LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A.

SORIANO, Petitioners - versus - BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE

COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK),* LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO A.
SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE,
Respondents
FACTS:
Petitioner Lolita A. Soriano (Lolita) alleged that she is a stockholder of petitioner Lisam
Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and a member of its Board of Directors, designated as its Corporate
Secretary. LEI, in the course of its business operation, acquired by purchase a parcel of
residential land with improvement situated at Legaspi City.
Lilian S. Soriano and the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., (hereafter Spouses Soriano), in their
personal capacity and for their own use and benefit, obtained a loan from defendant PCIB
(Legaspi Branch) (now known as Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.) in the total amount of P20
Million, wherein security for the payment of the aforesaid credit accommodation, Spouses
Soriano, as officers of LEI, without authority and consent of the board of LEI and with the use
of a falsified board resolution, executed a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned
property of plaintiff LEI in favor of defendant PCIB, and had the same registered with the Office
of the Registry of Deeds, Legaspi City to the prejudice of plaintiffs.
Spouses Soriano, falsified the signatures of Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary and
director of plaintiff LEI, in a document denominated as board resolution purportedly issued by
the board of plaintiff LEI, making it appear that plaintiff LEI's Board met and passed a board
resolution authorizing the Spouses Soriano to mortgage or encumber all or substantially all of
the properties of plaintiff LEI, when in fact and in truth, no resolution of that nature was ever
issued by the board of plaintiff LEI.
In order to remedy the defects in the mortgage transaction entered by the Spouses Soriano and
PCIB, the former signed a document denominated as Deed of Assumption of Loans and
Mortgage Obligations and Amendment of Mortgage wherein in said document, LEI was
made to assume the P20 Million personal indebtedness of the Spouses Soriano with defendant
PCIB, when in fact and in truth it never so assumed the same as no board resolution duly
certified to by plaintiff Lolita as corporate secretary was ever issued to that effect. Lolita, upon
discovery, immediately made demands upon Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A.
Soriano, Jr., to free subject property of plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by paying in full
their personal indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20 Million. Defendants,
for reason only known to them, continued and still continue to ignore said demands, to the
damage and prejudice of plaintiffs.
Petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for Annulment of Mortgage with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages with the RTC of Legaspi
City. RTC issued TRO, and, after hearing, went on to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondent PCIB (now known as Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.) from proceeding with
the auction sale of the subject property.
Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. filed an Answer while PCIB filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state
cause of action, and litispendencia. Petitioners filed an Opposition thereto, while PCIB's codefendants filed a Motion to Suspend Action.
RTC issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' Complaint. Petitioners then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. While awaiting resolution of the motion for

reconsideration, petitioners also filed, a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, amending

paragraph 13 of the original complaint adding that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made
demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect
the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no
such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in behalf of
the corporation.
The trial court issued the questioned Order denying both the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. The trial court held that no new argument had been raised
by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration to address the fact of plaintiffs' failure to allege
in the complaint that petitioner Lolita A. Soriano made demands upon the Board of Directors of
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. to take steps to protect the interest of the corporation against the
fraudulent acts of the Spouses Soriano and PCIB. The trial court further ruled that the Amended
Complaint can no longer be admitted, because the same absolutely changed petitioners' cause
of action.
ISSUE: WON RTC should have allowed the motion to admit an amended complaint
HELD:Yes.
It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr.
already filed their Answer, to petitioners' complaint, and the claims being asserted were made
against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint
may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right.The granting
of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments
should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was
not made to delay the action.
However, as enunciated in Valenzuela case, even if the amendment substantially alters
the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought
to serve the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits
and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was
made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to
answer and to prepare for trial.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real
facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and
unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the
taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.
Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting
for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended
complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and

executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the
amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the
higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all
parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the
Court overrules the trial court's denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders
the admission of the same.
REMEDIAL LAW > RULES 10-14> Amendment
HENRY CHING TIU, CHRISTOPHER HALIN GO, and GEORGE CO, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 151932; August 19, 2009
DOCTRINE/S:
Actions Pleadings and Practice The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter
particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that discretion is broad,
subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of
action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.The granting
ofleave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressedto the sound discretion of the
trial court; and that discretion isbroad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments
shouldnot substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory ofthe case, or that it was
not made to delay the action.Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if theamendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense,such amendment could still be allowed when
it is sought to servethe higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; andsecure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
Same Same The courts should be liberal in allowing the amendments to pleadings to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented,
their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.The
courts should be liberal inallowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suitsand in
order that the real controversies between the parties arepresented, their rights determined, and
the case decided on themerits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest inthe early
stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where theamendment was made before the trial of
the case, thereby givingthe petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for
trial.
Same Same Amendments of Pleadings Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and
should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order to speed up the trial of the case or
prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense.Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should beliberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every
case,may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in orderto speed up the trial of
the case or prevent the circuity of actionand unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are
circumstancessuch as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the
like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.
FACTS:

1. PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against herein petitioners-representatives of

Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI) due to the latters failure to pay loans after several
demands made by PBCOM.
2. Pursuant to said loans, a duly notarized Surety Agreement was executed by AWRIs
Directors, before the controversy arose.
3. In their Answer, petitioners-representatives ofAWRI alleged, among other things, that
they were not personallyliable on the promissory notes, because they signed theSurety
Agreement in their capacities as officers of AWRI.They claimed that the Surety
Agreement attached to thecomplaint as Annexes A to A2were
falsified,considering that when they signed the same, the words Inhis personal
capacity did not yet appear in the documentand were merely intercalated thereon
without theirknowledge and consent.
4. PBCOMadmitted its mistake in making the insertion andexplained that it was made
without the knowledge andconsent of the notary public. PBCOM maintained that
theinsertion was not a falsification, but was made only tospeak the truth of the parties
intentions. PBCOM alsocontended that petitioners were already primarily liable onthe
Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion wasmade, having admitted in their
pleadings that theyvoluntarily executed and signed the Surety Agreement inthe original
form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application ofthe Rules, emphasized that the
motion incorporated in thepleading can be treated as a motion for leave of court
toamend and admit the amended complaint pursuant toSection 3, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court.
RTC- RTC issued an Orderallowing the substitution of the altered document with theoriginal
Surety Agreement.
- Denied subsequent MR
CA (on Petition for Certiorari) Dismissed Petition!
5. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:

WON the amendment / substitution of altered document with the original

Surety Agreement was proper.

DECISION:

YES!

XXX
With respect to PBCOMs right to amend its complaint,including the documents annexed
thereto, after petitionershave filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules ofCourt
specifically allows amendment by leave of court. Thesaid Section states:
SECTION 3.Amendments by leave of court.Except as
provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments

may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be
refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with
intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in
this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after
notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,26 thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the
former rule in such manner that the phrase or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered was strickenoffand not retained in the new rules. The clear import
of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, the amendment
may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This should only be true,
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or
defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the
rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is amatter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of thetrial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to thelimitations that the
amendments should not substantiallychange the cause of action or alter the theory of the case,
or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if
the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still
be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay;
and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition ofactions and proceedings.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments topleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits
and in order thatthe real controversies between the parties are presented,their rights
determined, and the case decided on the meritswithout unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in theearly stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where theamendment was made
before the trial of the case, therebygiving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer
and to prepare for trial.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generallyfavored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance ofjustice in order that every case, may so far as possible, bedetermined on its real
facts and in order to speed up thetrial of the case or prevent the circuity of action
andunnecessary expense. That is, unless there arecircumstances such as inexcusable delay or
the taking ofthe adverse party by surprise or the like, which mightjustify a refusal of permission
to amend.
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the
altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have
submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that ,through
inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words IN
HISPERSONAL CAPACITY were inserted to conform to the banks standard practice. This
alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOMs counsel had no idea
that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the
surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously resolved.

Remedial Law > Rules 10-14 > AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD., respondents.
DOCTRINE: CAN A COMPLAINT STILL BE AMENDED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT BEFORE AN
ANSWER HAS BEEN FILED, EVEN IF THERE WAS A PENDING PROCEEDING FOR ITS
DISMISSAL BEFORE THE HIGHER COURT? SEC 2, RULE 10 Pleadings may only be
amended as a matter of right BEFORE a responsive pleading is served.
FACTS: Petitioner (Remington Industrial Sales Corp) filed complaint for sum of money and
damages arising from breach of contract against Industrial Steels with Ferro Trading GMBH as
principal defendant, and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and BS
separately moved for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. RTC denied the motions
and the MR. ISL filed answer.
British Steel separately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA claiming that
complainant failed to show that it had commited any act or ommission violating Remingtons
rights. Complaint only stated that BS and Ferro were just mere suppliers of goods for ISL.
Remington then sought to amend the complaint by incorporating additional facts to have a
cause of action against BS by using Sec 2, Rule 10, stating that it can amend its complaint as a
matter of right because respondent (BS) has not yet filed a responsive pleading.
RTC RULING: Amended Complaint is noted and other proceedings were held in abeyance until
CA decides on the petition for certiorari and prohibition of BS.
CA RULING: Granted BS writ of certiorari, ordered judge to dismiss without prejudice the
Complaint against BS. MR was also dienied.
ISSUE:
1. WON CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint agasint BS for lack of cause of
action under the original complaint even if it was already amended as a matter of right, and
sufficient causes of action are averred in the amended complaint.
2. WON CA erred in holding if Remington wants to pursue its case against BS, it has to refile
complaint, pre-empting the right of the lower court to rule on amended complaint.
HELD: YES. CA erred in dismissing the complaint because it the amendment made by
Remington was done in a timely manner and as a matter of right, which was before BS gave its
answer in accordance to Sec 2, Rule 10 of the ROC. The decision of the CA will result into
multiple suits.
THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED INSTEAD OF IT BEING
DISMISSED.
Sec 2, rule 10 - Before the answer, a complaint may be amended as a matter of right. It can
amend to introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. During this time, rights of
defendant have not yet been violated because he hasnt filed an answer yet. Considerable

leeway is given the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, PRIOR the
filing of answer.
Sec 3, rule 10 - After the answer, subtantial amendment of complaint is not allowed without
leave of court. RATIONALE: any material change in the allegations already contained in the
complaint could prejudice the rights of defendant who has alerady set up his defense in the
answer.
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS vs. CITY OF URDANETA
566 SCRA
FACTS:
Respondent Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for annulment of contracts with prayer for
preliminary injunction and Temporary restraining order against respondent City of Urdaneta and
petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean Pacific
Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by Cesar D.
Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five
contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management of a fourstorey twin cinema
commercial center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250
million, funded by a loan from the Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the
contractor was allegedly paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are
void because the object is outside the commerce of men which is a piece of land belonging to
the public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary
school. Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to management and
lease of the future building, are also void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco
family.
Urdaneta City Mayor Perez filed an answer asserting that the contracts were properly
executed with prior authority by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and that Del Castillo has no
capacity to sue and the case has no cause of action. After pretrial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered
its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to (1)
withdraw Urdaneta Citys Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff;
(3) admit Urdaneta Citys complaint; and (4) conduct a new pretrial which were granted by RTC
Urdaneta City.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the following grounds: (1)
defective verification and certification of nonforum shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to
submit certified true copies of the RTCs assailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted,
and (3) lack of written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not
personal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions
in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its trial brief, that the execution of the contracts
was in good faith.
HELD: NO.

Section 5 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected to at the
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the
action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.
Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pretrial Order dated April 1, 2002 already
defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is presentation of the
parties evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts
will be relevant and admissible. Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary
amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still given leeway to
consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not necessarily prevail over
documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A partys testimony in open court may also
override admissions in the Answer.
REMEDIAL LAW I > RULE 10-14 > SUMMONS
LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION AND ROSITA DIMALANTA, respondents
G.R. No. 108538. January 22, 1996
Rule 14, Section 15, ROC - Extraterritorial service. - When the defendant does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has
or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant
has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 7 or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such
leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice,
within which the defendant must answer.
FACTS:
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife. They are
both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the
Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and
Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
On March 9, 1992, private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for partition of real property and accounting of rentals
against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte before the Regional Trial Court

of Manila, Branch 48. The subject of the action is a three-door apartment located in
Paco, Manila.
Thus, private respondent Dimalanta averred that for purposes of communication, her sister,
petitioner Lourdes Valmontesent a letter to her counselin which, in regard to the partition of the
property in question, Lourdes referred private respondents counsel to her husband as the party
to whom all communications intended for her should be sent.
Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who at the time,
was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar as he
was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A. Valmonte, on the
ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent
moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in
behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondents motion.
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private respondents motion to declare
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied
on September 23, 1992. Whereupon, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and
declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A copy of the appellate courts decision was received
by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte on January 15, 1993 at his Manila office and on January 21,
1993 in Seattle, Washington which prompted the private respondent to file a petition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons
RULING: NO.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, reversing the Court of Appeals findings that
petitioner was validly served with summons and thereafter reinstating the Decision entered into
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, Section 17. Such service, to be
effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was
not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her
attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, in
any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient.
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside
the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides.Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on Atty.
Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte. In the first place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not
made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, Section 17 and certainly was not a
mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid
and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an
answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior
leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, Section 17. As provided in Section 17, such
leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some
person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules,
shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted that the period to file an
Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed
against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is
fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from
notice.
In the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her
attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent s attorney that all communications
intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her lawyer at the latters
address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom.
In fact the letter was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears
that it was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her sister, respondent
Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the property in question. As is usual in negotiations
of this kind, the exchange of correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the
authority given to petitioners husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as
also including an authority to represent her in anylitigation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in this case.
Remedial Law 1 > Rules 10 -14 > Summons
MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMM. CORP, petitioner, vs. JACKSON TAN, respondent
G.R. No. 131724; February 28, 2000

DOCTRINE:

GR: Summons to a corporation must be received by those exclusively

mentioned in Rule 14.
XPN: Doctrine of Substantial Compliance - although the service of
summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule 14, if it appears
that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation,
there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been
attained.
Requisites of Doctrine of Substantial Compliance:
a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served,
i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the
Sheriff to the person served;
b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and
c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation
through the person on whom the summons was actually served.
FACTS:
In December 1994, Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation, petitioner herein, executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over its real property in favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The
mortgage was executed to secure payment of petitioner's indebtedness to respondent in the
amount of P2 million, without monthly interest, but which, at maturity date on June 10, 1995,
was payable in the amount of P4 million.
Respondent then filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the Regional
Trial Court. On November 21, 1995, summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon
petitioner through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff's return, dated November
23, 1995, as "a Draftsman, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the
highest ranking officer or Officer-in-Charge of defendant's Corporation, to receive processes of
the Court."
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid service
of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and contended that service on
Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriff's return, was invalid as he is not one of the authorized
persons on whom summons may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.
RTCs RULING: trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Court
had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation because summons
was served upon a person who is not known to or an employee of the defendant corporation.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
its petition. Hence, this petition for review.Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON service of summons upon a mere draftsman who is not one of those upon whom
summons may be served in case of a defendant corporation as mentioned in the rules is valid.

HELD: NO.
Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action
against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If
the defendant is corporation, Rule 14, requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale
of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation
sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers received by him.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that service of
summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule. However,
it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons other than those
mentioned in the above rule may be justified. In G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule
14, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation, there
is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been attained.
In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the
application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of
the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the summons
from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's
return; and (c) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the
person on whom the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most important for
it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to
the third, the appellate court held that petitioner's filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure
suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is, however, no
direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the
officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule,
there was direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporation's officers, of receipt of
summons by the corporation through the person upon whom it was actually served. The
question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation
through the person on whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For
there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the
person served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of summons and
the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other than the person
actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is particularly true in the
present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of
summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriff's return,
there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the
corporation.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 10-14 > Service of Summons
E.B. Villarosa& Partner Co., Ltd. vs. Benito,
G.R. No. 136426, August 6, 1999

FACTS: E.B. Benito is a limited partnership with principal office at Davao City and with branch
offices at Paraaque City and Cagayan De Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent, Imperial
Development Corporation, executed a Deed of Sale with development agreement wherein the
former agreed to develop certain parcels of land belonging to Imperial. On April 3, 1998,
Imperial filed a complaint for breach of contract against E.B. Benito before the RTC Makati.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its BRANCH
MANAGER Engy. Sabulbero at Cagayan De Oro City Branch. E.B. Benito moved to dismiss on
the ground of improper service of summons thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of herein petitioner. On the other hand, Imperial contended that the service is valid
alleging that there was a substantial compliance with the rule as it was served through its
branch manager.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and held that there was a valid service of summons.
Hence, this petition was filed by EB Villarosa contending that the trial court committed
GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon
service of summons on its Branch Manager.
RULING: No. Sec 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the
laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or inhouse counsel.
This provision revised the former Sec 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:
If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent or any of its directors.
The rule now states general manager instead of only manager. As held by Justice
Regalado, the aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and
sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word agent. Service of summons upon
persons other than those mentioned in Sec 13 of Rule (old rule) has been held improper. The
purpose of which is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and
proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative
so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him. Accordingly, the service of summons upon the branch manager at its branch in
CDO, instead to the general manager at its principal office in Davao City is improper.
Soledad Chanliongco Ramos, Francisco D.Chanliongco, Adelberto D. Chanliongco,
Armando D. Chanliongco And Florencio D. Chanliongco, Petitioners, vs. Teresita D.
Ramos, Spouses Teresita And Edmundo S. Muyot, Spouses Vedasta And Florencio M.

Dato, Loreto Muyot, Spouses Teresita And Elmer Solis, Liceria Torres, Spouses Corazon
And Vicente Macatungal, Spouses Precilla And Crisostomo Muyot, And Spouses Caridad
And Salvador Pingol, Respondents
G.R. No. 144294. March 11, 2003
Judgments; A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable;
Exceptions.It is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The only exceptions to this rule are the
correction of (1) clerical errors, (2) the socalled nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, and (3) void judgments. To determine whether the CA Decision of September 28,
1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be
addressed.
Courts; Actions; Jurisdiction; Summons; Words and Phrases; Action in Personam,
Action Quasi in Rem, and Action in Rem, Distinguished; The rules on the service of
summons differ depending on the nature of the action.To be able to rule on this point, the
Court needs to determine whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The rules
on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of the action. An action in
personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability a action in rem is directed
against the thing itself instead of the person while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien
or obligation.
FACTS:
Petitioners are children of the late Paulino V. Chanliongco, Jr., who was the co-owner of a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-G of Subdivision Plan SWO No. 7308. Situated in Tondo,
Manila, it was co-owned by him, his sister Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and Antonio.
By virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her
daughter Adoracion C. Mendoza had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days in
September 1986. Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the
sale, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 a Complaint6 for interpleader to
resolve the various ownership claims.
RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Narcisa was concerned, that Adoracion had no
authority to sell the share of other co-owners.
Sept. 8, 1995 CA decision was made and CA ruled : modified the ruling of the RTC. It held
that while there was no Special Power of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was
nonetheless valid, because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters sub-agent.
CA Decision was not appealed, became final and was entered ifavor of respondents on August
8, 1996. April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion to Set Aside the Decision that they
have not been served a copy of either the Complaint or the summons. Neither had they been
impleaded as parties to the case in the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in denying petitioners Motion and allowing its Decision dated

September 25, 1995 to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the lower court did

not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing petitioners property in
favor of respondents, hence without due process of law
HELD: NO.
Entitlement to Summons:
It is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final judgment may no longer bemodified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law; and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The only exceptions to this rule are the
correction of (1) clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, and (3) void judgments.13 To determine whether the CA Decision of September 28,
1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon petitioners will now be
addressed. To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the action is
in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of summons differ depending on
the nature of the action. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action
quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation.
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the
ownership of the real property in question.
xxxxx. It was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real
property.
xxx.Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely
an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no standing in court.xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 10-14 > Voluntary Appearance
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. SPS. IRENEO M. SANTIAGO and LIWANAG P.
SANTIAGO, CENTROGEN, INC., REPRSENTED BY EDWIN SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 169116
March 28, 2007
Doctrine The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the issuance
of the new summons which was not
FACTS:
Private respondent Centrogen, Inc. is a domestic pharmaceutical corporation which obtained
several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). It was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land by Irene Santiago. Centrogen incurred default and
therefore the loan obligation became due and demandable.Meanwhile FEBTC merged with BPI.
BPI filed an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale
was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses
Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt, the spouses and
Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injunction
and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer to the Complaint filed by
Spouses Santiago and Centrogen. On the same day, the Sheriff served a copy of the summons
to the Branch Manager of BPI.
Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the
filing of the complaint. In its Motion to Dismiss, BPI claimed that the Branch Manager was not
one of those authorized to receive summons on behalf of the corporation.
RTC: On 6 March 2003, RTC ordered the service of new summons to BPI in accordance with
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court. In compliance with the aforesaid order, the Branch
Clerk of Court caused the issuance of a new summons.
CA: On 3 March 200, CA affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by
BPI.
BPI insists that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the
Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and
does not bind BPI.
ISSUE: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI?
HELD: Yes.
The court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was
cured by the issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.
Santos v. PNOC
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008
FACTS:
December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of
money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be
collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent
when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be
located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on
respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent
caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of
service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by
registered mail to petitioners last known address.

Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons.
Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted
said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging
that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the
clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed
way beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed
grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons,
failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over
equity and justice.
ISSUE: WON there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies of
orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings
HELD: No.
Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to Admit
Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos was
in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify
him of the order simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on
his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos
could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His
residence or whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is
obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The
law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges
no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the
September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was
unclaimed.
Remedial Law 1 > Rules 10-14 > Topic: Erroneous address in the complaint-Motion to
Dismiss-Alias Summons
RICHARD TEH, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO
C. FLORES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, EIM
INTERNATIONAL SALES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 147038; April 24, 2003
FACTS:

On August 20, 1998, respondent EIM International Sales, Inc. filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City a Complaint for collection of sum of money with prayer for issuance of
preliminary attachment against Wood Based Panels, Inc., Sinrimco. Inc., Manfred Luig and
petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 66974 and raffled to Branch 167 of the
RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner was impleaded in the case because he was the President of
both Wood Based Panels, Inc. and Sinrimco, Inc.
Subsequently, summons were served upon the two corporations and Luig (defendants). The
sheriff failed to serve the summons intended for the petitioner because the former could
not locate the petitioners address as indicated in the complaint. Said address was obtained
by the respondent from the General Information Sheets filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission by the two corporations.1
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, but the same was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, they filed their respective answers to the complaint. The respondent then filed a
motion to set the case for pre-trial, and the court granted the same and set the pre-trial on
October 19, 1999. A notice of pre-trial was sent by the RTC to the defendants, including the
petitioner. The notice to the latter was again sent to the address indicated in the complaint.
On October 19, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person because he had not been
served with summons. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the pre-trial and the resetting
thereof on November 19, 1999. It, likewise, ordered the respondent to submit a reply or
opposition to petitioners motion to dismiss within five days from October 19, 1999.
The next day, October 20, 1999, the respondent filed a Comment explaining that summons
had not been served on the petitioner because, according to the sheriff, the petitioners address
indicated in the complaint, "138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila,"could not be located.
The trial court issued an Omnibus Order dated November 17, 1999 denying petitioners
motion to dismiss and directing that an alias summons be issued against the petitioner to be
served upon him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The respondent thereafter filed a
manifestation and motion, informing the court that the address of the petitioner as indicated in
the complaint was erroneous, and that summons should instead be served upon him at "138
Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City," which was his correct address.
On December 14, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts
omnibus order. He contended therein that the case should be dismissed in view of the trial
courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over his person and the respondents failure to
prosecute the case, considering that more than a year had passed since the complaint was
instituted and yet summons had not yet been served on him. The respondent opposed the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The trial court issued an Order dated January 25, 2000 denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, which order the petitioner received on February 3, 2000.

On February 28, 2000, the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition questioning the trial courts November 17, 1999 Omnibus Order and the
January 25, 2000 Order denying his motion for reconsideration.
On March 14, 2000, the appellate court issued its Resolution dismissing the petition for
failure to attach certified true copies of relevant documents referred to in the petition.2
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution, but said motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 9, 2001.

ISSUE:
1. WON, the denial of the motion to dismiss is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
2. WON there is proper service of summons
HELD:
No grave abuse of discretion and there is proper service of alias summons.
The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that there was no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the issuance of an alias summons to be served upon him. Although the respondent
should have resorted to other means to determine the correct address of the petitioner when it
was informed by the sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the
respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure because the petitioners address as
indicated by Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco, Inc. on their respective General
Information Sheets, was incorrect.
Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under Rule 16, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss. Under said
rule, after hearing the motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or
order the amendment of the pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its
finding that the issues alleged by the respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully in
the absence of the petitioner. In its desire to resolve completely the issues brought before it, the
trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by ordering the issuance of alias summons on the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted
well within its discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 10-14 > Service of Summons

SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 144662; October 13, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioners Sps. Mason entered into a lease contract with private respondent Columbus
Corporation over the parcels of land owned by the spouses along EDSA in Pasay. Because
private respondent failed to comply with the stipulation in the contract that it will build a 10M
worth building therein at the end of 3 rd year of the lease, petitioners filed a complaint for
rescission of contract with damages before RTC of Pasay.
Summons were served upon private respondent through a certain AyreenRejalde. Receiving
copy of the summons describledRejalde as Secretary of Columbus, while the Sheriffs return
described her as secretary of the corporate president duly authorized to receive legal
processes.
Private respondent failed to file an answer and other responsive pleading, hence petitioner
filed a motion to declare defendants in default. Motion was granted and petitioners were allowed
to present evidence ex parte. The trial court later rendered a decision in favour of petitions.
Decision became final on May 12, 1999. Respondent filed a motion to lift order of default
which was opposed by petitioner. Trial court denied motion to lift order of default. Since the
decision became final and executor, petitioners motion for execution was granter.
Private respondent motion for recon and motion to lift order of default were both denied.
On appeal to CA, the court ordered that all proceedings and order of default and writ of
execution be set aside. It required petitioner to file its answer and to conduct further appropriate
proceedings. Petitioner filed a motion for recon.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons on private respondent for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction
HELD: No.
Petitioners stress that there was a substantial compliance with Rule 14 Sec 11 although the
summons was received by a mere filing clerk because the summons actually reached private
respondent.
SC applied the Villarosa case whereby it held that the trial court is w/o jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because there was no valid service of summons as service was made
through a person not included in the enumeration under Sec. 11 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited, and exclusive
following the rule on statutory construction that expresso unious est exclusion alterious.
Doctrine of substantial compliance was overturned by Villarosa case, hence the RTC of Pasay
didnt acquire jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent
proceedings held before it are null and void.
Petitioners invoking the ruling in Millenium to support their position is not applicable with the
instant case. Millenium were substantial compliance was allowed was decided when the 1964
Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new
rule. Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial
compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 10-14 > Service of Summons
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, Petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, Respondents
G.R. No. 130974; August 16, 2006

A substituted service of summons to be valid must faithfully and strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.
FACTS: Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the United
States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, USA against Imee Marcos-Manotoc for the wrongful
death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the
Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance
and/or influence of Manotoc. RTC issued summons addressed to petitioner at Alexandra
Homes, Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The summons and a copy of the complaint were served
upon Macky Dela Cruz, an alleged caretaker of the petitioners unit. When petitioner failed to file
an answer, she was declared in default. Petitioner, by special appearance, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person claiming that Alexandra Homes is
not her residence, dwelling or regular place of business considering that she was a resident of
Singapore; that Dela Cruz is not her representative, employee or resident of the place; and that
the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was
ignored.
RTC: RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss relying on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the sheriffs duties. It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
CA: CA dismissed the petitioners Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. It adopted the finding
of facts of the RTC. It also denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid service of summons.
HELD: NO.
Requirements for Substituted Service:
1. There is impossibility of prompt Personal Service. There must be several attempts of at least
3 tries by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within reasonable time.
2. Sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the specific details of the attempted
personal service.
3. If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it should be left
with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein. A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
4. If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of business, then
it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
In this case, the Return of Summons describing the facts and circumstances in inexact terms is
wanting of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner to reach the
conclusion that there is impossibility of prompt personal service. Assuming arguendo that the
general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from the
requirement that the summons must be left with a person of suitable age and discretion residing
in defendants house or residence. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Dela Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la
Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged
receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. Besides, De la Cruzs refusal to sign

the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary relation of
confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners right to due process by being accorded proper
notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly
comply with the rules.
For failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the rules on valid substituted service, the
proceedings held before the trial court must be annulled.
YUK LING ONG, Petitioner, v. BENJAMIN T. CO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206653, February 25, 2015
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants voluntary appearance in court
FACTS:
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (Ling), a British-Hong Kong national married to Benjamin Co, a
Filipino, received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation directing her to
appear because her permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation
proceedings. When she did, she was furnished copies of the following documents: petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. CV-01-01777, petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage in Civil Case No. 02-0306, Decision dated December 11, 2002 by the RTC
Paranaque City declaring her marriage void in Civil Case No. 02-0306, and copy of her
marriage certificate, with the decision annotated therein. From the documents, she learned that
Benjamin first filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. CV-01-01777;
without any inkling as to what happened to the first petition, Civil Case No. 02-0306 was again
filed by Benjamin, indicating her address as 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden
Homes, Quezon City; substituted service of summons allegedly made in the case by the Sheriff,
the RTC proceeded to hear the case without her participation, and rendered the decision
annulling her marriage with Benjamin on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the basis
thereof, Ling filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, averring that
she was never notified of the proceedings in the case, thus there was extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. She added that Benjamin purposely indicated a wrong address so she could not
participate in the proceedings; further, no valid service of summons was made upon her
because there was no explanation that personal service was impossible before substituted
service was effected thereto. The summons was received only by the security guard, and she
was not psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage with Benjamin.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Citing the case of Robinson v. Miralles, it ruled
that substituted service of summons upon Ling was valid, as it was customary in her townhouse
that the security guard would first entertain the visitors or receive communication on behalf of its
residents, thus it would be impossible for the sheriff to personally serve the summons upon her.
Further, the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Her
motion for reconsideration denied, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court, assailing the CA decision, and arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her due to improper service of summons, and extrinsic fraud was committed upon her.

ISSUE: WON the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
HELD:
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory
law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The
latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other processes on
the petitioner.
The present case, petitioner contends that there was lack of jurisdiction over her person
because there was an invalid substituted service of summons. Jurisdiction over the defendant is
acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in
court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by
personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, which state:
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by

the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means
at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite
why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed
or accepted.
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was issued on July 29,
2002. In his servers return, the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of
summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons.
The servers return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the
process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a
general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same

personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the
personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made;
and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were
inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts
to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify
substituted service.
The servers return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on
behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat. It did not expound on the competence
of the security officer to receive
Court ruled that the meticulous requirement for substituted service of summons were not
met. Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 10-14 > Service of Summons
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner vs. HON. REINATO G. QUILALA and ALL SEASON
FARM, CORP., Respondents.
G.R. No. 168723; July 9, 2008
A defendants voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons
FACTS: A complaint was filed in the RTC of Makati by All Season Farm, Corp. seeking the
recovery of a sum of money, accounting and damages from Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropi fresh
Division). According to Dole, an alias summons was served upon it through a certain Marifa
Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific General Services, Ltd., which is an entity
separate from Dole. Thus, Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of summons.
RTC: Denied said motion, as well as Doles subsequent partial motion for reconsideration.
Dole then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the alias summons was
not properly served.
CA: Denied said petition, it reasoned that Doles president had known of the service of the
alias summons although he did not personally receive and sign it. It also held that in todays
corporate setup, documents addressed to corporate officers are received in their behalf by
their staff. Dole sought reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Dole Philippines, Inc.
HELD: YES.
Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited
and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Sec. 11, Rule 14, following the rule in statutory
construction that expression unios est exclusion alterius. Service must therefore be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel.In this case, it appears that Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant who received the alias

summons was not authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the president and is not
one of the designated persons thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary appearance in the action
is equivalent to service of summons. The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.Note that petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It
was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons,
but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt of the
alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading.Consequently,
petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked the
jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner
effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from asserting
otherwise, even before this Court.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 14, SECTION 7> SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS
SIXTO N. CHU, Petitioner, vs. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be
resorted to.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the defendant
had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons
FACTS:
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump trucks
and heavy equipments. On December 8, 1998, petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment
one (1) Hitachi Excavator worth P900,000.00 from the respondent. Petitioner initially
paid P180,000.00 with the balance of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly installments through
Prime Bank postdated checks. On March 29, 1999, petitioner again purchased two (2) heavy
equipments from the respondent on installment basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00, namely: one
(1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made a down payment of P200,000.00 with
the balance of P800,000.00 payable in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated
checks.3
However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were dishonored by the bank
either by reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient funds," or "payment stopped."
Respondent informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored and invited him to its office to
replace the checks. On September 16, 1999, respondent sent petitioner a formal demand letter
urging the latter to settle his accounts within five days from receipt of the letter. In response,
petitioner sent respondent a letter explaining that his business was badly hit by the Asian

economic crisis and that he shall endeavor to pay his obligation by giving partial payments. He
said that he shall also voluntarily surrender the subject units should he fail to do so.4
On November 11, 1999, respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorneys fees and damages against the petitioner.
Respondent prayed for the payment of the unpaid balance of P1,661,947.27 at 21% per annum
until full payment, 25% of the total amount to be recovered as attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs.5
On November 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order 6 allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on
the subject heavy equipments.
On December 9, 1999, Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at petitioners given address for the
purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond.
However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter
was not there. The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the
complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner.7
Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading, which prompted respondent to move for the
declaration of defendant in default. On January 12, 2000, the RTC issued an Order declaring
defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte.
On December 15, 2000, after respondent presented its evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision
against the petitioner,
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 70666.
Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in concluding that the substituted service of summons was
valid, and that, consequently, there was error on the part of the RTC when it declared him in
default, in proceeding with the trial of the case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against
him.
On July 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision9 affirming the Decision of the RTC
ISSUE:
WON the CA committed a serious error in defiance of law and jurisprudence in finding that the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant even when the substituted
service of summons was improper
HELD:
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.14

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when

summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that
substituted service may be resorted to.15 Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating
that the person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom
the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive
the summons.16
In the case at bar, the Sheriffs Return provides:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, the
Summons and writ issued in the above-entitled case with the following information, to wit:
1. That the Summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond was
received on December 7, 1999, by Rolando Bonayon, a security guard on defendant
Sixto Chu at his given address who received and signed receipt thereof.
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the
petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely
receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the
security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service.
Remedial Law 1 > Rule 10-14 > Service of Summons
MACASAET et al., Petitioners, vs.CO, JR.,Respondent.,G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013
Doctrine: To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the
officer resort to substituted service.
FACTS:Respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila,
sued AbanteToniteand herein petitioners, claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous
article petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of AbanteTonite. Subsequently,
summonses were issued and RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to
effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally
serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the
office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at

serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He
decided to resort to substituted service of the summons and explained in his returnthat
Macasaet and Quijano were always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos
and Reyes were always out roving to gather news; and that he had then resorted to substituted
service upon realizing the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a reasonable
time. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction over their
persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended
that the sheriff had made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in
accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the MTD stating that considering that summonses cannot be served within a
reasonable time to the persons of all the defendants, hence substituted service of summonses
was validly applied. The MR was also denied. The CA affirmed the said decision of RTC. The
MR was also denied. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons to the petitioners
HELD: Yes.There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons
upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September
18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because
Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were
"always roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the
office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to
the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts
to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully
warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect
personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to
resort to substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the
circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant,
we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service
instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter,that governs..
Remedial Law Review 1 > Rule 10 14 > When to File Responsive Pleadings
GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. PLANTERS
DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193650; October 8, 2014
"Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him." The "presumption that a party who did not interject an appeal is
satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court" applies to it.
"Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to
every matter which the parties might have litigated and have x xx decided as incident to or
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within
the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of defense."
Facts:

Acomplaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages with prayer for the
issuance of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction filed by Plaintiff George
Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz against Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Planters Development
Bank (defendant Bank), Arturo R. Delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad, and Emmanuel
Tesalonia on 22 December 1998.
Defendant Bank manifested [its] intention of settling the case amicably and several attempts to
explore the said settlement [were] made as per records of this case. In the last pre-trial hearing
dated 17 November 2000, only plaintiffs[,] George Philip Palileo and Jose L. Dela Cruz[,] and
their counsel appeared, thus, the latter move [sic] for the presentation of evidence ex-parte,
which was granted by the Court with the reservation of verifying the return card [to determine]
whether the order for the pre-trial was indeed received by defendants. A 21 November 2001
hearing, x xx defendants [again] failed to appear and their failure to file pre-trial brief was noted;
thus [plaintiffs were] allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the Clerk of Court.
Defendants are hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally PAY plaintiffs, damages.
i) Actual Damages;
a) Plaintiff George Philip Palileo[,] the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Five
Thousand Nine [sic] Seventy Two Pesos and Ninety Two Centavos
(P2,605,972.92), with 12% compounded interest [per annum] reckoned from the
filing of this case until full settlement thereof;
b) Plaintiff Jose R. DelaCruz[,] the amount of One Million Five Hundred Twenty
Nine Thousand Five Hundred Eight Thousand [sic] and Eighty Centavos
(P1,529,508.80), with 12% compounded interest [per annum] reckoned from the
filing of this case until full settlement thereof;
ii) Moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each;
iii) Exemplary Damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
each;
iv) Attorneys Fees in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand [Pesos] (P500,000.00)
each x xx and to pay the costs.
Respondent Planters Development Bank (PDB) received a copy of the RTC Decision on July
17, 2006.
On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service specifically LBC 6 an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for New Trial,7 arguing therein that the trial courts Decision was based
on speculation and inadmissible and selfserving pieces of evidence; that it was declared in
default after its counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference on account of the distance
involved and difficulty in booking a flight to General Santos City; that it had adequate and
sufficient defenses to the petitioners claims; that petitioners claims are only against its
codefendant, Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende [Torcende]; that the award of damages and attorneys
fees had no basis; and that in the interest of justice, it should be given the opportunity to crossexamine the petitioners witnesses, and thereafter present its evidence.

Petitioners copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent
on July 31, 2006 by courier service through LBC, but in their address of record Tupi, South
Cotabato there was no LBC service at the time.
On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously
sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.
The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, while it granted
petitioners motion for execution pending appeal, which it treated as a motion for the execution
of a final and executory judgment.
On August 31, 2006, a Writ of Execution12 was issued. PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Writ of Execution,13arguing that it was prematurely issued as the June 15, 2006 Decision was
not yet final and executory; that its counsel has not received a copy of the writ; and that no entry
of judgment has been made with respect to the trial courts Decision. Later on, it filed a
Supplemental Motion to Quash Writ of Execution,14 claiming that the writ was addressed to its
General Santos branch, which had no authority to accept the writ.
On September 7, 2006, PDB filed a Notice of Appeal.15
In an October 6, 2006 Order,16 the RTC denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.
On October 9, 2006, the RTC issued a second Writ of Execution.17
The CA issued a Decision19 dismissing PDBs Petition for lack of merit. It sustained the trial
courts pronouncement, that by setting the hearing of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial on August 18, 2006 or 16 days after its filing on August 2, 2006 PDB
violated Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which categorically requires that the notice of
hearing shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than 10 days after
the filing of the motion.
The appellate court further characterized PDBs actions as indicative of a deliberate attempt to
delay the proceedings, noting that it did not timely move to reconsider the trial courts November
17, 2000 ruling21 allowing petitioners to present their evidence ex parte, nor did it move to be
allowed to present evidence in support of its defense.
The CA likewise held that the RTC did not err in ruling that the omnibus motion for
reconsideration did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
PDB filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 22 arguing that Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
should be relaxed in view of the fact that judgment against it was based on a technicality and
not on a trial on the merits; that there was no deliberate intention on its part to delay the
proceedings; that the court acted with partiality in declaring that the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial was pro forma; that its notice of appeal was timely; and that
the writs of execution are null and void.
July 28, 2009, the CA made a complete turnaround and issued the assailed Amended Decision,
which decreed thus, GRANTEDthe motion for reconsideration.

The CA further sustained PDBs argument that since judgment against it was arrived at by mere
default or technicality, it is correspondingly entitled to a relaxation of the Rules, in line with the
principles of substantial justice. It likewise held that PDB counsels act of setting the hearing of
the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial 16 days after its filing was an
excusable lapse; that no scheme to delay the case is evident from PDBs actions; that more
telling is the trial courts "blurring in cavalier fashion" the distinction between Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, 26 as well as its unequal treatment of the parties from its strict
application of Section 5, Rule 15 against respondent, while it bent backward to accommodate
petitioners by converting the latters motion for execution pending appeal into a motion for
execution of a final and executor judgment.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in granting the Motion for Reconsideration in favor of PDB?
Held: YES.
The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo and
the CA did not overlook the fact that PDBs Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial courts June 15, 2006
Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days or up to August 1, 2006 within which to file a
notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of
Court.32 Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2, 2006.
Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized.1wphi1 Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in
the Rules.33 This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or
area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB refiled and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service
under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
PDBs Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up to
August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying
PDBs notice of appeal.
Since PDBs Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal, it
follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question the trial courts
Decision in any other manner. "Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the
correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him." 34 The "presumption that a party who did
not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court" 35 applies to it.
There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision
has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. "Finality of
a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no
appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually determined and to every matter
which the parties might have litigated and have x xx decided as incident to or essentially
connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate
purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of defense."
"[W]here [an action] or issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."39

The Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 37 is ORDERED to proceed with the
execution ofits June 15, 2006 Decision in Civil Case No. 6474.