Certificate of Candidacy, defined.

CoC, contents of.

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks
to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in
the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Gayo vs. Verceles residence requirement
In this case, we discern no irreconcilable inconsistency between Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f) of the LGC. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides in part:
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not
be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
On the other hand, Sec. 40(f) of the LGC provides that permanent residents in a foreign
country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of
the same right after the effectivity of this Code are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
The two provisions are basically the same in that they both provide that permanent
residents or immigrants to a foreign country are disqualified from running for any local
elective position. The difference lies only in the fact that Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code specifically provides for an exception to the disqualification. This does not
make the two provisions inconsistent with each other.
Tecson vs. COMELEC citizenship requirement
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino
citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

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But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not
only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
Dumpit-Michelina vs. Boado residence requirement
Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and registered voter of Ambaracao
North, Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has already acquired a new domicile in
San Julian West and is thus qualified to run for the position of mayor. She transferred her
registration as a voter of San Julian West on 24 October 2003.
Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her acquisition
of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually built a house. However,
property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an
office.[17] Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost.[18] To successfully effect a
change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements:
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.
As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC Second Division, a beach house is at most a
place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence.
Limbona vs. COMELEC
The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. It
held:
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with
domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for
almost 20 months prior to the elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly
observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of selfserving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or
her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent has been staying, sleeping and
doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there
is no independent and competent evidence that would corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar
for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar,
standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence.
We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found
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that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality warranting her disqualification
as a candidate.
CoC, purpose.
Miranda vs. Abaya
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any
person, but only an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party may be
substituted. In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court
explicitly ruled that a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy
(p.13).
The law clearly provides:
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It
is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does
not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would
catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that
a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who
filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed no
certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose
certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No
amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired for.
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and
in fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty
days before the regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the
choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the
votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly
registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and
votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the
votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Monsale vs. Nico,
83 Phil. 758 [1949])
It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the
very core of the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and
chaos. Verily, this explains why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and
denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.
Who may file.
**those who intend to run for national or local elective positions
*Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
Who cannot file.
Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

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This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon

the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.
Acts of terrorism.
Diangka vs. COMELEC
We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the conclusions reached by the
COMELEC. Factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly
supported by gathered evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence
of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same,[16] as is the case in the instant
petition.
In support of the first ground, DIANGKA argues that her disqualification was simply based
on relationship, she being the wife of the alleged terrorist; that there is no evidence that
she conspired with her husband in the perpetration of the acts of terrorism; and that
there is a violation of the rule that "the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another."[17]
Contrary to DIANGKAS claim, the COMELEC found evidence of her direct participation in
the first act of terrorism. She was on board the ambulance used to transport the ballots,
ballot boxes and other election paraphernalia intended for Precinct 2A at the Gadongan
Elementary School. Instead of proceeding directly to said place, the ambulance went to
Barangay Bagoaingud where the watchers of DIANGKAs rivals were forced off the
ambulance at gunpoint by barangay chairman Lombayan Dubar and their cohorts.
DIANGKA could not feign ignorance as to what had transpired as the COMELEC had
found, based on her own admission and the testimonies of witnesses, that DIANGKA was
a passenger in the ambulance; that she had control over the driver of the ambulance,
who upon her request, dropped her off at her house; and that the ambulance belongs to
the municipality under the control of her mayor husband. Evidently, the application of the
rule on res inter alios acta is unavailing on account of these circumstances which show
her participation or at the very least her acquiescence to the incident.
Fugitives from justice.
*Marquez vs. COMELEC
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Permanent residents abroad.

*Caasi vs. CA
Moral turpitude.
Ty-Delgado vs. HRET
Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 7 Although not every criminal
act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not.
In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People
of the Philippines,20 the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory
articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or
not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint
can be considered as further evidence of malice.21 Thus, Pichay clearly acted with
actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He committed
an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow
men, or society in general," and an act which is "contrary to justice, honesty, or good
morals."
Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Term limit.
Pamil vs. Teleron
A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for
his disqualification 2 based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there
be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service,
persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or
contractors for public works of the municipality."
Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify
for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code
provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a
valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act
of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on
holding a municipal position had not been nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted.
Where, When and how filed
RA 7166, Sec. 7. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy of any
person running for the office of President, Vice-President, Senator, Member of the House
of Representatives or any elective provincial, city or municipal official shall be filed in
five (5) legible copies with the offices of the Commission specified hereunder not
later than the day before the date legally fixed for the beginning of his
campaign period.
a. The certificate of candidacy for President, Vice-President and Senators shall
be filed with the main office of the Commission in Manila;

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b. The certificate of candidacy for the Members of the House of Representatives

shall be filed with the provincial election supervisor of the province
concerned. Those for legislative districts in the National Capital Region shall
be filed with the regional election director of said region and those for
legislative districts in cities outside the National Capital Region which
comprise one or more legislative districts shall be filed with the city election
registrar concerned;
c. The certificate of candidacy for provincial offices shall be filed with the
provincial supervisor concerned; and
d. The certificate of candidacy for city or municipal offices shall be filed with the
city or municipal election registrar concerned. Whenever practicable, the
names of registered candidates for local positions shall be printed in the election
returns: Provided, That, if a candidate has been disqualified or declared a
nuisance candidate, it shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without
delay the appropriate election officials to delete the name of said candidate as
printed in the election return.
The certificate of candidacy shall be filed by the candidate personally or by his duly
authorized representative. No certificate of candidacy shall be filed or accepted by
mail, telegram or facsimile.

Duty of COMELEC to receive CoC.

Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission,
provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission
or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the
ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of
candidacy.
Effect of Filing.
Quinto vs. COMELEC (2009)
Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a)
Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
b)
Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall
be filed on regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except
on the last day, which shall be until midnight.
Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4
and 8 of Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369.

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In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
Quinto vs. COMELEC (2010)
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55,
Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials,
or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials
vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all
the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a
definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit
of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
Petition to deny due course or cancel CoC.
Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. - It shall
be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may
hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty
days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.
Sec. 95. Prohibited contributions. - No contribution for purposes of partisan political
activity shall be made directly or indirectly by any of the following:
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a. Public or private financial institutions: Provided, however, That nothing herein

shall prevent the making of any loan to a candidate or political party by any such
public or private financial institutions legally in the business of lending money,
and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and regulations and in the
ordinary course of business;
b. Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or
exploiting any natural resources of the nation;
c. Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the
government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or
services or to perform construction or other works;
d. Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives,
exemptions, allocations or similar privileges or concessions by the government or
any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, including government-owned
or controlled corporations;
e. Natural and juridical persons who, within one year prior to the date of the
election, have been granted loans or other accommodations in excess of
P100,000 by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations;
f.

Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to

no less than P100,000.00;

g. Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; and
h. Foreigners and foreign corporations.
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution from any of the
persons or entities enumerated herein.
Sec. 96. Soliciting or receiving contributions from foreign sources. - It shall be unlawful
for any person, including a political party or public or private entity to solicit or receive,
directly or indirectly, any aid or contribution of whatever form or nature from any foreign
national, government or entity for the purposes of influencing the results of the election.
Sec. 97. Prohibited raising of funds. - It shall be unlawful for any person to hold dances,
lotteries, cockfights, games, boxing bouts, bingo, beauty contests, entertainments, or
cinematographic, theatrical or other performances for the purpose of raising funds for an
election campaign or for the support of any candidate from the commencement of the
election period up to and including election day; or for any person or organization,
whether civic or religious, directly or indirectly, to solicit and/or accept from any
candidate for public office, or from his campaign manager, agent or representative, or
any person acting in their behalf, any gift, food, transportation, contribution or donation
in cash or in kind from the commencement of the election period up to and including
election day; Provided, That normal and customary religious stipends, tithes, or
collections on Sundays and/or other designated collection days, are excluded from this
prohibition.
Sec. 261 (election offenses)
Sec. 264. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code
shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six
years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to deportation which shall be enforced
after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced
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to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon such
party after criminal action has been instituted in which their corresponding officials have
been found guilty.
In case of prisoner or prisoners illegally released from any penitentiary or jail during the
prohibited period as provided in Section 261, paragraph (n) of this Code, the director of
prisons, provincial warden, keeper of the jail or prison, or persons who are required by
law to keep said prisoner in their custody shall, if convicted by a competent court, be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period if the prisoner or
prisoners so illegally released commit any act of intimidation, terrorism of interference in
the election.
Any person found guilty of the offense of failure to register or failure to vote shall, upon
conviction, be fined one hundred pesos. In addition, he shall suffer disqualification to run
for public office in the next succeeding election following his conviction or be appointed
to a public office for a period of one year following his conviction.

Sec. 269. Preferential disposition of election offenses. - The investigation and prosecution
of cases involving violations of the election laws shall be given preference and priority by
the Commission on Elections and prosecuting officials. Their investigation shall be
commenced without delay, and shall be resolved by the investigating officer within five
days from its submission for resolution. The courts shall likewise give preference to
election offenses over all other cases, except petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Their
trial shall likewise be commenced without delay, and shall be conducted continuously
until terminated, and the case shall be decided within thirty days from its submission for
decision.
RA 6646, Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. a. A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate
under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through
duly authorized representative with the Commission by any registered candidate
for the same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
b. Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any.
c. The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving
copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised
as affirmative defenses.
d. The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the
case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of
oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together
with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing
officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such submission of
evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from
receipt thereof.
e. The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.

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f.

The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city
or municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general
public in the political subdivision concerned.

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. - The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Salcedo vs. COMELEC
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the use by respondent of the surname
Salcedo in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of
the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened
by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a
false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the candidate
from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws.[23] It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of
such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon
just any innocuous mistake.
Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondents qualifications to run
for the office of mayor. Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in
the use of the surname Salcedo, petitioner does not claim that private respondent lacks
the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run
for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. [24] Thus,
petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the misrepresentation
allegedly made by private respondent in her certificate of candidacy pertains to a
material matter.
Substitution of candidates.
Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws
or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
RA 8436, Sec. 12. Substitution of candidates. - In case of valid substitutions after the
official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be
considered votes for the substitutes.
RA 9006, Section 12. Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid substitutions after the
official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates
shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For
this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the
name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided,

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however, That if the substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision
shall not apply.
Domingo vs. Board of Canvassers
The main question, therefore, raised by petitioner is whether it was lawful for
the City Board of Canvassers for the City of Manila to add the votes garnered by
deceased Pedro Alfonso to those of his daughter, Irma Alfonso, the result of which make
Irma Alfonso one of the winning candidates for councilors of the First District of Manila.
**No ruling as to the substantive issues. What was briefly discussed was the fact of
petitioners resort to a wrong remedy.
Sinaca vs. Mula
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy is governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Under
the said provision it is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate must be of
the same political party as the original candidate and must be duly nominated as
such by the political party.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said
requirements. EMMANUEL was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS
party MATUGAS wing to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate, belongs, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance signed by MATUGAS, the
Partys provincial chairman.[10] That EMMANUEL is a bona fide member of the LAKAS party
is shown not only by the certificate of membership,[11] which is being controverted for
having been presented as new evidence for the first time before this court, but more
importantly by his certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC stating therein that
he belongs to the LAKAS party.[12]
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of
the candidates political creed or lack of political creed. [13] It is a statement of a person
seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office
mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which
he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes
being as well stated.[14]
The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the
electorate. It constituted an authorized badge, which the voter could scrutinize before
casting his ballot. Thus, with the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of candidacy
that he is affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the electorate not
as an independent candidate, but as a member of the LAKAS party. His allegation in the
certificate of candidacy as to political party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the
electorate conscious of the platform of the said political party.
Tangolino vs. HRET
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file
a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified.
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an official candidate before candidate
substitution proceeds.

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As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term candidate refers to any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by
himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be
considered a candidate.
But it must be noted that Richard's "disqualification" was due to his failure to comply
with the residency requirement and misrepresenting his residence which is a
ground for denial due course to and/or cancellation of CoC under Sec 78.
Hence, there was no valid substitution and Lucy Torres Gomez was not a bona fide
candidate for the position when she ran for office, which means she could not have been
elected.

Withdrawal of CoC.
Monsale vs. Nico
The pivotal question presented in this appeal is whether a candidate who has withdrawn
his certificate of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal
or by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the
filling of such certificate.
In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10,
1947, and requested the Commission on Election that it "be considered as though it has
never been filed at all." There is no question as to the right off a candidate to withdraw or
annul his own certificate of candidacy, there being no legal prohibition against such
withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-on days before the election, the
protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act.
Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a petition contesting the election of a
provincial or municipal officer-elect shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the
province by any candidate voted for in said election and who has presented a certificate
of candidacy." This clearly implies that a candidate voted for who has not presented a
certificate of candidacy has no right to contest the election. In other words, the herein
protestant, not being a registered candidate, has no standing before the court.
Pilar vs. COMELEC
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner asserts that he
cannot be made liable to make such SOCE because he has already withdrawn his
certificate of candidacy.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the
candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must
be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one
who withdrew his candidacy.
Multiple CoC.

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Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for
any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and
if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be
eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who was filed more than one certificate
of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be
eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Go vs. COMELEC
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for
governor of the province of Leyte.
COMELEC disqualified petitioner for filing multiple CoCs.
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be
filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed.
Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the
regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the
province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on
20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election
officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory
or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or
repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of
withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which
she filed certificates of candidacy.

Nuisance candidate.
Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu
proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate
of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of
the electorate.

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Nolasco vs. COMELEC

Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos
contention that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA
6646 and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt
that should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates
proclamation.
Pamatong vs. COMELEC
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who
could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or
are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates
the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of
the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification
of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to
divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises
are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account
the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add
into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll
body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral
process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a
senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Martinez vs HRET and Salimbangon
The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty
and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as
in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively
cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise,
potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by
filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition
to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted
and canvassed.
Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position
may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not
considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final
judgment after the elections.
Lone Candidate Law.
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF A LONE CANDIDATE FOR ANY
ELECTIVE OFFICE IN A SPECIAL ELECTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Declaration of policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide
the people with adequate and constant governance and representation in public affairs.
Towards this end, the State shall ensure that, as much as practicable, each and every
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elective position in the executive and legislative branches of government is occupied at

all times at the least of cost to government.
Sec. 2. Proclamation of a lone candidate. - Upon the expiration of the deadline for the
filing of the certificates of candidacy in a special election called to fill a vacancy in an
elective position other than for President and Vice President, when there is only one (1)
qualified candidate for such position, the lone candidate shall be proclaimed elected to
the position by proper proclaiming body of the Commission on Elections without holding
the special election upon certification by the Commission on Elections that he is the only
candidate for the office and is thereby deemed elected.
Sec. 3. Assumption of office. - In the absence of any lawful ground to deny due course or
cancel the certificate of candidacy in order to prevent such proclamation, as provided for
under Sec.s 69 and 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 also known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, the candidate referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall assume office not earlier than the scheduled election day. Certificates of candidacy
filed in violation hereof shall not be given due course. For this purpose, the Commission
shall decide petitions for disqualifications not later than election day; otherwise, such
petitions shall be deemed dismissed.
Sec. 4. Disqualification. - In addition to the disqualifications mentioned in
Sec.s 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in a special election called to fill the
vacancy in an elective office, to wit:
a) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office
or for whatever reason which he previously occupied but has caused to become vacant
due to his resignation; and
b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates
or actually causes, inflicts or produces any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage,
loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or that of
the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all
other potential candidate.
Sec. 5. Prohibited acts, election offenses and penalties. - Any act of coercion, bribery,
threat, harassment, intimidation, terrorism, or actually causing, inflicting or producing
violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to discourage any
other person or persons from filing a certificate of candidacy in order to eliminate all
other potential candidate from running in a special election shall constitute as an election
offense. Violations of this provision shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with
the provision of Sec. 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 6. Applicability. - The pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as
amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, and other
election laws which are not in conflict with the provision herein provided, shall remain in
full force and effect and are hereby adopted as parts hereof.
Sec. 7. Implementing authority. - The Commission on Elections shall, within fifteen (15)
days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the purpose of this Act.
Sec. 8. Separability clause. - If for any reason or reasons, any Sec., provis ion of this Act,
or any part thereof, or the application of such Sec., provision or portion is declared or
held unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or the remainder thereof which are not
affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

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Sec. 9. Repealing clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, in whole or in part,
particularly pertinent provisions of Republic Act Nos. 7160 and 7166, including the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are
hereby amended, repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 6, 1997.

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