ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS-TUCP,

vs.
THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIFTH DIVISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision and resolution dated June 22, 1992 and September
14, 1992 respectively of the National Labor Relations Commission (Fifth Division). 1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act, took effect, granting a
P25.00/day increase in the statutory minimum wage of all workers and employees in the private sector, subject to
certain conditions.

In implementation of the law, private respondent Del Monte Philippines, Inc. gave a P25.00/day increase to the
P54.00/day wages of its temporary employees or "broilers." Because the regular employees, members of petitioner
union, who were then receiving P100.80 a day were not granted a similar increase, they complained to the
management of private respondent.

On February 14, 1990, the parties executed a Memorandum Agreement wherein private respondent, "in positive
response to the union's representations and notwithstanding that it has no legal or contractual obligation," granted
the members of petitioner union a P10.00/day wage increase effective January 1, 1990, subject to the latter's right
to claim P15.00/day as balance, through compulsory arbitration. 2

On June 5, 1990, petitioners (Associated Labor Union-TUCP, representing its members, DMPIEU-ALU-TUCP, Local 302
and Geronimo de los Santos) filed a complaint against private respondent in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch X in Cagayan de Oro City. They alleged that a wage distortion 3 had
been created by the grant to its temporary employees of a P25.00/day salary increase under Republic Act No. 6727,
thereby reducing to P21.80 from the previous P46.80, the difference in salaries between the regular employees
(herein petitioners) and the temporary employees.

On November 27, 1990, the Labor Arbiter, Noel Augusto S. Miranda, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. He
found no wage distortion in view of a series of salary increases which respondent had granted to petitioners
vis-a-vis the temporary employees, as shown by the following table:

Pay of Union Pay of Temporary Difference

Members Employees

A. Prior to July 1, 1989 P100.80/day P54.00/day P46.80

B. Effective July 1, 1989 P100.80/day P79.00/day P21.80 (Under R.A. No. 6727
giving P25.00/day
increase to the tempo-
rary employees)

C. Effective Sept. 1, 1989 P115.80/day P79.00/day P36.80

(Under CBA giving
P15.00/day increase to
the union members)

D. Effective Jan. 1, 1990 P125.80/day P79.00/day P46.80

(Under Agreement on
Feb. 14, 1990 giving
P10.00/day increase
to the union members)

E. Effective Sept. 1, 1990 P140.80/day P79.00/day P61.80

(Under CBA giving
P15.00/day increase
to the union members)
On appeal the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's findings and denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence
this petition.

Petitioners contend that the increases mandated by the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement and the voluntary
agreement dated February 14, 1990 should not be considered as having corrected the wage distortion, since
employee benefits derived from law are exclusive, distinct, and separate from those obtained through negotiation
and agreement.

The contention has no merit.

Art. 124 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6727, expressly provides that where the application of
any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order issued by any Regional Board results in distortions of
the wage structure within an establishment, the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distortions.
The law recognizes, therefore, the validity of negotiated wage increases to correct wage distortions. The legislative
intent is to encourage the parties to seek solution to the problem of wage distortions through voluntary negotiation
or arbitration, rather than strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management. 4
Recognition and validation of wage increases given by employers either unilaterally or as a result of collective
bargaining negotiations for the purpose of correcting wage distortions are in keeping with the public policy of
encouraging employers to grant wage and allowance increases to their employees which are higher than the
minimum rates of increases prescribed by statute or administrative regulation. 5 As this Court stated in Apex
Mining, Inc. v. NLRC: 6

To compel employers simply to add on legislated increases in salary or allowances without regard to what is already
paid, would be to penalize employers who grant their workers more than the statutorily prescribed minimum rates
of increases. Clearly, this would be counterproductive so far as securing the interest of labor is concerned.

Thus in Cardona v. NLRC, 7 it was held that there was no wage distortion where the employer made salary
adjustments in terms of restructing of benefits and allowances and there was an increase pursuant to the CBA.

There is thus, to use the language of the law, no "effective obliterate[ion of] the distinction embodied in [private
respondent's] wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other logical basis of differentiation" in this case.
For it is undisputed that the difference in wages between petitioners and the temporary employees is now even
greater than it used to be prior to the grant of the P25.00/day increase to the latter pay pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6727.

Finally, whether or not a wage distortion exists by reason of the grant of a wage increase to certain employees is
essentially a question of fact. In this case, the findings of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC, that no wage
distortion exists being based on substantial evidence, are entitled to respect and finality. 8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140689 February 17, 2004

BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BANKARD, INC., respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises the issue of whether the
unilateral adoption by an employer of an upgraded salary scale that increased the hiring rates of new employees
without increasing the salary rates of old employees resulted in wage distortion within the contemplation of Article
124 of the Labor Code.
Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) classifies its employees by levels, to wit: Level I, Level II, Level III, Level IV, and Level V. On
May 28, 1993, its Board of Directors approved a "New Salary Scale", made retroactive to April 1, 1993, for the
purpose of making its hiring rate competitive in the industry’s labor market. The "New Salary Scale" increased the
hiring rates of new employees, to wit: Levels I and V by one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), and Levels II, III and IV by
nine hundred pesos (P900.00). Accordingly, the salaries of employees who fell below the new minimum rates were
also adjusted to reach such rates under their levels.

Bankard’s move drew the Bankard Employees Union-WATU (petitioner), the duly certified exclusive bargaining
agent of the regular rank and file employees of Bankard, to press for the increase in the salary of its old, regular
employees.

Bankard took the position, however, that there was no obligation on the part of the management to grant to all its
employees the same increase in an across-the-board manner.

As the continued request of petitioner for increase in the wages and salaries of Bankard’s regular employees
remained unheeded, it filed a Notice of Strike on August 26, 1993 on the ground of discrimination and other acts of
Unfair Labor Practice (ULP).

A director of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board treated the Notice of Strike as a "Preventive Mediation
Case" based on a finding that the issues therein were "not strikeable".

Petitioner filed another Notice of Strike on October 8, 1993 on the grounds of refusal to bargain, discrimination, and
other acts of ULP - union busting. The strike was averted, however, when the dispute was certified by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment for compulsory arbitration.

The Second Division of the NLRC, by Order of May 31, 1995, finding no wage distortion, dismissed the case for lack
of merit.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case was, by Resolution of July 28, 1995, denied.

Petitioner thereupon filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. 121970. In accordance with its
ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,1 the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals which, by October 28,
1999, denied the same for lack of merit.

Hence, the present petition which faults the appellate court as follows:

(1) It misapprehended the basic issues when it concluded that under Bankard’s new wage structure, the
old salary gaps between the different classification or level of employees were "still reflected" by the
adjusted salary rates2; and

(2) It erred in concluding that "wage distortion does not appear to exist", which conclusion is manifestly
contrary to law and jurisprudence.3

Upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6727 (WAGE RATIONALIZATION ACT, amending, among others, Article 124 of the
Labor Code) on June 9, 1989, the term "wage distortion" was explicitly defined as:

... a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of
intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an
establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of
service, or other logical bases of differentiation.4

Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Company5 laid down the four elements of wage distortion, to
wit: (1.) An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates; (2) A significant change in the salary rate
of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the salary rate of a higher one; (3) The elimination of the
distinction between the two levels; and (4) The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country.

Normally, a company has a wage structure or method of determining the wages of its employees. In a problem
dealing with "wage distortion," the basic assumption is that there exists a grouping or classification of employees
that establishes distinctions among them on some relevant or legitimate bases.6
Involved in the classification of employees are various factors such as the degrees of responsibility, the skills and
knowledge required, the complexity of the job, or other logical basis of differentiation. The differing wage rate for
each of the existing classes of employees reflects this classification.

Petitioner maintains that for purposes of wage distortion, the classification is not one based on "levels" or "ranks"
but on two groups of employees, the newly hired and the old, in each and every level, and not between and among
the different levels or ranks in the salary structure.

Public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) refutes petitioner’s position, however. It, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, essays in its Comment of April 12, 2000 as follows:

To determine the existence of wage distortion, the "historical" classification of the employees prior to the wage
increase must be established. Likewise, it must be shown that as between the different classification of employees,
there exists a "historical" gap or difference.

The classification preferred by petitioner is belied by the wage structure of private respondent as shown in the new
salary scale it adopted on May 28, 1993, retroactive to April 1, 1993, which provides, thus:

Thus the employees of private respondent have been "historically" classified into levels, i.e. I to V, and not on the
basis of their length of service. Put differently, the entry of new employees to the company ipso facto place[s] them
under any of the levels mentioned in the new salary scale which private respondent adopted retroactive [to] April 1,
1993. Petitioner cannot make a contrary classification of private respondent’s employees without encroaching upon
recognized management prerogative of formulating a wage structure, in this case, one based on level.7 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The issue of whether wage distortion exists being a question of fact that is within the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial
tribunals,8 and it being a basic rule that findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies, like the NLRC, are generally
accorded not only respect but at times even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence, as are the
findings in the case at bar, they must be respected. For these agencies have acquired expertise, their jurisdiction
being confined to specific matters.9

It is thus clear that there is no hierarchy of positions between the newly hired and regular employees of Bankard,
hence, the first element of wage distortion provided in Prubankers is wanting.lawphi1.nêt

While seniority may be a factor in determining the wages of employees, it cannot be made the sole basis in cases
where the nature of their work differs.

Moreover, for purposes of determining the existence of wage distortion, employees cannot create their own
independent classification and use it as a basis to demand an across-the-board increase in salary.

As National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, et al.10 teaches, the formulation of a wage structure through the
classification of employees is a matter of management judgment and discretion.

[W]hether or not a new additional scheme of classification of employees for compensation purposes should be
established by the Company (and the legitimacy or viability of the bases of distinction there embodied) is properly a
matter of management judgment and discretion, and ultimately, perhaps, a subject matter for bargaining
negotiations between employer and employees. It is assuredly something that falls outside the concept of "wage
distortion."11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As did the Court of Appeals, this Court finds that the third element provided in Prubankers is also wanting. For, as
the appellate court explained:

In trying to prove wage distortion, petitioner union presented a list of five (5) employees allegedly affected by the
said increase:

Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old employees and the newly hired
employees, to Our mind said gap is not significant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of the intentional
quantitative differences in the salary rates between the employee group. As already stated, the classification under
the wage structure is based on the rank of an employee, not on seniority. For this reason, ,wage distortion does not
appear to exist.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Apart from the findings of fact of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that some of the elements of wage distortion
are absent, petitioner cannot legally obligate Bankard to correct the alleged "wage distortion" as the increase in the
wages and salaries of the newly-hired was not due to a prescribed law or wage order.

The wordings of Article 124 are clear. If it was the intention of the legislators to cover all kinds of wage adjustments,
then the language of the law should have been broad, not restrictive as it is currently phrased:

Article 124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing.

Where the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or Wage Order issued by any Regional
Board results in distortions of the wage structure within an establishment, the employer and the union shall
negotiate to correct the distortions. Any dispute arising from the wage distortions shall be resolved through the
grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary
arbitration.

Article 124 is entitled "Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing." It is found in CHAPTER V on "WAGE STUDIES,
WAGE AGREEMENTS AND WAGE DETERMINATION" which principally deals with the fixing of minimum wage. Article
124 should thus be construed and correlated in relation to minimum wage fixing, the intention of the law being that
in the event of an increase in minimum wage, the distinctions embodied in the wage structure based on skills,
length of service, or other logical bases of differentiation will be preserved.

If the compulsory mandate under Article 124 to correct "wage distortion" is applied to voluntary and unilateral
increases by the employer in fixing hiring rates which is inherently a business judgment prerogative, then the hands
of the employer would be completely tied even in cases where an increase in wages of a particular group is justified
due to a re-evaluation of the high productivity of a particular group, or as in the present case, the need to increase
the competitiveness of Bankard’s hiring rate. An employer would be discouraged from adjusting the salary rates of
a particular group of employees for fear that it would result to a demand by all employees for a similar increase,
especially if the financial conditions of the business cannot address an across-the-board increase.

Petitioner cites Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. NLRC13 to support its claim that the obligation to rectify wage
distortion is not confined to wage distortion resulting from government decreed law or wage order.

Reliance on Metro Transit is however misplaced, as the obligation therein to rectify the wage distortion was not by
virtue of Article 124 of the Labor Code, but on account of a then existing "company practice" that whenever rank-
and-file employees were paid a statutorily mandated salary increase, supervisory employees were, as a matter of
practice, also paid the same amount plus an added premium. Thus this Court held in said case:

We conclude that the supervisory employees, who then (i.e., on April 17, 1989) had, unlike the rank-and-file
employees, no CBA governing the terms and conditions of their employment, had the right to rely on the company
practice of unilaterally correcting the wage distortion effects of a salary increase given to the rank-and-file
employees, by giving the supervisory employees a corresponding salary increase plus a premium. . . .14 (Emphasis
supplied)

Wage distortion is a factual and economic condition that may be brought about by different causes. In Metro
Transit, the reduction or elimination of the normal differential between the wage rates of rank-and-file and those of
supervisory employees was due to the granting to the former of wage increase which was, however, denied to the
latter group of employees.

The mere factual existence of wage distortion does not, however, ipso facto result to an obligation to rectify it,
absent a law or other source of obligation which requires its rectification.

Unlike in Metro Transit then where there existed a "company practice," no such management practice is herein
alleged to obligate Bankard to provide an across-the-board increase to all its regular employees.

Bankard’s right to increase its hiring rate, to establish minimum salaries for specific jobs, and to adjust the rates of
employees affected thereby is embodied under Section 2, Article V (Salary and Cost of Living Allowance) of the
parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), to wit:
Section 2. Any salary increase granted under this Article shall be without prejudice to the right of the Company to
establish such minimum salaries as it may hereafter find appropriate for specific jobs, and to adjust the rates of the
employees thereby affected to such minimum salaries thus established.15 (Italics and underscoring supplied)

This CBA provision, which is based on legitimate business-judgment prerogatives of the employer, is a valid and
legally enforceable source of rights between the parties.

In fine, absent any indication that the voluntary increase of salary rates by an employer was done arbitrarily and
illegally for the purpose of circumventing the laws or was devoid of any legitimate purpose other than to
discriminate against the regular employees, this Court will not step in to interfere with this management
prerogative. Employees are of course not precluded from negotiating with its employer and lobby for wage
increases through appropriate channels, such as through a CBA.

This Court, time and again, has shown concern and compassion to the plight of workers in adherence to the
Constitutional provisions on social justice and has always upheld the right of workers to press for better terms and
conditions of employment. It does not mean, however, that every dispute should be decided in favor of labor, for
employers correspondingly have rights under the law which need to be respected.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. 131247 January 25, 1999

PRUBANKERS ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
PRUDENTIAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Wage distortion presupposes an increase in the compensation of the lower ranks in an office hierarchy wirhout a
corresponding raise for higher-tiered employees in the same region of the country, resulting in the elimination or
the severe diminution of the distinction between the two groups. Such distortion does not arise when a wage order
gives employees in one branch of a bank higher compensation than that given to their counterparts in other regions
occupying the same pay scale, who are not covered by said wage order. In short, the implementation of wage
orders in one region but not in others does not in itself necessarily result in wage distortion.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, challenging the November 6, 1997 Decision 1
of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. 42525. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Voluntary Arbitration Committee dated June 18,
1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of or excess of jurisdiction, and a new judgment is rendered finding that no wage distortion resulted from the
petitioner's separate and regional implementation of Wage Order No. VII-03 at its Cebu, Mabolo and P. del Rosario.

The June 18, 1996 Decision of the Voluntary Arbitration Commitee, 2

which the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside, disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ruled that the Bank's separate and regional implementation of Wage Order No. VII-03 at
its Cebu, Mabolo and P. del Rosario branches created a wage distortion in the Bank nationwide which should be
resolved in accordance with Art. 124 of the Labor Code. 3

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals thus:

On November 18, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of Region V issued Wage Order No.
RB 05-03 which provided for a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to workers in the private sector who ha[d] rendered
service for at least three (3) months before its effectivity, and for the same period [t]hereafter, in the following
categories: SEVENTEEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P17.50) in the cities of Naga and Legaspi; FIFTEEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P15.50) in the municipalities of Tabaco, Daraga, Pili and the city of Iriga; and TEN PESOS
(P10.00) for all other areas in the Bicol Region.

Subsequently on November 23, 1993, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of Region VII issued
Wage Order No. RB VII-03, which directed the integration of the COLA mandated pursuant to Wage Order No. RO
VII-02-A into the basic pay of all workers. It also established an increase in the minimum wage rates for all workers
and and employees in the private sector as follows: by Ten Pesos (P10.00) in the cities of Cebu, Mandaue and
Lapulapu; Five Pesos (P5.00) in the municipalities of Compostela, Liloan, Consolacion, Cordova, Talisay, Minglanilla,
Naga and the cities of Davao, Toledo, Dumaguete, Bais, Canlaon and Tagbilaran.

The petitioner then granted a COLA of P17.50 to its employees at its Naga Branch, the only branch covered by
Wage Order No. RB 5-03, and integrated the P150.00 per month COLA into the basic pay of its rank-and-file
employees at its Cebu, Mabolo and P. del Rosario branches, the branches covered by Wage Order No. RB VII-03.

On June 7, 1994, respondent Prubankers Association wrote the petitioner requesting that the Labor Management
Committee be immediately convened to discuss and resolve the alleged wage distortion created in the salary
structure upon the implementation of the said wage orders. Respondent Association then demanded in the Labor
Management Committee meetings that the petitioner extend the application of the wage orders to its employees
outside Regions V and VII, claiming that the regional implementation of the said orders created a wage distortion in
the wage rates of petitioner's employees nationwide. As the grievance could not be settled in the said meetings,
the parties agreed to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration. The Arbitration Committee formed for that purpose
was composed of the following: public respondent Froilan M. Bacungan as Chairman, with Attys. Domingo T.
Anonuevo and Emerico O. de Guzman as members. The issue presented before the Committee was whether or not
the bank's separate and regional implementation of Wage Order No. 5-03 at its Naga Branch and Wage Order No.
VII-03 at its Cebu, Mabolo and P. del Rosario branches, created a wage distortion in the bank nationwide.

The Arbitration Committee on June 18, 1996 rendered questioned decision. 4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In ruling that there was no wage distortion, the Court of Appeals held that the variance in the salary rates of
employees in different regions of the country was justified by RA 6727. It noted that "the underlying considerations
in issuing the wage orders are diverse, based on the distinctive situations and needs existing in each region. Hence,
there is no basis to apply the salary increases imposed by Wage Order No. VII-03 to employees outside of Region
VII." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that "the distinctions between each employee group in the region are
maintained, as all employees were granted an increase in minimum wage rate. 5

The Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: 6

Whether or not the Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial procedure when it disregarded the
factual findings of the Voluntary Arbitration Committee as to the existence of wage distortion.

II

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error in law when it ruled that wage distortion exists only
within a region and not nationwide.

III

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in implying that the term "establishment" as used in Article 125 of the
Labor Code refers to the regional branches of the bank and not to the bank as a whole.

The main issue is whether or not a wage distortion resulted from respondent's implementation of the aforecited
Wage Orders. As a preliminary matter, we shall also take up the question of forum-shopping.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit. 7

Preliminary Issue: Forum-Shopping

Respondent asks for the dismissal of the petition because petitioner allegedly engaged in forum-shopping. It
maintains that petitioner failed to comply with Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which requires that parties
must certify under oath that they have not commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, they must state the status of the same; and if they should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the said courts, they should promptly inform the aforesaid
courts or any other tribunal or agency within five days therefrom. Specifically, petitioner accuses respondent of
failing to inform this Court of the pendency of NCMB-NCR-RVA-O4-012-97 entitled "In Re: Voluntary Arbitration
between Prudential Bank and Prubankers Association" (hereafter referred to as "voluntary arbitration case"), an
action involving issues allegedly similar to those raised in the present controversy.

In its Reply, petitioner effectively admits that the voluntary arbitration case was already pending when it filed the
present petition. However, it claims no violation of the rule against forum-shopping, because there is no identity of
causes of action and issues between the two cases.

We sustain the respondent. The rule on forum-shopping was first included in Section 17 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, which imposed a sanction in this wise: "A violation of the rule
shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions, without
prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned." Thereafter, the Court restated
the rule in Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94. Ultimately, the rule was embodied in
the 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court.

As explained by this Court in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 8 forum-shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other. Thus, there is forum-shopping when, between an action pending before this Court and another one, there
exist: "a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgement rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites also constitutive of the
requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens." 9 Another case elucidates the consequence of forum-shopping:
"[W]here a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the
same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a
bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of
the rest." 10

The voluntary arbitration case involved the issue of whether the adoption by the Bank of regionalized hiring rates
was valid and binding. On the other hand, the issue now on hand revolves around the existence of a wage distortion
arising from the Bank's separate and regional implementation of the two Wage Orders in the affected branches. A
closer look would show that, indeed, the requisites of forum-shopping are present.

First, there is identity of parties. Both cases are between the Bank and the Association acting on behalf of all its
members. Second, although the respective issues and reliefs prayed for in the two cases are stated differently, both
actions boil down to one single issue: the validity of the Bank's regionalization of its wage structure based on RA
6727. Even if the voluntary arbitration case calls for striking, down the Bank's regionalized hiring scheme while the
instant petition calls for the correction of the alleged wage distortion caused by the regional implementation of
Wage Order No. VII-03, the ultimate relief prayed for in both cases is the maintenance of the Bank's national wage
structure. Hence, the final disposition of one would constitute res judicata in the other. Thus, forum-shopping is
deemed to exist and, on this basis, the summary dismissal of both actions is indeed warranted.

Nonetheless, we deem it appropriate to pass upon the main issue on its merit in view of its importance.

Main Issue: Wage Distortion

The statutory definition of wage distortion is found in Article 124 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6727, which reads:

Art. 124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing — . . .

 As used herein, a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage
results in the elimination of severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or
salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate
the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service, or other
logical bases of differentiation.

Elaborating on this statutory definition, this Court ruled: "Wage distortion presupposes a classification of positions
and ranking of these positions at various levels. One visualizes a hierarchy of positions with corresponding ranks
basically in terms of wages and other emoluments. Where a significant change occurs at the lowest level of
positions in terms of basic wage without a corresponding change in the other level in the hierarchy of positions,
negating as a result thereof the distinction between one level of position from the next higher level, and resulting in
a parity between the lowest level and the next higher level or rank, between new entrants and old hires, there
exists a wage distortion. . . . . The concept of a wage distortion assumes an existing grouping or classification of
employees which establishes distinctions among such employees on some relevant or legitimate basis. This
classification is reflected in a differing wage rate for each of the existing classes of employees" 11

Wage distortion involves four elements:

1. An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates

2. A significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in
the salary rate of a higher one

3. The elimination of the distinction between the two levels

4. The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country

In the present case, it is clear that no wage distortion resulted when respondent implemented the subject Wage
Orders in the covered branches. In the said branches, there was an increase in the salary rates of all pay classes.
Furthermore, the hierarchy of positions based on skills, lengh of service and other logical bases of differentiation
was preserved. In other words, the quantitative difference in compensation between different pay classes remained
the same in all branches in the affected region. Put differently, the distinction between Pay Class 1 and Pay Class 2,
for example, was not eliminated as a result of the implementation of the two Wage Orders in the said region.
Hence, it cannot be said that there was a wage distortion.

Petitioner argues that a wage distortion exists, because the implementation of the two Wage Orders has resulted in
the discrepancy in the compensation of employees of similar pay classification in different regions. Hence,
petitioner maintains that, as a result of the two Wage Orders, the employees in the affected regions have higher
compensation than their counterparts of the same level in other regions. Several tables are presented by petitioner
to illustrate that the employees in the regions covered by the Wage Orders are receiving more than their
counterparts in the same pay scale in other regions.

The Court is not persuaded. A wage parity between employees in different rungs, is not at issue here, but a wage
disparity between employees in the same rung but located in different regions of the country.

Contrary to petitioner's postulation, a disparity in wages between employees holding similar positions but in
different regions does not constitute wage distortion as contemplated by law. As previously enunciated, it is the
hierarchy of positions and the disparity of their corresponding wages and other emoluments that are sought to be
preserved by the concept of wage distortion. Put differently, a wage distortion arises when a wage order engenders
wage parity between employees in different rungs of the organizational ladder of the same establishment. It bears
emphasis that wage distortion involves a parity in the salary rates of different pay classes which, as a result,
eliminates the distinction between the different ranks in the same region.

Different Regional Wages

Mandated by RA 6727

Petitioner's claim of wage distortion must also be denied for one other reason. The difference in wages between
employees in the same pay scale in different regions is not the mischief sought to be banished by the law. In fact,
Republic Act No. 6727 (the Wage Rationalization Act), recognizes "existing regional disparities in the cost of living."
Section 2 of said law provides:
 Sec 2. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to rationalize the fixing of minimum wages and
to promote productivity-improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of
living for the workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the
fruits of production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside through industry
dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and
growth.

The State shall promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages and other
terms and conditions of employment; and whenever necessary, the minimum wage rates shall be
adjusted in a fair and equitable manner, considering existing regional disparities in the cost of
living and other socio-economic factors and the national economic and social development plans.

RA 6727 also amended Article 124 of the Labor Code, thus:

Art. 124. Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixing. — The regional minimum wages to be
established by the Regional Board shall be as nearly adequate as is economically feasible to
maintain the minimum standards of living necessary for the health, efficiency and general well-
being of the employees within the frame work of the national economic and social development
program. In the determination of such regional minimum wages, the Regional Board shall, among
other relevant factors, consider the following:

a. The demand for living wages;

b. Wage adjustment vis-a-vis the consumer price index;
c. The cost of living and changes or increases therein;
d. The needs of workers and their families;
e. The need to induce industries to invest in the countryside;
f. Improvements in standards of living;
g. The prevailing wage levels;
h. Fair return of the capital invested and capacity to pay of employers;

I. Effects on employment generation and family income; and

II. The equitable distribution of income and wealth along the imperatives of social and economic
development.

From the above-quoted rationale of the law, as well as the criteria enumerated, a disparity in wages between
employees with similar positions in different regions is necessarily expected. In insisting that the employees of the
same pay class in different regions should receive the same compensation, petitioner has apparently
misunderstood both the meaning of wage distortion and the intent of the law to regionalize wage rates.

It must be understood that varying in each region of the country are controlling factors such as the cost of living;
supply and demand of basic goods, services and necessities; and the purchasing power of the peso. Other
considerations underscore the necessity of the law. Wages in some areas may be increased in order to prevent
migration to the National Capital Region and, hence, to decongest the metropolis. Therefore, what the petitioner
herein bewails is precisely what the law provides in order to achieve its purpose.

Petitioner claims that it "does not insist that the Regional Wage Boards created pursuant to RA 6727 do not have
the authority to issue wage orders based on the distinctive situations and needs existing in each region. So also, . . .
it does not insist that the [B]ank should not implement regional wage orders. Neither does it seek to penalize the
Bank for following Wage Order VII-03. . . . What it simply argues is that it is wrong for the Bank to peremptorily
abandon a national wage structure and replace the same with a regionalized structure in violation of the principle of
equal pay for equal work. And, it is wrong to say that its act of abandoning its national wage structure is mandated
by law."

As already discussed above, we cannot sustain this argument. Petitioner contradicts itself in not objecting, on the
one hand, to the right of the regional wage boards to impose a regionalized wage scheme; while insisting, on the
other hand, on a national wage structure for the whole Bank. To reiterate, a uniform national wage structure is
antithetical to the purpose of RA 6727.

The objective of the law also explains the wage disparity in the example cited by petitioner: Armae Librero, though
only in Pay Class 4 in Mabolo, was, as a result of the Wage Order, receiving more than Bella Cristobal, who was
already in Pay Class 5 in Subic. 12 RA 6727 recognizes that there are different needs for the different situations in
different regions of the country. The fact that a person is receiving more in one region does not necessarily mean
that he or she is better off than a person receiving less in another region. We must consider, among others, such
factors as cost of living, fulfillment of national economic goals, and standard of living. In any event, this Court, in its
decisions, merely enforces the law. It has no power to pass upon its wisdom or propriety.

Equal Pay for Equal Work

Petitioner also avers that the implementation of the Wage Order in only one region violates the equal-pay-for-equal-
work principle. This is not correct. At the risk of being repetitive, we stress that RA 6727 mandates that wages in
every region must be set by the particular wage board of that region, based on the prevailing situation therein.
Necessarily, the wages in different regions will not be uniform. Thus, under RA 6727, the minimum wage in Region
1 may be different from that in Region 13, because the socioeconomic conditions in the two regions are different.

Meaning of "Establishment"

Petitioner further contends that the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the meaning of "establishment" in
relation to wage distortion. It quotes the RA 6727 Implementing Rules, specifically Section 13 thereof which speaks
of "workers working in branches or agencies of establishments in or outside the National Capital Region." Petitioner
infers from this that the regional offices of the Bank do not themselves constitute, but are simply branches of, the
establishment which is the whole bank. In effect, petitioner argues that wage distortion covers the pay scales even
of employees in different regions, and not only those of employees in the same region or branch. We disagree.

Sec. 13 provides that the "minimum wage rates of workers working in branches or agencies of establishments in or
outside the National Capital Region shall be those applicable in the place where they are sanctioned" The last part
of the sentence was omitted by petitioner in its argument. Given the entire phrase, it is clear that the statutory
provision does not support petitioner's view that "establishment" includes all branches and offices in different
regions.

Further negating petitioner's theory is NWPC Guideline No. 1 (S. 1992) entitled "Revised Guidelines on Exemption
From Compliance With the Prescribed Wage/Cost of Living Allowance Increases Granted by the Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Board," which states that "establishment" "refers to an economic unit which engages in one
or predominantly one kind of economic activity with a single fixed location."

Management Practice

Petitioner also insists that the Bank has adopted a uniform wage policy, which has attained the status of an
established management practice; thus, it is estopped from implementing a wage order for a specific region only.
We are not persuaded. Said nationwide uniform wage policy of the Bank had been adopted prior to the enactment
of RA 6727. After the passage of said law, the Bank was mandated to regionalize its wage structure. Although the
Bank implemented Wage Order Nos. NCR-01 and NCR-02 nationwide instead of regionally even after the effectivity
of RA 6727, the Bank at the time was still uncertain about how to follow the new law. In any event, that single
instance cannot be constitutive of "management practice."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt

G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
(hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to
terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily
argues that what really motivated PT & T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her
employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated
against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor
Code.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker,"
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1
Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19,
1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in
replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. 2 After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to
their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled
up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991. 3

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the
same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated
January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the
company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. 4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. 5
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992, 6 which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal,
coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.

At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information,
and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of
P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner 7. All of
these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel.

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her
reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor
arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private
respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of
her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and,
in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and
unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the
qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of
her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter,
including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT & T.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of
November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and
respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.

1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but,
through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women
constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of
labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women
have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be
safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in
hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and
political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II 8
on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary
thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII 9 (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution)
pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly,
Section 14 of Article XIII 10 mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for
opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.

2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the
Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment
as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). 11

Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 12 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women
with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955
13
which bans the "mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to the rights of women workers; Republic Act No. 7192 14 also known as the "Women in
Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into
contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322 15 increasing the
maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 7877 16 which outlaws and punishes
sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, 17
or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the
deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure. Likewise,
it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, 18 women's rights in the field of civil law have been
greatly enhanced and expanded.

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof.
Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to
be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and
safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic,
bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other
hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on
account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.

3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and
security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment
ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a
valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as
constitutionally protected property.

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called
management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work
assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of
workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. 19 As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate,
according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except in
cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. 20

In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers
by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the
company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for
employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company
is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you." 21 Again, in the termination
notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance
from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was
her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not
applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.") 22 Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was
made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor
and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. 23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to
retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal
company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of
confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. 24 It must rest on an actual
breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer's caprices. 25 Furthermore, it should never be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. 26

In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter
got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed,
bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal.

Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage
over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since
private respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.

Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female
employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as
unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter
to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says it gives its blessings to its female employees
contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which
obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no
sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed.
This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled
with responsible advocacy.

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse through
less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married
women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her
supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's
secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.

Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly
misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere
and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit
some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because
of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That
the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought,
just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no
showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same
was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely
agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was
deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.

Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was
served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as
she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just
when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to
prevent her from earning security of tenure. 27 On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever
were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities
which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & T. 28 The primary standard of determining
regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to
the business or trade of the employer. 29

As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. 30 However, as she had undeniably committed an act of
dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-
month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such
act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction
whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be
computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be
reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension.

4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT & T.
The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
 Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to
stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 148, 31 better
known as the "Women and
Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, 32 entitled "An Act to Regulate
the Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The
forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and
which regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile
establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands.

It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines, 33
a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that
prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once
they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to
discrimination against married women. Thus:

Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with the codal
provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code
applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against
marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and
reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen profession.

We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the
controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential
Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for
the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the
same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which
amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same
provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1,
1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974.

It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all
policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins
the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women
employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine
appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight
attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The
standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary
of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.

It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be
established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in
Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . .
.

Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from employment of
flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own
health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent
claims that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant
merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the
consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the
supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel
that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of
Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
 In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the
provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an
inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for
its policy of non-marriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant
from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure
conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated
technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent
overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing
circumstances and events.

Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should
have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary
occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-
discrimination on the employment of women.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation 34
considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the
complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as
separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed
that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated
when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism"
tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate
court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree
No. 148 and the Constitution.

Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the
marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not
on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual
group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the
employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United
States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and
applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. 35

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married women. And,
where the employer discriminates against married women, but not against married men, the variable is sex and the
discrimination is unlawful. 36 Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried
could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job
would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in
the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and
female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of
the flight attendants. 37

5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise
assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status,
a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. 38 Hence, while it is
true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem
convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 39 Carried
to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would
encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that
is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public interest that the
same should yield to the common good. 40 It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of
oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the public. 41 In the final reckoning, the
danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & This that it strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of
the nation. 42 That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.