***Affirmative

*UQ

2ac No Pass
TPP wont pass no post-election vote and too much opposition
Schiff, 6-4 Editorial Programs Manager
Jaclyn, Modern Healthcare.com, Patently perturbed: Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal raises fears about drug patent periods,
higher costs, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160604/MAGAZINE/306049978

While Obama has expressed confidence the TPP could pass in this session of
Congress, it looks increasingly unlikely. Both Democratic and Republican frontrunners in the race for the White House have attacked the deal, and Congress is
unlikely to take up a controversial measure in an election year. Most trade deals are
not considered treaties but are congressional-executive branch agreements that must be approved by both houses
of Congress. Last November, Republican businessman Donald Trump call the TPP a horrible deal
designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone. China isn't part of
the deal, and some foreign policy experts see the deal as part of the U.S.' efforts to create a diplomatic bulwark against Chinese
hegemony in the region. Democratic front-runner Hillary

Clinton, under pressure from the left, has also

attacked the deal, which she supported while secretary of state. We are not going any longer to be at the mercy of what any
country is going to do to take advantage of our markets, she told Ohio voters in March during a swing through that Rust Belt state.

Leaders of both parties

have

expressed doubts that it will come up for a vote this year, even

during the lame-duck session following the November presidential election.

The TPP needs to pass

through legislative channels in all 12 countries before it can be implemented. Negotiations could resume if some countries are unable
to pass it in its current form.

1ar No Pass
TPP wont pass, more evidence
a) insider statements and vote count
Buxbaum, 6-6 Freelance journalist
Peter, Global Trade.com, TPP Faces Uphill Battle in Congressional Lame Duck Session, http://www.globaltrademag.com/globaltrade-daily/commentary/tpp-faces-uphill-battle-in-congressional-lame-duck-session

Obama administration is making a last-ditch effort to get Congress to approve the

Trans-Pacific Partnership in a lame duck session after the November elections. The
reasoning is that, with the current president and congressional leaders in both
houses of Congress being pro-trade, the time is ripe for passage. And, conversely, the
likelihood of passage in 2017, after a new president takes office, is diminished.
The

But a growing number of voices in Washington are expressing pessimism that the TPP will
receive a vote in Congress, let alone passage, in 2016. The fact that the presumptive

Republican nominee for president, Donald Trump, and the likely Democratic nominee, Hillary
Clinton, have said they are against the deal, doesnt help its chances , according to Rep. Tom
Reed (R-New York). Reed recently told National Public Radio that

the votes to pass TPP simply dont exist.

The two magic numbers down here being 218 and 60 with the House and Senate
needed to pass the legislation, he said. And with both candidates being opposed to
TPP, I dont know how you get that number. Senator Bernie Sanders (D-Vermont), who is still in the race
for the Democratic nomination, has also expressed opposition to the TPP. Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell (R-Kentucky), a backer of fast-track trade authority and generally perceived as pro-trade agreements told
AgriPulse that the political environment to pass a trade bill is worse than any time
in the time I have been in the Senate. It looks bleak for this year to have a TPP vote.

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), or fast track, which passed Congress and was signed by President Obama a year ago, gives the
White House the ability to negotiate trade agreements subject to an up-or-down vote in Congress and without the introduction of

Senator Dick Durbin (D-Illinois): the Assistant Senate

Minority Leader, said the White House shouldnt even bother bringing the TPP for
a vote in a lame duck session. I would counsel the White House, dont even try , he
said. I dont think thats even within the realm of possibility moving the TPP this year,
said Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri), who voted for fast track last June, in an interview with
congressional amendments. In a Bloomberg article,

Politico. Probably

even in the lame duck .

b) prefer our evidence, theirs cites Obama officials with an incentive to

overestimate the chances for passage not happening
Guebert 6-5 award-winning agricultural journalist and expert
Alan, Journal Star, Farm and Food File: White House trade deals fading away, http://www.pjstar.com/news/20160605/farm-andfood-file-white-house-trade-deals-fading-away?page=3

As the politics of this election year heat up, the chances of Congress debating let
alone passing either of the White Houses marque trade deals continue to melt away.
Oh, theres plenty of talk about the westward-looking Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Euro-centered
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TPP and TTIP, respectively.

Most of the yakking, however, flows

from Obama Administration officials; nary a word trickles out of Congress. Worse than

Capitol Hill silence is the vocal pounding that free trade takes when any of
President Obamas would-be successors talks trade. Bernie Sanders, a Democrat by name but socialist
by heart, makes it crystal clear that he would rather eat glass than back to free trade. Hillary Clinton, who three years
ago called the TPP exciting, innovative, and ambitious, now sees it as an agreement that
has failed to provide the basic safety net support needed for American workers.
Take that as an innovative no. And The Donald? Hes against TPP because, as he noted in
one Republican debate this spring, Its a deal that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door
China, however, is not part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership so whatever Trump meant must have been more of a suggestion than a
fact. Whatever. Even chatted-about vice presidential candidates are split on the White Houses trade deals. Ohios Sen. Sherrod
Brown, a possible Clinton veep candidate, is an outspoken critic of all past and most future trade deals. Another mentioned Clinton
running mate, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, is Browns opposite, a strong supporter of both TPP and TTIP who cant
leave his Washington, D.C. office or American shores without offering a quick sermon on the virtues of free trade. The typical Vilsack
sermon leans more on free trade law than free trade gospel: American farmers and ranchers have a birthright to sell whatever they can
wherever they can. As such, groups like the American Soybean Association (ASA) hold every farm state member of Congress and
every USDA boss accountable for any hiccup in ag export sales. The ASA made that hard line perfectly clear again in a toughly
worded April 11 letter to Vilsack and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman. It was really more of a to-do list for the
Administration to complete before, ASA implied, it would bless any TTIP deal with the European Union. Some of the problems TTIP
needs to resolve, ASA wrote, center on the need to reform or eliminate the EUs significant non-tariff trade barriers like its current
approval process for new biotechnology, its arbitrary restrictions on imports of U.S. soy-based biodiesel and biodiesel feedstocks,
and its trade-constraining biotech labeling requirements Talking ag biotech rule changes with the EU is like talking wish lists with
Santa Claus: Its foolish not to ask for the moon, but only a fool would expect it. ASA and Vilsack, however, are neither fools nor
foolish. They now see TTIP as an opening to impose a working biotech approval system on the EU, a phrase ASA used in an April 8
letter to Vilsack that pressed hard for him to lean on the EU Commission to approve three biotech soybean products. (Steve
Suppan, senior policy analyst at the Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy, examines the letter and its implications in a May 2 blog
post thats linked at farmandfood.com/in-the-news/.) Big Ags big push for the pending trade deals is understandable given the two
changed realities of todays election year politics. First, even as we lean on the EU to alter its biotech food rules, the U.S. Senate still
cant agree on how to write a biotech food labeling law here. Members know the tide has turned on labeling; 89 out of 100 Americans
want it. Majority Republicans, however, dont and they continue to search for a way to be anti-labeling without becoming antiincumbents. Second,
Taken together,

not one presidential contender sees free trade as a vote-winning issue.

its hard to see how any trade deal goes anywhere this year

. After that, you have to take

the word of Hillary or Bernie or Donald. Well, maybe not Donald. Or Hillary.

c) no momentum, not enough time, and not enough votes

Palmer, 6-6 15 years covering trade issues
Doug, Politico, TPP mired as Congress returns, http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-trade/2016/06/tpp-mired-as-congressreturns-214657

It could be a long, sleepy summer for the Trans-Pacific

Partnership one year after Congress nearly ripped itself apart to give President Barack Obama fast track authority to finish the
landmark Asia-Pacific deal. The administration is trying to sell Congress and the American public
on the economic and geostrategic benefits of TPP. But both Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell and House Speaker Paul Ryan are keeping their distance, while Donald
Trump is promising to walk away from the 12-nation pact. Lawmakers return this
week from their Memorial Day break with no indication that either House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Kevin Brady or Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch will
take any action on the agreement before Congress leaves town in mid-July for a
TPP MIRED AS CONGRESS RETURNS:

prolonged summer break because of the party nominating conventions. For its part, the

Obama

administration

still hasnt

, something its required

to do 30 days before submitting the pact for a vote. The Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative says its working on a handful of issues that have jeopardized
support for the trade deal, but theres no sign of progress on Hatchs main concern
that TPP doesnt provide 12 years of data protection for biologics medicine. The
given Congress a draft statement

of how it plans to implement the agreement

longer it takes for outstanding TPP issues to be addressed, the less likely it is that
TPP will be voted on during the Obama administration, one industry official said. And one
Senate Democratic aide similarly noted that it isnt clear whether theres enough time in
a lame-duck session of Congress to do hearings, the mock markup, and the vote.
Working backwards, that means key issues need to be resolved by August to hold hearings by September, the aide said.

No TPP before or after the election

Frasure 5-18
William G., Professor of Government at Connecticut College, The Diplomat, U.S. Presidential Election Campaign Dims Prospects
for TPP, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/u-s-presidential-election-campaign-dims-prospects-for-tpp/

In the spring of 2015, an assemblage of Vietnamese government officials were clearly taken aback when, in the course of
a workshop, I explained that criticism of the TPP had become so widespread in U.S.
politics that passage was not at all certain, and that in the presidential election year
of 2016, politics will be so feverish that adoption of something as controversial as
the TPP will be impossible. Today, it is clear that this unhappy forecast has come
to pass. This years election campaign is even more feverish than usual, and any
hope for the TPPs adoption before the election has long since vanished. The larger
problem, however, is that, even once the election campaign is behind us, its residue will
diminish the chances for successful adoption of the TPP for a long time to come.
Protectionist themes dominate the policy rhetoric of all the principal candidates. Three
contenders remain two Democrats and a Republican. All three proclaim opposition to the TPP.
Donald Trump, the Republican, and Bernie Sanders, a Democrat, are long-standing opponents of trade agreements. Hillary Clinton, a
Democrat, has only recently announced opposition to the agreement, which she had previously supported. Bernie Sanders describes
himself as a Democratic Socialist. As such, his position on the TPP is staunchly protectionist. He is a defender of the labor unions,
most of which are opposed free-trade in general and the TPP in particular. Moreover, he denounces the TPP as a device intended only
to benefit large corporations and Wall Street, institutions which are the principal targets of his campaign attacks. It is, at this time, very
unlikely that Senator Sanders can win the Democratic nomination and be elected president. Were he to be elected, it would represent a
major leftward shift in American politics, probably accompanied by large Democratic gains in congressional elections. Under a
Sanders presidency, the TPP would most likely be forgotten. Donald Trump is running a populist campaign. He is a very unusual
candidate for the Republican Party. For many years, most Republican leaders have supported trade agreements, such as NAFTA. Trade
agreements have usually been adopted with large support from the Republicans in Congress and somewhat lesser support from
Democrats. Donald Trump, however, is basing his campaign on the support of angry middle and working-class Americans who have
not done well in the new economy. He tells the disappearing middle class that the TPP is very bad for them. This suggests that if
Trump is elected, there would be no chance of the TPP being adopted. At present, however, Trump and prominent leaders of the
Republican Party are engaged in an effort to unify the party, which was completely unprepared for the success of his populist
campaign. The principal actor in the unification effort is the speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, who is a strong proponent of free trade,
including the TPP. It is possible, though not likely, that as part of the party-unification process, Trump might be persuaded to soften his
opposition to the TPP somewhat. In that case, a Republican Congress would probably go forward with it. It is very unlikely that
Trump would alter his opposition, however, without some provision for greater protections for American workers. The most promising
election result, in terms of the TPP, would be the election of Hillary Clinton, even though she currently professes opposition to the
agreement. She was usually a proponent of free trade in the past. She is by far the most internationalist of the three remaining
candidates. It is widely assumed that her recent opposition to the TPP is merely expedient, a necessary, albeit insincere, gesture to
forestall defections from the left wing of the Democratic Party. She was, after all, among the architects of the TPP. Now, however, she
faces strong opposition to the TPP within the Democratic Party, which she must placate in order to win the nomination. If she is
elected, she may be able, after a decent interval, to revert to her previous position of support for the TPP, especially if she can take
credit for concessions from other participating countries. She may then be able to count on greater support from Democrats in

One scenario that deserves

discussion is the possibility of the TPP being considered by a lame duck
Congress in the fall. That is, consideration by the current Congress after the election, but before the new Congress and
president take office in January. This is an unlikely course because it is has many uncertainties and
difficulties for either political party. If Trump is elected, it would be an act of open
defiance for this Republican-controlled Congress to pass the TPP during a lameduck session. If Clinton is elected, however, it might be possible for free-trade Republicans and some Democrats to pass the
Congress and also from the significant number of remaining free-trade Republicans.

TPP, in spite of her present opposition, provided that President Barack Obama resolutely pushes the issue in a way that does not
implicate her in a repudiation of her campaign posture.

*Thumpers

2ac Gun Control

Gun control fight thumps
Bluestein 6-12 Reporter
Greg, AJC.com, Barack Obama calls for new debate on gun restrictions after Orlando shootings,
http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2016/06/12/barack-obama-calls-for-new-debate-over-gun-restrictions-after-orlando-shootings/

Obama called the murders of 50 people at a gay nightclub in Orlando an act of terror and an act of hate and
urged lawmakers to open a new debate over gun control restrictions in the wake of
the worst mass shooting in American history. Saying the Orlando killings could have erupted in any one
President Barack

of our communities, Obama invoked previous mass shootings that jolted the nation. This massacre is therefore a further reminder of
how easy it is for someone that lets them shoot people in a school, or in a house of worship, or in a movie theater or a night club, he
said. And we have to decide if thats the kind of country that we want to be. To actively do nothing is a decision as well. Obamas
call for action, however, was much vaguer and more subdued than in addresses immediately following mass shootings earlier in his

The slaughter early Sunday at the crowded gay hangout is sure to stoke a new fight over
restricting access to firearms even as new battles over LGBT rights, such as
transgender bathroom equality and the religious liberty debate, play out in statehouses
presidency.

and City Halls across the country. The gunman, identified by federal law enforcement as Omar Mateen, stormed the Pulse club
wielding a handgun and an AR-15-type assault rifle, killing 50 and injuring another 53. Investigators were searching whether Mateen,

After a gunman slaughtered more than a dozen

elementary school children in Connecticut in 2012, Obama vowed to use whatever
power this office holds to engage my fellow citizens, from law enforcement, to mental health professionals, to
parents and educators, in an effort aimed at preventing more tragedies like this. Congress
who was found dead at the club, had ties to terrorist organizations.

has actively stymied Obamas efforts to pass gun control legislation

, including attempts by Democrats

to force votes on legislation that would block people on the terror watch list from obtaining firearms.

2ac Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico fight thumps the disad
Lane 6-6 politics and finance reporter
Sylvan, The Hill, Week ahead: Puerto Rico bill faces tough House vote, http://thehill.com/policy/finance/282149-week-aheadpuerto-rico-bill-faces-tough-house-vote

A bill to help Puerto Rico handle more than $70 billion in debt could come up for a vote on the
House floor in the coming week. The bill, supported by House Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (DCalif.) cleared the House Natural Resources Committee a week ago with wide bipartisan support. And with lawmakers returning from

Puerto Rico's debt woes are returning to center stage. The island territory
faces a $2 billion debt payment on July 1. But the bill's fate is uncertain. Hispanic lawmakers are
divided. While they agree its crucial to pass legislation to aid Puerto Rico, many are also troubled by measures that would limit
the minimum wage for young workers and create an oversight board outside of the control of elected officials. It's also
unclear how many Republicans will be on board despite Ryan's support. Many
their Memorial Day recess,

conservative lawmakers are worried the legislation could stick taxpayers with bailing out the island. The

is

also

Obama

administration

pushing for passage. Even if the bill clears the House, there are more

questions in the Senate, where leaders have stayed quiet on whether they would
support it.

2ac Zika
Zika fight thumps the disad its top of the agenda and a huge fight
Fell 6-7 Reporter in the D.C. News Bureau
Jacqueline, Fox 23 News Tulsa, Zika Virus fight resumes on Capitol Hill, http://www.fox23.com/news/zika-virus-fight-resumes-oncapitol-hill/328074242

Democrats say funding the battle against the Zika Virus needs to be a top priority.
White House Spokesman Josh Earnest called the Zika Virus an emergency situation.
Republicans in congress have dragged their feet and still not come forward with a
funding plan consistent with what our public health officials say is necessary, Earnest said. Senate Democrats
have pledged to push Republicans to fully fund the president's $1.9 billion
emergency funding request this week. The White House first made the request nearly four months ago when there
were just 50 confirmed cases of in the United States. Today, the CDC says there are 618 confirmed cases. The House and
Senate have passed separate Zika funding bills. A senior GOP leadership aide says
the House is ready to meet to merge the two bills and is waiting on the Senate.

*Link

2ac AT BIT Link

BIT solves security concerns binds China to predictable rules
Nguyen 2016 (Yen, Bilateral Investment Treaty, Balancing Cooperation and Competition: A New Era In U.S.-China
Relations Task Force Report March 2016 The Henry M. Jackson Foundation at the University of Washington)
Congress had proved to be difficult towards the openness of the United States to Chinese capital.35 For instance, when Chinese
enterprises had begun seeking opportunities to invest in the U.S., a significant concern from Beijing was that Washington would block
them for security reasons. This concern turned out to be correct. The blockage, however, was not only from the executive branch, the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, but also from Congress. Congress feared that Chinese companies would be
free-riding on the haven of U.S. opportunities and dodging security reviews while U.S. investors and potential investors, would still
suffer from restrictions within China.36 Similarly, CFIUS is unwilling to change its procedures and track record of using political

with a complete BIT, the fears of Congress and

CFIUS would be alleviated. Upon this treaty, A U.S.-China BIT is unlikely to change the CFIUS process because of
pressure to not jeopardize national security.37 However,

the difficult political climate, but it could foster greater disclosure of unclassified evidence, arguments, and allegations considered in

CFIUS can use the opportunity of the BIT or other investment

agreement talks to lay out conditions for Chinese investors so that the U.S. national
security isnt compromised, thus alleviating CFIUS concerns.
CFIUS deliberations.38

1ar AT BIT Link

Stimulating investment solves the link
Ikenson 2012 Daniel Ikenson is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.
(Trade Policy Priority One: Averting a U.S.-China Trade War, http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policypriority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war?utm_source=Cato+Institute+Emails&utm_campaign=c986bc133fCato_Today&utm_medium=email&mc_cid=c986bc133f&mc_eid=348d0d3f0a)
The most significant determinant of the quality and direction of the U.S.-China relationship is American self-confidence. In other

U.S.-China relations will be driven more by actions in Washington than by actions in

Beijing. If the U.S. economy starts to grow at a stronger pace and businesses begin to
invest and hire more rigorously, the temptation of politicians and the media to
scapegoat China for self-induced, domestic woes will diminish.
words,

2ac Focus Thumpers

Litany of other issues occupy Congressional focus
--Defense bill, other appropriations bills, and Puerto Rico

Greenspan et al. 6-7 Reporters

Eli, JDSUPRA Business Advisor, Health Care Congressional Outlook for the June Work Period,
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/health-care-congressional-outlook-for-23838/

The next six weeks are shaping up to be the final work period before the summer recess,
with both chambers scheduled to leave DC by July 15th for party conventions
followed by the August recess. The National Defense Authorization Act ( NDAA ) ,
appropriations, and Puerto Rico will take up the lions share of time

we have left

remaining

there are still a number of issues that both chambers

will have to address or leave in the balance for when both chambers return to
session September 6th.
on the schedule.

In the health care space,

2ac AT Focus Link

Focus links not true for Obama
Herald Times 9
April 29, 2009, LN

I don't think any of us were quite prepared for the sheer energy this new president
demonstrated in his first 100 days. The number of press conferences, policy speeches, cross-country and
international travels on top of new initiatives to bolster financial markets has been mind-boggling. Obama said he would close
down Guantanamo Bay, and the process is under way. He said he would extend health care to children, and he has signed into law
a program that will provide more than 11 million children with health care. He said he would assess the situation in Iraq and
provide a plan to bring our troops home safely. He said he would reverse many of George W. Bush's executive orders on stem-cell
research and did that, too. One astute political observer recently told me that Obama reminds her of

an octopus with eight arms, all doing different things, but each done with agile efficiency.

1ar AT Focus Link

Agenda focus constantly shifts- plan wont disrupt top priorities
Light 99
Paul Light, Director of Governmental Studies at Brookings Institute, The Presidents Agenda)
The Presidents agenda is a remarkable list. It is rarely written down. It constantly shifts and
evolves. It is often in flux even for the President and the top staff. Items move onto the agenda one
day and off the next. Because of its status in the policy process, the Presidents agenda is the subject of intense conflict.
The infighting is resolved sometimes through mutual consent and collegial bargaining, sometimes through marked struggle and
domination. It is not surprising that we know so little about it .

*Internals

2ac Winners Win

Winners win PC is a false concept
Hirsh 13
Michael, chief correspondent, Theres No Such Thing as Political Capital, 2/7/13, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-sno-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates

how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in
new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a
larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just dont know
what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, Winning wins . In
theory, and in practice, depending on Obamas handling of any particular issue,
even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals ,
But

depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many
Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who

political capital is, at

best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature
successfully quantifies or even defines it. It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a presidents
study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that

popularity, but theres no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless, says Richard Bensel, a government professor at

Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than
the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next
issue ; there is never any known amount of capital. The idea here is, if an issue comes
up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he
wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the
other actors Ornstein says. If they think hes going to win, they may change
positions to get on the winning side. Its a bandwagon effect .
Cornell University.

1ar Winners Win

Specifically true for Obama
Singer 9 - senior writer and editor for MyDD. Singer is perhaps best known for his various interviews with prominent
politicians. His interviews have included John Kerry, Walter Mondale, Bob Dole, Michael Dukakis, and George McGovern, Barack
Obama, John Edwards, and Tom Vilsack. He has also also interviewed dozens of senatorial, congressional and gubernatorial
candidates all around the country. In his writing, Singer primarily covers all aspects of campaigns and elections, from polling and
fundraising to opposition research and insider rumors
Jonathan, He has been quoted or cited in this capacity by Newsweek, The New York Times, USA Today, The Politico, and others. My
Direct Democracy, 3-3-09, http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428)
From the latest NBC News-Wall Street Journal survey: Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of
his policies, President Obama's favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10

What is amazing here is how much political

approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "

capital Obama has spent in the first six weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey
with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that, he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in

Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used

up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be
regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of
capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build
up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama,
who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of
the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point.

the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President
Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those
surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The
Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable.
On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41
percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame
the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his ambitious actions and the
Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not
to push forward on anything from universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq.

Even if they win a link, that just magnifies the steamroller effect
Green 10 professor of political science at Hofstra University
David Michael Green, 6/11/10, " The Do-Nothing 44th President ", http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Do-Nothing-44th-Presidby-David-Michael-Gree-100611-648.html

there is a continuously evolving and reciprocal relationship between presidential

boldness and achievement. In the same way that nothing breeds success like success,
nothing sets the president up for achieving his or her next goal better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This
is absolutely a matter of perception , and you can see it best in the way that Congress and especially the
Washington press corps fawn over bold and intimidating presidents like Reagan and George W. Bush.
The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the psychology of power all too well. They knew that by
simultaneously creating a steamroller effect and feigning a clubby atmosphere for
Congress and the press, they could leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to
preserve their dignities. By jumping on board the freight train, they could be given the
illusion of being next to power , of being part of the winning team. And so, with virtually the
Moreover,

sole exception of the now retired Helen Thomas, this is precisely what they did.

Winners win
Rottinghaus 12 Professor of Political Science @ Houston
Brandon, Obama Will Have to Bargain for His Mandate, http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/does-barack-obama-have-amandate/obama-will-have-to-bargain-for-his-mandate November 7
It would be tempting for the White House (and pundits) to suggest to the voters that the president gained a mandate at the end of a

mandates are not concretely "born" but are instead

"bargained." Political science scholars argue that mandates are perceptions of political
opportunity by presidents who use them as a bargaining tool. A president will claim a
mandate if he believes he can prospectively mobilize more voters than members of Congress to support his policy views .
Historically, claiming a mandate is the equivalent of putting a major policy
change on the national agenda . In general, presidents claim mandates to attempt to use that language and
hard won victory. Yet, the truth is that

positioning to pressure Congress. For the 2012 election to be a "mandate" in this way, the president must claim not only that the
people back him but also what specific policies they are suggested to support. The president's speech on election night only

It remains to be seen in the

coming days whether or not the White House suggests a mandate for a specific
policy or initiative which they can use to bargain with Congress. Even if a mandate is
vaguely hinted that his healthcare initiative was proving successful and popular.

claimed, Congress has to agree with the White House about the veracity of the claim. If Congress rejects the president's claims of
a mandateor, as House Speaker John Boehner did in a statement after the president's re-election, assert that the American
people re-elected a Republican Congress, toothen the Republicans in the House and Senate are poised to discredit any claim of
an Obama mandate and balk at negotiations over new Obama policy initiates or solutions to immediate issues involving automatic
tax and spending increases to take place at the first of the year. It is not clear that either side has an advantage in these
negotiations, considering the dynamic with either the present or future Congress. Imminent scholar of democracy Robert Dahl
wrote that "no elected leader is uniquely privileged to say what an election means." Clearly the president's

victory

signals faith in him and his efforts to handle the nation's fragile economy and delicate foreign policy. Voters
clearly trusted his vision for the future, even if only slightly more than Mitt Romney's vision. Yet these outcomes do not make a

The White House must push for something tangible or the president's reelection is just an invitation to struggle for four more years.
mandate.

2ac PC No Key
Political capital not key to the agenda
-their evidence misuses the term
-ideological and partisan leanings outweigh

Dickinson 9 Professor of Political Science

Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the
supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, 5-26-2009, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics,
Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-andpresidential-power/
As for Sotomayor, from here the path toward almost certain confirmation goes as follows: the Senate Judiciary Committee is
slated to hold hearings sometime this summer (this involves both written depositions and of course open hearings), which should
lead to formal Senate approval before Congress adjourns 1for its summer recess in early August. So Sotomayor will likely take
her seat in time for the start of the new Court session on October 5. (I talk briefly about the likely politics of the nomination
process below). What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power.

Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of
measuring a presidents influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in
brief, they often center on the creation of legislative box scores designed to
measure how many times a presidents preferred piece of legislation, or
nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how
many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the
presidents preferences? How often is a presidents policy position supported by roll call outcomes?

These measures,

however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power they are a better indicator of
congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or
legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although
journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative endgame to
gauge presidential influence will the President swing enough votes to get his
preferred legislation enacted? this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence
of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors a member of
Congress ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her
constituency, whether shes up for reelection or not we can usually predict
how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the
president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a presidents veto power for the moment.) Despite the
much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during
the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes dont depend on
presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which
presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose.

presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting not armtwisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to
That is,

the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks
ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have
almost nothing to do with Obamas lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the
decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

1ar PC No Key
Political capital isnt key to the agenda voter preferences are resilient and
unrelated to presidential pushes
Dickinson 11 Professor of Political Science
Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the
supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, 3-21-2011, Friedman Weighs In On the Passionless President But Is He
Right?, http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2011/03/21/friedman-weighs-in-on-the-passive-president-but-is-he-right/
Friedmans complaint regarding Obamas passive leadership approach is not original I noted in my previous posts that it has

the
idea that presidents can sell their policy to Congress by leveraging public
opinion is one that has little-to-no empirical support among political
scientists. Its not for lack of trying: a number of scholars have sought to establish a link
between a presidents public standing and their effectiveness in getting legislation
through Congress. More than three decades ago Sam Kernell, in his book Going Public, made the most cogent
become a recurring leitmotif among pundits, particularly those, like Friedman, who write generally from the Left. However,

theoretical case for the idea that presidents can rally public opinion on behalf of their legislative program. Alas, Kernell rested
much of his argument on Ronald Reagans presidency particularly Reagans success in getting Congress, including a
Democratically-controlled House, to pass his 1981 package of tax and spending cuts. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns
out that Reagans success in getting that legislation passed depended as much if not more on old-fashioned horse-trading with key
members of Congress, rather than any speechmaking by the President. With hindsight, it appears that Kernell was much more
effective at documenting changes in presidents communication strategies than he was in showing that those changes had any

research has found that presidents efforts to go

public on behalf of their legislative program are only marginally successful
and then under only the most stringent conditions. Indeed, most political scientists
view the idea that presidents can go on national television to rally support for their
legislation very much outdated (something Kernell acknowledges in the latest edition of his classic text). In
impact on their legislative success. Subsequent

an era in which the media has increasingly fragmented into smaller and more opinionated news outlets (think of the change in
your lifetime from the three major evening news broadcasts to the dozens of cable news programs), presidents are more likely to

going local by targeting local newspapers

and television stations. However, the initial studies of this change in tactics suggest it too has proved to be of
distinctly limited effectiveness. As a case in point, one need only recall George W. Bushs ultimately fruitless
bypass national news media outlets altogether, and instead adopt a strategy of

effort to barnstorm through 60 cities on behalf of social security reform in 2005. In his memoirs, Bush recalls laying out his
going local strategy with Republican congressional leaders. The response? If you lead, well be behind youbut well be way
behind you. And so they were. Despite giving speeches, convening town halls, and even holding an event with my favorite
Social Security beneficiary, Mother Bushs legislation went nowhere in a Republican-controlled Congress. Upon consideration,

the going
public/local thesis presumes that presidents can affect their popular approval as
measured, for example, by Gallup polls. But as Obama is discovering, this is not the case . Many
it is easy to see why, and to identify the weaknesses in Friedmans reasoning more generally. First,

pundits were convinced that his presidency had reached a turning point when the lame-duck 111th Congress passed several pieces
of legislation shortly after the 2010 midterms. In faact, as this chart shows, after a brief bump up in approval, his ratings have
dropped down again closer to what they were prior to the midterms. As I noted in an earlier post, they arent likely to go much
higher than this, barring a significant uptick in the economy, until the 2012 presidential campaign is well underway, and voters
began evaluating him in comparison to a single Republican opponent. At that point I expect to see his approval ratings begin to
climb. (Interestingly, approval numbers for Congress have also begun to recede Ill deal with that in a separate post.) Second,

Friedman assumes those approval ratings are fungible, that is, that they can be converted into a
currency of exchange acceptable to members of Congress. From this
perspective, a popular presidency has surplus cash in the bank with which to
buy congressional support. But members of Congress dont really care what the
presidents national poll numbers are they are only interested in what their
smaller geographic-based constituency in their state or House district thinks about
the presidents stance on any particular issue. And in most cases most of the time, most of the

constituents arent paying attention, or have no strong opinion. And when

constituents are paying attention, they are as likely to take their cues from their
Representative or Senator as they are to listen to the President. Keep in mind that members
of Congress can go public as effectively with their constituents as can the president. It is small wonder, then, that political
scientist Jeff Cohen finds that presidents efforts to go local that is, to target local media outlets as a way of ramping up
support have only modest effects in terms of improving media coverage of the president, never mind raising his poll numbers. I
understand that Friedman is not a political scientist; he is an opinion columnist whose job is to stake out a position to get people
talking. But it is important, given his rather large readership, that someone call him out when his opinion appears to contradict

if passing energy and budget legislation were as simple

as touring the country giving speeches and getting in Republicans face President Obama would
already be doing that. As it stands, however, theres no reason why he should pay any
attention to what Friedman writes on this score.
what political scientists think they know. Im sure

Political capital doesnt work

Ornstein 9
Norman J. Ornstein is a resident scholar at AEI, Is Obama Too Weak in Dealing with Congress?, July 8, 2009,
http://www.aei.org/article/100731
But even in a wonderfully functional Congress, achieving policy success in an area

as difficult
as this one would be a tough and uphill battle--no matter how skillful and popular a president
may be. The same is true of health policy. Presidents can and must engage, have to step in at crucial moments and shape
outcomes, mediate disputes, and use the bully pulpit to push controversial or difficult policy decisions. But the history of
presidents and Congresses shows that trying to do more--to go over the heads of Congressional leaders,

to set a series of bottom lines and insist on them from party leaders and committee chairmen
who find it easy to resist White House pressure--rarely works unless we are neck deep, not just waist or
chest deep, in a crisis. That has always been true, but is even more so today, when majorities have to be largely one-sided and a
majority party (especially when it is the Democrats) has limited cohesion or homogeneity.

*! Asia

2ac TPP No Key

TPP wont boost US influenceChinas rise is inevitable
Kroeber 10/7/15 -- managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics and editor of China Economic Quarterly
Arthur R., What Will the TPP Mean for China?, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/07/china-tpp-trans-pacificpartnership-obama-us-trade-xi/
For the most part I concur with Barry about the scale and importance of the TPP, and the challenges it poses for China both
economically and strategically. Im not sure I agree, though, that it will do much to reduce Chinese economic

preponderance in the region. That preponderance is driven by Chinas sheer size, its continued
growth which though slower than in the past is still faster than that of most other Asian economies and its increasing
centrality in global supply chains. Moreover, China has its own strategy for increasing its influence,
through projects under the Belt and Road umbrella, which will be funded by Chinese policy
banks and the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The impact of the Belt and Road
initiative will likely be felt more immediately and concretely than the effect of the TPP, many of
whose features will phase in slowly over several years.

1ar TPP No Key

TPP fails and wont save the Pivot
Choong 10/13/15 The Straits Times
William, US and TPP: Losing balance in the rebalance, Asia One, http://news.asiaone.com/news/asian-opinions/us-and-tpp-losingbalance-rebalance
Firstly, the TPP will face much opposition in a sceptical Congress and among the increasingly crowded field of presidential candidates
for next year. Even if the TPP could somehow be ratified, the other two elements - diplomacy and

military - look wobbly. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Washington is again being
sucked into longstanding feuds in the Middle East and Afghanistan . As Mr Aaron Connelly of the Sydneybased Lowy Institute argues, dysfunction and neglect plague Washington's Asia-Pacific policy. While his
predecessor, Mrs Hillary Clinton, spent much time in Asia, Mr John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, has focused his
efforts in the Middle East and Europe. The military element of the rebalance - a plan to base 60
per cent of US Navy vessels in the Pacific - does not convince US allies and partners of
Washington's staying power. A US Congressional Budget Office report noted that the US fleet would likely fall
from 275 ships to somewhere around 208 to 251 ships, depending on annual shipbuilding budgets. More
importantly, China has also not taken the rebalance sitting down . From the onset, China viewed the TPP - with its
so-called 21st century free trade elements, such as the protection of intellectual property rights - as a device that seeks to exclude
Beijing. China also sees the TPP and the US rebalance as American attempts at pseudo-containment. Hence, China has sought

to create its own parallel universe of institutions to erode America's dominance in the AsiaPacific. Under Chinese President Xi Jinping's "Asian security concept", where Asia's future is to be decided by Asians, Beijing
has forged ahead with the One Belt, One Road initiative, the wildly successful Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Xiangshan Forum, which is seen to be the northern analogue to the annual Shangri-La
Dialogue of defence ministers in Singapore. America should not be too smug about its network of friends in
Asia. In past years, Beijing has not shied away from using economic leverage to win friends and
influence people. South Korea is a classic example. While South Korea-US ties remain strong, Americans should not be too
sanguine about Seoul's ability to stay out of China's orbit. Last November, China warned Seoul that the deployment of the Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defence system known as Thaad against North Korea would "harm China's security system". Seoul backed down.
The presence of South Korean President Park Geun Hye at China's Sept 3 military parade to commemorate the end of World War II
was seen as a visible "tilt" towards Beijing. This hit home for me at a recent lunch with an Asian diplomat. To her, South-east Asia's
wariness about China's recent bout of assertiveness is overdone. "Why are people in South-east Asia so worried about China's rise?
The people in Korea have been under China's tutelage for a long time, and they have no problems," she said. Another chink in

Uncle Sam's armour is its refusal to join the AIIB - an entity that now boasts of US friends such
as Australia, France, Germany, Israel and South Korea . Most importantly, China's massive land
reclamation in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea has cocked a snook at America's bid to
remain the security guarantor for Asia-Pacific security.

2ac Impact Defense

No Asia warinterdependence, institutions, and intervening actors
Haass, 14
Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State
Department (2001-2003), and was President George W. Bushs special envoy to Northern Ireland and Coordinator for the Future of
Afghanistan, November / December 2014, Foreign Affairs, The Unraveling http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142202/richardn-haass/the-unraveling
It would also be wrong to look at the Asia-Pacific and assume the worst. The region has been

experiencing unprecedented economic growth for decades and has managed it peacefully . Here, too,
economic interdependence acts as a brake on conflict. And there is still time for diplomacy
and creative policymaking to create institutional shock absorbers that can help reduce the risk
of confrontation stemming from surging nationalism and spiraling distrust.

1ar Impact Defense

Multiple factors make Asia war unlikely
Vannarith 10Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. PhD in Asia Pacific Studies,
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific U (Chheang, Asia Pacific Security Issues: Challenges and Adaptive Mechanism,
http://www.cicp.org.kh/download/CICP%20Policy%20brief/CICP%20Policy%20brief%20No%203.pdf)
Some people look to China for economic and strategic interests while others still stick to the US. Since, as a human nature, change is
not widely acceptable due to the high level of uncertainty. It is therefore logical to say that most of the regional leaders prefer to see
the status quo of security architecture in the Asia Pacific Region in which US is the hub of security provision. But it is
impossible to preserve the status quo since China needs to strategically outreach to the wider region in order to get necessary resources
especially energy and raw materials to maintain her economic growth in the home country. It is understandable that China needs to
have stable high economic growth of about 8 percent GDP growth per year for her own economic and political survival. Widening
development gap and employment are the two main issues facing China. Without China, the world will not enjoy peace, stability, and
development. China is the locomotive of global and regional economic development and contributes to global and regional peace and
stability. It is understandable that China is struggling to break the so-called containment strategy imposed by the US since the post
Cold War. Whether this tendency can lead to the greater strategic division is still unknown. Nevertheless, many observers agree that
whatever changes may take place, a multi-polar world and multilateralism prevail. The reasons or logics supporting multilateralism
are mainly based on the fact that no one country can really address the security issues embedded with international dimension, no one
country has the capacity to adapt and adopt to new changes alone, and it needs cooperation and coordination among the nation states
and relevant stakeholders including the private sector and civil societies. Large scale interstate war or armed conflict

is unthinkable in the region due to the high level of interdependency and democratization. It is believed that
economic interdependency can reduce conflicts and prevent war. Democracy can lead to more transparency, accountability, and
participation that can reduce collective fears and create more confidence and trust among the people in the region. In addition,

globalism and regionalism are taking the center stage of national and foreign policy of many
governments in the region except North Korea. The combination of those elements of peace is
necessary for peace and stability in the region and those elements are present and being improved in this
region.

Despite multiple flashpoints Asian war unlikely

Bitzinger and Desker 8 Senior Fellow @ International Studies Perspectives
Richard and Barry, PhD from UCLA and Senior Fellow @ International Studies Perspectives, Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Why East Asian War is Unlikely, Survival, Volume 50, Issue 6 December 2008 , pages 105 128

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic
stability. It contains some of the world's most significant flashpoints - the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan
Strait, the Siachen Glacier - where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved
border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the
Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area
of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these

potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific , if not an area of serenity and calm, is
certainly

more

stable

than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles,

particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the
region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is

unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not
fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions
between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict
any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by
Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional
relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations . And while in Asia there is no
strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and
international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast
Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) - which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace
and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian

Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and

that war in Asia - while not inconceivable -

the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests

is unlikely .

*! Economy

2ac TPP No K2 Econ

TPP not key to the economy
Freeman 5-31-15 -- President Nixons main interpreter on his historic trip to China in 1972, retired career diplomat who also
served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1993-94
Chas W., Arguments for TPP dont make sense, Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/05/30/arguments-for-tppdon-make-sense/W8WNu5IR9xkhzsqYV0pBWK/story.html
In the end, trade

agreements need to be justified in terms of their economic impact much more than
by the putative political leverage they may provide. The two operative questions are: Will the TPP improve
American competitiveness and/or create jobs in the United States? What US economic problems
does it fix? When the US Department of Agriculture modeled a version of the TPP that
eliminated all tariffs (an unlikely outcome), it found that the pact would produce zero

growth gains for the US economy . Other modeling has suggested that the partnership might
boost growth by something less than 0.2 percent. A key reason for this is that the United States
already has free trade agreements that eliminate tariffs in six of the 11 TPP negotiating countries. (The
major exception is Japan.)

1ar TPP No K2 Economy

TPPs economic benefits are tinythe additional trade partners are all small
economies
Salord 10/8/15 -- FXStreet in 2013 as an Asia News Editor.
Matias, TPP: Effects on the US economy may be limited Wells Fargo, FX Street Forex, http://www.fxstreet.com/news/forexnews/article.aspx?storyid=ec5ee89b-8245-4559-b2b1-d83200f82869
FXStreet (Crdoba) - On Monday, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement was signed. Now it has to be approved by every
country and in the US by the Congress. According to Jay Bryson and Erik Nelson, global economist and

economic analyst respectively, at Wells Fargo Bank, consider that it could have limited effects on
the US. Key Quotes: The direct economic effects on the U.S. economy from eventual ratification
of the TPP may be limited. The United States already has FTAs in place with 6 of the other 11
TPP signatories, so it is questionable how much further American trade with these countries will
be enhanced by the TPP. With the notable exception of Japan, these five other non-FTA economies are
rather small and none would be considered a major trading partner of the United States . Did the
United States really go to all the trouble of negotiating the TPP just to get a FTA with Japan?

2ac Impact Defense

Economic decline doesnt lead to warbest studies
Drezner 14
Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, World Politics 66, no. 1 The System
Worked Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, January 2014

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great Recession on
cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that
the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in
power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races , or a ratcheting
up of

great power conflict , there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase

in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy
movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The

aggregate data suggests otherwise , however.

The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a Global Peace Index annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw

The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the

same as it was in 20 07 .38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of
the financial crisis as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies
confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the
secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, the
crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion
that might have been expected.40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating
from the 2012 report is that

swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain
depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency
volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and
employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either
scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008

Given the severity,

reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great
Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive . As Carmen Reinhart
global economy as in a state of contained depression.41 The key word is contained, however.

and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global
recession since World War II and not even worse must be regarded as fortunate.42

1ar Impact Defense

No econ impact
Jervis 11 Professor of Political Science @ Columbia
Robert, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University,
December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the
more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum

a worsening of
the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism,
undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor
economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the
conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to
contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic
interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states that were more
internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if
the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become
discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders
and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by
impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that
people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this
argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis , an
optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such
a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the
solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it
will not make war thinkable .
sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be

Empirical studies show no causal relationship between economic decline and

war
Miller 1 prof of economics
Morris Miller 2001, Professor of Economics, Poverty: A Cause of War?, http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v17n1p08.htm
Library shelves are heavy with studies focused on the correlates and causes of war . Some of the
leading scholars in that field suggest that we drop the concept of causality, since it can rarely be demonstrated. Nevertheless, it
may be helpful to look at the motives of war-prone political leaders and the ways they have gained and maintained power, even to
the point of leading their nations to war. Poverty: The Prime Causal Factor? Poverty is most often named as the

prime causal factor. Therefore we approach the question by asking whether poverty is characteristic of the nations or
groups that have engaged in wars. As we shall see, poverty has never been as significant a factor as one
would imagine. Largely this is because of the traits of the poor as a group - particularly their
tendency to tolerate their suffering in silence and/or be deterred by the force of repressive
regimes. Their voicelessness and powerlessness translate into passivity. Also, because of their illiteracy
and ignorance of worldly affairs, the poor become susceptible to the messages of war-bent demagogues and often willing to
become cannon fodder. The situations conductive to war involve political repression of dissidents, tight control over media that
stir up chauvinism and ethnic prejudices, religious fervor, and sentiments of revenge. The poor succumb to leaders who have the
power to create such conditions for their own self-serving purposes. Desperately poor people in poor nations cannot

organize wars, which are exceptionally costly. The statistics speak eloquently on this point. In the last
40 years the global arms trade has been about $1500 billion, of which two-thirds were the
purchases of developing countries. That is an amount roughly equal to the foreign capital they obtained through
official development aid (ODA). Since ODA does not finance arms purchases (except insofar as money that is not spent by a

government on aid-financed roads is available for other purposes such as military procurement) financing is also required to
control the media and communicate with the populace to convince them to support the war. Large-scale armed conflict is so
expensive that governments must resort to exceptional sources, such as drug dealing, diamond smuggling, brigandry, or dealmaking with other countries. The reliance on illicit operations is well documented in a recent World Bank report that studied 47
civil wars that took place between 1960 and 1999, the main conclusion of which is that the key factor is the availability of
commodities to plunder. For greed to yield war, there must be financial opportunities. Only affluent

political leaders and elites can amass such weaponry, diverting funds to the military even when this runs
contrary to the interests of the population. In most inter-state wars the antagonists were wealthy enough to build up their
armaments and propagandize or repress to gain acceptance for their policies. Economic Crises? Some scholars have

argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as
an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik shows that this
hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American
and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political
impact of economic crisis is wrong: "The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation
and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an
outbreak of violence... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by
increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

*! Japan Relations

2ac TPP No K2 Relations

TPP doesnt improve Asian alliances
Freeman 5-31-15 -- President Nixons main interpreter on his historic trip to China in 1972, retired career diplomat who also
served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1993-94
Chas W., Arguments for TPP dont make sense, Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/05/30/arguments-for-tppdon-make-sense/W8WNu5IR9xkhzsqYV0pBWK/story.html

The White Houses efforts to portray the treaty as critical to national security simply underscores
its inability to make a case for the agreement on the basis of economic benefits . The best that can be said
for the trade agreement is that it could reduce nontariff barriers in Japan, opening opportunities to reduce the chronic US trade deficit
with that country. It would also make it easier for US companies to outsource production to Vietnam and Malaysia. But it would do
nothing to address the huge US trade deficit with China. Quite aside from this, the administrations geopolitical case

for TPP is fanciful. In the real world, there is no way that new rules for trans-Pacific trade, written
without regard to China and without Chinese participation, will somehow pivot the United States
into a lasting position of supremacy in Chinas backyard. Four basic facts explain why that is so:
First , China is now everybodys biggest trading partner, including Americas prospective partners in
TPP. Second , the Chinese market represents the major growth opportunity for all these nations.

Third , whatever their concerns about Chinas increasing military power, Asian leaders have no interest in
distancing themselves economically from China or from the supply chains that converge there .
Fourth , most economists expect Chinas economic growth will continue to be much faster than
that of the United States. Casting the partnership as a way to cut China out of the rule-making process for
trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region may appeal to American Sinophobes and protectionists. But it ignores
commercial realities on the ground in Asia. They, not the internal dynamics of US politics, will
always guide Asian nations diplomacy. Even the Obama administration seems to recognize this. After
initial silence on the subject, administration officials have begun to say that China will be free to join TPP
once negotiations have concluded, provided that China undertakes further, unspecified legal and economic reforms. All this
makes it almost surreal that the administration has staked the future of US relations with Asia on TPP
as a counter to Chinese influence in the region . The likelihood that this will succeed is
poor to nonexistent, and there is no fallback proposal should the effort fail. In the end, the administrations
current arguments for trade treaty boil down to this: We have made the conclusion of this deal a test of
our credibility as a Pacific power. If it fails, our credibility will suffer along with our geopolitical
influence. So TPP must go forward. But thats both a circular argument and a bad bet.
More importantly, its irrelevant to what ought to be the main issue: What would the TPP do for US competitiveness and growth and
how would it effect American workers and consumers? It is absurd to imagine that TPP could wrest China

soon to be the worlds largest economy from a preeminent role in Asia . The United States is far more
likely to buttress its influence in Asia by leveraging rising Chinese prosperity and working with China than by ignoring it or
attempting to bypass it. Perhaps the Obama administration understands this. Even as it tries to sell the TPP as

means of containing China, it is well along in negotiating a bilateral investment treaty with
Beijing. That makes sense. But it would be nice to hear a serious economic case for the

TPP rather than a largely frivolous geopolitical one.

2ac Relations Resilient

Relations resilient---mutual interest
Cronin et al 10 (Patrick M, Senior Advisor and the Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Daniel M
Kliman, visiting fellow, Abraham M Denmark, fellow, October, Center for a New American Security, Renewal: Revitalizing the U.S.Japan Alliance http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Renewal_CroninKlimanDenmark.pdf, jj)

Fortunately, a world absent the U.S.-Japan alliance appears increasingly remote.

Chinas growing assertiveness and North Koreas nuclear weapons and ongoing
leadership succession place the value of the alliance in sharp focus . In the final analysis,
the United States will maintain forces in Japan for U.S. national interests, and
Japan will host them for Japanese national interests.

1ar Relations Resilient

No chance of alliance collapse
Soeya, 9 (Yoshihide, Keio University Law Faculty, Asian Econ. Policy Review, 4(2), p. 294-296)
The USAJapan alliance has been an integral and indispensable component of the
US strategies toward East Asia and the world throughout the post-war years. Although the global and
regional strategic environments have shifted over the years, the basic fact that the
US strategies are never complete without Japan as an ally has not been shaken . Under
normal circumstances, no alliance is perpetual. But the USAJapan alliance has lasted for almost 60
years and has not shown any signs of dwindling or weakening. As a result, policymakers in both Washington and Tokyo have tended to take the alliance for granted,
often resulting in the mishandling of and the lack of explicit attention to the delicacy of the political management of the alliance .
The tendency on the part of the US administration has been that the lack of
appreciation of the political delicacy of the alliance management would lead to the
overexpectation of the Japanese role as a normal ally and eventually to
disappointment and frustration because of the expectation gap. For many Japanese observers,
including the author, this was the initial worry vis--vis the Obama foreign policy team because apparently the Obama
team attempted to construct a new global approach from scratch, so to speak, and without some appreciation and sympathy toward the
peculiarities of Japanese security policy, this approach would have led to the overexpectation of the Japanese role and the subsequent

Fortunately

this has not been the case

usual disappointment.
, however,
, at least so far. For instance, in her tour
of Asia in February 2009, the first foreign trip as Secretary of State, Mrs. Clinton handled the case rather well. Particularly, she
succeeded in easing Japanese concerns prevalent in the political circle as well as the general public over the possibility of Japan
passing concerning US relations with China and the North Korean problem (Clinton, 2009a,b,c,d). This was not necessarily a
creative diplomacy per se but was still a skilled diplomacy, which was possible only with a solid appreciation of the value of the
alliance for its broader regional and global policies. The decision to come to Japan before China was also tactful, with the intention to
ease Japanese concerns first and then to visit China for a serious business. Japanese domestic politics have tended to be preoccupied
with the concern of Japan passing, which is not quite relevant from a broader strategic perspective based on the USAJapan alliance
(Smith, 2008). It may sound paradoxical, but this is often the case precisely because Japanese strategy does not have an alternative to
the alliance as its foundation. This is despite the fact that recent changes in the Japanese society are remarkable including rather frank
debates on security matters where former taboos are not taboo anymore and actual improvement in Japan's defense capabilities in

Japanese
political actors have become quite diversified in terms of their policy preferences
and assertiveness, but the overall policy framework is still sustained by the
alliance with the USA and the post-war constitution (Soeya, 2008; Wilkins, 2008).
quality if not in terms of the defense budget (Hughes, 2007; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007). In this process of change,

The alliance is resilient can overcome anything

Bisley, 08 Associate Professor of IR at La Trobe University (Nick, Securing the "Anchor of Regional Stability"? The
Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International &
Strategic Affairs, April 2008, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 13-14) PDF

The US-Japan relationship stands on robust political foundations and has

overcome many of the strategic and operational problems which had bedevilled it
in the 1990s and it is one of the key pieces of Americas global strategy. It rests on
a number of pillars which include a shared set of interests, shared threat
perceptions and policy responses, and is underpinned by a set of common values
that are overtly expressed as vital to the relationship. In the words of a senior Japanese policy-maker,
the US-Japan relationship is in a mature phase.41 The quality of the relationship was personified by
the concord which existed between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi. Koizumis final trip to the United States included not
only a summit putting the rhetorical stamp on alliance transformation, it included an unprecedented presidential tour of Elvis Presleys
home, Graceland. As a metaphor for the alliance more generally, the visit could hardly be more fitting. Although the personal
relationship between the two was very important to the political and operational process of alliance enhancement, the strategic

interests it advances and the extent of the consensus about these among policy-makers is such that, providing alliance managers

the basic tenor of the current relationship will last long after these two
political leaders have left the stage.42 Some have seen the November 2007 cessation of the Maritime SDF
exercise due care,

deployment to support the Afghanistan campaign as marking either an end to this process or a deeper rupture in the relationship.
However, this overlooks the deeply-rooted character of the alliance-binding process. Rather than representing a breakdown of the USJapan relationship, the move was primarily a function of domestic politics. Indeed, once Bush has departed office, and is presumably
replaced with an administration with a little more diplomatic finesse, managing the domestic politics of the alliance will become
noticeably easier. To be clear, Fukuda is not Abe, and he will focus more directly on Japans regional interests. But his inability to gain
Diet approval of a further extension of the laws in November 2007 was a function of the LDPs disarray in the wake of Abes collapse
in popular support. However, Fukuda did manage to assuage concerns and secured re-approval of the law in early 2008. While some
feel [End Page 85] his voicing of a more Asian-centric foreign policy is a concern, it does not reveal a significant fracturing of the

an Asia-focused Japan that is firmly

ensconced in Asian institutions is not at all contrary to Americas interests and the
functional imperatives of the alliance. Indeed with some creative policy-making it
may give the alliance greater regional weight. Although that will not mean that such moves will not cause
short term diplomatic difficulties for alliance managers. The United States and Japan now have a
genuine alliance, although one distinguished by an unusual and clearly delineated division of labour, which is intended to be
alliance or the process of its strategic change. One must recognize that

the foundation of Japanese defence and security, a mechanism to stabilize a strategically complex region and a vital piece of Americas
global strategy. In both states there is a strong consensus as to its long-term value. Although, the US-Japan alliance is still quite

it is testimony to the scope of changes wrought

in the past five years or so that it is now not impossible to imagine that, over the
longer term, Japan could become an ally which carries a strategic weight similar to
that born by the United Kingdom.
different from those which America has with other states,

2ac Impact Defense Cyber

Zero impact to cyber-attacks --- overwhelming consensus of qualified authors
goes neg
Colin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and External Researcher @
the Strategic Studies Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not
Falling, U.S. Army War College Press, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

THE SKY IS NOT FALLING This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and

explain the strategic meaning of cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been So what? Today
we all do cyber, but this behavior usually has not been much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have
endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to
go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to
national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical behavior un - guided by any credible
semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists that claims fairly
convincingly to explain how to . . . But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec
ommendations offer some understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. 1. Cyber can only be an
enabler of physical effort.

Stand-alone (popularly misnamed as strategic) cyber action is inherently grossly

limited by its immateriality.

The physicality of conflict with cybers human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a

passing phase in our species strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action on land, at sea, in the air, and in orbital space, certainly is

the strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in tactical achievement, is not
promising. To date, What if . . . speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is either
possible. But

contextually too light, or, more often, contextually

unpersuasive . 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment

advanced with considerable confidence. Although societies could, of course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in

i]n the absence of physical combat, cyber war cannot lead to the
occupation of territory. It is almost inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber
war can overthrow the adversarys government and replace it with a more pliable
one. 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea war, air war, and space war are fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is
Libickis apposite words, that [

unpersuasive. It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or in the air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more

cyber warfare would be very unlikely

to harm human beings directly , let alone damage physically the machines on which
they depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical
probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all,

consequences) might seem to ren - der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most

there would be serious uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber

action, which must include the possibility of escalation into other domains of
conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weapon
anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely they would need to be
to trigger events warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from
cyber assault would hardly appeal as prospectively effective coercive moves. On
likely

balance, it is most probable that cybers strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four
geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against networked computers, is hugely

Cyber defense is difficult, but should be sufficiently effective. The structural

advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are easy to overstate.
Penetration and exploitation, or even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift almost beyond
unconvincing. 2.

the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat. Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while,
or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though
not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a smoking gun. Once one is in the realm of the catastrophic What if . . . , the world
is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that hypothesized how
unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would
likely be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a series of Heroic Assumptions.

literature of cyber scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear attack

The

stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and 1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston
Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, [t]he terrible Ifs accumulate. 52 Of course, there are dangers in the cyber
domain. Not only are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber operation.
Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space

The more sophisticatedusually meaning complexthe

code for cyber, the more certain must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program
and will be made in digital communication. What I have just outlined minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of
who assuredly err in this and that detail.

the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain of war. All human
activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially
Book One of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14
states explicitly that Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena
inseparable from the mak - ing and execution of strategies. 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an
enemys cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only
annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more
danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be avoidable at best, or bearable and
survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: [T]here is no inherent reason that
improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret
agent). Really critical information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is

Cyber defense admittedly is difficult

but so is cyber offense

networked, it should be air-gapped.

to do,
.
To quote Libicki yet again, [i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense. 56 Unlike the
geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.Soviet/Russian rivalry,

the geographical domain of

cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own design and operating
fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily. When cyber is contextually regarded properly which means first, in particular,
when it is viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planningit should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather

Landpower, sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to
be capable of accepting combat damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on.
There is no fundamental reason that less should be demanded of our cyber power .
than perfect. 57 Our

Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear dangers in the menace it could con - tain, we should
anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age
is so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded

We can
be confident that cyber defense should be able to function well enough , given the
strength of political, military, and commercial motivation for it to do so. The technical
reaction to the new science and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58

context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is
paid in convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There
is nothing new about accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security. 3. Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion
should not be overvalued. The strategic history of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know already from the science and technology of

, cyber power is not technically forgiving of user error.

Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information if
their intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to
disrupt electronic Supervisory Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to
achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there are practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and
command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated as a potential source of serious danger. It
is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is
quite another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power
of an enemy. Critically important military computer networks are, of course,
accessible neither to the inspired amateur outsider, nor to the malignant political
enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical cyber Pearl Harbor reflects both
poor history and ignorance of contemporary military common sense. Critical potential
military (and other) targets for cyber attack are extremely hard to access and influence (I
believe and certainly hope), and the technical knowledge, skills, and effort required to do
serious harm to national security is forbiddingly high. This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means
this new domain for conflict. Specifically

absolutely could not secure

near-catastrophic results. However, it is to say that such a scenario is extremely

improbable . Cyber defense is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail can one be in the making
of cyberspace, that confidencereal confidencein cyber attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular
discussion to what rather idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could
be restricted to the EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the
potential to inflict catastrophic damage would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four geographical domains of war? I believe
not. Because we have told ourselves that ours uniquely is the Information Age, we have become unduly respectful of the potency of this rather slippery
catch-all term. As usual, it is helpful to contextualize the al - legedly magical ingredient, information, by locating it properly in strategic history as just
one important element contributing to net strategic effectiveness. This mild caveat is supported usefully by recognizing the general contemporary rule that
information per se harms nothing and nobody. The electrons in cyber - ized conflict have to be interpreted and acted upon by physical forces (including
agency by physical human beings). As one might say, intelligence (alone) sinks no ship; only men and machines can sink ships! That said, there is no
doubt that if friendly cyber action can infiltrate and misinform the electronic informa - tion on which advisory weaponry and other machines depend,
considerable warfighting advantage could be gained. I do not intend to join Clausewitz in his dis - dain for intelligence, but I will argue that in strategic
affairs, intelligence usually is somewhat uncertain. 59 Detailed up-to-date intelligence literally is essential for successful cyber offense, but it can be
healthily sobering to appreciate that the strategic rewards of intelligence often are considerably exaggerated. The basic reason is not hard to recognize.
Strategic success is a complex endeavor that requires adequate perfor - mances by many necessary contributors at every level of conflict (from the
political to the tactical). When thoroughly reliable intelligence on the en - emy is in short supply, which usually is the case, the strategist finds ways to
compensate as best he or she can. The IT-led RMA of the past 2 decades was fueled in part by the prospect of a quality of military effec - tiveness that
was believed to flow from dominant battle space knowledge, to deploy a familiar con - cept. 60 While there is much to be said in praise of this idea, it
is not unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle space knowledge has been compatible with so troubled a course of events in the
2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we might have misunderstood is not the value of knowledge, or of the information from which knowledge is
quarried, or even the merit in the IT that passed information and knowledge around. Instead, we may well have failed to grasp and grip understanding of
the whole context of war and strategy for which battle space knowledge unquestionably is vital. One must say vital rather than strictly essential,
because relatively ignorant armies can and have fought and won despite their ig - norance. History requires only that ones net strategic performance is
superior to that of the enemy. One is not required to be deeply well informed about the en - emy. It is historically quite commonplace for armies to fight in
a condition of more-than-marginal reciprocal and strategic cultural ignorance. Intelligence is king in electronic warfare, but such warfare is unlikely to be
solely, or even close to solely, sovereign in war and its warfare, considered overall as they should be. 4. Why the sky will not fall. More accurately, one

the sky will not fall because of hostile action against us in cyberspace

should say that

unless
we are improb - ably careless and foolish. David J. Betz and Tim Ste vens strike the right note when they conclude that [i]f cyberspace is not quite the
hoped-for Garden of Eden, it is also not quite the pestilential swamp of the imagination of the cyber-alarmists. 61 Our understanding of cyber is high at
the technical and tactical level, but re - mains distinctly rudimentary as one ascends through operations to the more rarified altitudes of strategy and

Nonetheless, our scientific, technological, and tactical knowledge and

understanding clearly indicates that the sky is not falling and is unlikely to fall in the
future as a result of hostile cyber action. This analysis has weighed the more technical
and tactical literature on cyber and concludes, not simply on balance , that cyber
alarmism has little basis save in the imagination of the alarmists. There is military and civil peril in the hostile use of cyber, which is
policy.

why we must take cyber security seriously, even to the point of buying redundant capabilities for a range of command and control systems. 62 So
seriously should we regard cyber danger that it is only prudent to as - sume that we will be the target for hostile cyber action in future conflicts, and that
some of that action will promote disruption and uncertainty in the damage it will cause. That granted, this analysis recommends strongly that the U.S.
Army, and indeed the whole of the U.S. Government, should strive to comprehend cyber in context. Approached in isolation as a new technol - ogy, it is
not unduly hard to be over impressed with its potential both for good and harm. But if we see networked computing as just the latest RMA in an episodic
succession of revolutionary changes in the way information is packaged and communicated, the computer-led IT revolution is set where it belongs, in
historical context. In modern strategic history, there has been only one truly game-changing basket of tech - nologies, those pertaining to the creation and
deliv - ery of nuclear weapons. Everything else has altered the tools with which conflict has been supported and waged, but has not changed the game.
The nuclear revolution alone raised still-unanswered questions about the viability of interstate armed conflict. How - ever, it would be accurate to claim
that since 1945, methods have been found to pursue fairly traditional political ends in ways that accommodate nonuse of nuclear means, notwithstanding
the permanent pres - ence of those means. The light cast by general strategic theory reveals what requires revealing strategically about networked
computers. Once one sheds some of the sheer wonder at the seeming miracle of cybers ubiquity, instanta - neity, and (near) anonymity, one realizes that
cyber is just another operational domain, though certainly one very different from the others in its nonphysi - cality in direct agency. Having placed cyber
where it belongs, as a domain of war, next it is essential to recognize that its nonphysicality compels that cyber should be treated as an enabler of joint

There are standalone possibilities for cyber action, but they are not convincing as attractive
options either for or in opposition to a great power, let alone a superpower. No
matter how intriguing the scenario design for cyber war strictly or for cyber
warfare, the logic of grand and military strategy and a common sense fueled by
understanding of the course of strategic history, require one so to contextualize
cyber war that its independence is seen as too close to absurd to merit much
concern.
action, rather than as an agent of military action capable of behav - ing independently for useful coercive strategic effect.

1ar Impact Defense Cyber

Cyberwar isnt an existential threat --- best studies prove
Healey 13 Jason, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, "No, Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as
Nuclear War", 3/20, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us

America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite

cybervulnerabilities are undoubtedly grave and

recent

warnings . Our

the threats we face are severe but far from comparable to

nuclear war . The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against
advanced threats (in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear
threat of the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The
single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems."

While it is true that cyber attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not
only never happened but are far more difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking
believes . The consequences from cyber threats may be similar in some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are
incredibly dissimilar. Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and

A study of the 25-year history of cyber

conflict, by the Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has shown a similar dynamic where the impact of
disruptive cyberattacks has been consistently overestimated. Rather than theorizing about future
cause their populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality.

cyberwars or extrapolating from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far

No attacks, so far, have been

both widespread and persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of anyone
dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia,
have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss. Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can take down many
tended to have effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused.

targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined defenses has so far been out of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries
such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in a conflict with those nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats

Plutonium trumps bytes in a shooting war

policymakers should be worrying about.

. This is not all good news.
Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little significant progress. Worse, the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily

Still, experts have been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of the 70 years
since the actual Pearl Harbor . The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber espionage could
someday accumulate into an existential threat. But it doesn't seem so seem just yet ,
with only handwaving estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it doesn't
add up to an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."
more worrying.

2ac Impact Defense

Best data concludes no impact to heg
Benjamin H. Friedman et al 13, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan Rittenhouse Green,
the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of
Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Fall 2013, Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand
Strategy, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199

Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing
a more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). By
supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, Brooks et al. write, primacy reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows

There are three reasons to reject this logic :

security competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will
have difficulty stopping it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little
threat to the United States. an increasingly peaceful world. An array of research , some of which Brooks et al. cite,
indicates that factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and
security competition .2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3 A major reason
for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal
in some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a geography of peace: its maritime
and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5 Conquest also yields lower economic returns than
in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and
transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade
barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.7 Although states are slow learners, they
increasingly appreciate these trends . That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world
wars, the international system "selected against" hyper-aggressive states and
demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed
calculus of military aggression through socialization.8 managing revisionist states. Brooks et al.
caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security
competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or
glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9 These scenarios, however, are a bigger
problem for primacy than for restraint . Offensive realist security paranoia stems
from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort, and U.S.
military commitments are unlikely to comfort or deter them .10 Nonsecurity
preferences are, by definition, resistant to the security blandishments that the United
States can offer under primacy Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or
the threat of those costs to be particularly credible. The literature that Brooks et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies
actually suggests that offensive realist and prestige-oriented states will be the most
resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power. These studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to
the diffusion of power away from the United States (pp. 3940).

prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is defending nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies
have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to mobilize power domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs

the
cases where it would be most important to restrain U.S. allies are those in which
Washington's efforts at restraint would be least effective. Highly motivated actors, by definition, have
for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish interests and the stronger state has only moderately dovish interests.14 In other words,

strong hawkish interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the credibility to deter or reassure. Such credibility concerns
create perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will be defending secondary interests, which will create
domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In short,

if states are insensitive

to the factors incentivizing peace, then the United States' ability to manage global
security will be doubtful. Third-party security competition will likely ensue
anyway. costs for whom? Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little risk to the United
States. Its wealth and geography create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position
have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi

Brooks et al. argue that "China's rise puts

the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term"
(p. 38). That possibility is remote , even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional
hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia's other regional
powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth
to quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have
ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such
vast ambitions.
Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today.

1ar Impact Defense

US hegemony doesnt solve war
Drezner 13 Professor of International Politics @ Tufts
(Daniel, The Year of Living Hegemonically, Foreign Policy

staple of international relations thinking for decades has been that U.S.
hegemony is the mainstay of global order. According to this "theory of hegemonic
stability," peace and prosperity are only likely to persist when a liberal superpower
is prepared to act to keep markets open and stamp out brewing conflict. If Mead or Robert Kagan are
correct, then a United States that is both unwilling and unable to stabilize the rest
of the world really should be a source of concern. Here's the thing, though: at the
same time that commentators were bemoaning U.S. decline, the world was looking up . I suspect that
A

ThinkProgress and Britain's Spectator magazine would agree on very little in politics, but this month they both ran features pointing

2013 was "the best year in human history." Their data is

incontrovertible. If you look at human development indicators, all of the key
metrics -- infant mortality, infectious diseases, per capital income -- are trending in
the right direction. By the end of 2013, the smallest fraction of the world's
population will be living in poverty. Both traditional and human security measures
reveal the same trend. Whether it's violent crime, discrimination, civil or interstate
war, the aggregate data shows a more peaceable world . Or, as the Spectator put it: "Every day in every
out something important:

way, the world grows richer, safer and smarter." If you don't believe political partisans, then buy Angus Deaton's The Great Escape

Despite the post-2008 trend of predicting that the global order is

crumbling and the world is going to hell, the opposite is transpiring. How and why can this
be happening when American power is on the wane? Those fearful of disorder have made two
fundamental errors in judgment. First, they assume that China, Iran, and others
want to rewrite the global rules of the game. Not so. To be sure, these countries want to preserve their
and you'll discover the same message.

sovereignty and expand their sphere of influence -- and on these issues, they will clash with the United States. On the other hand,

Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran very

much want to participate in the global economy. Indeed, the reason Rouhani is trying to negotiate a
contra Mead, they will also clash with each other as well. Furthermore,

nuclear deal is to get Iran out from under the dead weight of crippling economic sanctions. And contra what everyone expected in the

emerging markets are not eager to topple the existing global order. Indeed, the recent
trade deal in Bali suggests that, if anything, they want to reinforce the existing rules of the game .
wake of the 2008 financial crisis,

No transition wars the majority of great powers that have declined have
done so peacefully
MacDonald and Parent 11Profs of Political Science @
Williams and Miami
Paul K. and Joseph M., Graceful Decline?, International Security, Spring 2k11, Volume 35, Number 4, Muse

we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To

date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment
nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article
In this article,

fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers.

We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main
arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or

international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench.

In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment
is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the
empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven
and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When
international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance
on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose
adjustments on domestic populations.
No correlation between hegemony and resolving conflicts.
Maher 10PhD Candidate in Political Science @ Brown
Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the
United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2010 Orbis, ScienceDirect
Primacy: The Ability to Influence Outcomes. The other way to think about power is the ability to realize one's own preferences or
preferred outcomes, or the ability to influence other actorsusually other states but not alwaysto do what you want them to do.
When we think of power this way, we realize that the United States vast resources alone often are not sufficient to realize its

There is no perfect correlation between the resources at one's

command and the ability to realize preferred outcomes. Perhaps no other period
of world politics in recent memory represents this discrepancy more acutely
than today. U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other state. Politically, diplomatically, and
preferred ends.

economically the United States remains in a preeminent position. While it hardly gets everything it wants, no other country can

At the same time, from Iran, to North Korea, Pakistan,

Iraq, and Afghanistan, not to mention Russia and China, the United States is
seemingly not getting its way on issues central to its interests. More states are
unafraid to challenge the United States (if only at the margins), ignore its blandishments,
or seek to decrease their reliance or dependence on American security
guarantees.
match U.S. influence in these realms.

*! Trade

AT TPP Solves Trade

Not key to trade---globalization will continue without it
McManus 15 columnist @ LA Times
November 10, Trans-Pacific Partnership debate, Anderson Independent-Mail, Americas News
The White House released the text of its new trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, last week, and like any good citizen, I tried my
best to read it. But the 12-country agreement is more than 2,700 pages long, plus annexes, and a lot of it sounds like this: The parties
shall at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this agreement, and shall make every attempt through
cooperation and consultations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution. And thats one of the lucid bits. Those members of
Congress who say theyve read the whole thing? Theyre fibbing. There are three ways a befuddled citizen can figure out what to think
about a complex deal like the TPP. The first is tribal: Listen for signals from the politicians you support and assume theyve made the
right decisions. But thats not so easy when it comes to the TPP because the agreement divides both parties. A second approach is to
listen to what interested parties say and choose sides based on where your sympathies lie. Manufacturing workers and their unions
think another free-trade deal will inevitably hurt them. Environmentalists are condemning the deal too, mostly because it doesnt crack
down on climate change. Big business is mostly in favor of the deal, although not universally so. Hollywood, Silicon Valley and
agribusiness mostly like the deal. Now for the final, labor-intensive approach: Listen to smart people who dont have a vested interest
but are trying to analyze the deal in a comprehensive way. For a start, I consulted with Joseph A. Massey, a former U.S. trade
negotiator with China and Japan who has served as an adviser to Republicans and Democrats. Massey made three points. First, he

the TPPs impact has probably been oversold. It has benefits for U.S. export
industries, but I think theyre modest, he said. Second, he said, the biggest threat to jobs in the United States
said,

isnt free-trade agreements; its domestic policy. Weve neglected our own manufacturing sector, he said. Third, he noted, the TPP
isnt only about trade. Its also about economic reform, higher labor standards and environmental protection in developing countries
such as Vietnam and Malaysia. And its a way to knit countries on the Pacific Rim into a trading system that the United States helped
design instead of one run by Asias growing power, China. Obama hasnt been subtle about pushing that geopolitical argument. If we
dont pass this agreement if America doesnt write those rules then countries like China will, he said last week. To foreign

So are we better off with or without

the TPP? If Congress ratifies it, that wont turbocharge the U.S. economy. If
Congress blocks the deal, that wont stop globalization . And like any trade agreement, it creates
policy strategists, thats a compelling pitch. To American workers, its not.

winners and losers.

*! Warming

2ac TPP Causes Warming

TPP leads to accelerated climate change
Solomon 14 Director @ Sierra Clubs Responsible Trade Program
(Ilana, Raw Deal, Scholar)
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a trade agreement being negotiated between 12 Pacific Rim countries: Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Eventually, every Pacific
Rim nation may be included. While the TPP would have significant consequences for our global climate and

the ability of governments to tackle the crisis, it has been negotiated with an astonishing lack of
transparency. After more than three years of negotiation, not a single word of draft text or U.S. government proposals has been
released to the public. In fact, the full text of the TPP may not be made available until after President Obama has signed the
agreement, leaving little room for substantive public input. Despite the lack of transparency, we do know a lot

about the TPP based on leaked documents, conversations with negotiators, and analysis of existing trade pacts. Below
is a summary of some of the provisions directly related to environmental and climate protection, and the risks of this pact. THE
EnviRonmEnT CHAPTER One of the 29 TPP chapters is dedicated to the environment. We understand that the United States Trade
Representative has put forward an ambitious conservation proposal that would ban trade in illegally harvested timber and illegally
taken wildlife, include disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing, and include actions to deter shark-finning. The fate of
the environment chapter, however, is unclear; all other TPP countries oppose elements of the U.S. proposal, including the fact that the
environment chapter would be legally enforceable. What is certain, however, is that while a strong environment chapter is critical, it is
not at all sufficient to ensure the protection of our climate and our environment. Many TPP provisions outside the
environment chapter would seriously harm the environment and our climate , as discussed below. Moreover, while
the provisions of the environment chapter may be strong on paper, similar provisions in other trade pacts that allow one trading
partner to challenge the environmental practices of another trading partner have never before been utilized. The TPP would

lead to an expansion of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports without any review and without proper
protections in place to help safeguard the American public and our global climate. In fact, if the TPP includes socalled national treatment for trade in natural gasas we understand that it will the U.S. Department of Energy
would be legally bound to automatically approve all exports of U.S. LNG to countries in the agreement,
including Japan, the worlds largest LNG importer, without any review, modifications, or delay. Large-scale LNG
exports, which the TPP would facilitate, would put more pressure to frack in the United States in order to
feed foreign markets; require significant new investment in fossil fuel infrastructure , such as pipelines and
LNG terminals, at a time when we should be investing in renewable energy; increase climate emissions; and shift the
energy markets back toward coal
exports.

due to the increase in natural gas prices that would result from significant LNG

1ar TPP Causes Warming

TPP leads to fossil fuel expansion---accelerates warming
Solomon 14 Director @ Sierra Clubs Responsible Trade Program
(Ilana, Raw Deal, Scholar)
The TPP would lead to an expansion of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports without any review and without proper protections in
place to help safeguard the American public and our global climate. In fact, if the TPP includes so-called national treatment for trade
in natural gasas we understand that it willthe U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) would be legally bound to automatically
approve all exports of U.S. LNG to countries in the agreement, including Japan, the worlds largest LNG importer, without any review,
modifications, or delay. The origins of automatic exports of U.S. LNG date back to the U.S. Natural Gas Act. As amended in 1992,
the Act stipulates that the DOE must approve permit applications to export natural gas to countries with which the United States has a
free trade agreement requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas.7 Importantly, if no free trade agreement is in place, the DOE
must conduct a careful and public analysis to determine whether exports are inconsistent with the public interest before granting a
license.8 Automatic exports of U.S. LNG are particularly dangerous in the TPP. Japan, one of the TPP countries, is the largest LNG
importer in the world, importing 4112.608 billion cubic feet of natural gas in 2011.9 And the fact that the TPP is a docking station for
additional countries to join in the future means that the TPP creates an expanding web of countries with automatic access to gas from
the United States. While language in the TPP could be drafted to protect the Department of Energys authority, our understanding is
that no such language has even been proposed. Large-scale LNG exports, which the TPP would facilitate, would threaten

our environment and climate in a number of ways , including: increased unconventional Gas Production,
including Fracking: Exporting natural gas stimulates increased gas productionmost of which will come from unconventional gas
sources, including hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. An intrusive procedure, fracking involves pumping millions of gallons of water,
sand, and chemicals underground to create tremendous pressure which forces out natural gas. Unconventional gas

production can emit large amounts of hazardous, smog-forming, and climate-altering pollutants
into our air, and is a serious threat to our water supply. Unconventional gas production operations also have
negative impacts on communities, forests, and parks. According to the expert Shale Gas Production Subcommittee of DOEs
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, faulty and inadequate regulations mean that unconventional gas production comes with a real
risk of serious environmental consequences.10 Exacerbating Climate Change: LNG itself is a carbon-

intensive fuel,11 with life-cycle emissions significantly greater than that of natural gas. The energy needed to cool, liquefy, and
store natural gas for overseas shipment makes LNG more energy- and greenhouse-gas-intensive than ordinary pipeline gas and even
some fuel oils.12 Opening our natural gas reserves to unlimited exports will therefore increase the worlds dependency on a fossil fuel
with significant climate impacts. Locking in Fossil Fuel infrastructure and methane Emissions : LNG export
requires a large new industrial infrastructure that includes a network of natural gas wells, terminals, liquefaction plants, pipelines, and
compressors that all require thorough environmental review. For example, whether exporters are expanding old pipelines or building
new ones, these construction projects can cut across private property and public land, further fragmenting landscapes and increasing
pollution. There are also environmental impacts associated with the building of natural gas export terminals, which may require the
dredging of sensitive estuaries to make room for massive LNG tankers. Expanding facilities and ship traffic will also take a toll on
coastal communities and the environment. Additionally, natural gas production and infrastructure, including wells and pipelines, have
been found to leak methane, a potent greenhouse gas that traps nearly 25 times as much heat as carbon dioxide over a 100-year
period.13 Increased exports, therefore, will also likely drive increased methane emission and exacerbate climate change. Shifting

the Domestic Gas market Toward Coal: U.S. exports of natural gas would raise demand for U.S. natural gas, causing
an increase in domestic gas prices. While the magnitude of the price increase will depend on the amount of gas exported and the
elasticity of supply, a recent report commissioned by Dow Chemical estimates that natural gas prices in the U.S. could triple by 2030
under a high-export scenario.14 Analysis also shows that the price increase in natural gas will shift the domestic gas market back
toward coal.15

Insures a rapid increase in GHG emissions

Vincent 14 -- J.D., University of San Diego School of Law,
David P., Article: The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Environmental Savior or Regulatory Carte Blanche?, Winter, 2014, Minnesota
Journal of International Law, 23 Minn. J. Int'l L. 1
While any increase in trade and production has potential environmental impacts , the TPP would particularly affect

several specific environmental areas due to the current state of socioeconomic affairs of its potential members. One
such area, anthropogenic climate change, is a widely recognized global problem . 196 According to the
International Energy Agency, trends indicate that "delaying action is a false economy" and that the opportunity cost of preventative
action today is less than twenty percent of what would be required after 2020. 197ANovember 2012 World Bank report predicts that
the world [*30] temperature will increase by as much as four degrees Celsius by 2100 if GHGs continue to rise at current rates. 198
This past century has already seen a 0.8 degrees Celsius increase, and while governments have vowed to make efforts to limit the
increase to only two degrees Celsius, the authors of the report do not believe the proposed global efforts, if enacted, will be effective
enough to meet their goal. 199 A broad consensus exists for the proposition that a global mean temperature increase greater than two
degrees Celsius will result in increasingly costly adaptation and considerable impacts that exceed the adaptive capacity of many
systems and an increasing and unacceptably high risk of large-scale irreversible effects. 200 NAFTA's members 201, Mexico,

Canada, and the United States, represent some of the worst offenders for GHG emissions. The three North American countries are
among the top fifteen countries in terms of GHG emissions; in 2009, the United States alone accounted for 18.9 percent of the world's
emissions. 202 From 1990 to 2005, GHG emissions increased at an alarming rate, with increases of 17, 26, and 37 percent in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico, respectively. 203 While emissions from Asian countries, excluding China and India, are not nearly
as large as North American countries, their emerging economies are expected to produce a very large increase in GHGs over the next
few decades. 204 [*31] Climate change is an environmental concern of the TPP because of the

increases in GHGs resulting from trade liberalization. FTAs usually result in the increase of
exports, which requires increases in production and transportation. According to one study, trade
liberalization leads to an expected increase in exports of 3.36 percent per year, which coincides
with an increase of 3.4 percent in transport emissions and 4.3 percent in output related emissions
per year. 205 Numerous econometric studies have found similarly large positive

correlations between instances of trade liberalizing and GHG emissions . 206

Considering that the TPP covers members that are separated by the Pacific Ocean, the increase in
transport related emissions could be especially significant as 33 percent of trade-related emissions
come from international transport. 207 Many countries have shown their commitment to reducing GHGs through
international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol. 208 As a trade agreement without any offsetting GHG
provisions will negatively contribute to the increasingly dire climate situation, countries that are
concerned about the environment will want to take into consideration the inevitable effects that
the TPP will have on climate change.

2ac Impact Defense

No mass extinction
Willis 10 PhD in Plant Science @ Cambridge, Professor of Biodiversity in the Department of Zoology, University of Oxford,
and an adjunct Professor in Biology at the University of Bergen. She holds the Tasso Leventis Chair of Biodiversity at Oxford and was
founding Director, now Associate Director, of the Biodiversity Institute Oxford
(Kathy, Keith D. Bennett, Shonil A. Bhagwat& H. John B. Birks, 4 C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past?,
Systematics and Biodiversity, 8.1)

The most recent climate models and fossil evidence for the early Eocene Climatic Optimum (5351
million years ago) indicate that during this time interval atmospheric CO2 would
have exceeded 1200ppmv and tropical temperatures were between 510 C
warmer than modern values (Zachos et al., 2008). There is also evidence for relatively rapid
intervals of extreme global warmth and massive carbon addition when global
temperatures increased by 5 C in less than 10 000 years (Zachos et al., 2001). So what was
the response of biota to these climate extremes and do we see the large-scale
extinctions (especially in the Neotropics) predicted by some of the most recent models
associated with future climate changes (Huntingford et al., 2008)? In fact the fossil record for the
early Eocene Climatic Optimum

demonstrates the very opposite.

All the evidence from low-latitude records indicates

at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals
of time in the Neotropics(Jaramillo et al., 2006). It was also a time when the tropical forest biome
was the most extensive in Earths history, extending to mid-latitudes in both the
northern and southern hemispheres and there was also no ice at the Poles and
Antarctica was covered by needle-leaved forest (Morley, 2007). There were certainly
novel ecosystems, and an increase in community turnover with a mixture of
tropical and temperate species in mid latitudes and plants persisting in areas that
are currently polar deserts. [It should be noted; however, that at the earlier PalaeoceneEocene
Thermal Maximum (PETM) at 55.8 million years ago in the US Gulf Coast, there
was a rapid vegetation response to climate change. There was major compositional turnover,
that,

palynological richness decreased, and regional extinctions occurred (Harrington & Jaramillo, 2007). Reasons for these changes are
unclear, but they may have resulted from continental drying, negative feedbacks on vegetation to changing CO2 (assuming that CO2
changed during the PETM), rapid cooling immediately after the PETM, or subtle changes in plantanimal interactions (Harrington &
Jaramillo, 2007).]

1ar Impact Defense

No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or 1%
risk args
Mendelsohn 9 - Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies
(Robert O., Yale University, June 2009, Climate Change and Economic Growth,
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings
from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate
change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable
to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC
2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20
30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of
Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al.
2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well
being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These

statements are largely alarmist and misleading . Although climate change

is a serious problem that deserves attention, societys

immediate behavior has an extremely low probability

of leading to catastrophic consequences . The science and economics of climate change is quite clear
that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences . The severe
impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation . Many
of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation . The net economic impacts from climate
change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a
century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these potential impacts will never occur
because people will adapt . It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to
be developed to thwart longrange climate risks. What is needed are longrun balanced responses.