ATTY. WINSTON C.

RACOMA, petitioner,
vs.
CAMARINES NORTE WATER DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY ITS
GENERAL MANAGER MA. ANTONIA B. F. BOMA, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A kindred fellow seeks our intervention to collect what he claims is
justly due him.
Respondent Camarines Norte Water District (CNWD) engaged the
legal services of Atty. Winston C. Racoma to prevent the takeover of
its operation, facilities and properties by its creditor the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). This problem was precipitated by
allegations of default and unfair unilateral increase in interest rate on
the part of CNWD in the payment of its loans from LWUA. As LWUA
eventually took over the CNWD and installed an Interim Board of
Directors and General Manager on 4 October 1991, Atty. Racoma
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with prayer
for preliminary injunction against LWUA, docketed as Civil Case No.
6030.1 The following day petitioner obtained for CNWD a temporary
restraining order preventing LWUA from further managing and
operating his client's services.2
On 17 October 1991 the Board of Directors of CNWD passed three
(3) resolutions revising the original contract of legal services of
petitioner Racoma.3 In this regard, CNWD paid him P20,000.00 on 17
October 1991 and P15,000.00 on 23 October 1991.
After the expiration of the temporary restraining order, LWUA
(purportedly in behalf of CNWD) moved to discharge Atty. Racoma as
CNWD's counsel. This was followed by LWUA's motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 6030. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order
requiring petitioner to file a compliance manifestation to both motions
and denied the application for preliminary injunction. 4 As instructed,
petitioner filed the compliance manifestation. 5 On 17 January 1992
the trial court issued a Resolution-Order granting the motion for the
discharge of petitioner as counsel for CNWD and ordered the
payment of his legal fees "in accordance with the 'quantum meruit'
rule in relation [to] his up-to-date professional services rendered
under the contract of legal services dated September 1, 1991,
particularly paragraph IV, as his last pleading submitted." 6
Petitioner appealed the Resolution-Order to the Court of Appeals
which however dismissed the appeal on 8 January 1993 due to his
failure to file the corresponding brief. 7 On 3 February 1993 the

dismissal became final and executory, and entry of judgment was

made on 19 April 1993.8 On 30 March 1998 petitioner moved for
execution of the Resolution-Order,9 which the trial court granted on 4
June 1998.10 However, on 9 June 1998 the trial court amended its
order instructing payment to petitioner of P250,000.00 as his legal
fees.11 On 19 June 1998 CNWD moved for reconsideration of the
amended order.12 But the trial court denied the motion, explaining that
the amount of P250,000.00 was the result of the reference of the
Resolution-Order to the "contract of legal services dated September
1, 1991, particularly paragraph IV, as his last pleading submitted,"
which was inclusive of the P100,000.00 filing charge for the
memorandum that petitioner had filed. 13 On 6 July 1998 however the
trial court held in abeyance the issuance of a writ of execution due to
the pendency of a petition for certiorari with application for injunction
and/or restraining order before the Court of Appeals. 14
On 8 September 1998 CNWD filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals to review the Order of Execution and the alleged Writ of
Execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 6030. On 5 April
2000 the appellate court nullified these processes on the ground that
the dispositive portion of the Resolution-Order that was to be
executed did not indicate the exact amount of legal fees payable to
petitioner.15 On 21 June 2000 petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence this petition seeking to overturn these resolutions.
Petitioner argues that the Resolution-Order is not fatally vague. He
says that this order in fact resolved in his favor his entitlement to legal
fees and the amount thereof on the basis of the provisions of the
contract for legal services of 1 September 1991, particularly
paragraph IV of the last pleading filed. In arriving at the precise
amount of legal fees due him, petitioner invokes the power of the
court to amend and control its processes as well as the general
supervisory control of the tribunal which rendered the decision over
the process of execution. He avers in addition that no writ of
execution was ever issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 6030.
We rule for petitioner. As a matter of record, the trial court did not
issue any writ of execution that the Court of Appeals thought the court
a quo had. This is clear from the Order of the trial court of 6 July 1998
holding in abeyance the execution of the Resolution-Order. It is also a
matter of record that the dispositive portion of the Resolution-Order
unequivocally set the parameters for the determination of the precise
amount of petitioner's legal fees. For purposes of a strait-jacketed

enforcement of a writ of execution, this specification of parameters is

enough.
As early as Locsin v. Paredes16 we ruled that the trial judge may
clarify omissions and set forth specificities that can be ascertained
from the allegation of the complaint, the prayer thereof, the evidence
and the conclusions of fact and law.17 With more reason should this
rule apply in the instant case considering that the dispositive portion
of the Resolution-Order itself carries the standard by which to
determine petitioner's legal fees, and the failure to specify the amount
so collectible is a mere omission that the court may correct even at
finality of judgment by supplemental or amended order.18
Seavan Carrier, Inc. v. GTI Sportswear Corp.19 is instructive. This
case similarly involves a judgment that failed to state the actual
amount to be satisfied. We then ruled: "Hence, the trial court,
pursuant to its supervisory control over the execution of the judgment,
should have ordered a hearing on the motion to determine the actual
amount to be recovered by the private respondent, for the full
satisfaction of the judgment."20 So must we rule now. Verily, there is
no reason to abandon this ruling and in the process unjustly deprive
petitioner of the fruits of his efforts as it were and the wherewithal to
maintain an honorable profession. To stress all that the trial court has
to do in the present case is to compute the amount owing him
following the guidelines set in the Resolution-Order itself.
But we have to correct the elementary computation of legal fees done
by the trial court. In the 19 June 1998 Order, the court a quo
assessed P250,000.00 in petitioner's favor. Said the trial court: "x x x
the Resolution-Order have (sic) even noted the last pleading
submitted which is paragraph IV of the contract which is for
P100,000.00 for filing and submission of memorandum and it would
follow that the previous actual services rendered were for a
successful application for a preliminary injunction order for
P80,000.00, paragraph III, filing of the case in court for P40,000.00,
paragraph II, and signing of the agreement for P30,000.00, paragraph
I, or a total of P250,000.00 is what the Resolution-Order want to be
the payment in quantum meruit."21
While in truth the last pleading filed by petitioner in connection with
Civil Case No. 6030 was the compliance manifestation as narrated
above,22 we will nonetheless assume that the trial court consulted all
relevant circumstances and acted in compliance with law 23 when it
ruled that the memorandum was indeed the last pleading filed by him.

It must be stressed that under Sec. 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court the trial court has wide discretion to ordain the payment of
reasonable legal fees of a lawyer.
But the award of P80,000.00 in connection with his application for
preliminary injunction must be reduced by fifty percent (50%) or
P40,000.00 it appearing that hearings were conducted on the
application although no preliminary injunction was issued in the end. 24
Moreover, he had been previously paid P20,000.00 and P15,000.00.
The total legal fees pegged at P250,000.00 must accordingly be
whittled down. Recomputing what is due him: P30,000.00 upon
signing of the contract, plus P40,000.00 upon filing of the case in
court, plus P100,000.00 upon filing of the memoranda plus
P40,000.00 for the application for preliminary injunction less
P35,000.00 previously paid, results in a collectible amount of
P175,000.00 only. The kind spirit in petitioner should see this amount
as reasonable compensation for his legal services in behalf of
CNWD.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED although the professional
legal fee of petitioner Atty. Winston C. Racoma is reduced to One
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P175,000.00). The 9 June
1998 Amended Order of Execution of the 17 January 1992
Resolution-Order is accordingly MODIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.