Iamblichus Proclus and Philoponus On Par

C h ris to p h H e l m i g *
lamblichus, Proclus and Philoponus on Parts,

Capacities and ousiai of the Soul and the Notion o f Life
In this article, I shall address some pecu liarities o f the later N eoplatonic doctrine on parts
and faculties o f the soul and their distinction fro m each other. T h is will, in turn, entail an
investigation o f th e occasionally u n u su al term inology which w as em ployed in such a dis
cussion. B e g in n in g with a short overview o f recen t scholarship on Neoplatonic psychology
and som e o f its m ore characteristic traits, I shall focus, in w h at follows, on later views
on Platos tripartite division o f the soul and its relation to the so u ls unity. A further aim is
to highlight w h at I take to be some fun d am en tal differences b etw een Aristotelian and Neo
platonic psychology.
i Neoplatonic psychology - some introductory remarks

Although recen t years have witnessed a considerable upsurge o f interest in Neoplatonic
authors and th eir doctrines, a com prehensive monograph on the psychological views o f
the N eoplatonists has yet to be written. R egardin g Plotinus psychology, there exists a
book length stu d y by Henry Blumenthal (The H agu e 1971) as w ell a s several commentaries
on treatises that concern his theory o f the so u l.1 Blumenthal also wrote a study entitled
Aristotle and Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity. Interpretations o f the D e anim a (New York
1996). Jean T rou illard published two m o n o grap h s that are crucial fo r understanding Pro
clus psychology: L Un et IAme selon Proclos (Paris 1972) and La Mystagogie de Proclos (Paris
1982).2 O f eq u al im portance are the w orks o f Andre-Jean Festugiere, especially his French
translation w ith detailed commentary o f lam b lich u s treatise O n the Soul, preserved by
John o f Stobi in h is Anthologium. Subsequent to Festugieres research , John Finamore and
I would like to thank Jakub Deuretzbacher (Berlin) and Klaus Cordlius (Berkeley) for their generous and most
useful comments. I extend a special word o f gratitude towards Antonio Vargas (Berlin) with whom I was able to
discuss m any aspects o f this paper and who considerably improved parts o f it. Last but not least, Sabrina Lange
(Berlin) has contributed m any suggestions and im provem ents.
1
More recently, see the collected volumes edited b y Chiaradonna 2005 and 2 0 0 9 as well as Remes 20 0 7 rich
monograph and a coup le o f more recent com m entaries on treatises about the soul, e.g. Helleman-Elgersma
19 8 0 on IV 3 [27], Fleet 19 9 5 on III 6 [26], Aubry 2 0 0 4 on
1 1 [53], Chappuis 2 0 0 9
o n IV 1 [21], Longo 2 0 0 9 on
IV 7 [2].
2
On Proclus psychology, interesting material can be found in Perkams / Piccione 2 0 0 6 and Gritti 20 0 8 .
On his epistemology, see Helm ig 2 0 12 and Martijn 2 0 10 ; the latter mainly concentrates on the proemium o f the
Timaeus commentary.
IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS 149
John Dillon prepared an English translation w ith com prehensive com m entary o f the sam e
soul is at the same time a paradigm and a copy (modele et image), the latter, because it
contains the intelligibles (logoi), the former, because the world soul creates the sensible
cosmos.10 Such a view clearly presupposes the existence of intelligible Forms and hence a
Platonic metaphysics.
work in 2 0 0 2 .3
New g ro u n d was broken on m any fronts in the study The Changing Self. A Study on the
Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, D am ascius and Priscianus (Brussels 1978) by Carlos
[3] A strong dichotomy between rational (doxa, dianoia, nous) and non-rational parts (ais -
Steel.^ M oreover, Ilsetraud Hadot, R ich ard Sorabij, and Peter Lautner have contributed
thesis, phantasia) o f the soul; the assumption that the true nature or essence of the soul is
much to ou r understanding o f N eoplatonic psychology. 5
rational; sometimes, Platonists (e.g the Middle Platonist Numenius) even held that the
non-rational part o f the soul is, in fact, a soul o f its own.11
[4] The view that immaterial entities (intellects, souls) are able to revert towards themselves
(self-reversion/introversion) and to constitute themselves.12 The latter means that they
participate in the production of their own essence (ousia) and well-being (eu einai).:3
[5] Different explanations as to why the soul is embodied (descent or fall o f the soul) and
a systematisation o f the Pythagorean/Platonic doctrine of transmigration. This presup
poses the immortality of the soul.H According to some Neoplatonists, due do its incar
nation the soul changes essentially.
In G e rm a n , a monograph by M atthias Perkam s entitled Selbsthewusstsein in der Spatantike. Die neuplatonischen Kommentare z u Aristoteles De an im a, devoted to several co m
mentators on A ristotles De anima su ch as Philoponus, Priscian o f Lydia (whom the author,
following C. Steel and F. Bossier, takes to be identical with P s.-Sim pliciu s),34
567and Stephanus
of Alexandria, w as published in 2 0 0 8 7 Finally, there is the im p ortan t sixth volume (in two
parts) o f D o rrie / B altes Platonismus in der Antike (published in 20 0 2 ) which is devoted
exclusively to Platonic psychology and contains (in the second part, pp. 388-418) a m ost
useful overview o f Platonist doctrines o f the so u l and its capacities.89Neoplatonic views on
[6] For Neoplatonists from Iamblichus onwards: criticism o f Plotinus (and Porphyrys)
view that part o f the soul remains above/does not descend (the so called doctrine of the un
descended soul).16
the soul d iffe r in m any respects from those o f their predecessors, especially Aristotle and
the Stoics. T h e follow ing set o f assu m ption s an d resulting q u estio n s are characteristic o f
the N eoplatonic approach towards psychology:
[7] An elaborate faculty psychology distinguishing between different kinds of knowl

edge. From Iamblichus onwards, Neoplatonists adopt the view that the character of
knowledge depends on the knower and not on the object known, especially in the case
of the gods knowledge of contingent events. Such an approach entails that doxa already
has access to the Forms, though only in the manner appropriate to itself, that is to say
[1] A distinction between different types o f souls that all originate from a soul-principle
(monad o f soul); this, especially as far as Plotinus is concerned, implies the kinship of all
souls (this poses the problem of determining the relation between the monad o f soul, the
soul of the world, and the many human souls: How do the first two differ and how does
each contribute to the constitution o f human souls?). In Iamblichus and Produs, the pro
cession from the monad of soul is developed into the idea of an ordered series of substan
tially different kinds of soul, which nonetheless retain a certain kinship due to their com
mon origin.
[2] Definition of the nature of the soul as something in between the intelligible and sensible
realm, a mediator between unity (without parts) and multiplicity (spatially divided); the
doxastikos.
[8] A theory on free choice and its relation to fate and providence.1?
[9] The view that lower psychic faculties are derived from higher ones or that lower fac
ulties are their images or shadows.18
10 According to Proclus, Elem. Theol. 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 , the world soul and hum an soul(s) contain the same reasonprinciples (logoi). H en ce both the soul o f the world and the human soul can be considered paradigms for the sen
150
Finamore / D illon 2 0 0 2 .
The book w a s translated into Italian with a detailed postface by the author h im self; see Steel 20 0 6 .
11
Numenius, fr. 1 4 (des Places).
Hadot 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 4 , Sorabji 2 0 0 4 , Lautner 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 2 ,2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 , a n d 2 0 0 9 .
12
On the notion o f self-reversion (and self-constitution) in Neoplatonism, see Proclus, Elem. Theol. 4 0 - 5 1 ,
sible cosmos.
5 197, p. 17 2 .1 5 -17
6 Ps.-Sim plicius is the common denomination o f the author o f the Neoplatonic commentary on Aristotles De
anima, som etim es ascribed to Simplicius him self. On the question of authorship see Bossier/Steel 19 72, Hadot
(Dodds): For in the substance o f soul life and knowledge are implicit: otherwise not every soul will know itself,
2002, Perkams 2 0 0 5 , the sum mary in Steel / H elm ig 2 0 0 4 , 2 4 0 -2 4 1, as well as Steel 2 0 0 6 a , 2 6 1-2 8 5 .
inasmuch as a lifeless substance is bereft o f knowledge.
Gerson 1 9 9 7 and Steel 20 0 6 b . On self knowledge, see also the remark by Proclus, Elem. Theol.
See Proclus, Elem. Theol.
5 43 (Dodds).
Perkams 2 0 0 8 .
13
Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 a and 2002b. For w hat follows, Baustein 16 4 (On parts and capacities o f soul) and
14 All Neoplatonists agreed that the rational soul is im m ortal, but some also thou gh t that this holds true for its
Baustein 17 3 (O n the association o f soul and body) are especially relevant. See, moreover, Sorabjis useful source-
non-rational part. O n the whole discussion, see Dorrie / Baltes 2002a, 4 0 7 - 4 3 7 , O psom er 2 0 0 6 and Gertz 2 0 1 1.
book on psychology, which provides many relevant prim ary texts in translation (Sorabji 20 0 4). Two o f the latest
15
contributions to Neoplatonic psychology are G ertz 2 0 1 1 study on the late ancient comm entary tradition o f Plato's
16 See Steel 1 9 7 8 , 3 4 - 5 1 .
See Steel 1 9 7 8 an d 2 0 0 6 a .
Key post-Porphyrian texts are the works o f Hierocles, Iamblichus De Mysteriis, Proclus Tria opuscule, Simpli
Phaedo and K rew et s 2 0 1 1 monograph on emotions in Aristotle, which incorporates material from the Greek com
17
mentators on Aristotle. Apart from these, one also ought to mention the annotated translation o f the extant late
cius Commentary on the Epictetus Manual, and, m ore generally, Neoplatonic interpretations o f the myth o f Er in
ancient com m entaries on the De anima (by Pseudo-Sim plicius and Philoponus), published in Sorabjis Ancient
Platos Republic, see Ciirsgen 2 0 0 2 , Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 b , 2 5 1-2 7 1, and W ilberding 2 0 11.
Such an approach m ay be termed top-down; it is to be distinguished from h o w Aristotle proceeds in his De
Commentators on Aristotle Series.
18
anima.
This will be discussed in greater detail below.
CHRISTOPH HELMIG
IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS
151
[io] The conviction that experience cannot provide us with knowledge, but only trigger
the process o f knowledge acquisition (importance of the Platonic theory o f recollection)
and, consequently, a doctrine of innate psychic reason-principles (logoi) from Plotinus on
wards.KJ
soul is p rim arily a hypostasis separate fro m th e body.2? Consequently, they distinguish b e
tween two perspectives on or two lives (zoiai) o f the human soul, n am ely as embodied and
as disem bodied. Such a view, which w as attributed to Plato h im se lf, can be illustrated well
by means o f a p assage from Iam blichus On the soul:
[n] From Iamblichus onwards: a theory o f the vehide(s) of the soul (astral body) which
explains how the incorporeal soul can move in space and time, how souls can be punished
after death, and where the non-rational faculties are to be located.
[12] An agreement about the determination o f the final aim (telos) o f philosophy as a
likening to the divine (homoidsis theoi), but a disagreement about how such telos can be
reached. Some, such as Plotinus and Porphyry, seek it by philosophy alone, others main
tain that it is only possible by means o f theurgy (a kind of philosophical ritual).19
20
[13] In studying Neoplatonic psychology, one must take into account the complex relation
ship between philosophy and exegesis. Much o f Neoplatonic psychology can be found in
commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, especially on the Phaedo and the De Anima. When
dealing with a commentary, however, it is not always easy to distinguish between an expla
nation o f a difficult passage and the personal point of view of a commentator.
In the following way, then, the powers (dunameis) belong to the soul in itself or to the com
mon living being that possesses the soul and is conceived as existing along with the body.
According to those who think that the soul lives a double life, one in itself and one in con
junction with the body, they [sc. the powers] are present in the soul in one way but in the
common animal in another, as Plato and Pythagoras think.
According to those, on the other hand, who think that there is a single life o f the soul,
that o f the composite - because the soul is commingled with the body, as the Stoics say, or
because the soul gives its whole life to the common living being, as the Peripatetics confi
dently assert - according to them there is a single way in which the powers are present: by
being shared in or by being mingled with the whole living being.26
This text, as it stands, identifies two gro u ps o f philosophers, n a m e ly Pythagoras, Plato and,
we may su bm it, the Neoplatonists on the on e hand, and the Sto ics and Peripatetics on the
2 Aristotelian and Neoplatonic Psychology
other. The first gro u p distinguishes b etw een two states o f the so u l and between capacities
or powers (dunameis) that are to be attributed to the soul in its em bod ied or disembodied
It is a w ell-kn ow n fact that if we confront the w a y Aristotle d oes psychology in his treatise
state respectively. It is notable that the two states o f the soul a re referred to as its two lives
On the soul w ith how Neoplatonists a n aly ze d the nature an d faculties o f the soul, w e
(zoiai).
notice several telling differences. First, w h ile Aristotle com pares th e soul to a w riting tab
The p o sitio n o f the Stoics and Peripatetics helps to accentuate the first view better.
let (grammateion) on which nothing is w ritten in actuality21 a n d holds that all know ledge
Both schools argu e, according to Iam blichus, that the soul h as o n ly one life and that this
is know ledge acquired in time, N eoplatonists maintain that th e soul is equipped fro m
life is connected to the body. Consequently, th ere is only one gro u p o f psychic powers / fac
eternity w ith logoi, discursive u n fold in gs o f th e transcendent, u n ified Forms, and that
ulties, n am ely th ose o f the common livin g b ein g. Most probably, Iam blichu s Peripatetics
in our le a rn in g process these logoi h ave to b e recollected an d bro u gh t to our attention.
also include A ristotle.

The two states or lives o f the soul are also alluded to in a w ell-kn ow n proposition o f
Hence, N eoplaton ic psychology is in tim ate ly connected w ith a system atization o f P la

tonic anam nesis.22
Proclus Elements o f Theology, where it is said that every participated soul has an eternal
Second, th e immortality o f the soul entails that it becom es em bodied repeatedly and
takes on d iffere n t lives in the course o f its perpetual existence (transm igration o f souls or
metempsychosis).2324
*In this regard, the issu e w a s raised, for in stance, whether rational souls
could be incorporated in animals.2^ M oreover, unlike Aristotle, w h o (only) addresses the
problem w h eth er the intellect is separable fro m the body, the Neoplatonists hold that the
25
See Proclus, Elem. Theoi. 186: Every soul is an incorporeal substance (ousia) separate (choriste) from the
body.
2 6 Iamblichus, De anima
5 10 , S. 34 .12 -2 0
(Finamore / Dillon), translated by Finam ore / Dillon 20 0 2: Tauxtj
roivuv at buvapeig auxfjg xfjg ipuxfjg xaO auxfjv i) xoO Eyovxog xou xoivou g e x a xou otbpaxog Betopoupevou
guiou, xaO oug |xsv f| ipuyij 6ixxt|v bj)f|V ^fj, x a au x q v xe x a i (text* xou otbuaxog, akhoq (rev ttagetai xfj i|)uxfj,
akXwg e xa> xo ivaj ^cpoj, <d)g> x a xa nXaxcova x a i n u G a y o p a v xaO oug de p ia a>r| xfjg ipuxfjg eaxiv fj xou
19 On this see H elm ig 2 0 12 .
ctuvBexou, au yx8XQapevr|g xfjg tpuxfjg xoj atbpaxt, tog ot ExauxoL Xsyouotv, rj Sou arjg oktjv xqv fauxfjg boi|v gig xo
20 Damascius, In Phaed. I 17 2 (Westerink). O n Neoplatonic theurgy see Sheppard 19 8 2 , Shaw 19 95, van Lief-
xotvav (pov, d)g ot IlEQutaxTjxixoi buoxupttovxai, x a x a xouxoug gig eoxiv 6 xpojtog xfjg jtagouaiag auxdrv 6 ev
feringe 1 9 9 9 , and, m ore recently, Helmig / Vargas 2 0 1 4 an d Helmig / Vargas forthcoming.
xoj pexeyeoGat fj ev xoj xExgaoO ai xoj okm cpq>.
21
Aristoteles, De anima III 4 , 4 2 9 b3 J-4 3 0 ai.
22 On this see H elm ig 2 0 1 2 , especially chs. IV, V I and V II.
152
Cf. Iamblichus, De anima 16, p. 4 2 .1 5 -2 1 (Finam ore / Dillon), translated by Finam ore / Dillon 20 0 2: [T|he
soul itself m akes u se o f the whole body as an instrum ent or vehicle; but it po ssesses also movements proper to
23 On this see G ertz 20 11.
itself, and souls free in themselves that are separate from the composite living bein g produce the essential lives o f
24 On this interesting discussion, see Dorrie 19 5 7 , Sm ith 1 9 8 4 , Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 b , 3 4 4 - 3 8 2 (Bausteine 17 8
the soul, e.g., those o f divine possession, o f immaterial intellection and, in a word, o f those by which we are joined
and 179), and H e lm ig 20 0 5.
to the gods.
CHRISTOPH HELMIG
153
existence (ousia) but a temporal activity (energeia).2? Eternal existence and temporal activity
powers o f the so u l in conjunction w ith the body must be fu rth er refined to also allow for
correspond to the two lives respectively and it is implied that th e soul, being imm ortal, par
powers o f the so u l possessed in conjunction w ith its vehicles.34 M oreover, the Neoplatonists
ticipates b oth in tim e and eternity.
argued that th e soul is not in the body; rather there is only a relatio n (schesis) between body
The distinction is grounded in the so u l s knowledge o f itself, or intro-version, w hich
and soul, but th e soul is active in the body b y m eans o f its capacities (dunameis) and activ
Proclus a rg u e s is impossible for an extended o r bodily substance. The activity o f self-know l
ities (energeiai).35 A somewhat unusual notion from an A ristotelian point o f view, this idea
edge thus attests to the souls possession o f both an eternal, incorporeal substance an d an
can be su m m arized as follows:
interior life grou nd ed in this eternal su bstan ce and, thus, separate and independent fro m
N ot th at th e h u m a n sou l w ould b e d ire c tly m ix e d with the body. W h e n it b en d s dow n [sc.
its em bodied vital activities.28 Moreover, as said above, to the tw o kinds o f psychic life cor
tow ards th e b o d y], th en it brings fo rth fr o m it s e l f lower lives w h i c h are n ecessary to en
respond tw o types o f psychic capacities (dunameis), namely, capacities o f the soul its e lf and
soul a n d o r g a n iz e th e body, i.e. the se n s itiv e a n d vegetative liv e s: proballetai deuteras zdias.
capacities o f the living being (as a com posite o f body and so u l ).29 Because Neoplatonists
By the a c q u is it io n o f these irrational fo r m s o f life, the soul lo ses its p u r e transcend ence. It
argue stren u o u sly for the autonomous nature o f the soul with re ga rd to the body, they often
b eco m es e n t w in e d an d m ixes w ith th e s e in fe r io r lives and a lso , t h r o u g h th e m , w ith the
object to A risto tles definition o f the soul as the first actuality o f an instrumental natural
body. H o w e v e r , i f it ascend s again a n d fre e s it s e l f from the body, t h e n it p u ts o f f all these
body (De a n im a II i, 4 i2 b4-6), since it seem s to subordinate the so ul to the body or, at least,
low er liv e s a n d retu rn s to its pro per e s s e n c e p u rifie d o f all a c c re tio n s.?6
to consider so u l only insofar as it depends on or is connected to a body.

A th ird difference compared to A ristotle is that, while the latter develops his account o f
The top dow n approach entails two other peculiarities. On the o n e han d, lower faculties can
the d ifferent faculties o f the soul strictly fro m the bottom up, tak in g the vegetative so u l as
be seen as im a g e s o f higher ones (phantasia as an image o f nous a n d doxa as an image o f
his point o f departure, the Neoplatonists approach is top down. W hile scholars o f A ristotle
dianoia).37 O n th e other hand, the soul m irro rs to a certain extent th e three hupostaseis b e
argue that fo r h im the contrast betw een an im ate (belebt ) an d inanim ate (unbelebt ) is
fore it. This em erg es, for instance, fro m Elements o f Theology 19 7 , w here Proclus defines
more fu n d am en tal than the distinction b etw een rational and non-rational faculties (duna
the soul by m e a n s o f three aspects, n am ely its essence (or m od e o f being), its life and its
meis) o f the so u l, 3 the latter distinction is central for the N eoplatonic approach to psychol-
knowledge. T h e se three aspects are, at the sa m e time, the three firs t self-subsistent realities
ogyd1 A n d according to the Neoplatonists it is the rational soul th at produces or projects the
lower facu lties out o f itself.32
(hupostaseis) a fte r the One (Being, Life, Intellect). All three con tain each other in the
manner o f a tria d according to the N eoplatonic principle all in a ll. 38
From th e top down approach it also follow s that the m o st fundam ental type o f soul
In accordance with the view that all th in gs are derived from th e One, the text from Pro
is the rational soul, while for Aristotle the first or minimal so u l, as D. Ross has it, (prdte
clus further su g g e sts that the principles o f so ul (being, life, intellect) derive from Intellect
psyche, De an im a I I 4 , 4 i6 b25) is the nutritive soul. Neoplatonists h eld that the soul accrues
where they exist as a unity (hath henosin). O n the level o f soul th ey are distinguished and
its different faculties as it descends into the body, that is, as its activity comes to be located
divided (diakekritai kai memeristai, i.e., com pared to their m ode o f being in Intellect, but
within the p rogressively smaller celestial sp h e res and finally b o u n d to the presence w ith in a
single body.33 T h e possibility o f progressive localisation p recedin g earthly em bodim ent is
34 On the relation between the vehicle(s) and different psychic capacities, see D orrie / Baltes 2002a, 3 9 5 -4 0 1.
attributed to the soul s possession o f v e h ic le s (ochemata), w h ic h are at once im m aterial
35
and yet en d ow ed with a position in space, an d which the soul an im ates even when it lacks
an earthly body. Thus, the distinction draw n above between po w ers o f the soul its e lf and 278
1
30
9
Such a view seem s to go back to Am m onius Saccas, see Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 b , 2 3 5 -2 5 1 (commentary on
Baustein 17 3.4 : N em esiu s o f Emesa, De natura hominis 3, S. 3 9 .11-4 2 .9 .,2 2 -2 3 an d
43-I_9 [Morani]) and 4 0 6
notes 2 5 8 -2 6 0 . T h at an incorporeal soul cannot be localized in the body was agreed o n by all Platonists (for, strictly
speaking, incorporeals are at the same time everywhere and nowhere \pantachou kai oudamou]); and it is
well known that Plotinus asserted that soul is not in body, but rather body in soul an d the body o f the world in the
27 Proclus, Elem. Theol. $ 19 1 (Dodds): I l a o a
world soul (see, e.g., Plotinus IV 3 [27] 2 2 .8 -9 , HI
9 [13] 3 .3 - 4 and Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 b , 4 0 6 with notes 251 and
256).
x a ra xqovov .
36 Steel 19 7 8 , 6 1 - 6 2 .
28 See Proclus, Elem. Theol. 18 6 (Every soul is an incorporeal substance and separable from body) and f 18 7
37
(Every soul is indestructible and imperishable).
433*9-10, phantasian noesin tina). Although his intent there is to give a com m on account o f animal and human
29 See Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 a , 373, and Festugiere
154
F- extt | tt|v pfv o v o la v akbviov exei , rf|v S e E v ep y u a v
19 53,
1 9 2 note 2.
See Aristotle, w h o already refers to a view according to which phantasia is a kind o f noesis (De anima III 10 ,
locomotion, Neoplatonists interpreted the passage otherwise. Their theory o f the correspondence between lower
30
See, for instance, Rapp 2007.
and higher faculties, however, did have the similar goal o f showing the analogy betw een the embodied (animal)
31
Philoponus, In de anima 1.9 -10 .
and disembodied lives o f the soul.
32
In this paper, I restrict m yself to human souls. On the intricate problem o f non-rational souls in Proclus, see
38
Proclus, Elem. Theol. j 10 3 (Dodds): IT avta ev itaaiv, oiXBiwg 8 e ev ExdaTuv x a l ya g ev tu >o v u xa i f| â)f) x a l
the contribution b y Opsom er 2 0 0 6 : cf. also Dorrie / Baltes 2002a, Baustein 16 5 .
6 vofig, x a l ev Tfj tofj to Eivar x a l to voeIv , x a i ev t<p va> to Etvai xai to i^fjv, &Xk oitou psv voequ>s , oitou 8 e
33
tfimimq, oitou 8 b ovTtog ovTa itavta.
See Dorrie / Baltes 20 0 2 b , Baustein 17 2 w ith the detailed commentary on pp. 16 4 -2 1 8 .
CHRISTOPH HELMIG
interpenetrate one another in a being devoid o f parts [in the m a n n e r o f a triad]). 39 I f the soul
five (threptike) pow er and the power pro m o tin g growth (auxetike). Such a division o f the
is em bodied, th ese principles becom e d isjo in e d one from an oth er, while in the so uls
different facu lties o f the soul, as p resen ted b y Philoponus, se e m s to be the Neoplatonic
(sc. consid ered in themselves) they exist as a unity, because they a re im m aterial. The in tel
standard an d it is fully compatible w ith w h at Aristotle says in h is De anima.
ligible triad B e in g - Life - Intellect stru ctu res the soul and it c a n also b e deployed to illu s
D iscern in g the m any kinds o f psych ic faculties was im p ortan t to the Neoplatonists,
trate how th e low er layers o f soul (nutritive an d vegetative) ultim ately originate fro m the
but equally o r perhaps even more im p ortan t w as explaining h o w these faculties or capac
rational so u l an d its triadic structure. T h at is to say, the initial u n ity o f the three aspects o f
ities are related to the essence (ousia) an d h o w this, in turn, is related to the triad ousia -
the soul b ecom e disjoined when the soul is lin ked to the body.
dunamis - energeia mentioned above.
Fourth, w h ile Aristotle distinguished betw een the essence o f the soul and its faculties
(dunameis) o r activities (energeiai),4 N eoplatonist analysis w o rk s w ith a systematization o f
the distinction in the triadic schem e o f ousia - dunamis - energeia, w here all activities pro
3 The ousia o f the soul and its capacities
duced by a su bstance are explained in term s o f the substance s powers, through w h ich
activities are produced, but which are th em selves not products o f the substance but rather
In order to cla rify this, let us return fo r a m om en t to Iam blichus On the Soul. It has fre
effective ca u sal capacities that are directly dependent upon the substance. That this triadic
quently been claim ed, and rightly so, that h e was a champion o f the view that Plato and
scheme is fund am ental to Neoplatonic psychology emerges, fo r instance, from the stru c
Aristotle are in agreem ent on most, i f not all, subjects. We h ave tw o m ain testimonies o f
ture o f Iam b lich u s De anima, o f w h ich the first four parts are dedicated to the so uls e s
this. First, in h is On the eternity o f the world, Philoponus writes:
sence (ousia), pow ers (dunameis), activities (energeiai), and acts (erga).
In h is prooem ium to his com m entary on Aristotles De an im a, which contains a m o st
useful su m m a ry o f late Neoplatonic psychology, Philoponus p rovid es the following sch em e
of the stru ctu re o f the human soul, w h ich corresponds well to P ro clu s (and presum ably
T h u s, P r o c lu s , too, plainly and o p e n ly a g r e e s w it h us about th e d iffe r e n c e o f the two phil

o so p h e rs [sc . a s reg a rd s the status o f u n iv e rs a ls ], o r rather h e h a s d e m o n s tr a te d it fro m the
w o r d s / w r itin g s o f A ristotle h im self. F r o m th is o n e can only w o n d e r a t the u tter sh am eless
n ess o f t h o s e w h o try to sh ow that A ris to tle a n d Plato also a g re e d o n th is po in t.42
also S y rian u s) view s:4' The hum an soul co n sists o f three faculties (dunameis), nam ely the
rational (logikai), the non-rational (alogoi) an d the vegetative (phutikai). The two fo rm er fa c
That the latter rem ark is most probably directed against Iam blichu s can be seen from a text
ulties p o ssess, in turn, cognitive (gnostikai) pow ers and powers w h ich relate to their appeti
that tells u s th at the Syrian Neoplatonist argu ed that Aristotles co m p ariso n o f the soul w ith
tive nature (orektikai); that is to say, th e ration al soul houses nous, dianoia and doxa p lu s
an empty w ritin g tablet can be harm onized w ith Platos theory o f recollection.^
boulesis an d prohairesis, while the non-rational soul consists o f phantasia and aisthesis plu s
thumos and epithum ia. Finally, the pow ers o f th e vegetative so ul are twofold, viz. the nutri- 39
1
0
4
Second, w h ile earlier Neoplatonists (for instance, Plotinus in Ennead V I 1-3) claimed
that Aristotles theory o f the categories is not appropriate for the in telligible world o f Platos
Forms, Iam b lich u s denies this by developing a noera theoria, a n interpretation o f Aristotle
39 Produs, B ern . Theol. 197, p. 172.15-22 (Dodds), translated by Dodds *1963: For in the substance (ousia) of
soul, life and knowledge are implicit: otherwise not every soul will know itself, inasmuch as a lifeless substance
(ousia) [i.e. inanimate bodily existence] is in itself bereft of knowledge. And in its life are implidt substance (ousia)
and knowledge: for a non-substantial (anousios) life and one devoid of knowledge are proper only to lives involved
in Matter, which cannot know themselves and are not pure substance (ousia). Finally, a knowledge without sub
stance (ousia) or life is non-existent: for all knowledge implies a living knower which is in itself possessed of sub
stance (ousia).
I have borrowed the translation from Dodds, who renders the Greek ousia throughout by means of sub
stance. On the meaning of ousia in Proclus psychology, see below, p. 169-171.
40 I take it that he does so in his De anima, when he asserts that he is investigating the essence of the soul and
its attributes (to sumbebekota - the phrase does not, I think, signify merely incidental properties, they are rather
attributes that are connected to the essence of souls). Part if not all of the attributes of soul are, we may submit, its
capacities and activities. Moreover, in Aristotle we already find theviewthat the essence of a thing can be known, at
least partly, through its attributes; see De anim a I i,402bi6-25: eoixe5 on povov to ti dm yvcijvai yor|aigov eivai
HQ05 to 0 Ecopfjaou rag altiag nSv auppePrittoTcov taig ouaiatg [...], aXXa xal avaitaXiv xa avpfSeprptoTa crup[5dM.BTcu piya pepog itpog to eibevai to ti botiv- Bitetbav yap eyotpev aJto&iSovta Kara xf|v <j>avTaalav jtepi
Tdiv oupPeprittOTcov, r) jtavxcov f) xtov jikeLartov, tote teal jteptTfjg otialag |opEv Xeyew xalXicna.
41 On what follows, see Opsomer 2006,140-147.
156 CHRISTOPH H ELM IG
based on the know ledge o f intelligible F o rm s.44 The latter m a rk ed an important turningpoint in the h isto ry o f the reception o f A risto tles Categories an d resulted in an important
reconciliation o f Aristotle and Plato. For Iam blichus m aintained th at w hat Aristotle wrote
in his Categories is not only applicable to sen sib le substances, b u t also to the intelligible
Forms. That is to say, sensible phenom ena su ch as contrariety, quantity or quality can already
be found in th e intelligible and take its o rig in fro m there.
N otw ithstanding the general tendency towards reconciling P lato and Aristode in Iam
blichus philosophy, the introduction o f h is On the Soul su rp risin gly takes another tone.
42 Philoponus, De aetemitate mundi 32.8-13 (Rabe): ouxto y.ai 6 IIqoxXoc XapnQQi Trj tptovf) xr)v Sia(j)covlav tc&v
<t>doa6(f>cov cbpokoYTixEV, p&Miov Se e| a m & v tcov ApiaroTEXoug <xjio5e5 eixv e| cbv SaupaoEiE Tig xr|v tuieq(3oM|v xfjg avouSEias xa)v aupctjcovovg xav touto) Seocvuvai otiquiSevtiov A qiototeXti xai nkaxcova.
43 See, for instance, the brief summary in de Haas 2000,169-170. It is important to note that the price paid for
the reconciliation as it were is that Iamblichus has to ascribe a theory of innate knowledge to Aristotle.
44 On this see Dillon 1993.
There the N eoplatonist criticizes the b ases o f Aristotles general approach towards p sych o l
ogy. His re m a rk s, I take it, are fundam ental to later Neoplatonic theories o f the soul a n d its
faculties.
Aristotle, then, after he has assembled the attributes that seem m ost particularly to pertain
to the soul (to m alista dokounta h u p a rch e in ) into three main categories of motion, knowl
edge, and subtlety of essence (leptoteta ousias), which he also sometimes terms incorporeal
substance (asom aton hupostasin), relates to each of the three categories the opinions appro
priate to them, thus discovering a limit for the boundless and a clear and concise means o f
defining the opinions.
I see in these categories much that is ambiguous and confused (for motions in the
category o f change are not to be considered as identical with motions in the category o f life,
nor kinds o f knowledge that involve imagination with those that transcend it, nor the sort
of purity o f essence proper to air with that o f things essentially incorporeal), and much that
is incomplete and inadequate (for it is not possible to take in all the varieties of opinion
under these three categories).45
In com m en tin g on this text, the recent editors o f Iamblichus De anim a, John F. F in am o re
But i f you understand property, on the assumption that you are dealing with pri
mary and secondary entities that differ from each other in their whole nature and by entire
genus, as a simple state delimited in itself, then this concept o f property makes some
sense [...]. But your question is imperfectly phrased; for you should have asked what prop
erties there are first in respect of essence, then in respect o f potency, and then again in re
spect o f activity.48
Superior cla sse s, w e learn, are not part o f the same genus. Rather, their entire essence
differs in each case, that is, they have no com m unity o f essen ce {koindnian ousias mian).
Hence, p roperties o f superior classes m u st not be considered sp ecific differences o f one
and the sam e gen u s, but in investigating the properties w e o u g h t to take into account that
their essen ces are entirely different. A t the en d o f the text, Iam blich u s, in responding to
Porphyrys letter,49 m akes the im portant po in t that properties o f su p erio r classes should be
described accordin g to a triadic arran g em en t o f essence (ousia), potency (dunamis) and
power (energeia). That is to say, each o f the th ree members o f the triad taken together char
acterize the d ifferen t kinds o f superior cla sse s. 5
Other p a ssa g e s from Iam blichus w ork, m ore specifically fro m h is De anima, show
and Joh n M . D illon think that the N eoplatonist criticizes A ristotle with little ju s tifi
that what h e say s here about the distinction between different su p erio r classes also holds
cation.^ 6 T h is is probably correct, given that in the first chapters o f his work Aristotle a im s
true for d iffere n t classes o f souls. For types o f souls (human, daem on ic, universal, divine,
at providing a rough overview o f different theories (doxai) o f th e soul. However, I in te n d to
etc.)?1 d iffer fro m each other according to th eir genus.
suggest in w h a t follows that there m ay b e m o re to Iamblichus argu m en t. It points, I b elieve,

to a rather fu nd am ental disagreem ent on psychology in general. T h is disagreem ent c a n be
illustrated b y m eans o f a text from Iam b lich u s De Mysteriis. T h e text in question deals w ith
the problem o f how w e can distinguish su p erio r classes, that is, entities which are situ ated
between the h u m an soul and the gods, fo r instance, daemons, h eroes, angels, etc.47
As for the properties which you enquire about as pertaining to each o f the superior classes,
which distinguish them from each other, i f you understand the properties as specific dif
ferences distinguished from one another by dichotomy within the same genus (such as in
the case o f animal, rational and non-rational), we will never accept the existence o f
properties in this sense in the case o f beings who have no community of essence, nor divi
sion into sub-species of the same rank, and which do not exhibit the synthesis of an indefi
nite element that is common, and a particular element that defines.4
7
56
Another view, however, might be proposed which should not be rejected; it divides souls ac
cording to genera and species, making a difference between the perfect acts of universal
souls, the pure and immaterial activities o f divine souls and, different from these, the effica
cious activities of daemonic souls and the great-hearted activities o f heroic souls, and the acts
of a mortal nature proper to animals and men, and so on for the rest. When these things have
been defined, the features that are dependent on them admit of the same sort of distinction.?2
48 Iamblichus, D e Mysteriis 14,10.10-11.8, translated by Clarke / Dillon / Hershbell 2003, slightly modified: a b'
emtpixeig i8idipaxa xiva eaxiv Exaaxip xaiv xgEixxovcov yevaiv, oig xeydigiaxai out dUb|Xaiv, el pev dig eiSoitoioiig 8ia<)>ogag rut 6 xauxo ydvog avxiSiaigougEvag vostg av xa ISiuipaxa, waiteg vjxo xo <pov xo Xoyixov xai
aXoyov, oiiSejxoxe jxaga5 ex6 |i0a xa xoiatixa sm xibv [xt|xe xoivtovlav ofiaiag jiiav pips e|iodônoav exovxcov
dvriSiaigsaiv, pf|Te oiivSeoiv xrjv e^ dogiaxon xoO xoivofi xai ogkovxog xoii i6iou jigoaXappavovxtov. Ei 8 cog
ev xgoxEgoig xai Seuxegoig xax' otiaiav xe oXryv xai itavxi xai ysvEi EaXXaxxopEvoig aixXfjv xiva xaxaaxaaiv
.x.xEgaogevr|V ev eauxfj xpv iSioxrpa tijtoXapPdvEig, EyeipEv Aoyovr| evvoiaxaiv i8iai|xdxaiv [...].'H 8 Epcbxr|aig
axEXmg jtgoEiaiv e8 ei pev yag xax owiav jigtoxov, EixEixa xaxa fiiivagiv, ei0 otixm xax eveqyeiov, jtovOdvEa0ai xiva aiixcov futagyEi xa L6i(b|j,aTa.
49 See Clarke / Dillon / Hershbell 2003, xxvi-xxxvii.
50 On the triad ousia - dunamis - energeia (ODE), see the following.
51 On the different types of soul in Middle and Neoplatonism, see Dome / Baltes 2002b, 397-401.
52 Iamblichus, D e anima f 18, p. 44.11-16 (Finam ore / Dillon), translated by Finam ore / Dillon 2002: Tevoixo
45 Iamblichus, De anima J I, S. 26.1-12 (Finamore / Dillon), translatedby Finamore / Dillon 2002, slightly modi
fied: A ql0 totb X.t|s pev onv xa paXioxa 8oxotivxa xfj xpuxfl tutdgxsiv elg xgia xa xugiaixaxa yvr| avayaydiv,
xivqaiv x xai yvdiaiv xai kejtxoxr|xa oiioiag, fjv evioxe xai aoaipaxov tmoaxaaiv EitovopdÊi, Eg xabxa xa
xgia xag xa 0 Exaaxa SuogiapEvag EJtavatfmgEi 66|ag, jmgag xaiv amgaiv avEugdiv ofixai xai aa<j>fj xal auvxopov jiEQiX.Ti'ipiv. Eyd) 8e 6gd> ev xotixoig xoig ogoig jio Xu psv xo opcbvupov x a i auyxexvpevov, (on yap uioaiixaig
ai xaxa pxa(5oXr|v xai at xaxa cot|v OEaigoCvxai xivijaeig, f) ai poq<|>a)xixai xai <ai> apogcjioi yvaxjEig, f| ai
xoii asoog xai at xaiv xa0 aura doojpdxojv xaOagoxrytEg xf)g oiiaiag,) xoXh be. xai xo aneXeq, anxtov xai ev S eec
on ydg eveoxi Jtavxa xepiXapEiv xa yevri xarv boljaiv ev xotg xgiai xonxoig ogoig.
xa xaiv Oeicov t|mxaiv a y g a v x a x a i anXa, Exega 8 e x a xaiv 6atpoviaiv 8gactxf|gia, x a 8e
46 Finamore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 , 76.
xa 6 e xaiv ev xoig ^cootg x a i xoig avBgunroig OvrjxoeiSfj x a i xa aXXa tbaailxaig e g y a 6iaigot)pevr|. Toiixaiv 8r)
47 In Iam blichus, the superior classes can also include the gods, which m ay w ell be the case here.
SiatgtapEvaiv x a i x a eyopEva xotixiov xf|v o p o ia v Xijtpexai Siaxgiotv.
158 CHRISTOPH HELMIG
5e xav aXXr| 6 o | a
o fix ajidfiXprog, r| x a x a yevp x a i EiSr| xaiv ijraxaiv aXXa p iv x a xaiv oXuiv jtavxeXf), aXXa be
xcov
rjgauxaiv psyaXa,
159
For Iam blich u s, as for
P r o c lu s
there is no u niqu e genus o f so u l and, for this reason , he
4 The triad ousia - dunamis - energeia
classifies d iffere n t types o f souls as w h o lly d ifferent genera. Accordingly, properties su ch as

motion an d know ledge are likewise very d ifferen t from each other, i f w e are dealing w ith
I have already pointed out above that Iam b lich u s De anima is arran ged according to the im
different types o f souls. For, as Iam blichus says, each property h as to be examined in th ree
portant N eoplatonic triad ousia (essence) - dunamis (power) - energeia (activity) And w e
respects, viz. in respect o f essence, in resp ect o f power and in respect o f activity. In other
have seen h o w the triad was em ployed by Iamblichus to d istin gu ish entities from each
words, the d ifferen t kinds o f souls are not distinguished by m e a n s o f specific differences.
other that d iffe r according to their su bstance (ousia), and h en ce also differ substantially
Rather, th ey a re different genera related to each other in an an alogical way. The sam e is
from each o th er in their activities. From this it is apparent w h y th e triad is rather important
true, accord in g to Iamblichus, o f th eir m otion , knowledge and subtlety o f essence (leptotes
for the N eoplatonic discussion on the soul and its faculties. Its function can best be illu s
ousias). 54
H ence, I su ggest that the criticism o f A ristotle that p relu d es the De anima o f Iam b li
trated by m e a n s o f a fragment from Iam b lich u s lost Commentary on Platos Alcibiades:

T h e fir s t p o in t to m ak e, as noted, in d e e d , b y th e divine Ia m b lic h u s , is th at the essen ces o f
chus points to a rather fundamental d iffere n ce between our N eoplatonic author and A r is
d a e m o n s a n d in gen eral o f the en tities s u p e r io r to us are e x tre m e ly d iffic u lt to co m prehend
totle, to w it, th at different kinds o f so u ls ou gh t to be considered a s altogether different g e n
fo r th o s e w h o d o not have the m in d o f th e ir so u l thoroughly p u r ifie d - in a sm u c h as even
era. C ontrary to what one might a ssu m e fro m the common denom ination soul, th ey are
the e s s e n c e o f th e soul is not ea sily p e r c e p tib le to everyone ..., - b u t to p erceive and m ake
not related a s m em b ers o f a single g e n u s so u l. This entails th at A ristotles approach to in
clear th e
powers
o f daem ons is e a sie r. W e a tta in to a p ercep tio n o f th e m through their
vestigating so u ls according to three d ifferen t attributes (motion, know ledge and subtlety o f
a ctivities, o f w h ic h the pow ers are th e im m e d ia te m others; fo r a p o w e r is m e d ia n betw een
essence) ca n n o t be applied successfully to so u ls that differ gen erically from each other.
a n e s s e n c e a n d a n activity, put fo rth fr o m th e essen ce on the o n e h a n d , a n d its e lf generat
Hence, m o tio n as applied to em bodied so u ls is fundam entally different from the m o
in g th e a c tiv ity o n the other.*6
tion o f disem b odied souls. And it seem s crucial not only th at psychic/psychological at
tributes are n ot studied in the sam e w ay fo r all kinds o f souls, b u t also that the activities o f
For our p u rp o se, the last sentence is especially crucial. It says that a pow er (dunamis) lies b e
souls depen d upon essences (ousiai) an d can only be understood adequately i f we take into
tween an e sse n c e (ousia) and an activity (energeia). It proceeds fro m the essence and gives
rise to an activity. W hile in Aristotles De anim a, the ODE triad is not mentioned, it m ay
account fro m w hich essence they are derived.

The texts from Iam blichus De Mysteriis and De anima h ave two things in com m on .
be interesting to raise the question w h eth er it is altogether un-A ristotelian to describe the
They both d isc u ss entities that m ay be taken to fall under one gen u s (because they sh are
soul in such a way. I do not propose to settle this question here, b u t I would like to briefly
one and the sam e denomination) as h avin g n o communion in essence. Second, they e m
consider so m e possible answers.

It is w e ll know n that Aristotle d istin gu ish es between a dunam is tou paschein and a
phasize that the properties o f such entities ou gh t to be described according to the triad es
sence - potency - power. In what follow s, I sh all say a bit m ore abou t this particular triad.
dunamis tou p o iein .n Moreover, in Metaphysics Theta 8, i 0 4 9 b2 4 -2 5 , he stresses that

actuality (energeia) precedes potentiality an d that things in potentiality (dunamis) are ac
tualized by m e a n s o f things that are actual. In Neoplatonism w e also fin d the two kinds o f
dunamis. T h e first kind (dunamis tou paschein) is, as far as I can see , prim arily connected to
matter and th in g s that involve matter. In the triad of ousia - du nam is - energeia, dunamis
For the substantia] diversity in Iamblichus see also Comm. Math. 10 .2 7 - 3 2 : [h a t ouxcog Eaxai f| o v a ia xfjg
carries an exclu sively active m eaning. For instance, Proclus, Elem . Theol. 8 0 -8 1 calls the
cuixfjg dpxhS S i okcov 6tr|xouaTig. 8ia<|>o>ou ye pr]v o v ev fjxxov Ecovxai x a x a xag SiacJtoQoug Suvapstg x a i
Ipoag m l evegyeiag xfjg xpxjxfjs m i xo xaiv ouatcov atixfjg Jtkfj og, oiieg ev evl jtBQiixexcu. See, moreover, Iam bli
chus, In Tim. Fr. 8 2 (Dillon).
53
On the substantial difference o f kinds o f soul in Proclus, see In Tim. Ill 2 4 5 .1 9 - 2 4 6 .4 . The passage is trans
55
On this triad, see Cremer 19 6 9 , 4 0 -4 1, Steel 19 7 8 , 5 9 - 6 1 , Shaw 19 95, 7 2 , Stacker 19 9 5 , 5 0 -6 2 , Bergemann
2 0 0 6 ,2 2 8 - 2 3 3 , w h o discusses its metaphysical aspects, and Militello 20 10 , w ho focuses on its role in Neoplatonic
lated by Finam ore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 ,12 7 .
psychology, arg u in g that we can find it prefigured in Porphyrys psychology.
54 Aristotle h im se lf structures the inquiry in the first book o f his De anima according to three main attributes o f
56 Iamblichus, In Ale. frg. 4, translated by Dillon * 2 0 0 9 : jtpcoxov pev o v v qt|x eo v , o x a i 6
the soul (De anima I 2 , 4 0 5 bu -i2 ) : kinesis, aisthesis, to asomaton. Later on in the text (in the beginning o f chapter I
4>r|oiv, oxi xag pev uitaQlstg xcov 8aip6vcov x a i okcog xcov xqeixxovcov f|ptv hEcogfjaat xakEJtcbxaxov ectxi xoig pf|
5), he adduces D em ocritus view according to w h ich the soul is a fine-grained body (leptomeres soma) and in the
xeiicog exxexadaQ pevoig xov xrjg tyuxrjg vouv, oirou ye x a i t|n)xfjg ouatav xaxth eiv on paStov jtavxi [...] xag
same chapter h e refers to those (i.e., materialists) w ho consider the soul a body, yet the most fine-grained and most
Suvapeig auxebv x a i i6stv x a i fiiaaacfcfjaai p ao v. a ito y a p xcov Evegyeicov, w v eiai jtgoaExcog at fiuvapELg
0iog Tap|3Xix6 g
5e
incorporeal o f all bodies (ocopa xo XejtxopEQeaxaxov f) xo dacopaxcoxaxov xcov ctiAcov). Against this background,
pqxEQEg, x a i avxcov exeivcov jtaia avop a ' pear| y d q 4 6uvapig eoxl xf)g xe o tiaiag x a i xfjg EVEpyetag, it@o-
it is understandable why Iamblichus replaces Aristotles to asomaton" with leptotes ousias. On this particular
fSaihopEvri pev a ito xfjg onoiag, ajtoyevvcSaa be xqv evegyEiav.
point, see also Finam ore / Dillon 20 0 2, 7 7 - 7 8 .
57
l6o CHRISTOPH HELMIG
See Proclus, Elem. Theol. f 78 -7 9 , as well as Dodds 2i9 6 3 , 241-242.
l6l
dunamis in q u estio n dunamis poietike (active power).58 W hat is m ore, unlike in A ristotle
169). In h is doctrine o f the im m anent fo rm , the Neoplatonist explain s the interaction be
the O D E tria d dunam is precedes energeia a n d the latter p resu p p o ses the form er a n d de
tween the im m an en t, essentially incorporeal form and m atter b y m ean s o f the triad.58
60 In
59
pends on it ( it flow s from it).
what follow s, I shall concentrate on the role the triad plays in psychology.61
It is w e ll know n that Aristotle in h is De anim a distinguishes between two kinds o f d u
A s w e h av e already seen above, Iam blichus maintains th at different kinds o f souls
namis a n d tw o kinds o f energeia. T h e first k in d o f dunamis is th at o f a person who does not
differ generically. T h eir difference ultim ately stems from distin ction s between their su b
yet know h o w to read or is not yet rational. T h e second kind o f dunam is is that o f a p e rso n
stances, b u t c a n be m ore readily recognized in their powers an d activities. What is more, in
who h as le a rn e d how to read or has b ecom e rational. This seco n d kind o f dunamis is at the
the case o f th e h um an soul, the O D E triad works in two d ifferen t ways depending on
sam e tim e th e first kind o f energeia. T h e secon d kind o f energeia is reached when so m eo n e
whether the so u l is in an embodied or disem bodied state.
is actually re ad in g o r m aking u se o f h is ability to think.
To illu strate this let us take the fo llow in g example. In h is D e anim a, Iamblichus asks
Now, in N eoplatonic psychology the first kind of dunamis d o es not play any role, sin ce
whether m ovement is an essential activity o f the soul.62*Plato, h e explains, had already ar
the rational sou l, as such or in respect o f its faculties, is at n o stage a m ere potentiality.
gued that th e activities o f the em bodied so ul are by no m eans identical with the acts per
Rather, it is already equipped with all the faculties/capacities, b u t m ay not be able to u se
formed by the soul itself.
them. T h is is w h y in his Commentary on the Timaeus Proclus c a n say:
Now, according to Plato, the acts accomplished are far from being identical with the con
genital essence and life of the soul. For it is clear that he assigns the acts to the common liv
ing being, but since change, divisibility, corporeal dimensionality, and extension in time
and space coincide with these acts, none o f which is present in the incorporeal life taken by
itself, it plainly follows that according to Plato none of the motions o f the composite living
being is proper to the soul itself. And so, just as life for him was double - the one separated
from body and the other in common with it - so also some operations will be proper to the
soul and others will be common also to what possesses it.63
[Plato holds] that the rational soul is already present in children, but that it is bound/impeded and does nothing/is lazy, because it is governed by the irrational powers. It does not,
however, arrive later as some believe. 59
Hence, th ere are important differences betw een Aristotelian a n d the Neoplatonic approach
which o rig in ate from the deployment o f the O D E triad: the so u l s powers cannot be en tirely
potential, fo r they exist necessarily as a consequence o f its etern al substance. Put an oth er
way: n on e o f the soul s powers can be pu re potentialities, for th e so ul enjoys a form al m o d e
o f being. O n the other hand, I want to su g g e st that the ODE triad can be considered a co m
patible d evelopm ent o f what we can fin d in A ristotles De anim a, nam ely that the essen ce o f
the soul m a n ifests itself in different dunam eis or energeiai. W h at is, however, dissim ilar is
Iam blichu s em phasis that different kin ds o f souls display rath er different types o f faculties
From this text it em erges that the ODE triad can be employed to distin gu ish the two lives o f
the soul an d th eir respective activities; and, w e may conclude, i f the soul is free from the
body, its e sse n c e actually corresponds to its powers and activities. Shortly thereafter, Iam
blichus p ro vid es the following sum m ary:
and activities. In other words, faculties and activities are con sid ered insofar as they depen d
Others, m aking a more prudent distinction and insisting that it is by a downward sequence
o f primary, secondary and tertiary processions that the different essences o f souls continu
ally proceed, such as one would expect o f those who enter upon the discussion (of these
matters) with arguments which are novel but unshakeable, will say that the operations
(energemata) o f universal and divine and immaterial souls in all cases come to accomplish-
on d ifferen t essences (types or kinds o f so u ls), and only qua d epen d in g on a certain essen ce
can they b e understood and characterized correctly.
H avin g said this, I would like to dw ell a bit more on the ro le o f the ODE triad in N eo
platonism . F rom several texts we can in fer that it can be applied o n different levels o f reality.
Proclus, fo r instance, says that every intellect h as ousia, dunam is and energeia (Elem. Theol.
60 On this see H elm ig 2 0 0 6 ,2 6 8 - 2 7 3 .

58
Cf. B ergem an n 2 0 0 6 , 232.
61
59
In Tim. I ll 3 4 8 .1 0 -1 3 : oxi tt]v Xoyixf|v tyuxhv x a i ev xolg xaiaiv elvai g i v oi'exai, TCEJtE&fjaSai be x a i a p y a v
62 Iam blichus, De anima 16 (Finamore / Dillon).
tmo xajv dXoytov buvagecov xQaxougvr|v, a/./.' oir/_ Ooxepov xqovco Jia g a y iy v e o S a i, xabaxeQ oiovxcd xiveg.
Cf. In Tim. II 116.7-8: xa 0 fiSovri eoixev 6 figexegog vofigx a i dvajtejtXr]G|j,Evu) xfjg aXoyon xal .xXrjggEXofig
4>vaecog. Pro clu s account is fundamentally different fro m Aristotles and the Sto ics. Regarding the former, con
See Militello 2 0 1 0 and Steel 1978, 5 9 -6 1.
63 Iam blichus, De anima 16 , p. 4 2 .1-9 (Finamore / Dillon), translated by Finam o re / Dillon 20 0 2: AOtt] xoivuv
55
xaxa ye n X d x w v a jtoXXofi 8el r) avxr| slvai xfj avg<j>t>x<p xfjg xjnjxfjg o w i a x a i fafj. AfjXov yap oxi t oxai pev
tic xo xo ivov, &Xk ejtel pexa( oXt| xa i iaipeoig x a i jxapdxaoig jceq! xo aropa x a i x a x a xqovov x a i xoxov 6 1a -
sider the fam o u s statement in De generatione animalium III 3, 736b2 7 - 2 8 that the intellect enters the body from
axaau; em ail pjxfotxsi, d>v o vSev eoxiv ev xfj x a auxf|v daropaxip fajfj, cpavepov 6f| x a i xofixo yEyovEV, (bg ovbev
without (thurathen). The Stoics, on the other hand, believe that the human soul becom es rational only at the age o f
iijtagxsi x a x a IlXdxcova xfiov xofi avvOemv fto o v xivr|pdxa>v ifiiov avxfjg xfjg ipuxfjg. O uxofiv maaeg u)f| x a x
14, see S V F l 1 4 9 , II 83 and 764, III 17. See also Iam blichus, De anima J 15 (Finam ore / Dillon), with the com m en
afixov rjv 8ixxf|, r) p.v x <dqujxt| xofi ocopaxog, rj be xoivr) p tx avxofi, oi)xa> x a i e veg yf|p a xa <xa> pev iftia ea xa i
tary by Finam ore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 , 117-119.
xfjg ijwxfjg, xct be x o iv a x a i xofi exovxog.
162 CHRISTOPH HELMIC
th e ra t io n a l so u l a n d is connected w it h it, a n d so is the vegetative s o u l w ith th e non-rational
m e n t i n t h e ir e ss e n c e s also, bu t th e y w il l b y n o m e a n s agree th a t in d iv id u a l sou ls, c o n fin e d

as th e y a r e in o n e sin g le fo rm a n d d iv id e d a m o n g bodies, are to b e im m e d ia te ly id en tified
s o u l), a n d b e c a u s e o f the sym p ath etic a ffe c tio n that arises f r o m t h is c o n n e c tio n w e speak o f
w ith t h e ir a c ts .64
o n e s o u l a n d sa y that the rational s o u l u s e s t h e other faculties a s in s tr u m e n t s . O f these fa c

u ltie s, I m e a n the non-rational o n e s a n d th e vegetative o nes; s o m e a r e in clo se r proxim ity
The sam e id ea is expressed in the next p aragrap h o f the work.
to th e ra t io n a l so u l, others less so ; th e n o n -ra tio n a l ones are in c l o s e r pro xim ity, because it
is th e ir n a tu r e to obey reason; th is is w h y w e c a lm them d o w n b y c h a s tis in g their desires:
I say, t h e n , th a t th e acts (ergo) are a n o u t g r o w t h o f the p o w ers in th e c a se o f those s o u ls
b e a tin g h i s b rea st h e calm ed h is h e a r t w it h th e following w o r d s , a n d a g a in endure, m y
w h ic h a r e c o m p le te in them selves, s im p le i n n a tu re and sep arate f r o m m atter.6?
h eart, t h is th in g , fo r you have e n d u r e d w o r s e th in g s, and a g a in a c c u s t o m y o u rs e lf to con

tro llin g a n g e r, p le a su re and p a in , e tc .66*
As we have see n , the ODE triad is em ployed by Neoplatonists to describe capacities a n d ac

tivities o f th e so u l as grounded in the so u l's essence. In the case o f the disembodied so u l, its
In his co m m en tary on Aristotles De anim a, Philoponus raises th e question o f the unity o f
faculties an d activities correspond to its essen ce, whereas in th e case o f the em bodied so u l
the Platonic tripartite soul and at the sam e tim e provides an in terestin g answer. The tripar
the activities o f the composite living b ein g ou gh t not to be attributed to the soul in itself.
tite soul lack s indivisibility and unity proper, b ein g united, rather, b y m ere continuity (sane-
This explains, fo r instance, why N eoplatonists did not consider A risto tles definition o f the
cheia). We are accustom ed to speak o f one so u l and to say that th e rational part uses the two
soul as the first actuality o f an instru m ental natural body (De an im a II i, 4 i2 b4 -6 ) a co r
lower parts as instrum ents because o f the sympathetic affection (sumpatheia) between the
rect characterisation o f the soul in itself. T h e disembodied life (zoie) o f the soul is e n tirely
three parts.
independent o f the body, while the em bod ied life is a projection (prohole) o f the soul. W h at
In the s a m e commentary, the N eoplatonist connects the facu ltie s o f the soul to what he
is more, b od y and soul do not form a com p ou n d entity in the strict sense; rather, the e m
calls the liv e s (zdiai) o f the soul. A s w e h ave seen above, su ch a w a y o f talking is com mon
bodied life is a body-related life in w h ich the im m aterial soul does not m ingle with the body,
Neoplatonic practice and can be foun d in Iam blichus, Proclus a n d others.6'
but is only lin k ed to it through a special k in d o f relation (schesis).
To su m u p , for Philoponus, the u n ity o f the embodied soul d o e s not seem to be a m ajor
concern. First, h e does not demand o f it u n ity in a strong sen se, i.e ., indivisibility. This cor-
5 Tripartition and unity of the soul

66 Philoponus, In de anima 8 .16 -2 9 , translated by van der Eijk 2 0 0 6 : pr) Cbiopeixa) be xig xi)v
Having d iscu sse d the ODE triad and its im portance for Neoplatonic psychology, let u s n o w
16ia)xixf|v
0
00105 lav ex8ivT]v xl ouv; xpElg xpuxots sxopev x a i imo xpicbv t|)uxv ioixoupE a ; Xeyn) y a p oxi Sxskeq Evco eiaa
f| ij>ux4 T<P o w p ax t Toxitcj) oxel pev ev xl Jtp a yp a jtotEtv, x a x a aWj0eiav 8e otix ev xl eaxiv, outco xaixfj xe akoycp
come back to the distinction o f different parts or faculties w ith in one and the sam e so u l
xai xfj (fmxixfi anvr|ppEvr| piav psv xtva auvexeiav hole! 61a xr[v auvd4>ei,av (e^fjjtxai y a p 315008x015 xfjg pev
and, m ore specifically, to the Platonic tripartite soul. Such a tripartition clearly ra ise s the
toyixfjg f| a k o yo g , xfjg
5e
akoyov
4 <|>UTixfj),
S ia be x v yivopevrjv ex xqg ax>va(j>lag xai>xr|g aupttdOeiav
plav ()>apEv, x a i 6x1 tog opyavoig XEXpTjxaixaig a l i a ig S u va p ea m j Xoytx4. xotixcov x<Sv uvdpecov, Xeyw
question w h eth er the soul can be consid ered a unity.
te
54 xd>v
atoycov x a i xaiv cjwixcov, at pev paXXov E yyito u ai xfl Xoytxfl xpx>xfl> a i be fftx o v at psv aXoyoi p&XXov
Eyyltonoi, 6ioxt Jtscjm xaai xaxaxoueiv Xoyotr 616 EJtiJtWixxovTEg taig EJtiSnplaig 3x500x8505 afixag ttoioupEV
N o w le t n o o n e ra ise this trivial d iffic u lty : W e ll then, do w e h a v e th re e so u ls and are w e
0x4605
m a n a g e d b y th re e so u ls? M y re s p o n s e is th a t ju s t as the soul, w h e n u n ite d w ith this bo d y,
5 e jx k 4 |a g X5a6tr|v 4vl3ta3iE piiGcp, x a i jtaXiv xExXaGi xgablr], x a i xu vxepo v a lk o jxox etXtig, e 0 l e
aaxixov x 5 a x E lv 0 5 Y 4 5 q&ovqg Mutrig, x a i o a a xo iau xa.
s e e m s to b e c o n stitu tin g one th in g , w h e r e a s in reality it is not o n e t h in g , lik ew ise <th e s o u l
67 Philoponus, In de anima 6.31-38, translated by van der Eijk 2006: Qg o u v a v a x >aA.ai(uadpevov EiJteiv,
that i s > c o n n e c te d w ith the n o n -ra tio n a l a n d vegetative sou l c r e a t e s o ne c o n tin u u m b e
eapev x a i avGpcojtoi x a i Jppa xa i ept|)uxa- x a i 015 pev avOgctatoi rag t o y ix a g 0 5 djtr]gi p aapEV SuvapEig
04
EXopev, dig be fpa xa g aXoyoug, tbg 8e Epx|jnxa X S tpxjxtjtdtg. eptjjuxa yap te y o p e v x a i xa 4>uxd- Epijjiixwv yap to
c a u se o f th e co n n e ctio n betw een t h e m (after all, the non-rational s o u l h a s b een attached to
au|Eo a i x a i Tp (|>EO a i x a i ysvvav opota Eauxolg. k ey o vra i yofiv xa i avxa ^ q v xe x a i x vavai- 4 e t a
>4 x a i
0avaxog jta p o n a la x a i attonalQi x4g '4OX0S yivxai. 0 0 a pev oxv ixonoi xa g xQelxxong tmag, dvdyxrjg x a i
64 Iamblichus, De anima 19, p. 4 4 .1 9 - 2 7 (Finam ore / Dillon), translated b y Finamore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 : O t 6
tag xaxaSeEO xepag, ooxexl 8 e xai epttakxv on y a p Snvaxov e^ eiv xag t o y ix a g bxivapeig p
datjjaXEOTEpov toxitiov biaxaxxopEvoi x a i 115 0 6 6 0 0 5 ttpcoxag xai 6eoxeQag x a i xpixag ooaitov xfjS tpuxfjg
Eoyrixoxag x a g xaxa6EOTEpag. - To sum up, then, we say that we are hum ans an d living beings and ensouled; in
5 ua-
0 ir] xoug xatvwg pev cutTaiaxcog 5 e avTiXapPavopevovg

0siiov x a i auXcov evegyripaxa 850001V ooxol Jtdvxwg 6r|Jtoo x a i eic
JtpoxEpov
Xopiôpevoi TE505CC05ETV 15 xo jipoato, 01005 a v X15
our capacity as h u m an s we have the rational faculties w e enumerated, in our capacity as living beings we have the
xcov Xoyaiv, x a pev xu v oXwv tpoxcov x a i
non-rational faculties, and in our capacity as ensouled beings we have the vegetative faculties. Ensouled is what
oooiav daioxEÊOxav xa 8e xa)v peQiaxwv < x a l> xpaxonpevcov ev evl ei8 el x a i Siaipoupevcov itepi T0X5 acbpaaiv
we also say o f plants; for it is characteristic o f ensouled beings to grow and to feed themselves and to generate
ofi&apwg aoYxa>5T|aooaiv 0605 Etvat xa o 0 fin e s Evepyouai.
<beings> sim ilar to themselves. For plants, at any rate, too, are said to be alive or dead; and life and death come
65
about by the presen ce or the absence o f the soul. N ow those <beings> that have the higher <forms of> life neces
Iamblichus, De anima 5 20 , p. 4 6 .2 -3 (Finamore / Dillon), translated by Finamore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 : Aeyco 84

ngooJiEcJmxevai pev xaig 8ovapeot xa epya exeivcov xcov xpoycov xcov auxoxEXtov xai povoEifiaov xai xwpiaxcbv
ajto xfjg ukr|g.
sarily also have the lower ones, but the reverse is not the case; for it is not possible to have the rational faculties
without having the lower ones first.
165
responds w e ll to the Neoplatonic view, re fe rred to above, th at the rational soul is only
included in th e canon o f Iamblichus, it w as commented on by P roclu s and his teacher Sy-
related (in th e sen se o f a schesis) to the body a n d the rest o f the s o u l.686
12Second, the soul can
70
9
rianus. W h ile Syrian u s commentary is lost, Proclus works tak e the form o f several essays
be considered a unity insofar as the parts are connected and sym pathetic, such that the
on d ifferen t th em es from Platos Republic, including a detailed ru n n in g commentary on the
rational part m ak es u se o f the two lo w er parts.
final m yth o f Er. Since Proclus m ay h ave com posed the essays in differen t periods and m ay
W hat d id other Platonists think about th e unity o f the tripartite soul? It is well kn ow n
even have rew o rked them at a later tim e, it is rather difficult to determ ine when the co m
that G alens com m entary on the Timaeus p rim arily dealt with th e m edical passages o f the
m entary attain ed its present form. It is possib le that the essays w e re put together and p u b
dialogue.6^ T h e doctor from Pergam on is probably the first com m en tator to assert that the
lished by a p u p il o f Proclus or a later editor.

Now, in the seventh essay our Neoplatonist faces the p ro b lem o f the relation o f the
Platonic so u l consists o f more than on e ousia.

For it is with good reason that those who posit that the soul has only one substance main
tain that it possess three main (genikotatas) faculties. Plato himself, however, teaches that
the ruling part (logistikon) of the soul does not have the same substance as the non-rational
and appetitive (alogon kai epithumetikon) part, but different, and that the former frequently
struggles against the thumoeidesP0
three parts o f the soul to the four kinds o f virtue.?? Proclus develops his thoughts on the
basis o f th e fo u rth book o f the Republic, w h ere Plato argues that o u r soul contains three d if
ferent parts (mere) which he also calls k inds (eide oder gene). A n d it becom es clear that w h en
Proclus talks o f different ousiai - I w ill leave the word u n translated in what follows - h e
refers to P lato s well-known tripartite division. In the Republic, P lato does not term the parts
o f the soul ousiai. Proclus, however, ascrib es to Plato the view th at the soul contains three
Note that G a le n attributes the diversity o f ousiai o f the soul to Plato him self. Such a v ie w is
parts that d iffe r kat ousian:
similar to th at o f the Middle Platonist N u m e n iu s, who thought th at the non-rational so u l is

He [sc. Plato] has shown that the three parts o f the soul differ kat ousian [~.].?4
not a faculty o f the soul, but another soul, entirely different fro m the rational soul.?1
It is le ss clear what the im plications o f G a le n s statement a re and it is likewise u n clear
whether accordin g to him the Platonic soul is one or many. I tak e it that the view that the
soul consists o f different ousiai is in ferred fro m the way the Tim aeus localizes the d ifferen t
parts o f the so u l within the body.
In a recen t article on Proclus, it h as b een claimed that h e w a s the first who adm itted
the substantial diversity o f soul (that is to say, the soul as com posed o f different su b
stances [ousiai]) and such a view h as, p rob ab ly somewhat incorrectly, been dubbed an
innovation b y Proclus.?2 First o f all, w ith re g a rd to the p resu m ed novelty o f plural ousiai
in psychology, it is interesting to note that Proclus repeats so m eth in g that can already be
This statem en t raises several questions. First, let us hypothetically assum e, for a m om ent,
that the do ctrin e o f the substantial diversity o f the soul was actu ally an innovation by Pro
clus. In th is ca se, it would be strange fo r h im to only introduce it in passing, without p ro
viding arg u m e n ts for it. Rather, Proclus, lik e Galen, ascribes the doctrine to Plato that talk
o f parts im p lie s that the parts are them selves ousiai. Second, w h a t is the right translation o f
ousiai in o u r text? Connected to this is a th ird point about the ontological status o f these
three d iffere n t ousiai. To start with the latter, fo r Proclus the th re e ousiai (the three parts o f
the Platonic soul) are obviously not on the sam e ontological level - something that the
translation su bstan ces might suggest. For later in the text P ro clu s argues that the low er
found in G a le n and, as we shall see shortly, in Iamblichus. Secon d , unlike the medical doc
faculties o f the soul are images o f the h ig h er ones.?? Such a view is to he understood against
tor Proclus explicitly connects the in n e r diversity o f the soul w ith the question o f its unity.
the b ack gro u n d o f the Neoplatonic top dow n approach to psych o lo gy already highlighted in
Third, it is n ot quite clear what ousia m e an s in this context. I f it w ere to mean substance
the first part o f the article.
(in an A ristotelian sense), it would certainly b e difficult to m a in ta in both that the soul is a
unity and th at its parts are different ousiai.
Proclus talks about the tripartite so u l a n d its different ousiai in the seventh essay o f
his Commentary on Platos Republic (In Rem p. I, 206-235). A lth o u gh the Republic w as not
73
74
68 See above, p. 155.
Already Porph yry had remarked that the Platonic tripartition o f the soul w a s m ade for the sake o f delineating
the virtues (fr. 2 5 3 .1 - 1 8 Smith); cf. Finamore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 , n o , and M aclsaac 2 0 0 9 .

Proclus, In Rem p. I 2 0 7 .9 - n : xa pepq X95 910795 jxe6si|ev xa xpia x a x ' o v a ia v dXXf|Xa>v 6ia<|>povxa [...].
The context o f the difference kat" ousian" is the use o f the principle one ousia, o n e perfection (206.25: pia y a p
69 On the comm entary, see D om e / Baltes 1 9 9 3 , 2 1 6 .
xeXEt6xr|5 p iag 0 0 0 6 15) in the discussion concerning the relation between parts o f the soul and virtues. Parallel
70 Galen, In Plat. Tim. S. 12 .1-3 (Schroder): x a x a X oyov |xev yap exstvoi p ia v o v a ia v xiOepevoi xf|g xpux'ns 6uv-
to this is a d iscu ssio n at the beginning o f Proclus Commentary to Platos First Alcibiades, which invokes a similar
upcig xqL5 a v x fjs elvai <j)aoi rag yevixw xaxag, 6 6e IlXdxarv on xqv anxqv o v a ia v xo Xoyunixov X95 11111795 xq>
principle at i .y - g f f : Jtt|)vx y ap Exdarcn rdiv ovxcov, S a iie p xo slvai 6id<J>opov, ovxoo 69 x a i f| xeXel6 xt|5 X0I5 psv
aX6yq> x a i BmGupryujwp <j>T)aiv tmdpxeiv, aXK exspov exeivov , xai xovxo x a l xq> Gnpoeibet jtoXXaxig 6 ia p a 7 -
aXX.T), X015 6 e aXXq, x a x a xi|v X95 060105 fi<t>aiv. I thank Antonio Vargas for the reference.
See In Rem p. I 2 3 5 .1 1-15 : xovxiov ovv etxoveg siaiv a i aXoyoi huvapsig, a i p v o p sxxixa i xoiv opeÊtov, a l 6 e
o au See D orrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 , Baustein 1 6 4 .3 and PP- 3 5 6 357.
75
71
Num enius, fr. 14 (des Places).
yvroaxtxai xd>v yvcboEcov f| pev (jiavxaaxixr) xf)g voTfuxrjs, 9 6e 01009x1x9 xfjg 6 0 ^ 0 0 x1x95, x a i 9 pev 0vpoei6r|5
72
Perkams 2 0 0 6 .
X95 a v a y w y o v o p e le io g ,9
5 imOtipqrixq X95 yEVEaiovpyov.
167
M oreover, P ro d u s answer to the q u estio n how the soul c a n be unitary i f it con tain s
Seen in this ligh t, the views o f Plotinus and Proclus are not as differen t as they may seem at
three d ifferen t ousiai consists in a rg u in g that the rational so u l stands to the non-rational
first sight. P roclu s too, in the above quoted seventh essay fro m the Republic commentary
soul as fo rm to matter.?6 This answ ers the question whether fo r Proclus the hum an so u l is
asserts that th e two lower parts o f the soul h ave the same fath ers, while the rational part is
one or m any. In sofar as the rational so u l is like form and the non-rational soul like m atter, it
of another father .79
can be con sid ered a unitary hylem orphic entity as it were. H en ce, talking about the alleg ed
Before w e com e to texts that predate the works of Proclus a n d that talk about different
substantial diversity o f the hum an so u l b oils down to asserting that the soul has d ifferen t
ousiai in the h u m an soul, I would like to add a small observation on Proclus use o f ousia.
parts or p o w ers and that these pow ers nevertheless form a unity.
As we have seen , the way he introduces the w ord in the seventh essa y seem s to suggest that
In ligh t o f the above, it seems reason ab le to take ousia to m e a n form o f being (in the
he considers it synonym ous with Platos mere or eide o f soul. A stro n g reason for this is that
sense o f fo rm o f life ). That the three parts o f the soul are not independent substances in
he does not fe e l the need to explain h is allegedly new term inology. But why does Proclus
the strong, A ristotelian sense o f the w o rd can b e seen from the fact that in Proclus view, as I
use ousia in stea d o f eidos, genos or meros? T h e reason is, I think, tw ofold. First, he uses ousia,
have m en tion ed above, the two low er ones are derived from th e rational soul, d epen d in g
because, as w e w ill see shortly, Iam blichus, and probably also P ro clu s teacher Syrianus,76
*80
78
upon it as im a g e s, traces or shadows.
had already u s e d it in a similar context before him . Second, as em erg es from the fragments
It is interestin g to note that Plotinus too discussed the tripartite division o f Plato. For
of Porphyrys lost work On the Faculties o f the Soul, Neoplatonists (and later, Platonizing
him, how ever, the two lower parts are o f the sam e essence (homoousios). Moreover, as w ith
Stoics such as Panaetius and Posidonius) tried to avoid the te rm meros, because o f its a s
Proclus, P lotin u s specifies that they are both traces/images o f the highest faculty o f the
sociations w ith corporeality.81

In a rg u in g that an entity can have d ifferen t powers without h avin g different parts, Por
soul, the logistikon (IV 4 [28], 28, 4 9 -6 9 ).? ? T h is is in accordance with one o f the N eo p la
tonic p rin cip les enumerated above, n a m ely that the lower p sych ic faculties proceed fro m
phyry com pares the soul to an apple and says: For example now , all o f the powers o f an
the h igher on es.
apple are in a sin gle apple, but the parts [sc. o f the apple] are separated, som e in one place
U nlike Proclus, Plotinus does not argu e that the two lo w est parts differ according to
and others in another.82 In the sam e way, the soul can be co n sid ered an entity with m an y
their su bstance. Scholars have argu ed that Plotinus rejects th e distinction betw een the
faculties (poludunamos), but without parts that are separated fro m each other. Furthermore,
appetitive an d irascible part o f the so u l in Ennead IV 4 [28], b u t this does not seem q u ite
Porphyrys teach er Plotinus had already argu ed against d istin gu ish in g different parts in the
true. Indeed, it w ould be rather su rp risin g i f a Neoplatonist w e re to reject a distinction that
SOul.83
In order to corroborate my reading o f ousia in Proclus, I fin a lly suggest turning to a text
can explicitly b e found in Plato.

The en d o f the passage in question m ak es it clear that P lotin u s is, in fact, prepared to
by Iam blichus w h ich shows that the term in ology o f different ousiai (in the sense o f m odes
distinguish betw een epithumetikon an d thumoeides, stressing at the sam e time that both
of being or m o d es o f life) in the so ul certainly antedates P ro clu s. For the evidence from
are only traces o f the rational soul an d that in sofar as they are traces they are o f the sam e
Iam blichus treatise On the Soul (preserved b y John o f Stobi in th e section on the soul) does
essence (homoousios). The latter does not, however, exclude the possibility that both are d is
not leave an y doubt that Iamblichus already considered Platos tripartite soul as consisting
tinct.
of ousiai. In w h a t follows, I shall quote the relevant passage fro m John o f Stobi at length.
W e c o u ld d ivid e the non-rational p a r t o f th e s o u l into the a p p etitive (epithumetikon) a n d t h e

ir a s c ib le (thumoeides), the fo rm e r b e in g th e ve g e tal part an d th e latter a trace e m e r g in g
fr o m it, to d o w ith blood or bile o r th e c o m p o u n d creature; b u t t h is w o u ld be a m ista k e n
79 Produs, In Remp. I 2 15 .2 -7 : o n 8 e vp o g etuOu g l a ouyyeveoteoov t) koyw naxa nAdroiva, Srjkov ag(|>ai

yap Tfijv auTobv jrareptov, ArVyog be akkov jrarpog- dg<|>oi vryta xa i g e t dA.AV|A.cov o v r a r) (.it) ovra, kbyog be
a G avaro v anj>a> d ftex ra yvaiaEiog, Aoyog be (jjuaei yvoiaTixog.
d iv is io n s in c e it in vo lves so m e th in g p r io r a n d som eth ing p o sterio r. I n fact there is n o th in g
80 There is no d irect evidence for this, but the fact that Produs most probably revised Syrianus commentary on
to p r e v e n t u s fr o m sayin g that th e y a re b o th posterior, and that t h e d iv is io n is o f traces th a t
the Republic m ak es it probable.
are d e r iv e d fro m th e sam e so u rce.?8
81
In his De anima, Iamblichus frequently critidzes the Stoics for their m aterialistic psychology.
82 Cf. Finam ore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 ,1 0 4 , who also refer to Alexander, De anima 3 0 . 2 9 - 3 1 .6 : f| S e T[nixq oil govov o vy
dig gEYE og,

76 See Proclus, In Remp. I 234.2iff. The sam e idea can be found in Philoponus, In De anima 19 8 .2 -3.
77 The passage is translated in Sorabji 2 0 0 4 , 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 .
78
Plotinus, I V 4 [28] 2 8 .6 3 - 6 9 , translated by B. Fleet, slightly modified: A kk' el to akoyov tfjg qnixfig 5 icuqoIto
akk' ovbe dig agiBgog eon pEgiarfj. on y a q Eig a Suugoupev at>rr|v, dig ex toutcov xEyaigiopevaiv
akka rfj nov huvdpeaiv aiv exet xaTagiGgfjaEi x a i Tfj xajv Sia<j)ogcov auruiv Etigeaei
oir/xEiuevqv S iaip o u p ev,
tt|v SiaipeaLV auTfjg jtoiou a, dig a v el to pfjAov xig S ia ig o iq eig te EuoiSiav x a i eig euygo iav x a i tig axqpa x a i
elg xupov. f| yiuj roiafiTT| tou gi|Aoti Siaipeaig oute dig adigarog ylverai, el x a i o n p a k ia ra odipa to prjAov, oute
dig doiGpou. Iam blichus too adduces the example, but in order to illustrate the differentiation o f powers in Stoic
tig to JU0upr|Tix6v x a i BupoEiSeg xa i to p iv Eip to (fivTixov, to 8e GupoeiSeg eg aiiro u lyvog jteqI a lg a r) yokpv
r) to auvaucpoTEQOV, oiix a v oq9t| f| dvTiSiaioEaig y lv o ito , rob gev jiqoteqou, ro b 8e voxeqov ovtog. H o v5 ev
psychology (De anima n [Finamore / Dillon], partly identical with SV F 2 .8 2 6 ).
xaiAiisi ap4>co uoTEpa x a i tolv EjayevopEvcov ex ton aiiTofi Tqv Sialgeaiv s iv a r
83
168 CHRISTOPH H ELM IG
See the passages referred to in Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 a , 37 2 note 175.
Note that in th e very end o f the extract, Iam blichu s also provides an interesting d istin ctio n
ousia. That is to say, an ousia can be the source o f different p o w ers, w hile parts always differ
o f psychic p a rts and faculties. This b rin g s u s b ack to the first p a rt o f the paper.
kat ousian. S u ch a scheme is fully com patible with what Proclus said in commenting on the
Republic. M oreover, it fits with the N eoplatonic ODE triad d iscu sse d in some detail above
H o w , t h e n , a re the p o w ers [sc. o f th e so u l] d istin g u ish e d ? A c c o r d in g to the Stoics, so m e a r e

d is t in g u is h e d b y th e difference o f t h e b o d y p a r ts that underlie t h e m . F o r th ey say that e v e r
d iffe re n t e fflu e n c e s extend fro m th e r u lin g e le m e n t, som e to t h e e y e s , o th ers to the e a rs ,
o th e rs to o th e r s e n s e organs. O th e r p o w e r s a r e d istinguish ed b y t h e ir in d ivid u al q ualitative
n a tu re in th e s a m e substrate; fo r e v e n a s th e a p p le has in th e s a m e b o d y sw eetn ess a n d
and em ployed by the Neoplatonist to d escribe the relation b etw een the essence and powers
of the soul.
At first sigh t, it m ay be a cause o f irritation that Iam blichus is still speaking o f parts in
Plato. H ow ever, this is undoubtedly a m atter o f his repeating P lato s ow n m anner o f speak
p le a s a n t o d o u r, so a lso the ru lin g fa c u lt y c o m p r is e s in the s a m e s u b s tra te im agin atio n , a s
ing.8
586 Secondly, w e can observe, I believe, that Iamblichus is re-interpreting the Platonic tri
8
4
sen t, a p p e titio n , a n d reason.
partite d ivisio n in term s o f the differen t m od es of being b elo n g in g to life (ousiai zoes).
A c c o r d in g to th e A ristotelian s a n d all w h o consider the s o u l to b e w ith o u t parts, th e
Hence, i f w e com pare Iamblichus w a y o f presenting Platos th eo ry o f the soul with what
p o w e r s o r e n o t d istin g u ish e d > in ousia, b u t ra th er according to th e k in d s o f effects th a t
Proclus h ad sa id in h is commentary on the Republic, we obtain fu rth e r support for the read
th e y c a n p ro d u c e .
A c c o r d in g to Plato, in o ne s e n s e th e s o u l is called trip a rtite s in c e it varies in th r e e
w a y s i n l i f e s d iffe re n t m o des o f b e in g (en heterais ousiaig zoes), b u t in an o th er sen se it h a s
m a n y p o w e r s , th e so u l not n o w e x h ib it in g d iffe re n c e s in life s m o d e s o f b e in g (feat ousian
zoes) b u t b e in g d istin g u ish e d in th e s a m e s u b s tra te by m a n y in d iv id u a l properties. A n d i n

g e n e ra l, a p a rt d iffe rs fro m a p o w e r in t h is , th a t the part e x h ib its a d ifferen ce o f ousia,
w h e re a s t h e p o w e r exhibits a d iffe re n tia tio n i n production o r c r e a t io n in th e sa m e ousia .84
ing o f ousia n o t as substance, but as m od e o f being or m o d e o f life .87 Finally, note that
the text, as it stands, clearly proves that in Iam blichus we already fin d a concept o f the soul
involving d ifferen t m odes o f being (ousiai).88
H aving sa id this, let us return o n ce again to Proclus. It is undoubtedly correct that he
speaks about differen t ousiai within one an d the same soul. H ow ever, this does not m ean
that we are d ealin g with different su bstan ces in the strong A ristotelian sense o f the word.
Rather, the so u l betrays different m od es o f life within itself.8^
The text n a m e s three schools o f philosophy, nam ely the Stoics, th e Peripatetics (A risto te
From all th is it emerges that fo r two reaso n s it is rather p rob lem atic to assert that the
lians) and Plato. The Stoics, according to Iam blichus, operate w ith a twofold distinction.
substantial diversity o f the soul w as an innovation by P roclus. First, before Proclus w e
While so m e faculties or powers (dunameis) d iffer according to th e specific bodily p a rts in
already fin d th e doctrine o f different ousiai in the soul. Second, th ese (three) ousiai are not
which they a re situated, others are situated in one and the sam e substrate.
to be con sid ered different substances, but different modes o f b ein g. Unlike Aristotelian
The A ristotelians, considering the soul an entity without parts (ameriston), do n o t d is
substances, th ey are not items o f the sam e ontological category, but different modes o f
tinguish p o w e rs according to different ousiai, b u t according to th e effects that they are able
existence in th e hierarchical organization o f reality. They are distin ct ontological levels at
to produce .85
which things m a y exist and in this case the tw o lower ousiai are ontologically dependent and
Plato, in Iam blichus view, draw s an interesting distinction betw een parts and p o w ers
to the effect th at parts are related to d ifferen t ousiai, whereas po w ers depend on the sa m e
derived fro m th e rational ousia. Thus, the difference of soul kat ousian can be seen as a N eo
platonic re ad in g o f the Platonic tripartite soul.
84 Iamblichus, On the Soul n , p. 36.1-15 (Finamore / Dillon), translated by Finamore / Dillon 2002: Thug ouv
5iaxgivovxai; K a t a pev xoug Zxmixong evi.ai pev Siacbogoxqti <xwv> vitoxEigivcov acoucertov irveupaxa yap
cuto xou f|yepovixou cjtaaiv ouxoi 6 uxxelvelv aXha x a x aXha, xa pev elg 64>0akp,oti5, xa 8 e elg toxa, x a 8e eic
aXka a la 0r|xr|Qia- m a t 6 e ihioxqxi 11016x13x05 rcspl xo aiixo xmompevov woneg yap xo pqXov ev xm auxw awpaxi xf]v Ykvxuxqxa exet x a l xqv eia>5iav, outgo x a i xo fiyepovixov ev xauxcp 4>avxaaiav, anyxaxa 0 Eaiv, ogpqv,
Xoyov onvEtXq<()E. K a r a S e xoug ApiaxoxEkixovg x a i jxavxag oaot apegiaxov xqv i|mxr|v 5 tavoouvxai x a x a p,ev
xf|v ovoiav <ou 5 iaxpivovxai> at Swapeig, x a x a Se ei5 q wv Siivavxai ixoleiv. K a x a 6 e IlXdxtova aXkiog iiiv
Xeyexai f| ijjvxfl xgqiegfig, tog ev exegaig ouaiaig xguxXfj ^wfjg JiagaXXaxxonaa, aXXwg 5 e itokuSuvapog, ouxetl
xax oiiatav ^coqg SiacfiEgonoa, ev xaiixw 5 e jxoXXalg iStoxqai diaxpivopevr]. K a i oXwg pegog 6ovdpswg xatirr)
6ievt|voxV, fj xo pev pegog otiaiag EXEgoxqxa, q Se Suvapig ev xatixcp yevvqxixqv r) itoiqxixqv Sidxoiaiv
ixagioxqoiv.
For parallel texts from the Platonic tradition, see D orrie / Baltes 20 0 2a , 373.
85 The text transm itted by the mss. is difficult, i f not impossible to understand. With Finamore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 ,
86 Plato h im se lf either talks about parts (mere) or kinds (eide) of the soul, w h e n he refers to its tripartition; see
Dome / Baltes 2 0 0 2 a , 345.
87 Proclus h im se lf refers to the three parts as kinds o f life (eide tes zoies, In Remp. I 230 .29 ).
88 For such a u se o f ousia cf. Iamblichus, De anima J 1 9 and
5 31 (Finamore / Dillon). Perkams 2 0 0 6 ,17 0 note 16
writes: Obviously, Iamblichus acknowledges that different types of soul are substantially different.... but he wants
to avoid the conclusion that the one soul in w h ich they are united is a multiplicity o f substances.
However, as w e have seen, from Iamblichus De anima 11 (Finamore / Dillon) it clearly emerges that the N eo
platonist distinguished different ousiai in one and the sam e soul. Hence, there are important points o f contact be
tween Iam blichus view and what Proclus says m uch later in his Commentary on the Republic. For more references
to the substantial diversity in Iamblichus and other Neoplatonists, see M ilitello 2 0 10 , 17 3 note 15, and above
p. 16 6 -17 0 .
I have accepted the emendation suggested by W achsm uth. It makes good sense and renders the implied contrast
89 Note that Perkam s himself, in a later publication, actually speaks o f ousiai as Seinsformen (modes o f
between Stoics, Aristotelians and Plato com prehensible.
being); see Perkm ans 2 0 0 8 , 227.
171
6 Conclusion
C h ia r a d o n n a , Riccardo ( 2 0 0 9 )
P lo tin , la m em o ire et la c o n n a iss a n c e d es intelligibles , Philosophic antique 9 , 5 -3 3.
One o f the a im s o f this article was to show th at Neoplatonic psych ology differs in m any re
spects fro m h o w Plato or Aristotle d iscu ssed the nature and activities/pow ers o f the soul. It
C la r k e , E m m a C . / Dillon, Jo h n M . / H ersh bell, Jackson P . ( 2 0 0 3 )
Iam blichus. On the Mysteries, A tlan ta.
is im portant to realize that for ph ilosophers su ch as Iamblichus an d Proclus the soul is first
of all an im m ortal, incorporeal entity that su bsists independent o f a body. Hence, it m u st
not be con sid ered prim arily a first actuality o f an instrum ental natural body, as Aristotle
C r e m e r , Friedrich (19 6 9 )
D ie chaldaischen Orakel und Jam blichs De mysteriis, M e is e n h e im a m G ia n .
defines it in De anim a II i, 4 i2 b4~ 6. A part fro m this, there are several other fundam ental
C iir s g e n , D irk (2 0 0 2 )
differences betw een Neoplatonic and A ristotelian psychology. T h e m ost telling is certainly
D ie Rationalitat des Mythischen. Der philosophische Mylhos bei Platon und seine Exegese im N eu
platonismus, Berlin.
that N eoplatonist analysis o f the so u l is characterized by a strictly top down approach,

where the lo w er form s o f soul proceed from the higher ones. In th is view, the rational so ul
is the m ost b a sic form o f soul and lo w er fo rm s o f soul (non-rational, vegetative) can be con
sidered accretions o f it.
In h is De anim a, Iamblichus d istin gu ish es between two liv e s o f the soul, one em bo
Dillon, John (1993)

Ia m b lic h u s noera theoria o f A risto tle s Categories , in: H .J . B lu m e n th a l / F.F . Fin am o re
(e d s.), Iamblichus, the Philosopher, Io w a City, 6 5 -7 7 .
D illo n , Jo h n (^ 20 0 9 )
died and on e separate from the body. T h is particular Neoplatonic notion o f life brought m e
Iam blichi Chalcidensis In Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragm enta, ed. with transl. a n d
to challenge the view that Proclus w as the first to refer to the so called substantial diversity
c o m m , b y J.M . Dillon, W estbury.
of the soul. T h is, I take it, is no innovation o f Proclus, but can already be found in Iam bli
chus w ork On the Soul and goes ultim ately as far back as the M idd le Platonist Num enius
D o d d s , E ric Robertson (2i 9 6 3 )
Proclus. The Elements o f Theology, O xfo rd .
and G alens Commentary on Platos Timaeus. In the latter, the su bstan ces o f the soul are al
ready held to be identical with its parts. In Iam blichus and P ro clu s, they are not substances
in the strong sense, but rather different fo rm s o f being/life in o n e and the same soul. That
D o r r ie , H ein ric h (1957)

K o n tro v e rse n urn die S e e le n w a n d e ru n g im k a iserzeid ich en P la to n ism u s , Hermes 8 5 ,
4 14 -4 35 .
the three ousiai are not on the sam e ontological level and that th ey are not independent o f
each other em erg es inter alia from a text w h ere Proclus asserts th at the two lower parts are
D o r rie , H ein ric h / Baltes, M atth ia s ( 1 9 9 3 )
derived fro m an d im ages o f the rational part.
D er Platonismus in der Antike I II : Der Platonismus im 2. und 3 . Jahrh un dert nach Christus, Bausteine 7 3 -2 0 0 : Text, Ubersetzung, Kommentar, Stuttgart.
D o r r ie , H ein rich / Baltes, M atth ia s ( 2 0 0 2 a )
D er Platonismus in der Antike V I 1: Die philosophische Lehre des Platonismus (3), Von der Seele als
der Ursache aller sinnvollen Abldufe, Bausteine 151-16S: Text, Ubersetzung, Kommentar, Stuttgart.
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lamblichus, Proclus and Philoponus on Parts,

i Neoplatonic psychology - some introductory remarks

IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS 149

much to ou r understanding o f N eoplatonic psychology. 5

[7] An elaborate faculty psychology distinguishing between different kinds of knowl

Numenius, fr. 1 4 (des Places).

Hadot 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 0 2 , 2 0 0 4 , Sorabji 2 0 0 4 , Lautner 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 2 ,2 0 0 4 , 2 0 0 6 , a n d 2 0 0 9 .

inasmuch as a lifeless substance is bereft o f knowledge.

See Proclus, Elem. Theol.

Commentators on Aristotle Series.

This will be discussed in greater detail below.

IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS

2 Aristotelian and Neoplatonic Psychology

in our le a rn in g process these logoi h ave to b e recollected an d bro u gh t to our attention.

also include A ristotle.

Hence, N eoplaton ic psychology is in tim ate ly connected w ith a system atization o f P la

(Finamore / Dillon), translated by Finam ore / Dillon 20 0 2: Tauxtj

feringe 1 9 9 9 , and, m ore recently, Helmig / Vargas 2 0 1 4 an d Helmig / Vargas forthcoming.

xoj pexeyeoGat fj ev xoj xExgaoO ai xoj okm cpq>.

Aristoteles, De anima III 4 , 4 2 9 b3 J-4 3 0 ai.

22 On this see H elm ig 2 0 1 2 , especially chs. IV, V I and V II.

23 On this see G ertz 20 11.

24 On this interesting discussion, see Dorrie 19 5 7 , Sm ith 1 9 8 4 , Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 b , 3 4 4 - 3 8 2 (Bausteine 17 8

and 179), and H e lm ig 20 0 5.

IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS

ticipates b oth in tim e and eternity.

The distinction is grounded in the so u l s knowledge o f itself, or intro-version, w hich

Proclus a rg u e s is impossible for an extended o r bodily substance. The activity o f self-know l

can be su m m arized as follows:

tow ards th e b o d y], th en it brings fo rth fr o m it s e l f lower lives w h i c h are n ecessary to en

b eco m es e n t w in e d an d m ixes w ith th e s e in fe r io r lives and a lso , t h r o u g h th e m , w ith the

body. H o w e v e r , i f it ascend s again a n d fre e s it s e l f from the body, t h e n it p u ts o f f all these

to consider so u l only insofar as it depends on or is connected to a body.

be seen as im a g e s o f higher ones (phantasia as an image o f nous a n d doxa as an image o f

attributed to the soul s possession o f v e h ic le s (ochemata), w h ic h are at once im m aterial

Baustein 17 3.4 : N em esiu s o f Emesa, De natura hominis 3, S. 3 9 .11-4 2 .9 .,2 2 -2 3 an d

43-I_9 [Morani]) and 4 0 6

27 Proclus, Elem. Theol. $ 19 1 (Dodds): I l a o a

world soul (see, e.g., Plotinus IV 3 [27] 2 2 .8 -9 , HI

9 [13] 3 .3 - 4 and Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 b , 4 0 6 with notes 251 and

(Every soul is indestructible and imperishable).

29 See Dorrie / Baltes 2 0 0 2 a , 373, and Festugiere

F- extt | tt|v pfv o v o la v akbviov exei , rf|v S e E v ep y u a v

See, for instance, Rapp 2007.

Philoponus, In de anima 1.9 -10 .

and disembodied lives o f the soul.

the contribution b y Opsom er 2 0 0 6 : cf. also Dorrie / Baltes 2002a, Baustein 16 5 .

tfimimq, oitou 8 b ovTtog ovTa itavta.

See Dorrie / Baltes 20 0 2 b , Baustein 17 2 w ith the detailed commentary on pp. 16 4 -2 1 8 .

IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS

standard an d it is fully compatible w ith w h at Aristotle says in h is De anima.

dunamis - energeia mentioned above.

3 The ousia o f the soul and its capacities

this. First, in h is On the eternity o f the world, Philoponus writes:

T h u s, P r o c lu s , too, plainly and o p e n ly a g r e e s w it h us about th e d iffe r e n c e o f the two phil

156 CHRISTOPH H ELM IG

IAMBLICHUS, PROCLUS AND PHILOPONUS ON PARTS

at providing a rough overview o f different theories (doxai) o f th e soul. However, I in te n d to

etc.)?1 d iffer fro m each other according to th eir genus.

suggest in w h a t follows that there m ay b e m o re to Iamblichus argu m en t. It points, I b elieve,

xa xaiv Oeicov t|mxaiv a y g a v x a x a i anXa, Exega 8 e x a xaiv 6atpoviaiv 8gactxf|gia, x a 8e

46 Finamore / Dillon 2 0 0 2 , 76.