Potenciano vs CA

Potenciano vs. CA
GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001
FACTS:
In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned for habeas
corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the
CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider
the decision made. A conference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and
relevance of a physical and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted.
Erlindas motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts
appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March 2001.
ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
HELD:
Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but clearly
she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What the law provides
is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not
any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from
bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and
wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the
relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together
for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded
her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform
such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia
kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops,
face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia
could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of
a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for
review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
Ty vs CA
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in
March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings
were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties.
Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner
on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued
in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with
petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of
her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who
sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from
the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She
is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages
would result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common
funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting
and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2
children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
Ilusorio vs Bildner
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country
Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6
children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen.
They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in
Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in
Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose
Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to
have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for
such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the
capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of
his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife
to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he
is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ
of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
Ayala Investments vs CA
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable
with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against
PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of
execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982.
Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was
registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the
debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and
separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety
is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given
to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should
not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure,
appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161
of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product
or a spin off of the loan itself.
Agapay vs. Palang
276 SCRA 341
Facts:

Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church
at
Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born
Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with
his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel
had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good, he refused to live
with his wife and child.
When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a nineteen year old
Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee.
To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation
as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property
consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died.
Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party. Respondents sought
to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the
riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole property having bought with
her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while CA reversed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the
cohabitation of
petitioner and Miguel Palang.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of sale but was a
donation
and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
San Luis vs San Luis GR No. 133743 ; 2/6/07

Bigamy Void Marriage

During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with VirginiaSulit on
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. InGarcia v. Recio, the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

Facts: The husband of petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. suffered stroke which has
rendered him comatose, and in line with the said illness his wife Gilda seeks to dispose property
of her husband in favor of co-petitioners daughter Glenda Jardaleza-Uy and her husband Jose Uy.
Respondent Teodoro Jardeleza which is a son of Gilda and Ernesto Jr., filed a petition to the Iloilo
RTC upon knowledge of the pending sale of his fathers real property contending that there shall
be a court-appointed guardian in administering his fathers property while the senior Jardeleza is
incapacitated to do so.
Petitioner contends that the sale of her husbands property in Lot 4291 and its improvements are
necessary as to cover costs of his hospitalization.
While the proceedings are still ongoing, petitioner has sold the said property to her co-petitioners
daughter and son-in-law. Teodoro appealed the said sale to the Court of Appeals which has
likewise reversed the order of the RTC Iloilo. Petitioner submitted an appeal via certiorari of the
decision to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who
suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and
mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose of a parcel of land with its
improvements.
Held: The court ruled in favor of respondent Teodoro, further specifying that petitioner only holds
the power of administration and not the power of disposition and encumbrance of property as
these powers require consent of the other spouse or court authority. Furthermore, petitioner only
sought guardianship of property and has failed to allege that Ernesto Jardaleza Sr., would have
consented on the said sale of property.
Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of
a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two
children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the

name of Bonifacio, single. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her
husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a
reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses
averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because he was still single
when he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage
although some installments were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal
property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional
Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the
property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22,
1970. This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24,
1968. In effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
130 Phil 324
Facts:
Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz, defendant, at Bacolod City.
During
their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land
at Silay Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures.
The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City,
sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal
home at Bacolod City. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the
defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also began to suspect the defendant
in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed
upon getting several pieces of evidence on the defendants polo shirt and iron safe.
The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his
living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she
was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife
temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. The defendant, with
vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed,
even for a single month, to give them financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children
continued to draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their children, two
of whom were studying in Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations.

Ruling:
The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is considered view that the
defendant is not
guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the
conjugal partnership,

as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real abandonment, and not mere
separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to
financial and moral desertion.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the
husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the
defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part
not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
Partosa-Jo vs. CA
216 SCRA 692
Facts:
Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first
woman,
petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action
for support. The complaint for support was granted by the lower court but the judicial
separation of conjugal property was never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to
the CA but retain its affirmation on trial courts ruling. When their motions for reconsideration
were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal
property.
The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds that the petitioner and respondent
were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo
during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy.
Issue:

Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted to the petitioner on the
ground
of abandonment.
Ruling:
SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent had already rejected the petitioner.
The fact
that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial support to the
petitioner.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.
Johnson & Johnson Inc. vs. CA
262 SCRA 298
Facts:
Delilah Vinluan, defendant and owner of Vinluan Enterprises, engaged in the business of retailing
Johnson products incurred an obligation to the said company. She issued checks amounting to
the payment of the obligation but the checks bounced. Johnson & Johnson, petitioner, demands
for the payment and even offered accommodations to pay the obligation but failed. With these,
respondent filed a complaint against

defendant spouses Vinluan for collection of the principal obligation plus interest with damages.
RTC granted the complaint and ordered defendant to pay.
However, after meticulously scrutinizing the evidence on record that there was no privity of
contract between respondent and defendant-husband regarding the obligations incurred by the
defendant-wife, they held that defendant-husband must not be legally held liable for the said
obligation. Thus, they issued a writ of execution against the properties of the defendant-wife but
the two notices of levy on execution covered also the real and
personal properties of the conjugal partnership.
Defendant-husband filed a third-party claim seeking the lifting of the levy on the conjugal
properties. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to fix the value of the levied properties.
Defendant-husband moved to
quash the levy on execution but as expected petitioner opposed the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant-husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred
without
his consent.
Ruling:
SC denied petition based on the respondent Courts original findings which had already become
final
and indisputable. The defendant-husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation
incurred by the defendant-wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the conjugal
partnership, as well as the defendant- husband cannot be held liable. Only the defendant-wife
and her paraphernal property can be held liable. The conjugal properties and the capital of the
defendant-husband cannot be levied upon.
Spouses Laperal vs. Spouses Katigbak
90 Phil 77
Facts:
The plaintiffs, Roberto Laperal Jr. and his wife Purificacion M. Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak, who
acted
as an agent in the sale on the commission of jewels, and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover
the total sum
P113,500 plus interest and costs. The defendant Evelina moved to dismiss, on the ground that
the complaint
failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against her. The plaintiff opposed
the motion but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence this appeal.
Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. The first transcribed four promissory notes
for various sums and the notes are not signed by Evelina. The only allegations that may affect
her liability if any, are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her",
and that both defendants refused to pay the notes.
Issue:
Whether or not Evelina may be held liable for the debts of her husband against the spouses
Laperal.
Ruling:

The defendant Evelina is not personally liable. Ramon was not her agent, and he did not contract
for her.
For the repayment of the sums borrowed by him, Ramon Katigbak was personally responsible
with his own private funds, and at most the assets of the conjugal partnership. To reach
both kinds of property it is unnecessary for plaintiffs to implead the wife Evelina Katigbak.
"Where the husband is alone liable, no action lies against the wife, and she is not a necessary
party defendant.
The husband cannot by his contract bind the paraphernal property unless its administration has
been transferred to him, which is not the case. Neither can the paraphernal property be made
to answer for debts incurred by the husband.