
which reads:
On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the Motion for Dismissal filed by
the defendant through counsel, dated July 13, 1970.
A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge. Hence this
petition.
Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126 may be held
applicable the case at bar. For convenience We reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in
question:

Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another's dwelling is located shall, during
the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the
lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three
hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970.
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered
by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in
the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question took effect on
June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected.
Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract covering
the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30.00 effective January
1969, as he did not give his consent thereto. In his brief he alleges:
Defendant (respondent) herein also begs to disagree with the contention of plaintiffs. We believe and
respectfully submit that there would be no impairment of obligation of contract if Republic Act 6126
were to be applied to the present case. The alleged new contract of lease and subsequent increase
in the amount of rental were not effected as of January 1969 with respect to the defendant. He did
not accept the new rate of rental. The eloquent testimonies on record to show that defendant never
accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs were the pretrials on the case
wherein defendant offered to accept the increase to the tone of 100%. Hence, the new contract of
lease increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs and the defendant
because the defendant never gave his consent to the new rate of rental. In effect, therefore, the
alleged new contract of lease was not a contract at all since it did not have the consent of the other
party, the defendant.
Private respondent's contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to show
that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essential to its
validity. There was no more subsisting yearly contract of lease at a fixed amount. It had already
expired when the increase and conversion into monthly payments took effect in January, 1969. The
lessor was free to fix a higher amount than that previously paid by the lessee (private respondent
herein) and if the latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacated the premises
and thus rendered himself free from liability. Respondent Cipriano, therefore, cannot invoke lack of
consent on his part as basis for declaring the contract of lease ineffective.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial,
the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in
order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the
facts as found. 2 The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", 3 it had a
limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor
of a dwelling unit or land ... shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the
monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act." Hence the

prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and
beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did
not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory
construction that "Expressium facit cessare tacitum" 4 and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the
Legislature ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. A
perusal of the deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126, as
recorded its Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law did not
entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment. We quote pertinent
portions of the discussion:

Remarks of sponsor, Mr. Roces:

Mr. Roces Mr. Speaker, the President is still observing the effect of the newly established floating
rate. In the meantime we feel that, in line with the policy that those who have less in life should have
more in law, apartment dwellers are entitled to protection. Therefore this bill proposes that the
rentals paid today will not be increased in the next 18 months.
and on pages 66 and 72 respectively of the same Congressional Record We likewise find the
following:
Mr. Gonzales Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the phrase "during the period of 6
months preceding the approval of this Act" in Section 2? 5
Mr. Roces. My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that period not before will be the one
considered.

Mr. Montano ... The term moratorium as utilized by the gentleman from Manila at the start of his
sponsorship was applied not in its legal acceptance but generally. For purposes of the bill, the term
is construed as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yet determined the
real value of the currency ... .
Respondent's tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126 represents a
last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time escaping the obligation
to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a situation, for to permit the same to obtain
would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner herein. Well-settled is
the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair
the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to
be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless
such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment, 6 Similarly, in the case of La Previsora Filipina, Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Felix
Ledda, 66 Phil. 573, 577, this Court said:
It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive effect unless it is otherwise
provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No. 4118 does not
state that its provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is hereby declared,
that it is not applicable to the contracts entered into by the parties, and, hence the trial court erred in
granting possession to the petitioner.

The petitioner contends that said law is applicable because when the property in question was sold
at public auction said law was already in force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The date
which should be taken into account in order to determine the applicability of the law is the date when
the contracts were entered into by the parties and not the date of the public sale, ... .
Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to
the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what
it plainly says.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set
aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on
the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Costs against respondent.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/feb1974/gr_l_32743_1974.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of
the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the judgment of conviction,
for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael
Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the
municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of
imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of
firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded
to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two
offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a
patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the
requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing
him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of
the Government.
Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving
only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as
secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as
secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang, 1 was exempt
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a
quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial
governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the
case at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961"
includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have
the right to bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the
rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang, 3the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965,
the Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
- formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked
the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the
new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the
old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area,
more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret
agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at
the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle,
notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
1wph1.t

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713.

2 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
3 Vide People vs. Lucero, L-10845, April 28,1958, 103 Phil. 500.
4 People vs. Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607. Vide Senarillos vs. Hermosisima,
L-10662, December 14, 1956, 100 Phil. 501.
5 People vs. Jabinal, ibid.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_39990_1975.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6791

March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the

Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638
and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or
notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said
two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette,
presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of
the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws"
include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de
1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien
los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo
ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen
la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia
que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may
be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno,
JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1954/mar1954/gr_l-6791_1954.html>

G.R. No. L-34882 August 24, 1976

J. AMADO ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO DORONILA, A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., and COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.
G.R. No. L-35643 August 24, 1976
ALFONSO DORONILA and A. DORONILA RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioners,
vs.

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AS TRIBUNAL, JUDGE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO,

THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, and J. AMADO
ARANETA, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for J. Amado Araneta.
Mariano Aguilar and Alfonso A. Doronila for Alfonso Doronila and A. Doronila Resources
Development, Inc.

BARREDO, J.:
Two separate but related petitions, that in G.R. No. L-34882 being for certiorari and prohibition
against the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of said court in refusing to
dismiss the appeal of private respondents from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a
civil action between the private parties herein, notwithstanding allegedly that the record on appeal of
said private respondents, Alfonso Doronila et al. does not show on its face, in violation of Section 6
of Rule 41 and Section 1 of Rule 50, that their appeal was made on time, and that in G.R. No. L35643 being also one for certiorari and prohibition against the same Court of First Instance of Rizal
for having issued a writ of execution of the decision, the finality of which is in issue in G.R. No. L34882, said Court of First Instance having assumed that because of the restraining order of this
Court in said G.R. No. L-34882 enjoining the appellate court from enforcing its resolutions refusing to
dismiss the appeal of the Doronilas and from further acting on said appeal until further orders, the
result was that the judgment of said trial court could already be executed.
In connection with the second petition (G.R. No. L-35643), on November 23, 1974, counsel for
therein private respondent J. Amado Araneta f filed a motion for dismissal of the petition upon the
ground basically that said private respondent "would prefer to wait for the finality of the decision
before availing of the execution thereof." The Doronilas opposed such dismissal, unless it is coupled
with a final injunction of this Court against the questioned execution orders of the trial court.
Accordingly, said petition may be disposed of without elaborate discussion.
As regards the first petition (G.R. No. L-34882), it appears that in Civil Case No. 9856 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, an action filed by J. Amado Araneta for specific performance of an exclusive
option to buy granted by him to Alfonso Doronila, for himself and for A. Doronila Resources
Development Corporation, over two big parcels of land situated in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, at a total price of P13,071,215.00, and for damages, the said court, after due trial,
rendered on April 28, 1971 a decision the dispositive part of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendant Alfonso Doronila to clear the cadastral survey of Montalban, Rizal,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 7924 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, of all liens and
encumbrances, including the mining claims of Republic Cement Corporation and Silangan Mining
Association, and the claim of Cesario C. Bandong over the 13.6420 hectares thereof;

2. Ordering defendant A, Doronila Resources Development, Inc. to clear the San Mateo, Rizal
property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42999, Register of Deeds of Rizal, of squatters
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, and thereafter, within thirty (30) days, to execute
in favor of plaintiff, a deed of sale of said properties, free from all liens and encumbrances upon the
payment of P4,071,215.10, minus the P40,000.00 option money, in accordance with the option
contract dated February 10, 1966;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P63,448.00 as actual damages and P7,242,250.00
for damages arising from unrealized profits, with legal interest, from the filing of the complaint;
4. Dismissing the counterclaim, with costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED. (Pp. 168-169, Rec. on Appeal )
From this judgment, the Doronilas took steps to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but in the said
appellate court, J. Amado Araneta moved to dismiss said appeal. Acting on that motion, the Court of
Appeals resolved as follows:
Plaintiff Appellee, J. Amado Araneta, filed before us a motion to dismiss appeal of defendantsappellants on the ground that the record on appeal does not show on its face that the appeal was
perfected on time. Acting upon said motion to dismiss, this Court in its resolution dated January 27,
1972, required the defendants appellants to comment thereon within 10 days from notice. On
January 26, 1972, defendants- appellants thru counsel filed a manifestation asking for a 20-day
period within which to file an answer, which manifestation was favorably granted by this Court in its
resolution dated January 28, 1972.
On February 10, 1972, defendants-appellants filed their answer alleging among others that they filed
their appeal on time. In support thereof, they submit a copy of notice of the trial court (Annex A,
Answer) giving them an additional ten day period within which to file their amended record on
appeal.
An examination of the record shows that on April 28, 1971, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
rendered a decision in favor of J. Amado Araneta, copy of which was received by the defendants
appellants on May 14, 1971. As a consequence, defendants-appellants immediately filed on May 31,
1971, a notice of appeal and an appeal bond in the amount of P120.00. However, due to some
deficiencies, the original record on appeal was ordered amended. So that it was only on June 22,
1971, that the amended record on appeal was filed by the defendants-appellants. On July 19, 1971,
the trial judge approved the amended record on appeal, thus
It appearing that the defendants have already included the motion to dismiss, opposition filed thereto
and the resolution of the court thereon, in the amended Record on Appeal filed by the defendants,
and for want of any further objection on the part of the plaintiff,AS PRAYED FOR, the amended
record on appeal filed by the defendants is hereby approved. (R.A. p. 172).
From the foregoing data submitted by the defendants-appellants, we could reasonably infer that the
approval was perfected on time, not to mention in this connection that plaintiff did not object to the

approval of the record on appeal. The statement of the trial court that 'for want of any further
objection on the part of the plaintiff', is of vital significance which cannot just be ignored, especially,
since, as in this case, the supreme interest of justice is at stake, considering that the subject matter
of the appeal consist of big parcels of land, with an aggregate are of 21, 549, 183 square meters,
excluding 8 mineral rights and claims of limestones, shale, etc.
WHEREFORE, considering that the paramount interest of justice would be best served if we allow
the parties to litigate the facts in issues, the instant motion to dismiss appeal is hereby denied. (Pp.
33-35, Record.)
And when Araneta moved to reconsider the foregoing resolution, the motion was denied thus:
Acting upon plaintiff-appellee's 'Motion for Reconsideration' filed on March 9, 1972 of the is Court's
resolution dated February 24, 1972 denying the motion to dismiss appeal; the Court RESOLVED to
DENY the motion for reconsideration. The instant case can well be an exemption to the rule laid
down by the Supreme Court in the cases cited by the appellee because of the nature of the issues
involved in this litigation. (p. 46, Record.)
In the present petition with Us, Araneta maintains that under this Court's rulings in Valera vs. Court
of Appeals, 37 SCRA 80, Reyes vs. Carrascoso, 38 SCRA 311, Dominguez vs. Court of Appeals, 38
SCRA 316, The Director, Bureau of Building and Real Property Management vs. Court of
Appeals, 38 SCRA 317, De Guia vs. Court of Appeals, 40 SCRA 333, Imperial Insurance Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 42 SCRA 97, Luzon Stevedoring vs. Court of Appeals, and other cases of similar
vein, the respondent Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of the Dornilas, there being
no showing on the face of their amended record on appeal as to when their original record on appeal
was filed, hence said amended record "fails to show on its face that their appeal was perfected
within the period fixed by the rules", pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50.
Under date of July 29, 1976, however, with commendable candidness, Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales,
counsel for Araneta, filed a manifestation taking not only of the later more liberal rulings of this Court
in Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 228, Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, 64 SCRA 475
and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 262, cited by the Dornilas in their motion in this Court
of May 3, 1976, but also of Our decisions in Heirs ofSerafin Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA
309, Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 322 and Krueger vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 50,
which abandoned the strict line pursued in the earlier cases cited by him, albeit insisting just the
same that the impugned resolution of the Court of Appeals is erroneous in the light of the following
observations:
As may be seen, Berkenkotter and Pimentel and subsequent cases have overruled Valera vs. Court
of Appeals, Reyes vs. Carrascoso, and other cases adhering to the strict construction of material
data rule.
But Berkenkotter and Pimentel were promulgated only on September 28, 1973 and June 25, 1975
respectively, hence, it can only operate prospectively and will not affect previous cases appealed
before that date, relying on the old doctrine.

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that construed law purports to carry into effect.
At the time of Liceria's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule the Court's interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the
new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the
old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. (People vs. Licera, L39990, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA 270, 272, 273)
Therefore, Berkenkotter and Pimentel cannot retroactively affect the present case, whose appeal
was perfected on June 21, 1971.
Leaving aside for the moment, the well thought of issue thus rather ingeniously raised by
distinguished counsel, it is Our considered opinion that in the particular case on hand, the omission
in the Doronila amended record on appeal of any reference to the date of the filing of their original
record on appeal is not fatal, even from the point of view of the former rule of strict "literal adherence
to the 'material data rule'", to borrow Justice Munoz Palma's expression in Krueger, supra. For here,
there is no dispute that within seventeen days, from May 14, 1971, when Doronila's co-counsel was
served with the decision to May 31, 1971, the date the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed,
the Doronilas already clearly manifested their determination to appeal from the evidently onerous
decision which ordered them not only to comply with the option given them by Araneta but to
additionally pay over P7.8 M to their adversary for actual damages and unrealized profits, so much
so that when an objection was filed to their original record on appeal, they lost no time in amending
the same by inclusion of the papers referred to in the objection without waiting for any corresponding
order of the court. 1
Now under the rules (Sec. 7 of Rule 41), unless the court fixes a period for the filing of the amended
record on appeal, the same may be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the order for
amendment. We take judicial notice of the fact that ordinarily, appellants are given not less than said
period of ten days within which to comply with an order to amend the record on appeal and that it
would take at least one week before the court can consider and rule on the objection of appellee
plus another one week to issue and serve the corresponding order. So, assuming that the Doronilas
filed their original record on appeal as early as May 31, 1971, which is already rather extraordinary,
since generally, the record on appeal is filed some days later, they still had a total of 24 days from
May 31 to make a timely appeal by filing their amended record on appeal. In other words, their
reglementary period would have expired on June 24, 1971. And since the Doronila amended record
on appeal was filed on June 22, 1971, it is almost Beyond question that their appeal was perfected
on time. Surely, matters of judicial notice constitute part of whatever data is required under Section 1
of Rule 50 and Section 6 of Rule 41. And taking the circumstances of judicial notice already referred

to together with the absence of any further objection in the Part of Araneta to the amended record on
appeal in Question as well as the failure of Araneta to alleged Categorically that the original record
on appeal of the Doronila was filed out of time or to deny that it was filed within the reglementary
period, We are persuaded that the amended record on appeal here in dispute sufficiently complies
with the requirements of the rules.
It may be added here that when Araneta objected to the original record on appeal. It was only on the
ground of omission of certain papers therein, not for its being out of time. Under the omnibus motion
rule, "he objection of untimeliness was waived by Araneta and it is reasonable to assume that he
would not have raised such a clearly jurisdictional fatality if in fact the original Doronila record on
appeal had been filed out of time. Since the Purpose of the strict rule of literal compliance with the
"material data rule" is to avoid debate on the timeliness of the appeal, and there is here no occasion
for such debate, such timeliness being a matter no longer disputable by Araneta, it should follow that
the amended record on appeal may be read in the sense that the order of the court approving the
same includes the finding that the original thereof had been filed on time. We hold that thus read,
said amended record on appeal sufficiently complies with the rules. (Berkenkotter supra, and
subsequent rulings analogous thereto.)
Anent the ruling in Liceria relied upon by Araneta, We hold that the same is not applicable to matters
involving controversies regarding the application of the Rules of Court, if only for the reason that it is
within the power of this Court to excuse failure to literally observe any rule to avoid possible injustice,
Particularly in cases where, as here, the subject matter is of considerable value and the judgment
being appealed from, at least the portion thereof sentencing the Doronilas to Pay over P7.2 M of
supposedly unrealized profits., is by its very nature, reasonably open to possible modification, if not
reversal. Liceria was predicated on the principle that changes in substantive law may not be applied
retroactively, specially when prejudice will result to the party that has followed the earlier law. That
principle does not obtain in remedial law. 2
WHEREFORE, the petitions in the above two cases are hereby dismissed, without any
pronouncement as to costs, and the appeal of the Doronilas in CA-G.R. No. 49139-R, subject of the
petition in G.R. No. L-34882, may now proceed in its regular course, and the orders of execution
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 9856 is hereby set aside and its enforcement is in
consequence enjoined permanently.
Fernando, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1976/aug1976/gr_34882_1976.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132214

August 1, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ZALDY CASINGAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Must a man be brought behind bars when no one saw him pull the trigger of the carbine that felled
his fellowman?
In Criminal Case No. SCC-2411, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an
Information which states:
"That on or about May 8, 1995, in Barangay Sawat, municipality of Urbiztondo, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Diosdado Palisoc with a U.S. Carbine cal. 30 inflicting upon him
the following injuries:
-Gunshot wound on the left chest
POE: 0.5 cm., anterior shoulder
POX: 0.5 cm. 5th ICS-L paravertebral line
- Hypovolemic shock
which caused the death of said Diosdado Palisoc as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code:"1
In Criminal Case No. 2412, he was likewise charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition. The Information states:

"That on or about May 8, 1995, in Barangay Sawat, municipality of Urbiztondo, province of

Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) U.S. Carbine caliber 30 with ammunition, without first securing the necessary permit
and license to possess the same, which he used in the commission of the crime of Murder.
Contrary to P.D. 1866."2
The accused pled not guilty to both crimes. Trial proceeded in due course.
The facts of the shooting incident are based mainly on the narration of prosecution witness Edgardo
Mula Cruz. It appears that on the May 8, 1995 local elections, at about 8:15 p.m., Cruz was near the
gate of Sawat Elementary School in Barangay Sawat, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, waiting for Palisoc,
the victim.3 Palisoc went home to get food or "baon" for Cruz and himself.4 Cruz was talking with his
friends and facing the road when he saw Palisoc coming. 5 He heard a gunshot, and when he turned
his head towards its direction, he saw Palisoc facing the accused and falling to the ground. Carrying
a U.S. carbine caliber .30, the accused ran towards the house of one Francisca Galpao. 6 The area
where the shooting incident took place was lighted by an electric bulb near the school gate. Cruz
stood seven meters from both the victim and the accused whom he (Cruz) knew personally as they
were neighbors.7 After the accused left the crime scene, Cruz sought assistance from the policemen
assigned at the Sawat Elementary School for the elections.8 One of the policemen brought Palisoc to
the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Hospital.9 Palisoc expired in the operating room, the gunshot wound on
his chest causing his death.10 Cruz returned to the Sawat school to act as pollwatcher.11 The following
day, he executed an affidavit narrating the shooting incident. 12
An investigation team was dispatched to the crime scene where some bloodstains, a fired bullet
caliber .30 and fired caliber .30 cartridge were found.13 On May 9, 1995, the accused was arrested in
the house of one Mimi Payaoan in Barangay Salavante, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. On the same day,
pursuant to a search warrant, one (1) carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988 with one long
magazine and 30 rounds of live ammunition were found in the house of Francisca Galpao. 14 The
firearm with the magazine and ammunitions, as well as the fired bullet and cartridge were submitted
for ballistic examination conducted by Police Inspector Pascual G. Mangal-ip. 15
Police Inspector Mangal-ip testified that the fired cartridge and slug found at the crime scene were
the same with the cartridge and slug found in the house of Francisca Galpao and test-fired from the
carbine submitted for ballistic examination. He concluded that the cartridge and slug found at the
crime scene came from carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988. 16 Chief Inspector Theresa
Ann Bugayong Cid also testified that the paraffin test on the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the
hands of the accused and on said carbine caliber .30 yielded positive results. 17
The version of the defense was presented through the sole testimony of the accused. He did not
dispute that the victim was shot on the night of May 8, 1995 with the use of carbine caliber .30 with
serial number 5611988.18 Nor did he deny his presence at the crime scene.19 He, however, pointed to
another person as the triggerman.

The accused testified that on May 3, 1995, while in Baguio City, he received a letter from a certain
Ernesto Payaoan, requesting him to go to Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to help in the local
elections.20 The accused obliged and arrived in Urbiztondo on May 7, 1995. He spent the night in the
house of Francisca Galpao.21 The next morning, Payaoan came and instructed the accused to clean
carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988 and to fire it to test its condition. The accused did as
instructed and then gave the firearm back to Payaoan. 22 He asked Payaoan why the gun was being
tested and Payaoan revealed that he would kill Diosdado Palisoc. The accused tried to stop
Payaoan as Palisoc was his second cousin, but to no avail.23
On May 8, 1995, at about 7:30 in the evening, the accused and Payaoan went to Sawat Elementary
School. Payaoan brought the carbine with him.24 When they saw Palisoc, Payaoan shot the victim
and passed the firearm to the accused. He ordered the accused to run and bring the gun to the
house of Francisca Galpao.25 His story was reduced to an affidavit which he executed about seven
(7) months after the shooting incident or on December 20, 1995. 26 On January 25, 1996, he
executed another affidavit27 retracting his December 20, 1995 affidavit. On February 13, 1996, he
made another affidavit28 recanting his second affidavit. The accused likewise claimed that while in
detention in the Municipal Jail of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, he confided to SPO1 Teofilo Garcia that it
was Payaoan who killed Palisoc.29
Payaoan testified as a rebuttal witness. He declared that on May 7 and 8, 1995, he was at the
Regional PNP Command on standby detail because they were on red alert for election duties. 30 At
that time, he was a member of the General Services Group, PNP Recom 1, San Fernando, La
Union. He buttressed his claim with a certification that on May 6-9, 1995, he was in the camp vicinity
in San Fernando, La Union for election duties.31
The prosecution likewise presented SPO1 Teofilo Garcia. He confirmed that the accused was a
detention prisoner in the Municipal Jail of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan from May up to June 1995, but
denied that the accused confided to him that it was Payaoan who shot Palisoc. 32
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions.33 Hence, this appeal with the lone assignment of error, viz:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER AND
VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
SUBSTANTIATE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."
Prefatorily, we shall discuss the applicable law. On June 6, 1997, Republic Act 8294 amended P.D.
1866 which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms. Among its amendments was that if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use shall be
considered as a special aggravating circumstance.34 The amendment meant: first, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate
offense, but as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as a single crime is committed (i.e.,
homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm), only one
penalty shall be imposed on the accused.35

In its Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of murder and illegal possession of firearm
and ammunitions. It stressed that R.A. 8294 cannot be given retroactive effect for it was enacted in
1997 while the crimes charged against the accused were committed in 1995. It held that to give R.A.
8294 retroactive effect would be prejudicial to the accused and violative of Art. III, Sec. 22 of the
1987 Constitution which provides that, "(n)o ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted." 36
We disagree. This Court has previously ruled that R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, and should
thus be retroactively applied in the present case. 37 It was thus error for the trial court to convict the
accused of two separate offenses, i.e., Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions.
The crime for which the accused may be charged is murder, aggravated by illegal possession of
firearm.
We now examine the evidence to determine the guilt of the accused. The accused makes much of
the fact that no one saw him in the act of shooting. It is true that there was no eyewitness to the
shooting of the victim, but the testimony of prosecution witness Cruz is sufficient to convict the
accused as responsible for the death of Palisoc. He stated in his affidavit executed the day after the
shooting incident, viz:
"Q. Do you know who shot Diosdado Palisoc?
A. Yes sir, Zaldy Casingal also resident of Barangay Salavante, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. 38
He likewise testified as follows:
PROS. SORIANO:
Q. When he fell down, what did you do?
A. I called up a police, sir.
Q. Before you called up a police, could you tell this Honorable Court the direction where the shot
came from?
A. Yes, sir. When I turned my head where the shot came from, I saw Zaldy Casingal holding a
carbine going to the house of Ating Galpaw (sic).
xxx
Q. How were you able to recognize Zaldy Casingal whom you said was holding a carbine and
proceeded (sic) to the house of Ating Galpaw (sic) after Diosdado Palisoc was shot?
A. There was an electric bulb near the gate, sir.
Q. How far were you to (sic) Zaldy Casingal when you saw him holding a firearm proceeding to the
house of Ating Galpaw?

A. About seven (7) meters, sir.

Q. And how far were you to (sic) Diosdado Palisoc when he was shot?
A. The same, sir.39
xxx
Q. You mentioned Zaldy Casingal as a person whom you saw carrying a firearm/carbine after
Diosdado Palisoc was shot, do you know this Zaldy Casingal personally?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. He is our neighbor, sir.
Q. If he is now in (sic) courtroom, will you please point to him?
A. (Witness pointing to a man with a mustache, and when he asked his name he answered Zaldy
Casingal).40
xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. You said that you did not actually see who shot Diosdado Palisoc, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.41
xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. After you saw Diosdado Palisoc shot, did you look to the direction where the shot came from?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you saw a person running, is that correct?
xxx
A. There is sir, it was Zaldy Casingal bringing a gun.42
ATTY. VALDEZ:

Q. When you said that you saw Zaldy Casingal bringing a gun, how far was he from the place where
you were standing?
A. At about seven (7) meters, sir.
Q. You said that there was an electric bulb in the Sawat Elementary School, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this electric bulb was installed inside the school room?
A. It is in (sic) the gate, sir.
Q. How far is this electric bulb, Mr. witness (sic)?
A. It is about four (4) meters, sir.
Q. And in the place where you saw Zaldy Casingal running with the gun, there was (sic) various
obstruction on (sic) the illumination of that light, is that correct?
A. None, sir, because it is a road."43
For the accused to be convicted of murder, he must be positively identified as the assailant of the
victim. Positive identification requires essentially proof of identity and not per se an eyewitness
account of the very act of committing the crime. A witness may identify an accused as the
perpetrator of the crime by direct evidence, i.e.,an eyewitness account of the commission of the
crime. There are instances, however, when a witness may not have actually seen the very act of
commission of a crime, but he may still be able to identify the accused as the perpetrator as when
the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. In this case, the positive identification forms part of circumstantial
evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain,
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion
of all others. Otherwise, if circumstantial evidence could not be resorted to in proving the identity of
the accused when direct evidence is not available, then felons would go scot-free and the
community would be denied proper protection.44 The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the
conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1)
there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the
accused.45
In fine, it is not decisive that Cruz did not actually see the accused shoot the victim. But immediately
after the victim was shot, Cruz saw the accused holding the carbine which felled the victim, and then
accused ran towards the house of Francisca Galpao. The trial court noted in its decision that the
testimony of Cruz was ". . . direct, frank, unfaltering and straightforward . . . His testimony bore the
marks of truth and sincerity, having been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in straightforward
manner."46 It also found that there is ". . . nothing in the records which would show any base motive

or vile reason on the part of the witness to falsely implicate the herein accused." 47 It is well-settled
that where there is no evidence that the witness against the accused was actuated by any improper
motive, and absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, his testimony will be given full faith
and credit.48
Cruzs positive identification of the accused as the victim's assailant is corroborated by several
pieces of circumstantial evidence. Immediately after Cruz heard a gunshot, he saw the accused
carrying a U.S. carbine caliber .30 and running towards the house of one Francisca Galpaw. The day
after the shooting incident, carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988 with one long magazine
and 30 rounds of live ammunition of the same caliber were seized in the house of Francisca Galpao.
The paraffin test conducted upon the seized carbine and upon the accused yielded positive results.
The ballistic examination also showed that the fired cartridge and slug found at the crime scene were
the same with the cartridge and slug that were found in the house of Francisca Galpao and test-fired
from the seized carbine submitted for ballistic examination. These pieces of circumstantial evidence
point to the accused as Palisocs assailant.
The defense's attempt to cast doubt upon the prosecution's theory by passing the buck to Ernesto
Payaoan is futile for lack of supporting evidence. The accuseds lone testimony that the supposed
triggerman, Ernesto Payaoan, only handed to him the carbine used in killing the victim and that he
accepted and ran away with it is not credible. As held in People v. Maliput,49 "far from bordering
merely on the imaginary, captious or plainly being a possible doubt, any reasonable doubt must
be nothing less than a fair doubt based on reason and common sense (emphasis
supplied)."50 Certainly, it is beyond reason and common sense for the accused to have taken hold of
the carbine in full view of the people near the crime scene mindless of the danger that it would
incriminate him.
However, we hold that the evidence to prove treachery or alevosia which will qualify the killing to
murder is insufficient. To prove treachery, the following must be shown: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. 51 It is also the running case
law that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Without any particulars as
to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's
death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.52 In the case at bar, prosecution witness Cruz
testified on what transpired immediately after the killing of the victim. He had no knowledge of the
circumstances before the shooting and the shooting itself. There is therefore no proof that the victim
had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Nor is there any evidence to show that the victim
was unarmed. Even assuming arguendo that the attack is sudden, there is no evidence that the
means of execution was deliberately adopted.53 The finding of the trial court that the accused shot
the victim several times does not find support from the evidence on record.
Evident premeditation cannot likewise be appreciated. There is evident premeditation when the
following facts are proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt
act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of
sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.54 The trial court appreciated this aggravating circumstance
based on the accused's testimony. A close scrutiny of the accused's testimony, however, will show

that he testified that it was not him but Payaoan who planned to kill the victim and clung to his
determination to kill, and that there was sufficient interval of time between the premeditation and the
execution of the crime to allow Payaoan to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There is no
proof whatsoever with respect to the accuseds plan to kill the victim and when he conceived of such
plan.
There being no circumstance to qualify the killing to murder, the accused should be convicted of
homicide. The penalty imposed upon the accused should correspondingly be lowered to reclusion
temporal. As there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term is anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years, and the maximum within the range of reclusion temporalin its medium period, or from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. 55
1wphi1

We come now to the charge of illegal possession of firearm. As aforediscussed, the accused cannot
be charged separately with this offense. It can only be treated as a special qualifying circumstance.
Even then, the prosecution was not able to prove that the accused lacked the license or permit to
own or possess the firearm. While the prosecution presented a photocopy of a certification issued by
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the accused was not a licensed holder of a
firearm of any kind and caliber,56 it failed to submit the original of the same. Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the
Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases. . ."
The subject certification does not fall under the exceptions. Hence, we cannot give any evidentiary
value to the photocopy of the certification.57 Neither did the prosecution present the testimony of a
representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosive Unit to establish that the accused is not licensed
to possess carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988. This omission is fatal to the
prosecution.58 In fine, the crime of the accused cannot be qualified as having been committed with an
unlicensed, illegally possessed firearm.
Prescinding from these premises, we have to modify the pecuniary liabilities imposed by the trial
court. As the accused is liable only for homicide, he cannot be ordered to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
The award of exemplary damages cannot also be given. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, "(i)n
criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." The evidence on record does not
show any aggravating circumstance. We sustain the award of moral damages as the prosecution
was able to prove that the victims death caused the latter's family extreme grief, sleepless nights
and loss of appetite.59 Funeral and other related expenses are likewise adequately supported by the
evidence on record.60
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Joint Decision is MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is found
guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and

one (1) day of reclusion temporalmedium as maximum. The trial court's award of P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, P20,000.00 for moral damages, and P25,000.00 for funeral and other related expenses is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_132214_2000.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and
Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are
as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank
robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers
from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent
Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command
(CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command
(CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP
officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident
was a legitimate police operation. 1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the
Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by
the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations 5before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one
or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal
accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
of at least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales),
were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the
said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice
de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act
8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are
now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents:
namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in
all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take
cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the
Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it
was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by
restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for
nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to
render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced,
as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2304723057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in
Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975),
thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26
(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation
and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of
the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of
the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible
period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject
amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the
accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to
bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed
the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who
challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which
shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in
Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and
R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and
14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions
or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A,
issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial
has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions
in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade
"27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final
judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower
than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to
this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the
principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is
a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379
(the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is
not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The
phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is,
whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The
offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions
of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed
into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable
and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial
distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined
witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form
of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4
provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision
in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law
is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong
Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived
as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in
the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong
sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted
on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the
object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by
23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress

since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the
Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is
particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of
their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention
has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a

natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in
the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the
power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be
expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the
amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement,
since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its
power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and
the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner
and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to
their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed
in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if
it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must
be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of
the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v.
Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be
set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is
presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of
the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF
INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO
C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON,
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S.
BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP.
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN,
SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS,
SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official
positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein
alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds
which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3
WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts
in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as
accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely
representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the
crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the
said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as
among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein
that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely

representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The
sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the
reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested
by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of
the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information
that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the
accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably
indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office
was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that
the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and
provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo
which is under his command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed
the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and
acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it
was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official
functions and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused
had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the
offense and the office of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do
not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the
course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of
extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims,
and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by
the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to
public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
said cases.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/jan1999/gr_128096_1999.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18566

September 30, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER
MIRA BREHM,petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Pitt Vasquez for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
Finding that only legal issues are involved in the instant case, the Court of Appeals certified the
same to this Court for disposition.
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic
Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by
another man, also of the American Navy, who left the country in 1952, and never heard from since
then. After the marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila, and the minor
Elizabeth had always been under their care and support of Brehm.
On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their consent to
the adoption, not only to promote her best interest and well-being, but also to give her a legitimate
status. They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing the child
Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights
pertinent thereto.
An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the
Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely temporary,
same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him from
making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being
a non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him.
A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the
case, reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the purpose establishing a relationship of
paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers
to said child; that there is already a relation between the child and Brehm, created by affinity that Art.
338 of the New Civil code, expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, in
which category petitioner Brehm falls. Petitioners contend that the records show their residence is
Manila, for while Brehm works at Subic, he always goes home to Manila, during week-ends and
manifested that he intends to reside in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the
U.S. Naval Forces.

The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment, the Pertinent portions of which read
... Since residence is principally a matter of intention, the Court is of the opinion that notwithstanding
the nature of Petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm's coming to the Philippines, his subsequent acts, coupled
with his declared intention of permanently residing herein, have cured the legal defect on the point of
residence.
Finally, we must consider the status of the minor Elizabeth Mira whose welfare deserves paramount
consideration. Being a natural child of the petitioning wife, it cannot be in conscience be expected
that when petitioners married, the mother would reduce her responsibility and her affection toward
her child....
WHEREFORE, finding that the principal allegations of the petitioners are true, it is hereby adjudged
that henceforth the minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with
respect to her natural father, and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners
Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, said minor's surname being change from "Mira" to "Mira
Brehm".
1awphl.nt

The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment, claiming that it was error for the Court in
adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. The appeal,
however, did not assail the right of petitioner Ester Mira Brehm, the natural mother of the minor, to
adopt her.
There is no question that petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm is a non-resident alien. By his own testimony,
he supplied the conclusive proof of his status here, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the
same. For this reason, he is not qualified to adopt. On this very point, We have recently declared:
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners
are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides that
The following cannot adopt
xxx

xxx

xxx

(4) Non-resident aliens;

xxx

xxx

xxx

This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize
with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no
choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt
anybody in the Philippines (Ellis & Ellis v. Republic, L-16922, Apr. 30, 1963).
Prior to the above decision, We have also denied petitions to adopt by persons similarly situated as
petitioner Brehm. Thus, in the case of Caraballo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15080, April 25, 1962, giving
some reason why non-resident aliens are disqualified to adopt, We said

... Looking after the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law has surrounded him with safeguards to
achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may be removed from
the country by the adopter, who is not a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond the reach
and protection of the country of his birth. (See also S/Sgt. Katancik, v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15472,
June 20, 1962).
This notwithstanding, petitioners press the argument that Brehm being now the step-father of the
minor, he is qualified to adopt, in view of the provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which states
The following may be adopted:
(1) The natural child by the natural father
(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother
(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
We should construe, however, Article 338 in connection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly states that
"The followingcannot adopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory, because it
contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act
required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand, Art. 338,
Provides "the following may be adopted: (3) a
step-child, by the step-father or step-mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be given
operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335. Moreover, as
heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case, and
before Article; 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. We ruled out
the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, when the latter has a legitimate child of his own (Ball v.
Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387, April 29, 1959).
IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm,
is hereby reversed, and his Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1963/sep1963/gr_l-18566_1963.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163586
January 27, 2009
SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; the
COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sharon
Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the motion
for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as
follows:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of
Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of public funds in
the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her collections and other
accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit said
amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her account for said public
funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information.
Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 4 petitioner further argued that as
she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the
RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan.5
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the
penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial
authority of the Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by
the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001
Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in
cases cognizable by the RTC.
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after
petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information. 8
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001
Order.10
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the petition in the
Decision under review.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration12 was also denied.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation of
Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this
Supreme Courts ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001
in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without
violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due
process.13
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the
Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same
case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases
cognizable by the RTC. As the investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the
Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy was applicable,
notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in
said case. Hence, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the
Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
The petition lacks merit.
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al.
invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of
malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the
motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on March 20,
2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable
by the regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has
been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of
cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the
Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by
public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature
to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory
power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law

allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer
in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his
supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute
cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal Case
Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even
as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos,
Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED
and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, 16 in which, citing the August 9,
1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the
Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, "given the Courts Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001
Resolution, the trial courts assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support and must,
therefore, be set aside."
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the Ombudsman has
prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or
pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive
effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed." 17
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law as of
the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but construes a preexisting one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent of that law.18 Hence,
the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of
the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal interpretation
of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the
constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such
operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its
interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application. 19 But where no law is
invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed
incorporated at the moment of its legislation.20
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality
of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it
set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August
9, 1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to
validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman, such as the filing
of the Information against petitioner.
With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA*
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_163586_2009.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17915
January 31, 1967
TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA as Secretary
of Finance,
MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, respondents and appellants.
Ramon C. Aquino, Teodoro M. Castro, Leandro C. Sevilla and Antonio M. Castro for petitioner and
appellant.
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and E. M. Fernando for respondent and appellant Toledo.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for respondents and
appellants Secretary of Finance, et al.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II,
Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo
Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is
being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The court a quo annulled
Toledo's appointment, but did not grant Castro's prayer that respondent officials be ordered to
appoint him.
Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, was made on November 24, 1959, effective as of October 1, 1959. When he was
appointed Toledo's position was that of Chief Revenue Inspector, or Chief Revenue Examiner,
stationed in Manila. The appointment was protested by Castro in a letter he wrote the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue on January 19, 1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance with the provisions
of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he was
the one who should have been considered for the position. Copy of the letter-protest was furnished
the Secretary of Finance. On February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a first
indorsement, informed Castro that "the position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director II, R-53, at
P6,000.00 adjusted to P6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No. 3, Manila, and the
appointment thereto had to be issued to the person actually performing the functions of the position,"
namely, respondent Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant Revenue Regional Officer II, Manila.

On March 8, 1960 Castro appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who indorsed the matter to
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with a request for a statement of the comparative
qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After setting forth the qualifications as requested, the
Commissioner explained that the next two Assistant Revenue Regional Directors in line for the
protested position, as reported for purposes of Administrative Order No. 171, were Teodoro Lucero,
Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional District No. 4), with a salary of P6,900 per annum;
and Lauro Abraham, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I (Regional District No. 6), with a salary of
P6,000 per annum, but that since the protested position was for Regional District No. 3, Manila,
where Toledo was next in rank, and since he was actually performing the functions of the
controverted office, there was no need to make a comparison between his qualifications and those
of Castro.
On July 1, 1960 the Commissioner of Civil Service rendered his decision dismissing Castro's protest
on the ground that the contested position belonged properly to Regional District No. 3, where Toledo
was the next ranking employee, while Castro was in Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City. Hence,
Castro filed the present petition asking that Toledo's appointment be annulled and that he be
declared entitled to the position. As already stated, the trial court rejected Castro's claim, but at the
same time annulled Toledo's appointment this last on the ground that his previous appointment as
Chief Revenue Examiner was illegal.
Both sides appealed from the decision. Respondents claim that the lower court should not have
nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend (1) that the question as to the legality of his previous
appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was neither raised in the pleadings nor proven at the trial
with the consent of the parties; (2) that petitioner was precluded by laches from questioning said
appointment; and (3) that the same was not contrary to the Revised Administrative Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower court should have ordered respondents
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary of Finance to appoint him to the controverted
position because (1) he was senior in rank to Toledo and was the competent and qualified employee
next in line for the position; and (2) the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors I had
waived their rights to the position.
Castro entered the government service in 1931 as a messenger in the Bureau of Forestry. He
became a clerk in the Bureau of Internal Revenue on February 1, 1937. Then he became
successively law clerk, income tax examiner, Chief of Tax Audit Branch and eventually, on July 1,
1957, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I.
On the other hand , Toledo first worked in the Metropolitan Water District on July 16, 1948. He
became employed in the Bureau of Internal Revenue on December 4, 1952, when he was appointed
distillery agent. At the time he left the Bureau on January 15, 1958 his position was that of income
tax examiner with a salary of P3,300 per annum. On said date he became a Technical Assistant to
the Executive Secretary of the President of the Philippines at P7,200 per annum. On July 1, 1958,
when he returned to the Bureau he was appointed Chief Revenue Inspector (a new position created
under the Appropriation Act of 1958-1959, which look effect on July 1, 1958) at P6,787 per annum.
This case is principally a special civil action in quo warranto. A quo warranto proceeding is one to
determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. 1 The
action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or by a fiscal; 2 or a person
claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action in his own name.3 Where a private person files the action, he must
prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of his office.4
Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23, paragraph 3, Republic Act 2260, which provides:
Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified position in the government or in any
government-owned or controlled corporation or entity, the officer or employee next in rank who is
competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility
shall be promoted thereto: Provided, That should there be two or more persons under equal
circumstances, seniority shall be given preference: And provided, however, That should there be any

special reason or reasons why such officer or employee should not be promoted, such special
reason or reasons shall be stated in writing by the appointing official and the officer or employee
concerned shall be informed thereof and be given opportunity to be heard by the Commissioner of
Civil Service, whose decision in such case shall be final. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as
provided herein, then the same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government
service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by
certification from appropriate registers of eligibles in accordance with rules promulgated in
pursuance of this Act.
It appears that for internal revenue tax purposes the Philippines is divided into ten regional districts,
with Manila as District No. 3. Each district has a Revenue Regional Director and an Assistant
Revenue Regional Director. The Revenue Regional Director for the Manila District outranks the nine
other Revenue Regional Directors, while the Assistant Revenue Regional Director for Manila
outranks the nine other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors. These nine Assistant Revenue
Regional Directors therefore usually aspire to be promoted either to the position of Revenue
Regional Director or to that of Assistant Revenue Regional Director for Manila.
At the time the controverted petition became vacant Toledo was occupying the position of Chief
Revenue Inspector, (or Examiner) while the positions of Assistant Revenue Regional Director
outside the Manila District were occupied by the following:
Name
Salary
1. Teodoro Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P6900

2. Lauro D. Abraham . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

3. Ricardo A. Rivera . . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

4. Gaspar L. Angeles . . . . . . . . . . .

5100

5. Jaime Araneta . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

6. Policronio Blanco . . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

7. Francisco Tantuico . . . . . . . . . .

6266.40

8. Pedro D. Uy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

9. Teodoro M. Castro . . . . . . . . . . .
6000
According to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the next two in line for the position in question
were Lucero and Abraham. Obviously the position of Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner) was
considered to be of the same rank as the position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director for regions
other than Manila. And Toledo, who was then Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner), was chosen
because in the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue he was already in the region where
the vacancy occurred and therefore was more familiar with the work there, and both his salary range
and efficiency rating5 were higher than Castro's aside from the fact that he was already performing
the functions of the office.
Even on the assumption that Castro possessed, as he claims, better qualifications and a higher
efficiency rating than Toledo, it would avail him nothing because he has failed to prove that his
position was the one next in rank to the vacant office. He was not even the most senior among the
different Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District. However, he insists that
the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their rights to the position by their
failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other Assistant
Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated
on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the
intent to waive is unmistakable.
Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight others were not
interested in the position.6 Not having shown either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant
Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were

senior to him Castro has failed to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle him to oust
respondent Toledo.
Upon the other hand, the supposed illegality of Toledo's appointment as Chief Revenue Officer of the
Manila District cannot be a ground for the annulment of his appointment to the controverted
position.7 The legality of that earlier appointment may not be questioned except in a quo
warranto proceeding brought by the proper person at the proper time. To be sure, as heretofore
stated this is principally such a proceeding, but only insofar as the position of Assistant Revenue
Regional District II is concerned. It is true there is an allegation in Castro's petition that the earlier
appointment of Toledo as Chief Revenue officer was illegal. 8 But Castro does not claim to be entitled
to that other position and consequently the legality of Toledo's appointment thereto is not properly in
issue. Besides, even if Castro were the proper party to raise that issue, he did so beyond the time
limit prescribed by law.9 Toledo was appointed to said position on July 1, 1958. Castro had one year
from that date to assail the legality of the appointment. The petition here was filed only on August 6,
1960, or beyond the one-year period.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom that portion annulling
respondent Toledo's appointment to the position in dispute, and is affirmed in other respects. Costs
against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1
3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., page 188, citing State v. Columbus, etc.
Electric Co., 104 Oh. St. 120, 135 N.E. 297.
2
The instances when either may do so are (a) when so directed by the President of the Philippines;
(b) when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that there is enough proof to
maintain the proceeding (Sec. 3, Rule 66, Revised Rules of Court), or (c) at and upon the relation of
another person, with the permission of the Court in which the action is to be commenced. (Sec.
4, id.)
3
Section 6, id.
4
Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the
case may be, the right to bring such action, and in but one case does the law authorize an individual
to bring such an action, to wit, when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office
unlawfully held and exercised by another. Aside from this case an individual cannot maintain such
action. ... From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below should have first
passed upon the right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff. In our opinion
this should be done at the same time and in the same judgment. It is immaterial what method the
court may follow in the statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of his judgment
because even though the court may pass upon the right of the plaintiff first, and the right of the
defendant afterward, or vice versa, this procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court
does not fail to state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. But all of this,
of course, presupposes that the plaintiff had a right to maintain his action upon the evidence
submitted by him at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute a suit without a cause of action.
Wherefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that the plaintiff has no right to
maintain the action since he has not the essential conditions required by law in order to bring and
maintain such action, his complaint should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon
the right of the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his office, unless
the action is brought by a person having a right to maintain the same under the law. Acosta v. Flor, 5
Phil. 18.
5
That is, efficiency rating as of the time the appointment was made.
6
Page 100, t.s.n., September 6, 1960.
7
Note that while the lower court annulled Toledo's appointment to the position of Assistant Revenue
Regional Director on the ground that his appointment to the position of Chief Revenue Examiner of
Manila, was illegal, yet it did not annual the latter appointment.
8
See paragraph 29, Amended Petition.

We note that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted
within the period of one year. ... We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the
State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year,
they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by, abandonment. There are weighty
reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons
claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that the public
business may not be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of right to positions in the service must
be discouraged. ... Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person
claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding
it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of hanging to pay two salaries,
one, for the person actually holding the office although illegally, and another, for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so. Unabia vs. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting to
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66, (formerly Section 16, Rule 68, taken from
Section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of the
plaintiff to hold the office arose. Cui vs. Cui, L-18727, August 31, 1964.
9

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/jan1967/gr_l-17915_1967.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report
dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m.
of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together
with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator
core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of
channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable
wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin
which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the
whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D
of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions
who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform
but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED

NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT

PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.
The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to
the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not
testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same.
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error
and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best
brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion. 7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes
evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination. 8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official records.
Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran,
enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last
requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial
court. InRodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who
signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-examination,
the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his
perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as
well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony of
Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were
gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to
prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain
utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule
are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The
public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed
from official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be
found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public
having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many
others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their
duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to the
nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his
report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the
sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being no
showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3
Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his personal
knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3
Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the morgue, 12 making the latters death beyond dispute.
PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it
was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall
of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of

the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions, 18 the opinion of a witness is generally
not admissible.19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by
the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for
itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or
at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is
charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was
under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury
was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendants want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent
or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon
the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff
complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof
of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some court add to the three
prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means
of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has
superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of
the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies
where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person

charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule
of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and
human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to
the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellants negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but
argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendants negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements,
the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for the defendant to explain or
prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of
say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before
the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn statement, the
company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the
leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing
that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also assails
the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of
opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly
known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care
any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably,
petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence
arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds employer
damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee,
his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act
Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act,
provided that:
1wphi1.nt

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as
under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of
the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under
the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the
regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled thatan injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor
for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under
the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmens Compensation
Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation
to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the
motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
claims were filed under the Workmens Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of
the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and
violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive
Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmens
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael
Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp.
vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under
the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all
further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that
the claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil
Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the
acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits
under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the
Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received
a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal
complaint against petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to
the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at
all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early
as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigators report. The appellee merely executed
her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellants employees. It was the investigator who
recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutors office.
This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have even
known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x
are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible
that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred
from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law
waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public
prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment
therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein
that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at
all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the
foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation that she learned about appellants
negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact
that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of
her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than
from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her
complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or

mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear
or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as
early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991,
two months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a
resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioners employees, the
case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the
ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two
choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the
ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on
the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single
wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one
remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses
not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against
whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
the partys rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver,
and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has
adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated
on the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to
burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who
ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; 41 otherwise, the defense is
waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husbands death
and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the
"fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating
that there may be civil liability. InFloresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and
regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but aconclusion of law, over which only the courts
have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears,

therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware
of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Courts ruling inFloresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the
total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit
"K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from
November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was
P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by
the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments
already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'
award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed
by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/apr2001/gr_137873_2001.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25245

December 11, 1967

FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
MAURICIO ALILLANA and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
Paulino Manongdo for petitioner.
Paciano C. Villavieja and M.E. Lanzona, Jr. for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domestic corporation engaged in producing copra, on July
19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment, as truck loader. In 1956 he was assigned as
washer. Four months later, he became shell collector therein, performing duties of this nature: To
pick up unshelled coconuts from a moving conveyor; place them in a "caritilla" and hand them to the
shellers; four times during the 8-hour work, he and some assistants had to personally rotate the
pulley to keep the conveyor running when it gets stuck up by coconut shells.
On April 21, 1958, Alillana suffered from pains at the ribs he was found with bronchitis and went on
leave. On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowed by the company to resume his work.
Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time complained of cough, with chest and back pains, for
which he was treated. Referred for physical and X-ray examinations, on July 6, 1958, his condition
was found to be as follows: "Far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis at the left lung, associated with
bronchitis." The next day, on July 7, 1958, he retired from the company. Franklin Baker Co. paid him
P188.16 under its non-occupational sickness and disability benefit plan for the period from July 7,
1958 to October 29, 1958; and P669.12 as retirements benefits.
Alillana subsequently filed a claim for disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. On February 28, 1963, the Regional Office hearing officer awarded disability benefits. Franklin
Baker Co. elevated the case to the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, on October 11, 1963, affirmed the award, slightly
reducing the amount to P3,015.06. Section 14 was applied, on temporary total disability, i.e., 60% of
his average weekly wage of P27.01, times the maximum of 208 weeks less a brief period when he
had "odd-lot" or sporadic employment.
On July 25, 1964, Franklin Baker Co. paid said award of P3,015.06. Satisfaction thereof was
acknowledge by Alillana in writing (Annex "C" to Petition).
Thereafter, on August 10, 1964, alleging continuing disability from his ailment, Alillana filed a motion
in the same case for additional compensation. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, on
September 16, 1964, ordered a physical examination of Alillana. And on September 7, 1965, after
said physical examination by one of the Commission's doctors, finding Alillana still suffering from
temporary total disability due to his ailment, the Workmen's Compensation Commission issued an
order for additional compensation of P984.94, thus raising the total award to the then statutory
maximum of P4,000.

Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration. On October 13, 1965, the Workmen's Compensation
Commissionen banc denied the motion, stating that the period of disability can be extended beyond
208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.
Hence, this petition was filed by the Franklin Baker Co., to raise on appeal from the Workmen's
Compensation Commission's orders the issue: Does the Workmen's Compensation Commission
have power under Sec. 18 to extend the period of disability under Sec. 14 of the Act?
Section 14 provides:
Sec. 14. Total disability. In case the injury or sickness causes total disability for labor, the
employer, during such disability but exclusive of the first three days shall pay to the injured employee
a weekly compensation equivalent to sixty per centum of his average weekly wages; but not more
than thirty-five pesos nor less than ten pesos per week, except in the case provided for in the next
following paragraph. Such weekly payments shall in no case continue after disability has ceased, nor
shall they extend over more than two hundred and eight weeks, nor shall the aggregate sum paid as
compensation exceed in any case four thousand pesos. But no award of permanent disability shall
take effect until after two weeks have elapsed from the date of injury.
In Avecilla Building Corporation vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-10668, September 26,
1957, this Court already ruled that said maximum period of 208 weeks can be extended under
Section 18, as amended by Republic Act 772:
Speaking of this right of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to reopen a case already
decided by him, it is an innovation introduced by Rep. Act 772, particularly, Sec. 13 thereof,
amending Section 18 (last par.) of the original Workmen's Compensation Law, namely, Act 3428.
Before amendment, the last paragraph of Section 18 read thus:
"The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act shall, together, not exceed the
sum of three thousand pesos."
As amended, the said last paragraph now reads as follows:
"The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shall, together, not exceed the
sum of four thousand pesos: Provided, however, that after the payment has been made for the
period specified by the Act in each case, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner may from
time to time cause the examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending,
if necessary, the period of compensation which shall not, however, exceed the said amount of four
thousand pesos."
One change introduced is the increase from P3,000 to P4,000 of the total compensation provided in
the original provision. The more important change, however, is that contained in the proviso, which is
the last part of the paragraph. This legal provision empowering Workmen's Compensation Boards or
Commissioners to reopen a case is contained in the Workmen's Compensation Acts of many of the

States of the American union, including the Territory of Hawaii. The reason for this legal provision is
explained by Arthur Larson in his authoritative work entitled. The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Vol. 2, as page 330, as follows:
1awphil.net

"In almost all states, some kind of provision is made for reopening and modifying awards. This
provision is a recognition of the obvious fact that, no matter how competent a commission's
diagnosis of claimant's condition and earning prospects at the time of hearing may be, that condition
may later change markedly for the worse, or may improve, or may even clear up altogether. Under
the typical award in the form of periodic payments during a specified maximum period or during
disability, the objectives of the legislation are best accomplished if the commission can increase,
decrease, revive or terminate payments to correspond to claimant's changed condition.
Theoretically, then, commissions ought to exercise perpetual and unlimited jurisdiction to reopen
cases as often as necessary to make benefits meet current conditions. But the administrative
problem lies in the necessity of preserving the full case records of all claimants that have ever
received any kind of award, against the possibility of a future reopening. Moreover, any attempt to
reopen a case based on an injury ten or fifteen years old must necessarily encounter awkward
problems of proof, because of the long delay and the difficulty of determining the relationship
between some ancient injury and a present aggravated disability. Another argument is that insurance
carriers would never know that kind of future liabilities they might incur, and would have difficulty in
computing appropriate reserves."
1awphil.net

It will be noticed, however, that while in the several states of the union, the reopening is intended for
the benefit of both employer and employee in the sense that, in case of aggravation or deterioration
of the disability of the employee, the period of compensation should be extended up to a certain
limit, or in case the condition of the employee improves or the disability disappears altogether, the
period of compensation is shortened or compensation stopped, our law, under Section 18, is a little
one-sided and is all for the benefit of the employee, for the reason that as may be gathered from the
proviso, the Commissioner may from time to time cause examination of the condition of the disabled
laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of compensation. In this respect there is
room for improvement of the law as to make it more equitable to both parties, labor and
management. Furthermore, while in the several states of the American Union, the time within which
the Commissioner or Board may reopen a case is limited anywhere from one year to several years,
our law contained in the proviso in question, sets no time limit. The disadvantage of making this
period within which the case may be reopened, too long, or as in our law, with no limit at all, is
touched upon by Larson in the latter part of his commentary, as above-reproduced, namely, that in
case such a period is too long, there may be difficulty in completing and preserving the record of the
injury, or determining the relationship, if any, between the aggravation or deterioration of the
employee's disability and some ancient injury, to say nothing of the fact that insurance companies
which are interested in similar cases, by having insured employees of companies against injuries,
may find difficulty in adjusting their finances, such as putting up reserve funds to take care of future
liabilities.
But there is no question that under Section 18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended,
the Commissioner was authorized to reopen the case of Carpeso and to direct that the
compensation to him by petitioner be increased or continued. The claim of petitioner that it had not

been given an opportunity to traverse the claim that Carpeso's condition had deteriorated, is not
supported by the record.
1awphil.net

Clearly, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Commission did not incur in any error in extending
to cover beyond 208 weeks the period of Alillana's disability compensation, up to a total of not more
than P4,000.
Alillana's having signed a satisfaction receipt can not result in waiver; the law does not consider as
valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover under
the Act (Sec. 29).
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/dec1967/gr_25245_1967.html>
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24421. April 30, 1970.]

MATIAS GONGON, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, THE SPOUSES AMADA AQUINO and RUFINO
RIVERA, THE OFFICE OF THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, and THE OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Enrique M. Fernando for Petitioner.

Bengzon & Bengzon for respondents spouses Amada Aquino, Et. Al.

Solicitor General for other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REFORM; LANDED ESTATES; POLICY GOVERNING DISPOSITION OF LANDED ESTATES; CASE AT
BAR. The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539, governing the acquisition and disposition of landed
estates is to award lots to those who may apply, the first choice to the bona fide "tenants," the second to
the "occupants," and the last, to "private individuals," if the parties affected thereby stand on equal footing
or under equal circumstances. Where the parties cannot be said to be in equal footing respondent
spouses have their house on another lot they already own which is bigger than that where petitioner
constructed his house justice and equity command that petitioner be given the preferential right to
purchase the lot in question to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.

2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHT, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. Petitioners waiver of his
preferential right over the lot being contrary to the avowed policy laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 539,
such waiver is null and void.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal by the Court
of First Instance of Manila of Matias Gongons complaint to set aside the decision of the Land Tenure
Administration as affirmed by the Office of the President awarding Lot 18-B, Block 23 of the
Tambobong Estate, to herein private respondent Amada Aquino, wife of her co-respondent Rufino Rivera.
The decision appealed from likewise ordered Gongon to turn over the possession of the litigated lot to
Amada Aquino, to pay the rentals due at the rate of P6.00 a month from 1949 until such possession is
restored to her and to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P1,000.00.

Lot 18-B, Block 23, with an area of 274 square meters, is a portion of the Tambobong Estate in Malabon,
Rizal, which used to belong in its entirety to the Roman Catholic Church. The lot was originally leased to
Amada Aquino. who in turn sublet it in 1934 to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a nominal monthly
rental of P6.00. The sublessee constructed his residential house on the property and since then has been
living there, together with his family.

Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic Church on
December 31, 1947 under the provisions of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, which authorized the
President of the Philippines." . . to acquire private lands or any interest, through purchase or expropriation,
and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such
conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the
lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines." In due time Matias
Gongon filed an application with the defunct Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of Lot 18-B,
Block 23, claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant. The application was opposed by Amada Aquino,

who also filed her own application, alleging that as bona fide tenant or lessee she had the preferential right
to purchase the lot. After investigation, the Director of Lands the Bureau of Lands having then taken over
the functions of the Rural Progress Administration rendered a decision on May 31, 1965 approving
Gongons application, he being the actual occupant. On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, this official set aside the order of the Director of Lands and gave due course to Amada Aquinos
application.

Matias Gongon moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the Land Tenure Administration,
which had meanwhile taken over the functions, powers and duties of the Landed Estate Division of the
Bureau of Lands upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 1400. Matias Gongon then appealed to the Office of
the President, which thereafter affirmed the decision of the Land Tenure Administration. Accordingly, on
February 24, 1961 the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale of Lot 18-B in favor of Amada
Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, on March 10, 19761, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her
name.

On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul
the decisions of the Land Tenure Administration and of not in question to him; to cancel its registration in
the name of Amada Aquino and to have it registered in his name instead. The complaint likewise contained a
prayer for attorneys fees and costs.

It is noteworthy that the Land Tenure Administration, in a manifestation it filed in the lower court on May 27,
1961, made common cause with herein appellant Matias Gongon, stating (in part) as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"That at the time it issued the said Order, the LTA Board of Administrators was newly constituted and
therefore it has not had sufficient time to study thoroughly the legality or wisdom of the Bureau of Lands
policy giving preference right to tenants to purchase the lots leased by them over and above the actual
occupants or sublessees thereof; hence, it just affirmed the said decision of the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources as a matter of sound administrative policy.

That after a serious study of the issues of facts and of law in cases identical to the case at bar, the LTA Board
of Administrators found out that it would be more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the laws
(Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20 and 539 and Republic Act No 1400) governing acquisition and disposition of
the landed estates (including the Tambobong Estate) if it followed the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of Marukot, Et. Al. v. Jacinto, Et Al., (GR. Nos. L-8036-38) promulgated on December 20,
1955, giving the actual occupants or sublessees the preference to purchase the lots occupied by them as
against tenants or lessees who do not occupy the same; hence answering defendant subsequently reversed
the policy followed by the Bureau of Lands and adopted by the doctrines laid down in the Marukot case."
cralaw virtua1aw library

As heretofore stated, the lower court dismissed the complaint. In due time the plaintiff elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals. In affirming the decision appealed from the appellate court pointed out (1) that the
finding of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as affirmed by the Office of the President, to
the effect that appellant Matias Gongon had waived whatever right he might have had over the lot in
question was factual in nature and could not be reviewed by the courts; and (2) that appellant could be not
considered as a bona fide occupant of the lot because his possession as sublessee was in effect possession
by the lessee, citing Article 524 of the Civil Code.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, Matias Gongon filed the
present petition for review, contending that the appellate court erred in failing to recognize his right as
sublessee-tenant to the lot in question and in not cancelling the sale thereof to respondent Amada Aquino as
well as its registration in her name; in holding that he had waived his right to the lot in question in favor of
respondents-spouses Amada Aquino and Rufino Rivera; and in ordering him to pay rentals at the rate of
P6.00 a month from 1949, plus attorneys fees and costs.

The two issues posed in this appeal are (1) whether or not petitioner has the preferential right to purchase
the lot in question; and (2) if he has, whether or not the alleged waiver of whatever right he might have had
over said lot is valid.

The first issue involves a conflict of claims between a lessee and a sublesee insofar as the right to purchase
the property is concerned. Several decisions of this Court have been cited and discussed by the parties.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that in those cases the concept of possession by a sublessee under the Civil
Code, which according to the Court of Appeals in its decision under review was in effect possession by the
lessee sublessor, was not considered by this Court applicable at all in construing the term "occupant" under
Commonwealth Act No. 539.

In Grande v. Santos (98 Phil. 62), the registered lessee sublet two portions of the lot to two different
persons. In giving the right of preference to the registered lessee this Court took into consideration a
number of circumstances: that the lot was a small one of only 144 square meters; that the lessee was
himself an actual occupant of part thereof; and that to subdivide said lot into three portions would, owing to
the extremely limited size of each, lead to frictions, conflicts, misunderstandings and perhaps disturbances
of the peace consequences which Commonwealth Act No. 539 precisely sought to avert.

On the other hand, Marukot, Et. Al. v. Jacinto and Director of Lands (supra, 98 Phil. 128) this Court awarded
to the sublessees the portions of the lot they were occupying, as against the claim of the lessee. This case
differed from the Grande case not only in that the lot involved had a bigger area some 500 square meters
but principally in the fact that the lessee was not actually occupying the lot but had his residence on
another property altogether. This Court did not rule on whether a "tenant" that is, a lessee, should enjoy
priority over an "occupant" who is a sublessee, because after awarding the portions covered by the sublease
to the actual occupants, the registered lessee still got about 300 square meters, or 100 square meters more
than the total area awarded to the sublessees.

In Santiago, Et. Al. v. Cruz, Et Al., (98 Phil. 168), the right of preference was given to the registered tenant.
In interpreting Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, this Court said that "the intendment of the law is to
award the lots to those who may apply in the order mentioned", that is, "the first choice is given to the bona
fide tenants, the second to the occupants and the last to private individuals." The Court also took into
consideration the fact that the sublessees executed a document expressly agreeing to vacate the lots
anytime the tenant so required, together with the affidavit of one of the sublessees acknowledging the right
of the tenant to purchase the lot and renouncing whatever rights he might have to purchase it.

However, in the subsequent case of Gutierrez v. Santos, Et. Al. (107 Phil. 419), the ruling in the
Santiago decision was clarified and given a restrictive application, as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Now, we say that the above order of preference should be observed if the parties affected stand on an
equal footing or under equal circumstances, for only in that way can the provision of the law be
implemented with equity, justice and fairness to all and in keeping with the spirit of giving land to the
landless so that he may have a land of his own. But the order need not be rigidly followed when a party, say
a bona fide tenant, has already in his name other lots more than what he needs for his family, for certainly
to give him the preference would work injustice to the occupants."
cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar it is not disputed that respondent spouses have their house on another lot (lot No. 34,
block No. 7) in the Tambobong Estate. Furthermore, respondent Rufino Rivera is the registered bona fide
tenant of still another lot, also in Tambobong, with an area of 2,761 square meters, which is considerably
bigger than the lot in question, where petitioner and his family constructed their residence and where they
have been living since 1934. It cannot be said, therefore, that the parties herein stand on an equal footing
or under equal circumstances. Justice and equity command that petitioner be given the preferential right to
purchase in order to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.

On the second issue petitioners position is that his preferential right could not be validly waived, such
waiver being against public policy. Under Article 6 of the new Civil Code "rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law." The old Civil Code (Art. 4) carried a similar provision, although it mentioned
only public interest or public order.

That Commonwealth Act No. 539 lays down a public policy there can be no doubt. In the case of Juat v.
Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-17080, January 28, 1961, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Felix Angelo
Bautista. ruled in this wise:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . It may also be stated that the avowed policy behind the adoption of such measure, is, as aptly observed
by the Court of Appeals, to provide the landless elements of our population with lots upon which to build
their homes and small farms which they can cultivate and from which they can derive their livelihood
without being beholden to any man (Pascual v. Lucas, 51 O.G., No. 4, p. 2429), such measure having been
adopted in line with the policy of social justice enshrined in our Constitution to remedy and cure the social
unrest caused by the concentration of landed estates in the hands of a few by giving to the landless
elements a piece of land they can call their own."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Being contrary to public policy, the alleged waiver of his right made by herein petitioner should be
considered null and void.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The award of the lot in question to respondent Amada
Aquino is set aside; transfer certificate of title No. 84738 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal is ordered
cancelled; and petitioner is declared to have the preferential right to purchase the said lot. Costs against
respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Zaldivar, Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., took no part.

From <http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1970aprildecisions.php?id=112>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27828 February 27, 1970

THE SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (Formerly San Miguel Brewery, Inc.), petitioner,

vs.
MACARIO CRUZ and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo Belo and Ongsiako for petitioner.
Gonzalo A. Tejada for respondent Macario Cruz.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition filed by the San Miguel Corporation (formerly San Miguel Brewery, Inc.) for review of the
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (in Case No. 2870-ULP), finding it guilty of unfair labor
practices and ordering the reinstatement with back wages of complainant Macario Cruz.
The records of the case show that sometime in October, 1957 the "Pagkakaisa Samahang
Manggagawa sa S.M.B. (Paflu)", a labor organization in the San Miguel Corporation, staged a strike
against the latter. After said strike ended and the strikers resumed their work, Macario Cruz, a driveremployee and member of the Union, was called by one Mr. Camahort, a company official, and was
shown a newspaper clipping carrying a picture depicting him (Cruz) as one of the strikers. According
to Cruz, he was told by Camahort that he would be dismissed if he would not desist from union
activities. A few months thereafter, or on 17 March 1958, Cruz was advised of the company's
decision to retire him from the service for physical disability, effective 31 March 1958. 1Cruz must have
already received information thereof before it could be sent by the company because under date of 15
March 1958 said employee wrote the company requesting that the benefits due him on account of his
retirement be given in only one installment.2 Accordingly, on 10 April 1958, Cruz, received from the
company HSBC Cheeks Nos. K905357 and K905358 in the total sum of P3,019.46 as "full and complete
payment of all my (his) retirement benefits."3
On 12 June 1958, Cruz also filed with the Social Security System an application for disability
benefit,4 wherein he affirmed having retired from employment on 31 March 1958. This claim, however,
was denied for the reason that the case properly falls under sickness benefits, to which claimant was not
yet entitled, he having been a member of the System for less than one year.5
Three years after he was retired, on 27 May 1961, Macario Cruz charged the San Miguel Company
before the Court of Industrial Relations with unfair labor practices for his dismissal in 1958, allegedly
for union activities. The formal complaint against the company was filed by the Acting Prosecutor of
the Court on 12 October 1961 (Case No. 2870-ULP). After hearing, the trial Judge rendered decision
sustaining the charges and ordering therein respondent Company to reinstate the complainant with
back, wages, but deducting there from the amounts already received by him as retirement benefits.
The company sought reconsideration thereof before the court en banc, and when the same was
denied on 5 June 1967 (with two judges dissenting) the present petition for review was filed.
The primary question posed in this proceeding is whether or not a former employee who has
accepted retirement benefits may still contest the regularity and validity of his retirement 3 years
thereafter.

In disposing of the company's defense of estoppel and ruling that the acceptance by complainant of
retirement benefits did not preclude the latter from assailing the validity of the termination of his
employment, the respondent Court cited the case of Cario vs. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration,6 wherein we said:
Acceptance of those benefits (separation pay and terminal leave benefits) would not amount to
estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously, do not stand on the same footing.
The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because,
out of job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist
money proferred. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that
petitioners did not relent on their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not to have waived any of
their rights.
The above pronouncement relied upon by the Industrial Court is not controlling in the present case.
In the first place, as distinctly stated in the Cario case, therein petitioners were improperly
dismissed and never relented in their efforts to assert the illegality of their separation 'from
employment and to demand reinstatement. By contrast, the herein complainant not only specified,
and obtained, payment of retirement gratuities due him in a lump sum but even applied
for disability benefits with the Social Security System. Moreover, he never protested his alleged
illegal dismissal nor demanded reinstatement. It took him more than 3 years to question the validity
of his said retirement. The original posture taken by the complainant, indeed, can be nothing but an
agreement, or at least acquiescence, to the decision of the company to have him retired for physical
disability. Thus, even assuming that there was ground to declare his separation from the service
invalid, complainant's receipt of all the benefits arising therefrom, with full knowledge of all the facts
surrounding the same, amounts to waiver of the right to contest the validity of the company's act. 7
Secondly, the petitioner company's cause is not only premised on estoppel, but also on
complainant's right having lapsed into a stale demand. For, truly, all the elements for the operation of
the principle of laches are here present: (a) conduct on the part of the employer that gave rise to the
situation on which the complaint is made, which is the retirement of the complainant for physical
disability; (b) delay in the assertion of complainant's right the lapsing of a period of 3 years which
is neither explained nor justified; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the respondent
employer that the complainant would assert the right on which the present suit is based; and (d)
injury or prejudice to the employer in the event relief is awarded to the complainant. 8
Herein private respondent tries to remove this case from the operation of the laches principle by
alleging that the matter of unfair labor practice involves public interest, and that the Industrial Peace
Act (Republic Act 875)did not prescribe any period within which a right provided thereunder may be
enforced. There can be no quarrel on this point; but it must be realized that, unlike prescription, the
defense of laches is not dependent on the existence of a statutory period of limitation. It can be
invoked without reckoning any specific or fixed period; it is sufficient that there be an unreasonable
and unexplained delay in bringing the action that its maintenance would already constitute inequity
or injustice to the party claiming it. As this Court succinctly declared in previous cases:
... Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is

principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory;
laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on
fixed time; laches is not. (Nielson & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, 17
December 1966).9
Laches in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted. (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21456, 15 April 1968). 10
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations under review is hereby reversed, and
the complaint for unfair labor practices against herein petitioner, dismissed. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Concepcion, C.J, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/feb1970/gr_27828_1970.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24022
March 3, 1965
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400
metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of
1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on
December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the
President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to
undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to
bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.

Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government
from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer,
filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as
Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid
scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the
contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.
Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they
adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the
importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even
if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply
of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited
by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only
left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn
Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to
private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the
government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our
opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said
Act wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in
the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by
the National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru
any government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic
Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a
national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after
consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately
undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore,
no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable
in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic
Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked:
what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case,
the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so
that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson,
8 F (2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199
S.E. 876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal
any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such
inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable
to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as
provided for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the

Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of
sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the
local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support
program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step
adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate
objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the
other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the
time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers
three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption;
(2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a
national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by
the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law
authorizes importation, by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in
said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation
during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute
a national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not
inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered
by a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was
presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to
import rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and
Almendras:
SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the
Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice
and corn."
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee
as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable
under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President
authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest
and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in
any private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said
Act also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The
contention is predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that
the section refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortagebecause of the apparent
hoarding undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious
shortage of the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or
confiscate, because the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could
have intended under such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off
hunger and starvation. Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found
in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such
remedy cannot produce the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice
stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual
emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its
policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty

of this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to
effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to
the prior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix
Hotel Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible
(Compaia General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms
and provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be
such a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot
be made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The
clearest case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn
[Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year
Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any
nullifying value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as
provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to
purchase rice from abroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific
year. As its title reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same,
therefore, is now functus officio at least on the matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending
prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act
3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely
a safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated
with the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call
for lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given
retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the
discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill
was presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of
emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly
asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic
Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by
the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not
binding, are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic
Act 2207.
SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of
emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No.
2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2,
page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by
substitution reads:
Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the
provisions of existing law.
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452.
Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power
on the part of the President to import rice.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law
that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 that is the reason your Committee

eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what
is the use of that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No.
2207 the President can designate any government agency to import rice?
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme
Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal
between these two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag,
informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the
Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is
applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic
Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there
has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is
concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly
which side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally
repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First,
is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council
permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the
proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a
shortage amounting to a national emergency.
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally
approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No.
2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This
attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to
future importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in
question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is
authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives.
We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to
encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and
Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow
money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the
importation in question.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to import rice, under Section 2
of Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes is
primarily a matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly
intended to supersede the prior law, Republic Act No. 2207.

The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency power to import rice and corn,
granted to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at
present, notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No. 3452.
For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions of the respective acts:
REP. ACT NO. 2207
REP. ACT NO. 3452
(1959)
(1962)
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person, association, SEC. 10. ... Provided,
corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any that the Rice and Corn
point in the Philippines: Provided, however, That should there be
Administration or any
an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of the
other government
abovementioned commodities of such gravity as to constitute a
agency is hereby
national emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National prohibited from
Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office of Statistical importing rice and
Coordination of said body, the President of the Philippines may
corn: Provided, further,
authorize the importation of the commodities,through
That the importation of
any government agencythat he may designate in such quantities as rice and corn is left to
the National Economic Council may determine necessary to cover private parties upon
the shortage, subject to the taxes, duties and/or special charges as payment of the
now provided by law:Provided, further, That contracts for such
corresponding taxes.
importation shall be only on straightsales basis, and awarded only (Emphasis Supplied)
after a public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy; because
under Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall
import rice and corn; while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice and
corn is left to private parties, with no restriction other than the payment of tax. Second, in procedure;
under Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities
certified by the National Economic Council as necessary,through any government agency that he
may designate; while by Act 3452 any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn,
said prohibition being express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only this, but violation of the
prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and imprisonment for not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act
3452).
We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the presidential power to make
importations of rice and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452.
If any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and the
violation of the prohibition is penalized by fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President
make the importation? He cannot do so directly, since Act 2207 specifically requires that it be done
"through any government agency". How, then, may he import?
It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why this must be so. Suffice it to
note that the Administration's power to import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a
mere corollary to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such
exceptional import power necessarily depended on the continuation of that total prohibition.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between the
emergency importing authority granted to the government and the maintenance of the normal nonimport policy.
SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government
agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided, however, that should
there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of the above-mentioned commodities,
of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National
Economic Council, based on the studies of the Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the
President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities, through any
government agency that he may designate, in such quantities as the National Economic Council
may determine necessary to cover the shortage, subject to taxes, duties and/or special charges as
1wph1.t

now provided by law; provided, further, that contracts for such importation shall be only on straight
sales basis, and awarded only after a public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that the latter was not even set
apart in a section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening
portion of the section quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to
import rice and corn established by the later part of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule
disappears, the exception thereto must necessarily cease to operate, since the exception becomes
automatically functus officio for lack of basis.
The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic crop
became insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from outside
to fill the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done through governmental
agencies. But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private
parties were authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional importing power of
the Government lost all reason for its existence, because the private imports allowed by Act 3452
were contemplated and intended to make up for the difference between demand and supply, without
necessity of government intervention. In truth, the expression in Section 10 of Act 3452
SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency is
hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the importation of rice and
corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. (Emphasis supplied)
can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, and leave to private parties the
task of bringing such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production
should occur.
That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in the
legislative journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing the
transcript of the Senate debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No. 3452, the following
appears:
CUENCO AMENDMENT
Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period (.) to colon and add the following:
PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT
AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTING RICE AND CORN: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE AND CORN IS LEFT TO PRIVATE PARTIES
UPON PAYMENT OF THE CORRESPONDING TAXES.
Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.
Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any. The
amendment is approved. (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p. 1360)
The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following illuminating remarks:
SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your Honor, that we could proceed with
the discussion.
Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated, specifically provides that appointment of
personnel should be in accordance with the Civil Service Law as well as with the WAPCO. It seems
to me that this provision is very laudable and very, very reasonable. The second important feature in
this proposed measure is that it prohibits importation by the government. I think this should be
clarified in the sense that, at the same time, it allows importation by private parties but with the
payment of the corresponding duties. Or rather, under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which
is being set in the proposed measure is that the government should not resort to importation but that
importation of the cereal is open at all times to any citizen of this country so long as he pays the
corresponding duties and other taxes which are imposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No.
59, May 8, 1962)
It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that
All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly",.

intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to Republic Act No. 2207.
Hence, the Presidential power to import no longer exists.
In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the majority opinion avers that
Republic Act No. 3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and conditions. This is plainly
absurd, for in normal times, when production equals consumption, no importation need be
authorized, for none will be required.
The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms.
Grantingarguendo that this were true, despite the express prohibition of government imports in
section 10 of the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary, or
expedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of merely providing for the amendment of the
prior statute (R.A. 2207). If both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn sufficiency
for our country, and only a change of method was intended, why enact two statutes not only
unconnected with each other, but actually contradictory?
That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person or
entity, public or private, could import rice or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful
for any person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice and corn"; while under
Act 3452, on the contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time,
with no other restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with so
diametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co-exist?
Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since private
importation of rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawful under Act 2207 and lawful under
Act 3452), it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must have been,
intended to revise, supersede, and replace the former law (Act 2207).The established rule in this
jurisdiction in such a case is that
While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will
operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296
U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351) (quoted and applied in In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 52).
pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is
discarded and repealed (In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject-matter, and
the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to
such subject-matter and make a revision of the whole subject, that whatever is embraced in the new
statute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162,
173, 75 N.E. 841.)
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different
dates, and it is plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the
whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or provision in itself, the last must be held to
be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is
discarded and repealed."
Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:
6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for one revised, operates as a repeal of
the latter without any express words to that effect; and so any distinct provision of the old law, not
incorporated into the later one, is to be, deemed to have been intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat.
Constr. sec. 784;Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 99:
This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly destroys the contention of the
majority opinion that because the Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports of
rice and corn in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act 3452,
such power must be still deemed to exist. No such power can now exist for the reason that the Act
conferring it was totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The contradictory
philosophies of both Acts testify to that effect.
The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not contemplate situations where the
shortage in local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that

Act 3452 refers only to artificialshortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural shortages
where the rice and corn crops do not suffice to meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, the
opposite of these assertions is precisely true. Thus,
Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall engage in the purchase of these basic foods
from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines ... and whenever
circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require, (the Government)
shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers ... .
Section 3 of Act 3452 With a view to regulating the level of supply of rice and corn throughout the
country, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such
quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies. ...
Section 12, Act 3452 "The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to declare a rice and
corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest. During the emergency period,
the Rice and Corn Administration, upon the direction of the President, shall, subject to constitutional
limitation, conduct raids, seizures, and confiscation of rice and con hoarded in any private
warehouse or bodega: Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration shall pay such confiscated
rice and corn at the prevailing consumer's price of the Rice and Corn Administration. (Emphasis
supplied)
Certainly the words used by the statute, "any cause, natural or artificial", "any contingencies", "rice
and cornemergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due to
insufficient production, as well as artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt
the legislature from the accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it did
deny the Government was the power to import rice and corn whenever it so chooses; instead, the
law expressly prescribed "that the Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agency is
hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn" (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as previously
observed, squarely contradicts and vacates that permission to import previously granted under
Republic Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring in rice and corn from
abroad, unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, as was done for 1964 by Republic
Act No. 3848.
The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import
300,000 metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of that
permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former power under Republic Act No.
2207 no longer existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the
Administration in estoppel to assert the contrary. Why should it seek authority to make importation
during 1964 if it still possessed that granted by Republic Act 2207?
Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature
once more re-affirmed the prohibition of further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law,
Republic Act No. 3848:
SEC. 6 Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall
be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." (Emphasis supplied)
which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by Republic Act 3452. In addition, the law
imposed the further condition that the importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the National
Economic Council, where Republic Act 2207 specified no particular majority.
The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated prohibitions by claiming that said
section 6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was
absolutely unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in itself, as it only
permitted the importation of 300,000 metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, any
excess beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were automatically forbidden. The
enactment of section 6 of Act 3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawing
Government imports, as declared in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant that to import rice now,
the Executive must first obtain an enabling law.
Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of rice would violate the
Constitutional restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law" (Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has been

enacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections 606 and 607, no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds can be made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the
Auditor General. Nor can these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a Government agency
to borrow the funds required for the purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are
flatly forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec. 10), and the borrowing of funds to finance
importation is essential for the execution thereof.
Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the Senate during the
deliberations on House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is not before the Court. The
statements quoted are not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of construing the
legislative enactments.
The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had expressly prohibited government
agencies to import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill
No. 11511) granting the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this Court now
reverses this clear policy of the Legislature, and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the
laws have expressly forbidden.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/mar1965/gr_l-24022_1965.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14683

May 30, 1961

JOAQUIN QUIMSING, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
CAPT. ALFREDO LACHICA, Officer-in-Charge of the PC Controlled-Police Dept., Iloilo City; LT.
NARCISO ALIO, JR., Actg. Chief of Police of the City of Iloilo; and MAJ. CESAR LUCERO,
PC Provincial Commander of the Province of Iloilo, respondents-appellees.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
The City Fiscal of Iloilo City for respondents-appellees.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the petition in this case, as
well as the counterclaim of respondents herein, without costs.

Petitioner Joaquin Quimsing is the owner and manager of a duly licensed cockpit, located in the
District of Molo, City of Iloilo. On February 13, 1958, the cockpit was raided by members of the city
police force and the Constabulary under the command of Capt. Alfredo Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio
Jr., upon the ground that it was being illegally operated on that day, which was Thursday, not a legal
holiday. Quimsing claimed that the cockpit was authorized to operate on Thursday by an ordinance
of the City Council of Iloilo, approved on October 31, 1956. This notwithstanding, Capt. Lachica
allegedly threatened to raid the cockpit should cockfighting be held therein, thereafter, on Thursdays.
Moreover, Quimsing and nine (9) other persons were arrested and then charged in the Municipal
Court of Iloilo with a violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to sections 2285
and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Quimsing, in turn, commenced the present action, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, against
Major Cesar Lucero, as the then provincial commander of the Constabulary, and Capt. Alfredo
Lachica and Lt. Narciso Alio, Jr., as incumbent PC officer in charge and acting chief of police,
respectively, of the Iloilo City Police. In his petition, Quimsing set up two (2) causes of action: one for
the recovery from respondents, in their private capacity, of compensatory damages, as well as moral
and exemplary damages allegedly sustained in consequence of the raid and arrest effected on
February 13, 1958, upon the ground that the same were made illegally and in bad faith, because
cockfighting on Thursdays was, it is claimed, authorized by Ordinances Nos. 5 and 58 of the City of
Iloilo, in relation to Republic Act No. 938, and because Quimsing was at odds with the city mayor of
Iloilo; and another for a writ of preliminary injunction, and, after trial, a permanent injunction,
restraining respondents, in their official, capacity, and/or their agents, from stopping the operation of
said cockpit on Thursdays and making any arrest in connection therewith.
In their answer, respondents alleged that the raid and arrest aforementioned were made in good
faith, without malice and in the faithful discharge of their official duties as law enforcing agents, and
that, pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Penal Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, petitioner cannot legally hold cockfighting on Thursdays, despite said
ordinances of the City of Iloilo. Respondents, likewise, set up a P150,000 counterclaim for moral and
exemplary damages.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment dismissing the petition, as
well as respondents' counterclaim. Hence this appeal by petitioner herein, who maintains that:
1. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from representing the respondentsappellees in the first cause of action of the petition where they are sued in their personal capacity;
2. The lower court erred in not disqualifying the city fiscal from asking the invalidity of an ordinance
of the City of Iloilo;
3. The lower court erred in declaring Ordinance No. 51 series of 1954, as amended by Ordinance
No. 58, series of 1956, of the City of Iloilo as illegal;
4. The lower court erred in not awarding damages to the petitioner.

The first three assignments of error are related to petitioner's second cause of action, whereas the
fourth assignment of error refers to the first cause of action. Hence, we will begin by considering the
last assignment of error.
At the outset, we note that the bad faith imputed to respondents herein has not been duly
established. In fact, there is no evidence that Major Lucero had previous knowledge of the raid and
arrest that his co-respondents intended to make. What is more, petitioner would appear to have
included him as respondent merely upon the theory of command responsibility, as provincial
commander of the constabulary in the province and city of Iloilo. However, there is neither allegation
nor proof that he had been in any way guilty of fault or negligence in connection with said raid and
arrest.
As regards Capt. Lachica and Lt. Alio Jr., the records indicate that they were unaware of the city
ordinances relieved upon by petitioner herein. Indeed, they appeared to have been surprised when
petitioner invoked said ordinances. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that they were
earnestly of the opinion, as His Honor the Trial judge was, that cockfighting on Thursdays is, despite
the aforementioned ordinances, illegal under Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
sections 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although petitioner maintains that such
opinion is erroneous, the facts of record sufficiently warrant the conclusion that Capt. Lachica and Lt.
Alio Jr. had acted in good faith and under the firm conviction that they were faithfully discharging
their duty as law enforcing agents.
In the light of the foregoing and of the other circumstances surrounding the case, and inasmuch as
the assessment of moral and exemplary damages "is left to the discretion of the court, according to
the circumstances of each case" (Art. 2216, Civil Code of the Philippines), it is our considered view
that respondents herein should not be held liable for said damages. Neither should they be
sentenced to pay compensatory damages, the same not having been proven satisfactorily. Hence,
the fourth assignment of error is untenable.
The first assignment of error is based upon section 64 of the Charter of the City of Iloilo
(Commonwealth Act No. 158), pursuant to which the City Fiscal thereof "shall represent the city in all
civil cases wherein the city or any officers thereof in his official capacity is a party." Although this
section imposes upon the city fiscal the duty to appear in the eases specified, it does not prohibit him
from representing city officers sued as private individualson account of acts performed by them in
their official capacity, specially when, as in the case at bar, they claim to have acted in good faith and
in accordance with a legal provision, which they earnestly believed, as the lower court believed,
should be construed in the manner set forth in their answer. Again, under petitioner's second cause
of action, respondents are sued in their official capacity. This fact and the circumstances under which
respondents performed the acts involved in the first cause of action sufficiently justified the
appearance of the City Fiscal of Iloilo on their behalf.
We need not pass upon the merits of the second assignment of error, the same not being essential
to the determination of this case, for, regardless of whether or not it is proper for the City Fiscal of
Iloilo, as such, to assail the validity of an ordinance thereof, it cannot be denied that respondents
herein may do so in their defense.

Referring now to the third assignment of error, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the
court, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable
things, or who organizes cockfights at which bets are made, on a day other than those permitted by
law.
2. Any person who directly or indirectly participates in cockfights, by betting money or other valuable
things, or organizes such cockfights at a place other than a licensed cockpit.
Respondents maintain that this legal provision should construed be in relation to sections 2285 and
2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, reading:
SEC. 2285. Restriction upon cockfighting. Cockfighting shall take place only in licensed cockpits
and, except as provided n the next succeeding section hereof, only upon legal holidays and for a
period of not exceeding three days during the celebration of the local fiesta. No card game or games
of chance of any kind shall be permitted on the premises of the cockpit.
SEC. 2286. Cockfighting at fairs and carnivals. In provinces where the provincial board resolves
that a fair or exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, carnival, or any other
act which may redound to the promotion of the general interests thereof, shall be held on a suitable
date or dates, the council of the municipality in which such fair, exposition or carnival is held may, by
resolution of a majority of the council, authorize the cockfighting permitted at a local fiesta to take
place for not to exceed three days during said exposition fair, or carnival, if these fall on a date other
than that of the local fiesta. Where this action is taken, cockfighting shall not be permitted during the
local fiesta unless a legal holiday occurs at such period in which case cockfighting may be permitted
upon the holiday.
Petitioner assails, however, the applicability of these two (2) provisions to the case at bar, upon the
ground that said provisions form part of Chapter 57 of the Revised Administrative Code which
chapter is entitled "Municipal Law" governing regular municipalities, not chartered cities, like the
City of Iloilo, for, "except as otherwise specially provided", the term "municipality", as used in that
Code and in said section 2286, "does not include chartered city, municipal district or other political
division" (Section 2, Revised Administrative Code). Petitioner's contention is well-taken but it does
not follow therefrom that he was entitled to hold cockfightings on Thursdays.
Pursuant to section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 158, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Iloilo:
Except as otherwise provided by law, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers
. . . to tax, fix the license fee for, and regulate, among others, theatrical performances . . . and places
of amusements (par. j) . . . .
Moreover, under section 1 of Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Act No. 1224:

The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each
municipality and municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions,
cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusements within
its territorial jurisdiction:Provided, however, That no such places of amusement mentioned herein
shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the
case of night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of
dancing schools, bars, saloons, billiard pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, except
cockpits, the distance of which shall be left to the discretion of the municipal or city board or council,
from any public building, schools, hospitals and churches: Provided, further, That no municipal or
city ordinance fixing distances at which such places of amusement may be established or operated
shall apply to those already licensed and operating at the time of the enactment of such municipal or
city ordinance, nor will the subsequent opening of any public building or other premises from which
distances shall be measured prejudice any place of amusement already then licensed and
operating, but any such place of amusement established within fifty lineal meters from any school,
hospital or church shall be so constructed that the noise coming therefrom shall not disturb those in
the school, hospital or church, and, if such noise causes such disturbance then such place of
amusement shall not operate during school hours when near a school, or at night when near a
hospital, or when there are religious services when near a church: Provided, furthermore, That no
minor shall be admitted in any bar, saloon, cabaret, or night club employing hostesses: And
provided, finally, That this Act shall not apply to establishments operating by virtue of
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred eighty-five nor to any establishment already in
operation when Republic Act Numbered Nine hundred seventy-nine took effect.
The question for determination is whether the power of the Municipal Board of Iloilo, under section
21 of its charter to "regulate . . . places of amusement", as broadened by Republic Act No. 938, as
amended, to include "the power to regulate . . . by ordinance the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of . . . cockpits," carries with it the authority to fix the dates on which "cockfighting" may be
held. In this connection, it should be noted that said Republic Act No. 938, as amended, applies, not
only to "the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city", but, also, to "the municipal
council of each municipality or municipal district." Consequently, an affirmative answer to the
question adverted to above would necessarily imply, not merely an amendment of sections 2285 and
2286 of the Revised Administrative Code, but, even, a virtual repeal thereof, for then local boards or
councils could authorize the holding of cockfighting, not only on legal holidays, but on any day and
as often as said boards or councils may deem fit to permit, whether it be during a fair, carnival, or
exposition of agricultural and industrial products of the province, or not. Thus, the issue boils down to
whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local governments a blanket authority to permit
cockfighting at any time and for as long as said governments may wish it.
Upon mature deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in the negative. To begin with, repeals
and even amendments by implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative answer would entail a
vital amendment, amounting, for all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and 2286 of the
Revised Administrative Code. Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to be construed
strictly, and doubts in the interpretation thereof should be resolved in favor of the national
government and against the political subdivisions concerned. Thirdly, it is a matter of common
knowledge that cockfighting is one of the most widespread vices of our population, and that the

government has always shown a grave concern over the need of effectively curbing its evil effects.
The theory of petitioner herein presupposes that the Republic of the Philippines has completely
reversed its position and chosen, instead, to place the matter entirely at the discretion of local
governments. We should not, and can not adopt, such premise except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of Congress, which, insofar as said premise is concerned, is not manifest from
the language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended.
Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated separately by our laws. Thus, section 2243 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the
authority of said council over "cockfighting" is found in sections 2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in
said section 2243 (i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code punishes, not illegal "cockpits",
but "illegal cockfighting". What is more, participation in cockfights "on a day other than those
permitted by law", in dealt with in said article separately from participation in cockfights "at
a place other than a licensed cockpit." .
So, too, the authority of local governments, under Republic Act No. 938, as amended, to
"regulate . . . the establishment, maintenance and operation of . . . cockpits", does not necessarily
connote the power to regulate "cockfighting", except insofar as the same must take place in a duly
licensed "cockpit". Again, the first and second proviso in section 1 of said Act, regulating
the distance of cockpits and places of amusement therein mentioned from "any public building,
schools, hospitals and churches" and the third proviso of the same section, prohibiting the admission
of minors to some of those places of amusement, suggest that the authority conferred in said
provision may include the power to determine the location of cockpits, the type or nature of
construction used therefor, the conditions to persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be
established in each municipality and/or by each operator, the minimum age of the individuals who
may be admitted therein, and other matters of similar nature as distinguished from the days on
which cockfighting shall be held and the frequency thereof.
In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances relied upon by petitioner herein, authorizing
cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J. and Barrera, J., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1961/may1961/gr_l-14683_1961.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR.,
CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S.
FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and
TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed
LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its
men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due
protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws
and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting
tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date,
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a
matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping
within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said
date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7
days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left
mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still
alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's
decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in
the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their
Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men
working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact
that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating
income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual
Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00
as of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said
motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27,
1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent
Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed
Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was
opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that
in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has
exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or
injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding
that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall,
pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to
50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause
of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly
Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the
court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed
admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that
workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or
death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or
negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners
pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under
the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all
claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of

employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission,"

subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of
the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex
voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in
behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are
entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara,
now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and
Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections,
formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter,
submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under
the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or
his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by
virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee
or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He
submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in
accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is
that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right
of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of
negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that
once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail
themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in
the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the

resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners
are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of
their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate
failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or
a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or
allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual
relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad
faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages.
The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith,
read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as
assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made
as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not
based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for
loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even
if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On
the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It
is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or
relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured
employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the
burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551;
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that
unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award
of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to
claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial
expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12
and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint
alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case
at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act
was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation
designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or
ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in
the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts
set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.

In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the
regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured
worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and
thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as
against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the
respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission)
was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for
petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed
incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of
proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of
having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to
establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker
Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party
tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by
Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for
compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have
been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be
paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but
they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before
they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded
by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19,
1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case.
The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then
secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201,
2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to
guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and
employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work"(Sec. 9, Art.
II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of
the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor
Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-

organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New
Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on
June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30,
1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the
workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights
of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the
liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution
are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert
Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic
eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New
Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that
"all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights

and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis
supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section
shall be presumed to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside
the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the
employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions
of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
(emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610,
as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor
Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore
quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence,
is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New
Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines
the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security
System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the
law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of
the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5
was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu
Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to
recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute
an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied
Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969
ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958
case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said
Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer,

neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the
cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3)
cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American
Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the
restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the
range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil
Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6
of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The
right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the
employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to
provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are
inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to
recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without
due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton
neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for
the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such
attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are
retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964),
which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution
that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin
of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are
dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is
now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who
profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's
keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert

otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150
reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of
economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic
reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates
man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and
utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and
dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from
Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the
part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do
himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so
much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth;
its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
"
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in
the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity
to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American
Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply
the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies
that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist,
Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is
even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief
Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to
say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice
Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907,
quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice
Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In

the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint
of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts
breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused
by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no
fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New
Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable
negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life,
limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to
pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even
if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances
decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of
judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in
those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21
Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a
cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they
are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204
1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845,
852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even
the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they
must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is
to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles
of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly
concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such
law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include
Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer,
Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or
legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law,
or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of
such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave
rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest
or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them
is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US
335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it
protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are
not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the
American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was
developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy
(see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have
been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in
Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is
the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration
thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed
by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58
Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537)
as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of
Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause
means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal
facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46
Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working
women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no
longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice
Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due
process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The
law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in
the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American
Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum
wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for
women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political
questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions
(Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs.
Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate
concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question
as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine
Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation
of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine
jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking
American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in
the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or
executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A
GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE
PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides
for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found
in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil.
582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The
term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for
damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of
employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply
to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be
no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the
majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will
preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to
avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in
disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.

'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding
"the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took
effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law
were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the
Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or
another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
(Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]

3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within
the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person
for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to
sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first
paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the
legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if
entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code
nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when
the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be
presumed to include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of
the paragraph:

Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time,
if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the
employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should
the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured
employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689
[1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation,
caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June
20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there
was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator
not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again
given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or
under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court
is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts
would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove
the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort
suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer
and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could

employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses
available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted
employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030)
decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in
protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact
of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious,
inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if
not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a
major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate.
Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In
return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the
right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the
acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable
and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who
was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was
avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the

finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were
torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to
accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent
fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial
damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents.
The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the
product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost
of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to
broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase
price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a
given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is
essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not
disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on
the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a
definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two
major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of
more importance both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would
enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages
and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The
statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation

statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established
in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted
to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In
this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much
of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the
premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many
other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in
to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed.
The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of
the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am
personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive
employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was
precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and
public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary.
The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees
are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides
for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found
in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil.
582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The
term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for
damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of
employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply
to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be
no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the
majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will
preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to
avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in

disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding
"the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took
effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law
were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the
Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or
another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved

usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
(Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within
the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person
for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to
sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first
paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the
legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if
entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code
nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when
the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be
presumed to include such agreement).

On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of
the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time,
if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the
employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should
the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured
employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689
[1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation,
caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June
20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there
was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator
not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again
given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or
under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court
is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts
would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove
the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.

Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort
suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer
and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could
employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses
available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted
employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030)
decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in
protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact
of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious,
inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if
not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a
major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate.
Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In
return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the
right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the
acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable
and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who
was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was
avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered

some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the
finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were
torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to
accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent
fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial
damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents.
The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the
product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost
of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to
broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase
price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a
given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is
essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not
disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on
the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a
definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two
major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of
more importance both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would
enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages
and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.

The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The

statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established
in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted
to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In
this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much
of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the
premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many
other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in
to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed.
The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of
the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am
personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive
employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was
precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and
public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary.
The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees

are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/apr1985/gr_l30642_1985.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28790

April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive
Secretary,respondents.
Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from
investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare
inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the
terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The
appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer,
use the following expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to
explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against
petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-

subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and,
therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action
thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists
against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was
"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter
to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for
restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a
Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that
the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature;
that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of
the separation of powers.
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only
be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes
heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance.
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for
investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that
the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by
a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same
privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of
Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No.
4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt
petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating
and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent
curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and

remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution
expressly placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer
upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act,
sec. 24, par. 2).
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion
gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies
(Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to
be removed from office for the same causes and in the same mannerprovided by law for Judges of
First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public
Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension
or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to
that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had
really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging
this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E.
655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative
functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al.,
281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or
otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with
judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within
the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it
exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and
cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481,
47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47

Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48
Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep.
411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should
not and cannotbe required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the
Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric
Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).
1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming
that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section
invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register
of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter,
the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the
certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the
parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be
made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the
Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of
Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific
provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive
and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation 1 in effect
identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau
director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's
resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's
ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a
judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land
Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and
merely incidental to the latter.
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given,
whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are

constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of
the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not
intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be
violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of
the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260)
are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
1wph1.t

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/apr1968/gr_l-28790_1968.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28790

April 29, 1968

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS, as Commissioner of Land Registration, petitioner,

vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, as Secretary of Justice, and RAFAEL M. SALAS, as Executive
Secretary,respondents.
Leandro Sevilla, Ramon C. Aquino and Lino M. Patajo for petitioner.
Claudio Teehankee for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice from
investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare
inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the
terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The
appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said officer,
use the following expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him to
explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken against
petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidatedsubdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and,
therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action
thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists
against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was
"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter
to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for
restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land
Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a
Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that
the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature;
that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when
reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of
the separation of powers.
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only
be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes
heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance.
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for
investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that
the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by
a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same
privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of
Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No.
4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt
petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating
and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent
curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and
remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution
expressly placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer
upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act,
sec. 24, par. 2).
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion
gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies
(Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to
be removed from office for the same causes and in the same mannerprovided by law for Judges of
First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public
Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension
or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to
that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had
really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging
this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E.
655), saying:
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative
functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.

The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al.,
281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972,
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or
otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with
judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and controversies falling within
the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it
exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261 U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and
cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481,
47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47
Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48
Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep.
411. (Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should
not and cannotbe required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the
Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric
Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).
1wph1.t

Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming
that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section
invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. When the Register
of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where
any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter,
the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration either upon the
certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the matter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the
parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be
made. His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the
Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of
Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by specific
provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive
and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation 1 in effect
identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau
director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's

resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any bureau director's
ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a
judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land
Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and
merely incidental to the latter.
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given,
whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are
constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of
the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not
intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges would be
violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and suspension of
the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law (R. A. 2260)
are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
1wph1.t

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/apr1968/gr_l-28790_1968.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7927

August 8, 1913

JUAN BARRAMEDA, petitioner,

vs.

PERCY M. MOIR, (Judge of First Instance) ET AL., respondents.

Rafael de la Sierra for petitioner.
Thos. L. Hartigan, W. A. Kincaid, and Jose Robles Lahesa for respondent Judge Moir.
Facundo Salazar in his own behalf.
Manly and McMahon for respondent Valera Basmayor.
TRENT, J.:
This is an original application for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner relates that the he was defendant in
a suit brought before a justice of the peace to try title to a parcel of land; that the case was decided
adversely to him; that he appealed to the Court of First Instance; and that the judge of that court, on
motion of the appellee, dismissed the appeal with directions to the justice of the peace to proceed
with the enforcement of the judgment. At the request of the petitioner, a preliminary injunction was
issued by this court to stay the execution of the judgment, and he now prays that the respondent
judge be ordered to proceed with the case on appeal. The said judge has demurred to the complaint
on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The basis of the
demurrer is that Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace
to try title to real state, are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902. By
Act No. 2041, section 3, it was provided:
Justices of the peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate question of title to real estate or
any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does not exceed two hundred pesos,
and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less than six hundred pesos the justice of
the peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance.
By Act No. 2131, section 1, the above provision was amended by substituting "exclusive original
jurisdiction" for "exclusive jurisdiction."
In the case of Weigall vs. Shuster (11 Phil. Rep., 340) it was held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and Courts of First Instance, as fixed by section 9 of the Philippine Bill, may be added but to
not diminished by the Philippine Legislature. This holding has never been questioned, and it seems
unnecessary now to discuss the grounds upon which it was based. Therefore, there will be sufficient
reason for declaring the disputed provisions of Acts. Nos. 2041 and 2131 repugnant to the Philippine
Bill and, consequently void if they attempt to curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where
the title to realty is involved. The original jurisdiction of those courts extends to "all civil actions which
involve the title to or possession of real property, or of any interest therein," except in forcible entry
and detainer cases. (Act No. 136, sec. 56, par. 2.) Some one has said that there is no more
comprehensive word in the English language than the word "all." If this word be given its natural and
unrestricted meaning, there is no case involving the title to real estate which Court of First Instance
are not authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being supreme, any Act of
the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to curtail such jurisdiction must be held
void. Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to real

estate and provide that it shall be exclusive in cases where the value of the property in litigation does
not exceed P200. Is the word "exclusive" susceptible of a construction that would still give Courts of
First Instance original jurisdiction to try title to real estate where the value of the property in litigation
does not exceed P200? By no possible means can exclusive jurisdiction to try a specific class of
cases be construed so as to permit of another court entertaining jurisdiction over such cases. To give
a grant of unrestricted exclusive jurisdiction over a specific class of litigation to one court its only
proper sense, all other courts must be barred from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. To hold that
another court has jurisdiction also such in cases is to destroy the grant of exclusive jurisdiction given
to the first. It is no longer exclusive when shared by another court, but merely concurrent. Were the
disputed provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 allowed to stand, therefore, the necessary result
would be to deprive Courts of First Instance of their original jurisdiction to try cases where the title to
realty valued at not more than P200 was involved. This applies, whether the phrase "exclusive
jurisdiction" or "exclusive original jurisdiction" be used. The Philippine Legislature can not deprive
Courts of First Instance of any of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Organic Law. Upon this
ground alone, then, Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131, in so far as they attempt to confer exclusive original
jurisdiction upon courts of justice of the peace to try cases involving the title to realty valued at not
more than P200, must be declared void.
There remains to be considered the concurrent jurisdiction conferred upon justice of the peace by
the disputed provisions of those Acts in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds P200, but is
less than P600.
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But
in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N.E., 916; 128 A.
S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou.,
963.) Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligence, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass, 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be
eliminated without causing results effecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the
intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R. Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs.
Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co.,
184 U. S., 540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 III., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135;
State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute
can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs.
Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839.)
Courts of justices of the peace are courts of limited and inferior jurisdiction. They are the most
inferior courts in our judicial system. Where they have jurisdiction at all, it has never been limited by
the insignificance of the particular case. On the contrary, the province of those courts, as is well
known, is to handle precisely such cases. If litigation be divided into important and unimportant
cases, then assuredly, to justices of the peace fall only the unimportant. And when the division of
jurisdiction in a particular class is based upon the amount in controversy, as is the case with the
provisions of Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 in question, a law providing that because of the inferior

amount in controversy a case should go to the Court of First Instance, while another case of the
same nature, because of its greater amount, could be tried before a justice of the peace, would be
an anomaly and at war with the only logical distribution of jurisdiction. In other words, the case of A
vs. B is too small and inconsequential to be tried before a justice of the peace, and must be tried in
the Court of First Instance; while the case of C. vs. D, being of a larger amount, may be tried by a
justice of the peace. Such reasoning has never heretofore been used by the Legislature in
distributing jurisdiction over litigation between Courts of First Instance and justice of the peace
courts. In seems clear that the concurrent jurisdiction in cases where the amount involved is more
than P200 but less than P600, was meant only as supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive
jurisdiction over cases not exceeding P200. This concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be
considered as inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise of that exclusive
jurisdiction which has already been declared void. The concurrent jurisdiction must therefore be
declared void also.
Other additional jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace by Acts Nos. 2041 and 2131 is not
before the court. We need only say that such other additional jurisdiction bears no relation whatever
to those void provisions of the statutes which provide for jurisdiction in real-estate actions; and
applying the same rules to the rest of the Act which we have applied to the clause conferring
concurrent jurisdictional in real-estate actions between the amounts of P200 and P600, we are
clearly of the opinion that the validity of the remainder of the Act is not in any case dependent upon
the said void provisions.
In conclusion, it seems advisable to state that the able brief of counsel for the respondent judge is
based upon thea priori assumption that original jurisdiction of Court of First Instance in real-estate
actions is, by the Organic Law, made exclusive. We have found it quite unnecessary to postulate any
such theory in disposing of the case. Nor has it been necessary to rely upon the second point made
by counsel to the effect that jurisdiction in real-estate actions has never been conferred upon justices
of the peace in the United States or England.
The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the respondent judge on this
action review is an absolutely nullity. The respondent judge acquired jurisdiction of the cause only for
the purpose of dismissing the appeal, and in further directing the justice of the peace to proceed with
the execution of the void judgment, the respondent judge was in error.
The preliminary injunction granted by this court, staying the execution of the judgment, will be made
permanent, and the writ of mandamus prayed for must be denied. The petitioner will pay the costs of
the cause. This opinion will be substituted for the one handed down by this court in the same case at
the close of the last term. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1913/aug1913/gr_l-7927_1913.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid
the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their
immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners
and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be
paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available
upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest",
the contestant whose estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded
pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the second; and the next, the third.
Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac
hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver
set for third. The first-prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional
Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified contestants in each region will
be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that
region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day allexpenses-paid round trip to Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take
part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and third-prize winners will receive cash
prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-

prize and third-prize winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are:
P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as consolation prize for each of the
remaining four participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest
but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view
sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of
which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through
the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its
addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar
scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for
obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is
engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any
real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is
conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through
the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of
Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person,
depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the
outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or
company or the representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The
Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in
conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or
personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is
conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through
the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or
payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or
company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an
individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation
for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in
favor of such person or company or its agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in
which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed,

the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions
aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960,
Caltex sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no
consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under controlling authorities,
condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on
an unrelated case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General
maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a
"gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960
not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that
if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its
representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief
against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its
'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to
allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues
were joined and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as
follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the
petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public
distribution of said rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the
petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable
legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person
"whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity
arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64,
Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the
matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576,
578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of the
appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, our duty is to assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of
significant points stand out in bold relief. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some

consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to avail
of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast,
the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the
power and the duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud
orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against legally nonmailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales
promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of
information thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found expedient to request the
appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the
premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation
thereof in the proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the
correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in
which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with
which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the
appellant stood his ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the
appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it
and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent
assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live
controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a
mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial.
To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction
hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an
unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a
fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an
imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing
declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955).
And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that
merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others" which
admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is
actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:
Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of
construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set
of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The
infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances
here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their
application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of

the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p.
1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction
or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a
declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the
disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed
and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the
battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the
dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a
full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132
and cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59
Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny
declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would be to force it to
choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as
to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be
faced with these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not
only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with
its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it
abandons the contest, it becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect
a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these
considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in
the instant case, is to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights
and duties under a law we can see in the present case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any
futility or prematurity in our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in
this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory
judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be bound. But more than this,
he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial
decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will
terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its
proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion
were conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the

corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to
determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17
App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J.
Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.
2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical
terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely nonmailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or otherwise deny
the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the resolution of the second issue posed
in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs.
Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under
the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is
that of the United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the
United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution
of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and
various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs.
Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and
Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction
Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too
obvious in the disputed scheme to be the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant
himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the element of
consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the
same case just cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution
of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is
paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which
the invitation to participate therein is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy
anything? Simply estimate the actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your
favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win valuable prizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any
service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective
contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand,
and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or turned
inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery.
Indeed, even as we head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in
order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El
Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does not only
appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex
products simply to win a prize would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to
join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any Caltex product or the use of
any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.
1awphl.nt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would
naturally benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to
prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by securing entry blanks". The
required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is
whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those
conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.
Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the
sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some
benefit in the way of patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element
of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p.
849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
proposed by the appellee is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under
the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of
any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed?
Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated on the issue of consideration,
this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing
effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action
was predicated, amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice,
which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of consideration, may
nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of whether
or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited
gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words,
there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is
commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by
way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur.,
654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed.,
p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb.
13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed,
507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted,
there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the
purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the
appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within
the broadest sweep that the term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the
appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion relied upon, rulings there are
indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of
consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192,
178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford
vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only
one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and
consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P.
563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs.
Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851,
citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp.
590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory
provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms
"lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the
necessity for the element of consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54
C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater
Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is,
therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable
statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the
word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar
as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction should
be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to
eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the
determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed

matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839,
143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a
chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the
contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been
held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to
as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party
receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs.
Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., p. 695, emphasis
supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to
hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift
enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the
appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory
relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the
appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1966/sep1966/gr_l-19650_1966.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,

vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiffappellee.
Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in
Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and
one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in
issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v.
Mapa. 1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German
Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective
agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of
Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby

appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as
soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those
generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this
province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood
that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic
cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the
right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath
of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:
Kind: ROHM-Revolver
Make: German
SN: 64
Cal: .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas
as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted
persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of
record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and
carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated
December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that
the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned
in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the
accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,

supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a
certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to
the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and
by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to
... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,
sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant
governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative
Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ...
.
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law

originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
inLucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/feb1974/gr_l_30061_1974.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 203-J November 18, 1975

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, complainant,
vs.

JUDGE ALFREDO CATOLICO, respondent.

A.M. No. 625-CFI November 18, 1975
FERMINA OLAES, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALFREDO CATOLICO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:
Two administrative complaints with four charges, the first three of them formulated by the Secretary
of Justice, against Judge Alfredo Catolico of Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Cavite
charging him with "serious misconduct and gross disregard of law." It may be mentioned at the
outset that the action taken by the Secretary of justice must have been caused by the following
portion of the decision of the Court in the case of People vs. Judge Alfredo Catolico, 38 SCRA 389:
11. In view of the rash and improper actuations of respondent judge, which could have resulted in a
serious miscarriage of justice, the Court has resolved that this matter be brought to the attention of
the Secretary of Justice for the initiation of appropriate administrative action, as the facts and
circumstances warrant. This is in fact the third case involving respondent judge that has thus been
resolved to be officially brought to the Secretary's attention the two others being the contempt
proceedings in Barrera vs. Barrera, supra, and the prohibition proceedings in Queto vs. Catolico. (31
SCRA 52 [Jan. 23, 1970.])
The first complaint arose out of the actuations in October of 1965 of respondent, then acting as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, relative to the naturalization cases of
over fifty naturalized citizens wherein said respondent not only declared motu proprio, without any
corresponding petition of the Republic of the Philippines, null and void the oath taking of therein
petitioners, with the aggravating circumstance that, without priorly hearing the petitioner concerned,
"the respondent delivered in open court a lengthy dissertation reflecting on the honesty and integrity
of provincial and city fiscals appearing in naturalization cases, and venting his spleen particularly on
Chua Tuan, referred to him as a Chinese who had become a multi-millionaire by making over
shipments of copra, who was "untouchable because he could buy his way out in Malacaang, in the
Army, in the Foreign Affairs, in the Immigration, in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the Courts
of Justice," of which the respondent said he would take judicial notice. The respondent further
castigated Chua Tuan with the following epithets: "balasuba;" ingrate; "hambug;" animalistic; a
danger and a disgrace to the community; a dishonor to the Filipino people." (Pars. 5 & 6, p. 2 of
complaint.)
The second and third complaints relate to the insistence of respondent to consider himself as without
jurisdiction to continue trying every case, civil and criminal, which he found had not been tried for
more than thirty days since the respective previous hearings therein, for which reason, he ordered

their dismissal, with aggravating circumstance, that he refused to recognize not only the authority of
the Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of
the Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court in the usual form in
which parties have always been notified in all cases of resolutions of the Court.
The fourth complaint was filed by the widow of the victim, Mrs. Fermina Olaes, in a case of homicide
in which the arraignment was held on October 3, 1973 and the hearings were set on October 15,
November 23 and 27, December 6, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 26, 1973 and January 2, 3 and 4, 1974
and the decision acquitting the accused was promulgated by respondent on January 10, 1974, two
days before he reached the age of 70 years, the complainant charging that respondent hurried, in
preference to other cases in his sala which deserved earlier attention, the trial with the intention of
being able to finish and decide the same favorably to the accused before he (the judge) could retire,
with the aggravating circumstance that:
2. Respondent during the hearing of December 26, 1973 was so carried away by his emotions that
he was, for two hours, the one asking questions to the prosecution's witness; and that in the
process, respondent "bullied, ridiculed, frightened, threatened (there was even an instance when the
judge was banging the table with his own fist) and humiliated the witness.
3. Respondent has the propensity to ridicule the witness manifested in his questions regarding the
illness of the witness when he asked the latter if he was examined by a veterinarian.
4. Respondent tried the case with a "wrapped-up decision-that of acquittal "manifested in his order
dated December 26, 1973:
... and in order to disabuse any fear on the part of the prosecution for indeed the prosecution always
believes that anybody accused must have to be sentenced to die if necessary and can not admit into
their mind that there are doubt that may linger longer in the mind of the Court and can not be
explained by any amount of oral testimony because the prosecution cannot present evidence
enough for the conviction of the accused beyond any doubt ... (Pars. 2 to 4, page 2 of Report.)
In his answers, respondent claims that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to
comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which require the
speedy and expeditious disposition of cases. In regard to what he did in the naturalization cases
aforementioned, respondent avers that the rulings of this Court sustain him in his view that the
petitioners in the said cases had not validly become Filipino citizens because they had taken their
oaths of allegiance prematurely, and since this fact was evident in the record, he could act motu
proprio to require them to validate their said oaths. He denies having improperly castigated Chua
Tan. Anent the last complaint, respondent maintains he had nothing to do with the preparation of the
calendar and denies having been actuated any bias or prejudice either in his questioning of the
witnesses or in acquitting the accused. And as a general and fundamental defense, respondent
pleads that "if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than of the heart".
For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of
record in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further
administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer. The fourth case was referred

to Justice Buenaventura de la Fuente of the Court of Appeals for appropriate investigation. The
report was submitted on August 1, 1975.
In connection with respondent's actuations involved in the first charge of the Secretary of Justice, the
Court has in a way already admonished respondent. In the decision in Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA
52, Chief Justice Makalintal spoke for the Court thus:
Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should
see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power
as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure. If they arrogate unto themselves the authority
allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence but confusion in the administration of
justice and, in many instances, oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court has already reprimanded
respondent in its decision in Barrera vs. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, and thru Justice Fernando, We
therein stated:
Given the opportunity to explain both in a memorandum and in oral argument, he remained adamant
and obdurate. It was apparent he was not averse to disciplinary action being visited on his
conduct. ...
What calls for disciplinary action is the recklessness with which respondent judge did hurl the
baseless allegation that the Clerk of this Court was permitted to exercise an authority which
appertained to the Chief Justice. He did speak with all the valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from
such an indefensible stand in the face of his being informed that what the Clerk did was solely in
accordance with what was previously decided by this Court, which certainly will not tolerate, anybody
else, much less a subordinate, to speak and act for itself. This gross disrespect shown to this Court
has no justification. The misdeed of respondent judge is compounded by such an accusation
apparently arising from his adamantine conviction that a doctrine of this Court that fails to meet his
approval need not be applied ... "
In People vs. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, Justice Teehankee added the following strictures:
9. Respondent judge's capricious dismissal of cases in his court in Cavite, based on his own unique
appreciation of the provisions of Rule 22, section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court to the effect' that
upon the lapse of three months from the first day of trial on the merits, the trial judge lost control of
the same, and may not continue trying the same [when there is no written authority from the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court] for the only thing possible to be done is to dismiss the case,'
(Respondent judge's comments to the contempt charge against him, notes in brackets supplied, in
Barrera vs. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98) notwithstanding his awareness of this Court's contrary ruling in
Barrueco, supra, was already noted by the Court in Barrera vs. Barrera (Supra, fn. 17) decided on
July 31, 1970. In said case, where respondent judge was held in contempt of this court and
reprimanded, he was reminded of his duty to apply the law as interpreted by this Court "as the final
arbiter of any justiciable controversy' and of the great mischief and prejudice to the administration of
justice, and unnecessary inconvenience, delay and expenses to litigants, that would be needlessly
caused, should judges of lower courts dispose of cases in accordance with their personal views

contrary to the final authoritative pronouncements of this Court. The Court has noted that the
inconsistency of respondent judge's present posture that he loses control of a case upon the lapse of
three months from the first day of trial on the merits and has only to dismiss the case was brought
out at the contempt hearing in said case when he admitted that he did not follow such a course of
action in the other trial courts presided by him, viz, the Courts of First Instance or Misamis
Occidental and of Ilocos Norte, prior to his appointment to the Cavite court.
10. In the same case of Barrera, this Court, per Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, already found
respondent judge in contempt for recklessly "hurling the baseless allegation that the Clerk of this
Court was permitted to exercise an authority which appertained to the Chief Justice. He did speak
with all the valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from such an indefensible stand in the face of his
being informed that what the Clerk did was solely in accordance with what was previously decided
by this Court, which certainly will not tolerate, anybody else, much less a subordinate, to speak and
act for itself. This gross disrespect shown to this Court has no justification."
In his present order of denial of the People's motion for reconsideration, respondent judge committed
the same reckless act of making it appear in his Order that it was the Clerk of this Court who
"informs the presiding judge that he is extending authority to continue hearing and trying, until
finished all criminal cases pending ...," notwithstanding that the Clerk of this Court signed the
communication expressly "By authority of the Chief Justice.
Such action of respondent judge, aside from being grossly disrespectful of the Court, exposes his
lack of appreciation or disregard of the time-honored usage of the Court that minute resolutions,
summons and processes of the Court as well as official actions of the Chief Justice, upon being duly
adopted and recorded are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon the signature of the
Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions approved monthly
by the Court, it would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice and members of the
Court to the prejudice of the administration of justice if all such papers, other than decisions, could
be released only upon their own signatures. The situation is analogous to administrative decisions
signed by the Executive Secretary "by authority of the President," which decisions are given full faith
and credit by our courts as decisions of the President, "unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive." (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pao, 21 SCRA 895 [Nov. 17, 1967].).
Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of
respondent complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were
just the result of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not
be categorized as serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.
While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent
informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation
effective January 11, 1974, "without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to
under the retirement and other existing laws." Premises considered, and in line with the established
policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice
to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending
against the official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS above-entitled
cases.

Makalintal, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs in the result.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muoz Palma, JJ., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/nov1975/am_203_1975.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of
the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the judgment of conviction,
for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael
Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the
municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to

suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of
imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of
firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded
to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two
offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a
patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the
requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing
him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of
the Government.
Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving
only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as
secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as
secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang, 1 was exempt
from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a
quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial
governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the
case at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961"
includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have
the right to bear a firearm ... for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the
rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang, 3the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4

At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965,
the Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
- formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked
the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the
new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the
old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area,
more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret
agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at
the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle,
notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
1wph1.t

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713.
2 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
3 Vide People vs. Lucero, L-10845, April 28,1958, 103 Phil. 500.
4 People vs. Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607. Vide Senarillos vs. Hermosisima,
L-10662, December 14, 1956, 100 Phil. 501.
5 People vs. Jabinal, ibid.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_39990_1975.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070 February 12, 1997

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than
confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue. 1
The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still
relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions, judges are revered as models of integrity,
wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they are, however, magistrates do have
their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent
Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service,
as a result of a failed love affair that happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished
record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on August 8, 1997 had
death not intervened a few months ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this
Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect his retirement benefits.
Antecedent Facts
In a letter-complaint 2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A.
Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly
having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.
After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996, referred this case 3 to
Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation,
report and recommendation. The latter submitted his Report and Recommendation 4 dated July 26, 1996.
Thereafter, the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court Administrator 5 for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
According to the complainants:

Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be
complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together
as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June 19, 1947, whom they
named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born.
Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff
Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no reason
whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for
support, however, they were ignored by defendant. . . . 6
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Arty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to
respondent as follows:
Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
Pinamungajan, Cebu
Dear Judge Cantero:
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two legitimate children by her,
Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and Glicerio.
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left your conjugal home at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and
children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard from you.
They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband and father to them,
particularly that expressly provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195
of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support for three of
them, and a request that they be properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and legal
beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed with the Supreme Court and other
agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and
retirement laws.
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and children, without having to
resort to judicial recourse.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA 7

The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned
that respondent Judge had another family. In their own words,
. . . The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a
Public School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According to some documents obtained by
plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have children of their own, named as follows with
their date of births: Noralyn Y. Cantero May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero February 4, 1970; Erwin
Y. Cantero April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero
December 2, 1981.
It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of defendant Judge
Cantero to be filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his
personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his insurance policy with the
Government Service Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself as being married to
Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter is that
defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with whom they have two legitimate children, namely:
Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero. 8
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:
. . . I admit the existence and form of Annex "A" of the said complaint, but vehemently deny the
validity of its due execution, for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter,
without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to
our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from
Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we
were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(.) That
was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school days. 9
Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:
. . . sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in
their early age and in their second year high school days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which
resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and then and there gave birth to a child, named
Teresita Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom,
one of the complainants. That in order to save name and shame, parents of both the respondent and
the complainant came to an agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get
married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband, wife for being close relatives, thereby
forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were all
ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after the said affair both respondent
and the complainant immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as husband, and
wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal home. From that time respondent and the
complainant have never met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last
40 years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years after the affair of
1947; that in 1964, respondent was first connected in the government service as Comelec Registrar

of the Commission on Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after the affair
of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the
Department of Justice, that is 35 years after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3,
1989, respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the
Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is 42 years from August 11,
1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to the present time with
more than 6 years in the Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on
August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has served in the
government service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously without any complaint
whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent as member of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to
the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges against the
respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and
no other; that the complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed
(sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year, 1997; that this
actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;
xxx xxx xxx
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her public service as
public school teacher and have begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised
(sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding this case in order to enlighten the
Honorable (Court) that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged
marriage because it is the contention and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage was void
from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent
with the stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money consideration as
reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have
already signed a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex "1",
stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in
the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the a complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme
Court., and that respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus
the amount of P5,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent stop (sic) the
monthly allowance until such time the complainant will actually withdraw the instant case, and
without knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed
(sic) of three (3) years. 10
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in March 1994 by
Esmeraldo C. Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo
Sacurom are reproduced thus:
That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C.
CANTERO, of legal age, married, filipino, and with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan,
Cebu, Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA C. SACUROM, also of
legal age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her brother, and a residence (sic) of 133-A

J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby
depose and say:
1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan,
Cebu, is charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court now pending action;
2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled amicably in the
interest of family unity and reconciliation, and arrived at compromise agreement based on law of
equity, as follows:
(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the
retirement that the First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for the First Party;
(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries of the First
Party, in case of death;
(c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First party inherited
from his parents;
(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00,
monthly out of the second check salary of the First Party (The second half salary only);
3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the
outright dismissal of the said pending case filed by her and her mother;
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective and enforceable unless
the said case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be
received by the First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void from the beginning; and the
Second Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.
5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the interest of good will and
reconciliation and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously. 11
In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio
Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance policy. 12
The Issues
The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":
1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the
presumption that she is already dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;

3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed
the offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;
5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law. 13
Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Judge and Court Administrator
Investigating Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of
the crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however, considering
his length of service in the government, it is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year
without pay. 14
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its report
dismissal, as follows:

15

recommending respondent Judge's

After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the investigating judge.
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was married to complainant
Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two (2) children with her. Respondent's contention
that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it has lost its validity on the ground
that they never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be
given a (sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer, much more,
a member of the bench when he contracted his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for
having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960, he knows that the marriage
cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage with
Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the existence of a previous
marriage.
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for
misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of
were committed. The infraction he committed continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960
to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an
unlawful act performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg).
He can therefore be held liable for his misdeeds.
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had
committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8)

children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two (2)
children.
Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the
imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed against him. "A judge's actuation of
cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting his wife having been
allegedly absent for four years only constitutes gross immoral conduct" (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr.,
249 SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. While deceit employed by respondent, existed prior to his
appointment as a . . . Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with . . . began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guidepost to (sic) self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this case was still being
deliberated upon by this Court.
The Court's Ruling
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of the foregoing
recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and
retirement benefits of the respondent.
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable
The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following:
abandonment of his first wife and children, failing to give support, marrying for the second time
without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of
public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
"Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is
a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects
his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to
separate the character of man from the character of an officer. . . . It is settled that misconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of official duties . . . ." More specifically, in Buenaventura
vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present
Chief justice defines misconduct as referring "to a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer." That is

to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision
penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be shown, there
must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 16
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no
direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his
official re-sponsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross
misconduct in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero " . . . (t)o warrant
disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official
duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer." 17
Nullity of Prior Marriage
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Maria Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage was void
and that there was no need to have the same judicially declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then
prevailing. In the en banc case of Odayat vs. Amante, 18 complainant charged Amante, a clerk of court,
with oppression, immorality and falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat alleged among
others ". . . that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children,
even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive . . . ." In order to rebut the charge of immorality,
Amante ". . . presented in evidence the certification (of the) . . . Local Civil Registrar . . . attesting that . . .
Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is
that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said
Eliseo Ponales." This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab
initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages." 19
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs . . . a judicial declaration of such
fact" 20 before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void." 21 This was expressly provided under Article 40 22 of the Family Code. However, the marriage of
Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation
of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat
vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding
of guilt in the bigamy charge, Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge
cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's
belief in good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public
documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public
document, 23 which must be appreciated in his favor.
Personal Conduct of a Judge
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from
finding himadministratively liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action

from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he
personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be above
reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles
and sense of propriety without which he cannot presence the faith of the people in the judiciary, so
indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a
judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as the price
he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice." 24 It is
against this standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the
record reveals he had two families. The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs,
support and education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct unbecoming a trial
magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.'" 25
A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this case, we found
no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up
to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all appearances lived up to the stringent standards
embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 years in
government service, 26 this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at
his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort
at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.
This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He
may have committed an indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake
should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his
otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public
life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits
of his long and dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as
recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.
However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his
children of his first marriage children whose afiliation he did not deny. He neglected them and
refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this
Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/am_95_1070_1997.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070 February 12, 1997

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than
confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue. 1
The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still
relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions, judges are revered as models of integrity,
wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they are, however, magistrates do have
their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent
Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service,
as a result of a failed love affair that happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished
record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70 years on August 8, 1997 had
death not intervened a few months ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this
Court still resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect his retirement benefits.
Antecedent Facts

In a letter-complaint 2 dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A.
Cantero Sacurom and son Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly
having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.
After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996, referred this case 3 to
Executive Judge Gualberto P. Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation,
report and recommendation. The latter submitted his Report and Recommendation 4 dated July 26, 1996.
Thereafter, the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court Administrator 5 for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
According to the complainants:
Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be
complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together
as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June 19, 1947, whom they
named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born.
Thereafter, defendant left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff
Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no reason
whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.
Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for
support, however, they were ignored by defendant. . . . 6
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Arty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to
respondent as follows:
Judge Esmeraldo Cantero
Pinamungajan, Cebu
Dear Judge Cantero:
We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two legitimate children by her,
Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and Glicerio.
It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left your conjugal home at
Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and
children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard from you.
They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband and father to them,
particularly that expressly provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195
of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support for three of
them, and a request that they be properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and legal

beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed with the Supreme Court and other
agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and
retirement laws.
We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and children, without having to
resort to judicial recourse.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA 7
The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned
that respondent Judge had another family. In their own words,
. . . The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a
Public School teacher from Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According to some documents obtained by
plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have children of their own, named as follows with
their date of births: Noralyn Y. Cantero May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero February 4, 1970; Erwin
Y. Cantero April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero
December 2, 1981.
It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of defendant Judge
Cantero to be filed with the Supreme Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his
personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his insurance policy with the
Government Service Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself as being married to
Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter is that
defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with whom they have two legitimate children, namely:
Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero. 8
The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:
. . . I admit the existence and form of Annex "A" of the said complaint, but vehemently deny the
validity of its due execution, for the truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only
dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and purposes on the matter,
without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to
our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from
Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we
were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(.) That
was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school days. 9
Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:
. . . sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in
their early age and in their second year high school days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which
resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and then and there gave birth to a child, named
Teresita Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom,

one of the complainants. That in order to save name and shame, parents of both the respondent and
the complainant came to an agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get
married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband, wife for being close relatives, thereby
forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were all
ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after the said affair both respondent
and the complainant immediately separated each other (sic) without living together as husband, and
wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal home. From that time respondent and the
complainant have never met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last
40 years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years after the affair of
1947; that in 1964, respondent was first connected in the government service as Comelec Registrar
of the Commission on Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after the affair
of 1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the
Department of Justice, that is 35 years after the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3,
1989, respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial Judge (MCTC) of the
Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is 42 years from August 11,
1947; that respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to the present time with
more than 6 years in the Judiciary; that respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on
August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has served in the
government service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously without any complaint
whatsoever, except this instant case; that respondent as member of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to
the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the bar and judiciary; that the charges against the
respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11, 1947 and
no other; that the complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed
(sic) of almost 42 years and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year, 1997; that this
actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;
xxx xxx xxx
That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her public service as
public school teacher and have begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised
(sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding this case in order to enlighten the
Honorable (Court) that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand;
That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged
marriage because it is the contention and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage was void
from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and to do so will be inconsistent
with the stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money consideration as
reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have
already signed a compromised (sic) agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex "1",
stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in
the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the a complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme
Court., and that respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus
the amount of P5,000.00 for their Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent stop (sic) the
monthly allowance until such time the complainant will actually withdraw the instant case, and

without knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed
(sic) of three (3) years. 10
Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in March 1994 by
Esmeraldo C. Cantero and Teresita C. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo
Sacurom are reproduced thus:
That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C.
CANTERO, of legal age, married, filipino, and with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan,
Cebu, Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and TERESITA C. SACUROM, also of
legal age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her brother, and a residence (sic) of 133-A
J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby
depose and say:
1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan,
Cebu, is charged by Second Party for Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court now pending action;
2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled amicably in the
interest of family unity and reconciliation, and arrived at compromise agreement based on law of
equity, as follows:
(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the
retirement that the First will receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for the First Party;
(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries of the First
Party, in case of death;
(c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First party inherited
from his parents;
(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00,
monthly out of the second check salary of the First Party (The second half salary only);
3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the
outright dismissal of the said pending case filed by her and her mother;
4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective and enforceable unless
the said case will be withdrawn and dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be
received by the First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void from the beginning; and the
Second Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.
5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the interest of good will and
reconciliation and both parties is (sic) duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously. 11

In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio
Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance policy. 12
The Issues
The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":
1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;
2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the
presumption that she is already dead, that there was no need for any judicial declaration;
3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed
the offense, he was not yet a member of the judiciary;
4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;
5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law. 13
Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Judge and Court Administrator
Investigating Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of
the crime of Grave Misconduct (Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however, considering
his length of service in the government, it is recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year
without pay. 14
The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its report
dismissal, as follows:

15

recommending respondent Judge's

After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings of the investigating judge.
Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was married to complainant
Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 and have (sic) two (2) children with her. Respondent's contention
that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it has lost its validity on the ground
that they never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be
given a (sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer, much more,
a member of the bench when he contracted his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for
having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960, he knows that the marriage
cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage with

Nieves Ygay was therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the existence of a previous
marriage.
We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for
misconduct on the ground that he was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of
were committed. The infraction he committed continued from the time he became a lawyer in 1960
to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an
unlawful act performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg).
He can therefore be held liable for his misdeeds.
On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had
committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8)
children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two (2)
children.
Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the
imposition of an administrative sanction for the charges filed against him. "A judge's actuation of
cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting his wife having been
allegedly absent for four years only constitutes gross immoral conduct" (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr.,
249 SCRA 447). It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. While deceit employed by respondent, existed prior to his
appointment as a . . . Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with . . . began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guidepost to (sic) self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this case was still being
deliberated upon by this Court.
The Court's Ruling
In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of the foregoing
recommendation of the OCA which, if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and
retirement benefits of the respondent.
Gross Misconduct Not Applicable

The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following:
abandonment of his first wife and children, failing to give support, marrying for the second time
without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, and falsification of
public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.
"Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is
a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects
his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to
separate the character of man from the character of an officer. . . . It is settled that misconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of official duties . . . ." More specifically, in Buenaventura
vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge of the court of first instance, the present
Chief justice defines misconduct as referring "to a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer." That is
to abide by the authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision
penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that in order for serious misconduct to be shown, there
must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 16
The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no
direct relation to his judicial function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his
official re-sponsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be deemed misconduct much less gross
misconduct in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero " . . . (t)o warrant
disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official
duties. It is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer." 17
Nullity of Prior Marriage
It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Maria Apiag prior to marrying Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage was void
and that there was no need to have the same judicially declared void, pursuant to jurisprudence then
prevailing. In the en banc case of Odayat vs. Amante, 18 complainant charged Amante, a clerk of court,
with oppression, immorality and falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat alleged among
others ". . . that respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children,
even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive . . . ." In order to rebut the charge of immorality,
Amante ". . . presented in evidence the certification (of the) . . . Local Civil Registrar . . . attesting that . . .
Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is
that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said
Eliseo Ponales." This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab
initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages." 19
Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs . . . a judicial declaration of such
fact" 20 before any party thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be
void." 21 This was expressly provided under Article 40 22 of the Family Code. However, the marriage of
Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the promulgation

of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat
vs. Amante applies in favor of respondent.

On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding
of guilt in the bigamy charge, Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge
cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge's
belief in good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public
documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public
document, 23 which must be appreciated in his favor.
Personal Conduct of a Judge
However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from
finding himadministratively liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action
from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he
personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be above
reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles
and sense of propriety without which he cannot presence the faith of the people in the judiciary, so
indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a
judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as the price
he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice." 24 It is
against this standard that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the
record reveals he had two families. The record also shows that he did not attend to the needs,
support and education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct unbecoming a trial
magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
mandates that '[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.'" 25
A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted
Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this case, we found
no trace of wrongdoing in the discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up
to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all appearances lived up to the stringent standards
embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32 years in
government service, 26 this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.
Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at
his sin. We should also consider the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort
at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.

This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He
may have committed an indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake
should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy his career and render inutile his
otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public
life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits
of his long and dedicated service in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as
recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too harsh.
However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his
children of his first marriage children whose afiliation he did not deny. He neglected them and
refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this
Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/am_95_1070_1997.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. 53-MJ January 31, 1974

LOURDES CORPUS, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE CIPRIANO P. CABALUNA, JR., ALIMODIAN, ILOILO, respondent.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:

1wph1.t

Sometime on August 26, 1953, Lourdes Corpus and several, others filed with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo a complaint against Tiburcia Brabanco and Felix Amijana docketed as
civil case No. 2843 concerning the ownership of two parcels of land located in Barrio
Bugang, Municipality of Alimodian, Province of Iloilo. In a decision dated September 5, 1955,
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs true owners of
the parcels of land described in the complaint and ordering the defendants to vacate the
same. These case was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants and on February
26, 1963, a judgment was rendered which affirmed the decision of the trial court. 1
In the meantime, the Municipal Judge of Alimodian, Iloilo, Mr. Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., acting
as Cadastral Judge, heard several cadastral cases, one of which was Cadastral Case No. N11, L.R.C. Cadastral Record No. N-387 of the Alimodian Cadastre, which involved a parcel of
land described as cadastral lot 1762, with Adriano Camarista as claimant. In the course of the
hearing of the case, Adriano Camarista executed a deed of sale in favor of Procopio Cabalfin
and the document was ratified by Judge Cabaluna, Jr. After the hearing, cadastral lot 1762
was adjudicated to spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin on July 30, 1963. 2
On March 4, 1964, Lourdes Corpus and her co-plaintiffs in civil case 2843 filed in the
cadastral case a petition to set aside the decision rendered therein and to order another
hearing on the ground that cadastral lot 1762 is the same parcel of land litigated in civil case
2843 which was awarded to them by final judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon receipt of
this petition, Judge Cabaluna, Jr. inhibited himself and forwarded the records to the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo for a hearing on the merits. 3
Lourdes Corpus likewise filed on April 26, 1966, a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo against spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin for annulment of the aforementioned
decision rendered in the cadastral case 4 and there the trial court found that cadastral lot 1762
and the land litigated in civil case 2843 were indeed one and the same. 5
Not contented with having filed civil case 6998, Lourdes Corpus charged Judge Cabaluna, Jr.
before the Secretary of Justice with having committed "gross fraud" in that knowing, of the
pendency of the above-mentioned civil case before the Court of Appeals, said Judge
nonetheless ratified a deed of sale of cadastral lot 1762 in favor of Procopio Cabalfin and
awarded said lot to the latter. 6 The Secretary of Justice required respondent Judge to answer the
complaint after which the record was forwarded to Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo for investigation, report and recommendation. On May 24, 1972, Judge Inserts
submitted his report and recommended the exoneration of respondent for lack of evidence to
substantiate the charge. 7 The office of the Secretary of Justice concurs with the
recommendation. 8
For the charge of "gross fraud" to prosper there is need of clear and convincing evidence
that respondent knew that one of the parcels involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to
complainant was the same property which he awarded to spouses Cabalfin in the cadastral
proceeding; such evidence is, however, wanting in the record of this case.
The only possible basis for complainant's accusation was her testimony that sometime in
1961 she met respondent who inquired about the status or "development" of the civil case

and she informed him that the case was still pending before the Court of Appeals. 9 Assuming
that the conversation occurred, complainant failed, however, to bring out that respondent was
cognizant of the relation of the property involved in the civil case to the land applied for in the
cadastral proceeding. The complaint in the civil case did not identify any of the two parcels
described therein as cadastral lot 1762 10 which was the identification used in the cadastral
proceeding. As a matter of fact, complainant herself was unaware in 1961 that cadastral lot 1762
claimed by Adriano Camarista in the cadastral proceeding was the same land adjudicated to her
and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case, and for that reason she did not oppose the claim of
Camarista not until she filed her answer in the cadastral proceeding on February 6, 1964, by which
time, however, the land had already been awarded to spouses Procopio Cabalfin and Cleofe C.
Cabalfin as vendees of the applicant. 11
The acts of respondent in ratifying the deed of sale of lot 1762 executed by Adriano
Camarista in favor of spouses Cabalfin and adjudicating said lot to the latter as vendees
thereof are not in themselves "fraudulent", to use the word of complainant, in the absence of
any showing that respondent connivedwith the claimant Adriano Camarista and/or spouses
Cabalfin in causing the approval of the latter's claim over the land in question to the
prejudice of the rights of complainant.
Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations or circumstances
surrounding a particular situation, but must be supported by clear and convincing proof. 12
WHEREFORE, We exonerate respondent and dismiss the charge against him.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

1wph1.t

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/jan1974/am_53_mj_1974.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974

JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners,
vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Martinez and Martinez for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court holds that the court of first instance of Pasay City in an appeal erroneously taken to it from
the city court's judgment convicting petitioners-accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of said courts should grant petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court rather than peremptorily grant the prosecution's
motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the remand of the case to the city court for execution of
judgment. The appellate court's decision denying the relief sought by petitioners of compelling the
elevation of their appeal to it as the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the court of
first instance as a nominal party notwithstanding that it was duly represented by the respondent
People as the real party in interest through the Solicitor General who expressed no objection to the
setting aside of the court of first instance's dismissal order is set aside as sacrificing substance to
form and subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.
Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City Court of Pasay 1 for
allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced under
respondent city court's decision of February 26, 1971 to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P1,000.00 with costs of suit.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance of Pasay
City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss appeal" on the ground that since the case was
within the concurrentjurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the city
court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as
provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended. 2
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the analogous provision of Rule
50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss
the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the
grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the appeal to have been
wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." 3
The court of first instance per its order of October 29, 1971 did find that the appeal should have been
taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the
records to the city court "for execution of judgment." 4
Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the order of dismissal of their appeal and learned of it
only when they were called by the Pasay city court for execution of the judgment of conviction.

Hence, they filed with the city court their "motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals" of December
7, 1971 stating that "through inadvertence and/or excusable neglect" they had erroneously filed a
notice of appeal to the court of first instance instead of to the Court of Appeals as the proper court
and prayed that the city court, following precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it to the
proper court instead of dismissing appeals, "elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for proper
review." 5
Respondent city court per its order of December 11, 1971 denied petitioners' motion "for having been
erroneously addressed to this court" instead of to the court of first instance 6 ignoring petitioners'
predicament that the court of first instance had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of
their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of
conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus
against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the judgment and to compel
respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals. 7
The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the petition manifesting that "we shall not
interpose any objection whichever view point is adopted by this Honorable Court in resolving the two
apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial
decision," after observing that "(F)rom the view point of equity considering that petitioners' right to
appeal lapsed or was lost through the fault, though not excusable, of their counsel, and compounded
by the alleged error of judgment committed by the Court of First Instance to which the appeal was
erroneously brought, we sympathize with petitioners' plight."
The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973 dismissed the petition, after
finding that the city court's judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI
instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be
endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since petitioners did not implead the court of first
instance as "principal party respondent" it could not"grant any relief at all even on the assumption
that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities," as follows:
... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that was procedurally wrong; of course, CFI instead of
dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers, directed appeal to
be endorsedto this Court of Appeals, but when instead of doing so, it dismissed, it also had power to
do so, and correction of it is difficult to see to be remediable by mandamus, but ignoring this
altogether, what this Court finds is that since it was CFI that dismissed the appeal and according to
petitioners, wrongly, it must follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea for mandamus to compel it to act
"correctly" should have been directed against said CFI, it should have been the CFI, Hon. Francisco
de la Rosa, who should have been made under Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party respondent,
but he was not, this being the situation, this Court can not see how it can grant any relief at all even
on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some equities.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2, 1974 8 and for elevation of their appeal to the
Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense to the charge, viz, that the
offended party Atty. de Guzman had represented their son who was a suspect with two others for robbery
before the Pasay city fiscal's office and upon dismissal of the charge demanded payment from them as

parents the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they had no money to pay him required them
to sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970 in his favor for an imaginary lady's ring to sell "on commission
basis" for P1,000.00 (their "commission" to be any overprice) to assure payment of the sum by the stated
deadline of July 9, 1970 under penalty, of criminal prosecution for estafa; and that they had then newly
met Atty. de Guzman, whose services had been secured not by them but by the family of one of the other
suspects, implying the incredibility of his entrusting a lady's ring to both of them (husband and wife) for
sale on commission basis when his only association with them was his demand of payment of his P1,000attorney's fee for having represented their son-suspect.

Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court "for lack of sufficient merit," petitioners
filed the present petition for review. 9 The Court required the Solicitor General's comment on behalf of
the People of the Philippines, and upon receipt thereof resolved to consider the case as a special civil
action with such comment as answer and the case submitted for decision in the interest of justice and
speedy adjudication.
The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that the court of first instance acted with grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal which was erroneously brought to it and
ordering remand of the records to the city court for execution of judgment instead of certifying and
endorsing the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as timely prayed for by petitionersaccused in their opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss appeal. We find that the Court of
Appeals also acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their petition instead of setting aside
the challenged order of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing the appeal pursuant to
which respondent city court was poised to execute its judgment of conviction simply because the
court of first instance which is but a nominal party had not been impleaded as party respondent in
disregard of the substantive fact that the People as plaintiff and the real party in interest was duly
impleaded as principal party respondent and was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor
General.
The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners' appeal taken to the court of first instance was
"procedurally wrong" and that the court of first instance "in the exercise of its inherent powers could
have certified the appeal to it as the proper court instead of dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in
holding that it could not "correct" the court of first instance's "wrong action" and grant the relief
sought of having the appeal elevated to it since said court's presiding judge "who should have beenmade under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not." The Court has always
stressed as in Torre vs. Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal party" in special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and that he "is not a person "in interest" within the purview (of
Rule 65, section 5 12)" and "accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal from or seek a review
on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the appellate court setting aside his dismissal of a party's appeal
and issuing the writ of mandamus for him to allow the appeal.
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or presiding judge who issued the
challenged order or decision is but a nominal party, the real parties in interest being "the person or
persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty of
appearing and defending the challenged act both "in their own behalf and in behalf of the court or
judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, the formal impleading of the court of first instance which
issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the
interest of speedy adjudication." 13

Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff in the criminal proceeding against petitionersaccused was duly impleaded and represented by the Solicitor General to defend the proceedings in
the court of first instance and had expressed no objection to the appellate court's setting aside of the
court of first instance's dismissal order, in the interest of justice and equity the appellate court's act of
dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court
simply because of the non impleader of the court of first instance as a nominal party was tantamount
to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of
procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal to the court
of first instance rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the
court of first instance itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the
proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of
appeal and leave them without any remedy.
The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by respondent appellate court of mandamus to
compel respondent city court to elevate petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper
court as being within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3, providing for certification to the
proper court by the Court of Appeals of appealed cases erroneously brought to it, 14 particularly where
petitioners-accused have shown prima facie (and without this Court prejudging the merits of their appeal)
that they have a valid cause for pursuing in good faith their appeal (as against a manifestly dilatory or
frivolous appeal) and to have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support of their defense that they
were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure to pay a purely civil indebtedness
(the attorney's fee owed by their son to the complainant).
Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their appeal to the court of first instance, confronted
with the thorny question (which has confused many a practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction
of city courts andmunicipal courts of provincial and sub-provincial capitals with courts of first instance
under sections 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act where the appeal from the municipal or city court's
judgment should be taken directly to the Court of Appealsas held in Esperat vs. Avila 16 as distinguished
however from judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the courts of first instance where as held by this Court in People vs. Valencia 17 the appeal should
nevertheless be brought to the court of first instance which retains its appellate jurisdiction under section
45 of the Judiciary Act.
It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in exercise of its power to
"control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice" 18 to grant
petitioners-accused's timely plea to endorse their appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and
within the context and spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In a mis-directed appeal to the Court of Appeals of a
case that pertains to the court of first instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule expressly provides that the
Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court" viz, the court
of first instance in the given example. There is no logical reason why in all fairness and justice the court of
first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not be likewise bound by the same rule and therefore
enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but to certify the case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The
paucity of the language of the Rule and its failure to expressly provide for such cases of misdirected
appeals to the court of first instance (owing possibly to the fact that at the time of the revision of the Rules
of Court in 1963 section 87 (c) had been newly amended under Republic Act 2613 approved on June 22,
1963 to enlarge the jurisdiction of city courts and municipal courts of provincial capitals and provide for
their concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance and direct appeal from their judgments in such

cases to the Court of Appeals) should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial
right of appeal.

This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned
against "narrowly"interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator" " 19 and stressed
that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of
injustice or absurdity)" 20 and that therefore "a literalinterpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results". 21 In the construction of its own Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound
to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void that is
certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency by holding
as it does now that courts of first instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss
misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition is hereby set aside and
in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition for prohibition against respondent
city court which is hereby enjoined from executing its judgment of conviction against petitionersaccused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners' appeal from its judgment to
the Court of Appeals for the latter's disposition on the merits. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muoz Palma
and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:

I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by
analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City
Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic
Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall
be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it."
Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the
Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a
specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing
the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court
has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City
Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by
judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or

certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior
courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification
by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.
We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We
have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also
compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it
was its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance. The proper court to
certify and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is
not a party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor
General is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but
the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof
is a party respondent in these proceedings.
The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines
and the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former
may not be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter
can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution
of the judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
should have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings.
For their counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become
final.

Separate Opinions
ESGUERRA, J., dissenting:
I beg to dissent from the opinion that Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court may be applied by
analogy to this case, considering that the dispositive portion of the draft decision commands the City
Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Under Section 31 of the Judiciary Act (Republic
Act No. 296), "all cases erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall
be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it."
Section 3 of Rule 50 provides that "when the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the
Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a
specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor." These are the only legal provisions governing
the handling and disposition of erroneous appeals. Neither the Legislature nor the Rules of Court
has provided the rules for erroneous appeal to the Court of First Instance from the judgment of a City
Court or the Municipal Court of a provincial or sub-provincial capital in cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. I do not think the Supreme Court, by
judicial fiat, can supply the deficiency unless it formally promulgates a rule governing transfer or

certification of cases erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance from judgments of inferior
courts in cases directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. The void in the law is in the certification
by the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals in such cases.
We cannot apply Section 31 of the Judiciary Act and Section 3 of Rule 50 by analogy because We
have to compel the Court of First Instance to certify the case to the Court of Appeals. We cannot also
compel the City Court of Pasay City to do the same because the case was not appealed to it as it
was its decision which was erroneously appealed to the Court of First Instance. The proper court to
certify and to be commanded to do so by mandamus is the Court of First Instance, but this Court is
not a party to this case and cannot be bound by any judgment rendered herein.
That the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a party and represented by the Solicitor
General is of no significance to me. The People is not the one to be compelled to perform the act but
the Judge of First Instance that dismissed the appeal; and neither said Court nor the Judge thereof
is a party respondent in these proceedings.
The petitioners here should have known, through their counsel, that the People of the Philippines
and the Court of First Instance of Pasay City are not one and the same entity, and that the former
may not be compelled to perform the act of certifying the case to the Court of Appeals while the latter
can be. The respondent-appellate Court was right in dismissing the petition to prohibit the execution
of the judgment and to compel the City Court to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners
should have known that the Court of First Instance is an indispensable party to these proceedings.
For their counsel's fatal error, they should pay the price of having the judgment of conviction become
final.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/mar1974/gr_l_38161_1974.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR.,
CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S.
FLORESCA;

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and
TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed
LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children
JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its
men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due
protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws

and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which
seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting
tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date,
at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water,
accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a
matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping
within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said
date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7
days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left
mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still
alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's
decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in
the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their
Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men
working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact
that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating
income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual
Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00
as of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said
motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual

relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27,
1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent
Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed
Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was
opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that
in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has
exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or
injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding
that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall,
pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to
50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause
of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly
Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the
court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed
admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that
workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or
death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or
negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners
pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under
the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all
claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of
employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission,"
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of
the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex

voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in
behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are
entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara,
now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and
Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections,
formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter,
submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under
the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or
his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by
virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee
or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He
submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in
accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is
that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right
of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to
sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of
negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that
once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail
themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in
the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the
resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners
are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of

the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of
their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate
failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or
a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or
allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual
relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad
faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages.
The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith,
read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as
assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made
as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is
liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not
based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for
loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even
if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On
the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It
is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or
relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While

under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured
employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the
burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551;
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that
unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award
of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to
claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial
expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12
and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint
alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case
at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act
was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation
designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or
ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in
the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts
set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the
regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured
worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and
thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as
against an ordinary action.

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the
respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission)
was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for
petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the
amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed
incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover
from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of
proving the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of
having to establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to
establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker
Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the
compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party
tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by
Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for
compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have
been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be
paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but
they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before
they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded
by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19,
1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should

therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case.
The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then
secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of
the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201,
2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and
in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to
guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and
employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work"(Sec. 9, Art.
II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of
the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor
Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to selforganization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New
Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on
June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the
aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30,

1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the
workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights
of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the
liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution
are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert
Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic
eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New
Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that
"all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis
supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the

duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section
shall be presumed to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside
the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the
employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more
favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions
of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered
Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
(emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610,
as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor
Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore
quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence,
is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New
Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines
the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security
System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the
law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of
the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5
was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu
Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to
recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute
an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied
Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969
ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958
case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said
Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer,
neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the
cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3)
cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American
Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the
restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the
range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil

Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6
of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The
right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the
employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to
provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are
inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to
recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without
due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton
neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for
the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such
attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making,
but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are
retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964),
which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution
that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin
of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are
dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is
now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who
profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's
keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert
otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150
reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of
economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic
reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates
man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and
utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and
dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from
Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the
part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do

himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so
much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth;
its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
"
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in
the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot
envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity
to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American
Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply
the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies
that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist,
Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is
even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief
Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to
say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice
Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907,
quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice
Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only
between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In
the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint
of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts
breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused
by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no
fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New

Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable
negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life,
limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to
pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even
if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances
decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of
judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in
those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21
Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a
cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they
are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204
1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845,
852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even
the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they
must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is
to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles
of policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly
concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such
law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include
Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer,
Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or
legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law,
or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of
such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave

rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest
or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them
is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US
335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it
protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are
not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the
American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was
developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy
(see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have
been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in
Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is
the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration
thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed
by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58
Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537)
as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of
Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause
means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal
facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46
Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working
women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no
longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice
Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due
process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The
law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in
the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American
Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum
wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for
women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political
questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions
(Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs.
Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate
concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question
as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine
Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation
of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine
jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking
American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in
the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or
executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A
GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE
PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides

for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found
in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil.
582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The
term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for
damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of
employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply
to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be
no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the
majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will
preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to
avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in
disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding
"the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took
effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.

Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law
were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the
Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or
another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
(Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)

The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within
the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person
for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to
sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first
paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the
legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if
entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code
nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when
the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be
presumed to include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of
the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time,
if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the
employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should
the latter be more favorable to him.

(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured
employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689
[1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation,
caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June
20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there
was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator
not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again
given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or
under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court
is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts
would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove
the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort
suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer
and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could
employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses
available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted
employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030)
decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on
the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.

The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in
protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact
of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious,
inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if
not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a
major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate.
Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In
return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the
right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the
acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable
and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who
was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was
avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the
finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were
torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to
accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent
fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial

damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents.
The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the
product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost
of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to
broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase
price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a
given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is
essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not
disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on
the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a
definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two
major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of
more importance both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would
enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages
and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The
statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established
in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted
to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In
this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a
sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much
of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various

jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the
premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many
other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in
to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed.
The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of
the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am
personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive
employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was
precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and
public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary.
The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees
are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining
Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides
for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found
in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil.
582, 586, Justice J.B.L. Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The
term compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for
damages suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of
employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply
to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be
no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the
majority rules, both options cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will
preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already exercised their option to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable to them
under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already
become a "finished transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise
the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's
Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to" the "election of remedies", because
those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of
remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to
avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in
disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding
"the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:

1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took
effect on June 10, 1928. It was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law
were taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii,
1925). [Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the
Act is exclusive The following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and
employees of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or
another or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved
usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot
presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar.
Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.
(Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98) [Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment. (Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within
the Act itself. Thus, Section 6, in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured
employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person
for damages, in accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to
sue his employer under the Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first
paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of Section 6. That that was not done shows the
legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under the Civil Code for
injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if
entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code
nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when
the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies
under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the
legislatives continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate
with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries
received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the
duties of the employment (and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be
presumed to include such agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the
elimination of the underlined words in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of
the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
them. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time,
if he had so desired, the legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the
employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should
the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured
employee without regard to the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The
compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689
[1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation,
caused by negligence on the part of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the
employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the Act, on June
20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case there
was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator
not to give an option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter
under the provisions of the Civil Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again
given the opportunity to provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or
under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court
is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts
would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's
compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove
the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years
of the industrial revolution when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort
suit that his employer was either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer
and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. The employer could
employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common law defenses
available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted
employment. As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030)
decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an obligation on

the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do of
himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks of
employment that he should discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk
doctrine, the principle of contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in
protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had only to prove the fact
of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made
compulsory and where the element of fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the
employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have simplified, expeditious,
inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if
not automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a
major step in the desired direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate.
Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In
return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the
right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only
disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the wages of the
injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the
total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer
is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program.
And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system,
individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of
their entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the
acts and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable
and unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who
was to pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was
avoidable and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered
some measure of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was
manifest. The uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a
substantial disadvantage. So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the
finger of blame had been pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the
facts and the law were uncertain. The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were
torn between friendship or loyalty to their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the
employer, on the other. The expense and delay of litigation often prompted the injured employee to

accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full value of his claim. Even if suit were
successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the judgment were exacted as contingent
fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was cast often paid a substantial
damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured employee or his dependents.
The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the
product of a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost
of the injuries or deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the
product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to
broader economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is
expected that this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase
price until it is spread in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a
given industry is uniformly affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or
suffer any appreciable loss by reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is
essential that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not
disrupt too violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and
moderateness of cost are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on
the part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a
definitely limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two
major changes, irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a
compromise in which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of
more importance both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would
enjoy in cases where he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages
and accepts instead a more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The
statutes vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly
compensation payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are
matters concerning which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation
statute will be influenced greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established
in the Act. If the court feels that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted
to restore what it regards as a proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In
this way, a compensation act drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a

sympathetic court into a fairly liberal instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the
laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that employers can have little reason to complain. Much
of the unevenness and apparent conflict in compensation decisions throughout the various
jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant, Workmen's Compensation American
Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the
premiums paid by employers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many
other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted in
to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if it is to succeed.
The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of
the system without touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am
personally against stretching the law and allowing payment of compensation for contingencies never
envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only harmful results to the
principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive
employment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was
precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and
public hearings. If employers already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have
to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose, a major study will be necessary.
The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their families. All
workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees
are affected. Even as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to
dissent from the majority opinion.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/apr1985/gr_l30642_1985.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C.
REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN,
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN,petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M.
DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE
LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

+.wph!1

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly
sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that:
t.hqw

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name
of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased
partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has
authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the
name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of
accountancy a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as
that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly
indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of

professionals of a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm
name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that:
t.hqw

... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the
stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national
and international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a
deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist
from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene asamicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although
Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:

t.hqw

After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for
their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart
from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased.
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no

practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm
name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides:
t.hqw

Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not include the
name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be
subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be
those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his
name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an
agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either
gross or net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not
represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor.
There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names
of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without
connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who
can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the
first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to
formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than
of aprofessional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the
personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can
exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. 9
t.hqw

As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding partners or
parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation
forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from
the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand,

t.hqw

... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual skill of the members,
such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on
its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where
there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a
trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10
t.hqw

A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business
or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the practice of law from
those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.

Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal Profession, (The
Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service, no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association"
in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased
or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse
at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed.
t.hqw

The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners designated by it is
proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by custom this purports to Identify the
active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety of adding
the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never
a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be
guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by
custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either

name because the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein:
t.hqw

The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no statutory provision
or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar
Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use
of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use." There is no
question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be
prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The use of the firm
name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has
been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical
custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied
in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When
the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from
including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which
no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law
which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are
contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
t.hqw

... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims
primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the
era of wide free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order
each to acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and learning as
the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The

best service of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no
expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be
exercised is a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in
that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included
in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which
they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is
out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and
not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication
of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the
firm name was illegal or unethical.

# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the Justices being
of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is
out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the
law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and
not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera:
'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing of individuals wtes

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in
their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that firm name,
notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He
was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta
& Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said
firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son,
Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which was
established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm, the name
Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of a deceased
partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that
the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local
custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use"
(Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the
letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and
Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased
founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and
Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law
practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the
law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication
of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the
firm name was illegal or unethical.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/jul1979/PETITION%20TOCONTINUE%20THE%20USE
%20OF%20THE%20NAME%20SYCIP_1979.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 915

August 1, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

vs.
AMBROSIO TIQUI, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant.
Simplicio del Rosario, for private prosecutor.
Basilio R. Mapa, for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The final judgment in this case having been pronounced on the 31st day of March last, the
complaining witness, on the 5th day of April, gave notice of appeal. The appeal was allowed.
Counsel for the accused now moves the court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was taken
on the sixteen day after the promulgation of the sentence, fifteen days being the term assigned by
article 47 of the law.
The question arising is whether the fifteen days are to be counted from the very day of the
publication of the judgment.
In a doubtful case the law will be interpreted in the light of its underlying principles. The law in
question is based upon the American legislation, and the local legislation in force prior to its
promulgation, which, by section 1 thereof, is declared to be continued in force in so far as not in
conflict with its provisions.
Under the American system, in computing time the first day is excluded and the last day included, it
not being necessary to cite authority in support of this proposition, inasmuch as the same doctrine
has been established in the special legislation of the Philippines, as may be seen in article 4 and 76
of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force. No rule was more uniform in the law as formerly and as
still enforced in these Islands, as may be seen in the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure, as well
as in the Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. Article 1130 of the Civil Code establishes as a
principle that "when the term of an obligation is fixed by days to be counted from a specified one,
such day shall be excluded from the computation, which shall begin on the following day." It not
being demonstrated that article 47 of General Orders, No. 58, upon the subject of criminal procedure
has intentionally departed from these precedents, it must be construed harmoniously with the other
law, both substantive and adjective, which is wholly uniform on this subject. The reason why the first
day is excluded is undoubtedly because the appellant is given fifteen days in which to appeal, and

as Paragraph I, article 7 of the Civil Code provides that a day shall always be understood to consist
of twenty-four hours, it follows that the period allowed would not be fifteen complete days were the
day in question that is, the day of the publication of the judgment to be included in the
computation.
The motion is therefore overruled, with costs. So ordered.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1902/aug1902/gr_915_1902.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC

G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997

LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May 2, 1996 of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc suspending her proclamation as the duly
elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui,
Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to
be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of
Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner, who was then twentyone years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.

On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and
Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a
decision dated April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the
Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however,
inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with petitioner. 3
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman,
Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In
a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial
Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, 4disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her
age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside
the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. 6
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing her of her
ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of candidacy should not be
disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio
G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en
banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for
falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by
facsimile 8 and registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the
COMELEC en bancissued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers
of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the
election. The order reads as follows:
Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" by petitioner
Florencio G. Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April 29, 1996, the pertinent
allegations of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the
reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born
on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as Annex "A";
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos
Norte, she made material representation which is false and as such, she is disqualified; that her
certificate of candidacy should not be given due course and that said candidacy must be cancelled;
xxx xxx xxx
the Commission, it appearing that the petition is meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of Election
Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the

proclamation of Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest number of votes for the
position of Sangguniang Kabataan [sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and to
pay the filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of
76. 10 In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers
did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27,
1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner the winner for the
position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 11 The proclamation was
"without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested
party." 12 On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
officials of the Pederasyon. 13
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of the COMELEC en
banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy; the second, the cancellation
of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as
an elective official of the SK.
I
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the conduct of the SK elections
is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election
Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, viz:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before election.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false material
representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard and evidence received by any official
designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself. 15
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy
lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be

entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision,
resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the
COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election
cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear
and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional
remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the
Commission. 17
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt
of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996. 18
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with
the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These requirements
are:
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. Every pleading, motion and other papers must be filed in ten (10)
legible copies. However, when there is more than one respondent or protestee, the petitioner or
protestant must file additional number of copies of the petition or protest as there are additional
respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. The documents referred to in the immediately preceding section must be filed
directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally, or, unless otherwise provided in
these Rules, by registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is the date of filing and the
requirement as to the number of copies must be complied with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. (a) All pleadings allowed by these Rules shall be printed,
mimeographed or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in English or Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size
bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the
proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2) copies of the petition
were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the
petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed
and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the

shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an
image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with
a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an
exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party
and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile
pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the
questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by
registered mail.
III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No. 684 in 1975 as the
Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all residents of the barangay who
were at least 15 years but less than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its
members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in issues of transcendental
importance. 25 Its affairs were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay
youth leaders who were actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18
years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised the
maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than
21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not
more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Barangay. 29 A member of the SK holds office for a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for
cause, or becomes permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications laid down by the Local
Government Code of 1991, viz:
Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. The katipunan ng kabataan shall be composed of all citizens
of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are fifteen (15)
but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly registered in the list of the
sangguniang kabataan or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan if
he possesses the following qualifications:

Sec. 428. Qualifications. An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least
one (1) year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15) years but not more than twenty-one
(21) years of age on the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local
dialect, and must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must
be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not
more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the
official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a
resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15
years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f)
must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and 428 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an elective official. Thus:
Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. To be qualified to register as a voter in the SK elections, a person
must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day that is, he must have
been born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and actually residing in the barangay wherein
he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. An elective official of the SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine language or dialect or English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal
Election Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the May 6, 1996 SK elections if
he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter
must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the Philippines

for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a
voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections;
and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member and voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is
admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner,
however, argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the
scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the Code
itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges that
so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on
election day and therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as
candidate for the SK elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the maximum age of a
member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424
of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to
when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that
the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition
of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more
than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election.
The distinction is understandable considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an
elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est
ratio. 31 The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification. 32
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years of age on the day
of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the term
"qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not
necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide that the maximum age of a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at
exactly 21 years on the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day
of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days.
When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each. 34 One born on the
first day of the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth the last
day of the year. 35 In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After
the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second
cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old
on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire
span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after
the 365th day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It
means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent
to "less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the candidate
be less than 22 years on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification of a barangay youth
official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of age or over but less than
eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old and may
be 17 years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local
Government Code increased the age limit of members of the youth organization to 21 years, it did not
reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the
intention of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so
expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. 37
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government
Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and the
Kabataang Barangay discontinued was because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were
already over 21 years of age by the time President Aquino assumed power. 38 They were not the
"youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991 fixed the maximum age limit at not more than 21
years 39 and the only exception is in the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:
Sec. 423. Creation and Election.
a) . . . ;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of office, shall have passed the age of
twenty-one (21) years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was
elected.
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21
years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21
years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion
of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have
"been elected prior to his 21st birthday." 40 Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years old
before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date at
which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth
official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to Section 6 [a] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK
official on the day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered
as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months
old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed
office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days
away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428

of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was
ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he
lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the
candidate is over the maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the
candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his election. 42 The
will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. 43
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be declared elected. 44 A defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office. 45 Moreover, despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to
prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility and that they maliciously
voted for her with the intention of misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the
benefit of her rival candidate. 47
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local Government Code petitioner
should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number
of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman
"refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,49 is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is
permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three
(3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. 50 Being "eligible" means being "legally
qualified; capable of being legally chosen." 51 Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility is not one
of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to order that the
vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall
assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the
powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G. Garvida is declared ineligible
for being over the age qualification for candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang
Kabataan, and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple
majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/apr1997/gr_124893_1997.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving

money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following
morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the
lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and
Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta
continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March
1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her nonappearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages
and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable
for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on
their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at
the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because
of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a nonresident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act abovementioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory
and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates
born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for
the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for
legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of
the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife,
the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta,"
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and
his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to

intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to
his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has
been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good
faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a
million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena
Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and

neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/nov1965/gr_l-19671_1965.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, 1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint 3 for declaration of nullity
of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent

Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.
As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos
who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza
Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might
not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines
several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with
her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American
husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no
more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint
that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36,
in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that
she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While
she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely
refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she
was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent
Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of
sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could
not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely
left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning
as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all
of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well
as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for
one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to
sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her
American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed
by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was
presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of
misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of
their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage
to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely
the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, 5 the RTC afforded both
parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his
own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his
Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the

recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,
such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding
of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname,
Micklus.9
Felys counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,
Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular
officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.
Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York
and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a
single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the
case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, 14 considering Fely to have waived
her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As
observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has
establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married
to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that
sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply
with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant
Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by
defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and
void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein.
It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently
residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for
seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and
unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the
case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and
thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can
not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered
as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To
condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the
following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute psychological
incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity
was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because
the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition,
because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court
finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases,
this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the

Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated 21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which,
although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in

regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the
totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony,
which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent
Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of
respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and
her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her
marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental
defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration
of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent
Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 31 No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted
in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the
principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing
in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his
intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of

marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even
while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can
already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several
cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement
in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel
any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of
its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation
with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies
of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to
appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of
judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.


(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by
filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and
Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to
file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with
respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless
marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,
in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_152577_2005.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12105

January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,

vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositorsappellants.
Jose D. Cortes for appellants.
Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose, presiding,
dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to
the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to
probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In
the said order, the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a
citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located. This
contention in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his
stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States
and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent
residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he
selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that
state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive
personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of
the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is
fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to
such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters testamentary be
issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution and performance of its
trust. (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. The executor filed
a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will,
the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants

National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson
Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the
residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share
and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert
Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies
to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and
Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of
P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock
of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave
a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be
entitled to received. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued
that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from
his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs.Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315,
Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852, Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50
Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of
Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws
of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or
her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estafa had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19,
1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as Magdalena
C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On December 16,
1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the funds of the
estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record,
Court of First Instance), and the court in its said error found that there exists no community property
owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued. As already
and Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was no
community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on
January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925,
Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death

of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State
of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between
the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of
the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had
received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their
shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the
estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left
by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as
to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as
par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator
was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his
permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is
whether the estementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime
given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada
allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of
1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the abovequoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada,
being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our
Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the
officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was
introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws presented by the counsel for the
executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision
of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold
that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925,
can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of
the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to
be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that
the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows
a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the
court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must
be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1960/jan1960/gr_l-12105_1960.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595

November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as
to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.
lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed
and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1927/nov1927/gr_l-22595_1927.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
1wph1.t

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:

Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
1wph1.t

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16
a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further

indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the
oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit
his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on
appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters but this Court resolved to deny the
motion.
1

San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1967/jun1967/gr_l-23678_1967.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

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xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,

from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank,
and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx

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xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any
source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project
of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion
over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE

SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN
FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first
arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S.
Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following
nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he
again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of
his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.
(pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to
the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has
no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each
one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks
or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular

business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however,
is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p.
29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine

of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of
the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be
the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on
a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the
only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose
laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts
would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question,
and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule
of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but
any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the
situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be
valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws
as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts
court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in

French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts
statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative
course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself
into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this
is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the
law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign
law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but
a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in
returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine
of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law
to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
forum. The doctrine of therenvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood
as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of
the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx

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xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the
domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
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If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman
who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the
law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with
the law of nationality that is the English law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his
death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile
are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for
the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal
property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age,
when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we

must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-oflaws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1963/jan1963/gr_l-16749_1963.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez,
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic
chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and

then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got
wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home
where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following
morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to
validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the
lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was
handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from
San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and
Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta
continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March
1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly
accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating
with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June,
1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a
lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her nonappearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe,
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation
of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives
with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8
August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages
and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable
for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on
their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was
not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at
the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage
act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because
of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to
plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but
merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was
never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery
of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect,
give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of
those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a nonresident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95
Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion
of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled
to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines,
in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act abovementioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory
and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates
born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to
Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for
the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for

legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are
not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of
the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife,
the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta,"
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and
his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that
they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the
fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that
they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the
absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to

leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to
his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has
been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good
faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a
million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena
Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded
suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no
way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount
of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/nov1965/gr_l-19671_1965.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15895

November 29, 1920

RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer, plaintiffappellant,
vs.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, defendant-appellee.

Jose A. Espiritu for appellant.

Cohn, Fisher and DeWitt for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff ad administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer
to recover from the defendant life insurance company the sum of pesos 6,000 paid by the deceased
for a life annuity. The trial court gave judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
The undisputed facts are these: On September 24, 1917, Joaquin Herrer made application to the
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. Two days later
he paid the sum of P6,000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt
reading as follows:
MANILA, I. F., 26 de septiembre, 1917.
PROVISIONAL RECEIPT Pesos 6,000
Recibi la suma de seis mil pesos de Don Joaquin Herrer de Manila como prima dela Renta
Vitalicia solicitada por dicho Don Joaquin Herrer hoy, sujeta al examen medico y aprobacion
de la Oficina Central de la Compaia.
The application was immediately forwarded to the head office of the company at Montreal, Canada.
On November 26, 1917, the head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila. (Whether on
the same day the cable was received notice was sent by the Manila office of Herrer that the
application had been accepted, is a disputed point, which will be discussed later.) On December 4,
1917, the policy was issued at Montreal. On December 18, 1917, attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote to
the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. The
following day the local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called
attention to the notification of November 26, 1917. This letter was received by Mr. Torres on the
morning of December 21, 1917. Mr. Herrer died on December 20, 1917.
As above suggested, the issue of fact raised by the evidence is whether Herrer received notice of
acceptance of his application. To resolve this question, we propose to go directly to the evidence of
record.
The chief clerk of the Manila office of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada at the time of the
trial testified that he prepared the letter introduced in evidence as Exhibit 3, of date November 26,
1917, and handed it to the local manager, Mr. E. E. White, for signature. The witness admitted on
cross-examination that after preparing the letter and giving it to he manager, he new nothing of what
became of it. The local manager, Mr. White, testified to having received the cablegram accepting the
application of Mr. Herrer from the home office on November 26, 1917. He said that on the same day
he signed a letter notifying Mr. Herrer of this acceptance. The witness further said that letters, after

being signed, were sent to the chief clerk and placed on the mailing desk for transmission. The
witness could not tell if the letter had every actually been placed in the mails. Mr. Tuason, who was
the chief clerk, on November 26, 1917, was not called as a witness. For the defense, attorney
Manuel Torres testified to having prepared the will of Joaquin Ma. Herrer, that on this occasion, Mr.
Herrer mentioned his application for a life annuity, and that he said that the only document relating to
the transaction in his possession was the provisional receipt. Rafael Enriquez, the administrator of
the estate, testified that he had gone through the effects of the deceased and had found no letter of
notification from the insurance company to Mr. Herrer.
Our deduction from the evidence on this issue must be that the letter of November 26, 1917,
notifying Mr. Herrer that his application had been accepted, was prepared and signed in the local
office of the insurance company, was placed in the ordinary channels for transmission, but as far as
we know, was never actually mailed and thus was never received by the applicant.
Not forgetting our conclusion of fact, it next becomes necessary to determine the law which should
be applied to the facts. In order to reach our legal goal, the obvious signposts along the way must be
noticed.
Until quite recently, all of the provisions concerning life insurance in the Philippines were found in the
Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. In the Code of the Commerce, there formerly existed Title
VIII of Book III and Section III of Title III of Book III, which dealt with insurance contracts. In the Civil
Code there formerly existed and presumably still exist, Chapters II and IV, entitled insurance
contracts and life annuities, respectively, of Title XII of Book IV. On the after July 1, 1915, there was,
however, in force the Insurance Act. No. 2427. Chapter IV of this Act concerns life and health
insurance. The Act expressly repealed Title VIII of Book II and Section III of Title III of Book III of the
code of Commerce. The law of insurance is consequently now found in the Insurance Act and the
Civil Code.
While, as just noticed, the Insurance Act deals with life insurance, it is silent as to the methods to be
followed in order that there may be a contract of insurance. On the other hand, the Civil Code, in
article 1802, not only describes a contact of life annuity markedly similar to the one we are
considering, but in two other articles, gives strong clues as to the proper disposition of the case. For
instance, article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "In matters which are governed by special laws,
any deficiency of the latter shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code." On the supposition,
therefore, which is incontestable, that the special law on the subject of insurance is deficient in
enunciating the principles governing acceptance, the subject-matter of the Civil code, if there be any,
would be controlling. In the Civil Code is found article 1262 providing that "Consent is shown by the
concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the thing and the consideration which are to
constitute the contract. An acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer
except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such case, is presumed to have been
entered into at the place where the offer was made." This latter article is in opposition to the
provisions of article 54 of the Code of Commerce.
If no mistake has been made in announcing the successive steps by which we reach a conclusion,
then the only duty remaining is for the court to apply the law as it is found. The legislature in its
wisdom having enacted a new law on insurance, and expressly repealed the provisions in the Code

of Commerce on the same subject, and having thus left a void in the commercial law, it would seem
logical to make use of the only pertinent provision of law found in the Civil code, closely related to
the chapter concerning life annuities.
The Civil Code rule, that an acceptance made by letter shall bind the person making the offer only
from the date it came to his knowledge, may not be the best expression of modern commercial
usage. Still it must be admitted that its enforcement avoids uncertainty and tends to security. Not
only this, but in order that the principle may not be taken too lightly, let it be noticed that it is identical
with the principles announced by a considerable number of respectable courts in the United States.
The courts who take this view have expressly held that an acceptance of an offer of insurance not
actually or constructively communicated to the proposer does not make a contract. Only the mailing
of acceptance, it has been said, completes the contract of insurance, as the locus poenitentiae is
ended when the acceptance has passed beyond the control of the party. (I Joyce, The Law of
Insurance, pp. 235, 244.)
In resume, therefore, the law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph of article
1262 of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making
the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The pertinent fact is, that according to the
provisional receipt, three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was
a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; (2) there had to be approval
of the application by the head office of the company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be
communicated by the company to the applicant. The further admitted facts are that the head office in
Montreal did accept the application, did cable the Manila office to that effect, did actually issue the
policy and did, through its agent in Manila, actually write the letter of notification and place it in the
usual channels for transmission to the addressee. The fact as to the letter of notification thus fails to
concur with the essential elements of the general rule pertaining to the mailing and delivery of mail
matter as announced by the American courts, namely, when a letter or other mail matter is
addressed and mailed with postage prepaid there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was
received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of
the mails. But if any one of these elemental facts fails to appear, it is fatal to the presumption. For
instance, a letter will not be presumed to have been received by the addressee unless it is shown
that it was deposited in the post-office, properly addressed and stamped. (See 22 C.J., 96, and 49 L.
R. A. [N. S.], pp. 458, et seq., notes.)
We hold that the contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because it has not
been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the
applicant.
lawph!l.net

Judgment is reversed, and the plaintiff shall have and recover from the defendant the sum of P6,000
with legal interest from November 20, 1918, until paid, without special finding as to costs in either
instance. So ordered.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1920/nov1920/gr_l-15895_1920.html>

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61352 February 27, 1987
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARITIME COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellee.
Domingo E. de Lara & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Bito, Misa and Lozada Law Office for defendant-appellee.

NARVASA, J.:
This appeal, which was certified to the Court by the Court of Appeals as involving only questions of
law, 1 relates to a claim for loss and/or damage to a shipment of machine parts sought to be enforced by
the consignee, appellant Dole Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter caged Dole) against the carrier, Maritime
Company of the Philippines (hereinafter called Maritime), under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act. 2
The basic facts are succinctly stated in the order of the Trial Court 3 dated March 16, 1977, the
relevant portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Before the plaintiff started presenting evidence at today's trial at the instance of the Court the
lawyers entered into the following stipulation of facts:
1. The cargo subject of the instant case was discharged in Dadiangas unto the custody of the
consignee on December 18, 1971;
2. The corresponding claim for the damages sustained by the cargo was filed by the plaintiff with the
defendant vessel on May 4, 1972;
3. On June 11, 1973 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 91043, embodying three (3) causes of action involving three (3) separate

and different shipments. The third cause of action therein involved the cargo now subject of this
present litigation;
4. On December 11, 1974, Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order in Civil Case No. 91043
dismissing the first two causes of action in the aforesaid case with prejudice and without
pronouncement as to costs because the parties had settled or compromised the claims involved
therein. The third cause of action which covered the cargo subject of this case now was likewise
dismissed but without prejudice as it was not covered by the settlement. The dismissal of that
complaint containing the three causes of action was upon a joint motion to dismiss filed by the
parties;
5. Because of the dismissal of the (complaint in Civil Case No. 91043 with respect to the third cause
of action without prejudice, plaintiff instituted this present complaint on January 6, 1975.
xxx xxx xxx 4
To the complaint in the subsequent action Maritime filed an answer pleading inter alia the affirmative
defense of prescription under the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 5 and following pretrial, moved for a preliminary hearing on said defense. 6 The Trial Court granted the motion, scheduling
the preliminary hearing on April 27, 1977. 7 The record before the Court does not show whether or not that
hearing was held, but under date of May 6, 1977, Maritime filed a formal motion to dismiss invoking once
more the ground of prescription. 8 The motion was opposed by Dole9 and the Trial Court, after due
consideration, resolved the matter in favor of Maritime and dismissed the complaint 10 Dole sought a
reconsideration, which was denied, 11 and thereafter took the present appeal from the order of dismissal.
The pivotal issue is whether or not Article 1155 of the Civil Code providing that the prescription of
actions is interrupted by the making of an extrajudicial written demand by the creditor is applicable to
actions brought under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which, in its Section 3, paragraph 6,
provides that:
*** the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless
suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have
been delivered; Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or conceded, is not
given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to
bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have
been delivered.
xxx xxx xxx
Dole concedes that its action is subject to the one-year period of limitation prescribe in the abovecited provision.12 The substance of its argument is that since the provisions of the Civil Code are, by
express mandate of said Code, suppletory of deficiencies in the Code of Commerce and special laws in
matters governed by the latter, 13 and there being "*** a patent deficiency *** with respect to the tolling of
the prescriptive period ***" provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 14 prescription under said Act
is subject to the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code on tolling and because Dole's claim for loss or
damage made on May 4, 1972 amounted to a written extrajudicial demand which would toll or interrupt
prescription under Article 1155, it operated to toll prescription also in actions under the Carriage of Goods

by Sea Act. To much the same effect is the further argument based on Article 1176 of the Civil Code which
provides that the rights and obligations of common carriers shag be governed by the Code of Commerce
and by special laws in all matters not regulated by the Civil Code.

These arguments might merit weightier consideration were it not for the fact that the question has
already received a definitive answer, adverse to the position taken by Dole, in The Yek Tong Lin Fire
& Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. vs. American President Lines, Inc. 15 There, in a parallel factual situation,
where suit to recover for damage to cargo shipped by vessel from Tokyo to Manila was filed more than
two years after the consignee's receipt of the cargo, this Court rejected the contention that an extrajudicial
demand toiled the prescriptive period provided for in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, viz:
In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant argues that it was error for the court a quo not to
have considered the action of plaintiff-appellant suspended by the extrajudicial demand which took
place, according to defendant's own motion to dismiss on August 22, 1952. We notice that while
plaintiff avoids stating any date when the goods arrived in Manila, it relies upon the allegation made
in the motion to dismiss that a protest was filed on August 22, 1952 which goes to show that
plaintiff-appellant's counsel has not been laying the facts squarely before the court for the
consideration of the merits of the case. We have already decided that in a case governed by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription
should not be made to apply. (Chua Kuy vs. Everett Steamship Corp., G.R. No. L-5554, May 27,
1953.) Similarly, we now hold that in such a case the general provisions of the new Civil Code (Art.
1155) cannot be made to apply, as such application would have the effect of extending the one-year
period of prescription fixed in the law. It is desirable that matters affecting transportation of goods by
sea be decided in as short a time as possible; the application of the provisions of Article 1155 of the
new Civil Code would unnecessarily extend the period and permit delays in the settlement of
questions affecting transportation, contrary to the clear intent and purpose of the law. * * *
Moreover, no different result would obtain even if the Court were to accept the proposition that a
written extrajudicial demand does toll prescription under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The
demand in this instance would be the claim for damage-filed by Dole with Maritime on May 4, 1972.
The effect of that demand would have been to renew the one- year prescriptive period from the date
of its making. Stated otherwise, under Dole's theory, when its claim was received by Maritime, the
one-year prescriptive period was interrupted "tolled" would be the more precise term and
began to run anew from May 4, 1972, affording Dole another period of one (1) year counted from
that date within which to institute action on its claim for damage. Unfortunately, Dole let the new
period lapse without filing action. It instituted Civil Case No. 91043 only on June 11, 1973, more than
one month after that period has expired and its right of action had prescribed.
Dole's contention that the prescriptive period "*** remained tolled as of May 4, 1972 *** (and that) in
legal contemplation *** (the) case (Civil Case No. 96353) was filed on January 6, 1975 *** well within
the one-year prescriptive period in Sec. 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act." 16 equates tolling
with indefinite suspension. It is clearly fallacious and merits no consideration.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant,
Dole Philippines, Inc.
SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

From <http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/feb1987/gr_l_61352_1987.html>