G.R. No.

L-19201

June 16, 1965

REV. FR. CASIMIRO LLADOC, petitioner,

vs.
The COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and The
COURT of TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Hilado and Hilado for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City,
donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then
parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and
predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a
new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was
actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the
donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an
assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish
of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the
priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to
June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the
return.
Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the
motion for reconsideration presented to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 2, 1960. In the
petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed,
among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not
the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or
juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of
Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the
donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment
of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church,
would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of
the provisions of the Constitution.
After hearing, the CTA rendered judgment, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted below:
... . Parish priests of the Roman Catholic Church
under canon laws are similarly situated as its
Archbishops and Bishops with respect to the
properties of the church within their parish. They
are the guardians, superintendents or
administrators of these properties, with the right of
succession and may sue and be sued.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The petitioner impugns the, fairness of the

assessment with the argument that he should not
be held liable for gift taxes on donation which he
did not receive personally since he was not yet the
parish priest of Victorias in the year 1957 when
said donation was given. It is intimated that if
someone has to pay at all, it should be petitioner's
predecessor, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, who
received the donation in behalf of the Catholic
parish of Victorias or the Roman Catholic Church.
Following petitioner's line of thinking, we should be
equally unfair to hold that the assessment now in
question should have been addressed to, and
collected from, the Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz to be paid
from income derived from his present parish where
ever it may be. It does not seem right to indirectly
burden the present parishioners of Rev. Fr. Ruiz for
donee's gift tax on a donation to which they were
not benefited.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We saw no legal basis then as we see none now,

to include within the Constitutional exemption,
taxes which partake of the nature of an excise
upon the use made of the properties or upon the
exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties.
(Phipps vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 91
F [2d] 627; 1938, 302 U.S. 742.)
It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from
payment thereof are highly disfavored by law, and
the party claiming exemption must justify his claim
by a clear, positive, or express grant of such
privilege by law. (Collector vs. Manila Jockey Club,
G.R. No. L-8755, March 23, 1956; 53 O.G. 3762.)
The phrase "exempt from taxation" as employed in
Section 22(3), Article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, should not be interpreted to mean
exemption from all kinds of taxes. Statutes
exempting charitable and religious property from
taxation should be construed fairly though strictly
and in such manner as to give effect to the main
intent of the lawmakers. (Roman Catholic Church
vs. Hastrings 5 Phil. 701.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing

considerations, the decision of the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed from,

is hereby affirmed except with regard to the

imposition of the compromise penalty in the
amount of P20.00 (Collector of Internal Revenue v.
U.S.T., G.R. No. L-11274, Nov. 28, 1958); ..., and
the petitioner, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc is
hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the
amount of P900.00 as donee's gift tax, plus the
surcharge of five per centum (5%) as ad
valorem penalty under Section 119 (c) of the Tax
Code, and one per centum (1%) monthly interest
from May 15, 1958 to the date of actual payment.
The surcharge of 25% provided in Section 120 for
failure to file a return may not be imposed as the
failure to file a return was not due to willful neglect.(
... ) No costs.
The above judgment is now before us on appeal, petitioner
assigning two (2) errors allegedly committed by the Tax
Court, all of which converge on the singular issue of
whether or not petitioner should be liable for the assessed
donee's gift tax on the P10,000.00 donated for the
construction of the Victorias Parish Church.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines,
exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties
enumerated, as property taxes, as contra distinguished
from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector
assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not
on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general
ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the
properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving
the properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627).
Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of
the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax,
but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by
way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property
used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute
an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the
learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from
taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should
not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of
taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant
of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, the
exemption herein must be denied.
The next issue which readily presents itself, in view of
petitioner's thesis, and Our finding that a tax liability exists,
is, who should be called upon to pay the gift tax? Petitioner
postulates that he should not be liable, because at the time
of the donation he was not the priest of Victorias. We note

the merit of the above claim, and in order to put things in

their proper light, this Court, in its Resolution of March 15,
1965, ordered the parties to show cause why the Head of
the Diocese to which the parish of Victorias pertains,
should not be substituted in lieu of petitioner Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc it appearing that the Head of such
Diocese is the real party in interest. The Solicitor General,
in representation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
interposed no objection to such a substitution. Counsel for
the petitioner did not also offer objection thereto.
On April 30, 1965, in a resolution, We ordered the Head of
the Diocese to present whatever legal issues and/or
defenses he might wish to raise, to which resolution
counsel for petitioner, who also appeared as counsel for
the Head of the Diocese, the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bacolod, manifested that it was submitting itself to the
jurisdiction and orders of this Court and that it was
presenting, by reference, the brief of petitioner Rev. Fr.
Casimiro Lladoc as its own and for all purposes.
In view here of and considering that as heretofore stated,
the assessment at bar had been properly made and the
imposition of the tax is not a violation of the constitutional
provision exempting churches, parsonages or convents,
etc. (Art VI, sec. 22 [3], Constitution), the Head of the
Diocese, to which the parish Victorias Pertains, is liable for
the payment thereof.
The decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby
affirmed insofar as tax liability is concerned; it is modified,
in the sense that petitioner herein is not personally liable
for the said gift tax, and that the Head of the Diocese,
herein substitute petitioner, should pay, as he is presently
ordered to pay, the said gift tax, without special,
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Petitioner,
-

versus -

G.R. No.
186616
Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as
Present: amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991):

PUNO,
CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P.
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The
CARPIO, term
GO, RENATO F. BORBON,
of
office
of
CORONA, all barangay and sangguniang kabat
LEVVINO CHING, CARLOS C.
CARPIO MORALES,
FLORENTINO, RUBEN G.
aan officials after the effectivity of
CHICO-NAZARIO,
BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO,
this Act shall be three (3) years.
VELASCO, JR.,I
MARIO M. CAJUCOM,
NACHURA,
EMMANUEL M. CALMA, MANUEL
No barangay elective official
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
A. RAYOS, WILMA L. CHUA,
shall serve for more than three (3)
BRION,
EUFEMIO S. ALFONSO, JESUS M.
consecutive terms in the same
PERALTA,
LACANILAO, BONIFACIO N.
position: Provided, however, That
BERSAMIN,
ALCAPA, JOSE H. SILVERIO,
the term of office shall be reckoned
DEL
CASTILLO,
from
the
RODRIGO DEVELLES, NIDA R.
ABAD
1994
barangay
elections.
Voluntary
PAUNAN, MARIANO B. ESTUYE,
renunciation
of office for any length
VILLARAMA,
JR.,
JR., RAFAEL C. AREVALO,
of time shall not be considered as an
ARTURO T. MANABAT, RICARDO
interruption in the continuity of
O. LIZARONDO, LETICIA C.
service for the full term for which the
MATURAN, RODRIGO A. ALAYAN,
elective official was elected.
LEONILO N. MIRANDA,
DESEDERIO O. MONREAL,
FRANCISCO M. BAHIA, NESTOR
The RTC granted the petition and declared the
R. FORONDA, VICENTE B. QUE,
challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The
JR., AURELIO A. BILUAN, DANILO
present petition, filed by the Commission on
Promulgated:
R. GATCHALIAN, LOURDES R.
Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the
DEL MUNDO, EMMA O.
RTC decision.[1]
CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON,
November 20, 2009
TANY V. CATACUTAN, AND
THE ANTECEDENTS
CONCEPCION P. JAO,
Respondents.
Before
the
October
29,
2007
x
----------------------------------------------------------- Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kaba
---------------------------- x
taan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent
DECISION
officials of several barangays of Caloocan
City[2] filed with the RTC a petition for
BRION, J.:
declaratory
relief to
challenge
the
constitutionality of the above-highlighted
We resolve in this Decision the
proviso, based on the following arguments:
constitutional challenge, originally filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
I.
The
term
limit
Branch 128 (RTC), against the following
of Barangay officials should be
highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act
applied prospectively and not
(RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for
retroactively.

II.
Implementation
of
paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No.
9164 would be a violation of the
equal protection of the law.
III.
Barangay officials
have always been apolitical.
The RTC agreed with the respondents
contention
that
the
challenged
proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit
for barangay officials under the following
reasoning:
When the Local Government
Code of 1991 took effect abrogating
all other laws inconsistent therewith,
a different term was ordained. Here,
this Court agrees with the position of
the petitioners that Section 43 of the
Code
specifically
exempted barangay elective officials
from the coverage of the three (3)
consecutive
term
limit
rule
considering that the provision
applicable to these (sic) class of
elective officials was significantly
separated from the provisions of
paragraphs
(a)
and
(b)
thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed
intended to qualify paragraph (a) of
Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local
elective
officials
except barangay officials. Had
the
intention of the framers of the Code
is (sic) to include barangay elective
officials, then no excepting proviso
should have been expressly made in
paragraph (a) thereof or, by
implication,
the
contents
of
paragraph (c) should have been
stated ahead of the contents of
paragraph (b).
xxxx

Clearly, the intent of the framers of

the constitution (sic) is to exempt
the barangay officials from the three
(3) term limits (sic) which are
otherwise applicable to other elected
public officials from the Members of
the House of Representatives down
to
the
members
of
the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. I
t is up for the Congress whether the
three (3) term limit should be applied
by enacting a law for the purpose.
The amendment introduced by R.A.
No. 8524 merely increased the term
of
office
of barangay elective
officials from three (3) years to five
(5)
years. Like
the
Local
Government Code, it can be noted
that no consecutive term limit for the
election
of barangay elective
officials was fixed therein.
The advent of R.A. 9164
marked the revival of the consecutive
term limit for the election
of barangay elective officials after
the Local Government Code took
effect. Under the assailed provision
of this Act, the term of office
of barangay elective
officials
reverted back to three (3) years from
five (5) years, and, this time, the
legislators expressly declared that
no barangay elective official shall
serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same
position. The petitioners are very
clear that they are not assailing the
validity of such provision fixing the
three (3) consecutive term limit rule
for the election of barangay elective
officials to the same position. The
particular
provision
the
constitutionality of which is under
attack is that portion providing for
the reckoning of the three (3)

consecutive
term
of barangay elective
beginning
from
1994 barangay elections.

limit
officials
the

xxx
Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A.
9164 is not a mere restatement of
Section 43(c) of the Local
Government Code. As discussed
above, Section 43(c) of the Local
Government Code does not provide
for the consecutive term limit rule
of barangay elective officials. Such
specific provision of the Code has in
fact
amended
the
previous
enactments (R.A. 6653 and R.A.
6679) providing for the consecutive
term limit rule of barangay elective
officials. But, such specific provision
of the Local Government Code was
amended by R.A. 9164, which
reverted back to the previous policy
of fixing consecutive term limits
of barangay elective officials. [3]

In declaring this retroactive application

unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:
By giving a retroactive reckoning of
the three (3) consecutive term limit
rule for barangay officials to the
1994 barangay elections, Congress
has violated not only the principle of
prospective application of statutes
but also the equal protection clause
of the Constitution inasmuch as
the barangay elective officials were
singled out that their consecutive
term limit shall be counted
retroactively. There is no rhyme or
reason why the consecutive limit for
these barangay officials shall be
counted retroactively while the
consecutive limit for other local and
national elective officials are counted
prospectively. For if the purpose of

Congress is [sic] to classify

elective barangay officials
as
belonging to the same class of public
officers whose term of office are
limited to three (3) consecutive
terms, then to discriminate them by
applying the proviso retroactively
violates
the
constitutionally
enshrined
principle
of
equal
protection of the laws.
Although the Constitution grants
Congress the power to determine
such
successive
term
limit
of barangay elective officials, the
exercise of the authority granted
shall not otherwise transgress other
constitutional
and
statutory
privileges.
This Court cannot subscribe to the
position of the respondent that the
legislature clearly intended that the
provision of RA No. 9164 be made
effective in 1994 and that such
provision
is
valid
and
constitutional. If we allow such
premise, then the term of office for
those officials elected in the
1997 barangay elections should have
ended in year 2000 and not year
2002 considering that RA No. 9164
provides for a three-year term
of barangay elective
officials. The
amendment introduced by R.A. No.
8524 would be rendered nugatory in
view
of
such
retroactive
application. This is absurd and
illusory.
True, no person has a vested right to
a public office, the same not being
property within the contemplation of
constitutional guarantee. However, a
cursory reading of the petition would
show that the petitioners are not
claiming vested right to their office
but their right to be voted upon by

the
electorate
without
being
burdened by the assailed provision of
the law that, in effect, rendered them
ineligible to run for their incumbent
positions. Such right to run for office
and be voted for by the electorate is
the right being sought to be protected
by
assailing
the
otherwise
unconstitutional provision.
Moreover, the Court likewise agrees
with the petitioners that the law
violated the one-act-one subject rule
embodied in the Constitution. x x x x
The challenged laws title is AN ACT
PROVIDING
FOR
THE
SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AN
D SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELE
CTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC
ACT 7160 OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. x x x x
xxxx
To this court, the non-inclusion in the
title of the act on the retroactivity of
the reckoning of the term limits
posed a serious constitutional breach,
particularly on the provision of the
constitution [sic] that every bill must
embrace only one subject to be
expressed in the title thereof.
x x x the Court is of the view that the
affected barangay officials were not
sufficiently given notice that they
were already disqualified by a new
act, when under the previous
enactments no such restrictions were
imposed.
Even if this Court would apply
usual test in determining
sufficiency of the title of the bill,
challenged law would still
insufficient for how can

the
the
the
be
a

retroactivity of the term limits be

germane to the synchronization of an
election x x x x.[4]

The COMELEC moved to reconsider this

decision but the RTC denied the motion. Hence,
the present petition on a pure question of law.
The Petition
The COMELEC takes the position that the
assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No.
9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is
not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered
an ex post facto law. The three-term limit,
according to the COMELEC, has been
specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA
No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are
not penal in character may be applied
retroactively when expressly so provided and
when it does not impair vested rights. As there is
no vested right to public office, much less to an
elective post, there can be no valid objection to
the alleged retroactive application of RA No.
9164.
The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs
invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves
the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law that
the RTC has no right to inquire into under the
constitutional
separation
of
powers
principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that
there is no violation of the one subject-one title
rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are
related; the assailed provision is actually
embraced within the title of the law.
THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious. The RTC

legally erred when it declared the challenged
proviso unconstitutional.
Preliminary Considerations
We find it appropriate, as a preliminary
matter, to hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution
history of the barangay political system as
outlined by this Court in David v. COMELEC,
[5]
and we quote:
As a unit of government,
the barangay antedated the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines. The
word barangay is derived from the
Malay balangay, a boat which
transported them (the Malays) to
these shores. Quoting from Juan de
Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in
1577, Historian Conrado Benitez
wrote that the barangay was ruled by
a dato who
exercised
absolute
powers of government. While the
Spaniards kept the barangay as the
basic structure of government, they
stripped the dato or rajah of his
powers. Instead,
power
was
centralized nationally in the governor
general
and
locally
in
the encomiendero and
later,
in
the alcalde
mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. The dato or raja
h was much later renamed cabeza de
barangay, who was elected by the
local
citizens
possessing
property. The position degenerated
from a title of honor to that of a mere
government employee. Only the poor
who needed a salary, no matter how
low, accepted the post.
After the Americans colonized
the Philippines,
the barangays became known as
barrios. For some time, the laws
governing barrio governments were

found in the Revised Administrative

Code of 1916 and later in the
Revised Administrative Code of
1917. Barrios
were
granted
autonomy by the original Barrio
Charter, RA 2370, and formally
recognized
as
quasi-municipal
corporations by the Revised Barrio
Charter, RA 3590. During the martial
law regime, barrios were declared or
renamed barangays -- a reversion
really to their pre-Spanish names -by PD. No. 86 and PD No.
557. Their basic organization and
functions under RA 3590, which was
expressly
adopted
as
the Barangay Charter,
were
retained.However, the titles of the
officials
were
changed
to barangay captain, barangay counc
ilman, barangay secretary
and barangay treasurer.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas
Pambansa
Blg.
222,
a Punong Barangay (Barangay Capta
in)
and
six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Bara
ngay (Barangay Councilmen), who
shall constitute the presiding officer
and members of the Sangguniang
Barangay (Barangay Council)
respectively were first elected
on May 17, 1982. They had a term of
six years which began on June 7,
1982.
The Local Government Code
of 1983 also fixed the term of office
of local elective officials at six
years. Under this Code, the chief
officials
of
the barangay were
the punongbarangay,
six
elective sangguniang barangay me
mbers,
the kabataang barangay chairman,
a barangay secretary
and
a barangay treasurer.

Madam
President.
What will
be
the
term of the
office
of barang
ay official
s
as
provided
for?

B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus

Election
Code,
reiterated
that barangay officials shall hold
office for six years, and stated that
their election was to be held on the
second Monday of May nineteen
hundred and eighty eight and on the
same day every six years thereafter.
[Emphasis supplied.]

The 1987 Philippine Constitution

extended
constitutional
recognition
to barangays under Article X, Section 1 by
specifying barangays as one of the territorial
and political subdivisions of the country,
supplemented by Section 8 of the same Article
X, which provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of
elective
local
officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which
he was elected. [Emphasis supplied.]

The Constitutional Commissions deliberations

on Section 8 show that the authority of Congress
to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the
term of office of barangayofficials, but also to
the application of the three-term limit. The
following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission are particularly instructive on this
point:
MR.

NOLLEDO: One
clarificator
y question,

MR. DAVIDE: As may be

determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO: As provided
for in the
Local
Governme
nt Code?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there
any other
comment?
Is
there
any
objection
to
this
proposed
new
section as
submitted
by
Commissi
oner
Davide
and
accepted
by
the
Committe
e?
MR.

RODRIGO: Madam
President,

does this
prohibitio
n to serve
for more
than three
consecuti
ve terms
apply
to barang
ay official
s?
MR.

DAVIDE: Madam
President,
the voting
that
we
had
on
the terms
of office
did
not
include
the baran
gay officia
ls because
it
was
then the
stand of
the
Chairman
of
the
Committe
e on Local
Governm
ents that
the term
of barang
ay official
s must be
determine
d
by
law. So it
is now for
the law to
determine
whether
the
restrictio
n on the

number
of
reelection
s will be
included
in
the
Local
Governm
ent Code.
MR. RODRIGO: So that is
up to Congress to decide.
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted
that clear in the
record.[6] [Empha
sis supplied.]

After the effectivity of the 1987

Constitution, the barangay election originally
scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the
second Monday of May 1988 was reset to the
second Monday of November 1988 and every
five years thereafter by RA No. 6653.[8] Section
2 of RA No. 6653 changed the term of office
of barangayofficials and introduced a term
limitation as follows:
SEC. 2. The term of office
of barangay officials shall be for five
(5) years from the first day of
January
following
their
election. Provided, however, That
no kagawad shall serve for more
than
two
(2)
consecutive
terms. [Emphasis supplied]

Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653,

the punong barangay was to be chosen by
seven kagawads from among themselves, and
they in turn, were to be elected at large by

the barangay electorate. The punong barangay,

under Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for
loss of confidence by an absolute majority vote
of the Sangguniang Barangay,embodied in a
resolution that shall necessarily include
the punong barangays successor.
The election date set by RA No. 6653 on
the second Monday of November 1988 was
postponed yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA
No. 6679 whose pertinent provision states:
SEC. 1. The elections
of barangay officials set on the
second Monday of November 1988
by Republic Act No. 6653 are hereby
postponed and reset to March 28,
1989. They shall serve a term
which shall begin on the first day
of May 1989 and ending on the
thirty-first day of May 1994.
There shall be held a regular
election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994 and on
the same day every five (5) years
thereafter. Their term shall be for five
(5) years which shall begin on the
first day of June following the
election and until their successors
shall have been elected and
qualified: Provided,
That
no barangay official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive
terms.
The barangay elections shall
be nonpartisan and shall be
conducted in an expeditious and
inexpensive manner.

Significantly, the manner of election of

the punong barangay was changed
Section 5 of the law provided that while the
seven kagawads were to be elected by the
registered voters of the barangay, (t)he

candidate who obtains the highest number of

votes shall be the punong barangay and in the
event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots
under the supervision of the Commission on
Elections.
More than two (2) years after the
1989 barangay elections, RA
No.
7160 (the LGC) introduced the following
changes in the law:
SEC.
41. Manner
of
Election. -(a)
The
x
x
x punong barangay shall be elected
at large x x x by the qualified voters
therein.
SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a)
The term of office of all local
elective officials elected after the
effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June
30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, except that of
elective barangay officials: Provided,
That all local officials first elected
during
the
local
elections
immediately
following
the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution
shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.
(b) No local elective official
shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office
of barangay officials and members
of the sangguniang kabataan shall
be for three (3) years, which shall
begin after the regular election

of barangay officials on the second

Monday of May 1994.
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and
Offices. -- (a) There shall be in
each barangay a punong barangay,
seven
(7) sangguniang
barangay members, the sangguniang
kabataanchairman,
a barangay secretary
and
a barangay treasurer.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC.
390. Composition.
-- The Sangguniang barangay, the
legislative body of the barangay,
shall be composed of the punong
barangay as presiding officer, and
the seven (7) regular sanguniang
barangay members elected at large
and
the sanguniang
kabataan chairman
as
members. [Emphasis supplied.]

This law started the direct and separate

election of the punong barangay by the qualified
voters in the barangay and not by the seven
(7) kagawads from among themselves.[9]
Subsequently
or
on February
14,
1998, RA No. 8524 changed the three-year term
of office of barangay officials under Section 43
of the LGC to five (5) years. On March 19,
2002, RA No. 9164 introduced the following
significant changes: (1) the term of office
of barangay officials was again fixed at three
years
on
the
reasoning
that
the barangay officials should not serve a longer
term than their supervisors;[10] and (2) the
challenged proviso, which states that the 1994
election shall be the reckoning point for the
application of the three-term limit, was

introduced. Yet another change was introduced

three years after or on July 25, 2005 when RA
No. 9340 extended the term of the then
incumbent barangay officials due to expire at
noon of November 30, 2005 under RA No. 9164
to noon of November 30, 2007. The three-year
term limitation provision survived all these
changes.
Congress
Plenary
Power to
Legislate
Term
Limits for
Barangay
Officials
and
Judicial
Power
In passing upon the issues posed to us, we
clarify at the outset the parameters of our
powers.
As reflected in the above-quoted
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
has plenary authority under the Constitution to
determine by legislation not only the duration of
the term of barangay officials, but also the
application to them of a consecutive term
limit. Congress invariably exercised this
authority when it enacted no less than six
(6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
Through all these statutory changes,
Congress had determined at its discretion both
the length of the term of office
of barangay officials and their term limitation.
Given the textually demonstrable commitment
by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the

authority to determine the term duration

and limition of barangay officials under the
Constitution, we consider it established that
whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on
these matters are political questions beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny,[11] subject only to
the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law
contrary to the Constitution.[12]
Political questions refer to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard
to
which full
discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government; it is
concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legalityof a particular measure.
[13]
These questions, previously impervious to
judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under
the limited window provided by Section 1,
Article
VIII. Estrada
v.
Desierto[14] best
describes this constitutional development, and
we quote:
To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach
of the political doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable
but also
to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or
instrumentality
of
government. Heretofore,
the
judiciary has focused on the thou
shalt nots of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its
jurisdiction. With the new provision,

however, courts are given a greater

prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly,
the
new
provision did not just grant the Court
power of doing nothing. In sync and
symmetry with this intent are other
provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political
thicket. xxxx

Thus, we can inquire into a congressional

enactment despite the political question doctrine,
although the window provided us is narrow; the
challenge must show grave abuse of discretion
to justify our intervention.
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII
route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is
contrary
to
any
provision
of
the
Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the
challenged law against the legal standards
provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of
the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its
nullification, the breach of the Constitution must
be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or
equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong
presumption of constitutionality.[15] These are the
hurdles that those challenging the constitutional
validity of a law must overcome.
The present case, as framed by the
respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of
grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed
relate strictly to compliance with constitutional
standards. It is from this prism that we shall
therefore resolve this case.
The
Retroacti
ve

Applicati
on Issue
a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration
The respondents first objection to the
challenged provisos constitutionality is its
purported retroactive application of the threeterm
limit
when
it
set
the
1994 barangay elections as a reckoning point in
the application of the three-term limit.
The respondents argued that the term
limit, although present in the previous laws, was
not in RA No. 7160 when it amended all
previous barangay election laws.Hence, it was
re-introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164
(signed into law on March 19, 2002) and was
applied retroactively when it made the term
limitation
effective
from
the
1994 barangay elections. As the appealed ruling
quoted above shows, the RTC fully agreed with
the respondents position.
Our first point of disagreement with the
respondents and with the RTC is on their
position that a retroactive application of the term
limitation was made under RA No. 9164. Our
own reading shows that no retroactive
application was made because the three-term
limit has been there all along as early as the
second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the
1987 Constitution took effect; it was
continued under the LGC and can still be
found in the current law. We find this obvious
from a reading of the historical development
of the law.
The first law that provided a term
limitation for barangay officials was RA No.
6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term
limit. After only six months, Congress,

under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the twoterm limit by providing for a three-consecutive
term limit. This consistent imposition of the term
limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the
congressional intent to provide a term
limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC
followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it
provided, as originally worded, for a three-term
limit for barangay officials. We differ with the
RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of
the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided
into several chapters dealing with a wide range
of subject matters, allrelating to local elective
officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and
Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and
Succession (Chapter II), c. Disciplinary Actions
(Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II
likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation
(Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to
apply to all local elective officials, unless the
contrary is clearly provided. A contrary
application is provided with respect to the length
of the term of office under Section 43(a); while
it applies to all local elective officials, it does not
apply to barangay officials whose length of term
is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In
contrast to this clear case of an exception to a
general rule, the three-term limit under Section
43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies
to all local elective officials who must perforce
include barangay officials.
An alternative perspective is to view Sec.
43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as
independently standing and self-contained
provisions, except to the extent that they
expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a)
relates to the term of local elective officials,
except barangay officials whose term of office is

separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b),

by its express terms, relates to all local elective
officials without any exception. Thus, the term
limitation applies to all local elective officials
without any exclusion or qualification.
Either perspective, both of which speak of
the same resulting interpretation, is the correct
legal import of Section 43 in the context in
which it is found in Title II of the LGC.
To be sure, it may be argued, as the
respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for
elective officials (other than barangay officials);
and paragraph (c) is the specific law
on barangay officials, such that the silence of
paragraph
(c)
on
term
limitation
for barangay officials indicates the legislative
intent to exclude barangay officials from the
application of the three-term limit. This reading,
however, is flawed for two reasons.
First, reading Section 43(a) and (b)
together to the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not
justified by the plain texts of these
provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local
elective
officials,
except
elective barangay officials. In
comparison,
Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials
without
exclusions
or
exceptions. Their
respective coverages therefore vary so that one
cannot be said to be of the same kind as the
other. Their
separate
topics
additionally
strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers
to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers
to the three-term limit. These differences alone
indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be
read together as one organic whole in the way
the RTC suggested. Significantly, these same
distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).

Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed

because of its total disregard of the historical
background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that we
painstakingly outlined above.
From a historical perspective of the law,
the inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an
absolute necessity to clarify the length of term
of barangay officials. Recall that under RA No.
6679, the term of office of barangay officials
was five (5) years. The real concern was how
Section 43 would interface with RA No.
6679. Without a categorical statement on the
length
of
the
term
of
office
of barangay officials, a general three-year term
for all local elective officials under Section
43(a), standing alone, may not readily and
completely erase doubts on the intended
abrogation
of
the
5-year
term
for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus,
Congress added Section 43(c) which provided a
categorical
three-year
term
for
these
officials. History tells us, of course, that the
unequivocal provision of Section 43(c)
notwithstanding, an issue on what is the exact
term of office of barangay officials was still
brought to us via a petition filed by no less than
the President of the Liga ng Mga Barangay in
1997. We fully resolved the issue in the
cited David v. Comelec.
Section 43(c) should therefore be
understood in this context and not in the sense
that it intended to provide the complete rule for
the election of barangay officials, so that in the
absence of any term limitation proviso under this
subsection, no term limitation applies
to barangay officials. That Congress had the
LGCs three-term limit in mind when it enacted
RA No. 9164 is clear from the following
deliberations in the House of Representatives

(House) on House Bill No. 4456 which later

became RA No. 9164:
MARCH 5, 2002:
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep.
Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.
REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker,
next to interpellate is the Gentleman
from Zamboanga City. I ask that the
Honorable Lobregat be recognized.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep.
Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable
Lobregat is recognized.
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very
much, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this
is just
REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the
Gentleman from Zamboanga City.
REP. LOBREGAT. points of
clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of
office. It says in Section 4, The term
of
office
of
all
Barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials
after the effectivity of this Act shall
be three years. Then it says,
No Barangay elective official shall
serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same
position.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position
of the committee that the first term
should be reckoned from election of
what year, Mr. Speaker?
REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of
the Local Government Code, Your
Honor. So that the first election is to
be reckoned on, would be May 8,
1994, as far as the Barangay election
is concerned.

REP. LOBREGAT. Yes,

Mr.
Speaker. So there was an election in
1994.
REP. MACIAS. Then an election in
1997.
REP. LOBREGAT. There was an
election in 1997. And there will be
an election this year
REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.
REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This
will be the third.
xxx xxx
REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep.
Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable
Sumulong is recognized.
REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the
permission of my Chairman, I would
like to address the question of
Congressman Lobregat.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep.
Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.
REP. SUMULONG. With respect to
the three-year consecutive term
limits of Barangay Captains that is
not
provided
for
in
the
Constitution and that is why the
election prior to 1991 during the
enactment
of
the
Local
Government Code is not counted
because it is not in the Constitution
but in the Local Government Code
where the three consecutive term
limits has been placed. [Emphasis
supplied.]

which led to the following exchanges in the

House Committee on Amendments:

March 6, 2002
COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
REP. GONZALES. May we
now
proceed
to
committee
amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep.
Gonzalez). The Chair recognizes the
distinguished Chairman of the
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms.
REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page
2, line 7, after the word position,
substitute the period (.) and add the
following: PROVIDED HOWEVER
THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE
SHALL BE RECKONED FROM
THE
1994
BARANGAY
ELECTIONS. So that the amended
Section 4 now reads as follows:
SEC.
4. Term
of
Office. The term of office of
all
barangay
and
sangguniang
kabataan
officials after the effectivity
of this Act shall be three (3)
years.
No barangay elective
local official shall serve for
more
than
three
(3)
consecutive terms in the
same
position COLON (:)
PROVIDED, HOWEVER,
THAT THE TERM OF
OFFICE
SHALL
BE
RECKONED FROM THE
1994 BARANGAY ELECTIO
NS. Voluntary renunciation
of office for any length of
time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the

full term for which the

elective official was elected.

The House therefore clearly operated on the

premise that the LGC imposed a three-term limit
for barangay officials, and the challenged
proviso is its way of addressing any confusion
that may arise from the numerous changes in the
law.
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that
the challenged proviso has been there all along
and does not simply retroact the application of
the three-term limit to the barangay elections of
1994. Congress merely integrated the past
statutory changes into a seamless whole by
coming up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the respondents
constitutional challenge to the proviso based on
retroactivity must fail.
b. No Involvement of Any
Constitutional Standard
Separately from the above reason, the
constitutional challenge must fail for a more
fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity
objection does not involve a violation of any
constitutional standard.
Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil
law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing
law
is
the
Civil
Code,[16] not
the
Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code
provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. The
application of the Civil Code is of course selfexplanatory laws enacted by Congress may
permissibly provide that they shall have

retroactive effect. The Civil Code established a

statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.
The closest the issue of retroactivity of
laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is
if a laws retroactive application will impair
vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has
already vested in an individual and a subsequent
law effectively takes it away, a genuine due
process issue may arise. What should be
involved, however, is a vested right to life,
liberty or property, as these are the ones that may
be considered protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never
raised due process as an issue. But even
assuming that they did, the respondents
themselves concede that there is no vested right
to public office.[17] As the COMELEC correctly
pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an
elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent
in electoral exercises.
Aware of this legal reality, the respondents
theorized instead that they had a right to be
voted upon by the electorate without being
burdened by a law that effectively rendered them
ineligible to run for their incumbent
positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this
contention.
We do not agree with the RTC, as we find
no such right under the Constitution; if at all,
this claimed right is merely a restatement of a
claim of vested right to a public office. What the
Constitution clearly provides is the power of
Congress to prescribe the qualifications for
elective local posts;[18] thus, the question of
eligibility for an elective local post is a matter
for Congress, not for the courts, to decide. We
dealt with a strikingly similar issue

in Montesclaros
v.
Commission
on
[19]
Elections where we ruled that SK membership
which was claimed as a property right within the
meaning of the Constitution is a mere statutory
right
conferred
by
law. Montesclarosinstructively tells us:
Congress
exercises
the
power
to
prescribe
the
qualifications
for
SK
membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment
in the law cannot complain of being
deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify
as SK members can contest, based on
a
statutory
right,
any
act
disqualifying
them
from
SK
membership or from voting in the SK
elections. SK membership is not a
property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere
statutory right conferred by
law.Congress may amend at any
time the law to change or even
withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a
property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a
public trust. No one has a vested
right to any public office, much less
a vested right to an expectancy of
holding a public office. In Cornejo v.
Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court
already ruled:
Again, for this
petition to come under
the due process of law
prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider
an office a property. It
is,
however,
well
settled x x x that a
public office is not
property within the

sense
of
the
constitutional
guaranties of due
process of law, but is a
public trust or agency. x
x x The basic idea of
the government x x x is
that of a popular
representative
government,
the
officers being mere
agents and not rulers of
the people, one where
no one man or set of
men has a proprietary
or contractual right to
an office, but where
every officer accepts
office pursuant to the
provisions of the law
and holds the office as a
trust for the people he
represents.
Petitioners, who apparently
desire to hold public office, should
realize from the very start that no one
has a proprietary right to public
office. While the law makes an SK
officer an ex-officio member of a
local government legislative council,
the law does not confer on petitioners
a proprietary right or even a
proprietary expectancy to sit in local
legislative
councils. The
constitutional principle of a public
office as a public trust precludes any
proprietary
claim
to
public
office. Even the
State
policy
directing
equal
access
to
opportunities for public service
cannot bestow on petitioners a
proprietary right to SK membership
or a proprietary expectancy to exofficio public offices.
Moreover, while the State
policy is to encourage the youths

involvement in public affairs, this

policy refers to those who belong to
the class of people defined as the
youth.Congress has the power to
define who are the youth qualified to
join the SK, which itself is a creation
of Congress. Those who do not
qualify because they are past the age
group defined as the youth cannot
insist on being part of the youth. In
government service, once an
employee
reaches
mandatory
retirement age, he cannot invoke any
property right to cling to his
office. In the same manner, since
petitioners are now past the
maximum age for membership in the
SK, they cannot invoke any property
right to cling to their SK
membership. [Emphasis supplied.]
To recapitulate, we find no merit in the
respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1)
the challenged proviso did not provide for the
retroactive application to barangay officials of
the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No.
9164 simply continued what had been there
before; and (2) the constitutional challenge
based on retroactivity was not anchored on a
constitutional standard but on a mere statutory
norm.

The Equal Protection Clause Issue

The equal protection guarantee under the
Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article
III, which provides: Nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the
laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under
this clause is equality under the same conditions
and among persons similarly situated. It is
equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are different from one
another on the basis of substantial distinctions
related to the objective of the law; when things

or persons are different in facts or

circumstances, they may be treated differently in
law.[20]

expressed in the title thereof. Farias v. Executive

Secretary[21] provides the reasons for this
constitutional requirement and the test for its
application, as follows:

Appreciation of how the constitutional

equality provision applies inevitably leads to the
conclusion that no basis exists in the present
case for an equal protection challenge. The law
can treat barangay officials differently from
other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant
distinction between these elective officials with
respect to length of term and term
limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution
provides for a three-year term and three-term
limit for local elective officials, it left the length
of term and the application of the three-term
limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation.
Not only does this disparate treatment recognize
substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that
the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can
exist under these conditions.

The proscription is aimed

against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious
and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of
an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title.

From another perspective, we see no

reason to apply the equal protection clause as a
standard because the challenged proviso did not
result
in
any
differential
treatment
between barangay officials and all other elective
officials. This conclusion proceeds from our
ruling on the retroactivity issue that the
challenged proviso does not involve any
retroactive application.
Violation of the Constitutional
One Subject- One Title Rule
Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be

To determine whether there

has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed
in its title, the Court laid down the
rule that
Constitutional
provisions relating to the
subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power
of
legislation. The
requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed
in its title should receive a
reasonable
and not
a
technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be
comprehensive
enough
reasonably to include the
general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without
expressing each and every
end and means necessary or
convenient
for
the
accomplishing
of
that
object.Mere details need not
be set forth. The title need
not be an abstract or index of
the Act.

xxxx
x x x This Court has held that an act
having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter

how diverse they may be, so long as

they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out
the general subject.
xxxx
x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose
of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced
in its title is to apprise the legislators
of the purposes, the nature and scope
of its provisions, and prevent the
enactment into law of matters which
have not received the notice, action
and study of the legislators and the
public.

We find, under these settled parameters, that the

challenged proviso does not violate the one
subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act
Providing
for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kaba
taang Elections, amending Republic Act No.
7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, states the laws
general subject matter the amendment of the
LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK
elections and for other purposes. To achieve
synchronization of the barangay and SK
elections, the reconciliation of the varying
lengths
of
the
terms
of
office
of barangayofficials and SK officials is
necessary. Closely related with length of term is
term limitation which defines the total number
of terms for which a barangay official may run
for and hold office. This natural linkage
demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign

to the general subject expressed in the title of the

law.
Second, the congressional debates we
cited above show that the legislators and the
public they represent were fully informed of the
purposes, nature and scope of the laws
provisions. Term limitation therefore received
the notice, consideration, and action from both
the legislators and the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term
limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make
the title an index of all the subject matters dealt
with by law; this is not what the constitutional
requirement contemplates.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
we GRANT the
petition
and
accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of
the challenged proviso under Section 2,
paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs
against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 178413

March 13, 2008

AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING
AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE
SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR
MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED BY ATTY. EMILIO S.
SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F. ZUBIRI, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 4 July 2007, petitioner Aquilino L. Pimentel III
(Pimentel) filed the present Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus (with Urgent Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status
Quo Ante Order).1
The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national
elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the time of filing of the
Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11
candidates with the highest number of votes had already
been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of
office as Senators. With other candidates conceding, the
only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final
senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan
Miguel F. Zubiri (Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass
proceedings so as to determine the twelfth and last
Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.

Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs

from the municipalities of Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or
the copy intended to be posted on the wall. The SPBOCMaguindanao was then tasked to re-canvass the MCOCs
submitted by Task Force Maguindanao. The re-canvassing
of the Maguindanao MCOCs was conducted by the
SPBOC-Maguindanao from 25 to 26 June 2007 at Shariff
Aguak, Maguindanao. Although PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Maguindanao (MBOCs-Maguindanao) were present during
the canvass proceedings before the SPBOCMaguindanao, the candidates legal counsels were not
allowed to ask them any questions. Due to the consistent
denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and
persistent motions made by Pimentels counsel to
propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of
the MBOCs-Maguindanao regarding the due execution and
authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs, Pimentels
counsel manifested her continuing objection to the
canvassing of the said MCOCs. In particular, Pimentels
counsel objected to the Maguindanao MCOCs because:
a) the proceedings were illegal;
b) the MCOCs were palpably manufactured;
c) the results reflected in the MCOCs were
statistically improbable;
d) there is no basis for saying the MCOCs were
authentic because there were no other available
copies for comparison purposes;
e) in most of the MCOCs[,] no watcher signed;

Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its

constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for
Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the
Provincial and Municipal Certificates of Canvass (PCOC
and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were
respectively canvassed.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the
canvass proceedings held before the original Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOCMaguindanao), chaired by Provincial Election Supervisor
(PES) Lintang Bedol, were marred by irregularities, and the
PCOC (Bedol PCOC) and other electoral documents
submitted by the said PBOC-Maguindanao were tainted
with fraud and statistical improbabilities. Hence, the Bedol
PCOC was excluded from the national canvass then being
conducted by the NBC.
Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and Commissioner

f) there was no evidence or indication that the copy

2 MCOCs had been posted as intended by law;
g) the serial numbers of the MCOCs are not clearly
stamped;
h) copy 2 of the MCOCs cannot be used for
canvass;
i) that the MCOCs are therefore, improper,
unworthy and unfit for canvass;
j) that the manner the "re-canvassing" which was
being done where the parties are not allowed to
ask questions was patently illegal; and
k) that it has not been established that the other
copies of the MCOCs have been lost.2

All of the foregoing observations, manifestations, and

objections made by Pimentels counsel, as well as those
made by the other candidates counsels, were simply noted
by the SPBOC-Maguindanao without specific action
thereon.

Comelec in the exercise of such broad plenary

powers. It violated its own rules when it deprived
petitioner [Pimentel] of the right to ventilate and
prove his objections to the Maguindanao COCs.3
Pimentel seeks from this Court the following remedies:

On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to

the NBC the second PCOC for Maguindanao. In the
proceedings before the NBC, Pimentels counsel reiterated
her request to propound questions to PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the
SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC, however, refused to
grant her request. Pimentels counsel thereafter moved for
the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the
canvass, maintaining that the said PCOC did not reflect the
true results of the elections because it was based on the
manufactured Maguindanao MCOCs, the authenticity and
due execution of which had not been duly established. The
motion to exclude made by Pimentels counsel was once
again denied by the NBC, and she was ordered to sit down
or she would be forcibly evicted from the session hall. The
second Maguindanao PCOC was thus included in the
canvass proceedings conducted by the NBC and,
resultantly, Pimentels lead over Zubiri was significantly
reduced from 133,000 votes to only 4,000 votes.
Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were
conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao in
violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and
procedural due process and equal protection of the laws,
and in obvious partiality to Zubiri. Pimentel thus filed the
Petition at bar on 4 July 2007, anchored on the following
grounds:
I. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to
due process of law when the respondent SPBOC
and the respondent NBC adopted an
unconstitutional procedure which disallowed the
petitioner [Pimentel] the opportunity to raise
questions on the COCs subject of the canvass.
II. The petitioner [Pimentel] was denied his right to
equal protection of the law when the respondent
SPBOC and the respondent NBC unconstitutionally
adopted a procedure of "no questions" in the
canvass of COCs from Maguindanao, different
from the procedure adopted in the canvass of
COCs from other provinces/areas.
III. The respondent NBC acted with manifest grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to exercise its
broad, plenary powers in fully or accurately
ascertaining due execution, authenticity and fitness
for the canvass of the MCOCs collected by the

1. Forthwith ISSUE A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the respondent
Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers for Senators for the
May 14, 2007 elections ("NBC") from proceeding
with any proclamation (of the twelfth and last
winner of the May 14, 2007 Elections for Senators)
based on the on-going senatorial canvass which
includes the new/second Provincial Certificate of
Canvass of Maguindanao, until further orders from
this Court, or, in the alternative, in the event that
the proclamation of Respondent Zubiri is made
before the application for a TRO is acted
upon, ISSUE A STATUS QUO ANTE
ORDER requiring the parties to observe the status
quo at the time of the filing of the Petition, in order
to maintain and preserve the situation of the parties
at the time of the filing of this Petition, so as not to
render the issues raised in this Petition moot and
academic;
2. After proper proceedings, RENDER
JUDGMENT: (a) ANNULLING AND SETTING
ASIDE for being unconstitutional and illegal the
proceedings and acts of respondent Commission
on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers for Senators for the May 14, 2007
elections ("NBC") of including, on June 29, 2007, in
the national canvass of votes for Senators the
results from the Province of Maguindanao as
reflected in its new/second Provincial Certificate of
Canvass as well as the proceedings and acts of the
respondent Special Provincial Board of Canvassers
for Maguindanao ("SPBOC") in canvassing or "recanvassing" the collected MCOCs, on June 25, 26
and 27, 2007, leading to the preparation of the
new/second PCOC for Maguindanao, and
(b) COMPELLING or ORDERING respondent NBC
and its deputy, the SPBOC, to perform their
ministerial constitutional duty of fully determining
the due execution and authenticity of the MCOCs,
including, but not limited to, allowing petitioner
[Pimentel] to substantiate his claim of
manufactured results and propound questions to
the officers concerned, primarily, the Chairpersons
of the former PBOC and SPBOC of Maguindanao

and the Chairpersons of the Municipal Boards of

Canvassers of Maguindanao.
Petitioner [Pimentel] also prays for other reliefs,
just and equitable, under the premises.4
Pursuant to the Resolution5 dated 10 July 2007 issued by
this Court, Zubiri filed his Comment6 on the Petition at bar
on 12 July 2007; while the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindano,
chaired by Atty. Emilio S. Santos, filed their joint
Comment7 on even date. The respondents Zubiri, NBC,
and SPBOC-Maguindanao collectively sought the denial of
Pimentels application for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Status Quo Ante Order and the dismissal of
the instant Petition.
Pimentels prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Status
Quo Ante Order was set for oral arguments on 13 July
2007. After hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court
voted seven for the grant and seven for the denial of
Pimentels prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Status
Quo Ante Order; thus, said prayer was deemed denied for
failure to garner the required majority vote. The parties
were then directed to submit their respective Memoranda,
after which, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution.8 All the parties complied, with Zubiri submitting
his Memorandum9 on 31 July 2007; Pimentel,10 on 1 August
2007; and the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao,11 on 10
August 2007.
In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo
Ante Order from the Court, the canvass proceedings
before the NBC continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri
(with 11,004,099 votes) and Pimentel (with 10,984,807
votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and
thirteenth Senatorial candidates with the highest number of
votes in the 14 May 2007 elections. Since the NBC found
that the remaining uncanvassed certificates of canvass
would no longer materially affect Zubiris lead of 19,292
votes over Pimentel, it issued Resolution No. NBC 0767,12 dated 14 July 2007, proclaiming Zubiri as the twelfth
duly elected Senator of the Philippines in the 14 May 2007
elections, to serve for a term of six years beginning 30
June 2007 in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
On 19 July 2007, Zubiri filed with this Court a Manifestation
with Motion to Dismiss.13 Zubiri sought the dismissal of the
Petition at bar arguing that, in consideration of his
proclamation pursuant to Resolution No. NBC 07-67 and
his formal assumption of office on 16 July 2007,
controversies involving his election and qualification as a
Senator are now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).

Zubiri further informed the Court through a

Manifestation,14 dated 16 August 2007, that Pimentel filed
an Election Protest (Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam) before the
SET on 30 July 2007, docketed as SET Case No. 001-07,
to which Zubiri filed his Answer Ad Cautelam (With Special
Affirmative Defenses, Counter-Protest and Petition for a
Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses) on 13
August 2007. In his election protest, Pimentel prays,
among other remedies, for the annulment of Zubiris
proclamation as the twelfth winning Senator in the 14 May
2007 elections. Zubiri called the attention of the Court to
the "glaring reality" that with G.R. No. 178413 before this
Court and SET Case No. 001-07 before the SET, "there
are now two cases involving the same parties with
practically the same issues and similar remedies sought
filed before the two (2) separate courts/tribunals." Zubiri
also pointed out Pimentels ostensible failure to inform this
Court of his institution of SET Case No. 001-07 and the
subsequent developments therein.
On 23 August 2007, Pimentel filed before this Court his
Comment/Opposition (to Private Respondents
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss).15 Pimentel alleged
that Zubiris Motion to Dismiss solely relied on Aggabao v.
Commission on Elections.16 However, Pimentel argued
that Aggabao cannot be applied to the instant Petition
because of the difference in the factual backgrounds of the
two cases. In Aggabao, therein petitioner Aggabao filed his
Petition before this Court after the proclamation of therein
private respondent Miranda as Congressman for the
Fourth District of Isabela; while in the present case,
Pimentel already filed his Petition before this Court prior to
the proclamation of Zubiri as Senator. Moreover, Pimentel
asserted that his Petition questioned not Zubiris
proclamation, but the conduct of the canvass proceedings
before the NBC and SPBOC-Maguindanao. He maintained
that his case was one of first impression and no existing
jurisprudence could be used as precedent for its summary
dismissal. Pimentel then reiterated his arguments in his
Memorandum that Sections 37 and 38 of Republic Act No.
9369,17 amending Sections 30 and 15 of Republic Act No.
7166,18 respectively, significantly affected and changed the
nature of canvass proceedings, the nature of the duty of
canvassing boards, and the extent of allowable preproclamation controversies in Senatorial elections. Based
on the foregoing, Pimentel prayed for the denial of Zubiris
Motion to Dismiss.
After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and
evidence presented by all the parties before this Court, this
Court rules to dismiss the present Petition.
Pre-proclamation controversy/case

A pre-proclamation controversy has been defined by Batas

Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, as follows:

Pre-proclamation cases to resolve pre-proclamation

controversies are allowed in local elections. According to
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7166:

SEC. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation

controversy is any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appearance of the election returns.

SEC. 16. Pre-proclamation Cases Involving

Provincial, City and Municipal Offices. Preproclamation cases involving provincial, city and
municipal officer shall be allowed and shall be
governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22
hereof.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized

national and local elections, pre-proclamation
controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of election
returns and certificates of canvass.19
Essentially reiterating Section 243 of the Omnibus Election
Code, but adding the reference to the certificates of
canvass, COMELEC Resolution No. 7859, dated 17 April
2007, identified the issues that may be subject of a preproclamation controversy, to wit:
SEC. 37. Issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy. The following shall be
proper issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy:
1) Illegal composition or proceedings of the Board
of Canvassers;
2) The canvassed election returns/certificates of
canvass are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain
discrepancies in the same returns/certificates or in
the other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
3) The election returns/certificates of canvass were
prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or
not authentic; and
4) When substitute or fraudulent election
return/certificates of canvass were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of
the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

All pre-proclamation cases pending before the

Commission shall be deemed terminated at the
beginning of the term of the office involved and the
rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall
be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing
of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party.
However, proceedings may continue when on the
basis of the evidence thus far presented, the
Commission determines that the petition appears
meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the
proceeding to continue or when an appropriate
order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a
petition for certiorari.
SEC. 17. Pre-proclamation Controversies: How
Commenced. Questions affecting the
composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly
with the Commission. However, matters raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns, and the
certificates of canvass shall be brought in the first
instance before the board of canvassers only.
However, as to elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives,
pre-proclamation cases are prohibited. Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 7166, prior to its amendment, read:
SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in
Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator,
and Member of the House of Representatives.
For purposes of the elections for President, VicePresident, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall
be allowed on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
the election returns or the certificates of canvass,
as the case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu propio or upon written

complaint of an interested person to correct

manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings
of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the
board or directly with the Commission in
accordance with Section 19 hereof.
Any objection on the election returns before the city
or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the
provincial board of canvassers or district boards of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.
As Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 was then worded,
it would appear that any pre-proclamation case relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass,
was prohibited in elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of
the winner in the election, which delay might result in a
vacuum in these sensitive posts. Proceedings which may
delay the proclamation of the winning candidate beyond
the date20 set for the beginning of his term of office must be
avoided, considering that the effect of said delay is, in the
case of national offices for which there is no hold over, to
leave the office without any incumbent.21
The law, nonetheless, recognizes an exception and allows
the canvassing body motu proprio or an interested person
to file a written complaint for the correction of manifest
errors in the election returns or certificates of canvass even
in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, for the simple
reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong
the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of
the winner in the election.22 To be manifest, the errors must
appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election
returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto
must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.23 The law likewise permits pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, when
these cases question the composition or proceedings of
the board of canvassers before the board itself or the
COMELEC, since such cases do not directly relate to the
certificate of canvass or election returns.

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, after the amendment

introduced by Republic Act No. 9369, now reads:
SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of
the House of Representatives. For purposes of
the elections for president, vice-president, senator,
and member of the House of Representatives, no
pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except
as provided for in Section 30 hereof. However,
this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings
of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the
board or directly with the Commission in
accordance with Section 19 hereof.
Any objection on the election returns before the city
or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the
provincial board of canvassers or district board of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noticed in the minutes of their
respective proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Republic Act No. 9369 significantly amended Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 7166 by adding an excepting phrase to
the general prohibition against pre-proclamation
controversies in elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.
According to the amended Section 15, no pre-proclamation
cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass shall be allowed in elections for
President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, except as provided by
Section 30 of the same statute.
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, which was likewise
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides:
SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice
President: The Commission en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election
of senators:Determination of Authenticity and Due
Execution of Certificates of Canvass.

Congress and the Commission en banc shall

determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for president and vicepresident and senators, respectively, as
accomplished and transmitted to it by the local
board of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each
certificate of canvass was executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the
board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to
be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each
certificate of canvass contains the names of all of
the candidates for president and vice-president or
senator, as the case may be, and their
corresponding votes in words and figures; (3) there
exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of
the certificates of canvass or in any of its
supporting documents such as statement of
votes by city/municipality/by precinct or
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words
and figures in the certificate; and (4) there exists
no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in
words and figures in the certificate of canvass
against the aggregate number of votes
appearing in the election returns of precincts
covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided,
That certified print copies of election returns or
certificates of canvass may be used for the
purpose of verifying the existence of the
discrepancy.
When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province, city or
district, appears to be incomplete the Senate
President or the Chairman of the Commission,
as the case may be shall require the board of
canvassers concerned to transmit by personal
delivery the election returns from polling places that
were not included in the certificate of canvass and
supporting statements. Said election returns shall
be submitted by personal delivery within two (2)
days from receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certificate of canvass or
supporting statement of votes by city/municipality
or by precinct bears erasures or alterations which
may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of
votes stated herein and may affect the result of the
election, upon request of the presidential, vicepresidential or senatorial candidate concerned or
his party, Congress or the Commission en banc,
as the case may be, shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for
President and Vice-President or senator, count the

votes as they appear in the copies of the election

returns submitted to it.
In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness,
erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the
procedure on pre-proclamation controversies
shall be adopted and applied as provided in
Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20.
Any person who presents in evidence a
simulated copy of an election return, certificate
of canvass or statement of votes, or a printed
copy of an election return, certificate of
canvass or statement of votes bearing a
simulated certification or a simulated image,
shall be guilty of an election offense and shall
be penalized in accordance with Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. (Emphasis supplied.)
The highlighted portions in the afore-quoted section
identify the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
9369, specifically: (1) the duty to determine the authenticity
and due execution of certificates of canvass is now
imposed, not only on Congress acting as the NBC for the
election for President and Vice-President, but also on
COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the election for
Senators; (2) the third criterion for the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass requires the absence of discrepancy in
comparison not only with other authentic copies of the said
certificates, but also with the supporting documents, such
as the statements of votes; (3) a fourth criterion for the
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass was added, mandating the absence
of discrepancy between the number of votes of a candidate
in a certificate when compared with the aggregate number
of votes appearing in the election returns of the precincts
covered by the same certificate; (4) pursuant to the
exception now provided in Section 15 of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, permissible
pre-proclamation cases shall adopt and apply the
procedure provided in Sections 17 to 20 of the same
statute; and (5) the use of a simulated copy of an election
return, certificate of canvass, or statement of vote, or a
printed copy of said election documents bearing a
simulated certification or image shall be penalized as an
election offense.
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to
Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, preproclamation cases involving the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in
elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The

intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section

30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the
fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and
applies to such a case the same procedure provided under
Sections 17,24 18,25 1926 and 2027 of Republic Act No. 7166
on pre-proclamation controversies.

Maguindanao or the NBC, since such a case is prohibited

in elections for Senators. Pimentel, however, argues that
his pre-proclamation case is an exception to the prohibition
pursuant to Section 30, in relation to Section 15, of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369.
This Court rules for the respondents.

In sum, in elections for President, Vice-President, Senators

and Members of the House of Representatives, the
general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules,
there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely:
(1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the
composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution
of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369.
The Petition at bar
Pimentels objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs delve
into "matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation" of the said MCOCs by
the SPBOC-Maguindanao. He suspects the authenticity
and due execution of the Maguindanao MCOCs used by
the SPBOC-Maguindanao in its canvass, which were
mostly copy 2 or the copy for the wall,28 because of the
supposed mysterious circumstances surrounding the loss
or unavailability of any other copy of the said MCOCs. He
decries the denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the
NBC of the opportunity to question PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao on "where did
that copy 2 come from, what was the basis, when was it
accomplished, how was it posted x x x";29 and to
substantiate his claim that the Maguindanao MCOCs are
palpably manufactured and are not fit for canvass.30 He is
raising issues related to the tampering with, falsification of,
or discrepancies in the Maguindanao MCOCs, which are
properly the subject of a pre-proclamation controversy.31
Pimentel insists that the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the
NBC should hear his observations, accept his evidence,
and rule on his objections to the Maguindanao MCOCs in
what would undeniably be a pre-proclamation case.
Ultimately, what Pimentel seeks is that his preproclamation case be given due course by the boards of
canvassers.
Respondents contend that Pimentel cannot initiate and
pursue a pre-proclamation case before the SPBOC-

Proceedings before the SPBOC-Maguindanao

The SPBOC-Maguindanao, in the conduct of its canvass
proceedings, properly refused to allow Pimentel to contest
the Maguindanao MCOCs at that stage by questioning
PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCsMaguindanao and presenting evidence to prove the
alleged manufactured nature of the said MCOCs, for such
would be tantamount to a pre-proclamation case still
prohibited by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166, even
after its amendment by Republic Act No. 9369.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao, as its name suggests, was
constituted to be of the same stature and to perform the
same function as the PBOC-Maguindano: to canvass the
Maguindanao MCOCs and prepare the Maguindanao
PCOC to be submitted to the NBC. Undeniably, the
SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC
en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass submitted to it in accordance with the four
given criteria. There is no ambiguity in the said provision,
at least, as to whom it imposes the duty, namely:
(1) Congress as the NBC for the election for President and
Vice-President; and (2) COMELEC en banc as the NBC for
the election for Senators. This is a case where the law is
clear. It speaks in a language that is categorical. It is quite
explicit; it is too plain to be misread. No interpretation is
needed. All that is called for is to apply the statutory
command.32
Even if there is still a need for this Court to construe
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, it still cannot extend the scope of
said provision to local boards of canvassers. A preproclamation case under Section 30 is allowed only as an
exception to the prohibition under Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.
According to the rules of statutory construction, exceptions,
as a general rule, are strictly, but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule

is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not

curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication.33 A
maxim of recognized practicality is the rule that the
expressed exception or exemption excludes
others. Exceptio firmat regulim in casibus non exceptis.
The express mention of exceptions operates to exclude
other exceptions; conversely, those which are not within
the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in the
general rule.34 And, in this case, the exception applies
only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as
the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who
must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on
pre-proclamation controversies.
It is also significant to note that Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, prohibits
pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, VicePresident, Senators, and Members of the House of
Representatives; while Section 30 of the same statute,
as amended, refers only to elections for President, VicePresident and Senators. The intent of the Legislature to
confine the application of Section 30 of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, only to
Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC
thus becomes even more evident, considering that the said
provision does not apply to elections for Members of the
House of Representatives. It must be borne in mind that
only the votes for national elective positions such as the
President, Vice-President, and Senators are canvassed by
the NBC. The canvassing of votes for local elective
positions, including those for Members of the House of
Representatives, end with the local boards of canvassers.
Therefore, it would be contrary to the legislative intent to
extend Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, even to the canvass
proceedings before local boards of canvassers.
This Court can only conclude that the canvass proceedings
before local boards of canvassers in elections for Senators
are unaffected by the amendment of Republic Act No. 7166
by Republic Act No. 9369. They still remain administrative
and summary in nature, so as to guard against the
paralyzation of canvassing and proclamation proceedings
that would lead to a vacuum in so important and sensitive
office as that of Senator of the Republic.35
For the same reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs,
the four criteria enumerated by Section 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, are not
mandatory on local boards of canvassers in their
determination of authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass submitted to them. It is already wellsettled that the local boards of canvassers, as well as the
SPBOC-Maguindanao in this case, may proceed with the

canvassing of the election returns or certificates of canvass

for as long as they appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their face.36
Boards of canvassers are ad hoc bodies that exist only for
the interim task of canvassing election returns. They do not
have the facilities, the time and even the competence to
hear, examine and decide on alleged election irregularities,
unlike regular courts or the COMELEC itself or the
electoral tribunals (Presidential, Senate, and House),
which are regular agencies of government tasked and
equipped for the purpose. While this Court has time and
again expressed its abhorrence of the nefarious "grab the
proclamation and prolong the protest" strategy of some
candidates, nonetheless, it recognizes the very limited
jurisdiction of MBOCs and PBOCs. Unless Pimentel is able
to show cogently and clearly his entitlement to the
summary exclusion of clearly unacceptable certificates of
canvass, this Court must uphold the constitutional and
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions and authenticity of official documents.37
The burden is upon Pimentel to establish that the
Maguindanao MCOCs are manufactured, and that it is
evident on the face thereof. Pimentels insistence on being
allowed to propound questions to PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOCMaguindanao reveals that, although he has his suspicions,
he has yet no actual evidence that the Maguindanao
MCOCs were indeed manufactured.
Moreover, Pimentels main objection to the Maguindanao
MCOCs used in the canvass by the SPBOC-Maguindanao
is that they are mostly copy 2 or the copy intended to be
posted on the wall. According to Section 43 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7859, dated 17 April 2007, the MBOCs
must transmit copy 1 of the MCOCs to the PBOC for use in
the provincial canvassing of votes. The SPBOCMaguindanao was compelled to use copy 2 of the
Maguindanao MCOCs in the absence of copy 1 thereof.
The fact that copy 2 of the Maguindanao MCOCs was not
the copy meant for the PBOC-Maguindanao does not
necessarily mean that copy 2 of the said MCOCs was
manufactured, falsified or tampered with. All the seven
copies of the MCOCs required to be prepared by the
MBOCs should be considered duplicate originals.38 Just
like copy 1 of the MCOCs, copy 2 should be afforded the
presumption of authenticity as an official document
prepared by the MBOCs-Maguindanao in the regular
performance of their official functions. Copy 2 is no less
authentic than all the other copies of the MCOCs although
it may be more susceptible to manufacture, falsification, or
tampering. If the manufacture, falsification, or tampering of
copy 2 of the MCOCs is not apparent on its face, the

burden to prove the same falls on the candidate making

the allegation in a regular election protest. At least as far
as the proceedings before the local boards of canvassers
are concerned, this Courts ruling in Pangarungan v.
Commission on Elections39 still holds true: it is not required
that all the other copies of the election returns or
certificates of canvass be taken into account and
compared with one another before one of them,
determined to be authentic, may be used or included in the
canvass.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao determined that copy 2 of the
Maguindanao MCOCs is authentic and duly executed on
its face, while Pimentel insists otherwise. This issue
involves the appreciation of copy 2 of the Maguindanao
MCOCs by the SPBOC-Maguindanao, the proper subject
of a pre-proclamation controversy, which, as this Court
already declared, is still prohibited in proceedings before
local boards of canvassers for elections for Senators.
The resolution of the issues raised by Pimentel as to the
irregularities and suspicious circumstances surrounding
the Maguindanao MCOCs, which appear prima
facie regular on their face, compels or necessitates the
piercing of the veil of the said MCOCs. These issues,
however, are more appropriate in a regular election
protest, wherein the parties may litigate all the legal and
factual issues raised by them in as much detail as they
may deem necessary or appropriate.40
Proceedings before the COMELEC en banc acting as
the NBC for elections for Senators
Similarly, the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC for the
election for Senators, did not violate Section 30 of Republic
Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369,
when it denied Pimentels request to question PES Bedol
and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and
SPBOC-Maguindanao, and his subsequent motion to
exclude the second Maguindanao PCOC.
As already declared by this Court, the NBC has the duty to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass submitted to it in accordance with
the four criteria enumerated in Section 30 of Republic Act
No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. It has
not been established to the satisfaction of this Court that
the NBC failed to comply with its duty under said provision.
Pimentel asserts that in the absence of all the other copies
of the Maguindanao MCOCs, except copy 2, there is no
way to apply the third criterion under Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369. According to this criterion for authenticity and due

execution of a certificate of canvass, there must exist no

discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate or in
any of its supporting documents such as the statement of
votes by city/municipality/precinct and no discrepancy in
the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificate. Pimentel posits that without any other copies
available for comparison, then copy 2 of the Maguindanao
MCOCs cannot be deemed authentic and duly executed.
While it is true that having only one copy of the certificate
of canvass may raise problems as to the determination by
the NBC of its authenticity and due execution since there
are no other copies to compare it with, such is not the
situation in the Petition at bar.
According to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc, acting as the NBC, shall determine
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators,
respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to them by
the local boards of canvassers. For the province of
Maguindanao, it is the PBOC which transmits the PCOC to
the NBC. For the 14 May 2007 senatorial elections, the
NBC excluded from the national canvass the Bedol PCOC
submitted by the PBOC-Maguindanao after it found the
same to be tainted by irregularities and statistical
improbabilities. Thereafter, the SPBOC-Maguindanao was
created, which re-canvassed the Maguindanao MCOCs
and prepared and submitted to the NBC the second
Maguindanao PCOC.
Hence, the four criteria enumerated in Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, must be applied by the NBC to the second
Maguindanao PCOC. The authenticity and due execution
of the Maguindanao MCOCs, which had already been
determined by the SPBOC-Maguindanao, are no longer in
issue before the NBC. To allow Pimentel to revive again
before the NBC the issue of authenticity and due execution
of the Maguindanao MCOCs after a determination thereof
by the SPBOC-Maguindanao is like granting him an
appeal, a remedy which is without any statutory or
regulatory basis.
The SPBOC-Maguindanao prepared all seven copies of
the second Maguindanao PCOC. It properly submitted the
first copy to the NBC for national canvassing of the votes
for Senators. All the six other copies are in existence and
have been distributed to the intended recipients. There is
no allegation or proof that there is a discrepancy among
the seven authentic copies of the second Maguindanao
PCOC. Neither is it shown that the second Maguindanao
PCOC contains any discrepancy when compared with its

supporting documents. It would thus appear to this Court

that the second Maguindanao PCOC passed the third
criterion for its authenticity and due execution as provided
in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369. As for the three other criteria, there
is no sufficient allegation, much less proof, that the NBC
did not apply them to the second Maguindanao PCOC or
that the second Maguindanao PCOC actually failed to
meet any of them.
Given the foregoing, there is indeed no merit in Pimentels
request before the NBC to still question PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOCMaguindanao regarding the Maguindanao MCOCs. There
is also no reason to exclude the second Maguindanao
PCOC from the national canvass of votes for Senators
after its authenticity and due execution had been
determined by the NBC in accordance with the criteria
provided by the law.
Due process and equal protection of the law
Pimentel alleges that the proceedings before the NBC and
the SPBOC-Maguindanao disallowing him from asking
certain election officials, such as PES Bedol and the
Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and SPBOCMaguindanao, questions regarding the Maguindanao
PCOC and MCOCs, deprived him of his right to due
process.
In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,41 this Court already
provided a discourse on due process, to wit:
The constitutional safeguard of due process is
embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law
x x x."
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly
described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, and as
such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police
power.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty
and property of individuals; to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice;

to protect property from confiscation by legislative

enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and
destruction without a trial and conviction by the
ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure
to all persons equal and impartial justice and the
benefit of the general law.
The guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two
separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due
process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies,
refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with what kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when
it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes,
asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for
the governments action. Case law in the United
States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
justification depends very much on the level of
scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area
where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law
is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is
used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due
process only if it can prove that the law is
necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.
This Court finds Pimentels argument of deprivation of due
process problematic since he has not established what he
is being deprived of: life, liberty, or property. He was a
candidate in the senatorial elections. At the time he filed
the instant Petition, he might have been leading in the
canvassing of votes, yet the canvass proceedings were still
ongoing, and no winner for the twelfth and last senatorial
post had been proclaimed. May he already claim a right to
the elective post prior to the termination of the canvass
proceedings and his proclamation as winner, and may

such a right be considered a property right which he

cannot be deprived of without due process? These were
clearly substantial and weighty issues which Pimentel did
not address. Unfortunately, this Court cannot argue and
settle them for him.
Pimentel only made a sweeping claim that in the canvass
proceedings of the Maguindanao votes before the NBC
and the SPBOC-Maguindanao, he was deprived of his
constitutional right to due process, both procedural and
substantive. After going over his allegations, however, and
the definition of substantive due process, this Court finds
that Pimentel cannot invoke denial of substantive due
process because he is not assailing any law, which,
arbitrarily or without sufficient justification, supposedly
deprived him of life, liberty, or property.
At most, Pimentel can claim that he was denied procedural
due process when he was not allowed by the NBC and the
SPBOC-Maguindanao to propound questions to certain
election officials. But even on this point, Pimentel fails to
convince this Court. Asking election officials questions and
confronting them with evidence are not part of the canvass
proceedings. There is no statute or regulation expressly
providing for such a procedure.
Any objection or manifestation concerning a certificate of
canvass before the NBC, as well as any contest involving
the inclusion or exclusion of an election return or certificate
of canvass before a local board of canvassers, must be
orally submitted to the Chairperson of the NBC or the local
board of canvassers, as the case may be. Simultaneous
with the oral submission, the party concerned must submit
his written objection, manifestation, or contest in the form
required. The objection, manifestation, or contest shall also
be recorded in the minutes of the canvass. In the event
that the NBC or local board of canvassers shall determine
that there is a proper case for the objection, manifestation,
or contest submitted, it shall automatically defer the
canvass of the assailed election return or certificate of
canvass. Within 24 hours from the submission of the
objection, manifestation, or contest, the party concerned
shall submit his evidence which shall be attached to his
written objection, manifestation, or contest. Within the
same 24-hour period, any party may file a written and
verified opposition to the objection, manifestation, or
contest. Upon receipt of the evidence, the NBC or the local
board of canvassers shall take up the assailed election
return or certificate of canvass, and after considering the
objection, manifestation or contest, together with the
opposition thereto and the evidences submitted, shall
summarily and immediately rule thereon.42

The afore-described procedure does not provide any party

the opportunity to question and confront election officials
and other witnesses. It may have been allowed on
occasion by the boards of canvassers, but it does not
necessarily ripen into a legally demandable right. Again,
canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in
nature. As for local boards of canvassers, in elections for
Senators, they only need to determine the authenticity and
due execution of the election returns or certificates of
canvass on the face thereof. As for the COMELEC en
banc, acting as the NBC, the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass shall be limited only to those submitted before it
by the local boards of canvassers and in accordance with
the criteria provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. The
limitations on the powers and duties of the boards of
canvassers are meant to avoid any delay in the
proclamation of the elected official. Issues whose
resolution would require the presentation and examination
of witnesses are more properly raised in a regular election
protest.
And as a final observation on the matter of due process,
this Court notes that although Pimentel was not able to
propound questions to the election officials involved in the
preparation and canvassing of the Maguindanao MCOCs
and PCOC, he was still able, through his counsel, to state
his observations, manifestations, and objections regarding
the said certificates, which were duly noted.43 He may not
have received the response or action that he wanted with
respect to his observations, manifestations, and objections,
but Pimentel cannot deny that these were heard and
presented in the canvass proceedings. Pimentel further
admitted that he did not submit his written observations,
manifestations, and objections as the rules of procedure
before the NBC and the local boards of canvassers
require.44 He cannot now decry that his observations,
manifestations, and objections were not given due course
when he himself failed to comply with the procedure
governing the same.
Equally baseless is Pimentels averment that his right to
equal protection of the laws was violated when the NBC
and the SPBOC-Maguindanao adopted a procedure of "no
questions" in the canvass of the Maguindanao MCOCs,
different from the procedure adopted in the canvass of the
certificates of canvass from other provinces/areas. Article
III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that no
person shall be denied equal protection of the laws.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,

should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor

to some and unjustly discriminate against
others.45 According to Pimentel, he was deprived of equal
protection of the laws when he was not allowed to question
the election officials involved in the canvass proceedings
for Maguindanao, although he was allowed to do so for
other provinces or districts. In support of his claim,
Pimentel compared his own experiences in the canvass
proceedings for different provinces or districts. This Court,
however, finds Pimentels assessment misplaced. What
would have been essential for Pimentel to allege and prove
was that other senatorial candidates were allowed during
the canvass proceedings to question the election officials
involved in the preparation and canvassing of the
Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, while he was not; and
that the other senatorial candidates were given undue
favor, while he was the only one unjustly discriminated
against. It seems apparent to this Court that the position of
the SPBOC-Maguindanao and the NBC not to allow, during
the canvass proceedings, the questioning of election
officials involved in the preparation and canvassing of the
Maguindanao MCOCs and PCOC, was consistent for all
senatorial candidates. Hence, petitioner was similarly
situated with all the other senatorial candidates and they
were all treated alike insofar as the canvass proceedings
for Maguindanao were concerned.
Electoral protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET)
Pimentels Petition is for Certiorari and Mandamus, both
governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
A special civil action for certiorari may be filed under the
following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the
part of petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the

impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means a

capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.46
The extraordinary remedy of mandamus, on the other
hand, may be availed of under the conditions provided
below:
RULE 65, SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus.
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be specified by the court, to do
the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of
the respondent.
The writ of mandamus shall be issued only if the legal right
to be enforced is well defined, clear and certain. It lies only
to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one. The duty is ministerial only when its
discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion
nor judgment.47
To avail of both special civil actions, there must be no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law available to the petitioner, and in this, Pimentels
Petition falters.
It must be kept in mind that Zubiri was proclaimed the
twelfth Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections on 14
July 2007, and that he formally assumed office on 16 July
2007. In accordance with this Courts ruling in Aggabao,
Pimentels Petition must be dismissed, for his recourse
lies, not with this Court, but with the SET.
This Court elucidated in Aggabao48 that:

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution

provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organization registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections we ruled
that:
The Senate and the House of
Representatives now have their respective
Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members, thereby divesting the
Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction
under the 1973 Constitution over election
cases pertaining to the election of the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is
now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide
pre-proclamation controversies against
members of the House of Representatives
as well as of the Senate.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over
all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins.
It is undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on
June 14, 2004. As such, petitioners recourse
would have been to file an electoral protest before

the HRET. His remedy is not this petition for

certiorari. Thus:
Finally, the private respondent Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. has already been proclaimed
as the winner in the congressional elections
in the fourth district of Quezon City. He has
taken his oath of office and assumed his
duties as representative; hence, the
remedy open to the petitioner was to have
filed an electoral protest with the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
The allegation that Mirandas proclamation is null
and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its
jurisdiction. Thus:
(I)n an electoral contest where the validity
of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken his oath of office and
assumed his post as Congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the
HRET. The reason for this ruling is selfevident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due
regard to the peoples mandate.
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections we ruled
that, upon proclamation of the winning candidate
and despite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is
divested of its jurisdiction to hear the protest. Thus:
The petition is impressed with merit
because the petitioner has been
proclaimed winner of the Congressional
elections in the first district of Pampanga,
has taken his oath of office as such, and
assumed his duties as Congressman. For
this Court to take cognizance of the
electoral protest against him would be to
usurp the functions of the House Electoral
Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which has been previously
ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite
alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter
that is also addressed, considering the
premises, to the sound judgment of the
Electoral Tribunal.
In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that
there is an available and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling

or modifying the proceedings before the
COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioners
remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET.
The resolution of the issues presented in this
petition is best addressed to the sound judgment
and discretion of the electoral tribunal.
The afore-quoted pronouncements are likewise applicable
to the Petition at bar, with the references therein to the
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal over election protests involving members of the
House of Representatives also being true for the SET as
regards election protests involving Senators.
In Chavez v. Commission on Elections,49 this Court
similarly ruled that the word "sole" in Article VI, Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
electoral tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests
relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal
clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for certiorari and mandamus on matters which may
be threshed out in an election contest. It is the SET which
has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the
election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
Pimentel attempts to bring his case outside the
jurisprudential precedent set by Aggabao, but to no avail.
That Pimentel filed the present Petition prior to Zubiris
proclamation is insignificant. Since Pimentels prayer for a
TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order had been denied,
Zubiri was proclaimed the twelfth winning Senator in the
2007 Senatorial Elections.
Pimentel further claims that he is not challenging Zubiris
proclamation, but rather the conduct of the proceedings
before the NBC and the SPBOC-Maguindanao. This is just
a roundabout argument. Pimentel cannot deny that he
assails the canvass proceedings because he believes that
the annulment and setting aside thereof would result in his
winning as the twelfth Senator in the 14 May 2007
elections; and if he is the rightful winner, then logically and
necessarily, Zubiris proclamation must also be annulled
and set aside.
Finally, while Section 15, in relation to Section 30, of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, did introduce an additional exception to the
prohibition against pre-proclamation controversies in
elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators, this
Court has already established in the preceding discussion
that Pimentel cannot invoke the same in his Petition. The

provisions in question did not materially change the nature

of canvass proceedings before the boards of canvassers,
which still remain summary and administrative in nature for
the purpose of canvassing the votes and determining the
elected official with as little delay as possible and in time
for the commencement of the new term of office.
This Court deems it necessary to stress that attempts to
delay the canvass proceedings, except for the permissible
pre-proclamation controversies, must be shunned.
Grounds which are proper for electoral protests should not
be allowed to delay the proclamation of the winners.50 It
may well be true that public policy may occasionally permit
the occurrence of "grab the proclamation and prolong the
protest" situations; that public policy, however, balances
the possibility of such situations against the shortening of
the period during which no winners are proclaimed, a
period commonly fraught with tension and danger for the
public at large. For those who disagree with that public
policy, the appropriate recourse is not to ask this Court to
abandon case law, which merely interprets faithfully
existing statutory norms, to engage in judicial legislation
and in effect to rewrite portions of the Omnibus Election
Code. The appropriate recourse is, of course, to the
Legislative Department of the Government and to ask that
Department to strike a new and different equilibrium in the
balancing of the public interests at stake.51
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24693

July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS

ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for
respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of
the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause. The lower court held that it is and
adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void."
For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the
requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who
is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with
the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances."
(par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of
the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly
paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less
than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more
than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June
13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963
by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the
time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance
were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the
ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in

any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section

1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void
for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting
any room or other quarter to any person or persons without
his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public
view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length
of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any,
with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate
as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally
filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative,
with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds,
not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes
and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends
against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies
to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class
motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section
2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels,
motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs
counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty
and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in
Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the
license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments,

there is once again a transgression of the due process

clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction
and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null
and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an
admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are
licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but
a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or
constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition
did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper
purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or
customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self incrimination, with the assertion that the
issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was
contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there
was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28,
1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del
Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City
of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the
president and general manager of Hotel del Mar
Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a
resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to
sue and be sued;
2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected
and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of
the City of Manila charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;
3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage
in the business of operating hotels and motels in
Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of

the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City
Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent
regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662,
668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the
ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting
therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor
(Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
5. That the explanatory note signed by then
Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the
Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto
as Annex C;
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an
annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein
petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.
1wph1.t

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on

January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the
burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution
resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v.
Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities.
Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity.
Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the
memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail
what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what
they considered to be applicable American authorities and
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance
"null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent
the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are
members of the petitioners association, and referring to the
alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the
lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here
being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of
the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear
obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the
parties, the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on
constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance,
dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the
City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the
conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the

City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,

null and void." It made permanent the preliminary
injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question."
Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A
decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court
against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged
ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted
standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things,
be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect
given notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.2
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut
it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on
its face which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked
to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives
the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions
of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of
this character, the resumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face

the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does
not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers,4extending as it
does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself
to be deprived of its competence to promote public health,
public morals, public safety and the genera
welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of
facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in
great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and
exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to
check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of
these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated
to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments
of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and
at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation
of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity
of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably
stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing
vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the
maintenance or operation of public dance halls; 9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12prohibiting
playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal
holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball

machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping,

conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which
are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. In view of the requirements of due process,
equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process
or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill
tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of
legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has
been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow
or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such
a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrases.21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an
ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal
lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious

proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority.

It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to
govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration
of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a
remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the
challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character
the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even
of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of
Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out
such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels,
the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in
certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual
license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for
hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for
the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000
annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has
been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises,
for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or
enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: (2)
Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are
allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than
in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The
desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of
persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful
enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in
the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases
the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable. 23
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v.
Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation
may be made to implement the state's police power. Only
the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act
of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to

cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that

the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide
latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses
for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that
"much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation
from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf
of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the
ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation
and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also
dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some
individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living
cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was
said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by
the exercise of the police power embark in these
occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result
from the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar
as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or
the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full
payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was
intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How
could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears
a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these
different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by
law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man

must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual

is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general
law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen
may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of
the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
scope of the police power."28
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and
personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court
nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of
freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains
its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez
faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What
may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved
were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for
the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous
and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a
denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on
another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in
the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of
the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed
and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give
the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the
necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the
customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room With him at about the same time or coming at any

indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its

sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance
of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion
of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their
standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full
rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It
may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.
From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that
what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an
enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the
situation before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would
prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is

no canon against using common sense in construing laws

as saying what they obviously mean."35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all
due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor
and determination, the attack against the validity of the
challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far
from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so
uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this
Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and
the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.