CONSTI 2

Tanada v Tuvera
Facts: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees.
After a careful study of Article 2 of CC, and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others,
and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
Garcillano v The HOR Commitees on Pub. Info.

Ruling: As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be
allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. 42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. 43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in
newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. 45 With respect to the present Senate of
the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated
Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
"duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or
not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry
sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned,
the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution
People v Nazario, Eusebio
Facts: The defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance because being the
owner of a fishpond, he refused and fail to pay the municipal taxes amounting to P362.62 required
of him as a fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended,
inspite of repeated demands made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, to pay
the same.
In his defense, he said that he is residing in Manila and he never resided at Pagbilao but he was
only a lessee of a fishpond located there. There were exchange of letters between him and the
treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the payment of the taxes on his leased fishpond. He went to
Treasurer Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and the latter said none and he told

Nazario just to pay his taxes. He did not pay because up to now he do not know whether he is
covered by the Ordinance or not. The letters of demand asked him to pay different amounts for
taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal
taxes lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed ordinance. Because under the Tax Code,
fishermen are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax. There is no law empowering the
municipality to pass ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
The accused, by his evidence, tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to be collected have
already lapsed and that there is no law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances taxing
fishpond operators. The defense, by their evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a forest
land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally
that the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator because there is no fishpond yet being
operated by him, considering that the supposed fishpond was under construction during the period
covered by the taxes sought to be collected.
RTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance in question is void for being ambiguous and uncertain.
Ruling:
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous and uncertain." 8 The
petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said
ordinances speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they
reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall commence
payment "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the
Bureau of Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues "beginning and
taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964."
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is
unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual
operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he
financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had
employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it appears that it is the National Government which
owns them, 32 the Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is therefore only
logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue
measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot
be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient
principle that the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government
that had been making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of
profits brought about by the business, the appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in
question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances
vague.
Go v NAPOLCOM

Facts:

Petitioner Edgar M. Go had been a member of the Olongapo City Police Department. He
was dismissed for alleged involvement in illegal gambling.
Ruling: The INP record of this case does not show that a formal complaint was ever filed against
petitioner. Nor are there attached to such record supporting affidavits of witnesses, if any, against
him. Neither the decision of the board, nor that of the Director General of the PC/INP denying
reconsideration, nor the decision of the NAPOLCOM on appeal contains reference to any written
complaint with supporting affidavits filed against petitioner.
Petitioner's complaint that he had not been furnished written charges with supporting affidavits
merited no more than a passing mention in the decision of the PC/INP Director General. In his

appeal to the NAPOLCOM, petitioner reiterated his claim, but the decision of this agency, dismissing
his appeal, merely rehashed the decision of the Director General. There was no effort made to deal
with the assignment of errors of petitioner.
Indeed, that the summary dismissal board appears to have done in this case was simply to receive
the report on two raids allegedly conducted on petitioner's house on January 21, 1983 and on June
16, 1983, in the course of which what were believed were gambling paraphernalia (money in the
amount of P1,000.00, assorted "papelitos," a ballpen, and a calculator) were allegedly found and
two witnesses (Rodolfo Ablaza and Rolando de la Fuente) allegedly admitted they were collectors of
petitioner and his brother Lolito Go. But the report, if it was ever in writing, is not in the record of
this case which the NAPOLCOM transmitted to the Court. Nor does the decision of the summary
dismissal board disclose on what the supposed report was based. This is in violation of the rule that
in administrative proceedings "the decision must be rendered on the evidence contained in the
record and disclosed to the party affected."
In all probability the report of the team which conducted the raids was not even in writing and the
supposed testimonies of the two witnesses were not taken down. This is evident from the decision
of the board which, instead of referring to the testimonies or affidavits of witnesses, repeatedly
refers to the results of an "investigation." Thus, the decision states: "Investigation reveals . . . ,"
"investigation further reveals . . . .," "It was further discovered during the investigation . . . ." It is
clear that the facts found by the board were not the result of any investigation conducted by it but
by some other group, possibly the team that allegedly conducted the raids and that what the board
did was simply to rely on their finding.
Under these circumstances there was no way by which petitioner could defend himself. In summary
dismissal proceedings, unless other fully effective means for implementing the constitutional
requirement of notice and hearing are devised, it is mandatory that charges be specified in writing
and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the complaint because these are the only
ways by which evidence against the respondent can be brought to his knowledge. They take the
place of direct examination of witnesses. The formal investigation, which is dispensed with in
summary dismissal proceedings, refers to the presentation of witnesses by their direct examination
and not to the requirement that the respondent in the administrative case be notified of the charges
and given the chance to defend himself.
The Solicitor General argues that petitioner could not have failed to inquire what the charges
against him were because he admits he appeared before the board as ordered. That may be so.
Petitioner might have been told what the charge or charges against him were, but not the details
thereof, and, certainly, not what the alleged witnesses against him might have said because, as
already stated, the record of the INP simply did not contain their alleged testimonies.
Nor does it appear that petitioner was heard in his defense. His claim, that thrice he appeared
before the summary dismissal board but no hearing was ever held either because complainant and
his witnesses did not appear or the members of the board were absent or both complainant and
witnesses and members of the board were absent, was never specifically denied in any of the
decisions of the administrative authorities, beyond saying that the claim was belied by the record.
There is simply nothing in the INP record of the case to show this. It may be argued that the
requirements of due process are satisfied if a party initially denied a hearing is subsequently
granted one by means of motion for reconsideration. 11 That is true indeed if the charges and the
evidence against him are set forth in the record of the case, but not where, as here, they are not. If
in his appeal to the PC/INP Director General, petitioner presented the affidavits of retraction of two
of the witnesses against him, it was only because the decision of the board mentioned that these
witnesses allegedly said they had acted as petitioner's collectors and not because their prior
statements were in the record.
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even the fact that the
charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is in the opinion of his superiors strong
can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases
such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police
those who are innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to
escape punishment.