BSB Notes - K.sadananda

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Msg #
From: "K. Sadananda" <sada@anvil.nrl.navy.mil>

Date: Mon Aug 14, 2000 9:47am
Subject: Notes on Brahmasuutra I NOTES ON BRAHMASUTRA-1
shRîti smRîti puraaNaanaam aalayam karuNaalayam.h |
namaami bhagavat paada.n sha~Nkara.n lokasha~Nkaram.h ||
My humble prostrations to Shri Shankara Bhagavatpaada who is the very
abode (for the study) of the Vedas, the Bhagavad Gita and Puranas and
who is the very source of compassion and auspiciousness for the world.
Preface
The purpose of these notes is primarily for my own learning. If it helps
others in the process, it is due to His blessings. Any discussions,
comments and criticisms on the topics are most welcome, since it helps the
stated objective. I intend to present first my understanding of
Brahmasutras based on Shankara Bhashya. These notes closely follow the
teachings of the sutras by H.H. Swami Paramarthananda of Madras. My
humble prostrations at his holy feet. Shri Swamiji was a graduate of
Sandeepany Sadhanalaya of Chinmaya Mission, and studied under Swami
Chinmayananda and Swami Dayananda. He has been teaching for many years in
various parts of Madras City. I had the privilege of attending his
lectures when I was in Madras on my sabbatical. After discussing the first
four sutras based on Advaitic interpretation, it is my intention to
examine the other interpretations, particularly from Vishisht-advaita and
Dvaita points of view. Emphasis will be specifically on their primary
objections to Advaita doctrine and on the examination of the validity of
their objections. In this connection, I had the benefit of helping Shri
Gururaj, who was well known in Madhva community as former Pejavar Junior
mathadhipati, Shri Vishwavijaya Tirtha, in translating the condensed
version of Nyaya Sudha of Shri Jayatirtha of Madhva Tradition.
I am a student of Science and Vedanta, and therefore I do not claim myself
to be an expert in Brahmasutra or Advaita Vedanta. If the learned members
find errors in the contents or in the logic, I will be grateful if these
are brought to my notice. If alternate interpretations are possible, those
are also welcome. Editorial corrections in terms of English and in typing
are also appreciated. As Shri Gummuluru Murthy pointed recently that it
is difficult to translate some of the technical Sanskrit words into
English; the meaning will not be exact. Hence initially both Sanskrit and
English words are used with the hope that readers will get familiar with
the Sanskrit words. Later mostly Sanskrit words will be used. This is not
to discourage those who are not familiar but to encourage them to become
familiar with the words since in the final analysis one gains better
understanding of the subject. This being a serious subject one cannot just
read and expect to understand. It has to be studied. Because of
unfamiliarity of the words it may not be clear in the first reading, but
the second and third readings should help. As the time permits, I intend
to post one lecture a week, giving enough time for discussions and
assimilation. As we proceed, many of the doubts get cleared slowly. A
commitment or 'shraddhaa' is always essential to gain any knowledge and more
so for Brahmavidya.

I. Introduction
I.1. Prasthana-trayam
Brahmasutra forms one of the three basic texts of Hinduism or more
correctly to be called 'Sanatana Dharma'. The three basic texts are
called 'prasthaana-trayam'- the three pillars of Vedanta. They are shRîti
prasthaanam, smRîti prasthaanam, and nyaaya prasthaanam. The Upanishads or
uttaramiima.nsaa forms the shRîti prasthaanam, Bhagavad Geeta is the smRîti
prasthaanam, and Brahmasutra is the nyaaya prasthaanam. Brahmasutra
discusses the essence of Upanishads or Vedanta in a concise form. It
establishes the coherency or consistency in the Upanishads and shows that
the central theme of the Upanishads is related to the nature of Brahman.
Hence the sutras are called Brahmasutras. It is also called Nyaya
prasthanam since it uses nyaaya or logic to establish the superiority of
Vedanta over other philosophies. It is not necessary to study Brahmasutra
to understand Vedanta. For most of the seekers, the study of basic
Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita is sufficient. Only if one wants to
understand the intricate logic involved and wants to appreciate the logical
soundness of Vedanta over other systems of philosophy, one needs to study
Brahmasutra. The sutras being in a concise form, they need to be
studied through bhaashhya-s. There are many bhaashhya-s by many
aachaarya-s each reinforcing their philosophy using Brahmasutras. There
are commentaries on the Bhashyas and commentaries on these commentaries.
Thus it is a very vast mushrooming literature, and it is very easy to get
lost in these studies. Hence it is advisable to study sutras under a
teacher.
1.2 DarshhaNa-s
Human beings are different from animals in the sense that they are endowed
with intellect, what is commonly called as 'conceptual thought'. There is
a famous shloka that says:
aahaara nidraa bhaya maithuna.n cha
saamaanyam etat pashubhiH naraaNaam.h |
buddhirhi teshhaam adhiko visheshhaH
buddhyaa vihiinaaH pashhubhiH samaanaaH ||
Hunger for food, sleep, fear for security, and desire for progeny are
common for both animals and human beings. Only one thing that is special
for human is the intellect. If intellect is not there (or if it is not
used properly), then man is not different from animals.
Because the human being is endowed with such an intellect (buddhi), birth
as a human being is glorified in our scriptures. Because of the intellect,
the man is given a choice to accentuate his evolution to a state of
God-hood. To accomplish that Vedanta insists that contemplation is
essential for evolution and contemplation involves application of the
intellect.
Because of the gift of this rational intellect, man cannot but inquire into
the cause for an observed phenomenon. For example he begins to question:
who is he? Wherefrom he came and what is the cause for his birth? What is
death and what happens after one dies? What is this Universe? Wherefrom it
came or what is its cause? What is life and what is its purpose? Why there
is so much suffering in life? How to get over this suffering? These are
some of the questions that an intellect cannot but ask at one time or another. In fact one can formulate six topics of inquiry that a
seriousstudent of life can pursue. In Vedantic terminology these are related to:

1. Who is Jiva -or who is or what is an individual?

2. What is this Jagat, world?
3. Who is Ishwara or what is the cause of these two - the source for jiva
and the world?
4. What is bandhana or bondage, which is the cause for human suffering, or
sa.nsaara?
5. What is the nature of Moksha or Mukti or Freedom from this bondage or
Liberation from the human suffering?
6. What is the means or Sadhana for liberation, or means for a person to go
from bondage to liberation or what is the link between the bandha and
moksha?
The six topics are related to jiiva, jagat, iishvara, bandha, moksha,
saadhanaani (individual, the world, creator, bondage, liberation and means
for liberation, respectively). A serious thinker of life cannot but think
deeply and come to a consistent or self-consistent explanation for these.
A consistent and logical view or a teaching arrived at by a serious thinker
regarding these six topics is called 'darshanam' or a Philosophy, and one
who founds such a philosophy is called 'daarshhanika'. Because of the
consistent and philosophical approach to life, there are always others who
want to follow these daarshanika-s. Thus a daarshanika becomes a
preceptor and propagator of his philosophy, darshanam. In India there are
twelve such well known 'darshana -s', of which six are called 'naastika
darshana -s' and the other six are 'aastika darshana -s' The former are
those systems which do not accept Veda as pramaaNa, or means of knowledge.
Hence they rely mostly on 'pratyaksham' or direct perception and
'anumaana' or inference or reasoning as the means of knowledge. In
contrast 'aastika darshana -s' are those that accept Veda as the valid or
reliable source of knowledge.
The six naastika darshana -s are as follows: The first one is called
'chaarvaaka darshanam' or materialism. The source of this philosophy is
said to be bRîhaspati, who is the deva guru. The original purpose of this
philosophy was to mislead the demons so that they can be destroyed. The
first disciple of bRîhaspati is said to be chaarvaaka (meaning the one who
speaks very sweetly), and because of that he could popularize this
materialistic philosophy. This philosophy does not accept - Veda-s, soul
or aatmaa, re-birth, heaven, hell, dharma or adharma- but it emphasizes the
sense pleasures as the ultimate goal or the very purpose of life. The
modern science and technology may come close to this philosophy, since the
existence of a soul is not conceived, and consciousness is assumed to be a
temporary product of matter. 'yaavat jiivet sukham jiivet |' 'RîNam
kRîtvaa ghRîtam pibet.h |' Enjoy the life as long as you live - if you don't
have it, then borrow and enjoy - the American way. How about paying it
back?- That is not important since it is the lenders problem and not ours.
- How about heaven or hell? It says: 'bhasmii bhuutasya dehasya,
punaraagamanam kutaH | Once the body is burned into ashes, where is the
question of returning back and who has seen life after death? No one has
ever come back and no one has seen any one coming back. Hence death is the
end of life. They believe only 'kevala pratyaksha pramaaNa' -that is the
direct perception as the only means of knowledge. chaarvaaka darshanam is
not discussed in Brahmasutra, since it was not considered as worth
discussing. But it is recognized that materialism was not new and was
prevalent in those days along with theistic philosophies.
The second is Jaina darshanam. It is given by 24 aachaaryaa-s called
Tiirthaa~Nkaara-s, beginning from Rîshhabha deva ending with vardhamaana
mahaaviira. Vardhamana Mahavira is also called Jina -meaning one who

has conquered himself. He is responsible for the wide popularity of this
darshanam and hence is called Jaina matam or Jainism. Jainism has two
branches; shwetaambara and digambara. There is no differences in their
philosophies but only differences in their practices. Philosophical
aspects of Jainism are discussed and refuted in Brahmasutra.
The third is Bouddha darshanam or Buddhism, founder being Buddha who was
Siddhartha before he became Buddha. Buddha did not teach systematically
any system of philosophy. He only had various dialogues with his
disciples. Hence initially Buddhism was not well developed. But later,
the teachings of Buddha were collected into three books called tripiTakam
(three baskets), during the specially called assemblies of Buddhists called
'Sangha-s'. The three are: suutra (sutta) piTakam , abhidharma (abhidamma)
piTakam and vinaya piTakam. suutra piTakam deals with the statements of
Buddha in a simple form. abhidamma piTakam deals with philosophy, which is
based on the statements of Buddha and third one deals with the Code of
Conduct or aachaara. Later on, Buddhism gave birth to four branches: 1.
soutraantika, which is based on sutta piTakam. 2. vaibhaashhika, based on
the commentary of abhidamma piTakam known as vibhaashha. 3. yogaachaara got its name due to its emphasis on the practice of Yoga and aachaara. 4.
maadhyamika, since they claim to follow the true teachings of Buddha which
is called 'golden middle path' which is moderation or avoidance of
extremes. All of these philosophies are analyzed and criticized in
Brahmasutra. Thus there are four from Buddhism, one Jainism and one
chaarvaaka - total six 'naastika darshanam-s'.
There are six 'aastika darshanam-s': 1. Saa~Nkhya of Kapila muni 2. Yoga of
Patanjali 3. Nyaya of Gautama 4. Vaisheshika of Kanada 5.
puurvamiimaa.nsaa of Jaimini and 6. uttaramiimaa.nsaa of Vyasa. All of them
accept Veda pramaaNam. Even though all of them accept Veda as pramaaNa
(valid means of knowledge), three of them, Sankhya, Vaiseshika and Purva
mimamsa do not accept Brahman. Of these six, the first four give more
importance to tarka or reasoning. That is tarka is primary or pradhaana
for them while Veda is secondary or apradhaanam. In that sense, they are
similar to naastika darshanam-s, which also give emphasis on tarka or
reasoning. Shankara calls all of them, that give primary importance to
tarka over Veda, as taarkika-s. The last two darshanams give more
importance to Veda and only secondary importance to tarka. Of this the
puurva miimaa.nsaa darshhaNam, as the name implies is based on puurva bhaaga
or the first part of the Veda-s or on Karma Kanda of the Veda-s. For them
the Upanishad portion or the uttara bhaaga is of less importance or
unimportant compared to karmakaanDa. In contrast in uttaramiimaa.nsaa, the
importance is to the last portion of Veda or Veda anta bhaaga - or veda
uttara bhaaga. In this philosophy, veda puurva bhaaga or karma kaanDa is
considered as supportive or only of secondary importance. One common
feature of all these six darshanams is that all of them have been
presented in the suutra form by their founders. uttaramiimaa.nsaa suutra-s
are called Brahmasutras since they deal with Brahman. They are also
called as vedanta suutraas, shaariiraka suutraas (shaariiraka means aatmaa),
vyaasa or baadaraayaNa suutraas.
About the author of Brahmasutra: The author is Badarayana. The authors
of bhaashhya-s identified him as none other than Vyasacharya, who is the
editor of Veda-s and the author of puraaNa-s including Mahabharata, where
Bhagavad Gita is a part. There are some questions identifying
Badarayana with Veda Vyasa since Mahabharata is considered as
prehistoric while Brahmasutra-s must have been composed after Buddhism
became prevalent. But from the point of our discussion the true identity
of the author is immaterial, and we accept bhaashhyakaara's identification of

the author with Veda Vaasa.
What is a suutra? Sutra is a very brief statement packed with an idea. It
is the most concise statement possible to express a given idea, like a
mathematical equation. It will not be a complete sentence. Hence a simple
translation of the suutra will not make any sense to the novice. Therefore
many commentaries exist explaining the suutra-s and they are called
bhaashhyam-s. Since the statements are brief, there is always a possibility
for some ambiguity or doubt regarding the intention of the original author.
Hence different bhaashhya-s have come for different types of teachings,
each claiming that their bhaashhyam represents the intended meaning of the
author of the suutra-s or suutrakaara. Thus Brahmasutra-s themselves gave
birth to more than ten types of philosophies. Of these three are very
popular. One is the nirvisheshha advaitam that is Brahman without
attributes, by Shankara, popularly known as shaariiraka miimaa.nsaa
bhaashhyam, next is vishishhTaadvaitam by Ramanuja and his commentary is
called shriibhaashhyam, and the third one is dwaitam based on commentary
due to Madhvacharya called anuvyaakhyaana. We will consider here only
Shankara bhaashhyam.
I.3. A Brief out line of Brahmasutras
Brahmasutras consists of four adhyaaya-s or chapters. Each adhyaaya is
subdivided into four sections, called paada-s. Each paada or section is
divided into topics known as adhikaraNam. There are in total 191 or 192
adhikaraNam-s depending on how suutra-s are divided. The number of
adhikaraNam-s or topics in each section varies and is not constant. Most
of the adhikaraNam-s are related to the analysis of the statements in the
Upanishads, especially the ten important or dasha upanishad-s. Each
adhikaraNam contain sutra-s, number of sutra-s varying from one to many.
Thus we have in Brahmasutra, adhyaaya (chapter), paada (section),
adhikaraNa (topic) and suutra. There are 555 sutras in total.
Broadly there are four adhyaayas or chapters each with a major theme for
discussion. The first chapter is called samanvaya adhyaaya. Approximately
it means 'consistency'. Thus in the first chapter, Vyasacharya is
establishing consistency or samanvaya as the proof or hetu indicating that
the central theme of the Upanishads is Brahman. Vyasacharya has to
prove this, since some of the other darshana-s (especially saa~Nkhya and
puurvamiima.nsaa) do not accept Brahman as the central theme of Vedanta. The
second adhyaaya deals with avirodha, noncontradiction. That is, it shows
that Brahmavidya is free from all contradictions, since any contradiction
is recognized as a defect in teaching. Hence in this chapter Vyasa points
out that Brahmavidya is free from defects. He shows that all the three
types of contradictions are not there. First is the internal
contradiction, 'paraspara virodhaH', is not there within the Upanishads.
That is the Vedic statements do not contradict one another. The second
contradiction is with smRîti. And he shows there is no contradictory with
statements from smRîti. And the third one is no contradiction with logic.
That is it is not illogical. Hence the second chapter is heavily logically
based. The third chapter is based on saadhanaa and is called
saadhanaadhyaaya, discussion of the means for attaining Brahman. These
saadhana-s include both that are directly related and those that are
indirectly related, such as rituals, upaasanaa-s, values etc., which are not
the direct means but means for the purification of the mind. The fourth
chapter is phala adhyaayaH, discussion of the benefits of Brahmavidya and
that is mukti or moksha. The types of mukti are also discussed that
involve immediate liberation and delayed liberation, krama mukti.

1.4 Some Definitions:
The definition of three important words, suutram, bhaashhyam and adhikaraNam
are given below:
suutram or aphorism is generally defined as:
alpa aksharam asandigdham saaravat vishhvatomukham.h |
astobham anavadhya.n cha suutram suutravido viduH ||
The statement is believed to be from padmapuraaNam.
The definition says sutra has to be Alpa aksharam - very concise - very brief
asandigdham - clear without being vague or unambiguous (at least after the
commentary)
saaravat - should be pregnant with the meaning - with essentials
vishvatomukham - having many meanings or many facets if possible.
astobham - Since it is logical science it should be free from
glorification or praise since praise does not involve any logic and
sometime no limit also
anavadhyam - faultless or defectless - that is free from two defects - 1.
shabda doshha and 2. arthadoshha, that is free from grammatical mistakes
and logical mistakes.
Sutra literally means a 'thread'. For Brahmasutra, each suutra- serves
as a thread, threading upanishhadic statements which form beads constituting
different topics, adhikaraNas, presenting a coherent darshanam or
philosophy. Shankara says in his introduction - vedaanta vaakya kusuma
grathana arthatvaat suutraaNaam - Vedantic statements are like flowers - but
the flowers are not arranged but randomly spread - but Vyasacharya has
collected, rearranged and tied them beautifully through suutra-s to present
as a beautiful garland and that is the garland of Vedanta Shastra.
The definition for bhaashhyam:
suutra artho varNyate yatra vaakyaiH suutra anusaaribhiH |
swapadaani cha varNyante bhaashhyam bhaashhya vido viduH ||
The commentary should explain every word in the suutra and in the order
that is occurring in the sutra itself. One cannot rearrange the words.
The commentator may introduce extra technical words, then he has to explain
why those words and meaning of those words- swapadaani cha - such
commentary is called bhaashhyam.
Definition for adhikaraNam:
vishhayaH sa.nshayaH cha eva puurva-pakshastatottaram.h |
sa~NgatiH cha iti pa~nchaa~Nga.n shaastra adhikaraNam smRîtam.h ||
A topic should consists of five aspects:
1. vishhayaH - subject matter - Generally about the idea taken from the
statements from dasha upanishad-s - is it Brahman or jiiva etc.
2. sa.nshayaH - What is the doubt in that statement or if there are several
options available what is the most relevant among these - (if there is no
doubt, there is no need for further discussion - whatever is self evident
need not be inquired into).
3. puurva-pakshaH - the views of non-vedantins or other daarshanika-s with
their reasoning.
4. siddhaantaH - the Vedantic conclusion which need to be established by

refuting logically all other views and also showing that vedantic
conclusion is free from logical defects - hence Brahmasutra is called
nyaaya-suutra since every statement should be supported by logic.
5. sa~NgatiH - the connection between the two consecutive topics.
Every topic should consist of all these five topics. Shankara brings out
these five aspects with every sutra.
With this background we discuss next Shankaracharya's introduction to
Brahmasutra. This is called 'adhyaasa bhaashhyam' which Shankara
introduces as the basis for his philosophy of nirvisheshha advaita before he
begins his suutra-bhaashhya. But before we discuss the adhyaasa, we will
first discuss the nature of 'anumaana' or logical inference, since this is
extensively used in all bhaashhyam-s and in scientific investigations as
well.
End of Introduction
Msg #

Date: Mon Aug 21, 2000 9:56am
Subject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA - II
Notes on Brahmasutra-II
2. anumaana prakaraNam
Brahmasutra being nyaaya prasthaanam uses nyaaya or logic to establish the
teachings of the upanishads. The word nyaaya sometimes is translated as
yukti, tarka or logic, and is technically called anumaana or inference.
Since anumaana will be used extensively in the analysis of Brahmasutra,
one should have a clear idea of what anumaanam is or inference means or
what it involves.
2.1 pramaaNa - Means of knowledge
pramaa means valid knowledge and pramaaNa means valid means of knowledge.
In contrast to this, there is bhramaa, meaning illusory knowledge.
Understanding of the nature of pramaaNa becomes important in Vedanta. The
science of knowledge and means of knowledge and the errors in knowledge,
etc., constitute the Science of epistemology. The knowledge of
epistemology helps to understand the ontological aspects, that is the
reality of the objects. Our philosophers have done extensive analysis of
pramaa and bhramaa. Its importance can be recognized in Vedanta, since it
addresses what is real and what is unreal. For example, if I want to know
the Brahman, I need a proper means to know Him, as He is not directly
visible or whatever is that is directly visible cannot be Him. It becomes
important then to know whether the knowledge that I have gained is pramaa,
valid, or bhramaa, invalid, or the means for gaining that knowledge,
pramaaNa, is appropriate for the task or not. This requires an analysis or
understanding of the source and types of errors that can occur in the
knowledge to make sure the means of knowledge to know Brahman is
error-free. A student of science, for example, learns first about the
'parallax error' before he starts correctly measuring the dimensions of an
object. Without that understanding and without applying that understanding
in his measurements, his length measurements could be erroneous. Hence the
need to study the right means of knowledge, more so for Brahmavidya, which
is beyond the human comprehension. In the final analysis a valid
knowledge, pramaa, is the one that can not negated by subsequent

investigations.
There are six accepted means of knowledge or pramaaNa - They are
pratyaksha, anumaana, arthaapatti, upamaana, anupalabdhi and shabda. Some
philosophers reduce these to three, pratyaksha, anumaana and shabda. The
other three are considered as parts of anumaana itself. pratyaksha is the
direct perception, particularly through sense organs, the five senses and
sometime mind is included as the sixth, since mind can imagine things from
the past or project things into future which are not directly perceivable
in the present place or time. Each sense organ is very specific - eyes are
means only to see form and color of an object but not to hear sounds from
the object. Likewise each of the indriya-s function within their field of
operation. Thus we make a general rule that each pramaaNa is very specific
to its field of operation. That which cannot be directly perceived by
pratyaksha can be inferred. Hence anumaana becomes an important source of
knowledge for objects that cannot be directly perceived. That which is
beyond sense input and that which cannot be logically inferred, can only be
learned through shabda pramaaNa. An example is the knowledge of heaven or
hell. shabda includes shaastra, science or scriptures and sometimes aapta
vaakya, statements of the trustworthy. For sanaatana dharma, shruti, which
are Veda-s, form the main or ultimate source of shabda pramaaNa. It is
believed that Veda-s being apaurushheya (not authored by humans), they are
free from the defects associated with human authorship. In a general
sense, one can say that they are revelations to the sages who are in
contemplation who assimilated them and passed them on to their disciples by
word of mouth. Thus they are handed down through generations 'intact'
and they are called shruti since they are learned by hearing to the
teacher, who heard from his teacher, thus a guru-paramparaa. Brahmasutra
relies heavily on anumaana, inference and shabda pramaaNa. We will discuss
here a few aspects of anumaana. We may note here that Brahmasutra is not
apaurushheya, that is, it is authored by human, that is sage Badarayana to
present the coherent theme contained in the shruti. It is still an opinion
of an author who is well versed in the scriptures and hence cannot be as
valid pramaaNa as the shruti on which it is based. Even when Krishna
teaches Bhagavad Gita, He refers to the fact that the teaching is not new
but is what the sages have declared in the shrutis - 'RîshhibhiH bahudhaa
giitam ..'. pramaaNa therefore is a valid means of knowledge and for
brahmavidyaa, shaastras or shabda pramaaNa becomes an ultimate means of
knowledge.
2.2 anumaana pramaaNa:
If one has to infer something, he should have some basis for inference or
should have some valid data to make some conclusions. The data is gathered
directly or indirectly using pratyaksham or direct perception. One can
never make of an inference without collecting or relying on perceptual
data. (One can use inductive reasoning but for that reasoning to be valid,
it requires subsequent confirmation by perceptual data). If inference is
made without collecting or without having supportive data, the inference
can only be a speculation or imagination. Such a speculative inference
cannot be valid. For example if one wants to infer the age of a moon, he
cannot look at the moon and estimate the age of the moon. He can truly
estimate the age only by anumaana or inference. For that he needs to
collect the requisite data - such as rocks from the moon and study using
carbon dating etc. Using such a valid data one can infer the age of the
moon. However, without any data and by looking at the moon if one
estimates the age of the moon, then it will only be called a speculation
and not inference. Therefore for any anumaana or inference to be valid,

perceptual data is essential.
2.3 Factors involved in anumaana

In tarka shaastra, the anumaana has been extensively studied. Based on
this we conclude that at least four essential factors are involved in any
anumaana. They are as follows: 1. paksha, 2. saadhya, 3. hetu, and 4.
dRîshhTaanta. Taking a famous example of the inference of a fire on the
mountain by seeing the smoke on the mountain, one can express this in
anumaana vaakyam or an inferential statement as
"parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat, yathaa mahaanase"
'Mountain is fiery, because it is smoky, just as in the kitchen'
In this parvataH or mountain is said to be paksha. The saadhyam is
agnimaan - that is the mountain is fiery. The hetu is that it is smoky
or dhuumavatvaat. Finally dRîshhTanta is mahaanase, just as in the
kitchen. Thus the total statement is 'mountain is fiery, because it is
smoky, just as in the case of kitchen'.
Mountain is said to be paksha, because it is the locus of the discussion.
Mountain is the topic of the discussion and not the fire per se. Why the
discussion about the mountain? - because there is a dispute whether the
mountain is fiery or not. The locus of dispute is therefore not the
fieriness but the mountain, and the topic of discussion is whether the
locus of discussion, the mountain, is fiery or not. Therefore paksha is
always the locus of discussion or debate. From this debate, some
conclusion has to be arrived at. The paksha has to be visible or known,
otherwise it cannot be a matter of dispute - hence mountain has to be
perceptible or known. The dispute is not about whether the mountain exists
or not, but whether the existing or perceptible mountain is fiery or not.
The fieriness of the mountain (the mountain having fire) is not perceptible
and hence the dispute. If the fieriness of the mountain is perceptible then
there is no dispute at all, and anumaana does not enter into picture.
Hence mountain is perceptible but its fieriness is non-perceptible. Since
perceptual method is of no use to establish that the mountain is fiery, we
need an inferential method. Since mountain is visible but not its
fieriness, paksha is always partially visible. We are not proving the
visible part but proving only the invisible part, that is the fieriness of
the mountain, which is invisible. Using a technical language, the dharmii
(mountain) is visible but its dharma (fieriness) is not visible.
saadhyam is that the mountain is fiery or it has fire. This conclusion is

not perceptually available or directly provable. Hence saadhyam is always
'apratyaksham', while paksha is always partially pratyaksham. hetu is
dhuumavatvaat - the mountain is smoky. To be more precise, one cannot just
say 'smoke' is the reason or hetu, because if the smoke is somewhere else,
one cannot infer that the mountain has fire. One cannot infer that
mountain is fiery because there is smoke in the kitchen. Then it is the
kitchen that is fiery and not the mountain. Hence one cannot say merely
smoke is the hetu. The correct statement is smoke in the mountain is the
hetu or smokiness of the mountain is the hetu just as the fieriness of the
mountain is the saadhyam. The hetu, the smokiness of the mountain, is
pratyaksham or perceptible. Thus of the three, paksha and hetu are
pratyaksha and saadhyam is apratyaksha, invisible.
Next is the example or dRîshhTaanta, just as in this case of the kitchen,

where the smoke and the fire are together. Therefore dRîshhTaanta must be
such that one has the experience of both smoke and fire together - to be
precise, they should have invariable concomitance with each other. Thus
dRîshhTaanta provides an example, which both speaker and the listener are
familiar, to show that the fire invariably exists with the smoke. It is
not the other way around that smoke invariably exists with the fire. We
should have at least one example to show the invariable concomitance of fire
with the smoke. The current example shows whenever there is smoke in the
kitchen there is fire and that is the dRîshhTaanta.
Thus to make inference, one requires a basic knowledge of the concomitant
relationship between hetu and saaddhya which is gathered through
perception. Here the basis of the knowledge that one should have, is the
invariable coexistence of smoke along with fire. That is, wherever there
is smoke there is fire. This relationship becomes fundamental for the
inference. Thus 'yatra yatra dhuumaH, tatra tatra agniH' that is 'wherever
there is smoke there is fire' - this knowledge is called vyaapti j~naanam.
This invariable coexistence of fire and smoke is called vyaapti. It
consists of two factors vyaapyam and vyaapakam - 'yatra yatra dhuumaH' is
called vyaapyam and 'tatra tatra agniH' is called vyaapakam. Hence yatra
yatra vyaapyam tatra tatra vyaapakam. The coexistence of vyaapyam with
vyaapakam is called vyaapti and that knowledge is vyaapti j~naanam.
Thus in the operation of inference there are two statements - anumaana
vaakyam and vyaapti vaakyam. These are, 'parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat
yathaa mahanase' and 'yatra yatra dhumaH tatra tatra agniH', respectively.
The vyaapyam, dhuumaH, in the vyaapti vaakyam becomes hetu in the anumaana
vaakyam and vyaapakam in the vyaapti vaakyam becomes saadhyam in the
anumaana vaakyam. Hence vyaapti vaakyam can be rephrased as 'yatra yatra
hetuH tatra tatra saadhyam'. Only when this statement or vyaapti vaakyam is
proved, then only the anumaana vaakyam is valid. vyaapti vaakyam, for
example 'where there is smoke there is fire, can be validated only by
perception. Once the vyaapti vaakyam is validated, that can be used to
validate the anumaana vaakyam. This is the basis used even in scientific
investigations. hetu, the observed data such as the study of the rocks of
the moon, helps a scientist to arrive at the saadhya, the age of the moon.
Hence anumaana or inference is always based on valid or perceptual data.
2.4 Limitation of Scientific Logic
Another important aspect, which is always taken for granted in scientific
investigations, is the conclusion or inference can only be made about a
specific object if the hetu or the perceptible data is gathered from that
object or entity. For example, one cannot make conclusion about Mars if
the collected data is from the moon. One can speculate about Mars, but
inference is valid only for the moon since data is from the moon. It
appears to be a common sense statement, but is a fundamental requirement
for a valid anumaana, and many a time people argue without realizing that
they are violating this simple common sense. Thus loci of the data and
inference should pertain to the same object or paksha. If they are
different then that anumaana is illogical or unscientific or speculative at
best. Thus hetu and saadhyam must belong to the same paksha. We can state
this niyama or rule as 'hetu saadhyayoH saamaanaadi karaNyam'.
From this we reach an important conclusion. Scientist collects data from
the observed universe. Thus all the data that is collected, or can be
collected, are from 'anaatma' or perceptible universe. The data can range
from as small as sub-atomic particles to as huge as the clusters of
galaxies, but all belong to 'anaatma'. Hence paksha for all scientific

investigations is 'anaatma' or perceptible universe. One cannot collect
data from aatma - since we know from scriptures that aatma is 'ashabdam
asparsham aruupam avyayam tathaa rasam nityam agandham ..' - aatma is
essentially unobservable. Hence all the observed data deal with
'anaatmaa'. Hence if scientific reasoning is used, all the scientific
conclusions can only be about 'anaatma' and not about 'aatma'. Thus we
reach an important conclusion that using scientific observations one can
not arrive at any conclusions about 'aatma' because of the following
niyama or rule that 'hetu saadhyayoH saamaanaadi karaNyam'. Hence the
entire scientific reasoning is called 'laukika anumaanam', dealing with
'anaatma j~naanam' or 'aparaa vidyaa' alone. Thus 'laukika anumaana has no
access to 'aatma-vidyaa'. The Upanishads declare, 'naishhaa tarkeNa
matiraapaneya' - don't hope to arrive at aatma j~naanam through the
scientific process of reasoning or anumaanam or logic because it has no
access. It is similar to trying to 'hear' through the 'eyes'. It amounts
to abuse or misuse of the pramaaNam. In Brahmasutra itself there is
suutra to establish this - 'tarkasya apratishhThaanaat' that is tarka or
logic can never finally prove anything with regard to aatmaa.
2.3. shaastriiya anumana
Then question is how or where anumaana or logic is used by shaastram - what
is the shaastriiya anumaanam which is used in Brahmasutra that is
different from laukika anumaanam or scientific reasoning? laukika
anumaanam is based on the perceptual based data. For any anumaana 'valid
data' is important and based on which inference can be made. Therefore
shaastriiya anumaanam also involves data collection. The difference
between laukika and shaastriiya or alaukika is only with reference to the
source of the data. Scientific observations or laukika data are important
for laukika anumaanam. For shaastriiya anumaana, since we are dealing with
aatmaa, we cannot collect data from anaatmaa, that is, through observations
or by perception. The data can only be collected from shaastram itself.
Therefore it is shaastra based data collection. Hence all shaastriiya
anumaanam-s used in Brahmasutra are based on the data collected from
shaastram only.
Implication of this is that we must first accept that shaastram is the
means for collecting the data required for shaastriiya anumaanam, just as a
scientist accepts the observations as a means for collecting data for
laukika anumaanam. Once a scientist accepts the observations are correct,
he does not question anymore the validity of the data, he only questions
the conclusions that can be arrived at using the data. Sometimes different
theories are put forth to explain the same data. The theories can be
incorrect but not the observations. This statement becomes little bit
shaky as we go into quantum mechanics. Even the scientists are beginning
to question now the validity of the perceptual data to gain the knowledge
of the universe - 'do I see because there is a thing or is there a thing
because I see' - akin to the questions raised in Advaita concerning the
creation in terms of sRîshhTi-dRîshhTi or dRîshhTi-sRîshTi.
When it comes to shaastra anumaana, all the aastika darshana-s have
accepted that shaastra is a valid source for collecting data, which cannot
be disputed. Just as in scientific inference, what one can dispute is the
conclusion arrived at from the data but not about the data itself.
Advaita, Vishishtadvaita and Dvaita are conclusions arrived at based on
the shaastric statements - one can question these conclusions but not the
shaastric statements since they are accepted as valid data, therefore
cannot be questioned. Without valid data no anumaana can have a basis.
One can have speculations or beliefs without data, but for anumaanam valid

data are essential. Since for shaastriiya anumaanam the hetu is based on
shaastram, that requires a basic assumption that one must be 'aastika',
that is accept shaastra as valid means of knowledge. For a 'naastika'
person, that is those who do not accept that shaastra is a valid means of
knowledge or pramaaNa, Brahmasutra which is based on shaastriiya anumaana
is of no use.
2.4 Where laukika anumaana is used on shaastra-s?

This does not mean laukika anumaana or perception based reasoning is not
there in Brahmasutra. The application of it is different. laukika
anumaana or scientific reasoning is used not to establish Vedanta because
of the above stated objections. laukika anumaanam can not prove Vedantic
teaching since laukika anumaana deals with data from anaatma and Vedantic
teaching is related to aatma. It is equally important to recognize that
laukika anumaana cannot disprove Vedantic teaching either since it is not
accessible to laukika anumaanam. But some philosophers, particularly
naastika daarshanika-s used laukika anumaanam to disprove Vedanta. It is
immediately clear from the above understanding that they have used laukika
anumaana wrongly in trying to disprove Vedanta. That implies that there is
some fallacy in their inference when they use laukika anumaana which is
based on anaatma to disprove alaukika vishhayam or entity. In saadhana
pa~nchakam Shankara says:
vaakyaarthashca vichaaryataam shrutishiraH pakshaH samaashriiyataam.h |
dustarkaat suviramyataam shrutimataH tarko.anusandhiiyataam.h | |
Use of laukika anumaanam in Vedantic field, Shankara calls it as dus tarkaH
or shushhka tarkaH. The proper tarka or reasonings should be scriptural
data based.
Therefore a Vedantin uses lukika anumaana only to show the fallacy of the
laukika anumaana used by other philosophers. Thus Brahmasutra uses
laukika anumaanam not to prove Vedanta but to disprove other philosophies
that use laukika anumaana in their arguments against Vedanta. Thus laukika
anumaana is used in Brahmasutra not to prove Vedanta is logical but to
prove Vedanta is not illogical. The truth is Vedanta is neither logical
nor illogical, it is beyond the realm of logic.
There is a second use for laukika anumaanam. The philosophers of the
naastika darshanams, since they do not believe in the shaastra, use the
laukika anumaana to arrive at the truth of the aatmaa or the truth of the
world. A Vedantin wants to establish that the truth can never be arrived
at using laukika anumaana. To accomplish that he uses similar laukika
anumaana to disprove or dismiss all the conclusions of the naastika
daarshanika-s. This is because shaastriiya anumaana cannot be used for
naastika-s as they do not accept shaastra as the pramaaNa. Hence Vedantin
uses laukika anumaana to disprove all the naastika philosophies. Thus
limitations of laukika anumaana or scientific reasoning should be
understood when applied to Vedantic knowledge. It is said that
achintyaaH khalu ye bhaavaaH na taa.nstarkena yojayet.h |
apratishhThita tarkeNa kastiirNassa.nshayaambudhim ||
In the creation there are many things which are beyond logic and science.
To expect everything to fall within the scientific logic is to show
shortsightedness. Every scientist must be humble enough to understand that
there are things which are beyond the scope of science. Hence one should

not apply the scientific logic to those that are beyond logic. There can
be always a person who has superior intellect and who can provide a logic
superior to a previous one. Hence by using the logic improperly
(apratishhTita tarkeNa) no one has solved or gone beyond the ocean of
doubts. That is, the problem can never be resolved beyond any doubt.
Hence limitation of scientific logic or laukika anumaanam in Brahmavidya
should be understood. It is used in Brahmasutra only to establish that
Vedanta is not illogical and to disprove all the naastika systems of
philosophies such as Jainism, Buddhism etc., which do not accept the
validity of Veda as pramaaNa, but never to establish the validity of
Vedanta philosophy, per sec. Vedantic conclusions are arrived at using
only shaastriiya anumana or alaukika anumaana.
End of anumaana prakriyaa.
From the next topic on we will dive into Shankara Bhaasya starting with
adhyaasa bhaashhya which forms an introduction to his bhaashhya.
Questions on Notes II:
These questions are for those who are studying the Brahmasutra along with
me on the internet.
Try to answer the following questions without seeing the notes to check
your understanding. After answering go back and study the notes to cross
check your answers.
1. What are pramaa, bhramaa, and pramaaNa? What are the six pramaaNas?
2. What are the four factors needed in any anumaana pramaaNa?

3. Among the four factors what comes under pratyaksha and what under
apratyaksha? Where does paksha belong?
4. What is a vyaapti vaakyam and what is its role in anumaana?
5. What does the statement 'hetu saadhyayoH saamaanaadi karaNyam' means?
How does that establish that scientific logic has no access to Brahmavidya?
6. Where exactly then laukika anumaana used in Brahmasutra?
This ends the anumaana prakaraNam.
Msg #
From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <k_sadananda@hotmail.com>

Date: Tue Aug 29, 2000 2:26pm
Subject: Notes on Brahmasutra - IIIa
Notes on Brahmasutra -IIIa
sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n shankaraachaarya madhyamam.h |

asmadaachaarya paryantaa.n vande guruparamparaam.h ||
I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is ever

auspicious and with Bhagavan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to
my own teacher.
vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h |
shrii chinmaayaananda guro praNiitaM
sadaa bhaje.aham tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||
Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection, who is beyond the three
guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity, who is
the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayananda, to his lotus feet I
(sada) always prostrate.
----------------adhyaasa bhaashhyam.h .
(The topic is presented in three parts - because it is quite long and also
it helps to assimilate the subject providing enough time for discussions. I
know some people are preserving in a file to study later. But I can
guarantee that if you do not have the commitment to study now the
probability that you will study later is almost zero. One needs to study
couple of times before the concepts and the definitions become clear. The
first three notes are very important since subsequent topics will relay
heavily on the definitions and concepts discussed in these.)
Shri Shankara bhaashhyam popularly known as shaariirika miimaa.nsaa
bhaashhyam starts with Shankara's introduction called adhyaasa bhaashhyam.
Bhagavan Shankara gives a great importance to adhyaasa since that is the
basis of the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta and his interpretation of
Brahmasutra. As with all bhaashhyam-s, every bhaashhyakaara or author of
bhaashhyam claims that his interpretation is close to the meaning of what
was intended by Shri Baadarayana. We should recognize at the outset that
the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta does not depend on the validation of its
concepts by Brahmasutra-s. It rests squarely on the mahaavaakya-s, the
four aphoristic statements, one in each of the four Veda-s; praGYaanam
brahma (consciousness is Brahman), tat tvam asi (that thou art), aham
brahmaasmi ( I am Brahman) and ayam aatmaa brahma (this self is Brahman).
What Shankara shows is that Brahmasutra is compatible with the doctrine
of Advaita Vedanta. With the advent of science in the twentieth century and
with the development of relativistic and quantum mechanics, scientists
vision of the Universe is coming more close to the precepts of Advaita
Vedanta.
For a saadhak or seeker, it is important to have a very clear understanding
of the nature of the problem so that one can seek the solution that is
appropriate to solve the problem. Hence mind should be doubt-free, in terms
of the goal and the path. For this one needs to reflect deeply (mananam) to
insure that there are no traces of doubts about the goal and the means.
Constant study of scriptures and contemplation on their meaning and
applications of that to one's own situation are all the steps recommended to
have a clear vision. In that sense Shankara Bhashya helps to provide a
necessary means to launch oneself into the contemplation of the reality.
While the study of Brahmasutra is helpful but it is not necessary, since as
mentioned before Adviata Vedanta does not rely on the sutra-s for its
validation. With this understanding we now enter into adhyaasa bhaashhyam.
3.1 What is adhyaasa and what is its importance?
Before entering into the discussion of Brahmasutra, Shankara provides an
introduction, describing the adhyaasa aspect of Advaita Vedanta. adhyaasa

means an error or a mistake. In this bhaashhyam Shankaracharya
establishes the central cause for sa.nsaara or human suffering, and it is due
to adhyaasa or a mistake or an error. Once Shankara proves that sa.nsaara is
due to an error or adhyaasa, then removal of sa.nsaara should be related to
the removal of the error or adhyaasa nivRîtti. When the error is gone,
then the error-caused problems also disappear. If it is proved that
sa.nsaara is due to an error, naturally the question arises why there is an
error or how did the error arise? Errors can arise because of different
reasons. For example, when I do not know and I still act, I commit a
mistake or an error. Even if I do not know that I do not know, I still
commit a mistake. For example, lack of knowledge of the required language
skills can be the cause of some of the errors in these notes. Here the lack
of knowledge or ignorance is the cause. Sometimes even if I know, I still
can make mistakes as in the typographical errors in these notes. Here too,
if one analyzes carefully, the error is due to non-awareness or ignorance as
the basic problem, since I am not conscious of what I am typing in relation
to what I want to type. Errors can also arise if the instruments of
knowledge are defective, like if I am, say, color blind or if there is
insufficient illumination. In all these cases I am still ignorant of the
truth and more importantly I take the false as real. Sometimes there is a
double jeopardy since I not only take false as real but also real as false.
In all these commissions, there is always a price I have to pay for
committing an error. Thus there is always some suffering associated with
it. If the error is not there, the associated suffering will also be not
there. Thus fundamentally the root cause for all errors is lack of
appropriate knowledge. Hence any error arises because of ignorance or
aGYaanam. Therefore aGYaanam causes adhyaasa, error, and adhyaasa causes
sa.nsaara, suffering. For sa.nsaara to go, adhyaasa should go, for adhyaasa
to go aGYaanam should go, and for aGYaanam to go knowledge should come.
Hence Shankara says in Vivekachudamani,
na yogena na saa~Nkhyena karmaNaa no na vidyayaa |
bramhaatmaaikatva bodhena mokshasiddhyati naanyathaa ||
One can do anything or follow anything - yoga, sankhya, karma, bhakti,
direct path, straight path, curvilinear path etc. Through these process one
cannot gain Moksha. They may be useful in gaining the saadhanaa
chatushhTayam, the four-fold qualifications, which help to gain the requisite
knowledge. But to gain Moksha, the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and
aatmaaa alone is required. Otherwise even if all others are present, there is
no liberation. Because the bondage is an error-based or due to adhyaasa,
and adhyaasa can only be removed when ignorance goes, and ignorance goes
only when the knowledge comes. In support of this we have declarations: 'na
anyaaH panthaaH ayanaaya vidyate', 'gataasuuna gataasuu.nscha na anushochanti
paNDitaaH' - those who have gained the knowledge do not grieve for those who
have gone and for those in the process of going'. And therefore 'athaato
brahma jiGYyaasaa' - to gain that knowledge only, this inquiry into the
nature of Brahman. This is the essence of the adhyaasa bhaashhyam. Now the
details follow.
3.2 Example of adhyaasa:
For conveying this concept of adhyaasa in Vedanta a well known example is
taken as illustrated by Shri Goudapada in his Mandukya karika:
anishchitaa yathaa rajjuH andhakaare vikalpitaa |
sarpadhaaraadibhiH bhaavaiH tadvadaatmaaa vikalpitaH ||
meaning, when there is a rope in front of us which is not clearly visible

then there is a mistake of a snake or a stream of water. Similarly aatmaaa is
mistaken for something other than aatmaaa. Hence a snake perception on a rope
is an error or adhyaasa. rajju sarpa buddhiH - on the rope the notion of a
snake.
When does the error takes place? If the rope is completely not seen when it
is pitch dark, then no error takes place, and there is no fear of a snake.
Hence it is said that 'ignorance is a bliss', as in deep sleep. In total
ignorance, there is no error. Similarly in total knowledge also there is no
error, since one can see clearly the rope. There is no fear of snake and
hence knowledge is also bliss, as with a wise man. Only when there is a
partial light or when the eyes are partially defective, the error can occur.
When there is a partial light, then we know there is something in front of
us. Thus we have some partial knowledge. But what is that something we
don't know. That there is something is called 'saamaanya GYaanam' or
partial knowledge. That part of the rope (that is the 'thingness' that
exists) is called 'saamaanya a.nsha' (general existent part). The saamaanya
a.nsha is not covered by darkness since we know that something exists there.
Hence it is also called 'anaavRîta a.nsha' (uncovered part). Since the
existence of something is real, it is also called 'satya a.nsha' or real
part.
Since light is dull, that the existent thing is 'a rope' - that aspect is
covered, which is the particular feature of the existent object. The
'ropeness' of the object is covered, which is the specific feature of that
object. This specific feature of the object, that is the 'ropeness', is
called 'visheshha a.nsha' also 'aavRita a.nsha' or covered part. 'There is a
rope' is a fact or real. Of this total fact, one part is covered and
another part is not covered. Of the total statement, 'there is a rope',
'there is' -, that part (saamaanya a.nsha) of the knowledge is not covered
and ' a rope' - that part (visheshha a.nsha) is covered. When the visheshha
a.nsha is covered, the mind projects with another visheshha a.nsha - which is
'a snake'. Hence 'snakeness' is the replaced visheshha a.nsha in the place
of 'ropeness'. We are not replacing saamaanya a.nsha or satya a.nsha or real
part but we are replacing only the visheshha a.nsha, a particular part, with
a snake which is mithyaa or anRîtam or not real.
Thus when we say 'there is a snake' it consists of two parts - saamaanya
a.nsha, which is real and visheshha a.nsha which is unreal or anRîtam.
Therefore in every error there is satya saamaanya a.nsha and mithyaa
visheshha a.nsha. The unreal particular feature is there only because the
real particular feature (visheshha a.nsha - the ropeness) is covered. When
the light is shown, the true knowledge of the object takes place and we say
now 'there is a rope'. The previous saamaanya a.nsha, 'there is' or the real
part still remains. Only the previous visheshha a.nsha, the snakeness, which
is not real is replaced by the other visheshha a.nsha (ropeness), which
happens to be also real. When we say it is replaced, it is not that the
snake is now replaced by the rope. Where did the snake go? - the snake was
never there to go anywhere. But in the mind of the perceiver who says
'there is a snake', the snake was very much alive and it was a very
frightening experience for him. The frightening experience that includes
rapid heart beating, blood pressure rising and sweating are all as much
real as the snake, for the one who sees the snake. He runs away to avoid
the snakebite and that running away is real too. Can the false snake cause
so much of havoc? False snake cannot cause any problem if one knows that it
is false. Since it is a real snake in the mind of the perceiver, the
perceived suffering is equally real in his mind. Thus relative to his state
of mind, the snake is real. Only from the point of wise man, snake is
mithyaa (for the time being we translate it is unreal) while rope is real.

The snake appears to be real from the point of the perceiver, and is unreal
from the point of the wise man. Thus off-hand there appear to be two
realities, one from the point of the perceiver who sees the thing as a snake
and the other from the point of the wise man who sees the thing as a rope.
One is relatively real (vyaavahaarika satya) and the other is absolutely
real (paaramaarthika satya). Thus relative realities depend on from whose
reference we are discussing the issue. Most of the confusion in discussions
arises when we inadvertently switch the reference states without realizing
it. The discussion of real and unreal so far is from the point of a
perceiver. But from the point of the object, it was rope all the time. It
was just an innocent rope lying in semi dark alley, without realizing that
it is the subject of so much discussion from Goudapada on! It was rope
before any one saw, it is a rope when people are mistaking it as a snake and
it will remain as rope even when a torch light was shown on it. Rope never
became a snake causing problems for the people. But people saw it as a
snake and got frightened. Who created a snake out of a rope? Can we say
ignorance created a snake out of the rope? Both questions will sound as
ridiculous since there was never a snake where the rope is, for it to be
called a created entity. But yet for the person who is perceiving a snake,
there is indeed a snake where the rope is. But when we ask him later why
he saw the snake there when it is a rope, his only answer is - I didn't know
it was a rope. From his point, ignorance of the rope is the cause for the
snake creation in his mind. These concepts need to be clearly understood
when we apply it to reality of the world, concept of creation and what is
the adhishhThaanam or substratum for the creation or the world etc.
Now when the light is shown, the reality of the object gets revealed by
itself, since it is real, and the unreality disappears by itself since it is
unreal. The correction is not in the saamaanya a.nsha but only in the
visheshha a.nsha. When this correction takes place in the visheshha a.nsha,
the fear caused by that unreal snake is also gone. The fears and
tribulations are all related to the visheshha a.nsha, which is unreal and not
to the saamaanya a.nsha, which is real. Thus when the inquiry is done about
the nature of the visheshha a.nsha using a valid means of inquiry, in this
case, say a torch light, then the reality of the object in total is known.
The method of inquiry should be appropriate since the error is due to
ignorance of the visheshha a.nsha, the rope, because of the dim light. Hence
the means should be such as to eliminate the ignorance by throwing light on
the object. No amount of prayers, actions such as jumping up and down, or
japa or meditation on the rope ' idam rajjuH, idam rajjuH', 'this is a rope,
this is a rope' etc., will help reveal the rope in the place of a snake.
Hence Shankara say in Vivekachudamani:
vadantu shaastraaNi yajantu devaan.h
kurvantu karmaaNi bhajantu devataaH |
aatmaaikya bodhena vinaa vimuktiH
na sidhyati brahma shataantare.api ||
Let erudite scholars quote all the scriptures, let gods be invoked through
endless sacrifices, let elaborate rituals be performed, let personal gods be
propitiated. Yet, without the experience of one's identity with the self or
self-knowledge, there shall be no liberation for the individual, even in the
lifetime of a hundred Brahma-s put together.
The problem is centered on ignorance and the solution has to be an
appropriate knowledge that removes that ignorance. If I don't know
Chemistry no amount of the study of Psychology will help remove my ignorance
of Chemistry. Knowledge of Chemistry alone removes the ignorance of
Chemistry. Similarly the knowledge of oneself removes the ignorance

centered on the self. Hence discussion of any other paths is meaningless
from the point of the stated problem - hence the shruti's declaration - na
anyaH panthaa vidyate ayanaaya - no other path other than knowledge removes
the sa.nsaara. Hence Shankara insistence on the understanding of the nature
of the problem, i.e. adhyaasa.
Thus the problem itself will define the solution to that problem.
3.4. Role of adhyaasa in Vedanta:
Similar to the case of rope-snake case, when a person says 'aham sa.nsaarii'
- 'I am a sa.nsaarii', Shankaracharya says here too there is a 'saamaanya
a.nsha' and 'visheshha a.nsha'. "I am' in the above statement is the
saamaanya a.nsha, which refers to 'a conscious being' - conscious
corresponding to 'chit' and 'being' corresponding to 'sat'. It is anaavRîta
a.nsha or uncovered part and is also 'satya a.nsha', part that is real. In
fact this part is never covered or eternally true and is self evident or
ever evident or 'pratibodha viditam' or GYaanaswaruupam, of the nature of
the knowledge. That is, I am not only conscious but also I am
'self-conscious' - and therefore require no means of knowledge, pramaaNa, to
know that I exist. I know that I am there even when it is pitch dark
outside. Hence this particular saamaanya a.nsha is never covered - in fact
nothing can cover it!
In the above statement there is also a visheshha a.nsha, a particular part 'asamsaarii', which is unreal like our snake. The unreal 'visheshha a.nsha'
has come into existence only because of the covering of real visheshha
a.nsha. Therefore covering as well as uncovering belongs only to 'visheshha
a.nsha' and not to saamaanya a.nsha. What is that real visheshha a.nsha that
is covered - Sat and Chit are evident in the saamaanya a.nsha. Then what is
covered is aananda (bliss) a.nsha, or anantatva (unlimited) a.nsha, or
puurNatva (complete) a.nsha or Brahmatva (infiniteness) a.nsha or in effect
'asamsaaritva a.nsha'. That is the visheshha a.nsha that is covered. In that
place we have unreal visheshha a.nsha ' duHkhii, (miserable) or asampuurNaH
(incomplete) or parichchhinnaH(limited) or sa.nsaarii'. Hence ' aham
sa.nsaaari or jiivaH' is an error and is the cause for all the human
suffering. Therefore to solve the problem of human suffering there is no
need to change the real part (in fact one cannot change it) that is the
saamaanya a.nsha, which is 'I am', but only remove the visheshha a.nsha called
'sa.nsaarii'. This has to be done by putting a 'torch light' to reveal the
real visheshha a.nsha that 'aham asamsaarii' or 'aham Brahma asmi'. The
torchlight is 'the Vedanta Knowledge' that is required to reveal the true
visheshha a.nsha. 'aham asmi' is common both in the samsaarii state and in
the realized state. In the sa.nsaarii state, I have knowledge only as ' aham
sa.nsaarii asmi' , which is replaced by real knowledge, that 'aham Brahma
asmi'. The change is taking place only in the visheshha a.nsha, anRîta
a.nsha or mithyaa a.nsha, the unreal part -just as the change is taking place
from mithyaa 'snake' to real 'rope'. Hence 'I am the sa.nsaarii' notion goes
away and is replaced by 'I am asa.nsaarii or puurNaH' knowledge comes and
that is the aim of all the prasthaanatraya, Upanishads, Gita and
Brahmasutra.
3.5 Examination of adhyaasa:
This adhyaasa or error can be defined differently by looking at it from
different angles - As mentioned before the study of knowledge and error
comes under the science of epistemology. There are differences of opinions
about error (some may be erroneous too!) and these are called 'khyaati
vaada' or analysis of errors. From the standpoint of rope, one can call it

as 'misapprehension' of rope - mistaking (missing the rope and taking the
snake!) the rope is an error. In Sanskrit it is called 'anyathaa grahaNam
or anyathaa khyaati'. The same error can be defined from the standpoint of
snake also. From the point of snake error is 'superimposition of a snake',
that is a non-existent snake is superimposed on the existing object. This
is called 'adhyaaropa' or 'adhyaasa'. A third definition is both from the
point of rope and snake. From this point an error is a combination or
mixing of some parts of real rope and some parts of unreal snake. When we
say 'there is a snake', in that 'there is'- belongs to rope, which is
saamaanya a.nsha, which is real. Hence the statement ''there is a snake'
involves a real saamaanya a.nsha and unreal visheshha a.nsha. Hence error
involves mixing up of satyam, real, and asatyam or unreal or anRîtam.
Hence error is defined as 'satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam' - mixing up of real
and unreal. By the mixing up of the two entities, real and unreal, a third
singular entity is created that involves parts of the real and part of the
unreal. A fellow while seeing a rope says 'there is a snake'. While
saying, he does not know that there are two entities, real and unreal, which
he is mixing. The problem is, in principle, is inconsequential, but for
the fact that he is having a real suffering as a consequence of the mistaken
identity or the presence of unreal snake. From our point who knew the whole
truth, he is mixing up of the two entities. From the mistaker point, he is
not aware of the two things. In his cognition, there is only one entity but
only on analysis we find that in his unitary perception there is a satya
a.nsha and anRîta a.nsha. When he says 'the snake is frightening' frightening part belongs to anRîta a.nsha, the snake, whereas the 'is' part
belongs to the satya a.nsha, the rope. 'It is a long snake' - the length
belongs to the rope and it is therefore satya a.nsha. "It is a poisonous
snake' - the poisonous part belongs to snake which is anRîta a.nsha. ' It is
a curved snake' - the curved part belongs to rope, hence satya a.nsha. Hence
a peculiar mixture of some aspects which are satyam and some aspects which
are anRîtam. He mixes them both to arrive at one unitary entity.
Similarly when a person says 'I am so and so' - he takes himself as one
unitary entity but Shankara says there are two aspects mixed in that
statement - a satya a.nsha and anRîta a.nsha, creating a jiiva who is
miserable. When he says 'I am existent conscious being' - existent and
conscious are from satya a.nsha. When he says 'I am a fat person' - fat person
is anRîta a.nsha. Hence jiiva is neither pure aatmaaa nor pure anaatmaaaaa, it is
a mixture of aatmaaa and anaatmaaaaa, satya and anRîta a.nsha. It is this mixed
unitary entity, jiiva, is striving for liberation. This missing up is
called 'error' called 'satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam.
The purpose of Brahmasutra is to inquire into the nature of jiiva to
discard the unreal part and to get established in the real part. In this
process, the sa.nsaara which is associated with the unreal part gets
dissolved and that is Moksha or liberation. This is the general background
on adhyaasa.
3.6 Shankara's discussion of adhyaasa:
The discussion of Shankaracharya on adhyaasa bhaashhyam can be broadly
classified into six subtopics: 1. adhyaasa sha~Nkaa (objections to the
theory of error) 2. adhyaasa sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam (answering to the
objections) 3. adhyaasa lakshaNam (the definition of error) 4. adhyaasa
sambhaavanaa (showing the possibility of error) 5. adhyaasa pramaaNa (proof
for adhyaasa) 6. adhyaasa upasa.nhaaraH (conclusion of the adhyaasa topic).
For convenience, we take the third topic first, adhyaasa lakshaNam, the rest
of the topics will be discussed in the order.
3.7 Definition or lakshaNa for adhyaasa:

Shankara gives two definitions for adhyaasa. An additional third definition

is indirectly available and is often quoted. The first definition is:
'smRîti ruupaH, paratra puurva dRîshhTaavabhaasaH adhyaasaH' |
meaning 'the perception of a previously experienced object on a wrong locus'
- In the rope-snake example, one is perceiving a snake - a snake which is
already experienced before. A person who has never seen a snake will not
mistake a rope for a snake. I am superimposing an experienced snake upon a
wrong locus, which is a rope. This is called an error.
Second definition which is more popular and simpler and that is:
'atasmin tat buddhiH' meaning 'perception of an object on a wrong locus' The snake is seen on a wrong locus that is the rope. Or perception of
silver on a shell.
The third indirect definition is what was discussed before 'satyaanRîta
mithuniikaraNam' - mixing up of real and unreal.
When I say 'I am the body' - the error is seeing the body on a wrong locus
'aatmaaa' which is not the body. I, the immortal, is seen as the mortal - I,
the all pervading, is seen as the limited - This is the error.
This is the adhyaasa lakshaNam.
3.8 Objections to adhyaasa -adhyaasa sha~Nkaa:
The objections are raised by all other systems of philosophies, sankhya,
yoga, vaiseshika etc., who claim that adhyaasa introduction is an improper
introduction because aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa is impossible. Rope-snake
adhyaasa is possible which can be accepted but not aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa.
To establish that the puurvapakshii (the objector) gives the following
reasons. Any superimposition like rope-snake superimposition requires
four conditions to be satisfied simultaneously. Only if all the four
conditions are fulfilled then this satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam can occur
otherwise it is not possible. In the case of aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa not a
single one of the four conditions is satisfied. Hence the idea of adhyaasa
is itself an adhyaasa or a mistake.
Let us illustrate the four conditions using the rope-snake example. First,
the rope is a 'pratyaksha vishhaya', a directly perceivable object in front.
Hence the first condition is 'pratyaksha vishhayatvam', an object which is
directly perceivable in front. That is 'there is a rope in front', for
anyone to mistake it as a snake. The second condition is that the rope
should not be completely known. One should be ignorant of the fact that it
is a rope. Hence the second condition is called 'aGYaatatvam', absence of
the complete knowledge of the rope. The third condition is saadRîshyam there should be a similarity between what I superimpose and what is there in
front. I mistake the rope only as a snake but not as an elephant or monkey,
because there is no saadRîshyam between rope and the elephant or monkey.
The fourth condition is 'sa.nskaaram'. That is a false snake is superimposed
because I had an experience of a real snake before which left the impression
or vaasanaa in my mind. Because of that snake vaasanaa or 'sa.nskaara' alone I
commit the mistake that the rope as a snake. If I have not experienced a
real snake before then there is no question of mistaking the rope as a
snake. Therefore the fourth condition is 'puurva anubhava janya
sa.nskaaraH', a vaasanaa which is born out of the experience of a real snake
before. Hence only when the four conditions, pratyaksha vishhayatvam,

aGYaatatvam, saadRîshyam and puurva sa.nskaara, are there, then one can have
an error due to the superimposition or adhyaasa. If one applies this to
aatmaa-anaatmaaaa case, none of the four conditions is fulfilled. Hence
aatmaa-anaatmaaaa adhyaasa is impossible.
Let us examine this in detail. The first condition is pratyaksha
vishhayatvam - rope is clearly perceived as an object for the mistake to take
place. In the case of aatmaaa, is it an object to be perceived in front to
commit a mistake? aatmaaa is apratyakshaH, avishhayaH -it is imperceptible and
also not an object - Thus it is not an object in front for any one to commit
a mistake. Hence the first condition is not fulfilled. aatmaanaH
apratyakshatvaat, a claim made by advaitin himself that aatmaa cannot be
directly perceived, and that violates the first condition.
The second condition is aGYaatatvam, ignorance with regard to rope in the
rope-snake example. But in the case of aatmaaa advaitin accepts that aatmaaa is
svayaM prakaashaH(self evident or self-effulgent), nitya chaitanya
swaruupaH (always conscious). Hence how can there be ignorance with regard
to self-evident aatmaaa? nityopalabdha swaruupaH - swaya.n jyotiH -It is
self-luminous or shines by itself - these are advaitin's own statements
regarding aatmaaa. If that is the case, how can there be ignorance in that
chaitanya swaruupa swam prakaashha aatmaaa, self-conscious, self-shining
aatmaaa? Hence the second condition of aGYaatatvam is not fulfilled and hence
no adhyaasa is possible.
The third condition is saadRîshyam, similarity. Between aatmaaa and anaatmaaaaa
what similarity is there? They are diagonally opposite to one another in
all features. aatmaaa is the subject and anaatmaaaaa is the object. aatmaaa is
chetanam (conscious entity) and anaatmaaaaa is jaDam( inert), aatmaa is sarva
gatam (all pervading) anaatmaaaaa is alpa gatam (limited in time and space),
aatmaaa is nirguNam (attributeless) where as anaatmaaaaa is saguNam(with
attributes) - In every aspect they are opposite. Shankara says in his
bhaashhyam 'tamaH prakaashavat viruddha swabhaavayoH, vishhaya vishhayinoH, yushhmadashhmat pratyaya gocharayoH' - they
are diagonally opposite to each other like light and darkness, one is object and the other is subject etc. Hence saadRîshyam or
similarity is not at all there. Hence the third
condition is not fulfilled.
The fourth condition is sa.nskaaraH - Advaitin claims anaatmaaaaa is unreal and
aatmaaa is real - since it involves satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam - satya
aatmaa and anRîta anaatmaaa are mixed up. In the case of snake the unreal
snake is possible because we have experienced a real snake before. The
sa.nskaara of real snake is there in the mind. In the case of aatmaa-anaatmaaa
superimposition, for the unreal anaatmaa to be superimposed on real aatmaa,
we should have prior sa.nskaara or experience of real anaatmaa, that is, we
should have experienced before a real anaatmaa. But advaitin himself claims
that there is no real anaatmaa at all because aatmaa alone is real, which is
one without a second. Therefore the sa.nskaara, the fourth condition is also
not fulfilled. Since all the four conditions are not fulfilled the
aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is impossible. Hence the very foundation of Advaita
Vedanta is on shaky grounds.
Thus according to puurvapakshii for adhyaasa to operate all the four
conditions need to be satisfied - they are 1. pratyaksha vishhayatvam, 2.
aGYaatatvam, 3. saadRîshyam, and 4. sa.nskaaraH. puurvapakshii, the objector
shows while all the things are applicable to snake-rope case but none for
aatmaa-anaatmaa case. Therefore aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is impossible and hence the whole theory of based on adhyaasa is
wrong.
This ends the arguments of the puurvapakshii or an objector.

(A Note: We pause here for few days for us to think deeply - Is puurvapakshii
or objector right in his arguments? If we are convinced of Advaita can we
contour his arguments to show that adhyaasa is possible in the case of
aatmaa-anaatmaa case? - what do you think? How do you address these
objections? Can one argue that all the four requirements are met in the case
of aatmaa-anaatmaa case as in the case of rope-snake example and therefore
adhyaasa is applicable? Or is it the time now to switch our party and move
to a different list? The ball is now in your court.)
Msg #

Date: Mon Sep 4, 2000 9:35pm
Subject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUTRA-3B
Notes on Brahmasuutra-IIIB
sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |

my own teacher.
vaastalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h |
shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiita.n
sadaa bhaje.aha.n tava paada pa~Nkajam.h ||
Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the three
guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of purity who is
------------------------------------------------------------------dhyaasa bhaashhyam (continued)
(Note: Due to feed back I received so far, I am cutting down the length of
the postings. Hence the adhyaasa part will be discussed in more than three
parts. This may give more time for readers to think and discuss. If you have
not voiced your opinion so far it is time to do that).
In the last notes we stopped with puurvapakshii's claims that aatmaa-anaatmaa
adhyaasa is not possible even though rope-shake adhyaasa is possible. For
adhyaasa involving 'satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam', mixing up of real and
unreal entities, four conditions need to be satisfied, simultaneously. All
the four conditions are satisfied for the rope-snake case but none are
fulfilled for the aatmaa-anaatmaa case. They are pratyaksha vishhayatvam,
aGYaatatvam, saadRîshyam and sa.nskaaram. (The reader is referred back to
Notes IIIa for details). Since none of the four conditions are satisfied,
aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is not possible, and the concept of adhyaasa is
wrong. Since adhyaasa is the foundation for Advaita Vedanta, the whole
philosophy is on shaky grounds. This is the objector's contention.
3.9 adhyaasa sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam and sambhaavanaa
(Response to the objections and showing the possibility for
adhyaasa)

Of the six topics of adhyaasa stated above (see section 3-6), we have
covered two topics, adhyaasa lakshaNa and adhyaasa sha~Nkaa. The next two
topics of adhyaasa; sha~Nkaa samaadhaanam and adhyaasa sambhaavanaa are very similar. Hence they will be discussed together in
the following.
Shankaracharya has to address the objections with regard to each of the
four conditions stated by puurvapakshii or the objector.
The first condition is that the thing that is mistaken should be 'pratyaksha
vishhaya' - should be an object perceived in front. For that Shankara's
answer is that the condition to be fulfilled is not exactly the same as
stated by the puurvapakshii, or the objector. The first condition needs to
be modified slightly since it was presented incorrectly by puurvapakshii.
For a mistake to take place an object must be evident, or it should be a
known object since an unknown object cannot be mistaken. I cannot make a
mistake about 'gaagaabuubuu', since I do not know what that 'gaagaabuubuu'
is. Hence it should be a known object or an evident object, but need not be
an object in front, as puurvapakshii claims. There is no need for an object
to be in front for it to be mistaken. It is sufficient if it is a known
object. From the point of aatmaa, it is not an object in front, but still as
the subject aatmaa is evident enough for one to commit the mistake. Hence
the first condition should be restated as that it should be evident and not
pratyaksha vishhaya, as the puurvapakshii claims. It should be an evident
'vishhaya' and need not be 'pratyaksha vishhaya' and aatmaa fulfils the
modified requirement. Therefore the first condition should be restated as
'prakaashhamaanatvam', or a known existent entity and not 'pratyaksha
vishhayatvam'. Then the modified first condition is fulfilled both in the
case of rope-snake and in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa. Hence adhyaasa is
possible.
The second condition is aGYaatatvam - that is it should be not known - that
rope is not known - Rope is partially known as an object present but it is
not fully known as a rope. Existence of a rope as an object is known, but
the 'ropeness' of the existing object is unknown. Partial ignorance is the
second requirement - it is 'aa.nshika aGYaatatvam' that is partial ignorance
and not 'puurNa aGYaatatvam', complete ignorance. We claim in the case of
aatmaa also it is partially known and partially unknown, and therefore the
second condition is completely fulfilled. The aatmaa is partially known as
'aham asmi', that is 'I exist'. Whenever a person says 'I am' - the sat
(am) and chit (I) of aatmaa is evident but not fully known as 'aham brahma
asmi' or 'aham aanandaH asmi', I am the totality or I am bliss. Thus sat
and chit are known but anantatvam, my infinite nature is not known; 'aham
aanandaH', I am bliss, is not known. What is the proof for this? Everybody's bio-data speaks for itself in proof of this. Everyone
introduces himself as ' I am this or that' etc., where 'I am', the subject
corresponding to sat and chit, and 'this and that' being an object with a
limited qualification - apuurNatva - proving that one is ignorant of
oneself. Because of the existence of this self-ignorance only Upanishads
are coming to our rescue to teach us our true nature. In Chandogya
Upanishad there is a statement, 'aatmavit shokam tarati' - 'the knower of
the self crosses the sorrow' - From these it is very clear that a sa.nsaarii,
who is always engulfed in sorrow, does not have self-knowledge. Hence
self-ignorance is there. This is everybody's personal experience. Hence
the second condition that there should be partial knowledge and partial
aGYaatatvam is fulfilled. That is the requirement of aa.nshhika aGYaatatvam,
partial ignorance is fulfilled.
Third condition is 'saadRîshyam', similarity, should be there between the

'adhishhThaanam' that is the rope and the superimposed snake. For this
objection, the advaitin's answer is that the similarity is a general
condition, which always need not be fulfilled for adhyaasa to occur. There
are exceptions to this condition. For example, the general rule is the
creator, intelligent cause (nimitta kaaraNa) is different from the material
for creation (upaadaana kaaraNa). That is the pot maker (nimitta kaaraNa)
is different from the clay (upaadaana kaaraNa). But there are exceptions to
this general rule - for example a dreamer creating his dream world, a spider
creating its web, ultimately the Ishwara creating this world. Similarly
'saadRîshyam' or similarity is a general condition but it is not an
invariable necessity or compulsory condition. And adhyaasa is possible
without having 'saadRîshyam' or similarity. aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa comes
under this category of exceptions. Hence the third rule is not applicable
here.
Why saadRîshyam is not a compulsory requirement? Because we do have cases
where error or adhyaasa takes place without any similarity or saadRîshyam.
Shankaracharya gives an example - 'apratyakshetiH aakaashe baalaaH
talamalinataadi adhyasyanti' - To illustrate this take the example of the
blue sky or blue space - the blue sky, is it an error or knowledge? We know
that the sky is niruupam or without any color or form. When we say it is a
blue sky, we are superimposing blueness upon the colorless sky. Not only
the blueness but the sky seems to look like a vessel turned upside down (due
to horizons) - the concavity of the space (talatvam) and its niilatvam
(blueness) and also malinatvam (space pollution) are all falsely
superimposed on space. When such an error or adhyaasa takes place what kind
of saadRîshyam or similarity one can attribute between aakaasha or space and
the superimposed blueness or pollution or concavity? In fact aakaasha is
never similar to anything else - there is beautiful statement to this effect
in Ramayana.
Gagana.n gaganaakaara.n saagaram saagaropamam.h |
raama raavaNayor yuddha.n raama raavaNayoriva ||
There are no other similar things to compare, for space other than with the
space, ocean other than with the ocean and similarly the Rama-Ravaa war
other than with Rama-Raavaa war.
Therefore aakaasha is not similar to anything and therefore no saadRîshyam'
is possible. However aakaasha adhyaasa is every body's experience. Thus
adhyaasa seems to take place even with out having a similar object and
therefore the third condition saadRîshyam is not compulsory. In the
rope-snake case, it is applicable but in the case of blue sky or
aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa it is not applicable. Hence the third condition for
aatmaa-anaatmaa case is invalid.
The forth condition of the puurvapakshii is related to the mixing up of satya
and asatya or anRîta vishhaya. Such a mixing up is possible as in the case
of rope-snake case if one has prior experience of real snake before. That
is prior sa.nskaara of the real snake exists in the mind for one to project
it on the rope in front. Thus a false snake is possible due to experience
of a real snake before. Such sa.nskaara is not possible for aatmaa-anaatmaa
case since there is no real anaatmaa for one to have that experience or
sa.nskaara. This is the objection of the puurvapakshii. This objection is
answered by advaitin as follows. sa.nskaara is required and it comes from
previous experience and up to this part, it is acceptable. But we differ
from objector's statement that the previous experience of a real snake is
required for adhyaasa to take place. Previous experience of a snake is
required all right, but it need not have to be a real snake. One can have a

previous experience of a false snake and that experience of false snake or
sa.nskaara can create an impression, which can produce another false snake.
For example if I have never seen a real snake but experienced a false snake
in a movie (if it is real snake, no body will remain in the theater) which
created sa.nskaara for me to project a snake on the rope, and I experience
the fears associated with seeing a snake. People project ghost on a post
without having seen a real ghost in their life. Concept of a ghost in book
is sufficient to create a sa.nskaara for adhyaasa to take place.
Similarly the adhyaasa in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa is possible by the
previous sa.nskaara of unreal anaatmaa. How did this previous experience or
sa.nskaara of unreal anaatmaa occur? That again is due to adhyaasa involving
previous to previous unreal anaatmaa. And for the previous to previous
adhyaasa there is previous to previous to previous unreal anaatmaa. This can
go on. Then how did the very first unreal anaatmaa experience occur?
Shankaracharya says - 'naisargitoyam lokaH vyavahaaraH' - it is anaadi
adhyaasa. We never talk about the beginning of adhyaasa. It is naisargitaH
(uncreated or beginning-less or anaadi) - puurva puurva adhyaasaH, uttara
uttara adhyaasasya kaaraNam (previous previous adhyaasa is responsible for
the following and the following adhyaasa). anaadi avidyaa vaasanayaa - the
beginning-less ignorance based sa.nskaara. Therefore real anaatmaa is not
there and is not required for adhyaasa to take palace. Previous experience
of unreal anaatmaa is there which is the cause for adhyaasa.
Hence all the four conditions are effectively fulfilled. The first
condition is fulfilled in a modified form - prakaashamaanatvam instead
pratyaksha vishhayatvam that is it should be evident rather than directly
perceivable in front. The second condition aGYaatatvam is fulfilled since
aatmaa is indeed partially known and partially unknown. The third condition
is not compulsory and the fourth condition is also fulfilled since
sa.nskaara is there not of real anaatmaa but of unreal anaatmaa, which is
sufficient to produce adhyaasa. Therefore aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is
possible.
This forms the first answer to puurvapakshii. This answer is only a
provisional or temporary answer. This is a defensive argument. This above
answer is applicable to both objectors that belong to aastika and naastika
camps. The answer is given using the same laukika anumaana that
puurvapakshii used in his objections. Thus Shankara first shows using the
same language of the objector that it is not adhyaasa that is wrong but his
objections against adhyaasa are based on wrong postulates. In the process he
provides the correct postulates too and shows that adhyaasa is possible.
Since the objectors are mostly aastika-s a more complete answer is provided
in the next post.
Msg #

Subject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA IIIC
Notes on Brahmasutra IIIC
sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n shankaraachaarya madhyamam.h |


my own teacher.
vaastalya ruupa.n triguNairatiita/maananda saandramamalairnidhaanam.h |
shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiita.n
the best among the teachers, Shri Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I
--------------------------------------------------------------------adhyaasa bhaashhyam (continued)
In the last notes we began the discussion of Shankara's sha~Nkaa

samaadhaanam or response to the objections of the puurvapakshiii that
aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is not possible since the four conditions required
for the adhyaasa are not met in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa case. In response
to the objections, Shankara shows that the first condition is incorrectly
stated by the puurvapakshii and it should be prakaashhamaanatvam instead of
pratyaksha vishhayatvam. The second condition should be aa.nshika
aGYaatatvam instead of puurNa aGYaatatvam and this is fulfilled even the
aatmaa-anaatmaa case. The third condition is not universal and there are
exceptions and aatmaa-anaatmaa case falls in the category of the exceptions.
For the fourth condition involving 'sa.nskaara' Shankara shows that it need
not have to be real snake to have previous sa.nskaara, and even the sa.nskaara
of a false snake can do the job. In the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa case also it
is the previous experience of false anaatmaa that leaves a sa.nskaara, which
helps to project false anaatmaa on the aatmaa. The previous sa.nskaara of
false anaatmaa occurs because of previous to previous sa.nskaara of involving
false anaatmaa. The chain can go on. For the question of how did the very
first experience of false anaatmaa occurred. Shankara raises the issue that
one cannot ask about the beginning for the avidya. It is anaadi or
beginningless and it is similar to inquiring which is the first, chicken or
egg. It is anirvachaniiyam - naisargitoyam - it is inexplicable or
beginningless.
This above forms the first answer to puurvapakshii. This answer is
applicable to objectors that belong to both aastika and naastika camps. The
answer is given using the same laukika anumaana that puurvapakshii used in
his objections.
There is a second answer which is a more important answer, which is an
offensive argument. This part is mainly for the aastika puurvapakshii-s who
also believe in the validity of Veda-s as pramaaNa.
Shankara claims that adhyaasa that is talked about is Veda pramaaNa. The
rope-snake example is given not for proving adhyaasa. adhyaasa is not
derived from the rope-snake example. This example is given only as an
illustration of the nature of adhyaasa. Hence one should not try to extract
more than what is intended for, from the rope-snake example. It is not
meant for proving aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. The proof for that comes from
Vedas, directly. Not realizing that many puurvapakshii-s and objectors
focused their attention on the rope-snake example and extracted rules to
apply for aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Even if one can disprove rope-snake
adhyaasa, that does not affect our arguments about aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa,

since it is scriptural based not on laukika anumaana, such as on rope-snake
case. Arguments based on laukika anumaana are not applicable to adhyaasa
aatmaa since it is scriptural based anumaana. (The reader is referred back to
Ch.II to see the limitations of laukika or worldly example for application
to inference about aatmaa). For this adhyaasa, shruti is pramaaNa. This is
the first aspect to be noted.
The second aspect is this adhyaasa involving aatmaa-anaatmaa should not be
questioned by puurvapakshii-s coming from aastika group, because the
puurvapakshii-s themselves have accepted, in one form or the other, adhyaasa
in their own systems of philosophies, which they themselves are not aware
of. Here we are referring to puurvapakshii-s of aastika darshaNa-s that
is saa~Nkhya, yoga, nyaaya, vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa. In all their
systems aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is already there, whether they recognize it
or not. For example these systems also talk about aatmaa and they all accept
based on veda pramaaNa that aatmaa is nityaH or eternal. They accept Veda
pramaaNa, karmakaanDa, puNyam and paapam (merits and demerits), aatmaa
surviving the death, and reincarnation into next birth - all implying the
continuity of aatmaa. They are all aware that aatmaa refers to 'aham' or 'I'
the self. Hence all of them say that "I" the self is immortal or nityaH,
based on veda pramaaNa. In spite of this fact about aatmaa, which they all
agree, they are conscious also of the fact that our experience is 'I am a
human being' " I am a male', I am a female', I am a husband', I am a wife',
I am a father' etc. Since aatmaa is neither human being, nor male, female,
wife, husband, or father, the above statements, 'I am male' refers to
anaatmaa only. Hence even according to their systems, I am a human being or
I am a mortal when such statements are made, are they error or knowledge?
They have to accept, and they do accept, that they are erroneous statements,
since they believe based on veda pramaaNa that the self that I am is eternal
and not mortal. The error is 'deha aatma buddhi' or manushhyatva buddhi or
mRîtyatva buddhi - I am the body, I am a man, I am mortal - these errors
It is an error accepted by all aastika systems. It is called 'sthuula
shariira adhyaasaH', superposition of aatmaa on the gross body. They have to
agree for this sthuulashariira adhyaasa. In case if they do not accept it
as an error, then their philosophies will reduce to that of Charvaka
system of philosophy, which does not believe in the existence of aatmaa, leave
alone its eternity. This is because 'dehaatma buddhi' will become a fact,
if it is not an error. To be classified under Charvaka will not be
acceptable to any aastika philosophers, and therefore they have to accept
that dehaatma buddhi (dehe aatmaa buddhi) is an error or adhyaasa and not a
fact. Hence the second point is adhyaasa - stuulashariira adhyaasa, is
already accepted by puurvapakshii-s even though they are not conscious of it
when they raise this objection.
Since stuulashariira adhyaasa, superimposition of aatmaa on gross body, is
inherently accepted by the puurvapakshii-s, they have to accept the extension
of this error as aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. Therefore puurvapakshii has no
basis to raise the issue of fulfillment of the four conditions for adhyaasa,
since they have accepted the stuulashariira adhyaasa without applying their
four conditions. Let us take, for example the first condition, the
'pratyakshatvam' requirement for adhyaasa. It is not applicable, since in
stuulashariira adhyaasa that puurvapakshii has already accepted as an error,
even though the superimposed aatmaa is apratyaksham. Similarly the same
applies with respect to all other conditions that the puurvapakshii has
raised. What saad^Rishyam or similarity is there between aatmaa and
stuulashariiram, gross body? Yet it is accepted due to shruti pramaaNa that
says aatmaa is different from the inert gross body.
Hence puurvapakshii has no basis to raise the issue against aatmaa-anaatmaa

adhyaasa. Another problem with puurvapakshii's argument is he is bringing
conditions pertaining to laukika anumaana which are not necessarily valid
for aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa, which is based on shruti that is accepted by
both advaitin as well as puurvapakshii as valid pramaaNa.
While aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is based on shruti, one can not question even
the rope-snake adhyaasa also with the four conditions, since that adhyaasa
or error is experienced by us. Hence puurvapakshii can explain, but not
question the anubhava based rajju-sarpa adhyaasa. Different philosophers
have different explanations for the rajuu-surpa or rope-snake adhyaasa, and
these are called khyaati vaada-s.
aatmaakhyaatirasakhyaatiH akhyaati khyaatiranyathaa |
tathaa nirvachanakhyaatiH ityetat khyaati pa~nchakam.h ||
The yogachaara Budhhists say it is aatmaakhyaati, which is one type of
explanation. Madhyamika Budhhists say it is asakhyaati.
Nyayavaiseshika-s say it is anyathaa khyaati, miima.nsaka-s say it is
akhyaati, advaitins say it is anirvachaniiya khyaati; thus explanation vary
for the snake-rope adhyaasa. Shankara says whatever be the explanation, one
cannot question the snake-rope adhyaasa since it is based on anubhava or
experience or pratyaksha pramaaNa. Similarly the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa
also cannot be questioned since it is based shruti pramaaNa. Everyone's
explanation for it may differ but adhyaasa cannot be denied.
3-10. Degrees of adhyaasa in aastika darshaNam-s
Now, the difference between the puurvapakshii and advaitin is concerning to
what extent this adhyaasa has taken place. It is not the existence of
adhyaasa but to the degree this adhyaasa occurs. Here the different
philosophers disagree. Let us take for example the adhyaasa related to 'I
am a mortal'( anityatvam), 'I am a doer' (kartRîtvam), and 'I am an
enjoyer'(bhoktRîtvam). A nyaayavaisheshhika says that mortality is not a fact
but is due to a superimposition or adhyaasa and the truth is 'I am
immortal', whereas I am a doer, kartaa and I am enjoyer or bhoktaa are not
errors but facts only. Thus according to these philosophers, the first one
only is adhyaasa and the other two are facts. Sankhya and yoga
philosophers, on the other hand, says 'aham anityaH' and 'aham kartaa' both
are adhyaasa but 'aatmaa is a bhoktaa' is a fact and there is no adhyaasa in
that. An advaitin says all the three are adhyaasa.
naadatte kasyachitpaapam na chaiva sukRîtam vibhuH |
aGYaanenaavRîtam GYaanam tena muhyanti jantavaH ||
hantaa chenmanyate hantum hatashchenmanyate hatam |
ubhau tou na vijaaniitaH naaya.n hanti na hanyate ||
The first sloka is from Geeta (V-15) and the second one is from
KaThopanishad[I:ii:19]. Because one is not a doer he neither acquires merits or
demerits. Only because of ignorance-born delusion one thinks that one is a
doer and enjoyer. One thinks one is a killer and the other one is killed,
neither one knows the fact, there is neither a killer (kartRîtvam) nor the
one who undergoes killing (bhoktRîtvam). Hence in addition to anityatvam
the kartRîtvam and bhoktRîtvam are also due to adhyaasa.
Hence there is no disagreement in agreeing that there is aatmaa-anaatmaa
adhyaasa. Only in the extent of the adhyaasa there is a disagreement
between different schools of philosophy. Hence aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is
possible and is there.

With this, the third and fourth of the six topics that is adhyaasa sha~Nkaa
samaadhaanam and adhyaasa sambhaavanaa are completed.
Next we will discuss adhyaasa pramaaNam.
-------------------------------------------------------For those who are studying with me, here are the questions in Chapter III up
to this point. Try to answer and cross check the answers with the notes.
Questions on IIIA&B
1. What are the four mahaavaakyaas that provide shruti pramaaNa for advaita?
2. What is adhyaasa? what is the source for any error? What is the
fundamental error? What is its importance?
3. Why Shankara says there is no path other than knowledge? How does the
knowledge solve the problem? What role the other paths play?
4. In the rope/snake adhyaasa - why it is called satya anRîta
mithuniikaraNam? What does that mean? And how is this definition applicable
to rope-snake adhyaasa?
5. How the above definition satya anRîta mithuniikaraNam applies to aatmaa
-anaatmaa case? How is that relevant to you and to everyone else?
6. What are the three definitions of adhyaasa?
7. List the four conditions for adhyaasa that the puurvapakshii presents to
dismiss the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. How they are applicable to the
rope-snake case but not to the aatmaa-anaatmaa case.
8. How does Shankara address each of the four requirements for adhyaasa
that the puurvapakshii presents?
9. Why Shankara brings anaadi and anirvachaniiyam to account for how the
very first experience of anaatmaa occurs?
10. Now a bonus question! anaadi or beginningless and anirvachaniiyam, the
inexplicable nature -are they valid answers to the problem or are they just
a clever way of escaping to answer the question? How do the other
aachaaryaas get out of the problem of answering the question of 'How did we
all got into this problem of bondage in the first place?' - Or to rephrase
it, how did this cycle of janma to karma to janma start in the first
place? Which explanation you think is more logical and why?
Msg #

Subject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA-IIID
Notes on Brahmasutra - IIID


my own teacher.
shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitam.h
----------------------------------------------------------------------3-10 adhyaasa pramaaNa - proofs for adhyaasa:
Now we take up the fifth topic - adhyaasa pramaaNa. What is the proof for
adhyaasa? It has already been stated that aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa is based
on shruti pramaaNa. puurvapakshii has no basis to question since he has
already accepted in his system of philosophy, the sthuulashariira adhyaasa,
error associated with the identification of aatmaa with the gross body, on
the basis of shruti only. There are two shruti based pramaaNa for adhyaasa;
one is called arthaapatti (postulate) pramaaNa and the other is called
shaastriiya anumaana (inference from shruti statements) pramaaNa.
arthaapatti, as discussed in Ch.II, is one of the six pramaaNa-s or means of
knowledge. It is a means of knowledge based on an idea, which is postulated
to explain an observed fact. For example, let us say, after I get up from
sleep, I see lot of water flooding all over the streets. Based on this
observed data, I postulate that last night, it must have rained heavily.
Since I had a sound sleep last night, I did not have any direct knowledge of
the rain. However I had to postulate that it rained last night to explain
the heavily flooded streets, particularly in Madras, where the drainage
system is very bad. Without postulating the last night rain, I cannot
explain the observed fact, the flooded roads. One can, of course, make a
different postulate, like for example, a 'miracle' must have occurred last
night. However, such a postulate is not agreeable to a rational intellect,
unless one first proves that the more probable cause, like rain, did not
happen. Since the observed fact can only be explained by postulating an
idea, that idea becomes a valid knowledge. Even though it is a postulated
idea, it is considered as valid knowledge or pramaaNa. Postulation is to
explain, as in the case of the rain, a pratyaksha anubhava, a directly
perceivable experience or a fact. Hence we can call this as pratyaksha
based, or direct observation based arthaapatti pramaaNa. But when we
postulate something to explain the shaastra or scriptures, then it is
scripture based arthaapatti pramaaNa. Shankaracharya points out that
adhyaasa or error is an idea postulated to explain the shruti statements.
adhyaasa is not directly mentioned in shruti. This does not imply that it
should be considered as Shankaracharya's imagination, just as the
postulation of last night rain to explain the flooded streets is not a
segment of my imagination. Hence adhyaasa should be considered as valid
knowledge, since it is postulated based on shruti pramaaNa. Some
philosophers, for example, Shri Madhvacharya, consider that arthaapatti
is only an extension of anumaana pramaaNa (see Ch. II), and not different
from it. That is not completely incorrect, since one can possibly come up
with a concomitant relationship or vyaapti vaakyam, such as in the case of
flooded streets that 'wherever there are flooded streets there must be

heavy rains'. But here the concomitant relation between the rains and the
flooded streets does not necessarily apply at the same time and place,
making it as a poor example of anumaana. One can have rains upstate
somewhere at a slightly different times resulting in flooded streets down
stream later. The fact remains, however, that a postulation in arthaapatti
can be a means of valid knowledge or pramaaNa.
Just as in the case of postulation of rains to explain the flooded streets,
arthaapatti can be used to show that 'kartRîtvam', doer-ship, bhoktRîtvam,
enjoyer-ship, and 'anityatvam', mortality, are all due to error. In
reality, I am neither a kartaa, a doer, a bhoktaa, an enjoyer and 'anityaa'
a mortal. For this we need to go to shruti pramaaNa, which tells me of a
particular fact -For example the above quoted shloka (Ref. IIIC)- 'hantaa
chenmanyate hantum .... ' is from shruti, kaThopanishad. In support of this
a very similar shloka also exists in Gita [II:19], where only the first line is
slightly different but with the same meaning.
ya enam vetti hantaaram yashchainaM manyate hatam.h |
ubhau tau na vijaaniito naaya.n hanti na hanyate ||
In this shloka it is very clearly implied that aatmaa is 'akartaa' and
'abhoktaa', neither a doer, nor an enjoyer. It says aatmaa is not a killer,
killing representing all the actions, and aatmaa does not get killed, thus
representing that it is not a bhoktaa or an enjoyer. Krishna also says:
'naiva ki~nchit karomiiti yukto manyeta tatvavit.h' (Ch.V:8), one who knows
the truth knows that one does not do any action. He knows that he is
'akartaa', non-doer. Also He says ' ....... naiva kurvan na kaarayan.h' (Ch.
V:13) - aatmaa does not do any thing nor instigate anyone to do. ' I am
never a doer', therefore, the statement that 'I am a doer' is an error.
Thus there is a veda pramaaNa as well as smRîti pramaaNa. A shloka from
Geeta (V:15) as provided before which shows that aatmaa does not take either
merits or demerits of anyone. There is also another statement in shruti
that say 'aatmaa' is 'nirvikaaraH' - it is changeless. If aatmaa is kartaa,
doer or bhoktaa, enjoyer, it will have to undergo a change, since
action/experience requires a change. Hence aatmaa can be neither a kartaa or
a bhoktaa. From this we postulate that 'I am a kartaa or doer' or 'I am an
enjoyer or bhoktaa' is an error. Thus by arthaapatti pramaaNa based on
shruti as well as smRîti we postulate that 'aham kartaa', 'I am doer' 'aham
bhoktaa', 'I am an enjoyer' are due to error or adhyaasa.
One may note that shruti based arthaapatti pramaaNa is used not only by
Shankara but also by other aastika daarshanika-s, such as saa~Nkhya-s,
nayyaayika-s, etc., when they agree that 'I am mortal' is an adhyaasa or an
error. Thus 'aatmaa anityatva adhyaasa', the error that self is mortal, is
based on 'aatmaa nityatva', the aatmaa is immortal, shruti statement and
hence it is shruti based arthaapatti pramaaNa. In contrast to other
darshanams, advaita postulates, based on shruti statements, that aatmaa
anityaH, aatmaa is mortal, is an error, kartRîtvam or doer-ship is an error
and bhoktRîtvam, enjoyer-ship is an error.
Similarly, the next superimposition is 'I am a knower' 'pramaatutvam' is
also error or adhyaasa. 'I am the consciousness' is not a superimposition
but 'I am a knower' is. It is again postulated based on shruti statement,
which clearly says that aatmaa is not a knower. aatmaa is GYaanam, knowledge,
but not a GYaataa or pramaataa, a knower. In Mandukya Upanishad it says
'naantaH praGYam, na bahishhpraGYam, na ubhayatah praGYam, na
praGYaanaghanam, na praGYam, naapraGYam' meaning that aatmaa is not waking knower (knower in the waking state, vishva GYaata),
aatmaa is not a dream-knower (taijasa GYaataa), aatmaa is not a sleep-knower (praaGYa GYaata).
aatmaa is pure consciousness. Hence Shankara says that 'I am a knower' is

also an adhyaasa or an error based on shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa.
All these adhyaasa-s, I am a doer, enjoyer, mortal, knower, etc., can also
be derived using another shruti statement. 'aatmaa nirvikaaraH', aatmaa is
changeless from the statement 'achchhedyoyam adaahyoyam avikaaryoyam uchyate' -this is indestructible, incombustible, and
changeless. If aatmaa is kartaa,
bhoktaa or pramaata, it becomes subject to change. To be a kartaa is to
undergo a modification. It is anubhava or an experience. Similarly to be
bhoktaa or pramaataa - these all involve anubhava or experience of doing,
enjoying, knowing etc. since they are all 'process' involving modification
of one's state from say aGYaata to GYaataa - state of being ignorant to
state of being knowledgeable, etc. In fact, in Sanskrit - any suffix 'taa'
as in bhoktaa, kartaa, GYaataa, etc. indicates a modification just as in
English the suffix 'er' after a verb - doer, enjoyer, knower, etc. involves
a modification. The suffix 'taa' or 'er' indicates an action, action
indicates a process and process indicates a modification or vikaara. But
shruti says 'aatmaa is nirvikaaraH' meaning aatmaa is not a kartaa, bhoktaa,
pramaata because 'nirvikaaratvaat', it is changeless. Thus from
'nirvikaara' shruti statement we can postulate that aatmaa is neither doer,
enjoyer, knower, etc. Since they do not belong to me, the self, then
kartRîtvam, doer-ship etc., are adhyaasa.
There is also a third method to show that these are adhyaasa based on
shruti. This is also indicated by Shankara in his adhyaasa bhaashhyam. Any
kartaa or doer has to be associated by a karaNam or an instrument. He
cannot be a doer otherwise. For example, 'mind' is antaH karaNam, inner
instrument. Similarly sense organs are baahya karaNam, external
instruments. Instruments like spectacles or pen, etc., are called
upakaraNam. Thus doer will be associated with a karaNam or instrument of
doing, similarly a bhoktaa, enjoyer will also be associated with a bhojana
karaNam, instruments of enjoyment. kartaa, bhoktaa, pramaataa - all have
association or 'sa~Nga' with instruments of action. Thus if I am a kartaa,
bhoktaa or pramaataa, 'I am sa+sa~NgaH' - one who has associated with an
instrument. However scripture says - 'asa~Ngo hi ayam purushaH' - that is
aatmaaa is not associated with anything. Hence aatmaa cannot be a kartaa,
bhoktaa or pramaata since to be a kartaa, etc., aatmaa has to get associated
with something other than aatmaa. Thus the shruti's statement that aatmaa is
detached or asa~NgaH, it is non-doer, non-enjoyer, non-knower, etc. Hence
kartRîtvam, bhoktRîtvam or pramaatRîtvam, doer-ship, enjoyer-ship,
knower-ship, etc., must be due to error or adhyaasa.
Next we consider another adhyaasa - parichchhinnatvam -"I am limited' - I am
here, and not elsewhere - that the notion of space-wise limitation is also
an adhyaasa. How is this postulated? This is because shruti clearly says,
aatmaa is anantam - limitless. If limitlessness is the nature of aatmaa, then
limitation is an error.
In kaThopanishad (I-3-15) it says:
ashabdam asparsham aruupam avyayam
tathaa arasam nityam agandhavach cha yat.h |
anaady anantam mahataH para.n dhruvam.h
nichaayya taM mRîtyumukhaat pramuchyate ||
aatmaa is beyond the five sense perceptions namely shabda, sparsha, ruupa,
rasa, gandha (sound, touch, form, taste, smell). It is eternal and
unlimited. Thus it is anaadi and anantam - beginningless and limitless.
One who knows that is beyond the sense of limitations and is eternal. Since
limitlessness is a fact, limitation must be an error - by shruti arthaapatti
pramaaNa. The limitlessness alone is called 'brahmatvam', infiniteness, and

limitation is 'jiivatvam', individuality. Brahmatvam is a fact and hence
jiivatvam is an error. Thus aham brahmaasmi is a fact and aham jiivo.asmi is
an a error or adhyaasa. Thus parichchhinnatvam or jiivatvam, limitation or
jiiva-hood is an error or adhyaasa based on shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa.
Last example, which is also important is 'anekatvam' or 'bahutvam' or
multiplicity of aatmaa, is also an error or adhyaasa. That is, that 'there
are not one aatmaa but many aatmaa-s, is also an error or adhyaasa. That
there are many aatmaa-s is accepted by many philosophers - saa~Nkhya, yoga,
vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa, and even those that give importance to
Vedanta such as vishishhTaadvaita and dvaita. They all say that there are
many aatmaa-s. Shankara says 'anekatvam', multiplicity, is also an error or
adhyaasa based on shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa. There are shruti statements
that says aatmaa is ekaH - single. Shvetashvatara Upanishad says:
eko devaH sarva-bhuuteshhu guuDhaH
sarvavyaapii sarva-bhuuta-antaraatmaa |
karmaadhyakshaH sarva-bhuutaadi-vaasaH
saakshii chetaa kevalo nirguNash cha ||
(this is very important mantra that Shankara quotes very often)
'eko devaH' and 'saakshii chetaa kevalaH' in the above sloka imply that
aatmaa is one only.
There is one indweller who is enlivening all beings hidden from all
perceptions, while being all-pervading as the inner self in all. He
presides over all actions and all beings reside in Him. He is the witness
and is pure consciousness free from all qualities or attributes.
yasmin sarvaaNi bhuutaani aatmaivaabhuud vijaanataH |
tatra ko mohaH kaH shokaH ekatvam anupashyataH || [Isha Upan. 7]
when the wise man sees everything is nothing but aatmaa alone as ekaH, then
where is the delusion or sorrow, when one does not see anything other than
oneself - emphasizing singularity in statement 'aatmaa ekah eva abhuut.h'.
Since aatmaa ekatvam or is single, is a fact then aatmaa anekatvam, that there
are many aatmaa-s, must be an error or adhyaasa.
Thus shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa, Shankara shows that 'anityatvam
(mortality), kartRîtvam (doer-ship), bhoktRîtvam (enjoyer-ship),
pramaatRîtvam (knower-ship), parichchhinnatvam (limitedness), and anekatvam
(multipleness) - are all due to adhyaasa.
So far we have discussed one pramaaNa - that is shruti arthaapatti pramaaNa
for adhyaasa. Now we will discuss the anumaana pramaaNa for adhyaasa.
In Ch. II we have discussed in detail the technical aspects involving what
is anumaana pramaaNa, the four factors that are involved, and its relation
to vyaapti vaakyam or statement of concomitant or coexistent relation
between hetu and saadhya. The famous example is 'yatra yatra dhuumaH,
tatra tatra agniH', wherever there is a smoke there is a fire'. This
relation is required to establish the inferential statement, anumaana
vaakyam - 'parvatah agnimaan dhumavatvaaat yathaa mahaanase', the mountain
is fiery, because it is smoky, just as in the kitchen.
Hence to prove adhyaasa using anumaana, we need vyapti vaakyam or statement
of concomitant relation. We can express Shankara's analysis for adhyaasa in
vyapti vaakyam form as 'yatra yatra vyavahaaravatvam tatra tatra
adhyaasavatvam' 'wherever there is transaction there is adhyaasa. Any
transaction proves adhyaasa or error. Why? Shankara says 'aatmaa cannot do
any transaction' because aatmaa is different from the body, which is accepted
by all the 'aastika darshanam-s'. An example, Shankara gives for this

anumaana is 'pashu aadi vyavahaaravat' -just the transactions of a cow and
other animals. 'pashvaadibhischa avisheshhaat' is the statement in the
bhaashhya. When we are chasing a cow or showing fresh green grass to a cow,
the cow comes towards the grass - why does it come towards the grass?
Because the cow has the notion that 'I am the body, I am hungry and the
grass is tasty treat for me'. Only cow comes towards the grass because it
has the notion or error that 'I am this body'. In motivating the action,
the cow may think, "I am hungry and grass will remove the hunger, and the
fellow seems to be a nice guy offering me tasty grass". Because of deha
adhyaasa only (error or notion that I am the body), the cow comes towards
the grass. This is called pravRîtti vyavahaara or going after for some
thing conducive to one's happiness. This cannot happen without the deha
adhyaasa. Shankara gives another example - if the same person drops the
grass and takes a stick, a cow realizes that this person is worse than any
brute that I know off, not dependable. It is true, beasts are more
trustworthy and predictable than humans, and there is a danger involved in
staying here - making such an inference the cow goes away from him - this is
called 'nivRîtti vyavahaara', going away form things that cause
unhappiness. This is again due to 'deha adhyaasa', because of the notion
that I am the body. The person is going to beat with the stick only the
sthuula shariiram, gross physical body and not the suukshma shariiram,
subtle body. - thus there is a sthuula shariira adhyaasa error that I am
this gross body. Hence both pravRîtti and nivRîtti vyavahaara takes place
only because of adhyaasa or error. Hence the study of the behavior of the
cow, provides an example or dRîshhTaanta for vyaapti GYaanam. 'pashu aadi
vyavahaaravat' - just as the transactions of the cow and other animals,
particularly since the behavior of humans is not different from animals. He
goes after something he likes, pravRîtti vyavahaara and he goes away from
things he dislikes, nivRîtti vyavahaara. Hence we can express the
statement of anumaana in our standard format - manushhyaH adhyaasavaan
vyavahaaravatvaat, yathaa pashuvat - similar to our familiar statement parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat, yathaa mahaanase. manushhyaH is paksha,
adhyaasavaan is the saadhyam, hetu is vyavahaaravatvaat and pashuvat is the
dRîshhTanta.
Hence Shankara says all human activities are based on adhyaasa or error
since all activities can be considered as either pravRîtti going after or
nivRîtti or going away. Hence all human beings have got this adhyaasa.
This is the second pramaaNa for adhyaasa. Thus Shankara provides two types
of pramaaNa for adhyaasa.
With this adhyaasa pramaaNa section is also completed.
Next we will take up the concluding section of adhyaasa in terms of its
implication in human life. That constitutes the last section on adhyaasa.
Questions on Section IIID.
1. What are the two types of proofs Shankara provides for the adhyaasa?
How do the arthaapatti and anumaana serve as pramaaNa or means of knowledge?
2. How does Shankara prove each one of the following is an adhyaasa or an
error: 1.'I am a doer', 2. 'I am an enjoyer', 3. ' I am knower' 4. 'I am
limited', 5.'I am one of many aatmaa-s' etc.
3. How does Shankara prove that any vyavahaara or transaction involves an
error or adhyaasa.
End of Section IIID.

Msg #

Date: Fri Sep 29, 2000 2:37pm
Subject: NOTES ON BRAHMASUUTRA IIIE

my own teacher.
shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitam.h
----------------------------------------------------------------Notes on Brahmasutra IIIE
It should be understood from the analysis presented so far that in all our
transactions, we all have this problem of adhyaasa or error involving
aatmaa-anaatmaa mithuniikaraNam - satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam - mixing up of real and unreal or aatmaa and anaatmaa. In should
be recognized that we have
one unitary experience, but unaware that in that unitary experience, we are
mixing two things in all our transactions. This is exactly like the fellow,
who mistakes that there is a snake, is not aware of the fact that he is
mixing two things; a real rope as an existent entity and an unreal snake.
In his vision there is one single entity or unitary experience that it is a
snake. So when I say 'aham jaanaami', 'I know' it looks like there is one
single entity, knower. But upon analysis there is mixing up of 'chetana
aatmaa' conscious self and 'achetana vRîtti', inert thoughts are involved.
Hence Shankara says in Atmabodha:
aatmanaH sachchida.nshashcha buddher vRîttiriti dvayam.h |
sa.nyojya cha avivekena jaanaami iti pravartate ||
Thus in 'aham jaanaami' - I know - there is 'aatmaanaH sat and chit a.nshaH',
that is 'I am existent and conscious entity' is involved. At the same time
'vRitti', a thought process, in the intellect is involved. The changeless
chit and sat belong to aatmaa and changing vRîtti belongs to anaatmaa- these
two get mixed together, forming into one entity leaving me with the notion
that 'I am the knower'.
Thus we transact all the time, due to the notions about ourselves, based on
adhyaasa. In the same text, Shankara says:
aatmano vikRîyaa naasti buddherbodho na jaatviti |
jiivaH sarvamalam Gyaatvaa GYaataa drashhTeti muhyati ||
aatmaa cannot be a knower since it cannot go through the knowing process

(since it is 'avikaaraH', changeless), anaatmaa cannot be a knower because it
is jaDam or inert. Then we create a new entity by combining aatmaa and
anaatmaa, and thus, a 'knower' is born. Thus, there is a mix-up of aatmaa and
anaatmaa - satya asatya mithuniikaraNam, real and unreal parts into one
single unitary experience.
Thus adhyaasa pramaaNa proves that there is satyaanRîta mithuniikaraNam
resulting in adhyaasa.
3-11 adhyaasa upasa.nhaaraH - Conclusion of adhyaasa bhaashhyam:
In this last topic, Shankara says we are interested in this adhyaasa, not
for an academic interest, but for our own evolution, because adhyaasa is
harmful to the entire humanity, since adhyaasa alone brings in the notion
that I am 'anityaH' or mortal. Therefore, because of this adhyaasa, there
is a constant fear of death, and this fear in turn results into constant
insecurity. Hence wealth becomes very important in life, since we have a
strong notion that wealth brings some security - food on a plate to eat, a
shelter above my head etc., through the wealth. But the fact of the matter
is wealth only provides comforts and one can be comfortably insecure, since
the basic insecurity does not go away even if one has any amount of money.
The famous example is the terminal life of multi billionaire -Howard Hughes
of the fifties. Thus because of adhyaasa only there is sa.nsaara. Since
adhyaasa leads to pravRîtti and nivRîtti vyavahaara, we go after things or
try to get rid of things. Because of the adhyaasa 'that I am limited', I go
after for all those things that I like, to remove my limitations. Hence all
types of actions, vyavahaara, are due to adhyaasa alone. These actions
produce merits and demerits or puNya and paapa phalam. These, in turn,
result in re-birth, thus cycle of birth and death. Thus adhyaasa propels
one to action, karma, and karma leads to janma, birth. All karma-s are
based on this error. This includes both laukika karma or worldly actions
and vaidika karma or alaukika karma, or scriptural sanctioned actions, since
both involve the notion of kartRîtva bhaava or the notion of doer-ship. To
put it another way around, because of this adhyaasa alone, all the karma-s
originate. Because of laukika and vaidika karma-s, worldly and ritualistic
actions, one reaps different results. The laukika karma-s, the worldly
actions, produce dRîshhTa phalam or tangible results and vaidika karma-s
produce adRîshhTa phalam or intangible results. Because of this the cycle
of birth and death, there is the associated suffering involving janma,
jaraa, vyaadhi, duHkha, birth, old-age, disease and suffering, etc.
If we want to get rid of sa.nsaara, we need to get over the adhyaasa or
committing the error. Only remedy to sa.nsaara is adhyaasa nivRîtti. How
does adhyaasa go away? - Only by eliminating the cause of adhyaasa. Cause
for adhyaasa is aGYaanam or ignorance. Ignorance will go away only with
knowledge - hence athaato brahma jiGYaasaa - inquiry into the nature of
Brahman.
This adhyaasa occurs at various levels. The first adhyaasa is that 'ahaM
pramaataa' or I am a knower' caused by the mixing up of aatmaa and the antaH
karaNam, mind and intellect. Through the mind, the error, as if, flows down
to sense organ level. At that level, there is further mixing up I and the
sense organs resulting in the second level of adhyaasa. For example, if I
say 'I am blind' - the problem of the sense organ is super imposed on aatmaa.
Through the sense organs the error further flows down to the level of the
body - ahaM purushhaH, aham strii, aham sthuulaH, aham vRîddhaH, I am a man, woman, fat, old, etc. The properties of the
upaadhii-s, equipments, are
taken as my property by the superimposition on aatmaa. aatmaa in principle is

naiva strii na pumaan eshha na chaivaayam napu.nsakaH |
yadyat shariiram aadatte tena tena sa rakshyate ||
as stated in shvetaashvatara upanishhad V-10. He is neither female, nor
male, nor neuter. Whatever body he assumes he becomes identified with that.
This is further echoed as:
na asat na sat na sat asat na mahat na jaanuu |
na strii pumaan naja napu.nsakam eka-biijam.h ||
I am neither non-existent ( from aatmaa a.nsha) nor existent (from anaatmaa
a.nsha), neither existent and non-existent (mixture of both aatmaa and
anaatmaa), neither female nor male nor neuter - I am none of these - those
properties of the body are superimposed on the self and properties of the
self are superimposed on the non-self - all due to adhyaasa. Just like the
long, curved, poisonous, fearful snake, where there is only a rope.
Through the physical body, the adhyaasa goes to surrounding environment.
Through the body I get relationships with all types of people - father,
mother, brother, uncle, grand father etc.,. etc. In this process, one
develops aha~Nkaara adhyaasa and mamaakaara adhyaasa, I-ness and my-ness in
the upaadhiis or equipments and the surroundings. Really speaking aatmaa
being asa~NgaH with no associations, it is relation-less. But because of
this adhyaasa, the roots of sa.nsaara spread all over - Krishna comparing the
sa.nsaara as an ashvattha or peepal tree says (15-2):
adhashchordhvaM prasRîtaastasya shaakhaaH
guNapravRîddhaa vishhayapravaalaaH |
adhashcha muulaani anusantataani
karmaanubandhiini manushhyaloke ||
Its branches extend both above and below, nourished by guNa-s they indulge
in sense objects. Their secondary roots extend downwards resulting in
actions that bind the human beings. The root of sa.nsaara spreads all over
the world - some even to America - families spreading from east coast to
west coast.
One has to work for the removal of adhyaasa. How does adhyaasa start?
adhyaasa is born of ignorance - since the error is centered on the self 'I',
and therefore the self-error is born out of self-ignorance. It is not
ignorance of any thing or any subject - That is why any amount of removal of
other ignorance such as the ignorance of chemistry, physics, etc. will not
remove the self ignorance. In spite of all the degrees that can be attached
to the name, he will be only an educated sa.nsaari or an erudite sa.nsaari
since he has gained an anaatmaa GYaanam which cannot remove sa.nsaara.
Instead of being an unintelligent fool, I will be an intelligent fool.
sa.nsaara can only be removed by aatmaa GYaanam, since we have an error with
regard to aatmaa. That is the reason in Ch. U. in the seventh chapter known
as bhuumaa vidya, we find Naarada approaching Shri Sanatkumara to learn
Brahma vidya. Narada gives a long list of degrees he has so far received.
He has a Ph.D. in every subject possible in this world. But then he says in
the end: so.aham bhagavan shochaami- 'I am still suffering'. Sanatkumara says
'tarati shokam aatmavit' grief can go away only by self-knowledge. Hence
Shankara says 'aatmaa ekatva vidyaa pratipattaye sarve vedaantaaH
Aarabhyante | asyaaH anartha hetoH prahaanaaya |' all the Upanishads begin
with an intention of giving only, the knowledge of aatmaa or knowledge of
oneself alone removes the suffering resulting from adhyaasa. In Mundaka
Upanishad - the student approaches the teacher, realizing that no amount of
objective knowledge is making him wiser, asks the teacher - 'kasminnu bhagavo

viGYaate sarvam idam viGYaatam bhavati' - 'Oh bhagavan, please teach me
that knowledge, knowing which everything of 'this' is known. The teacher
teaches him self-knowledge which makes him realize that he is the very
essence of all knowledge. He is the very GYaanam in all GYeyam.
When we say aatma GYaanam, self knowledge, has to be gained to remove aatmaa
aGYaanam, self ignorance, one point has to be noted. We already have
partial knowledge or partial ignorance of the adhishThaanam, the substratum.
It is not total ignorance. Remember, if the rope is totally not seen there
will not be an error. There is a partial knowledge that 'there is' - some
object is there, the satya a.nsha or real part. Only the ignorance is about
the visheshha a.nsha or 'rope-ness' of the object. Similarly the self-error
is because of partial ignorance. I know 'aham asmi' - the sat part is
known and the chit part is known. What is not known is "aham brahma asmi'
or brahmatva a.nsha is not known. The Brahman feature or Brahmanhood or
Brahman status of mine is not known. Thus whenever we say Brahma GYaanam it
is not that we are going to know a new thing called 'Brahman', it is knowing
the Brahman status of mine. We are only knowing the full real status of
'I'. Hence 'Brahma GYaanam means 'aatmanaH brahmatva GYaana' the knowledge of my real status as Brahman. When the real status
is not known, a false
status is taken up as real that is my jiivatva status. Hence what is
required is a self-correction involving knowing my Brahman status and in the
process displacing my jiivatva status. Hence 'athaato brahma jiGYaasaa'
therefore inquiry into the nature of myself as Brahman - athaataH aatmanaH
brahmatva jiGYaasaa - I should learn my own superior status as Brahman. For
this purpose alone all the Upanishads begin teaching. This is the
difference between vedaanta shaastra and all other shaastra or sciences. All
other shaastra-s take our inferior status as a fact. Then they prescribe
the methods of improving the status. Some religions follow the same
methodology. They start with the statement that we are sinners. Only a
sage of the Upanishad screams at the top of his voice - 'shruNvantu vishve
amRîtasya putraaH' addressing all of us as 'Listen you all, Oh! Sons of
Immortality!' implying that immortality is our birth right! He even dares
to address the Gods in the Heavens - 'ayo dhaamaani divyaani santi - you
too the indwellers of the heavens!' That is the goal of Vedanta - to make
us inherit our own true divine nature. We waste our whole life in
working to improve our status symbol. Even the karmakaanDa is promoting
this status enhancement assuming an inferior status of us as a fact. All
sciences take the view that our inferior status as a fact. Only Vedanta
raises the very fundamental question- whether this, my present inferior
status, is a fact or a presumption on my part. Upanishads instigate us to
inquire saying that you do not have to work for improving your status. You
as you are 'a nitya shuddha budhha mukta swabhaavaH' -you are eternal, pure,
free from any limitations- there is no competitor for you since you are
ekaH, one without a second. It is not an image building but for removal of
superimposed low image. This is done by instigating us to inquire into the
nature of Brahman - which is the nature of our own self - athaato brahma
jiGYaasaa - to remove the superimposed error or misunderstanding on our part
by correct understanding of our own nature. Hence the inquiry into the
nature of Brahman.
This ends the essence of adhyaasa bhaasya.
3.12 Further questions on adhyaasa:
Here we will briefly mention couple of important objections raised by the
post-Shankara philosophers, that are relevant to adhyaasa. These include
from vishishhTaadvaita school, Shri Ramanuja and Shri Vedanta Deshika;
and from Dvaita school Shri Madhvacharya, Shri Jayatirtha and Shri

Vyasatirtha. There were also several advaitin masters who addressed these
issues. These include Shri Harsha, Shri Vidyaranya, Shri Citsukha, and
Shri Madhusudana Saraswati. These are only few names but in reality there
were many more involving arguments and counter arguments. These in fact
helped in crystallizing the concepts for each school of philosophy. We will
mention couple of objections that were raised and we will address them once
we complete the Shankara Bhashya.
1. Who or what is the locus of avidya?
According to Shankara, adhyaasa or error is due to ignorance and error
involves mixing up of satya a.nsha as in 'I am' and asatya a.nsha as in 'a
sa.nsaari'. This is the jiiva who consists of a mixture of real part of the
statement ' I am' or aham which implies that I am sat and chit, and unreal
part 'a parichchhinnaH' a limited entity, or jiiva asmi. My true nature is
aham brahma asmi. This error occurred because I am ignorant of my true
nature that is aham brahma asmi. Now Ramanuja asks - there has to be a
locus for avidya and what or who is that locus? That is who has this avidya
or ignorance - jiiva or Brahman? Brahman cannot be the locus because (1)
that will make Brahman ignorant, in which case He cannot be Brahman any
more, (2) If ignorance rests with Brahman then ignorance is as real as
Brahman and now we have two real entities, Brahman and ignorance and that
violates the advaita principles of non-dual nature of Brahman as well as his
nirguNatvam, since He has ignorance. Lastly 3) Brahman is of the nature of
light and ignorance of the nature of darkness and are diagonally opposite to
each other, and therefore cannot exist together. Thus Brahman is the locus
of ignorance is unacceptable. On the other hand jiiva cannot be the locus
of avidya since jiiva is the product of avidya. That is, the status of
jiiva or jiivatvam arose because of the presence of avidya. That implies
jiiva status comes after avidyaa. That is avidyaa existed even before
jiiva-hood arose. Hence jiiva cannot be the locus of avidyaa. Ignorance is
not an independent entity to exist without any locus. Therefore we conclude
that Advaitic concept of avidya is wrong. Hence there is a fundamental
problem in the doctrine of Advaita based on adhyaasa as the cause for jiiva.
2. Ontological status of pramaaNa:
The next important issue is related to Veda-s as pramaaNa. Shankara says
ignorance can only go with the knowledge of Brahman and the source of the
knowledge for Brahman is Veda-s which are apaurushheya. Hence the inquiry
into the nature of Brahman as stated in Brahmasutra. But in the discussion
of adhyaasa, the satya a.nsha is only 'aham' or 'I am' and any other is only
a superimposition of unreal on the real. This include all idam vastu-s or
all that can be identified as idam or 'this' - These are not real and are
superimposition on Brahman. Then the question is, are Veda-s real or
unreal?. If Veda-s are real like Brahman then we have duality, Brahman and
Veda-s and that violates the Advaita doctrine which states that Brahman is
one without a second. If Veda-s are unreal then how can the unreal pramaaNa
provide a knowledge of the reality? False books cannot teach us about real
science! If Veda-s are unreal and such unreal texts are pramaaNa, the
knowledge that they provide will also be apramaa or bhrama. Hence there is
no use of inquiry of Brahman using invalid tools. In addition as per
Advaitin, if Veda-s are considered as unreal, similar to the world which is
considered as unreal, then Advaita cannot claim as aastika system of
philosophy. It should be considered as naastika system similar to Budhhism.
In fact they are more parallel to Buddhism, with nirguNa Brahman, which
cannot described by any means, since all descriptions presuppose guNa-s.
Brahman is as good as 'shuunyam', which cannot be described since there is
nothing to describe it.

Thus there are many questions raised against Advaita doctrine and Shri
Vedanta Deshika has written a book with the title a 'shataduushaNii',
hundred objections to advaita. We will address some of these later but it
is suffice at this stage to know that philosophical discussions were kept
alive. These discussions and counter discussion are back bone of our
culture, and inquiry into the nature of reality is there at the time of Veda
Vyasa, at the time of Shankara and even now with advancement of science
and technology, as in the advaitin list serve! These discussions are not
necessarily for convincing somebody else, but at least for convincing the
discussor himself. Otherwise there will be 'vyabhicaara doshha' - a vagrant
mind uncertain about what the goal is.
Now, those who want to venture into the discussion of the above issues may
do so. But for the time being we will formally end here the adhyaasa
bhaashhyam and we will next take up Shankara's Brahmasutra Bhashya.
When and if the time permits we will come back later to address the above
issues.
This completes the Notes on adhyaasa bhaashhyam. With this introduction,
Shankara takes up the suutra bhaashhyam. adhyaasa bhaashhyam forms the back
bone for the entire analysis of the suutras and hence its importance need
not be emphasized. This section should be thoroughly studied not only from
the point of its contents but also from the point of its implications in
terms of our day to day life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------We will start the notes with discussion of Sutra 1, after three weeks.
This will give some time to contemplate on the contents discussed so far.
Message 6566
From: Kuntimaddi Sadananda <k_sadananda@hotmail.com>
Date: Mon Oct 23, 2000 12:58pm
Subject: Notes on Brahmasuutra-I-i-1-1
Notes on Brahmasutra IV
(Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1A)

auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all the way up to
my own teacher.
vaatsalya ruupa.n triguNairatiitaM
aananda saandram amalairnidhaanam.h .|
shrii chinmayaananda guro praNiitaM
the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I
(sadaa) always prostrate.
--------------------------------------------------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada- i
jij~naasaa adhikaraNa 1
suutra 1: athaato brahma jij~naasaa

( A note for the readers: The discussion is done very elaborately and some
parts are somewhat technical and some are rather general. One could have
condensed the notes avoiding subtle technical points, and emphasize only its
essential aspects. In that process we could miss a lot. Even if one finds
some redundancy, I feel it is important to go through the arguments and
counter arguments to be familiar with the logic and the depth to which the
analysis was done by Shankara Bhagavat paada before one studies criticisms
of Shankara Bhaashhyam by other bhaashhyakaara-s. References to shruti's
statements and some sloka-s are incomplete and any help in completing the
references are most welcome. As stated in the beginning, the notes follow
closely the lectures of H.H. Swami Paramaarthaanandaji of Chennai. I am
deeply indebted to him.
Notes Designation: While the Bhaashhyam is discussed under chapter IV - to
follow which suutra we are discussing, from now on, we will use the
following designation - For example for sutra 1 we use the designation as
I-i-1-1. The first Roman number designates that it is first of the four
adhyaaya-s, the second lower case Roman number designates that it is first
paada of the adhyaaya, the third number designates that it is the first
adhikaraNa and last number designates the suutra in that adhikaraNa. Since
the suutra will be discussed in more than one post, we will use the letter
designations A ,B, C, etc., to the suutra number for easy identification
during discussions. Following this notation this post is designated as
Notes BSB-I-i-1-1A)
This is the first adhyaaya called samanvaya meaning consistency. The
significance of samanvaya will be discussed later. The first paada in this
adhyaaya has a big name and is called 'spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya
samanvaya paada'. The significance of this title will also be discussed
later. Each adhikaraNam or topic is also given a name. The name of the
topic will be based on the first suutra in that adhikaraNa. The first
adhikaraNa is called jij~naasaa adhikaraNam, based on the first suutra athaato brahma jij~naasaa. The number of suutra-s in a topic can vary from
one to many, and in this very first adhikaraNa, there is only one suutra.
From now on in the study of each suutra, we will strictly follow a
three-step procedure: First, a general analysis of the suutra will be
provided. Second, the word analysis of the suutra is done
taking each word in the order it is given in the suutra. And finally, a
conclusion of the suutra is provided bringing out any special aspects
involved.
1. General Analysis of the first suutra:
This suutra happens to be an introduction to vedaanta shaastram, or
Brahmavidya. This is like upodghaata or anubandha or preface to the text,
which is required for every shaastram. This suutra cannot be considered as
out side the text nor inside the text - it is
the connecting link to the outside and the inside like a door of a house.
Hence it is called anubandhaH, a pre-appendix, attached to the shaastra as
an integral part but not part of the shaastra, similar to the first chapter
of Geeta. The shaastra begins from the second
suutra only just as Geeta starts with the second chapter.
2 The content of the suutra:
According to our tradition for any shaastra, the introductory shloka should
discuss four-fold factors called anubandha chatushhTayam. (These four

factors, anubandha chatushhTayam, should not be confused with the four-fold
qualifications, saadhana chatushhTayam, required for a seeker. These two
chatushhTayam-s will be discussed with reference to this suutra, and the
reader should be aware of the difference between the two). This anubandha
chatushhTayam is stated simply in a sloka form as:
adhikaariishcha vishhayaH sambandhashcha prayojanam.h |
shaastraarambha phalaM proktam anubandha chatushhTayam.h ||
The shloka just provides the list of the four factors that constitute the
anubandha chatushhTayam. The first suutra or shloka in a text should
present these four factors. The four factors are: 1. adhikaarii - or
qualified student - who is qualified to study the text,
here the Brahmasuutra-s? 2. The second factor is vishhayah - the subject
matter. 3 The third one is 'prayojanam'- what is the benefit of studying
the suutra-s? and 4 the fourth is the sambandhaH, the relationship. This is
similar to preface in a textbook, where the
author discusses to whom the text is written, the contents and the benefit.
For the study of Brahmasuutra, who is the adhikaari or qualified student?
Shankara says the one who has saadhana chatushhTayam or the one who has the
four-fold qualifications is the adhikaari or the qualified student. Nowhere
in the ten upanishhads one can find
directly mentioning of saadhana chatushhTayam as qualifications. How did
Sankara come up with these four-fold qualifications? - It is based on
Brahmasuutra only. On that basis he wrote Tattvabodha which defines these
four-fold qualifications. All other prakarana grantha-s contain an
elaborate discussion of these. The four-fold qualifications are 1. viveka,
discrimination to remove the superimposed error or adhyaasa, 2. vairaagyam
or dispassion - considering all other pursuits to be subservient to this
main pursuit, which is the removal of adhyaasa, 3. shaTka sampattiH - the
six-fold inner discipline: (a) shama, mind control, (b) dama, sense
control, (c) uparama, reduction of extrovertedness (withdrawal), (d)
titikshaa, forbearance (capacity to ignore discomforts in life), (e)
shraddhaa, faith in guru, scriptures and God and (f) samaadhaanam
(concentration) or commitment to the goal. and 4. mumukshutvam or desire
for moksha. The benefit of having these four-fold qualification is to be
qualified to the study of Brahmasuutra - He is the adhikaarii or a
qualified student.
The second factor that should be provided in the introduction - it is
vishhayaH, the subject matter. For Brahmasuutra as the name shows Brahman is
the subject matter of the suutra-s. It has to be understood from advaitin's
point that when we use Brahman, we are not using Brahman as a new substance,
which is revealed by Vedanta. Brahman is the new status of the student or
the listener or the aatma. It is not a new thing but my own higher status,
paraa prakRîti. Thus whenever we talk about Brahman it should be understood
as aatmanaH brahmatvam, the brahman status of my own self is the subject
matter.
The third factor is prayojanam - What benefit do I get for studying Vedanata
shaastra through Brahmasuutra? When I know the Brahman status of mine, the
benefit is that I will negate the abrahman or non-Brahman status of mine,
which is due to error. For example, when I come to know that 'this is a
rope', what benefit I have of knowing the 'ropeness'? In the process of
knowing that 'this is a rope', the prior misconception that 'this is a
snake' goes away or displaced by the knowledge of the truth of the object.
Thus 'ropeness' knowledge displaces the prior 'snakeness' misconception.
It is replaced only because it is a misconception and not real knowledge. If

it is real, it will not be replaced. Similarly 'Brahmatvam' knowledge (the
knowledge of Brahmatvam status of mine) displaces the 'jiivatvam' (the
knowledge of jiivatvam status of mine) misconception. This is stated simply
as "brahmatva j~naanena jiivatva nivRîttiH prayojanam |" Jiivatva is the
same as samsaara. samsaara nivRîtti is otherwise called moksha or
liberation. Moksha is the freedom from the sense of limitation, sense of
smallness or sense of inadequacy.
The fourth factor is sambandha or relationship. The immediate question that
arises is relation between what and what? In this context, the relationship
is between the textbook and the subject matter. We call the relationship as
'pratipaadya pratipaadaka sambandhaH' (a poor translation of this is
object-subject relationship) - Brahman and Brahmasuutra have got the
pratipaadya pratipaadaka sambandha - It is a technical factor and can be
understood as follows. There is a rule that a topic can be considered as a
subject matter of a book only if the topic is discussed as the central theme
of the book. If the topic is discussed casually as a side-subject, it cannot
be taken as the central theme of the book. For example in the Bhagavad
Geeta there is a discussion on one's diet. From that we cannot say 'diet'
is the subject mater of the Geeta. Since diet is not the central theme,
Geeta and the diet do not have pratipaadya pratipaadaka sambandha. Then what
is the central theme of Geeta? One can say aatma vidyaa or Brahmavidya is
the central theme. This is explicitly stated at the end of each chapter;
brahmavidyaayaa.n yogashaastre shrii krishhNaarujana sa.nvaade..., etc. With
Geeta, Brahmavidya has pratipaadya-pratipaadaka sambandha. This may be
translated into English as revealer-revealed relationship. This aspect
becomes more clear when one discusses the various arguments in terms of what
is the central theme of Brahmasuutra.
As mentioned above the anubandha chatushhTayam, the four fold-factors, are
required for any text as the contents of its introductory sloka. But this
anubandha chatushhTayam is not directly revealed by the first suutra. In the
first suutra that says - 'athaato brahma jij~naasaa', there is no direct
mention of adhikaarii etc., in the suutra. Hence the anubandha chatushhTayam
is not the direct meaning of the suutra but it is only an implied meaning of
the suutra. This is called in Sanskrit 'aarthika arthaH' or indirect or
implied meaning. If so, then what is the direct meaning of the suutra?
The direct meaning of the suutra, 'athaato brahma jij~naasaa', is
'thereafter, therefore, Brahman inquiry (should be done)'. Incidentally we
should be aware that Shree Vyaasaachaarya is not discussing a new
philosophy, unlike saankhya, nyaaya, vaisheshhika etc., wherein the authors
are propounding a new system of philosophy. Vyaasa's aim is to extract the
philosophy, which is contained in the Upanishads. Hence whenVyaasaachaarya
writes a suutra, he has got some Upanishhad mantra-s or sloka-s in his mind.
To understand the right meaning of the suutra, we should know what is the
upanishhadic mantra-s he had in his mind. Then only we will know what is
the import of the suutra. This is very much required here since suutra
happens to be a very cryptic statement. So when we study a suutra, we
should be aware of what upanishhadic statement Vyaasaachaarya had in his
mind in formulating the suutra. That relevant upanishhadic statement
pertaining to a given suutra is called 'vishhaya vaakyam'. Hence every
suutra must have a vishhaya vaakyam. Unfortunately Vyaasaachaarya does not
say what is the vishhaya vaakyam of a given suutra. It becomes important,
therefore to take the help of commentators. Without bhaashhyam one cannot
know the vishhaya vaakyam-s of many suutra-s. Fortunately Bhagavaan
Shankara has laid a royal path for us to follow suutra-s closely in
conjunction with the advaitic interpretation. How did Shankara knew the
vishhaya vaakyam or relevant upanishhadic statements? He claims that he

learned from his teacher, and who in turn learned from his teacher, etc., thus a guruparampara traced all the way to Vyaasaachaarya. Hence the
invocation of the lineage of teachers at the very beginning of each notes.
A teacher of sampradaaya is emphasized in Vedanta.
On that basis, what is the vishhaya vaakya for suutra one? There are three
Upanishhadic sentences on which this suutra is based: 1. First and the
foremost one is from taittiriiya upanishad 3-1. 'tad vijij~naasaasva' based
on which Brahmasuutra says 'athaa to brahma jij~naasaa'. In that
Upanishad, the student 'bhRîgu' is being told by his teacher, VaruNa, that
he should know or conduct Brahman inquiry, if he wants peace, or fulfillment
and security, which are the basic needs of anyone's life. If the problems
in life are to be eliminated or samsaara to be removed, the teacher says,
know Brahman or inquire into the nature of Brahman. In the Upanishhad, the
statement is in imperative mood - vijij~naasasva - 'you should know' indicating that there is no other alternative to solve the problem at hand
than knowledge of Brahman. People say in Kaliyuga it is very difficult to
follow any yoga, and it is enough to chant the name of the Lord - naama
sa.nkiirthanam and that will take one beyond the ocean of samsaara. Here
VaruNa in the Upanishad and Vyaasa in Brahmasuutra are very specific. One
should know Brahman or one should inquire into the nature of Brahman. Hence
'chanting of the name of the Lord' may be helpful to quiten the mind so
that Brahman inquiry can be done - It is the preparatory to the knowledge
and hence for Moksha, but it is not the primary means or sufficient means
to gain the knowledge required for Moksha. Upanishhad makes it very clear
that if one wants Moksha - tad vijij~naasasva, 'you should know Brahman'.
Nowhere in the Upanishad it says that this is only relevant in kRîta or
tretaa or dvaapara yuga-s but in a kaliyuga, knowledge is not required and
chanting is enough or one can get liberated with some kunDalini raising,
etc. Upanishhad does not specify any specific yuga or time or place. From
this it is very clear that irrespective of what yuga it is - for liberation
j~naanam is the only means since problem is centered on adhyaasa or error
which is based on ignorance. From this it is clear the Brahmasuutras and the
Vedanta teaching that it points out are eternally true since they talk
about eternal knowledge and not temporal or relative knowledge.
The second vishhaya vaakyam is from Chandogya Upanishad 8-7-1. '...saH
vijij~naasitavyaH ...' Here also .'..tavyaH' is an imperative statement
implying that 'you have to know' - no short cuts. It is similar to that of
taittiriiya statement. Only difference is in T.U. the word 'tat' is in
neuter gender and in Ch. U. it is 'saH' in masculine gender - tat refers to
Brahman and saH refers to paramaatma, both are one and the same, from the
point of the seeker - sat chit aananda swaruupam.
The third vishhaya vaakyam is from Brihadaaranyaka Upanishhad 2-4-5. This
occurs in the famous Maitreyii Braahmanam where sage-husband YaJNavalkya
while teaching his wife Maitreyi provides a long discourse with the central
theme that 'aatmanastu kamaaya sarvam priyam bhavati', giving a big list
saying that nobody loves anybody. Everybody loves oneself alone. Hence
'self' alone is the object of love and since everybody loves only that which
is the source of maximum happiness, 'self' alone is the ananda swaruupaH happiness or bliss itself. Whatever is the object of love is of the nature
of ananda or happiness. Upanishhad says 'aatma alone is loved by everyone'.
How do we know that? When crucial things come we are ready to drop one by
one for the sake of oneself. A person disowns his own children, the moment
the child disobeys him. Husband disowns wife, wife disowns husband. Both
owning and disowning are only for one's happiness. What one is longing for
is one's happiness and Upanishhad says that happiness is one's own self.
Hence discovering eternal happiness requires self-discovery. Having

presented this elaborately YaaJNavalkya tells his wife Maitreyi 'aatmaa vaa
are drashhTavyaH, shrotavyaH, manthavyaH, nidhidhyaasavyaH' - aatma alone
has to be seen, heard, thought about, and contemplated upon - therefore
aatman inquiry should be done.
Thus in all three Upanishhads - taittiriiya, chhaandogya and
bRîhadaaraNyaka - Brahman inquiry is emphasized. In keeping with those
Upanishhadic portions Vyaasaachaarya condenses all of them and says athaato brahma jij~naasaa.
The suutra is grammatically incomplete and to emphasize the inquiry should
be done and to complete it grammatically we add at the end of the suutra a
word - karthavyaa. Hence the full suutra should read as: 'athaato brahma
jij~naasaaa kartavyaa', thereafter, therefore, Brahman inquiry should be
done
This is the direct meaning of the suutra. This direct meaning we revise a
little bit. If one has to do Brahman inquiry, it cannot be done
independently since Brahman is not available as an object in front of us
for one to study - like the study of microbiology or chemistry etc. Hence
independent inquiry of Brahman cannot be done. We need to use the
'Upanishhad microscope'. In one of the mantras it is said 'sarvaM
brahmopanishhadam' - Brahman is given the title as aupanishhadam to
indicate that Brahman can be inquired using Vedanta. Hence we can replace
the Brahman inquiry with the word 'vedantic inquiry' - Hence Brahma
jij~naasaa is equal to 'vedaanta shaastra vichaaraH' - Hence the suutra
will mean as 'athaato vedanta vichaara kartavyaH' - for what purpose? - for
Brahma j~naanam - for the knowledge of Brahman. Hence the revised meaning
of the suutra is 'thereafter, therefore, vedantic inquiry should be done
for Brahma j~naanam'. This is the revised direct meaning of the first
suutra.
Some technical considerations: Now we will make some more revisions. We
should remember that Brahmasuutra is nyaayaprasthaanam - it is meant for
analyzing everything logically. Hence every suutra should present a logical
statement - a nyaaya vaakyam. Hence the suutra must be presented
technically as nyaaya vaakyam or anumaana vaakyam . (please refer to Ch. 2
for the analysis of anumaana that involve the four factors - paksha,
saadhya, hetu and dRîshhTanta ex. parvataH agnimaan dhuumavatvaat yathaa
mahaanase). Hence the question is what is then the anumaana vaakyam that
corresponds to the first suutra. We can express that in the standard format
similar to: parvataH
agnimaan, dhuumavatvaat, yathaa mahaanase | vedaanta shaastram
aarambhaniiyam, anubandha chatushhTayavatvaat, yathaa dharmashaastravat
|vedaanta shaastram is the paksha, aarambhaniiyam, should be inquired into
is the saadhyam and hetu is anubandha chatushhTayavatvaat, because it has
got the four-fold factor (mostly here the emphasis on prayojanam or benefit
being the Moksha). The example is dharmashaastravat, just as the
dharmashhastra. For this anumaana vaakyam there should be a vyaapti vaakyam
(similar to yatra yatra dhuumaH tatra tatra agniH- a statement of
coexistence). For the above anumaana vaakyam we can express the vyaapti
vaakyam as - yatra yatra anubandha chatushhTayavatvam tatra tatra
aarambhaniiyatvam - all those shaastraa-s are worth studying since we get
prayojanam or benefit. For Brahmasuutra the benefit is the moksha itself.
This is the revised meaning for the first
suutra.
With this the general analysis containing both the direct meaning and the
implied meaning of the first suutra is completed.

Next we will take up the word by word meaning and their analysis.
End of BSB I-i-1-1A.
Message 6619

Date: Wed Nov 1, 2000 7:55am
Subject: Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1B
Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1B

my own teacher.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
P.S. Since for some reason single or double quotation marks are not coming
properly through e-mail, I am using hyphen to separate the Sanskrit words
from the text.
Now the word analysis of the sutra 1:
There are three words - atha ataH brahmajij~naasaa . The last word is the
compound word consisting of brahman and jij~naasaa. sha~Nkaraachaarya
analyzes each word in the order that it occurs. This is one of the
requirement for a bhaashhya as defined in the Ch. 1.
atha shabda vichaaraH: analysis of the first word, atha:
sha~Nkaraachaarya points out the expression -atha- has two fold function;
one is -atha- as a sound (shabda ruupena) and second is -atha- as the word
(pada ruupena). In the form of a sound, it denotes or produces
auspiciousness. That is, -atha-, shabda ruupena mangala janakam. The very
sound of the word -atha- as mere vibration (shabda ruupena) produces
auspiciousness(mangala janakam). When the word -atha- functions as a
-padam-, then it is -artha bodhakam- that it provides a particular meaning.

To be technical, Shankara says: prameya ruupena mangala janakam, pramaaNa
ruupena arthabodhdakam.
Why does Vyaasaachaarya uses this word -atha- in this two-fold

function? Because, this is the first suutra of the text and should
therefore begin with mangalam or auspicious sound. In our tradition, any
text that begins without the mangalam is considered as amangalam text or
inauspicious text, and we are not supposed read that. Hence every text
starts with some prayer sloka. This is benediction for removing any
obstacles (vighna nivaaraNaartham) and receiving the blessings of the Lord
for the successful fulfillment of the work. In addition, it is the
recognition by the author that it is an offering to the Lord and that the
Lord is behind the action both as an propeller
and a supporter, without whose help the work cannot be undertaken. It is
also an invocation by the student of the shaastra to help understand the
shaastra in its correct import. Since Vyaasaachaarya is writing the text in
suutra form, one cannot have an invocation sloka. He has to reduce the size
of the sloka to a word or two since this is a suutra text (alpaaksharam).
Vyaasa ingeniously uses just one word to do both functions mentioned above.
How do we know that the sound 'atha' is auspicious? There is a
pramaaNa for this:
o~NkaaraH cha atha shabdaH cha dwau etau brahmanaH puraa |
kaNTham bhittvaa viniryaatau tena maa~Ngalikau ubhau || - reference?
Before the creation started two sounds, Om! and atha!, issued forth from the
throat of the creator, Brahma. Hence these two are considered as auspicious
sounds. The two words -Om- and -atha- are ma~Ngala shabda-s. The two words
are used in the conclusion of dhyaana slokas as - Om atha | Om atha | Om
atha | - In the Geeta, chapters start as -atha prathamo.adhyaayaH- because
-atha- sound is considered as auspicious sound.
Now padaartham - word meaning:
The word -atha- has many meanings according to amarakosha: it says

mangala, aarambha, adhikaara, prayojana, atha shabdaH | It includes many
meanings such as auspiciousness, beginning, qualification, benefit, etc.,
besides other meanings such as now, then, moreover, rather,
certainly, but, else, whatelse, howelse, etc. sha~Nkaraachaarya analyzes
various possible meanings and ultimately arrives at one particular meaning
with reference to Brahmasuutra. That meaning is -aanantaaryaaH atha shabdaH
- the word means -anantaram- or thereafter or immediately after. What does
that mean? Shankara says, if we take that meaning, naturally a question
will arise in the mind of a listener as to -Whereafter?- Vyaasachaarya by
implication can convey the pre-requisites in terms of qualification for the
study of the Brahmasuutra - or adhikarii for the study of the suutra - which
is one of the four requirements (anubandha chatushhTayam) of any text as
outlined in the beginning. Any study should be after - yogyataa siddhi
anantaram brahma jij~naasa - after acquiring the necessary qualifications
one should inquire into the nature of Brahman. Thus by using the word
-atha- Vyaasaachaarya implies the -niyama apekshita yogyataa-, the
qualifications which should invariably proceed the study or invariable
prerequisites, similar to the requirements for any higher course in any
subject in a university. Now what are the invariable prerequisites for the
study of Vedanta? Shankara says- saadhana chatushhTayam is the
prerequisite. This is not directly mentioned by Vyaasa but it is indirectly

implied by Vyaasa. By using a single short word with two syllables Vyaasa
is able to convey in the suutra format the prerequisites needed for the
study, the saadhana chatushhTayam. Hence the implied meaning of the word
-atha- according to Shankara is -saadhana chatushhTa anantaram- - after
acquiring the four-fold qualifications. Of this, -after- is the direct
meaning, and the rest is the implied meaning.
The next question is, how does one know that saadhana chatushhTayam or the
four-fold qualifications are the prerequisites? The four-fold
qualifications are outlined in the beginning of this chapter. There are two
pramaaNa-s to show that saadhana chatushhTayam are the prerequisites for
Vedantic study. The first is -yukti pramaaNam- or based on logic. The
logic is called -anvaya vyatireka nyaaya - or the logic of co-presence and
co-absence. This logic can be simply stated as: -yat sattve tat sattvam,
yadabhaave tadabhaavaH, tasmaat tat tasya kaaraNam | meaning, when that is
present this is present; and when that is absent this is absent and
therefore that is a prerequisite for this. This can be simply illustrated by
an example. When we add sugar, the milk is sweet and when sugar is absent
the milk is not sweet - Hence we can write simply as an exercise as - sugar
sattve sweet sattvam, sugar abhaave sweet abhaavaH, tasmaat sugareva
sweetasya kaaraNam (this is just to illustrate the point!). Similarly from
general observation we come to know that whoever has saadhana chatushhTayam
he is able to get
the benefit of the Vedantic study, namely moksha - like Nachiketa in the
kaThopanishat, like the student in the Kena, etc. who have the necessary
qualifications - the proof is in the end of the teaching they say dhanyo.aha.n kRîtakRîtyo.aham...- etc. expressing outright joy at the
discovery of their freedom from limitations. On the other hand, a student
who does not have the saadhana chatushhTayam does not derive the benefit
even if he does the shravaNa, manana and nididhyaasana
etc. In kaThopanishat (I-2-24) a similar idea is conveyed when it says:
na avirataH dushcharitaat.h na ashaantaH na asamaahitaH |

na ashaanta-maanasaH vaa api praj~naanena enam aapnuyaat.h ||
whoever does not give up the foul actions, and whose mind is always
perturbed, who does not have a single pointedness and who does not have a
peace of mind, even if he studies Vedanta, he cannot attain the
self-realization. Shankara puts this idea nicely in his vivekachuuDaamaNi,
v. # 18
saadhanaat yatra chatvaari kathitaani maniishhibhiH |
yeshhu satsu eva sat nishhThaa yat abhaave na sidhyati ||
The wise people have spoken of the four qualifications that are
required. Only when they are present one can attain brahma nishhThaa or
established in Brahman, but when they are absent one cannot attain it. This
is the logical establishment for the requirement of saadhana
chatushhTayam using the logic of anvaya and vyatireka. If there is any more
doubt, we can cross examine our own lives. When these four-fold
qualifications are lacking, the study of Vedanta and Brahmasuutra becomes
only an academic exercise involving intellectual gymnastics. Study of the
suutra becomes more a cause for information rather than transformation of
the person. Thus using logic, Shankara shows that saadhana chatushhTayam is
required. This is called yukti pramaaNam.
We also have shruti pramaaNam to establish that the four-fold

qualifications are necessary for a vedantic student. They do not directly
state them but indirectly imply them. There are many but one
or two will be mentioned for reference here. Mundakopanishhat: I:ii:12
pariikshya lokaan.h karma chitaan.h braahmaNaH

nirveda-maayaat na asti akRîtaH kRîtena |
tat vij~naartha.n sa gurum eva abhigachchhet.h
samit paaNiH shrotriyamM brahma nishhTham.h ||
It is said that a seeker has to examine carefully all his life activities or
experiences to learn what is permanent and what is impermanent. From that
examination learn that all his experiences and
achievements are all impermanent. By implication of this statement, shruti
says one should have nitya anitya vastu viveka (discrimination of what is
permanent and what is impermanent), which is one of the four qualifications.
nirvedamaayaat - he should get disgusted with the anitya vastu or
impermanent results and having suffered enough he should know the limitation
of the impermanent results and hence turn his attention away from these That is he should have dispassion or vairaagyam. Tat vij~naartham sa
gurumeva abhigachchhet - he should approach a guru seeking the permanent
solution for his problem. This indicates the mumukshutvam a desire for the
freedom from limitations. Thus the sloka indicates the need for Viveka,
vairaagya and mumukshutvam, discrimination, dispassion and the desire for
liberation for a student seeking brahmavidya.
The same idea is presented in kaThopanishhat through the story of
Nachiketa, who is the glorious example of the person possessing all these
four qualification to the degree that the teacher Yama praises him to
heavens that he had not seen such a deserving student. When Nachiketa
requests for the Vedantic knowledge, Yama tempts him by offering everything
including a blank check to shun him away from his desire to know the means
for liberation. Nachiketa rejects all the offers without any hesitation and
insists that he wants only the brahmavidya and nothing else. The moral of
the story is if I want to gain brahmavidya like Nachiketa, I should be after
Moksha like him and throw away dharma artha kaama like -kaaka-vishhThaayaam
yathaiva- (a statement of Shankara in Aparokshaanubhuuti) meaning -like a
droppings of a crow- We just immediately wipe it out and do not claim that
getting rid of kaakavishhThaa, crow drops, is a great achievement. Just as a
person throws away effortlessly or without thinking twice kaakavishhThaa,
one should reject all the pleasures of the fourteen worlds. Nachiketa did
not ask for time-out to contemplate whether to take Yama's offer or not. It
was an outright rejection without a second thought. Through Nachiketa
story, shruti is guiding us to select shreyas over preyas (permanent
liberation over temporal pleasures) that is to have appropriate
discrimination, viveka, to select shreyas over preyas, and vairaagyam or
dispassion towards
preyas, and mumukshutvam - the necessity of all these four-fold
qualifications is presented. Yama says to Nachiketa (Katha Up.I-2-2):
shreyaH cha preyaH cha manushhyameta\

stau sampariitya vivinakti dhiiraH |
shreyaH hi dhiiraH abhi preyasaH vRîNiite
preyaH mandaH yoga-kshemaat vRîNiite ||
Man has always a choice between shreyas (what is good) and preyas (what is
pleasurable). Only an intelligent saadhak after contemplating decides to
select what is good over what is pleasurable. The dull witted ones are the

ones who select for sense of security and pleasure and go after the sensuous
objects. Thus scripture is guiding us to go after disciplined life which
helps to acquire the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti.
Hence the necessity of the four-fold qualifications for a student of
brahmavidyaa are given in shruti in one form or the other. In these
shlokas, we get information about viveka, vairaagya and mumukshutvam. What
about the shama aadi shhaTka sampatti? Where is it mentioned in
the shruti? In bRîhadaaraNyaka Upanishhad IV:iv:23 these are clearly
mentioned. There is a sloka that says:
shaantaH daantaH uparataH titikshuH shraddhaa
vitto bhuutvaa aatmanyeva aatmaanam pasyet|
In this statement shamaadi shaaTka sampatti is also emphasized. How about
that samaadhaana in that group of six which is not mentioned in the above
mantra? The BRîhadaaranyaka has two versions, one belonging to kaanva
shaakha and the other belonging to maadhyandina shaakha. In one shaakha
shraddha is mentioned and in the other it is said as 'samaahito bhuutva'
indicating the need of samaadhaanam as qualification. This is also stated
in subaala upanishhat 9:12. Thus all the four-fold qualifications for a
student are mentioned in one form or the other in the shruti.
Thus with yukti pramaaNa and with shruti pramaaNa, Shankara proves that
-atha- means -saaddhana chatushhTaya anantaram-, that is -after acquiring
the four-fold qualifications.
In the next section we take puurvapakshi's or objector's arguments
against the above implied meaning for the atha shabdaH. My deep thanks to
shree sunder hattangadi for helping me in the transliteration and in getting
the correct references for the upanishat mantra-s. Any mistakes are mine.
End of Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1B ----------------------
6682
Date: Thu Nov 9, 2000 1:37pm
Subject: Notes on Brahmasuutra-I-i-1-1C
Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1C

I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who is
ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all the
way up to my own teacher.

Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who is beyond the
three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the very source of
purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to
his lotus feet I (sadaa) always prostrate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
In this section we take a few puurvapaksha-s or objections against the

above-implied meaning for atha shabdaH.
Objection:
Some philosophers have ascribed different intended meanings for the word
'atha'. They agree with Shankara that 'atha' means anantaram or thereafter
but disagree that thereafter means saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram. The
other commentators suggest that 'atha' means 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram',
that is, only after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsa or the first portion or
karmakaaNDa portion of the Vedas, one should inquire into the nature of
Brahman. To put in Shankara's language they say 'karmaavabodha aanantaryam
arthaH' - that is after the study of karmakaaNDa portion of the Veda-s.
Shankaracharya elaborately refutes this meaning. We will go over this since
these ideas are also engraved in some form in the Vishishta-advaita and
Dwaita interpretations that give lot of weight to the karmakaaNDa portions.
What is puurvamiimaamsa?
We need to have some understanding of this before we can appreciate
Shankara' refutation of their meaning to atha shabda. Purvamimamsa is the
analysis of the first portion of the Veda-s. Where as, Brahmasutra-s are
uttaramiimaa.nsa containing the analysis of the final portion of the Veda-s.
The first portion deals with karma and upaasanaa and the last portion
deals with j~naanam aspect. Hence puurvamiimaa.nsa is the analysis of karma
and upaasanaa and uttaramiimaa.nsa is the analysis of Brahman or j~naanam.
Now puurvapakshi or the objector says that the very word 'puurvamiimaa.nsa'
indicates that it should come puurva or first and the
very word 'uttaramiimaa.nsa' indicates that it should come later or after.
Therefore 'atha' should be translated as 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram' that
is after the study of the puurvamiimaa.nsa only the inquiry into the nature
of the Brahman. Purvapakshi's logic is as follows: puurvamiimaa.nsaa deals
with karma and upaasanaa. We all know that karma and upaasanaa are needed to
get the qualifications such as chittashuddhi etc. and saadhana
chatushhTayam. Therefore one should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa, follow karma
yoga and upaasanaa, thereafter acquire saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, and
thereafter he should come to the study the uttaramiimaa.nsa and Brahmasutra.
Since we know that everybody requires qualifications, and further since
qualifications require the puurvamiimaa.nsa, one should give the meaning for
the word 'atha' as puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram.
Response:
Shankara refutes puurvapakshi's arguments using both yukti or logic and
shruti support.
yukti pramaaNa: Shankara give four reasons to refute the puuvapakshi's

views: The first reason is called 'vyabhichaara doshhaH' - we
can roughly translate as error due to inconsistency. Suppose the word
'atha' is translated as 'after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa' - then we
will run into two problems. Suppose a person completes the study of
puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Next he will take up the study of uttaramiimaa.nsaa as
per the purvapakshi's argument, thinking that he is now qualified to study
the uttaramiimaa.nsaa. Shankara says that there is a danger involved.
After the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa he may become a scholar of
puurvamiimaa.nsaa and does not necessarily have the required saadhana
chatushhTaya sampatti for uttaramiimaa.nsaa. The study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa
does not necessarily guarantee that one will have acquired viveka,
vairaagya, shhatkasampatti and mumukshutvam. Therefore unqualified student
thinking that he is qualified will end up studying uttaramiimaa.nsaa. A
person may become an expert in karma-s, yoga-s, rituals etc but that does
not guarantee that he acquired saadhana chatusshTaya sampatti. On the other
hand he may get more interested
in heavenly pleasures etc. MunDaka U. (1-2-10) exemplifies these
karmakaanDi-s
ishhTaapuurtaM manyamaanaa varishhThaM
naanyachchhreyo vedayante pramuuDhaaH|
naakasya pRîshhThe te sukRîte anubhuutvaa
imaM lokaM hiinataraM vaa vishanti||
Thinking that these 'ishhTaapuurta karma-s are most supreme and there is
nothing more beneficial than these and one goes after heavenly pleasures
and thereafter go down the hill into lower worlds. This is what can happen
if one hangs on to the karma-s thinking that they are important rather than
acquiring the needed saadhana chatushhTayam. There are many expert
ritualists and they do not have any interest in Vedanta. On the other hand
they want to perform more and more rituals. Hence Shankara says that there
is no guarantee that after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa one gets the
necessary qualifications for the Vedantic study. He will not gain anything
out of it. Thus the first problem that Shankara says is that an unqualified
person taking up the study of Vedanta.
There is a second problem also. There can be some rare cases where a person
is born with saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti because of puurva janma
saadhana. (Shankara's own disciple - Hastamalaka is an example). Hence
such students who are already having saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti do not
require puurvamiimaa.nsaa since they already have the saadhana chatushhTaya
sampatti. Then why should they waste their time in studying
puurvamiimaa.nsaa? Right from brahmacharya aashrama they are ready for
Vedantic study. Therefore if puurvapakshi says that only after
puurvamiimaa.nsaa one should study Vedanta, then even an otherwise qualified
student will end up wasting his time in studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Thus the
puurvapakshi's ascribed meaning to 'atha' word that it implies
'puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram' or after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa will
result in two problems; one an unqualified student entering into the study
of Vedanta and the second a qualified student being denied immediate access
to the study of Vedanta. On the other hand, as Shankara's ascribed if
'atha' implies 'saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram brahma jij~naasa' that is
only after acquiring the four-fold qualifications one should inquire into
the nature of Brahman, it automatically eliminates both problems stated
above. One can acquire these qualification through puurva janma sa.nskaara
(from previous birth) or in this birth through karma and upaasana. What is
important is to emphasize the actual qualifications that are required rather
than insist on a particular means, which does not necessarily guarantee
acquisition of those qualifications. In this interpretation, the four-fold

qualifications become compulsory than the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa for
all. Only for the unprepared minds, karma and upaasana can help in
acquiring the four-fold qualifications and for them the study of the
puurvamiimaa.nsaa will be beneficial. This is the first reason why
puurvapakshi is wrong in his interpretation of the meaning to 'atha'
shabdam.
Shankara gives three more reasons. To understand these reasons one should
understand the background of the Shankaracharya's times when he was
responding to these objections. When the puurvapakshi says one should come
to Vedanta after studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa, this philosopher has got a
particular philosophy in his mind, which was very prevalent during
Shankara's time. According to that philosophy, mere knowledge cannot give
liberation - 'kevala j~naanena mokshaH na sambhavati'. As an example, the
puurvapakshi points out the state of most of the Vedantic students. This
example may very well be applicable then as well as now. There are very
many great Vedanta experts who can quote from one end to the other, some
even in Orange robes. Some can give eloquent lectures and have big ashrams
and number of disciples. They have studied Vedanta for many years. But
their behavior and their language of communication is worse than the Vedanta
illiterates. In the name of tradition, they propagate only fanaticism.
Hence the puurvapakshi argues that these have studied Vedanta and still have
not gained any benefit from it. Hence it is very clear that 'kevala
j~naanena na mokshaH' by the Vedanta knowledge alone one cannot gain moksha.
Hence j~naanam must be combined with karma. "j~naana karma samuchchhayena
mokshaH' that is only by combining j~naana and karma one can gain moksha
and not by j~naana alone. The proof is the direct evidence of the presence
of so many Vedanta experts who have not gained what they intend to gain
through the knowledge alone. This is the view of one philosopher who is
called 'j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi', a proponent of the mixture of
j~naana and karma for moksha (Some people now a days give more fancy name
called- 'Integral yoga' - involving a samuchchaya of several things!).
Hence his contention is that everyone should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa first
so that he can know about all rituals or karma-s or upasana-s. Once he
learns them, he should practice them or implement them - Yagna-s, various
types of puuja-s, japa, vratams, etc. While implementing these, he should
study the Vedanta to gain knowledge. Then he can combine both karma and
j~naana required for moksha. Hence 'atha' means puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram
one should enter into Brahman inquiry and while the inquiry is going on he
should perform in parallel the rituals that he learned through the study of
puurvamiimaa.nsaa. This way he can combine karma with j~naanam - This is
the contention of j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi - or a puurvapakshi's
argument.
Shankara refutes this j~naana karma samuchchaya philosophy. For this, he
gives three reasons. This is the topic Shankara enters into very often
since this philosophy was very prevalent in his times. This may be little
divergence, but some aspects of this philosophy is also prevalent at least
in the practices of vishishhTa-advaita and more so in dwaita where the
emphasis on the upaasanaa and puujaa dominates the field.
vishishhTa-advaita emphasizes the sharaNaagati aspect with Bhakti involving
archanaa, stuti or stotrams and japa as a means while in Dwaita major
emphasis is on the puujaa with rigorous aachaara or practices. Puja-s look
and sound spectacular with aarati of the deity, Krishna or NaaraayaNa, with
one, two, five, ten, twenty-four, forty-eight, etc flames with as many drums
and bells as possible making a deafening sound. Vedic upaasanaa and
observance of various vrata-s became a norm of the practice than inquiry
into the nature of the reality. Hence the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa and
karma is given importance in daily life.

Shankara provides three reasons to refute the j~naana-karma sumuchchaya

philosophy. Three reasons are namely; karma j~naana kaanDayoH (between
karma and j~naana) (a) vishhaya bhedaat (themes are different) (b) prayojana
bhedaat (utilities are different) and
(c) pravRîtti bhedaat (means are different). Because of these three
reasons karma, j~naana cannot be combined.
Each one of these will be explained in the next post.
End of Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1C.
6682
Date: Thu Nov 9, 2000 1:37pm
Subject: Notes on Brahmasuutra-I-i-1-1C
Notes on BSB: I-i-1-1C

In this section we take a few puurvapaksha-s or objections against the

above-implied meaning for atha shabdaH.
Objection:
Some philosophers have ascribed different intended meanings for the word
'atha'. They agree with Shankara that 'atha' means anantaram or thereafter
but disagree that thereafter means saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram. The
other commentators suggest that 'atha' means 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram',
that is, only after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsa or the first portion or

karmakaaNDa portion of the Vedas, one should inquire into the nature of
Brahman. To put in Shankara's language they say 'karmaavabodha aanantaryam
arthaH' - that is after the study of karmakaaNDa portion of the Veda-s.
Shankaracharya elaborately refutes this meaning. We will go over this since
these ideas are also engraved in some form in the Vishishta-advaita and
Dwaita interpretations that give lot of weight to the karmakaaNDa portions.
What is puurvamiimaamsa?
We need to have some understanding of this before we can appreciate
Shankara' refutation of their meaning to atha shabda. Purvamimamsa is the
analysis of the first portion of the Veda-s. Where as, Brahmasutra-s are
uttaramiimaa.nsa containing the analysis of the final portion of the Veda-s.
The first portion deals with karma and upaasanaa and the last portion
deals with j~naanam aspect. Hence puurvamiimaa.nsa is the analysis of karma
and upaasanaa and uttaramiimaa.nsa is the analysis of Brahman or j~naanam.
Now puurvapakshi or the objector says that the very word 'puurvamiimaa.nsa'
indicates that it should come puurva or first and the
very word 'uttaramiimaa.nsa' indicates that it should come later or after.
Therefore 'atha' should be translated as 'puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram' that
is after the study of the puurvamiimaa.nsa only the inquiry into the nature
of the Brahman. Purvapakshi's logic is as follows: puurvamiimaa.nsaa deals
with karma and upaasanaa. We all know that karma and upaasanaa are needed to
get the qualifications such as chittashuddhi etc. and saadhana
chatushhTayam. Therefore one should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa, follow karma
yoga and upaasanaa, thereafter acquire saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, and
thereafter he should come to the study the uttaramiimaa.nsa and Brahmasutra.
Since we know that everybody requires qualifications, and further since
qualifications require the puurvamiimaa.nsa, one should give the meaning for
the word 'atha' as puurvamiimaa.nsa anantaram.
Response:
Shankara refutes puurvapakshi's arguments using both yukti or logic and
shruti support.
yukti pramaaNa: Shankara give four reasons to refute the puuvapakshi's
views: The first reason is called 'vyabhichaara doshhaH' - we
can roughly translate as error due to inconsistency. Suppose the word
'atha' is translated as 'after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa' - then we
will run into two problems. Suppose a person completes the study of
puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Next he will take up the study of uttaramiimaa.nsaa as
per the purvapakshi's argument, thinking that he is now qualified to study
the uttaramiimaa.nsaa. Shankara says that there is a danger involved.
After the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa he may become a scholar of
puurvamiimaa.nsaa and does not necessarily have the required saadhana
chatushhTaya sampatti for uttaramiimaa.nsaa. The study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa
does not necessarily guarantee that one will have acquired viveka,
vairaagya, shhatkasampatti and mumukshutvam. Therefore unqualified student
thinking that he is qualified will end up studying uttaramiimaa.nsaa. A
person may become an expert in karma-s, yoga-s, rituals etc but that does
not guarantee that he acquired saadhana chatusshTaya sampatti. On the other
hand he may get more interested
in heavenly pleasures etc. MunDaka U. (1-2-10) exemplifies these
karmakaanDi-s
ishhTaapuurtaM manyamaanaa varishhThaM
naanyachchhreyo vedayante pramuuDhaaH|
naakasya pRîshhThe te sukRîte anubhuutvaa

imaM lokaM hiinataraM vaa vishanti||
Thinking that these 'ishhTaapuurta karma-s are most supreme and there is
nothing more beneficial than these and one goes after heavenly pleasures
and thereafter go down the hill into lower worlds. This is what can happen
if one hangs on to the karma-s thinking that they are important rather than
acquiring the needed saadhana chatushhTayam. There are many expert
ritualists and they do not have any interest in Vedanta. On the other hand
they want to perform more and more rituals. Hence Shankara says that there
is no guarantee that after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa one gets the
necessary qualifications for the Vedantic study. He will not gain anything
out of it. Thus the first problem that Shankara says is that an unqualified
person taking up the study of Vedanta.
There is a second problem also. There can be some rare cases where a person
is born with saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti because of puurva janma
saadhana. (Shankara's own disciple - Hastamalaka is an example). Hence
such students who are already having saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti do not
require puurvamiimaa.nsaa since they already have the saadhana chatushhTaya
sampatti. Then why should they waste their time in studying
puurvamiimaa.nsaa? Right from brahmacharya aashrama they are ready for
Vedantic study. Therefore if puurvapakshi says that only after
puurvamiimaa.nsaa one should study Vedanta, then even an otherwise qualified
student will end up wasting his time in studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa. Thus the
puurvapakshi's ascribed meaning to 'atha' word that it implies
'puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram' or after the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa will
result in two problems; one an unqualified student entering into the study
of Vedanta and the second a qualified student being denied immediate access
to the study of Vedanta. On the other hand, as Shankara's ascribed if
'atha' implies 'saadhana chatushhTaya anantaram brahma jij~naasa' that is
only after acquiring the four-fold qualifications one should inquire into
the nature of Brahman, it automatically eliminates both problems stated
above. One can acquire these qualification through puurva janma sa.nskaara
(from previous birth) or in this birth through karma and upaasana. What is
important is to emphasize the actual qualifications that are required rather
than insist on a particular means, which does not necessarily guarantee
acquisition of those qualifications. In this interpretation, the four-fold
qualifications become compulsory than the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa for
all. Only for the unprepared minds, karma and upaasana can help in
acquiring the four-fold qualifications and for them the study of the
puurvamiimaa.nsaa will be beneficial. This is the first reason why
puurvapakshi is wrong in his interpretation of the meaning to 'atha'
shabdam.
Shankara gives three more reasons. To understand these reasons one should
understand the background of the Shankaracharya's times when he was
responding to these objections. When the puurvapakshi says one should come
to Vedanta after studying puurvamiimaa.nsaa, this philosopher has got a
particular philosophy in his mind, which was very prevalent during
Shankara's time. According to that philosophy, mere knowledge cannot give
liberation - 'kevala j~naanena mokshaH na sambhavati'. As an example, the
puurvapakshi points out the state of most of the Vedantic students. This
example may very well be applicable then as well as now. There are very
many great Vedanta experts who can quote from one end to the other, some
even in Orange robes. Some can give eloquent lectures and have big ashrams
and number of disciples. They have studied Vedanta for many years. But
their behavior and their language of communication is worse than the Vedanta
illiterates. In the name of tradition, they propagate only fanaticism.
Hence the puurvapakshi argues that these have studied Vedanta and still have

not gained any benefit from it. Hence it is very clear that 'kevala
j~naanena na mokshaH' by the Vedanta knowledge alone one cannot gain moksha.
Hence j~naanam must be combined with karma. "j~naana karma samuchchhayena
mokshaH' that is only by combining j~naana and karma one can gain moksha
and not by j~naana alone. The proof is the direct evidence of the presence
of so many Vedanta experts who have not gained what they intend to gain
through the knowledge alone. This is the view of one philosopher who is
called 'j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi', a proponent of the mixture of
j~naana and karma for moksha (Some people now a days give more fancy name
called- 'Integral yoga' - involving a samuchchaya of several things!).
Hence his contention is that everyone should study puurvamiimaa.nsaa first
so that he can know about all rituals or karma-s or upasana-s. Once he
learns them, he should practice them or implement them - Yagna-s, various
types of puuja-s, japa, vratams, etc. While implementing these, he should
study the Vedanta to gain knowledge. Then he can combine both karma and
j~naana required for moksha. Hence 'atha' means puurvamiimaa.nsaa anantaram
one should enter into Brahman inquiry and while the inquiry is going on he
should perform in parallel the rituals that he learned through the study of
puurvamiimaa.nsaa. This way he can combine karma with j~naanam - This is
the contention of j~naana karma sumuchchaya vaadi - or a puurvapakshi's
argument.
Shankara refutes this j~naana karma samuchchaya philosophy. For this, he
gives three reasons. This is the topic Shankara enters into very often
since this philosophy was very prevalent in his times. This may be little
divergence, but some aspects of this philosophy is also prevalent at least
in the practices of vishishhTa-advaita and more so in dwaita where the
emphasis on the upaasanaa and puujaa dominates the field.
vishishhTa-advaita emphasizes the sharaNaagati aspect with Bhakti involving
archanaa, stuti or stotrams and japa as a means while in Dwaita major
emphasis is on the puujaa with rigorous aachaara or practices. Puja-s look
and sound spectacular with aarati of the deity, Krishna or NaaraayaNa, with
one, two, five, ten, twenty-four, forty-eight, etc flames with as many drums
and bells as possible making a deafening sound. Vedic upaasanaa and
observance of various vrata-s became a norm of the practice than inquiry
into the nature of the reality. Hence the study of puurvamiimaa.nsaa and
karma is given importance in daily life.
Shankara provides three reasons to refute the j~naana-karma sumuchchaya
philosophy. Three reasons are namely; karma j~naana kaanDayoH (between
karma and j~naana) (a) vishhaya bhedaat (themes are different) (b) prayojana
bhedaat (utilities are different) and
(c) pravRîtti bhedaat (means are different). Because of these three
reasons karma, j~naana cannot be combined.
Each one of these will be explained in the next post.
End of Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1C.

Msg #
Date: Sat Nov 25, 2000 10:46am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-1E
Notes on BSB-I-I-1-1E


ataH shabda vichaaraH-Discussion of meaning of 'ataH' word :

The literal meaning of the second word 'ataH' is 'therefore'. We know that
therefore always indicates a reason. Thus 'ataH' or therefore should be
preceded by some reason for Brahman inquiry to be conducted. Vyaasaachaarya
does not mention the reason since it is suutram where he has to be brief.
Hence we have to supply the reason or reasons and once reason is provided we
can say therefore Brahman inquiry should be done. Shankaracharya gives two
reasons, one is the negation of alternates and the second is to ascertain
the path of inquiry. The first reason is karma cannot give moksha and
puurvamiimaa.nsa deals mostly with karma. The second is brahmaj~naanam alone
gives moksha. Therefore Brahman inquiry should be done.
Let us take each reason in detail. First, karma cannot give moksha. Why is
it so? This aspect has been discussed in the last sections. It is
established through shruti, yukti (logic) and anubhava (experience)
pramaaNa. The well-known shruti statement is:
na karmaNaa na prajyayaa dhanena
tyaagena eke amRîtatvam aanashuH| (kaivalya upanishhat-I-3)
Neither by action, nor by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation alone
the immortality can be obtained. Thus by karma moksha cannot be attained.
Shankara gives another shruti's statement taken from Ch. U. (VIII:i:6)
"... yatheha karma-jitaH lokaH kshiiyate evam eva amutra puNya-jitaH lokaH
kshiiyate |"
just as karmaphalam belonging to this world is anityam or impermanent, karma
phalam belonging to swargaadi loka-s, heavens etc., are also are
impermanent.
Hence-iha karma phalam anityam, paraloka karma phalam anityam, sarvam karma
phalam anityam - ataH nityamokshaH karmaphalam na bhavati |- The results of
actions here in this life are impermanent, the results of actions belonging
to next world are impermanent and results of all actions are impermanent,
hence moksha which is permanent and eternal cannot be the result of any
action, here and hereafter.

Action being finite can only give finite result and series of finite actions
can give only a series of finite results and sum of series of finite results
can only be finite but not infinite. This statement is mathematically
precise. Hence action cannot give eternal infinite result. This is shruti
pramaaNa, which is also logical.
Next yukti pramaaNa. Since karma itself anitya or impermanent, the anitya
karma can only produce anitya phalam or impermanent result. As the cause so
is the effect - karmaNaH anityatvaat karmaphalasyaapi anityatvam-. Why karma
anityam? It is -anityam-, impermanent because -kaaraka janyatvaat- - karma
is born out of ephemeral ingredients; the perishable man, the perishable
priest, the perishable materials, the perishable fire or agni. Hence anitya
kaaraka janyatvaat kriyaa api anityaa bhavati|. Since ephemeral impermanent
is the cause the result is also ephemeral and impermanent and cannot give
permanent eternal liberation.
Next anubahava pramaaNa. Our experience also shows that whatever is produced
out of work is also anityam. Civilization arose out of efforts but they all
disappeared into oblivion. Kings came, dynasties grew, empires were built
but they all got destroyed. None remained eternal. Thus from shruti, yukti
and anubhava, one can prove that karma does not give permanent eternal
happiness, moksha that one is seeking in all pursuits.
The second reason is brahmaj~naanam alone gives moksha. Again we prove this
using shruti pramaaNam, yukti pramaaNam and anubhava pramaaNam.
First shruti pramaaNam:
Shankara quotes from tittiriiya upanishhat (II-i-1) - brahmavit aapnoti
param| - knower of Brahman gains the supreme. From mundaka upanishhat
(III-ii-9)- sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati - knower
of Brahman becomes Brahman. From purusha suuktam: tamevam vidvaan amRîta
iha bhavati| naanyaH panthaa ayanaaya vidyate| Knowing Him only immortality
can be obtained even in this life. There is no other path for liberation.
From Kaivalya upanishhat-I:10: sarva bhuutastham aatmaana.n sarva bhuutaani
ca aatmani | sampashyan brahma paramam yaati na anyena hetunaa || By
knowledge of oneself alone in all beings and all beings in oneself alone,
one attains the supreme Brahman, not by any other means. (a somewhat similar
statement occurs in Bhagavad-Gita.6-29)
Thus there are several shruti pramaaNa.
Now yukti pramaaNa. Moksha means sa.nsaara nivRîtti - liberation means
freedom from sa.nsaara. Freedom from sa.nsaara can only come through
knowledge only because sa.nsaara is adhyastam, is due to an error (Please
refer to adhyaasa bhaashhya). sa.nsaara will go only by knowledge, because
it is adhyaasa or superimposition, like rope-snake case'. How do we destroy
the superimposed snake or false snake? We cannot destroy using a stick or
GaruDa mantra or Irula tribes men (who catch snakes). It can only be
eliminated only by one method that is by j~naana maatrena -by knowledge
alone since it is a superimposition or error. Similarly the sa.nsaara, as it
is also due an error or adhyaasa. How do we say that sa.nsaara is adhyaasa?
Shankarachaarya says you have to go back and study Ch. III again as this was
discussed exhaustively there. He says only to explain this word 'ataH' - the
whole adhyaasa bhaashhya was written.
Next anubhava [or experience] pramaaNa. Any superimposed problem goes only
by knowledge as we see in the case of rope-snake, mirage water. This is our
experience - rajju-sarpa janya bhaya kampaadikam rajju j~naanena nashyati |-

A person who was frightened out of rope-snake has got fear, shivering,
sweat, thus suffering from sa.nsaara caused by the rope-snake. He gets out
of these fears and the associated sa.nsaara once he learns that it is only a
rope. Similarly the problems in the dream are superimpositions and we find
all the dream sa.nsaara goes once awakened to the knowledge of reality. -yat
saakshat kurute prabodha samaye |- Thus by knowledge alone many of the
superimposition problems go. After listening to this, one fellow asked sir, superimposed snake will go by knowledge gained by shedding the light,
but if it is a real snake it will not go. Similarly the superimposed
sa.nsaara can go by Vedanta knowledge but if there is a real sa.nsaara, it
will not go! (This is one of the arguments of the Dwaitins since for them
experience is real and sa.nsaara is an intense experience). The answer is in
the case of snake there is a possibility of real snake and a false snake but
in the case of sa.nsaara there is only a false sa.nsaara and no real
sa.nsaara - for this read Shankara's answer for puurvapakshi's arguments in
Ch. III. There is no real sa.nsaara at all. The absolute reality is one and
that is Brahman - ekam eva advitiiyam, one without second. Hence any second,
including sa.nsaara can only be an adhyaasa or error. Hence sa.nsaara cannot
be real.
na nirodhaH na cha utpattiH na baddhaH na cha saadhakaH |
na mumukshuH na vai muktaH iti eshhaa paramaarthataa || [Mandukya-Karika
II:32]
In reality there is neither obstruction for liberation, nor birth, nor
bondage, nor a seeker of moksha, none liberated - Just the supreme
transcendental truth.
Thus by shruti, yukti and anubhava pramaaNa we have established that only by
knowledge alone one can gain moksha or freedom from limitations. By the
shruti, yukti and anubhava pramaaNa we have also established that karma
cannot give moksha - 'ataH', therefore, -brahma jij~naasaa kartavyaa-, the
inquiry into the nature of Brahman should be done. Thus, the word -ataHdirectly signifies -therefore- implying the reasons for the study of Vedanta
and indirectly signifies the -prayojanam- or purpose of the study as
required in the anubandha chatushhTayam.
With this the -ataH shabda vichaara- or the inquiry into the meaning of the
word -ataH- is completed.
Msg #
Date: Mon Dec 4, 2000 2:19pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-1F
Notes on BSB I-i-1-1F
my own teacher.

----------------------------------------------------------------------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
Next word is brahma-jij~naasaa. The word meaning is Brahman inquiry. It

should mean 'brahma j~naanaaya vedanta vichaaraH', that is Vedantic inquiry
for brahma j~naanam. brahma-jij~naasaa is a compound word with three parts brahma, jij~naa, saa. The word brahma means brahman which will be defined
later as jagat kaaraNam brahma, the cause for the world. Brahman has got
different meanings in the shaastra - in Geeta it says - karma brahma
udbhavam viddhi brahma-akshara-samudbhavam - there it is translated as the
Veda. In taittiriiya Upanishad [I:v:1] it says - 'maha iti tad brahma, sa
aatmaa |' - there brahma is translated as OM-kaara. In kaThopanishad
[I:ii:25]- yasya brahma cha kshatra.n cha ubhe bavata odanaH| - there the
word brahma was translated as braahmaNa. Sometimes brahma is translated as
hiranyagarbha also [muNDaka I:1]- sa brahma-vidyaam sarva-vidyaa
pratishhThaam - here brahma vidyaa is vidyaa given by hiranyagarbha. When it
says [taitt. II:i:1]'brahmavid aapnoti param' - there brahma means 'satyam,
j~naanam, anantam brahma' - who is the jagat kaaraNam. Thus according to
context the word brahma is translated to mean different meanings. The
definition used here for brahma is explained more elaborately in the second
suutra by vyaasaachaarya. Based on that suutra we come to conclusion that in
brahma-jij~naasaa, brahman stands for jagat kaaraNam brahma, the one who is
the cause for the creation of the universe. The second part of the word is
jij~naa - Shankara says it means j~naanam - what kind of j~naanam it is? it is avagati paryantam j~naanam - avagati means dRîDha aparoksha j~naanam,
firm and direct knowledge of the reality.
The last part is 'saa' - it is a suffix - san pratyayaH - it literally means
ichchhaa or desire (direct meaning). In Sanskrit when we add the 'san'
pratyaya, it conveys the meaning of a desire. Thus jij~naasaa - is desire to
know - just as mumukshaa, desire for liberation, pipaThishaa, desire to
learn, etc. Hence Shankara says desire is the vaachyaartha of the 'san'
pratyaya, here we have to take lakshyaartha or implied meaning. The implied
meaning is inquiry or vichaaraH. Thus ichchhaa or desire is the vaachyaartha
and vichaaraH or inquiry is lakshyaartha. What is the connection between
desire and inquiry? Inquiry is always the result of a desire for knowledge.
That is 'ichchha janya vichaara lakshaNa' - that is the inquiry born out of
desire to know. The words brahma jij~naasaa means brahma j~naana ichchhaa which means 'brahma j~naana vichaaraH'. Hence if we can combine all this, we
have brahma jij~naasaa meaning 'dRîDha aparoksha brahma j~naanaaya vedaanta
vichaaraH (kartavyaH) - to gain the direct abiding knowledge of brahman,
Vedanta vichaara should be done.
The question can be raised as to why one should add Vedanta vichaara Vyasaachaarya suutra imply just vichaara - he did not specify Vedanta
vichaara. Why cannot I make 'self-inquiry' without worrying about Vedanta? How do you do if asked, they respond that the 'self-inquiry' - it is very
simple and is a straight path ' All I have to do is to close my eyes and ask
myself- who am I? and thus find out who I am. There are some who claim that

'who am I inquiry?' is different from Vedantic inquiry. And people claim
that 'who am I inquiry?' can be done sitting in a corner without having a
guru or study of Vedanta - it is a straight path or direct path. All I have
to do is dwell deep into my heart and ask the question - who am I, who am I
... etc., and one day I will realize. Since we don't know who we are other
than what we know of ourselves as ' I am sa.nsaarii, I am limited, I am
duHkhii, I am ignorant, etc. etc. These are the only answers that will come
out in the 'who am I inquiry since we do not know any better of who we are.
Hence 'self-inquiry' does not mean one self doing the inquiry -it is the
inquiry of 'the self' with help of Guru and shaastra or Vedanta. Self
inquiry does not mean oneself inquiry or independent inquiry - it is
shhashhThii tatpurushha - it is the inquiry of the self with the help of
guru and shaashtra. Because Vedanta alone is the pramaaNam for brahman.
Hence brahma vichaara or aatma vichaara is through Vedanta vichaara.
Hence the final meaning for 'brahma jij~naasaa' means 'brahma j~naanaaya
vedanta vichaaraH' inquiry into Vedanta for gaining brahma j~naanam. Any
knowledge can takes place only through the operation of a pramaaNam (means
of knowledge), pramaaNa janyaa pramaa. We have already mentioned the six
means of knowledge that involves pratyaksha, anumaana, etc. Now vicharaH is
not accepted as one of the six pramaaNa-s. Mere inquiry or independent
thinking, mere sitting in meditation are not accepted as one of the six
pramaaNa-s. If a person goes on inquiring without any of the six means of
pramaaNam, it will lead only to a speculative system of philosophy, it can
lead to various hypotheses, but can never lead to knowledge. Hence if
inquiry should lead to a knowledge, it should involve a pramaaNam, a valid
means of knowledge. In the case of brahman, we have got only one relevant
and useful pramaaNam, which is shabdta pramaaNam, vedanta shabda pramaaNam.
Hence without bringing in the upanishad shabda pramaaNam if inquiry is done
it will only lead to speculations only. Therefore brahman inquiry involves a
shabda pramaaNam, that is Vedanta or upanishad pramaaNam. Vyaasaachaarya
does not use the word 'vedanta vichaaraH', we have to supply the word
vedanta vichaara kartavyaH|| In fact, Vyasaaachaarya, himself tells in the
third suutra that Vedanta alone is the pramaaNam for brahman and also uses
Vedanta for the inquiry of brahman. Hence brahma jij~naasaa means brahma
j~naanaaya vedanta vichaaraH. This is the final meaning.
Why are we interested in brahma j~naanam? We are interested in brahma
j~naanam since we are interested in moksha or sa.nsaara nivRîttiH, removal
of sa.nsaara. We have analyzed why brahma j~naanam removes sa.nsaara. While
inquiring into ataH shabda we have inquired why karma cannot give moksha and
why j~naanam alone gives moksha. Since sa.nsaara is adhyastaH or
superimposed, it can be removed by j~naanam. Now a question arises. Any
superimposition goes by knowledge, like our good old snake. When we say the
superimposed snake is removed by knowledge, the question is what knowledge
will remove the snake. The snake is not removed by the knowledge of
chemistry or knowledge of physics. The snake is removed only by the
knowledge of rope which is the adhishhThaanam of the snake. From this we get
a rule - adhyaasa is removed only by adhishhThaana j~naanam. Any
superimposition is removed by the knowledge of its adhishhTaanam. Applying
this logic, we have 'sa.nsaaraH swa adhishhTana j~naana nivartyaH,
adhyastatvaat, rujju sarpavat|' sa.nsaara can be removed by the knowledge of
its adhishhTaanam, because sa.nsaara is superimposed like our snake. While
writing adhyaasa bhaashhyam Shankaraachaarya pointed out that the entire
sa.nsaara or jiivatvam is superimposed on the adhishhTaanamm which is aatma.
Thus in adhyaasabhaashyam we have learned that the adhishhTaanam of
sa.nsaara is aatma. The entire jiivatvam is superimposed upon aatma. If we
have to remove sa.nsaara, it is removed by the swa adhishhTana j~naanam.
This implies that aatmaj~naanam alone will remove sa.nsaara. Hence for the

removal of sa.nsaara one needs aatma j~naanam and therefore inquiry should
be about aatman.
Therefore a puurvapakshi argues that we should be conducting aatmaa
vichaaraH where as Vyaasaachaarya writes athaato brahmagij~naasa. It should
have been 'athaato aatma jij~naasaa' - aatma vichaaraH karthavyaH. From
which we gain aatma j~naanam which removes the samaaraH. It is like inquiry
into the shell when we have to remove the snake in the rope-snake adhyaasa.
Hence why are you introducing brahman inquiry when we want to inquire into
the aatma j~naanam? - asks a puurvapakshi.
One answer is brahman is the same as the aatma. Hence brahman inquiry is
aatman inquiry. That is why in taittiriiya Upanishad it says, tat
vijij~naasasva in that place brahma vichaara is mentioned. In
bRîhadaaraNyaka - aatmaa vaa are shrotavyo, manthavyo, nidhidhyaaitavyaH,
there atmaa vichaara is mentioned. Thus Upanishads loosely use the two words
indicating that brahman and aatman are one and the same. Hence the first
suutra itself indirectly reveals brahma-aatma aikyam. This is the first
answer to show that brahma vichaara is the same as the aatma vichaara since
brahman and aatma are one and the same. In addition there is a declaration
in the Upanishhad as one of the mahavaakya-s. - ayam atmaa brahma - this
aatma is brahman. Thus equating the two.
The answer can also be presented in a different way also. When we say
brahman inquiry, one should not think that Brahman is a new substance to be
revealed by the scriptures. This is the biggest mistake a seeker commits.
When the scriptures introduce Brahman, we think Brahman is some new
substance to be known. That is why even after studying scriptures for years
and years together we look for Brahman in meditation. Some say I have
understood Brahman but I have not come across face-to-face with Brahman in
Meditation. We should very clearly understand that inquiry of Brahman does
not mean inquiry of something other than oneself as a new substance
unfamiliar. Brahman is not a new substance. The word Brahman indicates a new
status of mine which is already available called 'aham', I am. This can be
stated as 'aham, aham, aham iti, siddha ruupasya aatmanaH brahmatvam eva
brahma shabdena uchyate|' Hence when we say brahman knowledge, it is the
knowledge of brahmatvam status of mine - my paraprakRîti - now I am lost in
aparaa prakRîti - It is my own supreme status, currently I am lost in the
notion of inferior status due to superimposed limitations that do not belong
to me. Therefore 'brahma vichaaraH' should be translated as 'aatmanaH
brahmatva vichaaraH'. Brahman inquiry is to be understood as inquiry into
the Brahman (limitlessness) status of aatma, one's own self. If Brahman
status or brahmatvam is the new status of mine to be discovered, what is the
old status of mine? Jiivatvam is my present status. By discovering the
brahmatvam status, I discard my jiivatvam status, since that status is not
natural to me. This is similar to discarding sarpatvam ( snakeness ) status
of the object by learning its the rajjutvam (ropeness) status. Similarly
brahman inquiry means inquiry of ones own true nature, aatman inquiry.
Therefore athaataH brahma jij~naasaa is equal to athaataH aatma jij~naasaa
or athaataH aatmanaH brahmatva gij~naasa. This is the meaning of the word
'brahma gij~naasa'. Through this word, Vyaasaacharya indirectly reveals the
subject matter of Brahmasuutra, a requirement of the anubandha
chautashhTayam. Now connecting all these we have the first word atha
indirectly revealed 'adhikaari', who is a qualified student, the word 'ataH'
indirectly revealed prayojanam, the word brahma gij~naasa' indirectly
revealed vishhayaH. Thus three of the four anubandha chatushhTa are pointed
out.
------------------

End of Notes on BSB I-i-1-1F
Next the conclusion of this adhikaraNa.
Message 7100
From: K. Sadananda <sada@anvil.nrl.navy.mil>
Date: Wed Dec 13, 2000 1:27pm
Subject: Notes on BSB-I-i-1-1G
Notes on BSB I-I-1-1G

I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from Lord Shiva who
is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the middle and all
the way up to my own teacher.
We have completed analysis of all three words of suutra. However,

there is a fourth word which we have to supply to complete sentence.
The word is kartavyaa. kartavyaa means should be done. That is
inquiry should be done for aatmaj~naanam. Since the word is
implied,vyaasaachaarya omits the word for brevity. By using this
word, it is implied that there is a vidhi or a rule prescribed in
the upanishhads - aatmaa vaa are drashhTavyaH shrotavyaH , mantavyaH
, nididhyaasitavyaH - where the ending of each involve - tavyaH,
indicative of imperative mood meaning 'should be done'. The three
are replaced by one word 'kartavyaH'. kartavyaH should therefore be
understood as shrotavyaH , mantavyaH and nididhyaasitavyaH. Hence
one should do Brahman inquiry means one should do shravaNam , mananam
and nididhyaasanam.
Thus the final expanded meaning of the suutra is 'saadhana
chatushhTaya sampattyanantaram brahma-j~naanaaya vedaanta shravaNa ,
manana , nididhyaasanaani kartavyaani - yasmaat brahma-j~naanaat eva
mokshaH na tu karmaNaa '. That is 'after acquiring the four-fold
qualifications, one should do shravaNa , manana , nididyaasana of
Vedanta for the sake of brahma-j~naana because brahma-j~naanam alone
gives moksha, not karma'.

Now suppose anyone asks Vyaasaachaarya, 'what should I do?' Then

Vyaasaachaarya will ask a counter question - 'Have you already
acquired saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti - the four-fold
qualifications - in this life or in the past life?' - If you already
have like Nachiketa, then you can begin the inquiry into the nature
of Brahman using Vedanta as a tool. If not, my advice is to gain the
saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti by following the karma yoga and/or
bhakti yoga. This can be more easily done by following rules laid
down in puurvamiimaa.nsa for the karma and upaasanaa. If one has not
studied the puurvamiimaa.nsaa , then one can take the help of the
priests who have studied puurvamiimaa.nsaa and follow the rituals for
karma and upaasanaa. What is required is the saadhana chatushhTaya
sampatti, but how it is acquired is of less significance. Following
the strict rules laid down in puurvamiimaa.nsaa which involve do's
and don'ts one can gain mental discipline required that involve shama
, dama , etc. puurvamiimaa.nsaa helps but does not guarantee that
one will acquire the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. Karma yoga and
bhakti yoga are the most efficient methods to acquire the saadhana
chatushhTaya sampatti. We hear people complaining that "I have been
doing meditation and studying Vedanta for so many years and nothing
is happening to me?" - The problem is not with Vedanta but with the
lack of appropriate mental framework needed for the inquiry of
Brahman. It is like my studying the book on 'Quantum Mechanics' and
complain that I have not understood anything from that even though I
read it many times. It is not the fault of the book but lack of the
prerequisites to study the book. Hence Vyaasaachaarya advises us to
go back to our fundamentals and gain the prerequisite qualifications
so that when Brahman inquiry is done with that preparatory mind
through vedaanta vichaara , one can gain the knowledge of one's own
self.
Now the next question is, 'does that mean we should all stop Vedantic
study now?' Qualified people are very rare and the majority of us
are unqualified and therefore there is no use of continuing the study
of the 'Notes on Brahmasutra'. We should stop the notes on
Brahmasuutra and what we need now is the "Notes on Jaimini sutra" for
our study from the next week on.
The intention is not that. The idea is we should continue our study
of Vedanta while we continue to acquire, increase or intensify our
saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti. As the acquisition of saadhana
chatushhTaya sampatti intensifies, the study of Vedanta becomes more
and more relevant or significant or meaningful to our own
understanding of the nature of ourselves or Brahman. Without that,
it will become only an academic study. But even then, let it start
as an academic study. However, as I acquire slowly the four-fold
qualifications, even the so-called academic study will become very
relevant for my life. A causal approach becomes a serious approach
as the interest develops. A simple example is like a fellow who is
trying to connect an electric bulb to a receptacle. If the wires are
already 'live', as soon as the bulb makes a proper contact, it glows
instantly and the light emanated from the bulb removes the darkness
at the very instant the bulb made the contact. Suppose it is not a
live wire, since no electricity is passing through the wires.
Connecting the bulb will not make much difference in terms of
removing the darkness in the room. However that action is not in
vain. One can go back and slowly turn the switch on to pass the
electric current through the wires. The switch is like the modern

'dimmer switch'. Nothing will happen even after switch is on. One
has to turn slowly to higher power to get the light from the bulb.
The previously connected bulb, which was not glowing up to now, will
start glowing to its full glory, the moment the wires become fully
alive. He does not have to reconnect the bulb again. Vedanta
knowledge is like fixing the bulb needed to remove the darkness. If
the saadhanaa chatushhTaya sampatti is already there, then Vedanta
knowledge will help glow the light of knowledge that removes the
darkness of the ignorance. If not, gaining the Vedanta knowledge
will not be a waste; it helps slowly as we acquire the saadhana
chatushhTaya sampatti through karma and bhakti yoga. As our mind
becomes purer and purer by karma and bhakti yoga, the light of
Vedantic knowledge will intensify to convert j~naanam into vij~naanam
, praj~naa into sthirapraj~naa , paroksha j~naanam into aparoksha
j~naanam, pratibandhaka j~naanam into apratibandhaka j~naanam. Hence
we can continue our Vedantic study and the weekly Notes on
Brahmasutra and continue our aashrama dharma also, that is our
obligatory duties at various levels including personal, family and
society levels. Thus on one side we should refine our qualifications
and on the other side shravaNa , manana and nididhyaasana should
continue.
With this the word analysis of the first suutra is completed.
Next will be the conclusion of the first suutra with odds and ends!
7177
From: K. Sadananda <sada@anvil.nrl.navy.mil>
Date: Tue Dec 19, 2000 11:06am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-1H
Notes on BSB I-I-1-1H


Conclusion:
The final topic of the first suutra is conclusion. In the
conclusion, the same concepts are discussed in a technical format in
which the Brahmasuutra should be presented.
This may be more of an academic interest, but is worth knowing the
format used. Hence no new ideas will be discussed in this section
other than following a technical format for the presentation of
suutra literature. One can read as review of the topic.
In the introduction we mentioned that topics are discussed under the
heading of 'adhikaraNam'. In the first adhikaraNam there is only one
suutra and appropriately named as jij~naasaa adhikaraNam based on the
first suutra 'athaato brahma jij~naasaa'. Every adhikaraNam has to
be presented in a format that includes five factors starting from
vishhaya as outlined in the definition sloka given in the Notes I of
Brahmasuutra. These are 1. vishhayaH, the subject matter, 2.
vishayaH or sa.nshayaH or doubt, 3 puurvapakshaH, the view of an
opponent, 4. sidhhantaH, our conclusions and 5. sangatiH, the
connection of this topic with the overall. This format is called
adhikaraNa nirNayaH and Shankara follows this format with each
adhikaraNa.
For the jij~naasaadhikaraNam, the subject matter is Vedanta
shaastram. The doubt is 'vichaaraNiiyam vaa or na vichaaraNiiyam
vaa' , whether it should be studied or is it worth studying or not
worth studying? Should we receive this notes or not, or even if we
receive it, 'as some one complained recently that we are dumping on
his head', is it worth studying now, delete it or store it in a file
to study later as it is not of high priority right now; or complain
that we are unnecessarily targeted with something that we are not
interested and these is a violation of a law, etc.? These are doubts
that need to be resolved. The third factor is the puurvapakshaH the view of an opponent that should be presented along with his
reasoning as anumaanam. For example, we can present a puurvapaksha
in anumaana vaakyam as:
'vedaanta shaastram na vichaaraNiiyam, anubandha chatushhTaya
abhaavaat, vyatirekeNa dharma shaastravat.h |'
vedaanta shaastram should not be studied, since it does not have
anubandha chatushhTayam, unlike dhramashaastra.
Therefore according to a puurvapakshii, there is no anubandha
chatushhTayam (the four-fold requirements starting from adhikaarii
etc - see the Notes I-I-1-1A). In brief, this puurvapakshi argues
first that no adhikaari is ever possible. This is because viveka is
impossible, vairaagya no one has it, shama aadi shaTkasampatti nobody
seems to have it, including the so-called great sages of the lore who
cursed left and right, and nobody seems to have the intense desire
for moksha, the mumukshutvam. Hence saadhanachatushhTaya sampatti is
asambhavam or impossible. Hence there is no one who is adhikaarii.
There is no student who is qualified to study - such students are
available only in the books like kaThopanishhad and not in this world
and definitely not in this kaliyuga, when dharma is only on one leg.
Thus, the first factor in the anubandha chatushhTayam, i.e. a

qualified student, is not there.
We have problem also with the second factor i.e. subject matter Brahman - we are consistently discussing pages and pages about a
hare's horn, which is not there. How can there be a nirguNam vastu
at all for one to inquire about. And if we ask the question how to
know it, the answer we get is that ' we cannot know it' - and
upanishhad in fact declares that 'he who knows it knows not!' It is
different from the known and at the same time different from the
unknown, one cannot see it, hear it, speak about it or think about
it -and at the same time pages and pages are written about that which
is unthinkable and unspeakable. From all this, it is very clear that
it is just consistent brain washing. There is no such thing as
Brahman and it is just mere bhrama of the student and the teacher.
The teacher is confused and transmitting that confusion to his
student using very high sounding Sanskrit words which are self
contradictory with no substance, saying on one side 'He is smaller
than the smallest' and with the same breath contradicting that
statement by saying that 'He is bigger than the biggest'. And some
say He is aatmaa, but no aatmaa has been found anywhere in any body
by anybody. You say it is consciousness, there appears to be no
independent consciousness. Matter alone seems to be independent and
consciousness seems to depend on matter for its existence rather than
other way around. If you have any doubts look into discussions on
advaitin list serve during the months of August. Consciousness seems
to be an illusion happening in matter rather than the other way
around. Hence there is no such thing as Brahman or aatman and
therefore there is no subject matter to inquire into. Hence
adhikaarii naasti, vishhaya naasti - what about prayojanam - when
Brahman himself is not there what prayojanam we can talk about. It
is like the story in 'Emperor's clothes'!. Hence vedaanta shaastram
na vichaaraNiiyam - says the puurvapakshi.
siddhaanta anumaanam says, vedaanta shaastram vichaaraNiiyam,
anubandha chatushhTaayavatvaat, dharma shaastravat. anubandha
chatushhTaya is there. This means adhikaarii is there, vishhaya, the
subject matter is there and prayojanam and sambandha are also there.
Just because adhikaari-s are few, one cannot say adhikaari-s are nil.
This is true any time including in Krishna's time as declared in
Geeta - manushhyaaNaam sahasreshhu kashchit yatati siddhaye | - Of
the thousands of people very few are really interested in this Brahma
vidya.. Hence adhikaari-s are always few in number but not nil as
puurvapakshi claims. Similarly Brahman is there, since it happens
to be yourself. How can you negate Brahman? Brahman negation is
self-negation. Everyone knows that they are not mere matter - this
is my body, my mind and my intellect - the very statements indicate
that I am different from this body, this mind and this intellect. I
do not know who I am, yet I know I exist and I am conscious. I
enliven the body but body does not enliven me. People say when
someone dies that 'he is dead and gone', implying that he is
something different from the body to go somewhere else after the
death. I am not an object for someone to see, hear, feel or touch.
I am the very subject because of which the capacity to hear, feel,
think, etc. are possible in the enlivened matter. Only objects have
attributes or guNa-s, but I am not an object. I am the very subject
because of which objects are revealed or illumined by my
consciousness. I can not deny myself since I have to be there even
to deny myself. I can negate everything but cannot negate myself.
Hence I am the one who remains as the very substratum for every

thing. Brahman is not something different from me. Hence he is not
an object to have attributes. He is the very subject that I am.
Hence Brahman inquiry is the inquiry of the nature of one's own self
and thus the vishhaya of the Vedanta suutra-s. Prayojanam is also
there since it is moksha. It is freedom that I am inherently longing
for in all my pursuits in life. There are always some realized souls
existing at a given time even in this kaliyuga. Therefore sambandha
also exists. Hence the anubandha chatushhTaya is there, hence
Vedanta is vichaaraNiiyam, to be studied. Thus siddhaanta in the
adhikaraNa list is given.
The last requirement is sangatiH - the connection with the other
topics, particularly with the previous topics. Since this is the
first adhikaraNam, there is no connection to previous topic. Since
this adhikaraNam consists of the very first suutra, which is
anubandha or preface, it emphasizes the central theme of the whole
text as the inquiry of the nature of Brahman. By specifying the
pre-requisites for a student, it connects all other knowledge
required for a student to possess as the pre-requisites. This
completes the sangatiH and also the conclusion part of our analysis.
With this the analysis of the first suutra is over.
(A note: For Shankara the most of the puurvapakshi's are
non-vedantins, consisting of both aastika group and naastika group.
Post Shankara bhaashhyakaara-s, such as Shree Raamaanuja and Shree
Madhva have included Advaita philosophy as their puurvapaksha, in
fact their main puurvapaksha, since they have to reckon with the most
prevailing philosophy of their times, which is advaita, before they
establish their siddhaanta. It is fruitful to go into the discussion
of their major discussion of advaita and their objections to it. But
we will first complete Shankarabhaashhya so that we are better
equipped to address the issues that they have raised. )
We will next take the suutra 2 for discussions.

Msg #
Date: Wed Jan 3, 2001 1:41pm
Subject: Notes BSB I-i-2-1A
Notes on BSB: I-i-2-1A

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
----------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada I
janmaadi adhikaraNam 2
suutra 1 : janmaadyasya yataH |
Introduction:
After the upodghaata or introductory suutra, which indirectly deals
with the anubandha chatushhTayam or the four-fold requirements,
Vyasacharya begins the shaastram with the second sutra. The second
suutra belongs to second adhikaraNam. This adhikaraNam is known as
the janmaadi adhikaraNam because the suutra begins with the word
janmaadi. This adhikaraNam also has only one suutra. The suutra is
'janmaadyasya yataH'.
We will follow as usual the three-stepped approach; first the general
analysis, then specific word by word analysis and then the conclusion.
1. General Analysis:
The topic of discussion in this adhikaraNam is Brahma lakshaNam or
the definition of Brahman. Hence the second suutram is also called
Brahma lakshaNa suutram. There is a well-known statement in the
shaastra which says: 'lakshaNa pramaaNaabhyaam vastu siddhiH', which
means that any object is established only through two factors;
lakshaNam and pramaaNam. Only after the object is fully established
(siddham), there is a possibility for further inquiry into the nature
of the object. No inquiry can be done if the existence of the object
itself is not established. The inquiry in such a case can only be
limited to the extent whether such an object exists or not. Hence
vichaara or inquiry of an object presupposes the knowledge of its
siddhatvam or existence. Furthermore, even if an object can be
defined by its lakshaNam or definition that is not sufficient to
establish its siddhatvam or existence. In addition to lakshaNam, we
need a valid pramaaNam or valid means for knowing the object. For
example, even if someone provides a lakshaNam of a full moon in the
sky, that is not sufficient to establish the existence of a moon, if
I do not have the eyes to see. Hence we require at least two
entities for any inquiry, a lakshaNam and a pramaaNam. If either one
is present without the other, it is still useless for me to inquire
into that object. Even if I have the eyes to see (pramaaNam), I will
not know about the moon, unless I have the definition of the moon
that distinguishes it from many luminary objects in the sky. To put
in Sanskrit (one can skip these lines if you want, without losing the
continuity)
lakshaNa satve api, pramaaNam vinaa na vastu siddhiH |
pramaaNam satve api, lakshaNam vinaa na vastu siddhiH |
yatra lakshaNam cha vartate, pramaaNam cha vartate, tatra eva
vastunaH siddhiH |
Once the moon is established through the lakshaNam and pramaaNam one
can spend his whole lifetime, if he wants, inquiring into the moon.

Thus vichaara or inquiry presupposes siddhi or existence, and siddhi
requires both lakshaNam and pramaaNam.
1.1 lakshaNam and pramaaNam of Brahman:
We are discussing in Brahmasuutra -s about the inquiry into Brahman.
Inquiry into Brahman is possible only if there is such a thing called
'Brahman'. To know Brahman's existence therefore we need 'Brahma
lakshaNam and Brahma pramaaNam. Hence in the second suutra
Vyasacharya gives Brahma lakshaNam and in the third suutra he gives
Brahma pramaaNam. Only from the fourth suutra on, we get into Brahma
vichaara or inquiry.
In this context it is worth discussing Shankaracharya's comments at
the end of the first suutra. There Shankara asks a question - Is
Brahman known or unknown before we can talk about the inquiry of
Brahman? Purvapakshi comes and says either way the inquiry is not
required. If Brahman is unknown, how can one make an inquiry of an
object that one does not know. If I ask a student to inquire on
'gaagaabuubuu' and if none of us know what that blessed
'gaagaabuubuu' is or whether such a thing exists or not, then how can
one do any inquiry. If Brahman is already known, then one is already
a 'brahmaj~naani'. Then any further inquiry into Brahman is also
useless. Hence Brahmasutra need not be studied. There is an
interesting shloka in Vivekachudamani (shloka 59) to this effect.
avij~naate pare tattve shaastraadhiitistu nishhphalaa |
vij~naate api pare tattve shaastraadhiitistu nishhphalaa ||
If one does not know the Brahman, the study of the shaastra -s is
futile. Having known the Brahman, the study of the shaastra -s is
again futile.
In response to puurvapakshi, Shankara says, Brahman is not unknown.
It is known through Veda pramaaNa. Even the word 'Brahman', one is
conversant with only because of Veda-s. When a Vedic student studies
Veda, he comes to know that there is something called 'Brahman'.
Veda teaches him 'brahmavit brahma eva bhavati', 'brahmavidaapnoti
param', 'satyam j~naanam anantam brahma'. The very word 'Brahman'
indicates that the object in question is infinitely big, since the
word is derived from the root 'bRîh' meaning 'bRîhati' or
'bRînhati' - in the meaning of vRîddhi or expansion or bigness.
Hence the student comes to know that there is an entity which is very
big. Further Shankara says that the very word 'big' is a relative
word. The meaning of the word 'big', which is an adjective, itself
gets qualified by the noun that it qualifies. There is a big
mountain ahead if we say, not only the mountain is qualified by its
bigness, but bigness is also qualified by the word mountain in
relation to a normal size mountain. In contrast if we say there is a
big mosquito in my net, the bigness of the mosquito is qualified by
the normal size mosquito which is different from the normal size
mountain. The dimensions of the bigness for a mountain are different
from those of a mosquito, or an ameba. When upanishhad talks about
Brahman it uses the adjective 'big' as the noun itself, as The Big.
That is there is no noun to condition the bigness, as the big itself
is used as a noun. That is it is unconditionally big, meaning it is
infinite. Similarly we use existence not as an adjective but as a
noun referring to Brahman. Thus adjectives are used as nouns to
indicate that we are not talking about any object that is conditioned

but that which is beyond any conditioning. Hence Shankara says
through veda pramaaNa, one comes to know that there is infinitely big
entity called Brahman. Since all my experiences are about finite
things or entities and that one has never experienced an infinitely
big entity, one would doubt the existence of such a thing indicated
by Vedas. Hence to remove such a doubt the scripture says that
entity is nothing but one's own Self, the aatma. If so, I can never
doubt the existence of Brahman, since doubting the existence of
Brahman means doubting my own existence. Nobody doubts whether 'I am
or not', since the very doubt presupposes my existence. Doubter
cannot be doubted, because doubt cannot exist without a doubter.
Hence Shankara says 'na kaschit naahamasmiiti pratyeti', no one can
question his own existence. Hence there is no doubt regarding aatma
astitvam, and thus brahma astitvam, existence of Brahman. And such a
'Brahman', I come to know through veda pramaaNa. Therefore the
inquiry is into 'known Brahman' only and not unknown Brahman.
But puurvapakshi still questions, if you have already known Brahman,
why do you need to do inquiry? For that Shankara says that from
scriptures, I learn that Brahman is aatma. Hence one does not doubt
about the existence of oneself, but one still does not have complete
knowledge of oneself. One does not know 'who am I?' I do not have
clear knowledge of my self due to adhyaasa (See Ch. III). Because of
this reason only different philosophers have different notions about
I, the self. The chaarvaaka -s say 'I am the body'. The naiyyayika
-s say I am not the body, but the soul, which is all pervading.
There are many souls or aatma -s ,'aneka vibhu aatmaanaH', each one
is all pervading, but locused, one on each body and is kartaa and
bhoktaa. The saa.nkhyaa -s say, these all pervading multiple aatma
-s are not kartaa -s but only bhoktaa -s. Thus regarding 'who am I'
there is so much of confusion, and hence Shankara concludes that
inquiry is required. Thus Brahman is neither totally known nor
totally unknown, but it is unclearly known. Hence 'aapaata j~naanam'
or unclear or vague knowledge or paroksha j~naanam exists. Hence
Brahman inquiry is required to convert the unclear knowledge or
paroksha j~naanam into aparoksha j~naanam or clear and direct
experiential knowledge. Thus Shankara discusses in his introduction
to suutra 2, that there are pramaaNam and lakshaNam for Brahman.
1.2 taTastha and swaruupa lakshaNam-s:
The lakshaNam or definition is of two types; swaruupa lakshaNam and
taTastha lakshaNam. When an object is defined through its intrinsic
feature, that definition is called swaruupa lakshaNam. When an
object is defined through an incidental feature or a temporary
feature which is not intrinsic feature of the object, it is called
taTastha lakshaNam. The word taTastham consists of two words taTa
and stha. taTaH means the bank of a river, and sthaH means existing.
taTastham means that which remains in the bank of the river, hence is
not a part of the river and hence is not an intrinsic feature of the
river. An example that is given is 'prakRîshhTa prakaashhaH
chandraH' - moon is brightest luminary in the (night) sky.
Brightness of the moon is its intrinsic feature (forgetting the
science now) and hence it is swaruupa lakshaNam of moon. Likewise
satyam, j~naanam and anantam or aanandam - are swaruupa lakshaNam of
Brahman since they are the intrinsic feature of Brahman. The
definition of swaruupam lakshaNam is 'swaruupam sat vyaavartakam
swaruupa lakshaNam' that intrinsic feature of an object which reveals
or defines an object. Typical example of taTastha lakshaNam which

can be appreciated easily in America where most of the houses look
alike (indistinguishable swaruupa lakshaNam-s) is ' That house on
which a crow is sitting right now is John's house' - The sitting of a
crow is only an incidental feature of the John's house and not a
swaruupa lakshaNa of the house. The definition of taTastha lakshaNam
is 'kaadaachitkam sat vyaavartakam, taTastha lakshaNam', temporarily
that which pin-points is taTastha lakshaNam.
The taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman is 'jagat kaaraNam Brahma', Brahman
is that which is the cause of the universe. To decide if this is
taTastha lakshaNam or swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman, one should ask
if the world is an intrinsic feature of Brahman or an incidental
feature of Brahman. It is an incidental feature since before the
creation there is no world and after the desolation there is no
world. For videha mukta, the world is permanently not there. Hence
world is only an incidental feature of Brahman, thus a taTastha
lakshaNam of Brahman. The second suutram is presenting only a
taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman and we can say it is 'taTastha lakshaNa
suutra of Brahman'.
Next we take the general meaning and then word by word meaning of the suutra.
End of Notes on BSB I-2-1A
Msg #
Date: Mon Jan 8, 2001 2:05pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1B
Notes on BSB: I-i-2-1B
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada I
1.3 General meaning of the suutra:
The suutra grammatically is incomplete and we need to supply two
words to complete it. This is called ' adhyaahaaraH ', meaning
supplying the words required completing the suutra grammatically.
The full suutra is ' janma aadi asya yataH, tat brahma ' - one can

also add ' bhavati ' in the end, which is automatically implied in
Sanskrit. Meaning of the suutra is 'Brahman is that from which the
origin, etc., of the world takes place' - simply ' sRîshhTi aadi
kaaraNam, brahma '. The ' aadi ' or etc., includes ' sthithi ' and '
laya '. Hence the final meaning is ' jagat sRîshhTi, sthiti, laya
kaaraNam, brahma ', Brahman is that from which the origin,
sustenance and annihilation of the world takes place. (Shankara uses
the word bha~Ngam instead of laya since janmaadi is neuter gender and
to maintain the same neuter gender or a samaahaara dvandva compound).
Vyasacharya uses the pronoun ' asya ' and from the context it refers
to ' asya jagataH ', of this world or universe. The word ' yataH '
means yasmaat kaaraNaat - from which cause. tat brahman meaning that
is brahman. Hence the final general meaning of the suutra is
'Brahman is that cause, from which the origin, sustenance and
dissolution of the universe takes place'.
Being a nyaaya prasthaanam, every suutra must present a ' anumaana
vaakyam '. The nyaaya vaakyam that can be derived from this suutra
is: ' brahma asti, lakshaNa sattvaat, ghaTavat ' Brahman is
existent, because there is lakshaNam for Brahman, just as a pot. the
vyaapti vaakyam is, ' yatra yatra lakshaNa sattvam, tatra tatra
vastu sidhhiH '. Therefore brahma vichaara can be possible since
Brahman exists.
1.4 The vishhaya vaakyam for the suutra:
As discussed before every suutra must have a upanishhad statement or
statements that it should have based on which Vyasacharya formulates
the suutra. For this suutra the vishhaya vaakyam is from ' bhRîgu
valli ' of taittiriiya Upanishhad [III:i:1]. The mantra is :' yato
vaa imaani bhuutaani jaayante | yena jaataani jiivanti | yat
prayantyabhisa.nvishanti | tad vijij~naasasva | tad brahmeti |' This
bhRîgu valli statement is brahma taTastha lakshaNa vaakyam.
'Brahman is the sRîshTi kaaraNam, sthiti kaaraNam and laya
kaaraNam'. This is the vishhaya vaakyam of the second suutra. This
concludes the general analysis of the suutra.
2. Now word by word analysis of the suutra.
The first word is janmaadi, which is a compound word consisting of
janma and aadi. Janma referring to creation and aadi means etc.
referring to the sthiti or sustenance and laya or annihilation.
2.1 Objection 1.
A puurvapakshii comes forward and comes with a suggestion for the
meaning. Shankara has interpreted the janmaadi as the three-fold
aspect, janma, sthiti and layam or janmaadi trayam. Puurvapakshi
says that there is another book known as 'niruktam', the science of
etymology, authored by 'Yaaska'. In that, Yaaska points out that
every object in the creation goes through six-fold phenomenon and not
three. He calls them as ' shhaD bhaava vikaaraaH ', six-fold change
for objects or padaartham. While enumerating these six, Yaaska starts
with 'janma'. He says: 'jaayate, asti, vardhate, vipariNamate,
apakshiiyate, vinashyati', birth, existence, growth, modification,
decay and death. From that nirukta we came to know that every object
in the universe goes through janmaadi shaTkam. Hence the suggestion
of the puurvapakshii is that in the suutra, janmaadi means janmaadi
shaTkam, the six-fold aspect starting from janma in tune with

Yaaska's nirukta rather than janmaadi trayam, the three-fold aspect,
that Shankara proposes.
Shankara gives two answers for this objection.
First Yaska is a human being. Hence 'niruktam' is paurushheyam or
authored by a human. Hence the author can only talk about objects
within the creation and cannot discuss the creation of the whole
universe since the human intellect does not have an access to study
the jagat kaaraNam or the cause of the whole universe. For example,
Yaska cannot talk about the origin of aakaasha or space. He can
speculate about the origin but that is not pramaaNa or valid means of
knowledge. Hence his discussion can only be confined to bhautika
prapa~ncha or objects within the creation. Hence the six-fold aspect
that he discusses concerns only about the objects within the
universe. Here in the suutra we are discussing the origin of the
whole universe that includes the space and even time. Hence Yaska's
statement is irrelevant here.
For this puurvapakshii comes forward with counter statement. Why one
should dismiss Yaska text is as not valid pramaaNam? It can be a
valid pramaaNam just as smRîti (like Bhagavad geeta) text since it
is based on shruti and is not his intellectual product. Then, even
though it is paurusheyam, authored by a human, it gets validity as
pramaaNa similar to apaurusheya text. Hence Yaaska's statement about
the six-fold aspect can be taken as referencing to the entire cosmos
rather than just to objects within the cosmos. Hence Yaska's
statement should be relevant here.
For this Shankara says, even if Yaska's statement is taken as
pramaaNam, it has only the borrowed validity since it is presumably
based on the shruti statement. But the interpretation that is given
is based on direct shruti statement, which has intrinsic validity
and not the borrowed validity. Shruti talks about janmaadi trayam or
the three-fold aspect only and not the six-fold aspect. The
taittiriiya upanishhad mantra above very clearly states the
three-fold aspect and not the six-fold aspect. This is the first
answer to puurvapakshii.
The second answer is simple. Vyasacharya has written the entire
Brahmasutra for analyzing the Vedanta statements only and that is the
stated purpose of the Brahmasutra. Hence it is also called vedanta
suutraani or uttaramiimaa.nsa suutraani. Hence when Vyasa uses the
word 'janmaadi', one should give the meaning in tune with Upanishads
and not that in tune with Yaska's nirukta text or any other text.
Therefore 'janmaadi' in the suutra should refer to the three-fold
aspect involving creation, sustenance and annihilation. Then what
about the six-fold modifications that Yaska talks about? Since that
refers to the objects, which are within the universe, it is part of
the three-fold aspect discussed in the Upanishad mantra. Hence it is
included and not excluded from the three-fold aspect of the
Upanishhad statement. Hence the primary meaning of the 'janmaadi' is
the janma , sthiti and layam , and by implication it can include the
six-fold aspect discussed by Yaaska.
With this the objections of first puurvapakshii are answered.
2.2 Objection 2.

Now the arguments of a second puurvapakshi are as follows:
According to advaitin, the sRîshhTi , sthiti and laya are cyclic
processes and not a linear process. If this is linear, then advaitin
will be faced with more severe question, 'When all this began?'
Hence advaitin circumvented the problem by arguing that it is cyclic
process and therefore the question of beginning does not arise, since
every point in a cycle is both beginning as well as the end point.
The pramaaNam for that advaitin quotes:
avyaktaadiini bhuutaani vyaktamadhyaani bhaarata |
avyakta nidhanaanyeva tatra kaa paridevanaa || B.G.2-28
The beings are unmanifested before creation and unmanifested after
annihilation and manifested temporarily in between. Therefore why
grieve for such temporal things.
ayaktaad vyaktayaH sarvaaH prabhavanti aharaagame |
raatri aagame praliiyante tatraiva avyakta sanj~nake || B.G. 8-18.
All beings and things get manifested from their unmanifested state
when the creation starts (when Brahma's day starts) and return to
unmanifested form when the creation folds (when Brahma's night
starts).
Hence advaitins subscribe that sRîshhTi , sthiti and laya ,
creation, sustenance and annihilation are cyclic processes. Thus in
a cyclic process one can not claim which one of three is the
beginning. If so, puurvapakshii questions how did Vyasacharya say janmaadi asya jagataH, because the word -aadi - in Sanskrit literally
means beginning with. The secondary meaning only is etc. Hence the
literary meaning of the suutra should be - the three phenomenon of
the universe beginning with creation. Because of the cyclic nature,
why didn't suutra say, beginning with sthiti or beginning with laya
instead of beginning with janma, unless it is a linear process and
not a cyclic process?
Shankara gives two answers to this objection.
Even though it is a cyclic process and hence one cannot in principle
talk about the beginning in these phenomena, human comprehension
generally goes in a particular order. In the events there is no
order. But in our - pratipatti - or our understanding there is an
order. If I have to talk about the destruction or death of
something, it presupposes the existence of that thing. Hence its
laya presupposes its sthiti. Likewise, if I have to talk about the
existence of something, it presupposes its origin. Hence the
understanding of laya presupposes the understanding of sthiti and
which in turn presupposes the understanding of shrushhTi. Only after
the child is born, we inquire into whether it is surviving or dying.
Hence Shankara says understanding requires this logical sequence.
Thus what Vyasacharya presents is - pratipatti kramaH - the order in
understanding the phenomenon.
The second answer is that Vyasacharya is writing the suutra keeping
the shruti vishhaya vaakyam in his mind. Even though there is no
order in the sRîshhTi , sthiti and laya , shruti gives a particular
order. Hence the choice of the order is dictated by the shruti
vaakyam itself. In addition similar order is discussed in several

shruti texts. For example, B.G 11-2 starts - bhava apyayau hi
bhuutaanaam , meaning the sRîshhTi and laya of the beings.
With this the analysis of the word janmaadi is completed.
End of Notes on BSB I-I-2-1B.
Msg #
Date: Wed Jan 17, 2001 6:51am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1C
Notes on BSB I-i-3-1C
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada 1
Next the Analysis of the word - asya:
The word -asya - is a pronoun meaning, of this'. Vyasacharya does not
specify what noun this pronoun stands for. It can be any noun, noun
being that which can be conscious or unconscious entity or object.
Since Vyasa has not specified any particular noun, we should include
all the nouns in the universe as indicated object of the pronoun,
asya. That is, the word asya should denote -sarvasya jagataH. Further
Vyasacharya used the pronoun -of this - and not -of that or (tasya).
According to grammar the pronoun -this- is used for something
available or accessible in front. Hence this indicates - pratyaksha
gocharasya - or pratyaksha prapanchasya -of the world that is seen in
front.
The sixth case or shhashhTi (of this') should be connected with the
previous word - janmaadi or sRîshhTi, sthiti and laya. Hence
combining with the previous word we get the meaning -pratyaksha
prapanchasya sRîshhTi, sthiti, layaH - the origin, sustenance and
annihilation of the visible or objectifiable universe.
This completes the meaning of the word -asya.

The next word is -yataH:

Shankara gives the meaning for yataH as yasmaat kaaraNaat, from which
cause all these (the origin, sustenance and annihilation of the
objectifiable universe) take place. Now the question comes, which
kaaraNam the shruti is referring to? We know that cause or kaaraNam
is two-fold; nimitta kaaraNam, and upaadaana kaaraNam, the
intelligent, and material cause. Since Vyasacharya is talking about
sRîshhTi, sthiti and laya kaaraNam, we can say that word kaaraNam
should refer to upaadaana kaaraNam or material cause. This can be
seen readily as follows:
We find in general nimitta kaaraNa or the intelligent cause is only
responsible for the creation of a thing. It is not responsible for
the existence and annihilation. For example, if kulaalaH, the potter,
is responsible for the existence or for the survival of the pot, then
one has to buy potter along with pot. If so every maker of an object
then will come with the material object for its existence. Since that
is not the case, nimitta kaaraNam is defined as sRîshhTi maatra
kaaraNam or cause for the creation only. Whereas the material cause
is defined as sRîshhTi, sthiti, laya kaaraNam. It is the material
cause that sustains the object and into which the object merges
during its destruction. In this particular suutra the word janmaadi
refers to sRîshhTi, sthiti and laya and not just to sRîshhTi alone,
the kaaraNam or cause should therefore refer to the material cause or
upaadaana kaaraNam. The primary meaning of the yataH is upaadana
kaaraNam.
Now to give complete meaning of the suutra we can say - yasmaat
upaadaana kaaraNaat, pratyaksha prapanchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH
sambhavanti, tat upaadaana kaaraNam brahma. Because of which material
cause, the origin, sustenance and annihilation of the objectifiable
universe occurs, that material cause is Brahman.
Later upon inquiry, we find that the cause of the universe or jagat
kaaraNam is and has to be only one. In the case of worldly objects
one can afford to have a separate nimitta kaaraNam and a separate
upaadaana kaaraNam. Since we are discussing about the entire universe
that includes desha and kaala, time and space, it cannot have two
separate causes. (maayaakalpita desha kaala kalanaa vaichitrya
chitrii kRîtam ... - Shankara's dakshiNamuurti shloka). That cause
which is beyond desha kaala the cause should be - ekam eva advitiiyam
- one only without a second. If it has to be one, it itself should
serve as upaadaana kaaraNam and nimitta kaaraNam. Hence the second
implied meaning for yataH is - nimitta kaaraNam cha - the intelligent
cause also. Hence the final meaning of yataH is - abhinna nimitta
upaadaana kaaraNaat - non-differentiable intelligent and material
cause - To put in a complete statement (one can skip this if one
wants) - yasmaat abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat asya pratyaksha
prapanchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH sambavanti, tat abhinna nimitta
upaadaana kaaraNaM brahma. That from which the origin, sustenance,
annihilation takes place, that undifferentiable intelligent and
material cause is Brahman.
In the upanishhad statement that this suutra refers to varuNa, the
teacher, told his student, bhRîgu, that (X) from which this universe
originated, that (X) by which this universe is sustained and that (X)
into which this universe dissolves is to be known - that is Brahman.

Thus the teacher gave only taTastha lakshaNa and not swaruupa
lakshaNa and it is up to bhRîgu as his homework to solve for that X.
That is left for the student to inquire and find out what is that X.
bhRîgu being an intelligent student (like us!) he goes through the
process of inquiry - First he comes up with a solution -annam
brahmeti vyajaanaat -annam or food is Brahman since scripture says annaat purushhaH - since all beings are born out of food, sustained
by food and goes back into food. But the teacher sends him back to
inquire further. Upon further inquiry he comes up with another
answer- praaNo brahmeti vyajaanaat - All these beings are born of
life, sustained by life and go back into life. Further inquiry leads
to - mano bramheti vyajaanaat - mind is the cause for the creation,
sustenance and dissolution since when there is the mind there is the
world. - vij~naanam brahmeti vyajaanaat - Intelligence is the root
cause for the universe, since without intelligence universe cannot be
created - But teacher sends him back to further inquiry. Ultimately
this inquiry culminates with the knowledge that (T.U. 3-6)
aanando brahmeti vyajaanaat.h | aanandaat hi eva khalu imaani
bhuutaani jaayante | aanandena jaataani jiivanti | aanandam prayanti
abhisamvishanti iti | saishhaa bhaargavii vaaruNii vidyaa | parame
vyoman pratishhTitaa | ya evam veda pratitishhTati | Determined that
happiness, fullness or limitlessness, aananda, is Brahman. From the
limitlessness these beings are born, these beings are sustained, and
into which these beings get dissolved. This is the knowledge
belonging to bhRîgu and varuNa. This is established in the supreme
space (its very basis). Those who know it, are fully established (in
knowledge).
Thus finally bhRîgu discovered that the X-factor, because of which
origin, sustenance and dissolution takes place, is of the form
aananda swaruupam brahma, is limitlessness or infiniteness or pure
bliss. This is the swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman. (Pl. Refer to the
discussion before of the difference between swaruupa and taTastha
lakshaNa). jagat kaaraNam is the taTastha lakshaNam of Brahman,
aanandaH is the swaruupa lakshaNam of Brahman. Hence the word yataH
in the suutra further means - aananda swaruupaH brahma.
Thus three meanings are provided for the word yataH - first as the
upaadaana kaaraNam, material cause then as the nimitta kaaraNam,
intelligent cause and now aananda swaruupam cha, limitlessness or
bliss state.
Now recapitulating the whole meaning of the suutra - yasmaat
prapanchasya abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat aananda swaruuupaat
prapanchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH sambhavanti tat abhinna nimitta
upaadaana kaaraNam aananda swaruupam brahma bhavati. Thus the word
yataH refers to abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNam
(non-differentiable material and intelligent cause) which is the
taTastha (incidental) lakshaNam and aananda swaruupam which is the
swaruupa (intrinsic) lakshaNam of Brahman. Primarily it indicates the
taTastha lakshaNam, but indirectly it indicates the swaruupa
lakshaNam also. Hence the suutra is called Brahma lakshaNa suutra.
With this we conclude the analysis of the word yataH.
Now two more words are left which are supplied to complete the suutra
- tat brahma, that is Brahman. We have already seen three features upaadaana kaaraNam, nimitta kaaraNam and aananda swaruupam. To this,
Shankaracharya adds one more feature of Brahman. Once we know that

there is an intelligent cause, the extent of intelligence involved
can be inferred from the nature of the product. The more intricate
and sophisticated the product is, the more the intelligence involved
in creating that product. For example, seeing the sophisticated
computer we can infer the intelligence that was behind the creation
of that computer. Shankara says, if one sees the nature of the world,
its vastness, its wonders, its vibhuuti, then one can definitely
conclude that Brahman or the intelligent cause for this whole
creation must be sarvaj~naH, omniscient and sarva shaktimaan,
omnipotent. All laws that are discovered and that are yet to be
discovered by scientists are within the creation. A scientist does
not invent a law, he only discovers the laws that are already there.
In an absolute sense, there is nothing really that is man-made, since
the possibilities for a man to make already exists within the
creation. Incidentally when Brahman is seen as the cause, he gets
named as IswaraH. To establish the sarvaj~natvam, sarveshwaratvam
(supreme Lordship) and sarvashaktitvam, Shankara beautifully
expresses in his bhaashyam about the glory of this universe by giving
four adjectives. From the glory of the universe the glory of the
creator of such universe can be inferred. Shankara says:
asya jagataH naama-ruupaabhyaam vyaakRîtasya,
aneka kartRî bhoktRî samyuktasya,
prati niyata desha kaala nimitta kriyaa phala aashrayasya,
manaso.api achintya rasanaa ruupasya,
janma sthiti bha~Ngam, yasmaat sarvaj~naat sarva shakteH
kaaranaat bhavati tat brahmeti vaakya cheshaH |
This will be explained below, step by step. Shankara says, it is a
well-designed universe (naama-ruupaabhyaam vyaakRîtasya), which
means it cannot be explained that it accidentally formed by some big
bang. Hence an intelligent being is required for such an ordered
thermodynamically well behaved system with universal laws governing
the system. Furthermore this universe consists of- aneka kartRî
bhoktRî samyuktasya - countless jiiva-s who are karta-s and
bhokta-s. By this Shankara indicates that all the varieties and
countless jiiva-s fall within the creation as a product, and hence
the creator must be a non-jiiva. Thus jiiva-bhinnatvam (Iswara
different from jiiva) is indicated by the statement. He must also be
omniscient because - prati niyata desha kaala nimitta kriyaa phala
aashrayasya - there are no accidents in the creation. Every event is
an incident triggered by specific time, place and reason. Hence it is
a cosmos and not chaos, as every event depends on - prati niyata
desha kaala nimitta - specific place, time and reason. Thus we call
an incident as an accident only when we, with limited intelligence,
cannot comprehend the reason. If we take countless number of jiiva-s
present, every jiiva is going through a series of experiences with
every experience is conditioned by desha, kaala and nimitta. One
cannot imagine the amount of intelligence and data base required to
run this master show in insuring that every experience of every jiiva
is not randomly based but in tune with specific desha, kaala and
nimitta. In addition we find that there are certain events which are
common to many jiiva-s that Lord has to design the event in such a
way that one and the same event should give punya phalam (results of
merits) and paapa phalam for another jiiva-s (result of demerits).
For example, for some people this posting of these notes is a
blessing indeed while some people felt and even complained that it
was nuisance thrust on their heads. Thus Bhagavan has to design each
event in such a way that He has to gather some to exhaust their

merits and some others to exhaust their demerits by the same event.
As the story goes, in the Air India accident that occurred few years
ago, many passengers who were originally scheduled to fly in a
different flight ended up in that flight since they missed their
original flight. At the same time some that were originally scheduled
in that flight missed that flight due to delays in their connecting
flights. When the flight took off, those who made must have been
happy and those who missed the flight must have been cursing their
fate. But the fates turned around when accident took place. Bhagavan
has to make sure only those that are qualified, enter into that
flight. This is just an example. This is true with every experience
that involves more than one jiiva. Thus every experience is from one
reference a result of punya or merits and some other reference result
of paapa or demerits. Thus every event is designed according to karma
phala of not just one jiiiva but countless number of jiiva-s. It is
not only the human beings but Lord has to take into consideration the
merits and demerits of innumerable jiiva-s, including the karma phala
of a mosquito which is trying to collect its hard-earned quota of
delicious food in a serene spiritual environment when you are trying
to meditate on the Lord, in the very early morning.
Rest of the analysis in the next post.
-----------------End of Notes on BSB I-i-2-1C
Msg #
Date: Wed Jan 24, 2001 2:12pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-2-1D
Inadvertently an uncorrected version got posted in the morning. Here
is the corrected version. (These passive voices are useful, aren't
they, to put the blame on non-free will factors!). Please substitute
the new version in place of the old. The contents, of course, remain
the same, since it is 'vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam' (the
transformation is only apparent in the name and form) and we are
advaitins!
Notes on BSB I-i-2-1D

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

samanvaya adhyaaya - I
We are discussing Shankara's description of the Iswara in terms of

sarvaj~natvam.
Shankara in his description uses another adjective- manasaa api
achintya rachanaa ruupasya. A scientist can possibly determine how
the brain functions, but he cannot recreate such a complex organ. The
Lord not only has omniscience - the know-how of how to create but to
implement that knowledge or execute that technology. That is, He has
enough power and skill to produce such a complex creation. One can
see and destroy an ant or bug easily or swallow the whole chicken in
few minutes after frying it. But to produce such a complex living
entity that can reproduce itself is unimaginable and we can not but
admire that great designer and executor. Hence Shankara says He is
sarva-j~na and sarva-shaktimaan due to sarva kaaraNatvaat - cause for
everything.
This is the final meaning of the suutra 2. To summarize the whole
thing - the meaning is yasmaat abhinna nimitta upaadaana kaaraNaat ,
aananda swaruupaat , sarva-j~naat , sarva shaktaat , pratyaksha
prapa~nchasya sRîshhTi sthiti layaaH sambhavanti , tat brahma.
Because of which the non-differentiable intelligent and material
cause, which is of the form of pure bliss, omniscient, omnipotent
cause for creation, sustenance and dissolution of the visible
universe - that is Brahman.
With this Shankara concludes his commentary on the second suutra.
After the conclusion he enters into another discussion by introducing
a puurvapaksha or objection from nayyayika -s (nyaaya philosophers).
Because of its importance we will discuss that aspect here.
The first suutra says that we have to do Brahman inquiry. This can
be done only after it is established that there is something called
Brahman. To establish Brahman, it was said that - lakshaNa
pramaaNaabhyaam vastu siddhiH - we need a lakshaNam or a definition
and pramaaNa and means of knowing it. The second suutra provides
that lakshaNa for Brahman and the third suutra will provide pramaaNa
required. In the third suutra it is said that the pramaaNam for
Brahman is shaastram - shaastra yonitvaat . Now nayyaayika comes up
with a suggestion. He says why cannot one take the second suutra
itself as a pramaaNam for Brahman also. According to him, the second
suutra defines Brahman or Iswara as jagat kaaraNam, cause for the
world. Since jagat kaaraNam is Brahman, conversely jagat is kaaryam
of Brahman. That is if Brahman or Iswara is defined as the cause or
kaaraNam, then the world is the effect or kaaryam of Iswara
(nayyayika-s use Iswara instead of Brahman). Hence naayayika-s say
that the invisible Iswara can be inferred from the visible world just
as the invisible fire can be inferred from the visible smoke. Hence
nayyayika-s say the pramaaNam for Iswara can be simply anumaanam or
inference or logic. This anumaanam is popularly known in tarka
shaastra as - kaarya li~Ngaka anumaanam - the inference of invisible
kaaraNam or cause from visible kaaryam , or effect. From this
nayyayika arrives at a conclusion that shaastra pramaaNam is not
required to prove the existence of Iswara. Logic itself can do the

job without the need of shaastra. Generally it is understood that if
direct perception, pratyaksha, can establish an object, then we do
not need logic. Likewise, if pratyaksha cannot but logic can do the
job, then we do not need the next one, shabda pramaaNa to establish
the object. Hence nayyaayika -s argue that there is no need for
shaastra pramaaNa to establish Iswara.
Advaitin as well as other vedantins would not agree for that. Iswara
cannot be established by pure logic without the help of shaastram.
There is a radical difference between taarkika and the vedantin. For
taarkika the logic is the primary means of knowledge with regard to
Iswara and shaastra is only of secondary importance while for
Vedantin it is the other way around (see Notes I for reference). We
will analyze this in detail since the relative roles of shaastra
pramaaNa versus anumaana pramaaNa will be established from the point
of two different philosophies, aastika -s vs. naastika -s.
nayyayika-s argue that we do not need shaastra to prove the existence
of the Iswara. Just as when we see a person, even though we do not
know any thing about his parents, we know that he must have parents.
The very presence of an effect presupposes the existence of the
cause. Hence if there is a product there must be a producer whose
existence I can infer. Since the world or jagat is seen, there must
be a creator, Iswara. Thus by inference or anumaana, I can know the
existence of Iswara without the need of shaastra -s. Hence for
establishing Iswara or Brahman, anumaanam can serve as pramaaNam and
shaastram is not required - this is nayyaayika's argument.
Shankara says it is not so. The second suutra does not provide
anumaana pramaaNam for brahma siddhi or iishwara sidhhi. Shankara
gives a simple reason for this, but the subcommentators provide
additional reasons. The argument is as follows. Vyasacharya does
not propound a new philosophy by using his reasoning power. This is
in contrast to many of darshanams (see Ch.I-for details) where the
basis of their new philosophy is the or anumaana pramaaNa. These
include saa~Nkhya, yoga, nyaaya, vaisheshhika, etc. all of which
propound new philosophies primarily based on tarka or anumaanam; and
Shankara calls all of them together as taarkika -s. They accept the
shruti pramaaNam only as subservient to anumaaNa. Uniqueness of
Brahmasutra is Vyasacharya does not establish the philosophy through
reasoning. He uses reasoning not to propound a new philosophy but
only to derive a cogent systematic philosophy of the Vedas. Hence
every suutra has got one or many Vedanta vaakyam -s or vishhaya
vaakyam -s as its basis. If one claims that the second suutra
establishes Iswara by anumaana pramaaNa then the very purpose of
Brahasuutra is defeated. Hence Shankara uses a beautiful line which
is often quoted and which was provided in Ch. I - vedaanta vaakya
kusuma grathanaarthatvaat suutraaNaam - every suutra is providing an
anumaaNam or reasoning alright but this reasoning is not an
independent anumaanam. It is used only to bring out the Vedantic
teaching in cogent form. It is like a thread to create a necklace or
garland of the flowers of vedaanta vaakyam -s. Here the garland is
the vedaanta darshanam and the flowers are the veda vaakyam -s.
The,tarka - thread is only hiding behind the flowers as subservient
factor and has no independent utility other than tying the flowers
together to form a beautiful garland of cogent vedantic philosophy.
Hence the second suutra does not provide an independent anumaana
pramaaNa but it is there to analyze the vedaanta vaakyam quoted
before: "etova imaani bhuutaani jaayante ...." to provide lakshaNa

suutra but not pramaaNa suutra. - This is the simpler answer
Shankara gives. The subcommentators provide further arguments.
It is clear from their puurvapaksha , nayyaayika -s believe that
Iswara can be logically established. Vedantins vehemently disagree
with nayyayika -s in this aspect. Vedantins strongly believe that
Iswara or Brahman is revealed through shaastra alone. For Vedantins,
Iswara that is revealed through shaastra can be assimilated through
logic. In the discussions that follow we will see that nayaayika -s
use anumaana pramaaNam to establish Iswara and Vedantins take the
position like that of DMK politicians in Madras to show that their
logic is defective.
Now nayyayika -s arguments: They deduce Iswara through three
anumaanam -s or logical statements. (See Ch. II for discussion of
anumaana pramaaNa.) 1. kshitya~Nkuradhikam (or jagat) sakartRîkam,
kaaryatvaat , ghaTavat . - That is, the world must have a creator,
because it is an effect or product like a pot. The vyaapti vaakyam
for this is - yat yat kaaryam tat tat sakartRîkam , that is,
whatever is product, it must have been created (by a creator). From
this anumaanam, they deduce first that there is a creator. 2. The
second anumaana vaakyam is, jagat kartaa iishvaraH , jiiva bhinnatve
sati chetanatvaat , vyatirekeNa kulaalavat. In this anumaanam ,
nayyayika establishes that the creator must be Iswara alone, because
no jiiva can create this world and since the creator has to be an
intelligent or conscious being. Since there are only three entities,
jiiva , jagat and iishvara , conscious intelligent being other than
jiiva is only Iswara, and hence the creator of this world has to be
Iswara. This is called paarisheshha nyaaya , the logic by elimination
and residue. It is unlike a pot-maker, since like example cannot be
given as it is one of a kind. The vyaapti vaakyam is yat jiiva
bhinnatve sati chetanam tat iishvaraH - whatever is conscious being
other than jiiva that must be IswaraH. 3. The third anumaana vaakyam
is - iishvaraH sarva-j~naH sarva-kartRîtvaat vyatirekeNa kulaalavat
- that is IswaraH is omniscient since he is a creator of everything
unlike alpa-j~na kulaalaH or our good old pot maker who has knowledge
of only how to make a pot. The vyaapti vaakyam is yatra sarva
kartRîtvam tatra sarva-j~natvam api bhavati. This is called
lakshaNa li~Ngaka anumaanam. Thus nayyayika logically establishes
sarva-j~na iishvaraH, omniscient Lord. Therefore he argues that
existence of Iswara can be established logically and we do not need
Vedas to do that. A modern day rational intellect is more happy with
a nayyayika than a Vedantin who relies on shaastra which requires a
faith.
Vedantin claims all these anumaana vaakyam -s or logical statements
are defective. Let us examine the first anumaanam - jagat
sakartRîkam, kaaryatvaat, ghaTavat - the world is a creation because
it is a product, like a pot. For this nayyayika uses a vyaapti
j~naanam - yat yat kaaryam sakartRîkam, wherever there is product
there must be a creator - example is like a pot. Every anumaana
vaakyam must require a vyaapti and this vyaapti vaakyam (statement
expressing concomitant relationship between hetu and saadhya - see
Ch. II) is derived from pratyaksha pramaaNa only. anumaanam requires
vyaapti j~naanam and vyaapti j~naanam is established by pratyaksha
pramaaNam alone. If vyaapti j~naanam is established by another
anumaanam then that second anumaanam requires another vyaapti and
this leads to infinite regress problem. It cannot be by shaastram
either, since nayyaayika -s have already rejected shaastra pramaaNam.

Like the example we gave in Ch. II - yatra yatra dhuumaH tatra tatra
agniH - this vyaapti j~naanam is arrived only by pratyaksha pramaaNam
only - or by direct observation. vyaapti arrived by observation is
valid only if it holds good in all the cases. Hence wherever there
is a smoke there is a fire is a valid vyaapti but the converse
wherever there is fire there is smoke is not a valid vyaapti, since
it does not hold good all the time.
Now Vedantin argues - if you say where there is product there is a
creator - this is proved by pratyaksha only if the products are
man-made. How about natural products - there the creator for these
products are not perceptually proved. Therefore the defect in the
first anumaana is vyaapti asiddhiH since there is no pratyaksha or
direct observation of the creation of the universe by Iswara.
Let us examine the second anumaana - jagat kartaa iishvaraH , jiiva
bhinnatve sati chetanatvaat , vyatirekeNa kulaalavat - Iswara is the
creator of jagat, since He is a conscious entity different from jiiva
. For this vyaapti j~naanam involves establishing that wherever there
is a conscious being other than jiiva is involved, it must be Iswara.
That means the vyaapti statement involves a presupposition of the
existence of Ishwara who is other than jiiva. But vyaapti j~naanam
must be gathered by pratyaksha pramaaNam only or by direct perception
since nayyayika has already discarded shaashtra pramaaNam . But
through perception we cannot talk about a conscious being other than
jiiva. Hence the second anumaanam is also defective since vyaapti
vaakyam cannot be established by pratyaksha .
Now the third anumaana: iishvaraH sarva-j~naH sarva-kartRîtvaat
vyatirekeNa kulaalavat - Iswara is omniscient since He is the creator
of everything. Now to negate this anumaana we need to examine some
'axioms' that nayyayika -s have assumed in developing their
philosophy. nayyayika-s say that every knowledge is born out of
mind. - yat j~naanam tat manojanyam - This axiomatic statement is
made since they depend heavily on the perceptions and inferences for
their philosophy. There may not be any problem with this statement
but in a different place they make another statement which appears to
be unrelated to this - iishvaraH asshariiraH - that is Ishwara does
not have body- that statement includes sthuula suuksham kaaraNa
shariiraaNi - gross, subtle and causal bodies - which obviously
includes the mind which is part of subtle body. The reason they took
mind away from Iswara is of their presumption that wherever there is
mind there is sa.nsaara - since Ishwara cannot have sa.nsaara, He is
made devoid of mind. Since according to nayyayikaa 's own
statements - that the mind is required for j~naanam and Iswara does
not have mind - hence it follows that Iswara being mind-less cannot
have any knowledge leave alone the sarva-j~natvam. This defect is
called - swa
abhyupagama virodhaH - defect involving self-contradiction or
contradicting ones own statements. Thus Vedantin proves that
nayyayika -s third anumaanam is also defective. (For the record,
these arguments are from the commentary called puurNaanandiiyam by
Purnananda Saraswati which itself is a commentary on bhaashya
ratnaprabhaa by Govindananda Saraswati which is in turn a comentary
on Shankara Bhashya).
Hence anumaanam which is based on pratyaksha cannot be a pramaaNa for
establishing Ishwara, who is beyond the human perception and hence
beyond inference. Iswara established by anumaanam can be negated by

anumaanam. Hence shaastra alone is the valid pramaaNa for that which
is beyond the perceptual knowledge. If vedantin uses logic it is
blessed by shaastram - shruti sammata tarkeNa iishvara sidhhiH, na tu
kevala tarkeNa , or shushhka tarkeNa iishvara sidhhiH. That is logic
supported by the shaashtra is only valid for entities that cannot be
established by direct perception. The logic supported by direct
perceptions are invalid to establish Iswara since He is beyond direct
perception.
One more point Shankara makes in his bhaashyam. The discussion does
not mean that tarka is totally useless in the inquiry. Shankara
emphasizes that tarka is important when properly used with the
support of shaastra. - shrotavyaH , mantavyaH , nidhidhyaasitavyaH the word mantavyaH indicates tarka is imporant for understanding
Vedanta. In fact the whole Brahmasutra is called nyaaya prasthaanam
- logical analysis of upanishhad -s. Hence the use of tarka as
subservient in understanding Vedanta. Shankara gives the reason why
tarka is important in Vedanta. He contrasts the karma kaandam and
j~nana kaandam - in karma kaanDa tarka has got a limited role.
There procedures of rituals is more important - what should be done
rather than why should it be done - There the knowledge of a ritual
does not produce the results - performance of the ritual does. The
benefit is the result of accomplishment of a ritual in time or
time-bound. Hence Shankara's language - karma-kaandasya
saadhya-vishhayatvaat karma pradhaanam , j~naanam apradhaanam - since
it deals with something to be produced in future doing is important
and knowing has only an indirect role. Suppose if moksha is
something to be produced in future then like karma kaanDa, procedure
is important than knowledge - hence people say I have studied Vedanta
and now I have to practice or do more practice - some meditation or
something else. Shankara says this is the common misconception.
Vedanta does not deal with a future event - the result of a process
or procedure. We are not learning any procedure, any technique or
method of meditation through Vedanta or implement something after
Vedantic study. It is dealing with the fact of moksha - which is an
accomplished fact! - which one has to understand. The whole
Vedantic saadhana is only a process of understanding and there is
nothing to implement after understanding. With the understanding the
end is accomplished. Whatever the obstruction in understanding need
to be eliminated. One of the obstruction is the intellect itself in
the form of sa.nshayaH or doubt - Hence tarka or mananam is very
important - it is not an independent tarka but to remove the
intellectual obstacles created in assimilating the Vedantic teaching.
Hence tarka serves in the understanding the Vedantic teaching and in
assimilating that teaching as one's own. There is nothing to do
after understanding since the very understanding involves - I am
akarthaa and abhoktaa. - I have nothing to do as I am ever
liberated. - Hence Shankara says shruti is imporant, yukti is
important and finally anubhava , which involves assimilating the
knowledge as one's own, is important. anubhava is important only
because our samsaara is present only in the form of anubhava - I am
limited, I am small, the helplessness- the feeling of inadequacy, the
misery due to that feeling, the doubt about oneself, the doubt about
the teaching of Vedanta, etc. The moksha is freedom from these
sensations - the puurNatvam , the samatvam - it is not anubhava or
experience in the form of mystic experience that comes and goes, but
anubhava in the form of full freedom from all limitations. The
understanding is complete when the sa.nsaara bhaavana or vipariita
bhaavana goes away- Hence the benefit of this understanding is HERE

and NOW - That I am eternally free and never was bound for any
process of un-binding required. Hence inquiry is to be done using
shaastra sammata tarka .
With this Shankara's commentary on the second suutra is over. Next
the conclusion part.
Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and can be accessed at

http://www.egroups.com/files/advaitin/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.
Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected.
Msg #
Date: Wed Jan 31, 2001 10:10am
Notes on BSB I-i-2-1E
Now the conclusion of the Second suutra.

First the technical presentation of this adhikaraNam :
For this adhikaraNa
vishhayaH : The subject matter is brahma lakshaNam , the definition
of Brahman.
sa.nshayaH : The doubt - Since we are asked to inquire into Brahman,
who is Brahman or what is Brahman in order to begin the inquiry - Is
Brahman defined, if so, what is the definition? These are the doubts.
puurvapaksha : - There is no definition for Brahman and hence no
inquiry can be done. This is because a definition has to be such that
it has to be through a unique feature that identifies that object

from the rest of the objects in the world. Otherwise it cannot be a
valid definition. asaadhaaraNa dharmaH lakshaNam - Unique feature of
object forms the definition. Since Vedantin says Brahman is
featureless, puurvapakshii asks how featureless Brahman can have
unique feature to have a definition that distinguishes Him from
everything else. Upanishads in fact declare that Brahman is
undefinable. yato vaacho nivartante apraapya manasaa saha - na tatra
chakshur gachchhati na vaak gachchhati - Since scriptures themselves
declare that Brahman cannot be defined, puurvapakshii says brahman
lakshaNam naasti - there cannot a definition for Brahman.
siddhaanta: brahma lakshaNam asti - there is a definition for
Brahman. Even though Brahman is really featureless, we can define
Brahman through superimposed features, adhyasta dharma satvaat ,
through mithyaa features. It is just like defining our rope as the
substratum for our snake, even though the rope is snake-less.
Similarly through the superimposed jagat or the world, Brahman can be
defined as jagat kaaraNam, even though Brahman is beyond kaaraNa
-kaarya sambandha , cause-effect relationship. Hence lakshaNam asti
is the siddhaanta.
sa~Ngati : This concerns the connection between this and the previous
topic. The previous topic relates to the fact that one should inquire
into the Brahman. The connection between this and the previous topic
technically is called ' aakshepa sa~NgatiH '. It means the first
topic leads to an objection, which is answered in this second topic.
Since Brahman inquiry is required and without proving the existence
of the Brahman one cannot do such an inquiry and to prove the
existence we need - lakshaNa and pramaaNa . Hence to prove the
existence of Brahman the second suutra fulfils the lakshaNa
requirement.
That ends the technical part of the format.
Some additional important points will be considered now:
1. It was mentioned before that the suutra - janmaad yasya yataH
primarily refers to taTastha lakshaNam rather than swaruupa
lakshaNam. In the same upanishhad, where the statement - yato vaa
imaani bhuutani jaayante .... which forms the vishhaya vaakyam for
this suutra, there is also a statement that can provide the swaruupa
lakshaNam for Brahman - satyam j~naanam anantam brahman. A question
can be raised as to why Vyasacharya choose taTastha lakshaNa for the
definition of Brahman in this suutra rather than swaruupa lakshaNam
since both are available in the same upanishhad.
The answer lies in the fact that in the case of Brahman, it is easier
to understand Brahman initially through the taTastha lakshaNam than
swaruupa lakshaNam. The reason is that in the taTastha lakshaNam we
are using an external features which are easily available and
perceptible and which are known to every one. Thus one transcends
from the known to the unknown. When we use swaruupa lakshaNam ,
satyam j~naanam anantam , the very intrinsic feature of satyam (pure
existence) or j~naanam ( nirvisheshha chaitanyam , objectless
consciousness) is not easily perceptible or available or known to the
inquirer. It will be like defining one unknown thing using another
unknown. Hence Vyasacharya chose taTastha lakshaNam for Brahman.
2. The suutra 2 provides the definition of Brahman primarily as the

upaadaana kaaraNam or the material cause of the universe. In
upanishhads the Brahman is often said to be the material cause of the
universe. But at times we find maayaa or prakRîti was presented as
the material cause of the universe. maayaa.n tu prakRîtim viddhi
maayinaa.n tu maheswaram - swetasvatara upanishhad - maaya is the
prakRîti, which is the material cause. In the Mahanarayana Upanishad
there is a famous sloka (12-5) that says:
ajaam ekaa.n lohita shukla-kRîshhNaaM bahvii.n prajaa.n janayantii
saruupaam.h |
ajo hyeko jushhaamaaNo.anusheto jahaatyenaa.n bhuktabhogaamajo.anyaH ||
This mantra is going to be elaborately analyzed later - for the time
being it will suffice to know that it describes maayaa (unborn
female) endowed with sattva , rajas and tamo guNa -s as the material
cause. It is associated with two types of jiiva -s one, the
unrealized souls who are fascinated by her and are attached to her,
and two, the realized souls who, having enjoyed her, reject her by
getting detached from her. In Bhaagavat Giita (13-19) says:
prakRîtiM purusham chaiva viddhyanaadii ubhaavapi |
vikaaraa.nshcha guNaa.nshchaiva viddhi prakRîtisambhavaan.h ||
prakRîti and purushha are the two beginningless principles and the
creation has come out of prakRîti.
Thus sometimes the upanishhads say Brahman is the material cause and
sometimes the prakRîti as the material cause. Now of the two which
is really the material cause. There is a big difference if one says
Brahman or purushha is the material cause then the chetana vastu or
conscious entity is pointed out as the cause. But if prakRîti is
the cause then it is achetana vastu or inert entity is pointed as the
cause. Question boils down to ' chetanam kaaraNam vaa achetanam
kaaraNam vaa ". Here Vyasacharya has chosen Brahman as the material
cause and does not mention about the prakRîti. This choice of
Vyasacharya has got lot of significance. Because of this aspect only
this suutra has a great significance.
We will present here few arguments why Vyasacharya chose chetana
brahman as the material cause for the world.
1. Vyasacharya wants to clearly distinguish Vedantic teaching from
Sankhya philosophy. Emphasis of the distinction between the two was
felt important for (a) Sankhya was prevalent at that time and (b)
many of the words are common between the two philosophies. In Sankhya
philosophy they use the word ' purushhaH ' meaning chaitanya aatma or
conscious self. In vedanta also the word purushha is used
extensively. Gita 13-19 the example above uses the word ' purushha '.
In kaThopanishhad also - ' avyaktaat tu paraH purushhaH purushaanna
param ki.nchit ' - The word prakR^riti is also used in Sankhya and
Vedanta as triguNaatmika achetana vastu , unconscious matter has
three guNa -s. More than that the very word Sankhya is used to
indicate Vedantic teaching. In Bhagavatam the Sankhya teaching is
given by Kapila who is incarnate of the Lord Vishnu to his mother,
Devabhuti. Sankhya philosophy is also expounded by Kapila who is
different from Bhagavatam Kapila and this Sankhya philosophy is
different from Vedanta. To provide distinction between the two,
Vyasacharya chose the particular suutra. Sankhya philosophy says
achetana prakRîti is the material cause of the universe. Vyasacharya
uses this as a key suutra to differentiate Vedanta from Sankhya

philosophy by stating clearly that chetana brahman is the material
cause of the universe.
2. In all the systems of philosophy the fundamental question is about
the material cause of the universe. From where did the universe come?
Even science is trying to address this issue either in terms of the
Unified Principle or some Big Bang Theory. Almost all philosophies
arrived at achetana tattvam as the basic material cause for the
universe. For example, for Sankhya and Yoga philosophies, achetana
prakRîti is the basic material cause. Nyaaya and Vaisheshika claim
that atoms or paramaaNu as the basic material cause. They are called
paramaaNu vaadaH , may be close to modern science. paramaaNu -s join
together under appropriate conditions to form grosser and grosser
matter leading to the formation of jagat or the universe. paramaaNu
-s are also achetanam and hence their theory also falls under
achetana kaaraNa vaadaH. Even the naastika systems of philosophies
they subscribe to achetana kaaraNa vaada each with different names;
pa~ncha skandha -s in Buddhism, astikaaya -s in Jainism etc. Modern
science also assumes matter (or energy) alone is fundamental, no life
at the time of Big Bang - particles or sub-atomic particles
agglomerate to form bigger molecules and life (conscious entity)
originated more recently out of matter that too accidentally when the
conditions became conducive for it. Thus in most of the philosophies,
consciousness is either existing parallel to the matter, or a product
of matter. Even the Vedic philosophies such as - vishishhTaadvaita
and dwaita subscribe to the theory that achetana and chetana
padaartham existing parallel but independent of each other eternally.
Interestingly in nyaaya vaisheshhika philosophies even aatmaa is
considered as one of the nine types of matter. Consciousness is a
property of aatmaa . Hence in principle almost all philosophies are
achetana kaaraNa vaadaH , whereas advaita vedaanta stands out as the
most unique philosophy which presents chetana kaaraNa vaadaH where
the consciousness is the superior to matter as the primary cause or
the universe of matter. ( vishishhTadvaita and dvaita vedanta -s
differ from advaita in the sense that they subscribe achetana tattva
, prakRîti , as the material cause while chetana tattva , iishwara ,
as the instrumental cause. iishwara being all pervading He pervades
the acetana tattva as well as the chetana jiiva -s - jiiva satyam ,
jagat satyam and paramaatma satyam . The first two are not
independent but depend on paramaatmaa who pervades both, yet
remaining separate). Uniqueness of the advaita vedaanta is its
chetana kaaraNa vaadaH, consciousness is the very essence of the
universe. That means it is the very substratum or content of the
universe and there is no matter other than chaitanyam . Hence the
second suutra presents, Brahman, chetana swaruuupa as the material
cause. Through this suutra Vyasacharya distinguishes Vedanta from
all other systems of philosophies not only Sankhya but also Yoga,
Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Bouddha, Jaina, Charvaka, etc. as well as modern
science etc.
3. No doubt upanishhads point at some places Brahman as the material
cause, at other places prakRîti as the material cause. Vyasacharya
as the basis for the very first chapter as samanvaya or consistency
establishes starting with suutra 2 that upanishhads declare
predominantly that Brahman is the material cause of the universe.
This in fact may be considered as the essence of the first chapter of
the Brahmasutras.
4. The question then arises how can upanishhads teaching contradict

itself by declaring at one side Brahman as the material cause and
other places prakRîti is the material cause. Actually there is no
contradiction. According to upanishhads, prakRîti does exist
independent of purusha (it is a-swatantram or para-tantram and not
swa-tantram ). Since maayaa is non-separate from brahman , whatever
is attributed to maayaa or prakRîti can be attributed to Brahman
also. (As noted before in the context of creation we are using
Brahman and Iswara are synonymous). Technically we say in Vedanta,
prakRîti is the pariNaamii upadaana kaaraNam but brahman is vivarta
upaadaana kaaraNam . The definition of vivarta upaadana kaaraNam is
that which lends its existence to the pariNaama kaaraNam , parinaamii
upaadaana kaaraNa adhishhTaanam vivarta upaadaanam . Likewise the
definition of achetana vastu is anyaadhiina satvam and anyaadhiina
prakaashhatvam tat jadam - whose existence and illumination depends
on the other (conscious) entity. In contrast, the definition of
chetana vastu is swayam prakaashhatvam or swayam chaitanyatvam ,
self-existent and self-conscious entity. Hence there is no
self-contradiction in the upanishhads since prakRîti does not exist
separate from purushha. In contrast in Sankhya philosophy prakRîti
is independent of purushha. This is the basic difference between the
two philosophies. In Vedanta purushha and prakRîti are inseparable
like ardhanaariishwara, half shiva and half paarvatii together as
one, or like naarayaNa with lakshmii always carrying her on his
chest). Since prakRîti is a-swatantram or dependent in Vedanta,
hence at places where prakRîti is mentioned as the material cause
upanishhads ultimately imply only that Brahman is the material cause.
This aspect Vyasacharya emphasizes in this suutra by declaring that
Brahman is indeed the material cause.
5. In MunDaka and Chandogya one important topic is discussed and that
relates to - eka vij~naanena sarva vij~naanam - by knowing one, one
can know everything. This is possible because upaadaana kaaraNa
vij~naanena sarva kaarya vij~naanam bhavati - by knowing one material
cause all the products are known. This is because the products do not
exist separate from its material cause just as bangle cannot exist
separate from gold. And in the process, the upanishhads for gaining
sarva vij~naanam teach the student the brahma j~naanam or the
knowledge of Brahman. In Gita Krishna says:
j~naanam te.aha.n savij~naanam idam vakshyaamyasheshhataH |
yaj j~naatvaa neha bhuuyo.anyat j~naatavyam avashishhyate ||
I am going to teach you (Arjuna) brahmaj~naanam completely. Knowing
this there will be nothing else left for you to know.
If suppose prakRîti is the material cause then knowing prakRîti,
sarva vij~naanam will not come. But if Brahman is the material cause
then knowing Brahman, sarvavij~naanam will come. Since the first one
does not result in sarva vij~naanam , it follows that Brahman has to
be the material cause knowing which everything should be known. (when
naarayaNa comes lakshmii also comes with Him, but if one goes after
only Lakshmi alone one gets ruined just as it happened to raavaNa ).
Hence brahma j~naanena sarva vij~naanaM bhavati is essential truth
discussed both in Mundaka and Chandogya. This is possible only if
Brahman is the material cause of the universe. This is indirectly
implied by Vyasacharya by the emphasis of Brahman as the material
cause of the universe in this suutra.
Hence the second suutra is a very significant suutra which presents

the chetana kaaraNa vaadaH , which is the uniqueness of the vedaanta
shaastram. It is not there in any of the aastika as well as naastika
darshanam -s and is unique to Vedanta, particularly to Advaita
Vedanta.
With this discussion of the second suutra is over.
Next we take the third suutra that belongs to third adhikaraNa.
Msg #
Date: Thu Feb 8, 2001 12:35pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-3-1A
Notes on BSB I-i-3-1A
shaastrayoni adhikaraNam -3
suutra 1: shaastrayonitvaat
The third suutra is shhastrayonitvaat. - This belongs to third
adhikaraNam , which again has only one suutra. This suutra will be
interpreted in two different ways. It is the glory of a suutra to
have the possibility of more than one interpretation (see sutra
definition in Ch. 1 that discussed about vishvatomukhatvam , and this
suutra is an example for that. We will first study the first
interpretation and come back and study the second interpretation.
The general analysis, the word by word analysis and the conclusion of
the suutra, for each interpretation, follow:
1. General analysis.
The essence of this suutra is that it confirms the omniscience of
Brahman which is directly revealed in the second suutra , brahma
sarvaj~natvam dRîDhayati. The second suutra said Brahman is the
sarva kaaraNam or jagat kaaraNam. Since sarvasya kartaa sarvaj~naH,
it indirectly implied that Brahman is sarvaj~naH or omniscient. This
omniscience is derived because of the nimitta kaaraNam or intelligent
cause of the jagat (rather than upaadaana kaaraNam - see discussion
related to suutra 2.) Vyasacharya confirms the omniscience of

Brahman in the third suutra by pointing out that Brahman is the
creator of the Veda-s also. shaastra yoni means Veda kartaa, the
creator of Veda-s. kartaa means here the nimitta kaaraNam, the
intelligent cause. In the second suutra, Brahman is described as the
nimitta kaaraNa of the entire world and in this suutra it points he
is the nimitta kaaraNam of all the Veda-s which includes all the
knowledge. One can say in the second suutra, nimitta kaaraNam of
artha prapa~ncha is pointed out and here the nimitta kaaraNam of
shabda prapa~ncha, veda-shabdaanaam api kartaa, is pointed. How does
this reveal the omniscience of Brahman? Shankara says Veda contains
all knowledge, both paraa and aparaa vidyaa , ephemeral as well as
transcendental knowledge. There is no branch of science, which is
not discussed in the Veda. Veda-s that are known today considered as
insignificant in relation to what was there before. Much was lost.
It was said that Sama Veda had 1000 shaakhaa -s or branches of which
very few are remaining now. Many branches of Veda are known to be
extinct now. Even from Shankara's time to now, in the span of 1300
years many portions are lost, since we cannot find Vedic source of
some of the quotes of Shankara. Hence Shankara says vedaH
sarvaj~naH. From this Shankara makes a logical statement or vyaapti.
That is, the author of a text invariably knows more than the contents
of the text. This is because one can never express everything one
knows in verbal form in one's authored text. Hence the inference is
brahma sarvaj~nam, sarvaj~nkalpa veda kartRîtvaat, vyatirekeNa asmad
aadivat ! Brahman is omniscient, since He is the author of the Veda
that have all knowledge, unlike all of us! (since there is no like
example!)
An incidental point to be made for technical reason. It is accepted
by Vedantins that Veda-s are anaadi and apaurushheyam , not created
by anyone. If Veda-s are not created by any one intellect then how
can one say that Brahman has created these Veda-s. This is not a
contradiction since when we say Brahman created Veda-s it does means
Brahman has intellectually invented veda-s, like Valmiki writing
Ramayana. This knowledge was already there in a potential form.
Brahman only brought the teaching to manifestation, like the
creation. The world was existing in potential form and creation is
only manifestation of that existing in a potential form - avyaakRîta
prapa~nchasya vyaakaraNam sRîshhTiH . Similarly the Vedic
knowledge, it was anaadi, or beginningless. It was in potential form
in Brahman itself. In this aspect, Vedanta differs from nyaaya
system of philosophy, which states Bhagavaan created the Veda-s.
vishhaya vaakyam for this suutra: The vishhaya vaakyam is from
Brihadaranyaka 2-4-10 in maitreyii braahmaNam . In this particular
mantra Brahman is said to be creator of not just the world but Veda-s
also: sa yathaa aardra edhaagneH abhyaahitaat pRîthak dhuumaaH
vinishcharanti evam vaa are asya mahataH bhuutasya niHshvasitam etat
yat RîgvedaH, yajurVedaH, saamavedaH, atharvaa~NgirasaH, itihaasaH
...etc. When a wet fuel is burned the smoke comes out effortlessly
and listen Oh! Maitreyii! it is like breathing out - niHshvaasaH that
is effortlessly (niHshvasita nyaaya or liila nyaayaH - effortlessly
like breathing or play) Breathing occurs naturally even when we are
engaged actively in other actions and we not even aware that we are
breathing. Hence it is said the creation of all veda-s Rîg, yajur,
saama and atharvaNa etc. are done effortlessly by Bhagavan. This is
symbolized by Lord Vishnu lying as vaTapatra shaayee - breathing in
and breathing out the whole universe - unmanifestation to
manifestation. Based on the above mantra Vyasacharya writes -

shaastrayonitvaat.
Next the word analysis:
There is one compound word shaastrayonitvaat - shaastra yoni shaastra means Veda. The entire Veda is called shaastra. shaasanaat
traayate iti shaastram - the teachings and commandments (such as
satyam vada, dharmam chara etc - all are in imperative mood). The
commands are mostly in the puurva bhaaga in the first portions where
do-s and don't-s are discussed. In the end portion of the Veda-s the
shaasanam implies the revelations - the statement of facts - the fact
is you are Brahman - it is one thing that one does not have to work
for - svataH siddham - an accomplished fact. In our whole life we
strive for moksha and shaastra comes and tells us that this is one
thing you do not have to strive for in life! When shaastra says
'You are Free" - what commandment is there? - it is just a statement
of fact. Thus through these two - commandments in the karma kaanDa
and revelations of facts in j~naanakaaDa shaastra does is traayate,
protects people from sa.nsaara. The second word is yoni - it has
several meanings and in this context it means nimitta kaaraNam,
author or creator of the Veda-s.
With this the word analysis is also over.
Now conclusion:
In this we discuss the five aspects associated with an adhikaraNam.
1. vishhayaH or subject matter - the subject matter for this
adhikaraNam is also Brahman.
2. sa.nshayaH or doubt - the doubt is whether Brahman is the author
of Veda-s too or not.
3 puurvapaksha - Brahman is not the author of the Vedas- why? vedasya anaaditvaat - since veda-s are beginningless. Whatever is
created has an end - Veda-s are eternal - vedasya nityatvaat, anaadi
nidhanaa vaak - Hence it is not created.
4 siddhaanta - Even though Veda is anaadi or beginningless, we
discuss the beginning of Veda as a state of manifestation and
unmanifestation exactly like the world. The whole Veda in
unmanifested state is considered as just the o~Nkaara. Hence OM is
considered as the essence of Veda. yaH chhandasaam RîshhabhaH
vishvaruupaH | chhandobhyaH adhyamRîtaat sambabhuuva | saH maa
indraH medhayaa spRîNotu | - .. T.U. 1-4
By churning the Veda-s Brahmaji took the essence of veda-s and that
is the OM -kaaraH. The OM -kaara was there as shabda in the
aakaasha or space in the very beginning of the creation. (In the
beginning was the word). If OM is the essence of Veda-s, Brahman is
the essence of OM - OM iti ekaaksharam brahma. Manifestation from
unmanifest is considered as creation and hence there is nothing wrong
in saying that Brahman is the creator of the Veda-s since He is the
cause for its manifestation.
5. sa~NgatiH - the connection is said to be aakshepa sa~NgatiH,
meaning this adhikaraNam answers an objection raised particularly by
puurvamiimaa.nsaka based on the previous adhikaraNam. In the
previous adhikaraNam Brahman is said to be sarva kaaraNam. The

objection that one can accept Brahman is the kaaraNam for everything
except the Veda-s since Veda is anaadi. In this suutra the aakshepa
is answered with the emphasis that Brahman is sarva kaaraNam
including Veda. Hence that Brahman is sarvaj~nam or omniscient is
established through this suutra.
This completes the first interpretation of the suutra.
End of Notes on BSB I-i-3-1A
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/ for personal study.
Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected
Msg #
Date: Thu Feb 15, 2001 12:30pm
Notes on BSB I-i-3-1B
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
--------------samanvaya adhyaaya - I
spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya samanvaya paada - i
shaastrayoni adhikaraNam - 3
suutra : shaastrayonitvaat
The second interpretation of the suutra: Let us assume that we are
studying the suutra once again as fresh - As before we will follow
the general analysis, the word analysis and the conclusion.
General Analysis:
In the second suutra Brahman is defined as jagat kaaraNam , the cause
of the universe. We called it as a brahma lakshaNa suutram. We
established before that (1) we need a pramaaNam along with lakshaNam
to establish Brahman,(2) the second suutra does provide only a
lakshaNam and not an anumaana pramaaNa as claimed by nayyayika -s and
finally Veda-s alone can provide the shabda pramaaNam to establish
Brahman. This idea is conveyed by this suutra. The general meaning

of the suutra - shaastra yonitvaat means shaastra vishhayatvaat -It
means the Brahman is the subject matter of Vedanta alone as it is
beyond the scope of logic. This can be stated as - brahma na
anumaana vishhayaH, shaastra vishayatvaat , dharmavat that is Brahman
cannot be the subject matter of the logic, it is the subject matter
of shaastra alone which is apaurushheyam , like puNyam or merits. In
the first interpretation Vyasa states that Brahman sarvaj~nam ,
shaastra kart^Ritvaat . In the second interpretation Vyasa states
that Brahman na anumaana gamyam , shaastra vishayatvaat . yoni means
source and in the first interpretation it is the source (author) of
Vedas and in the second interpretation it is source for knowledge of
Brahman.
vishhaya vaakyam for the suutra :
It is again from bRîhadaaraNyaka from shaakalya braahmanam (debate
between yaaj~nvalkya and shaakalya) and is the basis for this second
interpretation- tantu aupanishhadam purusham pRîchchhaami - Here the
word purushha means Brahman - After yaaj~nvalkya successfully
answering all the questions of shaakalya, yaaj~nvalkya asks shaakalya
a counter question about nirguNa brahman which is only known through
neti, neti, not this, not this. In that context the above statement
is made where aupanishhadam purushham means upanishhad eka vedyam
brahman , that Brahman which can be known only through upanishhads.
Also in shaanti paaTha we chant - sarvam brahmopanishhadam - Brahman
that includes everything is to be known through upanishads, thus
providing additional reference as vishhaya vaakyam. We chant the
shaanti paaTha (saama veda eg kena & chhaandogya upan.) as
sarvam brahmaopanishadam maaham brahma niraakuryaam |
maa maa brahma niraakarot |
aniraakaraNamastu aniraakaraNam me astu |
tadaatmani nirate ya upanishatsu dharmaaste mayi santu |
Because Brahman is not available as an object for analysis or can be
established by anumaana, let me not reject Brahman. Let me accept
the shaastram and through the shaastram let me know Brahman.
Now the word analysis.
shaastra has the same meaning as veda or vedaanta and yoni means
source of knowledge or pramaaNam . Grammatical difference is also
there between the two meanings. In the first interpretation it is
tatpurusha samaasa or compound - shaastrasya yoniH kartaa brahma ,
Brahman is the author of shaaastra. In the second interpretation it
is bahuvriihi samaasa or compound - shaastram yoniH pramaaNam yasya
tat , shaastram is the means of knowledge of that which is Brahman.
( A little digression: To see the difference between the tatpurusha
and bahuvriihi samaasa - a story is told - an intelligent beggar
approached a king and said - aham cha tvam cha raajendra lokanaathau
ubhaavapi | bahuuvriihi samaaso.aham shhashhTii tatpurusho bhavaan ||
Oh! King, myself and your self, both are lokanaatha -s
(world-masters) - before the King become furious, the beggar
continued, in my case the word lokanaatha should be split into
bahuvriihi samaasa and in your case it should be tatpurusha samaasa.
In the tatpurusha samaasa lokanaatha means lokasya naathaH - the
master of the world. In the case of bahuvriihi samaasa, lokanaatha
means lokaH naathaH yasya saH lokanathaH - the one for whom the world

is the master. Similar story is told about rameshwara linga - the
linga that Rama worshiped. Rama interprets as tatpurusha that is
raamasya iishwaraH, the Lord of Rama; and Shiva interprets as
bahuuvriihi samaasa that is raamaH iishwaraH yasya saH, the one for
whom Rama is the Lord.)
In bahuvriihi samaasa, shaastra yoni means shaastra pramaaNakam or
shaastra vedyam which implies that it is shaastraa vishhayaH ,
brahman - Brahman is the subject matter of shaastram. Hence it is
not available for anumnaana pramaaNam.
Conclusion:
vishhayaH - subject matter is still chetana kaaraNam brahman .
sa.nshayaH - doubt - Is Brahman knowable through anumaaNam or not anumaana vishhayam vaa , na , - can consciousness be studied
objectively by a scientist.
puurvapaksha - brahma anumaana vishhayaH - it is within the scope of
objective science - jagat kaaraNatvaat, ghaTa kaaraNabhuuta mRîdvat
. The cause for the world just as the clay is the cause of a pot.
siddhanta - brahma na anumaana vishhayaH - Brahman is not subject of
anumamaana because it is shaastra vishhayatvaat , because it can be
known through shaastra alone. Hence we have a definition for veda
(given by Sayanacharya),
pratyaksheNaanu mithyaiva yas tu upaayena budhyate|
yenam vindati vedena tasmaat vedasya vedataa ||
Veda means that which gives the knowledge of such a subject matter
which is not available for any other means of knowledge such as
pratyaksha, anumaana, anupalabdhi, upamaana, arthaapatti.
sa~NgatiH : Connection between this and the previous adhikaraNam. The
connection between these two is technically called - eka phala
kartavya sa~NgatiH. both adhikaraNam -s have a common goal or
benefit - it is brahma siddhiH - Existence of Brahman is to be
proved before proper inquiry is done. We have said already that to
prove existence of any thing, we need lakshaNam and pramaaNam . The
second adhikaraNa gives lakshaNam and this adhikaraNam gives
pramaaNam.
In summary connecting all the three adhikaraNam -s we can say that
jagat kaaraNam brahma j~naanartham vedaanta pramaaNena vichaaraH
kartavyaH | - Brahman, who is the cause for the Message 8254 of 8529 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ] Message Index
Msg #
Date: Wed Feb 21, 2001 11:44am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1A
Notes on BSB I-i-4-1A

samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .
suutra 1: tat tu samanvayaat.h .
The fourth adhikaraNam also has one suutram. This adhikaraNam is
called samanvaya adhikaraNam based on the suutra tat tu
samanvayaat.h . First the general analysis, then the word analysis
and then the conclusion.
General Analysis - This suutra is the key or important suutra based
on which the entire first chapter containing 134 suutra -s is
developed. This being the fourth suutra , one can consider the rest
of the 130 suutra -s that follow are only an elaboration of this
suutra alone. Based on this suutra only, the first chapter is named
as samanvaya adhyaayaH . The second suutra - janmaad yasya yataH is
the foundation suutra on which the entire Brahmasutra is based. The
entire first chapter is based on this fourth suutra. Thus we find
among the first four suutra -s two very important suutra -s. Thus
according to a tradition if a person cannot study the entire
Brahmasutra, at least one should study the first four suutra -s. The
first four suutra -s put together is known as chatuH-suutrii . There
are many books just dealing with these four suutra -s or
chatuH-suutrii alone. In the third suutra Vyasacharya has mentioned shaastra yonitvaat - and we saw two meanings for this - shaastra
kaaraNatvaat and shaastra vishhayatvaat. Of these two, we will be
taking now the second meaning for further development. shaastra
vishhayatvaat means Brahman is the central theme of Vedanta shaastram
.
Now the question is how one can say that Brahman is the central theme
of Vedanta shaastram ? When many topics are discussed in a
shaastram how can one arrive at the central theme or topic among all
the topics that are discussed. Sometimes the central theme is very
evident but often it is not. For example, in Bhagavat Gita, various
topics, karma yoga, bhakti yoga, j~naana yoga are discussed.
Krishna in fact emphasizes while discussing each one as if that
particular yoga is the most important among all others. If so, what
is the central theme of Bhagavat Gita? Normally a shaastra should
have only one central theme and the rest of the topics become
subservient to that theme. If there are more than one theme, then it
is considered as a defect according to miimaa.nsaka -s, and the
defect is called ' vaakya bheda doshhaH '. There is a big
controversy regarding Gita as to what is the central theme - karma
or bhakti or j~naana. Several scholars consider karma is the
central theme while bhakti and j~naanam are subservient (in contrast

to Bhagavatam where bhakti is the central theme). Shree Ramanuja
emphasizes Bhakti as the central theme while karma and j~naanam are
subservient, and Shree Shankara emphasizes j~naanam while the other
two are subservient to j~naanam. If one includes impartially all
the yoga-s, then one can say that yoga shaastra or brahmavidyaa is
the central theme of the Giita. The question that remains is how
does one determine which is the central theme of a given shaastra ?
If author is available or has written a commentary on his own work
then the question can be easily answered. Veda-s being
apaurushheyam the author is not readily available to answer. In all
these cases our acharya-s have pointed that there is one method by
which a central theme can be arrived at. The central theme is the
one that fulfils
one important condition and that is called ' samanvayaH '. It is a
technical term, which will be analyzed in detail when we come to the
word analysis. SamanvayaH means taatparya vishhayatvam or nearest
translation to the word is consistency or a compromised meaning is
'importance'. Next question that arises is how does one know which
theme enjoys the importance. The answer is it is that which fulfills
six factors of proofs called ' shhaD li~Ngaani '. Vyasa says Brahman
is the central theme since it fulfills the six factors of proof. The
general meaning of this suutra is Brahman is the central theme of
Vedanta shaastram because it enjoys the importance ( samanvaya ).
This idea can be presented as anumaana vaakyam - brahma vedaanta
shaastra vishhayaH, samanvayaat , dharmavat . Brahman is the
central theme of the upanishads since it enjoys the samanvaya just
as dharma in the puurvamiimaa.nsaa.
The vishhaya vaakyam (the upanishhaD vaakya on which this suutra is
based on) for this suutra consists of the entire upanishhaD mantra
-s since we are talking about importance of the entire vedaanta
shaastram. This concludes the general analysis of the suutra.
Now the word analysis.
There are three words - tat tu samanvayaat . We have to supply the
fourth word for the completion of the statement and that fourth word
is shaaastrayoni . The complete suutra reads tat tu shaastrayoni
samanvayaat. The meaning is that the Brahman is the subject matter
of Vedanta because it has importance. tat means that - a pronoun
that stands for a noun. Since no other noun is specified here it
refers to whatever noun that was discussed in the three previous
suutra -s is the noun that is being referred to here. That noun is
Brahman since discussion of the three previous suutra-s are centered
on this noun only. In the first suutra Brahman is discussed as an
object of inquiry, in the second suutra discussion was centered on
Brahma lakshaNam that is jagat kaaraNam , and in the third suutra
also we discussed Brahman as shaastra kartaa and hence sarvaj~nam
and sarvashakti. The word tat indicates that Brahman. Hence the
meaning of tat is vichaaryam, jagat kaaraNam , veda kartRî ,
sarvaj~nam , sarvashakti brahma shaastra vishhayaH. We have to bring
the two words shaastra vishhayaH from the previous suutra - this is
called anuvRîtti . A simple example of anuvRîtti is - Rama went to
temple; Krishna also. Krishna also gives the complete meaning since
we borrow from the previous sentence the words 'went to temple'. In
suutra literature this anuvRîtti is used extensively to shorten the
words. This completes the meaning of the word ' tat '.

The next word is ' tu ' - which for convenience we will explain this
word later, although we are supposed to explain the words in the
order present.
The third word is samanvayaat , because Brahman enjoys the
importance or consistency. How does one prove Brahman enjoys
importance in the shaastra ? It can be proved only if the six
factors or shhaD li~Ngaani , are supporting Brahman alone. Hence
Vyasacharya has to show now using the six factors that Brahman is the
central theme. This method of proving the importance or samanvya by
making use of six factors or shhaD li~Ngaani is called miimaa.nsa or
analysis. shhaD li~NgaiH taatparya nirNayaH miimaa.nsaa.
Vyasacharya is going to do that from the fifth suutra onwards. From
suutra 5 up to suutra 134 Vyasacharya will be proving samanvaya .
Since at the rate the notes are being posted and studied it will take
many months before we complete this section on samanvaya (we started
this series six months ago and we are still at suutra 4), Shankara
and the subcommentators briefly provide the proof here itself while
commenting the suutra 4. Following Shankara bhaashhya , we will also
therefore do the brief analysis.
This we will take up from the next post.
********
world, is to be
inquired into using vedaanta pramaaNa.
With this third suutra / third adhikaraNam is over.

---------------We will take up next the suutra # 4 which happens to be the fourth
adhikaraNa also.
Msg #
Date: Fri Mar 2, 2001 6:25am
Notes on BSB I-i-4-1B

suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .
Discussion of samanvaya aspect:

First question is therefore what are those six factors or shhat
li~Ngaani? Lingam means an indicator. li~Ngyate iti li~Ngam . That
which indicates is li~Ngam. The shhat li~Ngaani are:
upakrama - upasa.nhaarau abhyaasaH apuurvataa-phalam.h |
artha-vaada upapattiH ca li~Ngyam taatparya nirNaye ||
To establish the importance of certain topic six indicators are
enumerated. The first one is upakrama upasamhaarau - which means the
identity or oneness of the theme at the beginning and in the end.
The second one is abhyaasaH or repetition - that which is repeated
must be important. Third one is apuurvataa, whatever enjoys newness,
that which is not known. The fourth one is phalam - fruitfulness or
benefit, something is important only if it is fruitful or useful.
The fifth one is arthavaadaH, or stutiH or glorification, whatever
that is glorified must be important. Finally upapattiH, reason or
logic. Whatever fulfills the logic is of importance and whatever is
illogical or irrational or unreasonable cannot be the central theme.
These are the six factors. In tradition the commentators take one
example for analysis and the standard example is the sixth chapter of
Chandogya Upanishad which is called tat tvam asi prakaraNam . It is
considered as the model chapter. When we apply the six factors to
this chapter, we come out with the conclusion that Brahman is the
central theme of the chapter.
The first factor is upakrama upasamhaara li~Ngam, that is, the
relation to the topic at the beginning and end of the chapter. The
tat tvam asi prakaraNam begins and ends with the discussion of
Brahman. - sad eva saumya idam agra aasiit . ekam eva advitiiyam "Hay good-looking one! Existence alone was there in the beginning and
it is one without the second" - thus the beginning of prakaraNa is
revealing the nature of Brahman. The chapter ends with the
statements - aitad aatmyam idam sarvam | tat satyam | saH aatmaa |
tat tvam asi shwetaketo | This entire universe is Brahman. That is
the truth. That is aatmaa. Oh! Swetaketu! that thou art. Thus
Brahman which is the same as aatman is the theme in the beginning and
the end.
The second factor is abhyaasa or repetition. In this chapter of
Chandogya the teacher Uddalaka gives several examples to illustrate
the point and in the end of each example the same statements - aitad
aatmyam idam sarvam | tat satyam | saH aatmaa | tat tvam asi
shwetaketo | - are repeated. It is repeated nine times each time
taking different examples, to indicate that the statements are not a
casual statements but have great significance requiring such extended
repetition. Hence the tat tvam asi is considered as the essential
teaching as mahaavaakya or aphorism.

The third factor is apuurvataa - new topic. Vedanta shaastram

reveals Brahman only, which is new entity since it is not only
unknown but also cannot be known by any other means or pramaaNam .
What is considered as new? The definition of what constitutes new or
apuurvataa is pramaaNaantara avedyam, apuurvatvam. A thing is new if
it is not known or cannot be known through all other instruments of
knowledge. na tatra chakshuH gachchhati na vaak gachchhati no manaH
gachchhati , I cannot know Brahman through the eyes, through the
speech nor by process of analysis of thinking. I cannot even know
Brahman through karmakaanDa or puurvamiimaa.nsaa also. Brahman is
outside the scope of karma - na karmanaa na prajayaa dhanena taygena
eke amRîtatva maanasuH - says the shruti. Brahman is revealed only
by Vedanta - Hence it is apuurva vishhayaH or new knowledge that is
not gained by any other means. Hence apuurvata li~Nga or factor is
satisfied. This apuurvata is also indicated in the sixth chapter of
Chandogya.
Here the teacher asks the student to bring a lump of salt and
dissolve it in a cup of water. Then he asks the student to taste the
water at the top, in the middle and from the bottom of the cup. The
student after tasting, says the water is saltish everywhere. When
the teacher asks the student if he can see the salt in the water, the
students says no. He knows that there was the lump of salt in water
since he himself added it but he can see where the salt is. Since he
could taste salt all-over, the water is pervaded by something other
than water, since he is experiencing it yet he cannot see it any
where in the water and it is imperceptible to the eyes. Having given
this example the teacher says to the student - one knows the body is
bundle of matter, just like a statue which is also made up of
pa~nchabhuutaa -s. Yet one experiences the body as conscious entity
unlike the statue out there, just as the water is saltish. Just as
the water is pervaded by something other than water to make it
saltish, the body is pervaded by something other than matter to make
it conscious. That extra something makes the water saltish, there is
extra something that makes the body alive and conscious. Just as one
can not see that lump of salt that makes the water saltish, similarly
one cannot see that which makes the body alive and conscious. What
is that something that makes the matter enliven. The teacher says sad eva saumya idam agra aasiit , ekam eva advitiiyam - that which
exists that which is conscious is there from the beginning before the
creation. It is one with out the second. That Brahman you are - tat
tvam asi swetaketo. So Brahman pervades the body - atra eva khila
sat - na nibhaalayate - My dear boy - there is no need to go in
search of Brahman. He is right inside you as the very essence of
your life, the essence of your existence and consciousness and is
imperceptible to the senses, mind and intellect. You are that. Thus
by this example, the teacher proves that Brahman is pratyaksha
agocharam or pramaaNaantara agamyam hence apuurvam brahman. Brahman
cannot be perceived or thought about. He cannot be known by any other
pramaaNa and can be known only through Vedanta pramaaNa. This is the
apuurvataa li~Ngam or factor that is established.
Thus Vyasa established that 1. Brahman is the subject matter of
Vedanta, 2) it is unique subject matter and 3) Brahman is known
through Vedanta alone and not by any other pramaaNam. Conversely,
looking from Vedanta point, it is the unique pramaaNam for Brahman.
The converse is established because other than shabda pramaaNa the
other pramaaNa essentially rests on pratyaksha in one way or the

other. Since Brahman cannot be perceived, it can be known only by
shabda pramaaNa and Vedanta is the rightful shabda pramaaNa . Thus
Vedanta is unique pramaaNam and Brahman is unique prameyam . The
first part, Vedanta is unique pramaaNam is established by shaastra
yonitvaat and the second part Brahman is the unique prameyam is
established by tat tu samanvayaat , since samanvaya requires as a
part of the shhad li~Nga, uniqueness aspect. Thus the fourth suutra
' tat tu samanvayaat ' is the converse of the third suutra ' shaastra
yonitvaat '. Thus fourth suutra corroborates the third suutra.
The fourth li~Ngam is phalam . It is common understanding that
wherever phalam is mentioned that aspect should get primary
importance otherwise it is of secondary importance. It is like the
bottom line. In the Upanishads we find the statement ' brahmavit
aapnoti param ' if one knows Brahman one gets eternal liberation or
moksha. Hence the importance is given to brahmaj~naanam . If we
examine the sixth chapter of Chandogya, there is a statement 'tasya
taavad eva chiram yaavat na vimokshye atha sampatsya iti |' That is
brahmaj~naani will get jiivan mukti and at the time of death he will
get videha mukti . Thus both jiivan mukti phalam and videha mukti
phalam are mentioned from brahmaj~naanam. Hence Brahman is central
theme of Vedanta.
The fifth factor is arthavaadaH or glorification. In the Upanishad-s
the advaitic understanding is glorified by pointing that ' eka
vij~naanena sarva vij~naanam bhavati ', by knowing one, one knows
everything. brahma j~naani will become sarva j~naani. The word '
sarvaj~naani ' has to be understood. It does not mean he will start
knowing immediately quantum mechanics or C++ language etc.
sarvaj~naanam means sarva aatma j~naanam . He gets the knowledge of
the essence of everything, which is as good as knowing everything.
Thus by glorifying brahmaj~naani as sarvaj~naH , the sixth chapter
indirectly glorifies Brahman only. Glorification of brahmaj~naani is
the same as the glorification of Brahman since ' brahmavit brahma eva
bhavati ' knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. Not only brahma j~nanam
is glorified, the knowledge of all others are condemned in the sense
that they do not give moksha or freedom from ignorance. In
Kathopanishad (2-1-10) it was said " mRîtyoH saH mRîtyum aapnoti
yaH iha naanaa eva pashyati ", one who is in duality he will travel
from death to death. The one who dies without gaining brahma
j~naanam he is considered as unfortunate person, saH kRîpaNaH .
Whereas one who dies after brahmaj~naanam he alone is braahmaNaH ( sa
eva braahmaNaH - Bri. Upa.), implying that all the aj~naanii -s are
called abrahmaNaH. In fact in all other knowledge, the more one
knows the more alpa j~naani one becomes. The more and more one
specializes in any objective sciences the more and more one
recognizes that what he knows is very very small in comparison to
what is left to know. He feels more and more ignorant in relation to
what he knows. He will never feel that there is nothing more to
learn. He will feel more and more inadequate and hence feels more
and more humble. On the other hand a brahma j~naani feels he has
learned what need to be learned and that there is nothing more to
learn. - yat j~naatvaa na param j~neyam'. He has accomplished what
need to be accomplished in life, kRîta kRîtyaH. Thus
brahmaj~naanam is glorified and in contrast anyaj~naanam is
criticized - both come under arthavaadaH , glorification of
brahmaj~naanm. It includes brahmaj~naana stuti and anyaj~naana
nindaa .

Final factor is upapattiH - the upanishhat wants to show that it is
not illogical. It is not dogmatic or irrational or based on blind
belief. Brahma satyam and jagat is mithya giving a logical support.
The upanishad -s reveal Brahman is kaaraNam and the jagat or the
world is kaaryam. It logical shows kaaraNam alone is satyam because
it has independent existence. Whereas kaaryam has no independent
existence. Hence upanishhat makes an anumaana vaakyam - brahma
satyam kaaraNatvaat , jagat mithyaa kaaryatvaat . Upanishad gives an
example also for this in the same sixth chapter of Chandogya Up. vaachaarambhaNam vikaaro naamadheyam mRîttikaa eva satyam , when
there is a pot, we know that clay alone is satyam and there is no
such substance called pot. Pot is mere name and form ( naama and
ruupa ). We need to note mRîttika eva satyam - eva meaning alone the clay alone is satyam - by using the word eva or alone, the
upanishhat indirectly says the pot is mithyaa. If there are two
people and if I say pointing to one of them, this one alone is
intelligent, it implies that the other one is not intelligent or he
is dumb. mRîttika eva satyam means the pot etc mRîtpinda -s are
only mRîttikaa vikaaraaH , the products of clay. The products etc.
are vaachaarambhanam naamadheyam , they are only name-sake existent.
Thus Upanishads logically shows using several examples like this
(actually three examples are given) the kaaraNa satyatvam and kaarya
mithyaatvam . Through that upanishads reveal the brahma satyatvam and
jagat mithyaatvam - and that is upapattiH , the sixth factor which is
the logical factor.
Thus by taking the sixth chapter of Chandogya Upanishad as the model,
it is clearly established that all the shad li~Ngaani or six factors
reveal Brahman alone. Hence brahmaNi samanvyaH |. Hence the
conclusion is tat - that Brahman is shaastra prameyam . Brahman is
the central subject matter of shaastram - samanvayaat, because of
consistency or importance. Conversely the Vedanta is the pramaaNam
for Brahman, corroborating the third suutra.
With this we conclude the analysis of the word samanvayaat .
Next we take up the analysis of the word 'tu'.
********
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Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1C
Notes on BSB - I-i-4-1C


suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .
Now The Analysis of the word 'tu':

We will now analyze the word 'tu', which we skipped before for
convenience. It is the most important word of this suutra. This
simple looking word 'tu' received the most elaborate analysis by
Bhagavatpada Shankara.
The word 'tu' is used for emphasis. In English it means only or
alone. We have said that Brahman is the subject matter of Vedanta
shaastram. By adding 'tu' Vyasacharya is emphasizing that Brahman
alone is the subject matter of Vedanta shaastra. This is called
avadhaaraNam or emphasis. Indirectly Vyasa is implying that nothing
else is the subject matter. Hence every emphasis involves indirectly
a negation of non-essentials. This exclusion in Sanskrit is called
vyaavRîtti - thus every avadhaaraNam implies a vyaavRîtti. tu
shabdhaH vyavRîtyarthaH. Hence Shankara says 'tu' involves
puurvapaksha vyaavRîtti artham. By using the word 'tu', Vyasa is
negating all other interpretations, and all other puurvapakshi-s.
Here the puurvapakshi-s include all those who claim that the subject
matter of Vedanta shaastram is other than Brahman. Who are those
puurvapaksha-s? Obviously it includes only those who analyze the
Vedanta shaastram. Hence naastika-s are not of concern here since
they do not believe in Veda pramaaNa. Hence the puurvapaksha-s are
the aastika-s, that is those who accept Veda pramaaNam. There are six
aastika darshhanam - saa.nkhya, yoga, nyaaya, vaisheshhika, puurva
miimaa.nsaa and uttaramiimaa.nsa or vedaanta (see Introductory
chapter for details). The first five are the possible puurvapaksha in
relation to Vedanta. Of these we reduced them to three since saankhya
and yoga are practically the same and they are bunched as one as
saa.nkhya-yoga system. Similarly nyaaya and vaisheshhika are almost
the same and together are referred to as nyaaya-vaisheshhika system.
Hence the three puurvapaksha-s; saa.nkhya-yoga, nyaaya-vaisheshika
and puurvamiimaa.nsaa are negated using the word 'tu'. Vyasa has to
negate each one. He considers saa.nkhya-yoga as the most powerful
puurvapaksha. Hence he spends the rest of the first chapter, from
fifth to one-hundred & thirty four, for two tasks; establishing
Vedanta that is brahma samanvaya and negating saa.nkhya-yoga
puurvapaksha. Hence the rest of the 130 suutra-s in this chapter is a
commentary on the word 'tu'. He extends this negation of
saa.nkhya-yoga even to the second chapter. The nyaaya-vaisheshhika is
not looked upon as that powerful but only a weak puurvapaksha for
refutation. In the second chapter nyaaya-vaisheshhika is discussed

very briefly. In one suutra Vyasa says it is not at all relevant.
puurvamiimaa.nsaa is only left out. It is the ritualistic section of
the Veda and is analyzed using sutra format by Jaimini maharshi, who
was in fact a disciple of Vyasacharya. There is a bhaashhyam also for
this suutra by shabara swami - shaabara bhaashhyam. Shankara holds
this bhaashhyam with high regard. We normally do not consider the
puurvamiimaa.nsaa and shaarbara bhaashhyam as puurvapaksha at all,
since the puurva bhaaga of Veda-s are relevant and useful since it is
a means for dharma, artha and kaama - dharma artha kaama
purushhaartha siddhyarthaM puurvamiimaa.nsaa atyantam upakaarakam. In
addition it is useful for chittashuddhi, for purification of the
mind. Hence it is called dharma shaastram. It is helpful to obtain
the saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti, discussed with reference to
suutra 1. Hence puurvamiimaa.nsaa is not really a puurvapaksha. But
we emphasize that puurvamiimaa.nsaa cannot give moksha. According to
Vedantins, Jaimini as well as Shabara muni also accept this. However
later there were subcommentators who wrote subcommentaries on the
shaabara bhaashhyam and presented the puurvamiimaa.nsaa as a means of
moksha. Subsequently the subcommentators pushed their arguments
further to claim that puurvamiimaa.nsaa alone gives moksha, and
uttaramiimaa.nsaa is utterly useless. Therefore the puurvamiimaa.nsaa
as presented by these subcommentators forms puurvapaksha. Here
puurvapaksha does not include other vedantins such as
vishishhTaadvaita and Dvaita but only with non-vedantins. The
difference of opinions among the vedantins in the interpretation of
Brahmasuutra comes under yaadaviiya kalahaM, internal differences
only in interpretations since all vedantins come under one category
as uttaramiimaa.nsaka-s. Here all the puurvapakshins are aastika
anyottaramiimaa.nsaka-s. Vyasacharya is going to negate elaborately
the saa.nkhya-yoga and to some extent the nyaaya-vaisheshhika in the
first and second chapters, since those two were considered important
at that time. Since Vyasa does not discuss the puurvamiimaa.nsaa to
that extent, Shankara uses this opportunity to cover also the
puurvamiimaa.nsaa elaborately in his bhaashhyam under the pretext of
the word 'tu', Brahman alone or only. This is because of the renewed
emphasis on puurvamiimaa.nsaa or karmakaanDa at the time of Shankara,
due to the influence of Prabhakara and Kumarila Bhatta, who were the
two influential sub-commentators of the shaabara bhaashhyam of the
Jaiminisuutra-s. The story of the debate between Shankara and Mandana
Misra, the disciple of Kumarila Bhatta is well known. Kumarila
Bhatta's subcommentary is in the form of vartikam or verses known as
bhaTTa vaartikam-s and the philosophy that was expounded based on the
puurvamiimaa.nsaa is called bhaaTTamatam. Similarly Prabhakara's
commentary which is in prose form is called bRîhatii. There he
presents another version of puurvamiiimaa.nsaa called
praabhaakaramatam. Hence bhaaTTamatam and praabhaakaramatam form the
puurvamiimaa.nsaa puurvapaksha-s for our analysis.
First the discussion of puurvapaksha. Under this we will first
discuss the common views of both matam-s and later point out where
they differ. Later we negate the puurvapaksha using siddhaanta. This
is like exercise while learning atomic theories; first we learn about
Rutherford model and then later we discard it for the better quantum
mechanical model. It provides the glimpse of the logic of the thought
that went in the analysis. As noted in the very introduction of the
suutra-s, all this analysis and the study of Brahmasutra is not
necessary for a saadhak for self-realization, but would help in
confirmation of his understanding, particularly when the mind is

still full of doubts about the nature of the reality and means to
accomplish the goal.
According to puurvamiima.nsaka-s, the entire Veda or Vedic statements
can be broadly classified into two types. 1) siddha bodhaka vaakyaani
or statements of facts 2) kaarya bodhaka vaakyaani or statements of
commandments persuading one to act, consisting of imperative and
potential moods - kuryaat, kartavyaH, na hantavyaH, etc - statements
of injunctions. Statements of facts will lead one to only knowledge,
where as the statement of commandments or injunctions will lead one
to action. They further argue that since the siddhabodhaka vaakyaani
or statement of facts give only knowledge, they are not much of
benefit to us. This is because mere j~naanam will not help in
accomplishing anything. Knowing itself is not an accomplishment or
end in itself. Hence j~naanam does not give any purushhaartha, it is
utterly useless. For example, if I come to know that there is a
heaven; I have only the information about the heaven now. By knowing
that there is a heaven what benefit do I get? In fact it can make me
more miserable because I have now something to compare with. Hence
knowledge does not give any benefit. If you go to a doctor, the
doctor diagnoses and says this is the disease you have. Now I have
clear knowledge of the my disease. Previously I used call it as
stomachache but now I call it with more sophisticated technical name.
How does that knowledge relieve my pain? Knowledge does not give
either sukha or sukhapraaptiH or get rid of pain or duHkha
nivRîttiH. It does not give any purushhaartha - that involves sukha
praapti or duHkha nivRîtti or both. Therefore j~naanam does not give
any benefit. siddhabodhaka vaakyaani aprayojanaani -For example, aham
brahmaasmi - aham brahmaasmi - knowing that how does the problem is
solved. Even after knowing aham brahmaasmi, the headache or
stomachache that one has still remains. The starving pains due to
poverty in the house still remains. One still has to pay for school
fees. Did it solve family problems? Did it solve national problems?
Did it solve the problems due to hunger and poverty in India? Did it
solve the war between India and Pakistan or China? What does one get
out of any knowledge particularly the Vedanta j~naanam? On the other
hand kaaryabhodhaka vaakyaani make one to do something and by doing
alone we get some puurushhaartha in the form of either sukhapraapti
or duHkhanivRîtti. Medicine knowledge did not remove the pains only
kaaryam involving taking the medicine relieves the pain. Similarly
knowledge of heaven does not give any benefit.
swarge loke na bhayam ki.ncha naasti,
na tatra tvam na jarayaa bibheti,
ubhe tiirtvaa ashanaayaa pipaase,
shokaatigo modate swargaloke || (KaTha. U. 1-1-12)
Nachiketa says to Yama, the Lord of Death, there is no fear in the
heavens, you (death) are not there to have any effect. No fear of
oldage and disease. No pains due to hunger and thirst. Without any
sorrows one enjoys the heavenly bliss.
The above statements come under siddhabodhaka vaakyam. It says heaven
is so wonderful, etc. By knowing what do I gain. On the other hand by
doing a ritual - jyotishhToma yaga- based on the kaarya bodhaa
vaakyam one can go to heaven. jyotishhTomena swarga kaamo yajeta which asks one to do jyotishhToma yaga by which one can attain as
purushhaartha the heavens. Hence puurvapakshi-s assert that all the
kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s will lead to actions which will lead to

either sukhapraapti or duHkha niVîtti. Hence kaaryabodhaka vaakyams
are saprayojanaaNi or useful.
In support of their arguments puurvapakshii-s show that many Vedantic
scholars are direct proof for their assertion. They argue that even
after any amount of Vedantic teaching, the student still asks in the
end, what should I do here after? Why they want to do something? They
ask - give me a practical recipe so that I can practice or do. Give
me a mantra so that I can do japam. Now that I know I am Brahman,
what should I do now? Enough of this intellectual analysis and
studies of Brahmasutra-s etc will not help. It is just a waste of
time. What we need to do is we need to sit down and meditate or
contemplate. Every student asks for doing something since he feels
that he has not benefited much out of just the study of Vedanta. This
is only because by action only something can be achieved and not just
by knowledge. If the students got benefit from knowledge as Vedantins
claim then why should they want to do something. Hence we cannot but
conclude that siddhabodhaka vaakyaani aprayojanaani, kaaryabodhaa
vaakyaanii eva saprayojanaani. Both Praabhakara and Bhatta matams
agree with these assertions.
The third point is as follows. These puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s accept with
other aastika that Veda-s are pramaaNam. If all the credit of driving
Buddhi-ism out of India, it actually belongs to the
puurvamiimaa.nsaka. Kumarila Bhatta in fact disguised himself as a
student of Buddha to learn their intricate teachings and used that
knowledge only to defeat them later on their own grounds. For
deceiving his own teacher of Buddhism he later felt guilty and
immolated himself for the sin he has committed. Therefore
puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s accepts vedapramaaNam. What does it mean when we
say Veda is pramaaNam. The popular definition of pramaaNam is:
' anaadhigata abaadhita artha bodhakam pramaaNam' - pramaaNam reveals
something that which is not revealed by other pramaaNam
(anaadhigatam).
If Veda is pramaaNam it should reveal something that is not revealed
by pratyaksha or anumaana or logic not even by science. To be a valid
pramaaNa Veda has to reveal something, which is even beyond the scope
of science (objective). This is what anaadhigatam implies. The second
condition abaadhitam that which is not contradicted by other
pramaaNam. Veda should not reveal something, which contradicts our
pratyaksha pramaaNam. If Veda tells that fire is cold, it is rejected
since it is baadhitam, contradicted by pratyaksha. It should not make
illogical statements even if it is beyond logic. It should not
contradict science either. At the same time it should reveal
something that cannot be revealed by other pramaaNa. Hence it should
be, unrevealed and uncontradicted by other pramaaNam-s. To this
definition the puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s add one more qualification or
condition. The altered definition is anaadhigata abhaadita phalavat
arthabodhakam pramaaNam. Vedantins are not keen but do not reject the
added condition. phalavat means it should be saprayojanam, should be
useful. Hence pramaaNam is that which reveals something which is
useful and unrevealed and uncontradicted by other pramaaNam-s.
Since puurvapakshi-s argue that siddhabodhaka vaakyaani
aprayojanaani, kaaryabodhaka vaakyaani saprayojanaani (statements of
facts are useless and statements of commandments are useful),
applying the new definition of pramaaNa, they conclude that
siddhabodhaka vaakyaani apramaaNaani while kaaryabodhaka vaakyaani

pramaaNaani. That is the former are invalid as pramaaNa since they
are useless, while the latter are valid as they are useful. They
claim all these ideas have been revealed in one important jaimini
suutram which is key suutram. 'aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaat
aanarthakyam athadarthaanaam' - aamnaayasya means vedasya,
kriyaarthatvaata meaning kaarya bodhakatvaat, statements of
injections being important (because they are useful), aanarthakyam
meaning apramaaNam (invalid referring to all other statements other
than kaarya bodhaka vaakyaani), athadarthaanaam meaning
sidhhabodhakaanaam, statements of facts. In summary it states that
the statements of commandments are valid and statement of facts are
invalid as pramaaNam, since the former is useful and the later is
useless.
The entire j~naanakaaNDam deals with only siddhavastu - talks about
Brahman, talks about sRîshhTi or creation, talks about aatmaa but it
does not talk about any karma to be performed. The very word j~naana
indicates that it only gives us knowledge. We already established
that kevala j~naanam is aprayojanam or if it cannot be put into
action it is useless. Hence the entire j~naanakaaDam is apramaaNam or
invalid, siddhabodhaka vaakyatvaat. What benefit do I get by knowing
that Brahman is satyam j~naanam and anantam? What benefit do I get
that the five elements were created? What benefit do I get knowing
that there are pa~ncha kosha-s or pa~ncha praaNa-s in me? By mere
knowledge of these, I do not get any benefit, will not put dinner on
my table, will not remove the pain in my back or in the neck, or pay
the skyrocketing doctor's bill. Hence the entire j~naanakaaNDa is
useless. vedosharaaH vedaantaaH - Vedanta is like a desert in an
otherwise fertile land. This is the puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s puurvapaksha.
We will continue in the next post.
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Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1D
Notes on BSB I-i-4-1D

samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .-4
suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1D
We have been discussing the Shankara's presentation of puurva

miimaa.nsaa puurvapaksha under the explanation of the word 'tu'.
puurva miimaa.nasaka-s reject that siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s,
statements of facts, which are essentially the whole of j~naakaanDa,
as apramaaNaani or invalid, since they are not useful. However, in
presenting these, puurva miimaa.nsaka-s themselves encounter a
problem in their arguments. The puurva miimaa.nsaka-s accept that the
whole Veda as pramaaNam, since it is
apaurushheyam, and hence does not have any defects that can arise if
it is authored by a human intellect (nirdushhTa pramaaNa- defect-free
pramaaNam). puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s do not accept iishwara as the
revealer of the Veda-s. For them Veda is ultimate and it is
unrevealed even by
iishwara since they are eternal and anaadi or beginningless. For
puurvamiimaa.nsaka the Veda enjoys the same status as iishwara. But
through this aamnaayatvaat suutram he has divided the Veda into two
parts - siddhabodhaka vaakyam and kaaryabodhaka vaakyam - of which
the farmer is apramaaNam. Hence he made now the part of the Veda as
apramaaNam.
The question they had to face is how can one accept on one side the
whole Veda as pramaaNam and on the other side reject part of it as
apramaaNam. For that they say that siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s are
apramaaNam in the direct sense but they are useful indirectly, when
they are applied. All the siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s help indirectly the
implementation of kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s. For example when Veda-s
are glorifying heaven, swarga (see sloka quoted before), naturally we
get a desire to go there. Once the desire comes, one looks for the
means to go there and Veda-s help him instructing that jyotishhtomena
swarga kaamo yajeta - a desiree of swarga should do the ritual
jyotishhTa.
Thus student is directed to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam because he learned
about swarga. Learning about swarga did not help him directly to go
to swarga but indirectly helped him to have a desire and which caused
of action that he has to do to go to swarga. Hence all swarga varNana
vaakyam (statements describing heaven) should be linked to kaarya
bodhaka vaakyam - jyotishhTomena swarga kaamo yajeta. When they are
linked like that to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s they become useful hence
become pramaaNam. Thus the whole Veda is pramaaNam, part dealing with
kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s are directly, while the part dealing with
siddhabodhaka vaakyam are only indirectly by linking to kaaryabodhaka
vaakyam-s. This aspect is conveyed by another puurvamiimaa.nsaa
suutram - vidhinaathu ekavaakyatvaat stutyarthena vidhinaamsyuH vidhinaam means kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s, eka vaakyatvaat means
sambandhavatvaat, by linking with, stutyarthena vidhiinaa, by
assisting kaaryabodhaka vaakyam they become pramaaNam. They use two
technical words - siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s are sheshha or dependent
and kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s are sheshhi, independent. sheshha-sheshhi

sambandhaH or mukhya-amukhya sambandhaH. Hence they consider that any
Vedantic statements (upanishhadic statements) are independently
useless. They have to be linked to one or the other kaaryabodhaka
vaakyam-s for them to be indirectly useful. They are useless unless
it is hooked to some kaaryabodhaka statement. That is why some people
claim that Vedanta has to be put into practice or to be applied.
What about Brahman revealed in Vedanta - satyam j~naanam anantam
brahma. puurvamiimaa.nsaaka-s says - there is no such thing called
Brahman at all. It is only a bhrama or illusion. This negation of
Brahman is there in both praabhaakara and bhaaTTamatam-s. Veda will
not reveal Brahman because Brahman is utterly useless. Upanishads
clearly state that Brahman is not attainable or knowable, by
statements such as adreshyam, agraahyam, it is imperceptible and it
cannot be grasped by the intellect, etc. Brahman is avyayahaaryam,
being so it is not available for any transaction. It cannot be a
subject, an object, an instrument, a locus etc , it is not a kartaa,
karma, kriya, karaNam, sampradaanam, or apaadaanam - Vedantins
themselves say that it is kriyaa kaaraka phala vilakshaNam - it is
neither an end nor a means to an end. Hence brahman na asti. There is
no such thing called Brahman.
What about aatma j~naanam, self-knowledge. That also is not
acceptable since self is intimately known to everyone. Why should
Veda reveal that which is already siddham or self-evident?
Swatasiddhasya aatmanaH vedavedyatvam kathaM bhavati? - pramaaNa
should reveal something, which is not known otherwise. Since aatmaa
is self-evident, why should Veda waste its breath to reveal
something, which is already known. Then what is use of Vedanta?
Whenever aatmaa is talked about in Vedanta one should take it as
statement glorifying the yajamaana or doer of the
ritual, so that he will be so happy to perform the ritual. It is like
a mother-feeding a child telling the stories of how great the child
is so that the child can eat the food. Wherever Brahman is talked
about, it should be understood as the glorification of yaaga
devata-s, the deities of rituals, so that the yajamaana is encouraged
to offer oblations to those devata-s. Thus all the Vedantic
statements have to be connected to the kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s,
statements of injunctions.
If every Vedantic statement has to be connected to one or the other
kaaryabodhaka vaakyam, the question arises which one to be connected
to what? Is it optional or is there some rule of connection? With
respect to this technical point, the two matam-s, the bhaaTTamatam
and praabhaakara matam differ.
According bhaTTamatam, all the j~naanakaanDa vaakyam-s should be
connected to karmakaanDa vidhi vaakyam or kriyaa vaakyaani.
praabaakara-s disagrees that this connection can be that arbitrary.
The karmakaanDa vaakyam-s are far away from the Vedantic vaakyam-s,
the arbitrary
connection he calls as prakaraNa bhedaH, totally far apart. According
to him the j~naanavaakyam-s should be connected to the closest
kaaryavaakyam-s. In the j~naanakaanDa itself there are many upaasana
vaakyam-s which are kaaryabodhakam. Hence all the brahmabodhana
statements should be connected to upaasana-s prescribed in Vedanta.
Because of this the person achieves purushaartha, and that is the
final goal of kaaryam, action. There is no direct use of j~naanam,
one has to do something, that something can be karma as in

karmakaanDa or upaasanaa as in j~naanakaanDa. Action is the essence
of Veda.
So far we have discussed puurvapaksha of puurvamiimaa.nsaa consisting
of both praabhaakara and bhaaTTamata-s.
We next take up Shankara's siddhaanta.
********
Message 8678 of 9722 | Previous | Next [ Up Thread ]
Message
Index
Msg #
From: Sunder Hattangadi <sunderh@yahoo.com>

Date: Mon Mar 26, 2001 9:56 am
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes on BSB I-i-4-1E

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya
madhyamam.h |
I prostrate to the lineage of teachers starting from
Lord Shiva who
is ever auspicious and with Bhagavaan Shankara in the
middle and all
Who is the very embodiment of motherly affection who
is beyond the
three guNa-s, who is full with bliss, and who is the
very source of
purity who is the best among the teachers, Shree
Chinmayaananda, to
--------------------------------------------------samanvaya adhyaaya
-I
spashhTa brahma li~Nga vaakya
samanvaya paada- i
samanvaya
adhikaraNam.h .-4

suutra: tat tu
samanvayaat.h .-1E
Notes on BSB I-I-4-1E

Now siddhaanta - Shankara's refutation of the above
puurvapaksha.
We will go point by point.
1. Taking puurvapakshi's argument that all
siddhabodhaka vaakyams lead to
knowledge, which is useless, while kaaryabodhaka
vaakyams lead to action
which, is useful, Shankara says yes you are right. But
it is only a general
rule, but there are exceptions to the rule. By
reading about tennis or
swimming, I do not get much benefit. Only by playing
or swimming, I get the
benefit. Hence the general rule is kevala j~naanam na
purushhaartha
saadhakam. However, there are several cases where
kevala j~naanam or mere
knowledge alone without requiring any action gives the
benefit. Wherever
there is a problem caused by ignorance, then mere
knowledge alone can solve
the problem. In the case of disease, the problem is
not centered on
ignorance, but some germs etc and therefore the
solution to the problem
involves taking an antidote to the germs or
antibiotic. But for ignorance
caused problems the knowledge alone is the solution.
Our famous example is
rajjusarpavat, fear arising from the error of
superimposed snake. Bhaya
kampaadikam sarvam are caused by the snake which
appears to be there only
because of ignorance of rope, rajju aj~naanam. What
homa one needs to
perform to get rid of the snake? No karma is required,
no upaasanaa is
required, what is required is rope-knowledge. rajju
j~naanaat rajju
aj~naana nivRîttiH , rajju aj~naana nivRîtyaa sarpa
adhyaasa nivRîttiH,
sarpa adhyaasa nivRîtyaa bhayakampaadi nivRîttiH .
By the knowledge of
the rope, the knowledge of the existence of serpent is
gone, by that the
associated fear etc is gone. Therefore in all such
cases kevala j~naana
maatrena purushaartha siddhiH , only knowledge alone
accomplished the result
and not the action. Therefore sidhhabodhaka

vaakyaani pramaaNaani,
saprayojanatvaat, naayam sarpaH iti vaakyavat. Since
they produce results
they are useful and hence are pramaaNa vaakyam-s just
as in the rope-snake
example. Hence whenever the problems are centered on
ignorance, then the
siddhabodhaka vaakyam are directly useful and hence
are pramaaNa-s. If the
problems are not centered on ignorance then
siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s need to
be connected to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam for them to give
useful result. Hence
one cannot apply a general rule.
Now the question is do the vedaanta vaakyam-s come
under this exceptional
category giving benefit directly or they must be
connected to kaaryabodhaka
vaakyam-s as the puurvapakshii-s claim. A vedaantin
claims that all the
siddhabodhaka vaakyam come under the exceptional cases
giving directly the
utility prayojanam-s. For this Vedanta itself is the
pramaaNa since it makes
it very clear that j~naana maatreNa moksha phalam
bhavati. One need not
join this knowledge with any kaaryabodhaka vaakyam
since knowledge alone can
give the moksha which is the purushhaartha. Where it
is said? Almost in
every upanishad this is mentioned.
1. Ishavasya Upanishad- shloka 7
yasmin sarvaaNi bhuutaani aatmaa eva abhuut
vijaanataH |
tatra ko mohaH kaH shoka ekatvam anupashyataH ||
When a person clearly knows the aatmaa which is the
substratum of everything
after that mere knowledge where is the grief and where
is the delusion?
Hence j~naana maatreNa shoka moha nivîttiH, sa.nsaara
nivîttiH, moksha
praaptiH | By mere knowledge grief, delusion and
sa.nsaara are gone, one gets liberated.
2 Kena Upanishad - shloka 2-4
pratibodha-viditam matam amRîtatvam hi vindate |
aatmanaa vindate viiryam vidyayaa vindate amRîtam.h
||
with the emphasis on vidyayaa vindate amRîtam, kevala
j~naanamaatreNa (by
mere knowledge) a person attains immortality.
3. Katha upanishad shloka 2-2-12

eko vashii sarva-bhuuta-antara-aatmaa

ekam biijam bahudhaa yaH karoti |
tam aatmastham ye anupashyanti dhiiraaH
teshhaa.n sukha.n shaashvatam na itareshhaam.h ||
The one who clearly recognizes (anupasyanti) Brahman
as the very aatman,
they will have eternal happiness and there is no other
way than
through this knowledge ( na itareshhaam).
4. Prashna Upanishad:
The upanishad teacher, pippalaada, says in the end:
6-6
...tam vedyaM purushha.n veda yathaa maa vo mRîtyuH
parivivyathaaH iti |
After knowing Brahman(purushham) there will not be any
suffering due to death
etc. One attains immortality.
The students in the end after learning, prostrate to
the teacher and
prayerfully say: 6-8
.. asmaakam avidyaayaaH paraM paaraM taarayasi iti |
namaH parama Rîshhibhyo
namaH parama RîshhibhyaH ||
Thus thanking the teacher they indicate that through
knowledge they have
gained the Supreme.
5. Mundaka uanishad: 3-2-9
sa yo ha vai tat paramaM brahma veda brahma eva
bhavati| na asya abrahma-vit kule bhavati | tarati
shoka.n | tarati paapmaanam | guhaa-granthibhyo
vimuktaH amRîtaH bhavati ||
Knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. In his lineage
everyone will have
knowledge of Brahman. He is liberated from all the
sorrows and all the
sins. Free from all ignorance, he attains liberation
from death.
6. Mandukya Upanishad: mantra 12
sa.nvishati aatmanaa aatmaanam yaH evam veda |
One, saH, knows the aatmaa (paramaatmaa) by oneself
(aatmanaa) yaH evam veda by knowledge alone.
7. Taittiriya Upanishad - Brahmanandavalli - 1-1

brahmavit aapnoti param.h | tat eshha abhyuktaa |

satyam j~naanam anantam
brahma | yo veda nihitam guhaayaam parame vyoman saH
ashnute sarvaan kaamaan
saha|
- thus yaH veda nihitam guhaayaam, the one who knows
Brahman as the aatmaa in
the heart fulfils all the purushhaartha-s.
8. Aitareya Upanishad: 3-1-3
sarvam tat praj~naa-netram.h | praj~naane
pratishhThitam.h | praj~naa-netraH lokaH | praj~naa
pratishhThaa | praj~naanaM brahma |
This every thing is nothing but the vision of the
consciousness or
knowledge. It is established in consciousness. It is
the projection of the
consciousness. It is nothing but consciousness.
9. Chandogya Upanishad 7:1:3
tarati shokam aatmavit - the knower of aatma crosses
over all the sorrows no need to do any action.
10. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad : janaka-yaaj~navalkya
sa.nvaadana- 4-4-12
aatmaanam chet vijaaniiyaat ayam asmi iti puurushhaH |
kim ichchhan kasya kaamaaya shariiram anusa.njvaret.h
||
For the one who has known the aatmaa,
there-afterwards, what desire he has,
what action he has to do, and what suffering he will
have to undergo in
life? - meaning none. (This mantra has been
exhaustively commented on by
Shri Vidyaranya in his Panchadasi, 3-298)
11. Kaivalya Upanishad: 10.
sarva-bhuutastham aatmaanam sarva-bhuutaani cha
aatmani |
sampashyan brahma parama.n yaati na anyena hetunaa ||
By merely knowing Brahman he attains moksha and by no
other means (The
first line is repeated in Bhagavad Giita 6-31. The
second line is different
- iikshyate yoga-yukta-aatmaa sarvatra sama darshanaH
|)
12. Purusha-suukta: 7.

veda aham etaM purushaM mahaantam | aaditya-varna.n
tamasaH tu paare |
sarvaani ruupaani vichitya dhiiraH | .....
tam evam vidvaan amRîta iha bhavati | na anyaH
panthaaH ayanaaya vidyate |
13. A slightly different version in Shvetashvatara
Upanishad 3-8
veda aham etam purushhaM mahaantam
aaditya-varNam tamasaH parastaat.h |
tam eva viditvaa atimRîtyum eti
naanyaH panthaaH vidyate ayanaaya ||
knowing this Brahman alone who is resplendent like the
sun and which is
beyond darkness of ignorance, one transcends death.
There is no other
path than knowledge.
These are only examples taken one from each of the
main upanishads. There
are many in each.
From smRîti pramaaNa- Gita B.G 5-15,16
aj~naanna aavRîtam j~naanam tena muhyanti jantavaH ||
j~naanena tu tat aj~naanam yeshhaam naashitam aatmanaH
|
teshaam aadityavat j~naanam prakaashayati tat param.h
||
All the problems are caused by ignorance therefore
what is required is only
j~naanam.
Thus both shruti pramaaNam and smRîti pramaaNam
declare that the problem of
human suffering is centered on ignorance and for such
kind of problems
knowledge is the only solution and not action.
Hence Vedanta is siddha bodhaka vaakyam and it
produces knowledge and that
mere knowledge we get purushaartha. Therefore
vedaanta vaakyaani pramaaNa
bhuutaani.
This is response to the first point of the
puurvapakshii.
********
Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and
can be accessed at
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/files/Notes+on+Brahmasuutra/
for personal study.
***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright

protected.
***
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K. Sadananda
Message
Index
Msg #
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From: "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@dircon.co.uk>

Date: Fri Mar 30, 2001 3:45 pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1F
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madhyamam.h |
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my own teacher.
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the best among the
teachers, Shree Chinmayaananda, to his lotus feet I (sadaa) always
prostrate.
samanvaya adhikaraNam.h .- 4
suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1F
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2. The next point of puurvapakshii '-s argument is that vedaanta j~naanam

being useless as such should be applied towards karma (according to bhaTTa
matam) or upaasanaa (according to praabhaakara matam).
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The reason these matam -s insist on this application is because they cannot
totally reject part of the Veda-s as useless and part useful. They are
forced to make this
connection to make the so-called useless statement useful.
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Shankara says there is nothing more ridiculous than these forced

connections.
It is impossible to apply or connect siddhabodhaka vedaanta vaakyam -s to
karma or upaasanaa. In the previous siddhaanta it is argued that the Vedanta
need not be connected since it give j~naanam which is useful to solve the
fundamental human problem whose root cause is ignorance. In this siddhaanta

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it is argued that it cannot be connected with karma or upaasanaa even if one

wants to try to do that. The first reason Shankara says is the vedaanta
j~naanam eliminates duality, which is the very basis for karma and
upaasanaa.
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tat kena kaM pashyet (there seer-seen distinctions gone) - na iha naanaa
asti
ki.nchana (there is no speck of plurality) - yasmin sarvaaNi bhuutaani
aatmaa eva abhuut ( where all the beings other than the self non-existent),
etc says Vedanta. upaasanaa also requires upaasya - upaasaka bheda , karma
requires kartRî - karaNa aadi bheda and Vedanta knocks off all these
bheda -s involving subject-object dualities. After a knowledge of Advaita
how can Advaita j~naanam be applied in the field of dvaitam. It is
impossible.
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2) In addition to being kartaa , the Vedanta knowledge involving Advaita

knocks off the notions of varNaashrama which is one of the criteria for
certain yaaga-s. For example a Brahmin alone is qualified for certain
yaaga-s - brahmaNaH bRîhaspati savena yajeta , - the bRîhaspati sava
yaagam can be performed by a Brahmin only.
raajaa raajasuuyane yajeta - Only the king can perform the raajasuuya yaaga.
Not only varNa status, one has to retain aashrama status for performing
yaga.
Without a wife one cannot perform certain yaaga-s that a house-holder has to
do.
What brahmachaari can do, a gRîhastha cannot do. What gRîhastha can do a
brahmachaari should not.
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na varNaaH na varNaashrama aachaara dharmaaH

na me dhaaraNaa - dhyaana - yoga - aadayaH api |
anaatma - aashrayaa ahaM - mama - adhyaasa - haanaat
tat ekaH avashishhTaH shivaH kevalaH aham.h || 2 ||
Shankara - dashashlokii
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Hence Vedanta negates kartRîtvam and varNaashrama status and having

negated that how can it be combined with karma and upaasanaa which require
kartRîtvam?
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The third reason: Vedanta positively condemns karma and upaasanaa as bandha
hetu or cause for bondage. In MunDaka Upa. (1-2-7)
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plavaa hi ete adRîDhaa yaj~naruupaa

ashhTaadashoktam avaram yeshhu karma |
etat shreyaH ye abhinandanti muuDhaaH
jaraa mRîtyum te punaH eva apiyanti ||
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Those people who hold on to karma hoping that it will take them across
the ocean of sa.nsaara , they are all muuDhaaH - most ignorant. They will go
to heaven and come back and again go through the cycle of sa.nsaara. Hence
after the vedaanta j~naanam the person loses the purushhaarthatva buddhi in
karma. Hence how can it be possible to connect vedaanta j~naanam to karma?
Similarly upaasanaa also na karmaNaa na prajayaa dhanena tyaagena eke
amRîtatvam aanashhuH - [Kaivalya up. 2]
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karma cannot give moksha after saying that how can Veda say that therefore
perform karma?

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vedaanta vij~naana sunischitaarthaaH sa.nnyaasa yogaat

yatayaH shuddhasatvaaH |
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In Gita - sarva dharmaan parityajya maam ekam sharaNam

vraja | - Hence the third reason is that vedaanta j~naanam is contradictory
to karma
therefore it can never combine with karma. Hence Shankara declares in
Atmabodha
avirodhitayaa karma , avidyaa na nivartayet.h |
vidyaa avidyaam nihanti eva tejaH timira sa~Nghavat.h ||
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karma is being opposite cannot remove ignorance. Only knowledge can remove
ignorance just as the light removes the darkness. Hence one cannot say that
siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s should be connected to kaaryabodhaka vaakyam-s.
In the karmakaanDa one may be able to connect to the kaaryabodhaka
vaakyam-s. There the knowledge is how and why one should perform the
rituals. But the Vedanta is dealing with a different problem and one cannot
force any connection to the siddhabodhaka vaakyam-s of Vedanta to karma or
upaasana.
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The reason four: The fourth objection is related to the puurvamiimaa.nsaka

'-s
declaration that Brahman is not at all there. Shankara says it is not true.
To find out what is revealed by shaastra the puurvamiimaa.nsaka -s
themselves have come up with the procedure involving the shhaD - li~Nga or
six factors of determination. Their own criteria of shhaD - li~Nga or six
factors have been applied to Vedanta and it has been shown that Brahman is
revealed by the shaastram. upakramaadi shhaD - li~NgaiH tat brahma
shaastrasya vishhayaH
samanvayaat or nirnayaat |
When it has been clearly shown that Brahman is indeed revealed by Vedanta
how can one say that Brahman is non-existent, unless one is a naastika. In
that case you have to
reject swarga, heaven also, since you cannot establish that by pratyaksha or
anumaana etc and it is revealed only by Veda. Hence brahma asti, vedaanta
taatparya vishhayatvaat.
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In addition puurvapakshii says that Brahman is not there, because it is

neither useful as an end or useful as a means, based on Vedantic statement
that it is neither saadhyam (goal) or sadhanam (means) - saadhya saadhana
vilakshaNam brahma. Sir, if Brahman is neither saadhanam or saadhyam and if
Vedanta says Brahman still exists, it is very clear that Brahman is the
saadhaka only i.e the one who is the seeker of saadhyam by saadhanam. If one
still claims that Brahman is non-existent he is
only denying himself or it is a self-denial, and by that very self-denial
one denies that very denial itself, or in other words one is proving
existence of oneself, thus by Vedanta teaching existence of Brahman - aham
brahma asmi is the essential teaching of Vedanta.
neti neti iti vachanena sarva saadhana
saadhya nishhedhena saadhana
saadhya vyatiriktam siddharuupam saadhakam - tat tvam
asi iti bodhayati |
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The next argument is if aham is the Brahman and aham is ever revealed and I
do not need shaastra to reveal the self which is self-evident.
aham
aham iti baalyaadishhu api sarvaasu avasthaasu jaagrat
- swapna - sushhuptishhu

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sarvadaa prasiddhatvaat sarvadaa prathamaanatvaat it is self-evident as I am I am from childhood on, in all our experiences in
waking, dream and deep sleep in all states and was the prathama purushha as
the first person singular existent entity. If shaastra is revealing that
then it is useless as a
pramaaNa since aham is self-evident fact.
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For that Shankara answers aham or I am is known as saamaanya ruupeNa and not
as visheshha ruupeNa - as sat and chit but not as aananda - for that
Shankara says one has to read Ch. III where adhyaasa bhaashyam is
discussed. -
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yadyapi aatma prasiddhaH , parantu adhyasta jiivaatma

ruupeNa eva
prasiddhaH na tu paramaatma ruupeNa . aha~Nkaara
ruupeNa prasiddhaH na tu saakshi
ruupeNa.
tvam pada vaachyaartha ruupeNa prasiddhaH na tu
lakshyaartha ruupeNa. -
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Essentially, although self is self-evident, it is recognized only as a jiiva

or limited entity not as an all pervading entity, recognized as ego entity
but not as witnessing consciousness, recognized as conscious entities as I
and you but not as all pervading consciousness.
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Hence shaastra has to reveal aatmaa as Brahman. Hence Vedanta is required as

pramaaNa. Hence brahma asti and that brahman is aham. This knowledge is
sufficient since it gives me the purushhaartha , the moksha . The knowledge
that
aham brahma asmi is useful since it negates my jiivatvam or abrahmatvam
status.
This argument is presented in simple Sanskrit as -
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yathaa rajju sarpa

j~naanena rajju
adhyasta sarpa bhaavasya nivîttiH bhavati , evam
aatmanaH brahmatva
j~naanena aatmani adhyastasya jiiva bhaavasya
nivRîttiH bhavati | jiiva
bhaava nivRîttiH eva moksha ruupa parama
purushaarthaH - katham
taadRîsha brahmaNaH nishhprayojanatvam swapne api
sha~Nkitum shakyate!
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How can anyone doubt even in a dream that Brahman is useless when brahma
j~naanam gives the greatest purushhaartha called moksha itself. That is the
ultimate goal of human life itself. Hence brahman asti - aatmaruupeNa asti .
Vedanta is
required to give not saamanya j~naanam but visheshha j~naanam. Shankara
says for details refer to Ch. III- adhyaasa bhaashya.
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One more argument against puurvamiimaa.nsaka. They argue: In Veda-s

karmakaanDa is of primary importance as swataH pramaaNa and Vedanta has
no independent validity but gets secondary importance as pramaaNa that too
only by hooking itself to karmakaanDa or upaasanaa. Shankara now provides an
offensive argument. Shankara says in fact it is the other way around. That
is karmakaanDam is apramaanam, j~naanakaanDam alone is pramaaNam. If
karmakaanDa gets validity it is only because of its association with
j~naanakaanDam. How is this proved?

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You have to wait for the next post!

____________________________________________________________________________
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********
Notes on Brahmasuutra-s are now stored in a folder and
can be accessed at
for personal study.
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***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright

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-- K. Sadananda
Message
Index
Msg #
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Date: Wed Apr 11, 2001 3:37 pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1G
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madhyamam.h |
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my own teacher.
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the best among the
prostrate.
suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1G
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Notes on BSB I-i-4-1G

If we recall the puurvamiimaamsaka's definition of pramaaNam is - anadhigata
abaadhita saprayojana arthabodhakam pramaaNam - It should reveal something,
which is new, not negated by other pramaaNam-s and useful.
We have proved above that Vedanta is pramaaNa by their own definition since
it fulfils all the requirements. Now let us examine the karmakaanDa.

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Does it fulfil all the above conditions? It reveals new things like puNyam,
paapam, swarga, etc, merits, demerits, heaven etc. It is also useful - since
dharma, artha and kaama purushhaartha are fulfilled. Two requirements are
met.
But does it fulfil abaadhita condition that is it should not be negated by
any other pramaaNa. Shankara says it does not fulfil that requirement since
karmakaanDa is negated by the j~naanakaanDam of the Veda-s. This is because
karmakaanDa reveals duality, which is the main theme of karmakaanDa.
j~naanakanDam says na iha naanaa asti ki~nchana there is no plurality at all. What you call as plurality is nothing but
Brahman
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brahama eva idam amRîtam purastaat brahma pashchaat brahma dakshinataH cha
uttareNa, adhaH cha uurdhvam cha prasRîtam brahma eva idam vishvam idam
varishhTham - MunDaka Upa. 2-2-11
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Brahma which is changeless is everywhere - in the front, in the back, in the

south, in the north, above, below - all over it is nothing but Brahman.
This entire magnificent universe is nothing but Brahman. What about the
duality - Vedanta says - yatra vaa anyadi vasyaat tatra anyaH anyat
pashyet - where there is a seeming duality then alone a person sees
plurality everywhere - yatra sarvam aatmaa eva abhuut tatra kena kam
pashyet - when a person can recognize the aatman where is the question of
duality? From these two statements it is clear that aj~naana kaale dvaitam,
j~naanakaale advaitam - only when one is ignorant one sees the plurality and
the seeming plurality disappears when one has the knowledge of Brahman.
Whatever one perceives when one is ignorant can be a pramaaNam or
apramaaNam - valid or invalid knowledge. The snake is there at the time of
ignorance and rope is there after gaining the knowledge - then that is valid
knowledge. Hence snake is invalid or mithya. Hence karmakaanDa reveals
invalid duality which is perceived at the time of ignorance. Therefore
karmakaanDa is apramaaNam. Furthermore there is an interesting statement anyaH asau anyaH aham iti saH na veda saH devaanam paashuH - the one who
says I am different from others he does not know, he is the most ignorant.
(Devanaam pashuH is a proverb indicating that he is the master in
stupidity.) Thus dvaitam or duality is invalid and karmakaanDa based on
dvaitam is also invalid. If at all it should get validity it has to be
hooked up to j~naanakaanDa. In what way will it be useful to j~naanakaanDa?
Shankara says j~naanakaanDa saadhanatvena karmakaanDasya praamaaNyam. It is
useful as a means to prepare the student to qualify for j~naanakaanDa. How
will it help as a means to come to j~naanakaanDa? saadhana chatushhTaya
sampatti pradhaanena - karmakaanDa is useful by giving four fold
qualifications required to prepare a student for Brahman inquiry - for
details Shankara says refer to the discussion related to the first suutra atha ataH brahma jij~naasa. karmakaanDa is not meant for dharma artha kaama
purushaartha, and vedantin does not consider that they are purushhaartha at
all since they are only exalted sa.nsaara. In fact, karmakaanDa and
upaasanaa are all ultimately meant for vairaagya siddhi. dharma, artha,
kaama is only a sugar coating for the medicines to give ultimately the
vairaagya required to turn one's attention to secure moksha. It is like a
chocolate laxative given to children to cleanse the system. After one gets
deeply entangled in sa.nsaara, a time will come in the evolution of a jiiva
when he feels like running away from these attachments - an indication that
the medicine is working!
Hence it is superficially dharma, artha, kaamaartham but in the final
analysis it is meant only for acquiring saadhana chatushhTayam eva.
After acquiring the saadhana chatushhTayam the person comes to Vedanta athaH (suutra 1) karmakaanDa dwaara vairaagya siddhi anantaram - through the
path of karmakanDa after acquiring detachment, inquiry into Brahman.

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Is there a pramaaNam for this? - or is it just sour grapes of a

brahmachaarii sanyaasin bhaashhyakaara-s!?
pramaaNam 1: pariikshya lokaan karmachitaan brahmaNo ... Mund. Upa. 1-2-12
(the full mantra is explained with reference to suutra 1), having
experienced all the benefits of karma and after one examines the bottom
line, one should get vairaagyam or detachment. How come we see lot of people
not having that vairaagyam? - Well, all it means is that they will continue
taking the medicine until it works - that is the law of nature. Everyone is
seeking aanandam or happiness and it takes lot more for some to learn that
seeker and the sought are one and the same and any search is futile.
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pramaaNam 2: tam etam vedaanuvachanena brahmaaNaa vividishhanti yaj~nena

daanena tapasaa anaashhakena (Bri. Up. ref? ). Here yaj~na refers to karma,
daana means charity and tapasaa refers to upaasana. The mantra says the
purpose of all these is ultimately for generating interest in Vedanta
(vividishaa) - jij~naasa. Interest in Vedanta is directly proportional to
vairaagyam towards sa.nsaara. Gita says - yoginaH karma kurvanti sa~Nga.n
tyaktvaa aatmasiddhaye. Yogis perform action renouncing the fruits of
actions in order to purify their minds.
Hence karamakaanDa is not useful by itself but only useful for facilitating
the development of saadhana chatushhTaya sampatti which is the requirement
for Vedanta vichaara. In Gita also this is stated as - sarvam karma akhilam
paartha j~naane parisamaapyate - [IV:33]
Thus Shankara makes it clear that karmakaaNDa is only useful when it gets
related to j~naankaaNDa. puurvapakshi-s got it completely ultasiida
(opposite) in claiming that it is the other way. Hence by their own
arguments if utility is the criteria, karamakaaNDa is useless directly and
only useful indirectly. Hence it is not a primary pramaaNa but only a
secondary one.
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********
for personal study.
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***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected. ***

-- K. Sadananda
Code 6323
Naval Research Laboratory
Washington D.C. 20375
Voice (202)767-2117
Fax:(202)767-2623
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Dennis posting on behalf of Sadananda

Message
Index
Msg #
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Date: Thu Apr 19, 2001 4:02 pm
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1H
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madhyamam.h |

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my own teacher.
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the best among the
prostrate.
suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1H
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Notes on BSB I-i-4-1H

We are discussing Shankara's commentary related to the word 'tu'. With
this the answers to puurvamiimaa.nsaa puurvapaksha-s that include Prabhakara
and Bhatta matams are over.
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Shankara next introduces one more important matam in his commentary

related to the word 'tu'. Shankara discusses that here since this matam
is very close to puurvamiimaa.nsaka matam. That matam is called
'vRîttikaara matam'.
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vRîttiH here means a small commentary like Notes. vyaakhyaanam and

bhaashhyam are also commentaries but they are elaborate. Hence
vRîttikaara means a commentator. So vRîttikaara matam means the
philosophy or view of one of the brahmasutra commentators. There were
several bhaashyakaara-s before Shankara. We do not know who this
commentator was. In English we use the expression 'some Tom, Dick or Harry'
for the unknown person. In Sanskrit (it is not "TomaH, DickkiH or HarryH"!!)
- some times they use devadattaH, yaj~nadattaH or vishhNudattaH for the
general name or ditta davittadayaH - dittaH or davittaH etc.
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Shankara discusses two vRîttikaara-s through his commentary - one is called

j~naanakarma samuchchhya vaadii (who claims that j~naana and karma should
be judiciously integrated) - this is heavily discussed in his Gita Bhashya.
(Some aspects of this VRîtti we discussed with reference to suutra 1).
Here Shankara extensively discusses as puuurvapaksha another vRîttikaara
matam and dismisses it establishing his siddhanta. This vRîttikaara must
have been very popular during Shankara's time to consider his matam as
puurvapaksha. He does not come under puurvamiimaa.nsaa but some of his views
are very close to it. Hence Shankara discusses his philosophy along with
the discussion of puurvamiimaa.nsaka matams.
What is vRîttikaara matam?
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Most importantly he differs from puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s in saying that

Brahman is existent and is revealed by the upanishhad-s. That is he accepts
brahma
asti and brahmanaH shaastrayonitvam. He also agrees that the
upakramaadi shhaD-li~Nga vichaara proves the existence of Brahman as

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revealed
by the upanishhad-s; that is he accepts tat tu samanvayaat. Up to now he is
one with vedantin. But he differs from Vedantin by saying that even though
Brahman is existent as revealed by the upanishhad-s, mere Brahma j~naanam
cannot give moksha. Here he goes along with puurvamiimaa.nsaka to say that
kevala j~naanam cannot give any purushhaartha. He says after gaining brahma
j~naanam one has to do brahma upaasanam to gain moksha. Vedanta reveals
Brahman and asks you to do brahma upaasanaa. Through this brahma
upaasanaa karma - that is through meditation on brahman - one will get
extraordinary
puNyam or merit which helps to secure moksha. In support of this he
quotes the same puurvamiimaa.nsaa suutra - aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaat
aanarathakhyam athadarthaanaam. The whole veda asks you to do some thing
or other - mere learning Veda is not enough, one has to apply that knowledge
to something or other. vidhinaa tu ekavaakyarthvaat stutyarthena vidhiinaam
syuH - brahmaj~naanam by itself is of no use therefore it should be put into
upaasana vidhi.
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In support of his statement he gives upanishhat pramaaNam also. In Bri Upa.

there are two statements - aatmaa ityeva upaasiita - it is called vidyaa
suutram. In another statement that says aatmaanam eva lokam upaasiita. In
both cases there is clear expression - upaasiita. From this it is very clear
that brahma upaasanam or paramaatma upaasanam gives puNyam and that in turn
gives moksha. Then what about the Upanishad statements that say through
j~naanam one can attain moksha - aatmavit shokam tarati brahma veda
brahmaiva bhavati - the knower of aatmaa crosses the ocean of sa.nsaara,
the knower of Brahman becomes Brahman and all those upanishad mantras that
we have quoted before? For that he says, one should carefully interpret
upanishhadic mantra-s. Everyword indicating j~naanam has got the
meaning of upaasanam also.
For example, in shikshaavalli -
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ya evam etaa
mahaasa.nhitaa vyaakhyaataa veda | sandhiiyate prajayaa pashubhiH
brahmavarchasena annaadyena suvargeNa lokena | Taitt. Up. 1-2-6
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The word veda here is interpreted as upaasiita. Thus veda has two meanings
one
is j~naanam and the other is upaasanam. In bhRîguvalli also -
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ya evam veda |
kshema iti vaachi |
yogakshema iti praaNaapaanayoH |
karmeti hastayoH | 3-10-2.
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In this context also we take the meaning of veda as upaasanam. Hence brahma
veda brahmaiva bhavati - in this statement also brahma j~naanii does not
become
Brahman, brahma upaaste saH brahma bhavati. One who does upaasanaa on
Brahman
becomes Brahman.
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Similarly the other statements - brahmavit aapnoti paramam

means brahma upaasakaH aapnoti param; aatmavit shokam tarati means aatma
upaasakaH shokam tarati. Hence wherever j~naanam word comes one has to
translate
as upaasanam. yastu sarvaaNi bhuutaani aatmaivaabhuut vijaanataH .... Here
too vijaanataH means the one who does upaasanaa. aatmaanam chet vijaaniiyaat

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ayam asmiiti purushhaH - vijaaniiyaat means upaasiita. In short if we take

all the ten quotations given before wherever the word j~naanam comes it has
to be translated as upaasanam. Hence upaasanena puNya dwaara moksham
siddhyati, by upaasana one acquires the merits by which one attains
moksha. says vRîttikaara. According to him, there are exceptions like knowledge
that give
results as in the case of rajju j~naane phalam vartate - this is acceptable.
But
brahmaj~naanam does not come under that exception. Therefore after
brahmaj~naanam one should do upaasanam.
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In support of his statement he shows that there are many people who are
experts in the upanishads. Look at them - are they muktapurushha-s? They
continue to be sa.nsaarii-s even after the thorough study of Vedanta. Hence
vRîttikaara argues shRîta brahmaNaH
api yathaa puurvam sa.nsaaritva darshanaat - Thus there are many people
who know Vedanta thoroughly and still are sa.nsaari-s. They are all Vedantic
educated sa.nsaari-s. Therefore it is evident that brahmaj~naanena eva
mokshaH na sidhyati - by mere knowledge of Brahman one cannot gain moksha.
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This particular argument should convince anyone to side with the

vRîttikaara.
We have seen this as well in the advaitin list serve in terms of
discussions that cause us to conclude that we have had enough of this
intellectual analysis, it is of no use- we want to withdraw and spend our
time in saadhanaa! That is
exactly what the vRîttikaara says - brahma j~naana anantaram upaasanam
kartavyam , after studying Vedanta one has to do upaasana. He gives one more
argument - the upanishad very clearly says aatmaaa vaa are drashhTavyaH,
shrotavyaH, mantavyaH, nididhyaasitavyaH | Atmaa should be clearly
understood
through shravanam and mananam. Thus through shravanam and mananam one gets
brahma j~naanam. If j~naanam is enough then shrotavyaH and manthavyaH must
be
sufficient . But upanishad clearly prescribes after shravanam and
mananam, nididhyaasitavyaH - constant dwelling upon that - it is derived
from
the root dhyai - dhyaayati - hence nididhyaasana means repeated dhyaanam
-that is what is called upaasanam. Hence upaasanam kartavyam which is a
clean
action, since according to Sanskrit grammar, a suffix tavyaH indicates
a compulsory action. Hence the word nididhyaasitavyaH indicates a vidhi,
a vidhi indicates a compulsory action. Hence upaasanam action gives the
result or prayojanam of moksha and not brahmaj~naanam. Hence the conclusion
of
vRîttikaara is brahma upaasanena mokshaH, na tu brahma j~naanena. Only
action involving brahma upaasanaa will give moksha and not mere knowledge of
Brahman. This puurvapakshii differs from puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s who do not
accept the existence of even Brahman leave alone Brahma upaasanam.
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********
for personal study.
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***Copyright Protection - These notes are copyright protected. ***

-- K. Sadananda

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Message
Index
Msg #
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Date: Wed May 23, 2001 9:00 am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1i
Notes on BSB I-i-4-1i
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suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1i
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We are currently discussing vRîttikaara matam as a part of

puurvapaksha. This matam differs from puurvamiimaa.nsaka-s in that it
accepts the existence of Brahman. However, it subscribes to the
theory that by just knowing Brahman one cannot gain Brahman. After
brahmaj~naanam one has to do upaasana to gain Brahman. There is some
similarity between this vRîttikaara philosophy and Ramanuja's
vishishhTaadvaita in terms of saadhanaa where emphasis on upaasanaa
in addition to surrender or nyaasa to the Personified God-form is
emphasized as means for moksha. The similarity is only with reference
to the need for upaasanaa for moksha.
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Shankara refutes this puurvapakshii. Shankara approaches this by

defining clearly the nature of moksha from different angles. He shows
that if one accepts the moksha definitions given, then one has to
conclude that such a moksha is never possible through upaasanaa ,
whatever be the upaasanaa. Here we are going to heavily criticize
upaasanaa just as Gaudapada does in
Mandukya-karika: III:1
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upaasanaashritaH dharmaH, jaate brahmaNi vartate |

praagutpatteH ajam sarvam, tena asau kRîpaNaH smRîtaH ||
Goudapada says every upaasaka (one who does upaasanaa) is an

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unfortunate one. When we criticize upaasanaa, it should be understood

in the correct spirit. We are not criticizing upaasanaa totally. We
are criticizing upaasanaa presented as a means of moksha which comes
after brahma j~naanam. But we glorify upaasanaa before brahma
j~naanam as a means of mental purification. This has to be understood
clearly. What is criticized is vRîttikaara's philosophy that states
upaasanaa as a means of moksha after acquiring brahma j~naanam.
According to Shankara, brahma j~naana anantaram kartavyam kimapi na
asti - after acquiring the brahma j~naanam there is no obligation to
do anything. Gita says:
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Na eva tasya kRîtena arthaH na akRîtena iha kaschana |

na cha asya sarva-bhuuteshu kaschit artha-vyapaashrayaH || III:18
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Because for that brahma j~naani there is no gain by performing any

action, there is no loss by not performing any action. Since he does
not depend on anything for his happiness, he has no self-centered
motivation to perform any action amidst all beings.
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karmaNi akarma yaH pashyet akarmaNi cha karma yaH |

saH buddhimaan manushhyeshhu saH yuktaH kRîtsna-karma-kRît.h || IV:18
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One who sees inaction in action, action in inaction, he is the most

knowledgeable and yogi among men and he is fulfilled in terms of all
actions.
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Hence j~naaana anantara upaasanaa we criticize but j~naana puurva

upaasanaa we glorify. Hence Shankara is going to criticize upaasanaa
as presented by the vRîttikaara.
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The definitions of moksha: The first one, which is normally given, is

a-shariirataa hi mokshaH - moksha is freedom from shariira
sambandhaH, freedom from body-relationships.
Naturally the opposite of that is sa.nsaara: sa-shariirataa hi
sa.nsaaraH - shariira sambandha is sa.nsaara. Where does Shankara
find these definitions? - From Chandogya Up. 4-12-1:
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- nahhavai sa shariirasya sataH priyaapriayayoH apahatiH asti |

- ashariiram vaa va santaM na priyaa priye spRîshataH||
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When atmaa is embodied due to the notion of ego it suffers from likes
and dislikes. Along as one is embodied the likes and dislikes do not
leave. When there is no shariira, the likes and dislikes do not
touch that aatma. Hence Shankara says as long as shariira sambandha
is there sukha
and duHkha opposites cannot be avoided and that is sa.nsaara.
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The moksha is - ashariiraM vaa va santaM na priyaapriye spRîshataH |

One for whom there is no shariira sambandha the priya and apriyaa
will not touch. Having given the definition, Shankara says - both
karma and upaasanaa are actions, one is kaayikaM karma, physical
action and the other is maanasaM karma, mental action. Wherever
actions are there, there will be both quantitative and qualitative
gradations, taaratamyam, in those actions. Hence there will be
taaratamya or gradations in the puNya or merits produced also. Hence
the results also will have taaratamya or gradations in the
puNyaphala. The type of bodies that one gets depending on the puNya
phalam. Hence puNyaM can only improve sa-shariiratvam but cannot make
you a-shariiraH that is improvement in the body that one does not go

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beyond the body. One can get human body or even divine body of Indra
or bRîhaspati or prajaapati etc. Any amount of karma and upaasanaa
will keep one only with sa-shariiratvam wherein gradations cannot be
avoided - priya and apriya or likes and dislikes cannot be avoided hence sa.nsaara cannot be avoided. Hence Shankara says four things
are interrelated - karma or upaasanaa, puNyam or merits,
sa-shariiratvam or acquiring a body, and
sa.nsaaraH. One will get caught up in this cycle as long as karma or
upaasanaa is there. That is the reason we never accept moksha that
involves going to some loka or field of experience. In other systems
of philosophy the moksha is defined as going to some loka where God
is residing. Advaita
never accepts this as moksha as long as it is a loka and as long as
the jiiva retains their individuality -he will have sa-shariiratvam.
There will then be gradations that will lead to comparisons, some are
more fortunate being close to the Lord compared to the other etc.
(First class versus business class versus economy seats depending on
ones upaasana phala or credit card balance!) Hence Shankara's first
argument is upaasanaa phalam mokshaH na bhavati - Moksha cannot be
the result of a upaasanaa.
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tasmaat upaasana phalam sa-sariiratvam eva bhavati naiva

a-shariiratvam. As a result of upaasanaa one gets only field of
experience with different types of bodies and as long as there is a
body there will be gradations in phalam - as Tai. Upa. says:
II:viii:1 :
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te ye shatam manushhya gandharvaaNaam anandaaH |

sa eko deva gandharvaaNaam aanandaH| ..
te ye shatam deva gandharvaaNaam aanandaaH |
... sa eka indrasyaanandaH |
te ye shatam indrasyaanandaaH |
sa eko bRîhaspate aanandaH |
te ye shatam bRîhaspateH annandaaH |
sa ekaH prajaapateH aanandaH |
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One is happier than the other. The happiness of Gandharva-s is

hundred times that of human. Deva's happiness is hundred times that
of Gandharva-s. Indra's happiness is hundred times that of deva-s,
and Prajapati's ananda is hundred times that of Indra. Hence as long
as one has body, there are gradations in types of bodies and
gradations in happiness that one gets. Hence moksha is obtained not
by karma not by upaasanaa, but by knowledge alone.
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But one can say all other upaasanaa-s can give better sa-shariiratvam
whereas brahma upaasanaa can be so powerful that it can give moksha
with a-shariiratvam that is without a body. Shankara says no.
A-shariirataa cannot be result of any karma or upaasanaa. This is
because a-shariiratvam
is the very intrinsic nature of aatmaa or the self. Whatever is the
intrinsic nature (swadhrama) of a thing, it should be there always.
That is the definition of intrinsic nature, that is intrinsic swataH
siddham, just as the heat is the intrinsic nature of the fire.
Shankara says a-shariirataa is the very intrinsic nature of every
jiiva, and being nature, it is nitya siddha swaruupam, eternally
accomplished thing. On the other hand, any karma or upaasanaa phalam
is not available now but it will come later after the completion of
that karma or upaasanaa. Hence karma or upaasanaa phalam is not
siddham (already acquired) but saadhyam (yet to be acquired). Hence

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a-shariirataa which is a nitya siddham of jiiva cannot be equated to

saadhyam which is yet to be acquired. Therefore a-shariirataa ruupa
mokshaH, liberation that is free from any body, cannot be the result
of upaasanaa phalam.
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This raises the question that on what basis one can say that
a-shariirataa is the very nature of aatmaa. The shruti [Katha
I:ii:22] says:
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a-shariiram shariireshhu anavastheshhu avasthitaM mahaantaM vibhuM

aatmaanaM matvaa dhiiro na shocati |
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Thus upanishads clearly state that aatmaa is a-shariiram. In Mundaka

Upa. 2-1-2 says:
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divyo hi amuurtaH purushhaH sa baahyaabhyantaro hi ajaH |

apraaNo hi amanaaH shubhro aksharaat parataH paraH ||
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amuurtaH means sthuula shariira rahitaH (without gross body), apraaNa

amaNaaH means suukshma shariira rahitaH (without subtle body) and
shubhraH means kaaraNa shariira rahitaH (without causal body) - Thus
upanishads says aatmaa is shariira-traya varjitaH, without the three
bodies. In the Mundaka, I:i:6 it says :
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yat tat adreshyam agraahyam agotram avarNam achakshuH-shrotram tat

apaaNi- paadam -
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it cannot be seen, it cannot be grasped, from relations, and color

or caste etc. and no eyes, ears, hands and legs etc.- thus
emphasizing a-shariirataa.
In Ishaavaasya Upa. mantra 8:
sa paryagaat shukram akaayam avraNam asnaaviram shuddham apaapaviddham -
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thus says aatmaa is all pervading consciousness and is akaayam meaning a-shariiram, without a body. asnaaviram, shuddham apaapa
viddham - means shariira-traya rahitaH aatmaa -free from gross,
subtle and causal bodies. Hence a-shariirataa is not a goal to be
accomplished by karma or upaasanaa but it is a fact to be recognized.
Hence it cannot be upaasanaa phalam. - expressing this in anumaana
vaakyam (Refer to Ch. II of the notes for anumaana) - mokshaH na
upaasanaa saadhyaH, siddhatvaat, chaitanyavat.
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There comes a side objection from a secondary puurvapakshii (a

madhyasthaH) - how can an advaitin define a-shariirataa as moksha if he does that then he cannot accept jiivanmukti, that is a
liberation while living in the body, that is he is liberated yet
sa-shariiraH. Hence moksha will be only after death when the body
falls down. Shankara says jiivanmukti is possible. jiivamukta is
a-shariira only. The others around him may think he is sa-shariira.
It is their problem. The upanishad-s reveal a-shariiratvam as our
very nature or swa-swaruupam. Then when am I
a-shariira? The upanishad-s point out that I am a-shariiraH all the
time, it is swa-swaruupam, one's very intrinsic nature - nitya
a-shariiraH as stated by the upanishad-s above. Secondly aatmanaH
asa~NgaH - asa~NgaH na hi sajyate - asa~NgaH hi ayam purushhaH (Bri.
Up III:ix:26) - It cannot have any relationship with any object like aakaasha - like space. Hence aatma asa~Ngatvaat nityam

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a-shariiraH - It is eternally formless since it is not related to any

thing, like space. shariira sambandha (relationship with body) comes
as a result of karma phalam. Karma-phalam comes only to a kartaa or
doer. aatma being ever a-kartaa - there is no question of karma and
hence karma phala and hence body to experience karma-phalam - hence
aatmaa nitya akartRîtvaat shariira sambandhaH na eva bhavati aatmaa being non-doer has no relation to body. Hence aatmanaH
a-shariiratvam nitya siddham.
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If so then how can one say sa-shariiratvam is sa.nsaara - since there

will never be a sa.nsaara since aatmaa is eternally a-shariiraH. For
that Shankara says although aatmaa is nitya a-shariiraH, it can be
mistaken as sa-shariiraH. aatmaa cannot become sa-shariiraH but it is
mistaken as
sa-shariiraH - as Murphy's Law states (Murphy's upanishadic mantra!)
that what can go wrong will go wrong! - Hence sa-shariiratvam is
adhyaasa siddham - hence Shankara says that is the reason why I wrote
first adhyaasa bhaashhyam! If sa-shariiratvam is due to error then
how does one get
a-shariiratvam? If rope is mistaken for a snake then how can one get
the snake converted back to rope? There is no conversion process - it
is only understanding or knowledge that, there was, there is and
there will be rope only all the time and never a snake to start with.
Hence sa-shariiratvam is
adhyaasa or error and it is not by dying one gets a-shariiratvam but
by knowing that aham aatmaa nitya shariiraH sambandha varjitaH asmi I was, I am and I will ever be aatmaa without a body or without any
body-relations. I am ever free from shariira sambandha.
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Hence jiivanmukta is a-shariiraH only. So is aj~naani a-shariiraH or

sa-shariiraH? He is also a-shariiraH but he does not know that -He
thinks he is sa-shariiraH and hence he is aj~naani. Shankara quotes
Bri. Up.IV:iv:7 that says:
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tat yathaa ahinirlvayanii valmiike mRîtaa pratyastaa shayiita evam evedam

shariiragm shete | athaayaM ashariiraH amRîtaH praaNaH brahma eva
tejaH eva saH aham.h |
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It gives the example of the snake and its skin. The snake removes its
skin and skin continues to be there close to the snake. But snake has
no attachment to its discarded skin. Hence whatever happens to the
skin the snake is not affected. In the same way the j~naani continues
to be in the
body but whatever happens to the body he does not claim that it is
happening to him. It is not that the body becomes free from karma it undergoes its own course (praarabdha-karma) but j~naani never
claims those pleasures and pains as his pleasures and pains. He says
aham nitya ashariiraH.
Giita says: II:56
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duHkheshhu anudvignamanaaH sukheshhu vigata-spRîhaH |

viita-raaga-bhaya-krodhaH sthita-dhiiH muniH uchyate ||
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Hence a-shariiratvam is moksha and moksha is nitya siddha. By j~naana

it is owned-up and it is not a product of upaasanaa.
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That completes the first argument for why moksha cannot be the result
of upaasanaa.

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Shankara provides a few more arguments, which we will discuss in the next post.
----------------------End of the post.
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for personal study.
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-K. Sadananda
Date: Fri Jun 15, 2001 7:05 am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-1-4J
Sorry for the delay in posting this notes - we are streamlining the
editing processes and hopefully these processes become smooth. My
sincere thanks to Geetha who took up the major responsibility in the
editing process, and to Sunder and Dennis as usual for their efforts.
-Any mistakes obviously are mine. Hari Om! Sadananda
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------\
-----------------------------
Notes on BSB I-i-1-4J
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suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-4J
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We are discussing Shankara's response to the vRîttikaara's arguments

that upaasanaa is required after acquiring brahma-j~naanam. In the
last post we have presented the first argument of Shankara and in
this we present the other three arguments. As we noted in the
previous notes, these arguments have relevance also in relation to
vishishhTa-advaita as well as dvaita approaches to moksha.
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2. For the second argument, Shankara gives a second definition of

moksha from a different angle.

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brahma bhaavaH hi mokshaH | -
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This definition is given since every philosopher agrees that moksha

or liberation is nitya or eternal. From the scriptures, from adviatic
point, we come to know that there is only one nitya vastu that is
Brahman (dwaitins and vishishhTa-advaitins do not accept this, but do
accept that moksha is nitya - - yat gatvaa na nivartante tat dhaama
paramaM mama -) Gita | (15:6)
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Therefore from adviata point moksha and Brahman have to be one and
the same. Hence moksha praaptiH is equal to brahma praaptiH.
Brahmavit brahmaiva bhavati - knower of Brahman becomes Brahman. The
question of 'Can moksha be upaasana phalam?' translates now to ' Can
Brahman be upaasana phalam?'. brahma bhaavaH upaasanena labhyate vaa
na vaa ?-
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Shankara says any karma or upaasanaa can produce only four types of
results or phalam: 1. aaptiH, meaning reaching -Thus by doing an
action we can reach a place. 2. utpattiH, meaning production - Just
as a farmer producing the produce. 3. vikaaraH, meaning modification
or conversion - Converting a bangle into a chain. 4. san.skaaraH,
meaning purification - Purification of water for drinking.
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The question is - 'Can Brahman come under any one of the four types
for it to be a phalam?'.
(a) Reaching Brahman is out of question, brahmanaH sarvagatatvaat
(Brahman is all pervading) - If Brahman is all pervading and moksha
is attaining Brahman - and what should one do for that -some say that
one has to die first (since this body is impure) then, through '
shuklagati uttaraayaNa maargah' jiiva has to travel and go to some
loka and thereafter merge into that Bhagavan - - which Bhagavan?, the
sarvavyaapakaH bhagavaan, the one who is everywhere! Hence all
pervasiveness of Brahman and travel are contradiction - tasmaat
brahma aapyam na bhavati or therefore Brahman or moksha is not of the
type involving going somewhere or reaching somewhere, vaikunTa or
kailaasa, etc.
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(b) There is no question of utpatti or to be a product of an action

for Brahman because brahmanaH nitya siddhatvaat - ever present.
(people ask; Sir, when can we attain Brahman or make statements we
cannot attain moksha in this life, but may be in the next life - it
is like asking when is the snake going to become a rope? - it is all
the time a rope even when one is thinking it is a snake.) - Hence
'when?' cannot be the question since Brahman is ever present.
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(c) Can Brahman be the result of a modification or vikaara? Brahman

cannot be an end product of any process because brahmanaH
avikaaryatvaat -Brahman cannot be neither cause for modification or
effect of modification since Brahman is eternal. 'avyaktaH ayam
achintyaH ayam avikaaryaH ayam uchyate - The shruti says that
Brahman is unmanifested, unthinkable, does not undergo any
modification.
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(d) . Brahman cannot be the result of purification process.

Shankara says brahmanaH nityashuddhatvaat, 'apraaNaH hi amanaH
shubhraH' (This mantra was provided before). He is ever pure. Hence
He cannot be the product of purification process. The sa.nskaara or
purification process is subdivided into two types - i) doshha
apanayana-ruupa sa.nskaaraH - refinement by the removal of impurity

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and ii) guNa adhaana-ruupa sa.nskaaraH- addition of various virtues.

In the case of Brahman, doshha apanayana na bhavati nitya-shuddhatvaat- since He is eternally pure, there is no question
of purification process. Also guNa adhaanam api na bhavati,
nirguNatvaat , since he is guNaatiitaH. (guNa is a concept of
intellect and he is beyond any guNa-s since he is beyond any
intellectual comprehension). Also being infiniteness, nothing can be
added and nothing can be subtracted. Hence Brahman cannot be
sa.nskaaryaH also. Therefore, Brahman is chaturvidha karma phala
vilakshaNaH - different from all the four types of karma phalam.
Moksha is also different from all the types of karma phalam. Hence
moksha cannot be upaasanaa phalam.
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The next argument is called abhyupedya vaadaH -an assumption assuming that puurvapakshi is right and showing that such an
assumption leads to contradiction thereby invalidating the
puurvapaksha. We assume first that the argument of puurvapakshi that
'moksha is upaasana phalam' is right. Then what will be the nature
of moksha? If it is a result of upaasanam, then it will certainly
have a beginning - since result is accomplished by following a
saadhana and not before. It is not there before and it comes after
the upaasana is completed. It is called praak abhaavaH - not
existent before the upaasana took place. But, whatever has a
beginning will certainly have an end. jaatasya hi dhruvaH mRîtyuH
dhruvam janma mRîtasya cha | (Gita 2-27) - Hence the upaasana
phalaruupa mokshaH will be anitya mokshaH or is impermanent moksha.
Gaudapada says beautifully in his kaarikaa
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anaadeH antavatva.n cha sa.nsaarasya na setsyati |

anantataa cha aadimataH mokshasya na bhavishhyati || 4:30
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Eternity is not possible for moksha which has a beginning if it is

the result of upaasanaa, therefore moksha becomes anitya.
Fortunately all the philosophers have agreed that moksha is eternal.
The very purpose of moksha is to go beyond mortality. In Chandogya
Up., it is said that whatever is acquired here in this loka is
impermanent and whatever is acquired as a result of puNya phala in
the other loka-s is also impermanent -
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tat yathaa iha karma chitaH lokaH kshiiyate, evam eva amutra
puNyachitaH lokaH kshiiyate | -Hence the conclusion is nitya mokshaH
upaasana phalam bhavitum na arhati, upaasana phalasya anityatvaat -
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Eternal moksha cannot be the result of upaasana phalam since upaasana

phalam is impermanent. In fact the very word phalam - Shankara says
-phalgutayaa liiyate iti phalam - that which becomes rotten and gets
destroyed in time is called phalam.
This completes the second argument.
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3. For the third argument Shankara says upaasanaa cannot be or is

not the theme of Vedanta. upaasanaa vedaantasya taatparyam bhavitum
na arhati. Why? This is because miimaa.nsaa or samanvaya shows that
the theme of Vedanta is not upaasanaa. This has been proved using
upakramaadi shhaD-li~Ngaani or six-fold factors beginning with
upakramaa. (These six factors were discussed in relation to this
suutra in the earlier posts). By using these six factors it is
established that Vedanta talks about acquiring a moksha which is here
and now. Vedanta does not talk about accomplishing something new in

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future - that is which is not available now and here. In Vedanta the
mahavaakyam in the same 6th chapter of Chandogya. Up., that was
analyzed above, says- tat tvam asi - 'that thou art' - by using asi
the present tense Vedanta clearly shows moksha is in the present. If
it is not here and now, it cannot be anywhere at any time. Either
one is nitya muktaH or nitya baddhaH. That which is not here and now
and comes in future can never be moksha that involves freedom from
all limitations, since it is not eternal and ever existent as it is
not here and now hence that kind of moksha is itself is limited. That
which is limited cannot be a freedom from limitation.
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In addition in BRîhadaaranyaka. Up., there is a discussion of karma

and upaasanaa phalam. putreNa ayam lokaH jayyaH, karmaNaa
pitRîlokaH, vidyayaa deva lokaH (1:5:16). It is said through the
putra, father can gain the birth of human later, through karma one
can gain swarga or heaven and through vidya or upaasanaa one can gain
deva lokaH or brahmalokaH. Having enumerated karma phalam and
upaasanaa phalam, BRîhadaaranyaka. Up., (3:5:1) glorified a
sa.nnyaasii and says -
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putraishhaNaayaaH cha vittaishhaNaayaaH cha lokaishhaNaayaaH cha

vyutthaaya atha bhikshaacharya.n charanti | 3:5:1
saH eshha na iti na iti aatmaa agRîhyaH na hi gRîhyate ashiiryaH na
hi shiiryate asa~NgaH na hi sajyate asitaH na vyathate na rishhyati |
3:9:26
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I do not want putra phalam, I do not want karma phalam, I do not want
even upaasanaa phalam, all I want is moksha - by rejecting, neti neti
- not this - not this - he goes after that which cannot be
objectified, that which is without a body, therefore eternal, that is
free from all attachments, eternally free.
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Thus, shruti says by rejecting all that which can be obtained by

karma and upaasanaa phalam, he goes after moksha. Thus here it
indirectly indicates that moksha will not come under karma or
upaasanaa phalam. Hence how can one bring karma and upaasana in
Vedanta. Hence upaasana is not the taatparyam of Vedanta. In the
previous argument it was established that samanvayaat (in terms of
the six-factors) upaasanaa is not the central theme of the Vedanta.
In this argument it is established that mokshasya upaasanaaphala
vilakshaNatvaat, upaasanaa is not the taatparyam or the central theme
of Vedanta.
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Next Shankara gives a technical reason - The entire Veda is divided

into two portions - karma kaaNDa (upaasana is included) and
j~naanakaaNDa (Vedanta). The first part is analyzed by Jaimini in his
puurva-miimaa.nsaa suutraaNi which begins "atha ataH dharma
jij~naasaa". Vedanta is analyzed by Vyasa in this brahmasuutra which
begins with "atha ataH brahma jij~naasaa". Now Shankara raises a
question - whether all karma and upaasanaa should be analyzed in Veda
puurva or Veda anta? It should be analyzed only in the puurva
kaaNDa. Because karma or upaasanaa produces dharma or puNyam and
hence everything connected with Dharma should be analyzed in the
puurvakaaNDa. If Vedanta deals with moksha and if moksha is upaasanaa
phalam, and if Vedanta also deals with upaasanaa, there is no reason
to separate it from puurvakaanDa and it should be covered under
puurva-miimaa.nsaa under dharma jij~naasaa. Hence Shankara says
Vedanta would not have become a separate part of the Veda. It would
have come under karma kaanDa itself and would have come under

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jaiminii suutra-s. Vyasacharya chose to write a separate suutra for

the Uttara-miimaa.nsaa only because it does not come under karma or
upaasanaa. Only because Vedanta has nothing to do with Dharma
(karma)- It is dealing with aatmaa which is
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anyatra dharmaat, anyatra adharmaat, anyatra asmaat kRîtaa akRîtaat

anyatra bhuutaat cha bhavyaat cha yat tat pashyati tat vida ||
(KaTha. Up. 1-2-14)
-It does not deal with dharma or adharma, karma or akarma, and past
and future - that is to be known.
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yadaa pashyaH pashyate rukmavarNam

kartaaram iishaM purushaM brahmayonim
tadaa vidvaan puNyapaape vidhuuya
niranjanaH paramam saamyam upaiti || (MuNDaka. Up. 3-1-3)
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Vedanta deals with vidvaan who renounces both puNyam and paapam which are karma upaasanaa phalam. In the Gita Krishna says - sarva
dharmaan parityajya maam ekam sharaNam vraja - Give up all the karma
and upaasana which comes under dharma. (actually no achaarya advises
one to give up karma - what is advised is to give the kartRîtva
bhaava or notion of the doership - His will, will be done). Therefore
moksha is dharma vilakshaNatvaat. Upaasana is not the taatparyam of
Vedanta. That completes the third argument. The first argument was
moksha cannot be upaasanaa phalam. The second argument was if moksha
is upaasanaa phalam it becomes anityam or impermanent. The third
argument was upaasanaa cannot be the central theme of Vedanta.
This completes the third argument. Now the fourth argument.
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4. Shankara says, brahma upaasanaa itself is not possible. The

question of brahma as the upaasana phalam will arise until one
settles the issue whether one can even do Brahma upaasanaa at all
before settling the issue of Brahman can be obtained as upaasana
phalam. Upanishad clearly says 'tat twam asi' - you are yourself
Brahman. Which means Brahman is not an object at all for upaasana. It
is the upaasaka swaruupam - the very nature of upaasaka, one who does
upaasana. How can the upaasaka Brahman become upaasya Brahman kartRî karma virodhaat ? Subject can never be an object, object can
never be the subject. Therefore nobody can meditate on Brahman.
Therefore Brahman cannot be an object of upaasana - hence the very
basis of the argument of the puurvapakshi has no validity. It is
illogical to talk about Brahma-upaasanaa. The Kena Upanishad clearly
says:
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yat vaachaa nabhyuditam yena vaak abhyudyate |

tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upasate || [1:5]
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The student asked for Brahman and the teacher very clearly says
whatever you do upaasana upon is not Brahman.
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yat manasaa na manute yena aahuH manaH matam.h .|

tat eva brahma tvam viddhi na idam yat idam upaasate || [1:6]
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yat chakshushhaa na pashyati yena chakshuu.nshhi pashyati |

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yat shrotreNa na shRîNoti yena shrotram idam shrutam.h |


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yat praaNena na praaNiti yena praaNaH praNiiyate |

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Thus it repeats that statement five times indicating the importance

of the statement. It says the object of upaasanaa or meditation
cannot be Brahman - it is anaatma. The meditator is Brahman. When
one cannot even do any upaasanaa on Brahman, where is the question of
Brahma upaasanam producing moksha.
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Thus the fourth argument is Brahma upaasanam is not possible because

brahmanaH avishhayatvaat (Brahman is not an object - it is seeing the
truth as the truth - like seeing rope as a rope and it is not
acquiring, reaching or producing - aatmani atmanaa atmaanam pastyet realization of ones own self by oneself in oneself.).
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This completes the four arguments of Shankara that Brahma upaasanaa

is not possible and is not required for moksha. Only knowledge is
the solution to the problem since the problem is caused by adhyaasa
or an error in the vision - To understand the nature of adhyaasa one
should go back and study again the adhyaasa bhaashhyam of Shankara
(Ch. III in this 'Notes on Brahmasuutra').
We will try to complete the discussion on Suutra 4 soon.
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********
for personal study.
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-K. Sadananda
Code 6323
Voice (202)767-2117
Fax:(202)767-2623
Date: Fri Jun 29, 2001 6:53 am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1K
Notes on BSB I-i-4-1K
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suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1K
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Shankara presented four arguments why Brahman cannot be result of

upaasanaa and hence brahma-upaasanaa is not needed, or required or
even valid after one obtains brahma j~naanam. The last argument was
that Brahman is not an "object of", but is the upaasakaa himself, who
is the subject, and subject cannot be an object. In response to the
last siddhaanta, puurvapakshi raises a counter objection as follows:
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If vedantin argues that brahma upaasanaa is not possible because it

is not an object, then the vRîttikaara asks a counter question. In
that case, he says even the brahma j~naanam is not possible, since
brahma j~naanam involves Brahman becoming an object of knowledge. In
fact in the same Upanishad, it says - anyat eva tat viditaat atho
aviditaat adhi | (Kena 1-4). Further it says:
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yasya amataM tasya mataM mataM yasya na veda saH |

avij~naataM vijaanataaM vij~naatam avijaanataam.h || (Kena 2-3)
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Those who think they do not know, they know, and those who think they
know, do not know, since Brahman is not an object of knowledge. Thus
the Upanishad very clearly says Brahman cannot even be an object of
knowledge. Hence if siddhaantin claims that Brahma upaasanam is not
possible then puurvapakshi argues that, in that case even brahma
j~naanam is also not possible, since Brahman can not be an object of
knowledge. Then the statement brahma j~naanena mokshaH is also wrong
since BrahmanaH aprameyatvaat, avishhayatvaat, avij~neyatvaat ca. If
you accept that brahma j~naanam is not possible then you cannot
declare that Vedanta is pramaaNam for brahma j~naanam because
pramaayaaH eva asambhave pramaaNasya pramaaNatvam katham siddhayet.
If it is not an object to be known, then where is the question of
validity of means of knowledge. PramaaNa is meant for gaining valid
knowledge and if that knowledge is impossible, how can Vedanta be a
valid pramaaNa? - Then the third suutra, shaastrayonitvaat will be in
trouble since there is no valid pramaaNam, while the suutra claims
that Vedanta shaastra is the pramaaNam. Therefore siddhaantin is
totally wrong.
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For that Shankara answers - yes Brahma j~naanam is not possible - in

fact Brahma j~naanam is not required. This is because we have
repeatedly said that Brahman is all the time evident in the form of
consciousness. It is swayam siddhaH or swayam jyotiH bhavati.
atraayam purushham svayam jyotiH bhavati - BRî.Up (Ref?)
jyotishaam api tat jyotiH tamasah param uchyate| Giita 13-18
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na tatra suuryo bhaati na chandrataarakaM

nemaa vidyuto bhaanti kuto.ayamagniH |
tameva bhaantamanubhaati sarvaM

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tasya bhaasaa sarvamidaM vibhaati || ( Katha-2-2-15)
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Nothing is required to reveal consciousness because consciousness

reveals everything - shaastram need not reveal consciousness - in
fact consciousness reveals shaastram too.
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Hence Shankara repeatedly says- na aatma j~naanam or Brahma j~naanam

sampaadaniiyam - There is no need to gain aatma j~naanam or brahma
j~naanam. We need not work for one thing and that is to gain the
knowledge of Brahma j-naanam. Then why all these suutra-s starting
with atha ataH brahma jij~naasa - then therefore inquire into the
nature of Brahman? Why then does the advaitin talk about acquiring of
brhamaj~naanam - brahma j~naanena mokshaH (if it is swataH siddham
where is the need of brahma j~naanam) and also the need of shaastram
as pramaaNam that says - tat vij~naanaartham sa gurum eva
abhigachchhet - to gain that knowledge one should approach a teacher.
These are important questions raised.
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Now Shankaraacharya explains these using samanvaya adhikaraNam Hence the beauty of Shankara Bhaashyam - where many of the questions
an advaitic student has, are methodically answered by Shankara in the
pretext of puurvapaksha-siddhaanta bhaashya. That is an important
reason why one should study suutra bhaashya - which is to establish
oneself firmly in the abiding knowledge of the nature of the reality.
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Shankara says our problem is not in knowing aatman or Brahman, our

problem is the misconception or misunderstanding of aatman which
requires a correction. The self-evident 'I' is mistaken for
something other than 'I'. The mistakes have to be eliminated. The
unmistaken I remain - Shankara says in Upadesha Saahasrii (II-18-4)
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siddhaat eva aham iti asmaat yushhmat dharmaH nishhidyate |

rajjvaam iva ahidhiiH yuktyaa tat tvam iti aadishaasanaiH ||
Similar to the negation of the notion of snake from a rope based on
pratyaksha pramaaNa, notion of non-self from everything seen is
negated from 'I', based on shruti pramaaNa that says 'that thou art'.
So when I used the word aham 'I' , two things are evident - the Ithe self is evident as the aatma, and the anaatmaa - the body mind is also evident as 'this'. The self is evident as a
self-consciousness entity and this - the whole world including idam
shariiram etc, are also evident because of the same consciousness.
(Refer to the definition of adhyaasa - satya asatya mithuniikaraNam mixing up of real and unreal is adhyaasa). Thus two things are
shining intimately one is self-shining and other anya adhiina
prakaashaH - shining in the light of consciousness - tasya bhaasaa
sarvam idam vibhaati. When two things are shining intimately the
anaatma dharma or properties of non-self are superimposed on
consciousness out of sheer ignorance - I am father, mother, son,
employee, sukhii, duHkii etc due to this superimposed limitations of
the anaatma on the self. Hence shaastram is required not to reveal
Brahman but to remove the false notions of limitations due to
superimposition or adhyaasa. This removal of limitations is in the
form of vRîtti - a mode in the mind - and that vRîtti is called
'aham brahma asmi'. In the antaH karaNam a thought should take place
or a cognition should take place as aham brahma asmi. When it is
said - aham brahma asmi - I am not knowing any thing new - but I am
freeing ignorance that made me superimpose the limitations of anaatma
on myself. The limitations of anaatma still remain, I also remain as

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I am - but what is negated is I am 'this' is negated (this standing

for all upaadhi-s) and "I am what I am" as brahma asmi is realized.
The dropping of the limitations is an intellectual process involving
vichaara or inquiry using shaastra as pramaaNa. This process is
called aatma j~naanam or brahma j~naanam. In this j~naanam - I am
not seeing anything new, I am not experiencing anything new, I am
only removing something old - or dropping of something - that is my
wrong notions about myself. This is just like dropping of the notion
of a snake which is never there to start with, in the knowledge of
rope. We are not gaining rope as if it is new - it was rope all the
time but we are dropping our notions that it is snake in the light of
knowledge of the truth. I am not acquiring, seeing or experiencing
anything new. Another example is 'snaanam iva' - like taking bath.
Why one should take both? -One can formally say that I want to gain
freshness - but what is actually done is getting rid of the dirt in
the body which does not belong to the body. The dirt is adhyaasa or
superimposed on the body and getting rid of it using a detergent is
the means of attaining what is swataH siddham or reaching my natural
state. The role of detergent is not to bring freshness but to get
rid of adhyaasa that does not belong to one. In the processing of
taking bath, both dirt and the detergent that is used to remove the
dirt, both are removed leaving myself to myself.
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Hence aatma-j~naanam is possible not in the form of new experience

but in the form of intellectual elimination of limitations. Shankara
writes in his bhaasyam - pramaatRî pramaaNa prameya ruupa tripuTii
nivRîttiH eva aatma-j~naanam - elimination of three aspects knower, known and knowing is the role of aatma-j~naanam. akarataa,
abhoktaa - aj~naataa- aham eva - see adhyaasa bhaashya for details.
Such an aatma-j~naanam can come only through shaastram - hence
shaastram is the pramaaNam. brahma bodhaka ruupena shaastram na
pramaaNam, parantu ahdyaasa nivartaka ruupena shaastram pramaaNam
-not for teaching the knowledge of brahman but for eliminating the
superimposed error shaastra is pramaaNam. In fact Shankara quotes a
suutra -siddhantu nivartakatvaat - shaastram is pramaaNam not because
it reveals Brahman but because it removes the superimposed
limitations. Hence such a pramaaNam is called nishheda ruupa
pramaaNam. Hence brahma j~naanam is possible in this sense and
shaastra pramaaNam is also possible.
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With this the fourth argument is completed: that is- brahma upaasanaa
is impossible but brahma j~naanam is possible indirectly in the
elimination of aj~naana.
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Until now Shankara was refuting the arguments of a vRîttikaara in a

general sense, hereafter Shankara takes up specific statements and
questions of vR^ttikaara and answers them.
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1) The first argument is related to vRîttikaara statement in

parallel to bhaaTTa and praabhaakara matam-s that kevala j~naanena
prayojanam na asti - mere knowledge is useless. It has to be combined
with karma or upaasana to be effective. In support of this, all of
them quoted jaimini suutra - 'aamnaayasya kriyaarthatvaat
aanarthakyam atadarthaanaam' - Veda will be useful only if it
instigates one into some action or other. Statements that do not
propel one into action are useless or apramaNam - kriyaa sambandha
rahitam vaakyam apramaaNam. Hence vidhi vaakyaani pramaaNaani,
arthavaada vaakyaani apramaaNaani - statements of command are
pramaaNam and statements of non-commands are apramaaNam, since they

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do not involve action. Shankara negates them through a wonderful

argument. - Shankara asks -do you accept nisheda vaakyams in the
vedas as pramaaNam? These are statements of don't-s, like hi.nsam
na kuryaat - you should not harm anyone. kalamjam na bhakshayet you should not eat meat. suram na pibet - you should not drink liquor
- these are nishheda vaakyaani. The puurvapakshi-s accept that they
are pramaaNa vaakyam as valid as vidhi vaakyams. Now Shankara asks what action is involved in nishheda vaakyam-s for them to be
accepted as pramaaNam. I should not drink liquor - is the statement after knowing that from veda-s what action is expected of me?
Shankara says - avoidance of action is an absence of action. Hence
nishheda vaakyam-s do not instigate any action but only instigate
inaction - it is audaasiinyam - When we ask somebody what are you
doing and he may answer - I am doing nothing - but doing nothing is
not a doing - it involves doing no action. nishheda vaakyam only
instigate actionless-ness but not action. Hence even though kriyaa
sambandham is not there, the puurvapakshi-s have accepted nisheda
vaakyam-s as pramaaNam. Shankara extends their own logic and states
that kriyaa sambandha rahitam vedaanta vaakyam api pramaaNam eva, sa
prayojanatvaat, nishhedha vaakyavat. vedaanta
vaakyam-s are also pramaaNam even though no action is involved,
exactly like nisheda vaakyam. Hence the above jaimini suutram cannot
be applied indiscriminately.
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2. Puurvapakshi asks if brahma j~naanam gives moksha then all the

students of Vedanta should be mukta purusha-s or liberated
individuals since they all studied Vedanta and gained knowledge.
Puurvapakshi says I have interviewed several who have studied Vedanta
for many many years and even teach vedanta to others. But if you ask
them if they are liberated - we hear only if's and but's and no one
claims himself as jiivanmuktaH. It is obvious that Vedanta j~naanena
moksham na sidyati - upaasanena sidyati - is the claim of
vRîttikaara. Shankara says - I have never said a student of vedanta
will be free - only a knower of Vedanta is free from samsaara avagata brahmanaH or j~naata brahmanaH na tu sruta brahmanaH - the
one who has understood Vedanta is free not one who has listened to
Vedanta. ( One gentleman approached Swami Chinmayanandaji and asked
- swamiji I have been hearing your lectures. I understand it very
well. I understand that I am brahman and not this upaadhiis, the
body, mind and intellect - but then how come I am still suffering?
Swamiji smillingly asked him back - Sir this is also my question -why
are you suffering when you understood that you are Brahman? (JK
puts this beautifully- It is an understanding as "understanding as a
fact", not as an understanding as an "understanding as a thought").
Hence true knowledge and sa.nsaara can never go together. As long as
I doubt, my freedom and my knowledge is doubtful. As long as
knowledge is clear, the freedom can never be doubted. j~naanam and
bandha can never go together. If there is a doubt - the doubt will
be in the form - I know aatma or brahman is free but only my doubt is
whether I am free or not - that means there is still a doubt whether
I am aatma or Brahman or not. If I know I am aaatma and if I know I
am Brahman which is free from all limitations then where the
question of bondage? Hence listeners are many but knowers are few.
Knower is the one for whom "I am free" is a fact and not a thought.
Listener is one for whom "I am free" is the information contained in
the upanishads. A listener will say - upanishads say I am free - , a
knower will say - I am free is not an upanishadic information it is
ever established fact- Hence Shankara reiterates that where there is
j~naanam there is no question of sa.nsaara. Therefore after j~naanam,

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no upaasanaa is required.
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3) VRîttikaara's next question was if vedanta-j~naanam -aham

brahmaasmi - gives moksha then why does Vedanta prescribe
nididhyaasanam after Vedantic study. aatmaa vaa are drashhTavyaH,
shrotavyaH mantavyaH nididhyaasitavyaH - it prescribes after mananam
nididhyaasanam which clearly means meditation which is nothing but
upaasanam. Hence after the study of Vedanta, scripture says the
nididhyaasanam must be done which is nothing but upaasana. By saying
nididhyaasitavyaH, it is imperative that one must do upaasanaa.
Hence through upaasanaa alone one gains moksha.
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We will for the next post for Shankara's answer to this important
question of vRîttikaara.
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End of the post

********
for personal study.
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-K. Sadananda
Code 6323
Voice (202)767-2117
Fax:(202)767-2623
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Date: Wed Jul 18, 2001 7:15 am
Subject: Notes on BSB I-i-4-1L
Notes on BSB I-i-4-1L
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his lotus feet I (sada) always prostrate.

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suutra: tat tu samanvayaat.h .-1L
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We are discussing vRîttikaara-s argument that the upanishads say

that after gaining Brahma-j~naanam, one must do nididhyaasanam. This
implies that upanishads prescribe upasanaa after gaining
Brahma-j~naanam. Since it says nididyaasitavyam implying that it is
vidhi or one must do, it is clear that upaasanaa shruti declares that
Brahma-j~naanam is not sufficient and one must do upaasanaa to attain
moksha.
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Shankara says -what vRîttikara says is right- that nididhyaasanam is

important. But what it implies is that shravanam, mananam and
nididhyaasanam- all are meant for j~naanam only. They are not
practised after j~naanam, they are practised for j~naanam. How can
one prove that all these three are meant for j~naanam only? (This
answer is from sub-commentators) Shravanam is the main saadhana,
which gives j~naanam - it is called angi saadhana or mukhyasaadhana.
Shravanam reveals my true nature 'tat tvam asi'. Hence the emphasis
on the Vedantic or scriptural study as the most important saadhana Systematic, consistent listening to the scriptures. But even though
j~naanam takes place through shravanam, there are obstacles,
pratibandhaa-s, obstructing j~naanam from giving moksha. There are
two obstacles - one is doubt with regard to the goal - whether aham
brahmaasmi is a fact - this doubt can arise from my own intellect or
can come from other systems of philosophy. For example
vishishhTaadvaitam says 'you can never be Brahman'. It is sacrilege
and it is impossible - all you can be at the most is become a part of
Brahman. It is sheshha-sheshhii bhaava. There is an organic relation
between the jiiva and Brahman. Jiiva is only of the size of anu or
atom or finite and is part of Brahman and cannot be Brahman who is
infinite or ananta. In Advaita jiivanmukta is possible; in
VishishhTaadvaita jiivanmukta is not possible, only vidheha mukti.
Now both Advaita and VishishhTaadvaita are put forth by great
aachaarya-s - How can I decide who is right? Acceptance of one
philosophy is automatically is a rejection of the other. Similarly
several daarshanika-s have proposed philosophies that contradict one
another. In the adhyaatma vidya, my intellect cannot be diplomatic
and accept all. It has to accept one and accepting one involves
rejecting the rest. Thus intellect will have to be sure about the
nature of oneself and the nature of Brahman. As long as there is a
lingering doubt, it does not come under 'dRîDha j~naanam' or firm
understanding - it comes under sa pratibandhaka j~naanam - incomplete
understanding. Thus samshhayaH or lingering doubt is the first
obstacle.
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The second obstacle is the habitual notion that aatma is something

else other than I. We hear an advaitic vedanta student complaining I know I am Brahman, but I have problem with my wife or job, my son,
my neighbor or my employer etc. Such a self-contradiction is the
result of incomplete understanding due to habitual notion of taking
aatma as an entity other than oneself - this is called vipariita
bhaavana. (The purpose of serious study of brahmasuutra and other
scriptures as well as participating in Vedantic discussions should
become very clear now - it is to establish a firm logical foundation
for an understanding of the nature of the problem and the nature of
the solution. By discussing puurvapakshaa-s and siddhanta-s the

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intellect is provided a field of inquiry to investigate and

understand clearly the fundamental problem of adhyaasa and firm
understanding that takes one beyond ones habitual notions). Because
of this vipariita bhaavana, we have only sa pratibandhaka j~naanam Hence mananam and nididhyaasanam removes the obstacles - mananam
removes doubt - whether I am Brahman or not - this should become
clear - with conviction one must accept one philosophy rejecting all
other systems of philosophies and any other interpretation of
Vedanta. It is not a fanatical approach to Vedanta, due to some
reverence to a tradition or to an aachaarya or to an upbringing, but
conviction based on clear understanding of the nature of the problem
and solution to the problem. I have to think, weigh and analyze the
philosophies presented - all the darshhana-s that have been put
forth as well as any other interpretations and in the final analysis
come to firm conclusion in my mind of what is right and what is wrong
and, thus I should be completely doubt free in my own mind.
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This doubt-free knowledge involve four things: 1. One should know

what is right as right and 2. Should also know what is wrong as
wrong, 3. Why the right is right i.e. logically able to establish in
my own mind that, that right is right or that right cannot be wrong
and 4. Why wrong is wrong - what is wrong with the wrong or why it
cannot be right. In fact the second chapter of Brahmasuutra
discusses exclusively what is wrong with the wrong. Respecting a
person is one thing but accepting the philosophy that he preaches is
another. Hence one can have respect for Shankara or Ramanuja or
Maadhva, Kapila or Jaimini etc- but one should have firm conviction
what is the right philosophy and why is it the right philosophy and
what are the wrong philosophies and why are they wrong philosophies.
Respecting is the sign of a cultured person, but accepting all
philosophies is the sign of a confused person. If one is not
fanatical but convinced in one philosophy one should able to
communicate his knowledge without disrespecting the others.
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Hence mananam removes samshaya pratibandha. Nidhidhyaasanam is meant

for removing the second obstacles - vipariita bhaavana - looking upon
aatma or Brahman as something other than oneself- it is this that
makes one to ask or state - I have studied all scriptures and
understand Advaita Vedanta, now what should I do? Enough of
intellectual analysis - it is useless - I want to withdraw myself or
want to devote myself (to non-intellectual?) to something more
useful. When Vedanta says it is swataH siddham - ever existing
eternally present - how does doing something or not-doing something
help or obstruct? But the very question and the statement implies the
vipariita bhaavana or habitual obstacles due to taking anaatma as
aatma and aatma as anaatma - that is looking aatma as some third
person. The solution is to start looking aatma as the first person
that is I am that aatma and I am not this anaatma. - I should not
wait for moksha or liberation - since moksha is here and right now.
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I heard people saying Advaita is very difficult to understand and

follow and in the kaliyuga it is simpler and easier to get liberated
by kiirtana or through bhakti, etc. The fact is there is nothing to
practise in Advaita - it is some thing to be - as one's own self or
owning one's own self. Nididhyaasana involves firm establishment in
the correct understanding that there is nothing to do or achieve, and
one is already liberated - I am sidhha suddha mukta swaruupaH. This
is called changing the thought pattern or reorientating the ways of
one's thinking. A complete over-haul of one's mind. Nididhyaasanam

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does not give j~naanam, it does not give moksha - it removes the
obstacles for j~naanam - It converts sa pratibandhaka j~naanam to
apratibandhaka j~naanam. Thus all the three- shravanam, mananam and
nidhidhyaasanam- are meant for dRîDa j~naanaartham eva - for firm
abiding knowledge only. This can be illustrated by a simple example.
We know as soon as we turn on the switch, the electric bulb glows and
instantly the light of the bulb eliminates the darkness. Suppose when
the switch is turned on and the darkness still remained. Upon
inquiring we find there is nothing wrong with the switch nor with the
bulb nor with the line in between and we also know that current is
flowing and the bulb is also burning. Further investigation revealed
that the darkness is still there because the light from the burning
bulb is obstructed by two thick dark opaque sheets of clothes. Hence
even though the electric current has done its job and bulb is also in
working condition, yet the darkness remained only because of the
obstruction of the light coming from the bulb. All one has to do is
to remove the obstructing material and that very instant the darkness
will be removed by the light from the bulb. Now, the question is what
removed the darkness - is it light from the bulb or the action of
removing the covering sheets. Action of the removing the covering
sheets is required in this particular case but what actually
contributes to the removal of darkness is the turning of the switch
that resulted in passing the current to the bulb, which caused to
emanate the light. It is the light that is opposite to darkness.
Everything else is required but they are not the primary cause for
the removal of darkness. In the same way the Nididhyaasana is like
removing obstacles that obstruct the removal of darkness of ignorance
by the light of knowledge which is already glowing in the bulb of
intellect. Hence mananam and nididhyaasanam removes the two obstacles
for knowledge, the samshhayaH and vipariita bhaavana, but j~naanam
alone removes the ignorance and leads to moksha.
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Hence the arguments of Shankara can be briefly

a) Nididhyaasanam is not after j~naanam but for j~naanam only. It is
not a upaasanaa after j~naanam as vRîttikaara argues but it is part
of the process for j~naanam. Hence there is big difference between
the role of nididhyaasanam in the vRîttikaara outlook versus an
advaitin outlook. b) The second difference is for vRîittikaara
nididhyaasanam is a karma that comes after j~naanam whereas for
Vedantin nididhyaasana is not a karma after j~naanam, but a process
of j~naanam. c) In the vRîttikaara mata nidhidhyaasana as upaasanaa
produces a puNya phalam where as in Vedanta, it is not karma
producing a positive result as adRîshhTa phalam but for Vedantin it
only removes our habitual dehaatma-buddhi which is the dRîshhTa
phalam. d) In upaasanaa one expects moksha to happen in future, an
event in future, a result after an action. In Vedanta nidhidhyaasana
is not with an expectation of moksha, but it is knocking of an
expectation of moksha - I am free here and now and not an event in
future will be the affirmative knowledge. Thus even though both
Vedantin and vRîttikaara translates nidhidhyaasana as meditation the connotation and its implication are different. Hence from
Vedantin's perspective all the three, shravanam, mananam and
nididhyaasanam put to together as one gives the knowledge. Of these
shravanam has the positive role of producing knowledge and mananam
and nididhyaasanam have the negative roles of removing doubt and
habits, respectively. Thus all the three play different roles but the
ultimate result is j~naanam and after j~naanam there is nothing else
to be done.

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Next comes the last puurvapaksha. Up to this point Shankara has

established using various arguments that there is no karma involved
in Vedanta. While negating karma he negated upaasanaa also since it
is only a karma but at mental level. Now vRîttikaara puts forth his
last straw. If Vedantin says there is no moksha by karma and upasanaa
since they are activities, then j~naana also cannot give moksha since
it is also a kind of action involving mental activity or maanasika
vRîtti. If upaasanaa involving meditation is considered as a mental
activity then j~naanam should also be considered as a mental
activity, since both involve manasika vRîtti. Hence if upaasanaa is
negated as not a means for moksha, then j~naanam also gets negated
since it is also equally a karma involving mental activity. The
argument can be stated as - j~naanam karmaruupam, maanasa vRîtti
ruupatvaat, upaasanavat. j~naanam is also a type of karma, since it
involves a mental activity, just like upaasanaa. This is the
vRîttikaara's argument.
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Shankara refutes by this saying that j~naanam does not come under
karma. Even though upaasanaa and j~naanam both are maanasika
vRîtti-s, upaasanaa comes under karma but not j~naanam. Why is it
so? Shankara gives two arguments in support of this - these
arguments are presented in three stages.
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1) The first difference between j~naanam and karma is j~naanam

depends on the object of knowledge - vastu tantram where as karma
depends on the subject of action - kartRî tantram. For example
student who comes to the class performs two types of efforts - one is
a student is using the ears, j~naanedriyam to hear and he takes the
role of hearer. After hearing the student wants to take the notes.
Then he takes the role of kartaa, a writer of the notes. The moment
one becomes hearer, what one hears is not under the controller of the
hearer, it is under the control of speaker or a teacher since he
determines what the student hears. Thus what one hears does not
depend on the subject, the hearer, but the object of hearing.
J~naanam vastu tantram or prameya tantram and not pramaatRî tantram.
Where as the moment the student becomes a note-taker or writer, what
one writes using the karmendriya-s depends on the writer. Hence the
first difference is j~naanam is vastu tantram where as karma is
kartRî tantram.
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2. The second difference is actually the same as the first but put in
a different way. j~naanam is dependent on the type of pramaaNam one
uses - pramaaNa tantram whereas karma, particularly shaastra karma or
ritual, depends on shaastra vidhi or chodana -hence it is chodana
tantram. If I am using ears for j~naanam then I am using shabda
pramaaNam, if I am using eyes for j~naanamm then ruupa prapancha.
Hence as a pramaataa or knower, the knowledge I get depends on the
type of pramaaNam that I use to gain the knowledge - I, the
pramaataa, cannot decide -or rather cannot choose - the choice
depends on the pramaaNa or the type of objective knowledge - is it
some thing to see, some thing to hear or something to taste or
something to smell etc. Thus it depends on pramaaNa. Karma is
chodana tantram, that is shaastric injunction will determine the type
of karma that one must perform. Shankara give a beautiful example
here - In Chandogya upanishad there is pa~nchaagni vidya. In that
context the upanishad talks about a type of meditation to be done
which is termed as pa~nchaagni vidya. In that meditation various
things in the creation are to be seen as agni. At the end of that
meditation as a final part it instructs - "purushhaH vaava

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goutamaagniH | "- May you look upon the male or the father as the
fire principle. Finally it says "yoshaa vaava goutamaagniH | "-May
you look upon the mother or female also as fire principle. This is a
kind of upaasana or meditation. This type of meditation is chodana
tantram or shaastra vidhi or injunction by shaastra as karma.
Suppose a person sees a man as a man and woman as woman. Is it
because of shaastra vidhi or injunction by shaastra? Looking at man
as a man and woman as a woman is not considered as shaastra vidhi or
injunction by shaastra since it is natural to look woman as woman and
man as a man. It is not a chodana tantram whereas seeing a man as a
fire or anything other than a man is chodana tantram or an injunction
by shaastra. Hence seeing man as a man is j~naanam or knowledge
while seeing man as a fire is upaasanam. Seeing a stone as a stone
is j~naanam, seeing a stone as Vishnu is upaasanaa. Seeing a stone as
a stone does not depend on our choice, but seeing the stone as Vishnu
depends on seer's choice. A DMK fellow may not choose to look upon
the stone as God to do puuja for it, unless it is the statue of his
DMK founder! Hence j~naanam is pramaaNa tantram, karma or upaasanaa
is chodana tantram.
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3. Karma can produce four types of results that we discussed before

-aaptiH or reaching a place; utpattiH or producing a new thing;
sa.nskaaraH or purifying a thing; and vikaaraH or modifying a thing.
Where as j~naanam does not produce any one of the four results. It
only reveals a thing as it is but it does not produce. Suppose I
learned about Himaalaya-s from a book. By that knowledge - there is
no reaching of Himaalayas. Similarly j~naama does not produce
anything - Reading a cook book does not produce a dinner on the
table. Similarly knowledge does not purify - knowledge that the house
is dirty does not clean the house. Action only cleans the house Hence Shankara says in VivekachuuDamani
chittasya shuddhaye karma na tu vastu upalabdhaye |
vastusiddhiH vichaareNa na ki~nchit karmakoTibhiH ||
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Karma (yoga) purifies the mind only but does not help to gain the
knowledge. Only by inquiry into the nature of reality can one gain
the knowledge, and not by performing countless actions. Hence if you
want chitta suddhi mere knowledge will not do, you have to do karma
yoga. Does j~naanam modify any thing - knowing that I am fat does
not make me slim. Thus karma produces one of the four results where
as j~naanam does not produce these four results. Hence j~naanam and
karma are not identical. Hence self-knowledge is not a type of
karma. It does not produce anything -including moksha! j~naanam only
reveals the fact as a fact - the fact that I was, I am, I ever will
be a mukta purushhaH - thus it only reveals a fact! It does not make
one to reach, produce, purify or modify - it reveals the fact that I
am nitya muktaH. Therefore I have nothing to do. Thus j~naanam is not
karma and after j~naanam no karma is required either. Then why
karmaakaaNda- since there is no need of karma after j~naanam? Before
j~naanam it is useful - as the above vivekachuuDamani sloka
emphasizes, for chitta suddhi or for acquiring saadhana chatushhTayam
that is required before Brahman inquiry can be done as discussed in
Suutra 1.
With this Shankara concludes the vRîttikaara khanDana also.
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With this we end our discussion of the word 'tu' in the suutra ' tat
tu samanvyayaat'

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Conclusion:
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Now the conclusion where we present the fourth suutra in the standard
technical format.
vishhayaH - subject matter - vedanta shaastram
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vishayaH or sa.nshayaH - doubt - whether it is karma param or brahma

param -some action to be done or just revealing Brahman.
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puurvapaksha - karma param - Vedanta shaastra prescribes action karma alone gives one something whereas mere knowledge does not give
any benefit. Theory has to lead to technology for it to be useful.
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siddhanta: Vedanta shaastram is brahma param - since ignorance is the

root cause for the human suffering, the knowledge alone is the
solution to this problem. Just as by mere knowledge of the rope the
fear associated with snake etc are gone. Karma cannot get rid of
ignorance. No action is necessary or possible for getting rid of
ignorance. Gaining knowledge does not involve action although
thinking or inquiry is involved in that process. Thinking or inquiry
is not an action like upaasana which for example involves visualizing
Vishnu while one is seeing a stone. Hence gaining j~naanam involves
no action - there is nothing to do but something to know. In fact it
involves in knowing that one is akarthaa or a non-doer.
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sa~NgatiH -How is related to previous adhikaraNam-s? It is aakshepa

sangatiH - the fourth adhikaraNam is an answer to the objection,
which is raised on the third adhikaraNam. Brahman is the subject
matter of Vedanta is the third adhikaraNam and based on that
objection that Brahman is not the subject matter but karma is the
subject matter of Vedanta. That objection is answered - by tat tu
samanvayaat - that Brahman alone is the subject matter.
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With this fourth adhikaraNa and forth suutra is over.

---------------------------------Generally people stop the study of Brahmasuutra-s with this fourth suutra.
But we will continue thanks to the help of Geetha, Sunder and Dennis
in making sure I work hard along with them.
End of the post
********
for personal study.
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K. Sadananda
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Code 6323
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Voice (202)767-2117
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Fax:(202)767-2623
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/advaitin/messagesearch/6452?query=Re%3A%20BSB

AdhyasaADHYAASA
Notes on Shankara's exmination of the nature of 'Error' in the introduction to
the Brahmasutra.
These notes are essentially a rewording, omitting most of the Sanskrit, of the
notes provided by Kuntimaddi Sadananda on the Advaitin List and I gratefully
acknowledge his permission for this. In turn, he wishes that I acknowledge his
own indebtedness to H.H. Swami Paramaarthaananda of Madras, himself a student of
Swami Chinmayananda and Swami Dayananda. His lectures form the basis of these
notes.
The Brahmasuutra is the third of the so called 'Three pillars of Vedanta', the
first two being the upanishhad-s (shruti - the scriptures 'revealed' and not
'authored' by anyone) and the Bhagavad Giitaa (smRRiti - the 'heard' scriptures
passed down by memory). The Brahmasuutra is a very terse and logical examination
of the essential teaching of the upanishhad-s, seeking to show the nature of
Brahman and the superiority of the philosophy of Vedanta. It is usually studied
with the help of a commentary or bhaashhya, the best known being the one by
Shankara.
It is in the nature of man, with his intellect, that he seeks to enquire into
the causes of observed phenomena. The six topics of enquiry for a 'student of
life' relate to the individual, the world, the cause for these two, suffering,
liberation from this suffering and the means for attaining such liberation. Any
consistent explanation for all of these is deemed a philosophy or darshana.
There are 12 specific philosophies identified in India. Six of these are called
aastika and the other six naastika. Aastika refers to those systems which accept
the Vedas as a valid means for acquiring knowledge. Conversely, the naastika
philosophies do not recognise the Vedas as valid or reliable sources of
knowledge. These latter philosophies prefer to rely upon direct perception and
inference or reasoning as the means for knowledge.
The first of the six naastika philosophies is materialism, said to originate
with the teacher of the Gods, BRRihaspati. It is said that this was devised in
order to mislead the demons so that they could be destroyed. It emphasises the
sense pleasures as being the purpose of life and does not accept such things as
heaven and hell, the soul or Vedas. Modern science, with its belief that
consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, may come close to this philosophy.
Materialism only recognises direct perception as a valid means of knowledge.
This philosophy is not discussed in the Brahmasuutra since it is not considered
worthwhile.
The second naastika philosophy is Jainism. Some aspects of this are discussed
and refuted later. The remaining four cover the various aspects of Buddhism.
Buddha himself did not teach any real system of philosophy; he only had various
dialogues with his disciples. Hence Buddhism was not initially well-developed.
Later however it developed into four branches, each of which is analysed and
criticised in the Brahmasuutra.
Although all of the six aastika philosophies accept the Vedas as a valid means
of knowledge, three of them do not accept Brahman and four of them given more
importance to reasoning than to the Vedas. Only two give primary importance to
the Vedas. One of these however, considers that the first part of the Vedas the one concerned with ritualistic action - is more important than the
upanishhad-s. The second gives primary importance to the last portion of the
Vedas, and it is this that is the principal subject of the Brahmasuutra-s.

A suutra literally means 'a thread'. It is a very concise statement expressing
the essential meaning of a given idea in a logical manner, free from any
defects. A simple translation is therefore not adequate on its own and requires
additional explanation in the form of a commentary or bhaashhya. Because there
exist possibilities for ambiguity, the various commentaries have led to 10
different teachings each claiming that theirs represents the intended meaning.
The three most popular (in historical sequence) are known as Advaita,
VishishhTaadvaita and Dvaita,. The commentary by Shankara is concerned with
Advaita.
A brief outline of the brahmasuutra.
The Brahmasuutra consists of four chapters; each chapter is divided into four
sections and each section is divided into topics of which there is a total of
191 or 192 depending on how the suutra-s are divided. Most of the topics are
concerned with statements in the 10 principal upanishhad-s. The topics are
divided into suutra-s of which there is a total of 555.
Each of the four chapters is concerned with a particular theme. The first
chapter endeavours to establish that the central theme of the upanishhad-s is
Brahman. This is necessary because some of the other philosophies do not accept
this. The second chapter shows there are no contradictions in the teaching since
this would constitute a defect. There are three types of contradiction defined internal (i.e. the Vedic statements themselves contradicting each other);
contradiction with statements from smRRiti; contradiction with logic. The third
chapter discusses the means for attaining Brahman, both direct and indirect (the
latter covering such aspects as ritual etc., which are merely means for
purifying the mind). The fourth chapter is about the 'fruits' of knowledge of
Brahman, namely liberation from bondage and suffering, both delayed and
immediate.
Each topic consists of 5 aspects. The first is the 'subject', which is usually
an idea from one of the ten principal upanishhad-s. The second element is the
'doubt' inherent in the subject (if there is none, there is no need for
enquiry). Thirdly, the objections and reasoning of other philosophies are
considered. Fourthly, these objections are logically refuted and a conclusion
consistent with Advaita is drawn. Finally, the connection with the previous
topic is shown.
Shankara's introduction to the bhaashhya (called adhyaasa bhaashhya) is central
to the entire advaitic philosophy, covering the explanation of the basic errors
or mistakes (adhyaasa) that we make that lead us to our belief in a separate
existence and hence to the eternal cycle (samsaara) of suffering. Prior to
discussing this, however, there is an introduction to the use of inferential
logic, since this is fundamental for understanding the arguments of the
Brahmasuutra.
A distinction is made between valid and illusory knowledge. What constitutes a
valid means of knowledge is crucial to the understanding of this subject of
adhyaasa. (Indeed, all Indian philosophies discuss epistemology before moving on
to ontological issues.) The senses are usually regarded as our principal source
of knowledge but, apart from the fact that information from the senses is not
always reliable, much of what is discussed is not directly observable to the
senses. Thus we have to be aware of the source of the information and the types
of error that can occur in using this as a means of knowledge.
There are six accepted means of knowledge or pramaaNa. The first is direct
perception either through one of the senses or possibly imagined by the mind (of
things which are not directly present). The senses are however very specific.
For example the eyes can only detect colour and form and are unable to hear
sounds from an object. In fact, each pramaaNa has validity in its own sphere. If
something is directly perceived, inference is not needed; if something can be
inferred, the shaastra-s are not required.
The next valid means of knowledge is inference from something that cannot be
directly perceived. If something cannot be seen directly, nor inferred, it may
it be reported in the scriptures or science or directly from someone who can be

trusted. For this latter means, the principal source is the Vedas. It is
believed that the Vedas were not written by humans and are thus free from the
defects associated with human authorship. Effectively they are presumed to have
been revealed to the sages, who then passed them on to their disciples by word
of mouth. Since they are heard from a teacher they are called shruti. The three
remaining means of knowledge are considered as part of inference itself.
The Brahmasuutra relies heavily on inference and shruti as sources of knowledge.
It should be noted that the Brahmasuutra itself was written by a human and
therefore cannot itself be considered as a valid means of knowledge.
Inference
Before inference can occur, there needs to be some valid data which is itself
gathered directly or indirectly through direct perception. Otherwise, the
inference could only be a speculation or imagination. For example one could not
infer the age of the Moon just by looking at it and estimating it. Data must be
collected first e.g. rocks could be brought back and carbon dated.
Four aspects are involved in the process of inference. These are the subject or
'locus' of the discussion, the objective or 'conclusion' - that which is to be
inferred or concluded, a 'basis' for the argument and finally an 'analogy'. An
example given in the scriptures is the inference that there is a fire on a
mountain because one is able to see smoke there, just as might happen in a
kitchen. Here, the mountain is the 'locus'; to infer that there is a fire on the
mountain is the 'conclusion'; the 'basis' is that smoke can be seen and the
'analogy' is that when one sees smoke in the kitchen, it is invariably
associated with fire (this is in the days before electricity!).
The 'locus' has to be something that is partly visible and partly unknown;
otherwise, it cannot be a matter of dispute. Whether or not there is a fire on
the mountain is not visible or known - hence the dispute. Since we cannot see
whether or not there is a fire, we must use inference. The 'conclusion' - that
there is a fire on the mountain - is not observable or directly provable. The
'basis' is that smoke can be seen and it is on the mountain. This 'basis' is
observable. Thus, in the example, the 'locus' and the 'basis' are both visible
while that which is to be inferred, the 'conclusion' is invisible.
In order for the 'analogy' to be valid, both 'conclusion' and 'basis' have to
always be experienced simultaneously with the same locus in those examples that
have been directly perceived, i.e. on which the inference is based. In this
case, the listener is aware that fire invariably exists with the smoke when it
is encountered in the kitchen. (It has to be this way around and not that smoke
invariably occurs when there is fire.)
In order to use inference them, one has to have a basic knowledge of the
relationship between the conclusion and the basis, which has been gathered
through perception. Here, the knowledge is that wherever there is smoke, there
is fire. Once this concommitant relationship has been established through
repeated observation, only then can it be used to infer that same relationship
in a situation where the conditions cannot be directly perceived. Also, direct
perception forms the basis for the implied relationship from which the inference
is drawn.
An inference can only be made about a specific object if the perceptible data
has been gathered from that object. For example one cannot make conclusions
about Mars if the data has been collected from the Moon. All observable data
derive from the perceptible universe. The aatman is not perceivable. From this,
it follows that, by using scientific observation one cannot arrive at any
conclusions about the aatman. Hence, the whole of scientific reasoning is called
'commonplace inference' and can only deal with objects that can be perceived.
'Commonplace inference' has no access to knowledge of the aatman. To attempt to
do so is like trying to hear through the eyes and constitutes an invalid means
of knowledge.
Instead of using data collected through the senses, inference may also make use
of data collected from the shaastra-s. Here, inferences may be made about the
nature of the aatman, since this is the subject of the shaastra-s. The

implication of this is that the shaastra-s must be accepted as a valid source of
observation. Once this has been done, the validity of the data need not be
questioned, although different theories may be put forth to explain the same
data. The theories may be incorrect but not the observations. All of the aastika
philosophies have accepted the shaastra-s as a valid source; they have just
reached differing conclusions. Without valid data, there is no basis for
inference, only speculation or belief. Since inference based on the shaastra-s
assumes that the shaastra-s are a valid means of knowledge, this method is only
applicable to aastika philosophies. The naastika-s do not accept the shaastra-s.
Therefore the Brahmasuutra is of no value to them.
Inference or logic, which is based upon perception, could be called scientific
reasoning. This is still used in the Brahmasuutra though, as noted above, it
cannot make any statements about the aatman. Equally, it cannot be used to
disprove Vedantic teaching. This is a mistake that many naastika philosophers
make. The Brahmasuutra uses the same technique to disprove their claims. (They
would not accept inference based upon the shaastra-s in any case.) It is also
used to show that Vedanta is not illogical. In fact, it is beyond the realm of
logic.
Adhyaasa
Adhyaasa means error or mistake. This is the basis of Advaita Vedanta and of
Shankara's interpretation of the Brahmasuutra. The doctrine of Advaita Vedanta
rests upon the four aphorisms in the Vedas: consciousness is Brahman; that thou
art; I am Brahman; this self is Brahman. Shankara's aim is to show that the
Brahmasuutra is compatible with Advaita Vedanta. His claim is that adhyaasa
causes the cycle of birth and death with its concommitant suffering. Once the
error is removed, that is the end of the cycle.
Errors can arise for various reasons. When I act without knowledge, I commit an
error. Even if I know that I am ignorant I am still making a mistake. For
example, lack of knowledge of Sanskrit can cause errors in these notes. Even if
I know the word I may still make typographical mistakes. Here the error is due
to lack of awareness, which is also effectively ignorance, since I am not
conscious that what is being typed is not what was intended. Errors may also
arise if the instruments of knowledge are defective, for example if I am
colour-blind or if there is insufficient illumination. In all of these cases, I
am ignorant of the truth and, more importantly, I take the false as real and
possibly the real as false.
The price of these mistakes is suffering. Ignorance is the source of error and
error causes suffering. The solution is therefore knowledge - knowledge of
Brahman (Brahmavidya) brings realisation and release from suffering. All
techniques, yoga, paths etc. are only methods for preparing the mind to receive
that knowledge.
Analogy of the Rope and the Snake
This example originates from the commentaries of GauDapaada on the MaaNDuukya
upanishhad. Seeing a rope in the dark, it is mistaken for a snake - an error or
adhyaasa. We mistakenly superimpose the image of an illusory snake onto the real
rope. In just such a way we superimpose the illusion of objects etc. upon the
one aatman.
If there is total dark, we would not see the rope so could not imagine it to be
a snake. Hence 'ignorance is bliss', as in deep sleep - there can be no error.
Similarly, if there is total light we see the rope clearly - in complete
knowledge, we know everything to be Brahman. Knowledge is also bliss! The error
occurs only in partial light or when the eyes are defective. Then there is
partial knowledge; we know that some 'thing' exists. This part, that is not
covered by darkness or hidden by ignorance is called the 'general part' and is
'uncovered' or 'real'. That the 'thing' is actually a rope is hidden because of
the inadequate light or knowledge. This specific feature of the thing, that it
is a rope, is called the 'particular part' and is covered. In place of the
covered part, the mind substitutes or 'projects' something of its own, namely
the snake.

In the example then, when we say "there is a snake", there is a real part and an
unreal part. The real part is "there is"; this is the 'general part'. The unreal
part, the snake, only appears to be there because the 'particular part' - the
rope - is covered. If light (i.e. knowledge) is made available, the rope is now
seen. The 'general part', "there is" remains unchanged but the 'particular
part', which was previously projected by the mind, is now uncovered and revealed
to be a rope. The snake has not 'gone away' since it never existed, except in
the mind of the observer, where it might have given rise to very real fears and
physical effects (fast heartbeat, sweating etc.).
From the point of view of actual reality (paaramaarthika), only the rope is
real, the snake does not exist. For a perceiver who sees a snake, that snake is
'relatively' real (vyaavahaarika) and causes as much mental suffering as would a
truly real snake. There only ever was a rope but the ignorance of this in the
mind of the perceiver creates the illusion of a snake and the suffering follows.
Once light (i.e. the light of knowledge) is introduced, the mistaken perception
of the particular part is corrected; the unreal snake disappears and the real
rope is revealed. The associated fear etc. also disappears.
What has happened is that a valid means of enquiry has been undertaken into the
nature of the particular part to reveal the truth of the matter. The valid means
of enquiry in this example was the torchlight. It was appropriate because the
mistake was brought about by the dim light. Prayer or meditation would not have
been appropriate and would not have revealed the rope. The method has to be
appropriate to the nature of the error. Since ignorance of our true nature is
the reason for samsaara, the appropriate means of enquiry for removing the error
is self-knowledge.
Comparison with our own situation
The analogous statement that Shankara uses is 'I am a sa.nsaari', i.e. one who
is subject to the cycle of birth and death. He could just as well have said 'I
am a person' or individual. Here, 'I am' is the general part and is true. It
refers to a conscious and existent being. It is 'uncovered'. There is no doubt
in our minds that it is true; we need no external means of knowledge to verify
it. 'A sa.nsaari' (or 'a person' etc.) is the particular part and is unreal,
like the snake. In this case, the truth of the situation is covered over, rather
than projected, but is just as unreal. That we 'are' (sat) and that we are
'conscious' (chit) is known from the general part. What is hidden in the
particular part is that we are bliss (aananda) (or unlimited, complete, infinite
etc.). In its place, we perceive unreal aspects such as misery, limitedness,
incompleteness etc. This error is the cause of all our suffering. In order to
solve this problem, it is necessary to apply the torchlight of Vedantic
knowledge to reveal the real particular part - not 'I am a sa.nsaari' but 'I am
Brahman'.
Mixing of real and unreal
When a mistake of this type occurs, what is happening is that a real part and an
unreal part are getting mixed up and this is effectively how Shankara defines
adhyaasa - the mixing up of real and unreal. In the case of the rope and snake
analogy, the error can be viewed as a 'misperceiving of the rope' or as the
'superimposition of a snake' or as 'the mixing of part of a real rope and part
of an unreal snake'. When we say "there is a snake", 'there is' is the general
part, which could be viewed as belonging to the rope, which is real, while 'a
snake' is the unreal, mentally projected, particular part. The mixing up of real
and unreal effectively creates a third entity that is partly real and partly
unreal.
When someone refers to the 'snake', he does not realise that there are two
aspects, one real and one unreal. If he says, "there is a long snake", the
adjective 'long' in fact refers to the rope, which is real whilst, if he says,
"there is a poisonous snake", the adjective refers to the unreal part.
Similarly, when someone says, "I am a shopkeeper" (or whatever), he does not
realise that the attribute 'shopkeeper' refers to the unreal part. He does not
know that there are two parts, only one of which (I am) is real. In the mind of

the ordinary 'person' these two things are mixed up and a single, false, jiiva
is created. It is this mixed-up jiiva who is striving for liberation. The
purpose of the Brahmasuutra is to enquire into the nature of the jiiva, by
directing the knowledge of Vedanta so that we can discard the unreal part and
become established in the knowledge of the real part. When this happens,
realisation takes place and sa.nsaara is dissolved as unreal.
Shankara's discussion of adhyaasa
This effectively divides into six topics: - the definition of error, objections
to the theory as described, answers to these objections, showing the possibility
for error, proof of the theory, conclusion.
Definition of adhyaasa: - Shankara gives two definitions. The simpler is that it
occurs when the attributes of one thing are superimposed on another. Thus a
snake is seen instead of a rope or silver is seen on the inside of a shell. The
second suggests that it occurs when a previously experienced object is seen
instead of the actual. This accounts for the fact that a snake could not be seen
instead of the rope unless the observer knew what a snake was and had previously
seen a real one (or an image of one). A third indirect definition is the one
mentioned earlier; that it occurs when real and unreal are mixed up.
Objections to the theory: - Other systems of philosophy claim that, although the
rope-snake error is acceptable, the superimposition of anything onto the aatman
is not possible. The argument is that any superimposition requires four
conditions to be satisfied.
1. Perception. The object being covered must be directly perceivable, as is the
rope in the rope-snake example. The aatman is not an object and cannot be
perceived.
2. Incompletely known. The object must be incompletely known, as one is ignorant
of the fact that the rope is a rope. In the case of the aatman, however, the
advaitin accepts that the aatman is self-evident and always conscious - how can
there be ignorance with regard to something that is self-evident?
3. Similarity. There must be some similarity between the actual object and its
superimposition, just as a rope and snake have a basic similarity (one could not
mistake the rope for an elephant, for example). But there is total dissimilarity
between the aatman and anything else. E.g. aatmaa is the subject, anaatmaa is
the object; aatmaa is conscious and all pervading, anaatmaa is inert and limited
etc.
4. Prior experience. In order to make the mistake, we must have had prior
experience of that which is superimposed. We could not see a snake where the
rope is unless we knew what a real snake was. Whilst this is possible in the
case of the rope-snake, it is not possible in the aatmaa-anaatmaa case because
we would have to have prior experience of a 'real' anaatmaa and it is part of
the fundamental teaching of Advaita that there is no such thing; there is only
the aatman.
Accordingly, in the case of the aatmaa-anaatmaa, not one of these four
conditions is satisfied. Therefore superimposition of anaatmaa onto aatmaa, the
fundamental cause of our error according to Shankara, is not possible - so says
the objector.
Answers to these Objections and Showing the possibility for adhyaasa: 1. "The object must be directly perceivable." This is not strictly true. It is
certainly the case that the object must be known. It is not possible to make a
mistake about something about which we know nothing at all but it is not
necessary that the object be immediately in front of us. This first condition
should be restated as 'the object must be a known, existent entity'. Now, there
is no problem since the aatman is known even though it cannot be seen (we know
that we exist).
2. "The object should be incompletely known." This is equivalent to saying that
we should have partial, but not complete ignorance about the object. This is
precisely the case with the aatman. We know that we exist (sat) and are
conscious (chit) but we do not know that we are bliss (aananda). We have partial
knowledge. Thus there is no valid objection.

3. "There must be a similarity between the object and its superimposition." The
counter-argument here is that this is a general rule and that exceptions are
possible. E.g. it is a general rule that the intelligent cause or creator is
different from the material cause just as a potter is different from the clay
from which he makes his pots. However there are exceptions such as the spider
and its web. Here the material for the web comes from the spider's own body.
Similarly a dreamer creates her dream from the thoughts and memories in her own
mind. Shankara argues that this is such an exception to the general rule and
that it is not necessary for similarity to exist.
This argument on its own may seem a bit feeble. Shankara says that we know of
cases where adhyaasa takes place when there is no similarity and gives an
example to support his claim. We know that the sky is really colourless but
nevertheless we see it as blue. We might also claim that it is polluted. But
these are superimpositions by us of 'blue' or 'polluted' upon a sky which is
without colour or form. This error takes place without there being any
similarity between 'sky' and 'blue' or between 'sky' and 'pollution'. (As
written, this argument carries little conviction . It is slightly better if
'air' or 'space' is understood rather than 'sky' - the Sanskrit word 'aakaasha'
can mean either sky or space.)
4. "We must have had prior experience of that which is superimposed." Shankara
agrees that, in the rope-snake analogy, we must have had prior experience of a
snake but says that it does not have to be a real snake; experience of a false
snake would have left a suitable impression, too (e.g. we might have seen the
snake in a movie). Another analogy encountered in the scriptures is seeing a
ghost instead of a post and we all accept that we do not have to have seen a
real ghost for this since we mostly do not believe such a thing exists. It is
sufficient to have read about them. Similarly, in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa,
we project an unreal anaatmaa. And where did we encounter the unreal anaatmaa
before? In a previous adhyaasa, says Shankara! This leads to an infinite
regress, of course, and Shankara claims that 'we never talk about the beginning
of adhyaasa' - it is beginningless! Therefore (he says), there is no real
anaatmaa and it is not necessary for there to be a real one for adhyaasa to
occur.
Thus all conditions are effectively fulfilled. In the first, the object is
evident rather than actually perceived; in the second, the object is partly
unknown; the third condition is not compulsory; the fourth condition is
effectively fulfilled because we have prior experience of an unreal anaatmaa.
Therefore the objections are not valid and the adhyaasa is possible.
In fact, this is only a provisional refutation of the objector and a defensive
argument, to satisfy both aastika and naastika philosophies. It uses the same
scientific reasoning that was used for the objections. He then goes on to
provide a more complete response and offensive argument for aastika objectors.
He says that the entire rope-snake analogy is only an illustration of the
concept of adhyaasa and is not intended to be used to prove the aatmaa-anaatmaa
situation This must use the Vedas as pramaaNa (a source of knowledge) and not
rely solely on scientific reasoning. In fact, even if scientific argument
disproved the rope-snake adhyaasa, this would not affect scriptural based
arguments for the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa.
Furthermore, Shankara points out that the other aastika philosophies have
already implicitly accepted the aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa. All of these systems
talk about aatmaa and accept the Veda's assertion that it is eternal. They
realise that it refers to 'aham' or 'I' and claim that this is immortal. And yet
they are conscious of the their experience of 'I am a human being', 'I am a
father' etc., which clearly refer to anaatmaa. Therefore, according to their
systems, these statements must be erroneous. Statements such as 'I am the body'
are examples of superimposition of the gross body onto the aatmaa; a form of
adhyaasa. If they deny this, they will be reduced to the stance of materialism.
Thus they cannot object to this special case of aatmaa-anaatmaa adhyaasa.
Therefore they must accept the more general case, even though they might not

have realised it.
Because they had already implicitly accepted the aatmaa-body adhyaasa without
applying their four objections, they have forfeited the right to claim that
these apply in other cases. For example, as has already been said, the aatman is
not directly perceivable. But this did not stop the objector accepting that the
aatman was not the body.
Shankara goes on to say that, although the example of the rope and snake is not
based on shruti, we cannot legitimately object to that either because, like it
or not, that is our experience. The objector can try to explain it but he cannot
question it. The aatmaa-anaatmaa error, on the other hand, is based on shruti so
that, again, we can try to explain but we cannot question it. The explanations
given by the various philosophies may differ but the error cannot be denied.
Degrees of Error
In fact the aastika philosophies all agree that there is aatmaa-anaatmaa
adhyaasa; they just disagree about the extent to which this occurs. If the three
statements: - I am mortal; I am a doer; I am an enjoyer; are considered, the
Nyaaya and Vaisheshhika schools of philosophy claim that the first statement is
an error but the second two are facts. Saa~Nkhya and Yoga schools, on the other
hand, say the first two are errors and only the third is a fact. According to an
advaitin, all three are errors.
Proofs for Adhyaasa
There are two shruti-based pramaaNa-s for adhyaasa, the first is 'postulated'
and the second 'inferred'.
Postulated
The first takes an observed fact - for example I wake up one morning and find
the road outside is flooded - and postulates an explanation for this - e.g.
heavy rain occurred whilst I slept. Since I slept soundly, I have no direct
knowledge of any rain but, without such a supposition, I have no reasonable way
to explain the observed phenomenon. Other 'unreasonable' explanations may be put
forward but the one suggested is the most plausible to the rational mind. In
order to justify an improbable explanation, the more plausible must first be
discredited. Since the observed fact can only be explained in this way, the
explanation becomes a pramaaNa or valid means of knowledge. This pramaaNa is
'perception-based'. as opposed to 'shruti-based'. Shankara's concept of adhyaasa
is in fact a shruti-based 'postulate' since there is no mention of the subject
in the Vedas themselves and it is in this way that it becomes a valid knowledge
in its own right.
Just as this principle can be used to explain the flooded streets, shruti-based
postulates can be used to explain that the ideas that we are mortal, doers and
enjoyers are all due to error. For example, the Kathopanishad II.19 says "If the
slayer thinks that he slays or if the slain thinks that he is slain, both of
these know not. For It (the Self) neither slays nor is It slain." Also the
Giitaa V 8 tells us that one who knows the truth understands that we do not act.
We are not 'doers' or 'killers' or 'killed'. Therefore, any statement such as 'I
am a doer' or 'I am an enjoyer' must be an error, from shruti (and smRîti)
based postulate.
Similarly, the notion 'I am a knower' is an error. The MaaNDuukya Upanishad, for
example, says that the aatmaa is not a knower in the waking state, the dream
state or the deep sleep state but is pure consciousness. Thus shruti-based
postulate shows that this idea, that 'I am a knower', is false. (Unlike the idea
'I am consciousness', which is not an error.)
Another statement in the shruti says that the aatman is changeless
(indestructible and incombustible). To be a 'doer' would involve change since
this is an experience. All experiences, enjoying, knowing etc., are processes
involving a modification of ones state e.g. from ignorance to knowledge. In
fact, the suffix -er after a verb implies this modification by indicating an
action or process. Since the aatman cannot change, it follows that the aatman
cannot be a doer, enjoyer or any oth-er. The concepts must be errors or
adhyaasa.

A final argument is that, in order to be a 'doer' one would need an associated
'instrument'; for example, mind is an instrument of thought and sense organs are
instruments of perception. A 'doer' would have to be associated with an
instrument of 'doing' and an 'enjoyer' with an instrument of enjoyment. But the
scriptures say that the aatmaa is not associated with anything and so cannot be
a 'doer' etc.
Another adhyaasa is 'I am limited' e.g. ' I am here' (and not elsewhere). The
kaThopanishad (I-3-15) for example says that the aatmaa is beyond the five sense
perceptions, is eternal and unlimited, beginningless and limitless. Since it is
unambiguously stated that we are limitless, the idea that I am limited must be
an error, by shruti postulate. The notion 'I am an individual' is false; I am
Brahman is the reality.
The last example here is the idea that there are many aatmaa-s. This, too, is an
error. Many of the philosophies do claim multiplicity of aatmaa - saa~Nkhya,
yoga, vaisheshhika, puurvamiimaa.nsaa and even vishishhTaadvaita and dvaita
(which both recognise the importance of Vedanta. But Shankara cites the
shvetaashvatara upanishad as clearly implying that aatmaa is one and the iishaa
upanishad (V7) says "He who perceives all beings as the Self. for him how can
there be delusion or sorrow, when he sees this oneness (everywhere) - all in
all?"
Thus, shruti postulate has shown that the ideas that we are mortal, doers,
enjoyers, knowers, limited and many are all false.
Inferred
Earlier, the process of inference was explained as involving four aspects - the
'locus' of the discussion, the 'conclusion' that will be reached, a 'basis' for
the argument and an 'analogy'. The example used was ' whenever there is smoke,
there is fire'. (The full form used for the analysis was '(we infer that) there
is a fire on the mountain because we can see smoke, just as in a kitchen there
is always fire when we see smoke'). Shankara's analysis of adhyaasa can be put
into the first form by saying that 'wherever there is transaction, there is
adhyaasa'.
He uses the example of using grass to catch a cow. The cow comes to the grass
because, believing itself to be the body, it has notions such as 'I am hungry
and the grass will remove the hunger, giving satisfaction'. It is the mistaken
belief or adhyaasa 'I am the body' that causes the cow to come to the grass,
'going after things conducive to happiness'. Conversely, if instead of holding
out grass, we take a stick to the cow, the cow senses danger and moves off,
'going away from things causing unhappiness'.This is again caused by the
mistaken idea 'I am the body'. In fact, in this latter case, it is the belief
that 'I am this physical body' (as opposed to the subtle body, which cannot be
harmed by the stick).
This provides the 'analogy' for the inference. Man goes after things he likes
and avoids those that he dislikes, just as the cow comes to the grass and runs
away from the stick. The full form of the inference then becomes: '(We infer
that) all human activities are based on error, because all activities can be
considered as either coming towards or going away, just as in the example of the
cow with the grass or stick'. "Human activity" is the 'locus'; "that it is based
on adhyaasa" is the 'conclusion; "all activities are either coming towards or
going away" is the 'basis'; the example of the cow, grass and stick is the
'analogy'.
Implication of adhyaasa
In everything that we do, we make the error of confusing what is real with what
is unreal. We have a single experience but our understanding of it is confused.
It is just like the example of the rope and snake. In our ignorance we have a
single experience - there is a snake - but in fact two things are being mixed up
viz. a real rope and an unreal snake. When I say 'I know', we think there is a
single entity - a 'knower' but in fact there is a real, conscious self and
unreal, inert thoughts. In the sentence "I am a knower", 'I am' is the 'general'
part, referring to a real, conscious and existent being, while 'a knower' is the

'particular' part and is unreal. The two aspects are confused and adhyaasa
occurs. The changeless part (existence and consciousness) belongs to aatmaa and
the changing thought process belongs to anaatmaa. The two are mixed up and the
idea 'I am a knower' is the result. Aatmaa cannot be a knower since it is
changeless and thus cannot go through a 'knowing process'; anaatmaa cannot be a
knower since it is inert. The two are mixed up to form a new entity, a 'knower',
as a single experience but this is adhyaasa.
Conclusion of adhyaasa commentary
This understanding is not simply of academic interest; it is the source of the
belief that we are mortal and thus brings about our fear of death and consequent
insecurity. This then generates our constant concern with food and shelter etc.
and hence our obsession with money. The fact is that money can only provide
comforts; the basic insecurity does not go away however much money we may have.
Adhyaasa thus directly gives rise to samsaara. Because we believe we are
limited, we are continually trying to get those things we like in order to
remove the perceived limitations. The belief that we 'do' anything, that we are
'doers' is due to adhyaasa and such actions result in the merits and demerits of
karma and in samsaara. All of the suffering, from birth through disease, old age
and death results from this fundamental error that we make. And so it will
continue until the ignorance that is the cause of adhyaasa is removed. Actions
are only a movement within nature, the 'play of the guuNaa'; there is no doer.
The mistake takes place at all levels. With the thought 'I am the knower', the
anaatmaa of the mind and intellect is superimposed upon the aatmaa. At the level
of perception, a statement such as 'I am blind' superimposes the anaatmaa of the
sense organ upon the aatmaa. At the level of the body, ideas such as 'I am a
man' superimposes the anaatmaa of the body upon the aatmaa. All of these various
ideas are deemed to be properties of the Self, thus mixing up aatmaa and
anaatmaa in a disastrous mistake.
And so it goes on. Because of the identification with the body, we become
entangled in relationships with 'others' and imaginary 'needs' for 'external
objects' etc. The aatmaa has no relationships (there is only the aatmaa) but
because of the adhyaasa, the roots of samsaara spread everywhere.
The solution is to remove the ignorance of the Self. Only this can have the
required effect - removing any other ignorance will not affect this. Any amount
of education or knowledge in other subjects will only result in an educated
samsaari, someone who is knowledgeable about the anaatmaa. The error is in
respect of the Self, so samsaara can only be removed by knowledge of the Self.
The ignorance is not total. We already know that we exist and that we are
conscious, just as in the rope and snake metaphor, we know that 'something' is
there (if we did not there couldn't be any error). The aspect about which I am
still ignorant is that I am Brahman. When we talk about searching for knowledge
of Brahman, we are not endeavouring to find out about some new thing called
'Brahman' but about coming to realise our true status as Brahman. Whilst this
true status is not understood, we exist under the mistaken impression that we
are 'individuals' or 'jiiva-s'. It is the purpose of the Upanishads to remove
this adyhaasa.
Herein lies the difference between Vedanta and many other religions, together
with science, that they begin with the assumption that we are inferior or
'sinners' and that we have to better ourselves. We waste our whole lives trying
to improve our status. Vedanta tells us that this assumption of an inferior
status is mistaken; we do not have to try to improve ourselves, we are already
perfect, whole and without limitation of any kind. We need to enquire into the
nature of Brahman and thereby remove our adhyaasa.

BSB Notes - K.sadananda

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From: "K. Sadananda" <sada@anvil.nrl.navy.mil>

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1. Who is Jiva -or who is or what is an individual?

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From: "K. Sadananda" <sada@anvil.nrl.navy.mil>

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2.3 Factors involved in anumaana

saadhyam is that the mountain is fiery or it has fire. This conclusion is

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2.4 Where laukika anumaana is used on shaastra-s?

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2. What are the four factors needed in any anumaana pramaaNa?

From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <k_sadananda@hotmail.com>

Notes on Brahmasutra -IIIa

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n shankaraachaarya madhyamam.h |

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Shankara gives two definitions for adhyaasa. An additional third definition

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sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |

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From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <k_sadananda@hotmail.com>

Notes on Brahmasutra IIIC

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n shankaraachaarya madhyamam.h |

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In the last notes we began the discussion of Shankara's sha~Nkaa

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Notes on Brahmasutra - IIID

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From: "Kuntimaddi Sadananda" <k_sadananda@hotmail.com>

sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |

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sadaashiva samaarambhaa.n sha~Nkaraachaarya madhyamam.h |