1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of
"Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption,
with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.

Manila
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and
completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111709

August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,
ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES,
accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket
of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar
cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC
dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned
by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000
barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels
of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the
coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto
Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was
suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully
armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control
of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on
the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the
chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name
"Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to
sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to
PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the
disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured
the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy.
However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On
March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised
around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however,
failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines
on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991
where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored
about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another
vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the

vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew
were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the
incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April
12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched
from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accusedappellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them
to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the
crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was
fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and
were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members,

employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes
were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10,
1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed
in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.

a.
On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that
the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas.
After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and
brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some

inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1,
1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well
as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All
of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their
story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing
by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second
Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain
Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They
were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond
that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience.
On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming
that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the
morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for
nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted
to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of
employment signed by the parties.

b.
Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by
chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing
the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring

that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is
the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

c.
On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were
arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali,

adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the
"Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a
"Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He
was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The
company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including
shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international
markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of

the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to
report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard
Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew
executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or

violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was
filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I.
LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN
HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D.
No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991,
both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then
manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio
Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's
letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the
Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the
vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the
amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over
one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with

Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high

seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991.
Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore,
the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to
ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul
Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a
vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be
making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by
the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was
able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration
and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list
submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General
Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee".
The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T
Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor
William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby"
(who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did
not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's
personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in
the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared
the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name
"Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and
William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991,
Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil
purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same
procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told
that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the
company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and
was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the
transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had
four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was
asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in
Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time
with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was
scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being
billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under
the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who
later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha
Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the
vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accusedappellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is

hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in
Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law,
the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However,
considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose
the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The
accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused
can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to
remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the
amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at
the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is
paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby
ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T
Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said
corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and
severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the
amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said
amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served
his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at
the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the
pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by
and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of
Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all
the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco

uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation, they were
subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without
being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were
denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in
violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding
that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were
outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at
all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect
obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in
declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and
his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo
of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3)
the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (AntiPiracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters
and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for
trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual
conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in
fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court
erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accusedappellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O.
Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert
that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken
during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a
non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to
procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered
his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the
proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr.
Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accusedappellants do not prove any participation on his part in the commission
of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any
way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing
the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel
and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the
information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case
at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine
waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act
must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what
are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer
represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal
effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial
investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659

obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5)

can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was
not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were
done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20",
Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and
Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered
by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that
said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its
contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to
defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1,
Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact
that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is
also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil
Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that
"[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person
when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law,
it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently
and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An
examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was
unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of
rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson
vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2)
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.

(3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4)
The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966])
which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect
that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even
adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing
and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called
confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the
very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case
at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the socalled "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr.
Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United
States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case,
the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without
a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise
inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions,
there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral
certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that
indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the
crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J.
Callejo of the Court of Appeals
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers
and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified
and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and
seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the
said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the
vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San
Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to
the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on
March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao"
were on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March
2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can
be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew
of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their
leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by
the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo,
Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their
"Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said
Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three
(3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said
vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the
vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the port of
Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants'
defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare
testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the
accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial
of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284
SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three
complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants
were conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao"
which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants
agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time
without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing
their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal
effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and
clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial
court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their
companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and
venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks
or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that
on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10,
1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state
that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so
when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441
[1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult
to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not
only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his
place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a
testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an
untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses
and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth
(People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy

exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal
Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even
know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of
the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective
effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accusedappellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones
assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro,
while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the
transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the
officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on
their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accusedappellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an
objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one
another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of
Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin
Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his
brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or
seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close.
Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their
parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas.
Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by
affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a
seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and
plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo)
was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be
convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in
Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532
because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly
superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential
Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because
both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He
maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be
omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to
offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the
vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are
neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence,
excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122.
Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas.
The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who,
on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of

its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994),
reads:
ARTICLE 122.
Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted
upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall
attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d.
Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the
value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas
by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the
pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in
Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person
including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction
between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is
no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did
was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against
the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was

committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that

unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed
"M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such
transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure
of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part
of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal
law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but
under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy
in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied
with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761
[1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing
the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though
he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of
said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio
Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and
its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court
found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one
which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy
or highway robbery brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by
such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom;
or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of
the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided
in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is
proven.

The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if

there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an
accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514
[1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano,
Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does
any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly,
unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly
abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by
such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in
disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from
"M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the
hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp.
15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the
petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in
falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the
illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities,
and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their
maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and
Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accusedappellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of
their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence,
had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port
Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took
place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in
Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee"
to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in
detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated
goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with
Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the
Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm
submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port
authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration"
(for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore
(Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was
scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were
no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo
operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of
cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio
Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the
surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record)
stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross
cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he
affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master"
(Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did
not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not
issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival
at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ"
and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi
Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage

when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel
oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as
discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant
Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from
his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the
orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of
the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of
the source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same
from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated
mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer
given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He
failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase
order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative
to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert
Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the
cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off
Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did
not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with
Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued
therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national
and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the
cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00
(computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly,
the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant
Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right
mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for
transportation only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate
sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly
shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that
his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely
following the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in
performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such
order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior
Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippineoperated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said
order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities,
falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said
acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was
convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the
implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could
have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the
transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which
reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the
evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial
court in toto.
SO ORDERED.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were
charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy
and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while
armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one
another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and
Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu,
and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano
Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the duo
only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in
convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave
coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy
under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were
fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,
Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of them, later
identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the pump boat of
the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck
Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." 3
Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils.
There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the
boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and
ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the
other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its
passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded
Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to
keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan
Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could
help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.

2
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 118075

September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther
out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was
allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs
were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos 4 held by Ursal,
Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan
asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated
by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this,
Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning
them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new"
pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to
Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying

that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew
his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you." 5
Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in
from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger
caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its
prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the
water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two swam
together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by
and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or
seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or
its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by
any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided."
And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any
vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one
place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and
types of vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without authority of law,
shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it
is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims
that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the
Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the
boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used
force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant
also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact,
when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away
to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their
boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion
and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as
grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this
case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that
Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their
place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of
seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows
that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and
intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and
enlightening
Q:
Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the
seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that
happened?
A:
Yes.
Q:
Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A:
While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived
and the passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.

Q:
Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how
many were riding in that pumpboat?
A:
Four.
Q:
When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your
pumpboat, how did they do that?
A:
They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the
pumpboat (emphasis supplied).
Q:
How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A:
Only one.
Q:
What did that person do when he came aboard your
pumpboat?
A:
When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us
(emphasis supplied).
Q:
By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say
anything to you?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A:

He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).

COURT:
Q:

To whom did he aim that revolver?

A:

He aimed the revolver on me.

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

Q:
What else did he do?
A:
Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q:
What did he do with his revolver?
A:
He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion
of my left eye.
Q:
Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these
persons do?
A:
We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q:
To what place did he order you to go?
A:
To Daan Tabogon. 6
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in
Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the
accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and
Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness
Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then
struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye,
after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan
Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden
appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to
them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to
submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan
jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The
sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence
the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at
bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite
the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree

Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless

elements are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of
the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacle to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is
fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with
the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on
these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread.
To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very
subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No.
532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance
passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone
helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a
conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving
the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the
brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the
Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to
transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair.
Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they
were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the
matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not
produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact
remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal
seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while
the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from,
the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for
the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ,

tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported

conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo,
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.[8]

Petitioner,
- versus RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 168338

3.
On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons
included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense,
subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime
was committed or was being committed in their presence.[9]

Promulgated:
February 15, 2008
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

A. Precis

In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial

and so inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free
expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an
examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would
be allowed to curtail it.
Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished
freedom. We have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this
right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC,[1] Burgos v. Chief of Staff,[2] Social
Weather Stations v. COMELEC,[3] and Bayan v. Executive Secretary
Ermita.[4] When on its face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing
more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it must
be nullified.

B. The Facts

1.
The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004
national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the
administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation
allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wiretapping.[5] Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary Bunye
produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version,
and the other, a spliced, doctored or altered version, which would
suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to
manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. [6] It seems that
Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo,
but subsequently made a retraction. [7]
3
EN BANC

2.
On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph
Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic

4.
On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media
organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the
printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged wiretapped conversation
involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.
Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture
between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network,
because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to
disseminate the contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his
intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a
probe, and supposedly declared, I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a
tactical interrogation of all concerned. [10]
5.

On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: [11]

NTC
GIVES
FAIR
WARNING
TO
RADIO
AND
TELEVISION
OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND
PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS

xxx xxx xxx

Taking into consideration the countrys unusual situation, and in order not
to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC warns all radio stations
and television network owners/operators that the conditions of the
authorization and permits issued to them by Government like the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides
that said companies shall not use [their] stations for the broadcasting or
telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. Relative
thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain
personalities are in possession of alleged taped conversations which they
claim involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the
COMELEC regarding supposed violation of election laws.

These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are

products of illegal wiretapping operations.

Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly

authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes contain an
accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein, it is the
position of the [NTC] that the continuous airing or broadcast of the said
taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio
and television stations. It has been subsequently established that the

said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate

investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby
warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
companies.

In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars
on program standards to be observed by radio and television stations.
NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others,
that all radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any
broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, act or scene
or other matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to
disseminate false information or such other willful misrepresentation, or
to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition. The foregoing
directive had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89,
which, in addition thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting and television
stations from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any speech,
language or scene disseminating false information or willful
misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or
treasonable acts.

The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due
process, to apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their
accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators.

6.
On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of
the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly
assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to
information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement
which states, among others, that: [12]

NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to
information on matters of public concern. KBP & its members have
always been committed to the exercise of press freedom with high sense
of responsibility and discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.

NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a

restraint of press freedom or censorship. The NTC further denies and
does not intend to limit or restrict the interview of members of the
opposition or free expression of views.

What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be]
done responsibly.

KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the
treatment of news and public affairs programs. These include verification
of sources, non-airing of materials that would constitute inciting to
sedition and/or rebellion.

The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful

misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or commentaries.

The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and

handled responsibly giving due consideration to the process being
undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and actual content of
the same.

C. The Petition

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, praying for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal
remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.
[13]

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on

expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern,[14] petitioner specifically asked this Court:

[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents

committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the
publics rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and to
information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to
information regarding the controversial taped conversion of President
Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and
making of such issuances, and orders by respondents. [15]

Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and

questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the
arguments they raised as to the validity of the fair warning issued by
respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional
guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued
pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications
industry. [17] It was also stressed that most of the [television] and radio
stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within
the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP. [18]

D. THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD: LEGAL STANDING

To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional

challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast
media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by
respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and
a free press. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not
come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action.
Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC
that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.

It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal
standing, having failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens

the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. [19]

But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of
procedure. [20] Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing
and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public
interest,[21] in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution
to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them.

Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a
case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22] we
therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of
this petition,[23] seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of
all the civil rights, the freedom of expression. The petition raises other
issues like the extent of the right to information of the public. It is
fundamental, however, that we need not address all issues but only the
most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the
respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech
and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also gives
this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of freedom of speech
and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood
statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing
restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior
restraint, content-neutral and content-based regulations and their
constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the historical difference
in the treatment of restraints between print and broadcast media and
stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) to call attention to
the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and
broadcast media.

E. RE-EXAMINING THE LAW ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH,

OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,

or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.[24]

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle

of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands
on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties.
The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution,
copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of
Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence of republican
institutions and the complement of free speech.[26] This preferred status
of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its
recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that
binds all nations.[27]

In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of

expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. [28]
This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and
the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political
and legal, that freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly
every other form of freedom.[29] Moreover, our history shows that the
struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was,
at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the
exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is only when the people have
unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of
rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted words of Thomas
Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection

to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and
assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not
confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers
myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about
which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional
protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free
press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational
ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to
advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority.

E.1. ABSTRACTION OF FREE SPEECH

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The

protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that
are entertaining as well as instructive or informative. Specifically, in
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[41] this Court stated
that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the
broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression.

Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we

have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on
this basic freedom.[31] What is embraced under this provision was
discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, [32] in which it was held:

At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest
without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint
on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel
suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent. [33]

Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional

democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means
of assuring individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring
participation by the people in social, including political, decision-making;
and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.[34] As
early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and American
decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest
latitude for this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a
profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. [35]

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the
right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to
lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing
climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.[36] When
atrophied, the right becomes meaningless.[37] The right belongs as well
-- if not more to those who question, who do not conform, who differ.[38]
The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not
only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be
truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and
even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be
hostile to or derided by others; or though such view induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger.[39] To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us.
[40]

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of

freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.

E.2. DIFFERENTIATION: THE LIMITS & RESTRAINTS OF FREE SPEECH

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of
any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a
literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that
would abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an
absolute, [42] nor is it an unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom.

Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be
subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police
power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or
those of the community or society.[43] The difference in treatment is
expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g.,
political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech.
Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories
of speech. [44] We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction
slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as fighting words are
not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.[45]
Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech
(overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to
each category, either consciously or unconsciously. [46] A study of free
speech jurisprudencewhether here or abroadwill reveal that courts have
developed different tests as to specific types or categories of speech in
concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech
of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelous
speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile
audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial;
and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition. [47]

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated

by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency
doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection
has been established between the speech restrained and the danger
contemplated; [48] (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a
standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration
of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of
situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial
danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to
be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high. [50]

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous

tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free
speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have
generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. [51]

E.3. IN FOCUS: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as

part of the larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical
importance, though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of
information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most
powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by
which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their
aspirations and their grievances. It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to
keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the
mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses
unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:[52]

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience.

Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving
of extra protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary
rights. The productions of writers are classified as intellectual and
proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the
press or to maintain a periodical publication are liable for damages, be
they private individuals or public officials.

E.4. ANATOMY OF RESTRICTIONS: PRIOR RESTRAINT, CONTENT-NEUTRAL

AND CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935
Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These
are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment

subsequent to publication; [53] (3) freedom of access to information;

[54] and (4) freedom of circulation.[55]

Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents press statement

constitutes a form of impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of
this principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as
distinguished from content-neutral) regulations.

At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that
their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the
present challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving
prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the
governmental act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather,
the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified
by the Constitution.

restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.

[61] The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the
challenged act is assayed with.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation,

only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.[62]
Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any
particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial
scrutiny but an intermediate approachsomewhere between the mere
rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest
standard applied to content-based restrictions.[63] The test is called
intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity
of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to
promote an important or significant governmental interest that is
unrelated to the suppression of expression. The intermediate approach
has been formulated in this manner:

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it

is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73]
however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured
against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass
constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. [74]

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at
bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they
are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on
but one objecta specific content fixed as these were on the alleged taped
conversations between the President and a COMELEC official.
Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time,
place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.
E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an

impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based
on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint.
And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle
have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing
the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in which
they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which to
evaluate.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or

other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.[56] Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,
and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or
judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts
that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for
the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even
the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers,
resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are
deemed as previous restraint or censorship. [57] Any law or official that
requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be
made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy
can be had at the courts.

Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility

against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is
presumed invalid,[58] and any act that restrains speech is hobbled by
the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,
[59] it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.
Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but
determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act

constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction
has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation,
i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards;[60] or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the

constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [64]

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of

speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in
light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act
has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster,[65] with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the contentbased restraint will be struck down.[66]
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also
show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring
about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm
otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech
based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only
by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.[67] As formulated, the question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.[68]

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an
important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. [69]

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is

essential to the furtherance of that interest. [70] A restriction that is so
broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest will be invalidated. [71] The regulation, therefore,
must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose,
with the least restrictive means undertaken. [72]

Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on

the ground that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are
lesser in scope to that of print media. We next explore and test the
validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a
content-based restriction on broadcast media.

The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one
other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers,
magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video
have been subjected to regulatory schemes.

The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in
the United States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held
to have limited First Amendment protection,[75] and U.S. Courts have
excluded broadcast media from the application of the strict scrutiny
standard that they would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions.
[76] According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast
media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the
frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically
limited while print medium may be limitless]; [77] (b) its pervasiveness
as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.[78] Because
cases involving broadcast media need not follow precisely the same
approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media, nor go so far as
to demand that such regulations serve compelling government interests,
[79] they are decided on whether the governmental restriction is
narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,[80] or
the intermediate test.

As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed

a differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media.
Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will
show thatas we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill of
Rights[81] we likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of
free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as to which test
would govern content-based prior restraints.

Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the
difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied

to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media, and

narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography,
seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government
interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national security
or the electoral process.

Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is

subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present
danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without
making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.

The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first
enunciated in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[82]
wherein it was held that [a]ll forms of media, whether print or broadcast,
are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the clear and present danger rule[83]

Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which
had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. Although the
issue had become moot and academic because the owners were no
longer interested to reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of
the case and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior
courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Particularly, the
Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered in
cases involving broadcast media. Thus:[84]

xxx xxx xxx

(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the
broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The
test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear
and present danger rule, that words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570)
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions
which apply the test. More recently, the clear and present danger test
was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v.
Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend
itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply
appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica

Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and
indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more
than other forms of communications, receives the most limited
protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens,
Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be
prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener
or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are
found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities
accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low
income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines
beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce
enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The
television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a
blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves
reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to
persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons
whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to
monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and
immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has
lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio
stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the
industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not
be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio
and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are
limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since
they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos
(37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public

officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his
official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual
be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of
media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution. [Citations omitted]

It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments

found in U.S. jurisprudence to justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the
scarcity, pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but only after
categorically declaring that the test for limitations on freedom of
expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule, for all
forms of media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a close reading of
the above-quoted provisions would show that the differentiation that the
Court in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise
deemed as unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, national security,
seditious and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing or regulatory
scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast frequencies, which is
absent in print media. Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the
freedom given to broadcast media was somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media, it was not as to
what test should be applied, but the context by which requirements of
licensing, allocation of airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected
speech. [85]
In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in
Gonzales v. Katigbak,[86] that the test to determine free expression
challenges was the clear and present danger, again without
distinguishing the media.[87] Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat
of broadcast media but motion pictures. Although the issue involved
obscenity standards as applied to movies,[88] the Court concluded its
decision with the following obiter dictum that a less liberal approach
would be used to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to
motion pictures:
All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the
concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls
for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where
there is a set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of the
programs therein shown..It cannot be denied though that the State as
parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young.

More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and
dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that
the clear and present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere
to issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.[89]

This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule
has been applied to all cases that involve the broadcast media. The rule
applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when the challenged
act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech,
expression and the press. Indeed, in Osmena v. COMELEC,[90] which also
involved broadcast media, the Court refused to apply the clear and
present danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of
advertising of political advertisements because the challenged restriction

was content-neutral.[91] And in a case involving due process and equal

protection issues, the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC[92] treated a restriction imposed
on a broadcast media as a reasonable condition for the grant of the
medias franchise, without going into which test would apply.
That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print
media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes
in place over broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation
by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a British
author:

The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print
media differ in a number of respects, but have a common historical
basis. The stricter system of controls seems to have been adopted in
answer to the view that owing to their particular impact on audiences,
films, videos and broadcasting require a system of prior restraints,
whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media do not.
These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of
respects, but are also seen as possible sources of harm.[93]
Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate.
Historically, the scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a
rationale. However, cable and satellite television have enormously
increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital
technology will further increase the number of channels available. But
still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential
means of communication, since it comes into the home, and so much
time is spent watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people
and affects children in a way that the print media normally does not, that
regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has
been argued further that a significant main threat to free expressionin
terms of diversitycomes not from government, but from private
corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a reexamination
of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media
regulation. [94]

The emergence of digital technology -- which has led to the convergence

of broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry -- has
likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory model for
broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged
environment.[95] Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet
the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, [96] and the
rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the
Internet.[97] Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and
the government agencies regulating media must agree to regulate both,
regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to
justify the differential treatment. [98]

F. The Case At Bar

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on

broadcast media, let us go to its application to the case at bar. To
recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of
the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the
government having the burden of overcoming the presumed

unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies
equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as
it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the
burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the
quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case
at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not
abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and
present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of
the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are
confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of
satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in
the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is
also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version.
Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different
versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this
case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even
if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but
does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance
but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support
suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just
a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging
whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of
the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must
be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution
and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and
of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear
and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be
vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot
per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents
alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court
has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to
the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of
Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this
issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made by
respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or
circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly,
respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while
the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act

done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in

an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept
of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order
or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that
should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and press.

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on

record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a
regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio
and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the
alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute
those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings,
the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press
Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight
this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the
sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be
the subject of misinterpretation.

The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts

should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of
each case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery
constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative
freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must
be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes
and shadows of each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are
patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift
in striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for
freedom is preferred than a blow too late.

In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and

prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by
respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the
alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other
personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press
SO ORDERED.
4
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 123101

November 22, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TITING ARANAS @ TINGARDS/RONNIE, ANGELO PARACUELES,
JUAN VILLA @ JUANTOY, ELMER MANALILI, ET AL. accused.
ELMER MANALILI, accused-appellant.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City finding accusedappellant Elmer Manalili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified piracy and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify certain individuals.

he was hiding. The crew members looked for him, and when he
appeared, the pirates scolded and hit him with an armalite. He was about
3 meters away from Magalona. Magalona opened his locker but the
pirates were not able to find anything inside. When the locker was
opened, he saw that the left hand of one pirate had a tattoo with the
initials "G.V."4
The pirates took from Gervacio Uy P30,500.00 in cash and his wristwatch
worth P1,500.00. From an inventory made by the purser, the pirates
divested from the passengers P200,000.00 in cash, and P300,000.00
worth of personal belongings including radio and jewelry.5

The Information indicting appellant reads:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1992 in the seawaters of the
municipality of Ubay, Province of Bohol, Philippines, which is part of the
Philippine waters and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to gain, and by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously seize by boarding a passenger sea vessel M/V J & N Princess,
owned by one Nelson Uy and under the complement of Gervacio Uy and
Saturnino Gaudicos with 19 officers and crew members and while on
board said vessel, seized its radio and subsequently demanded and
divested them and its passengers cash in the amount of P200,000.00,
Philippine Currency and valuables and equipments worth P350,000.00,
Philippine currency or in the total amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P550,000.00), Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said
piracy, accused committed the crime of physical injuries on the person of
Ernesto Magalona, the quarter master; to the damage and prejudice of
the offended parties in the above stated total amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 123 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by PD 532.2
Accused Titing Aranas alias Tingards, Angelo Paracueles, Juan Villa alias
Juantoy, Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas remain at large. Hence,
this case proceeded only against appellant Elmer Manalili who was
arrested on January 21, 1993 in Cebu City.
When arraigned on August 23, 1993, appellant Manalili pleaded not
guilty.3 He also waived his right to pre-trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following testimonial evidence:
Prosecution witness Gervacio Ong Uy, 62, operations manager of the
cargo-passenger vessel M/V J & N Princess, testified that at 9:40 in the
evening of December 15, 1992, Tuesday, he boarded said vessel. The
vessel plies the route between Ubay, Bohol and Cebu (and vice-versa)
every other day or every Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday. It leaves the
port of Ubay, Bohol at 10:00 o clock in the evening. About twenty
minutes after departure on said date, he went down to urinate at the
lower deck. After urinating, two persons were standing behind him; one
was pointing a gun at his back and the other was holding his collar. They
ordered him to go upstairs to the third or upper deck. Arriving there, they
told him to open the radio room, and they destroyed the radio. They also
ordered that all lockers of the room be opened. They told him that they
were military men looking for firearms and shabu. He opened all lockers
except that of quartermaster Ernesto Magalona, who was not around as

After the robbery, the leader of the pirates told the quartermaster to stop
the engine of the vessel, then there was a gunshot, which was
apparently a signal for the get-away pumpboat. Before the pirates left,
they told Uys group not to go back to Ubay, but to proceed to Cebu,
otherwise the boat would be strafed. Nevertheless, they proceeded to
Talibon, Bohol in order to report the incident to the police. They arrived in
Cebu at 5:00 o clock in the morning of December 16, 1992.6
Gervacio Uy declared that he identified the two persons who initially
pointed a gun at him through pictures. The one who pointed an armalite
at him was about 56" in height, regular in built, brown complexion, with
straight hair and between 25 to 28 years old. The second man was older,
about 42 years old, 53" or 54" in height, medium built with brown
complexion and black hair; he was carrying what looked like an uzi gun.
From pictures presented by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS) when
he was investigated, he identified the two as Titing Aranas and
Paracueles, all at large. When appellant Elmer Manalili was presented
during the preliminary investigation before the municipal judge of Ubay,
he told Municipal Judge Napuli that his face was familiar among the eight
pirates. However, quartermaster Magalona and Boiser, a passenger,
identified him as one of the pirates.7
On cross-examination, Gervacio Uy said that out of the 20 pictures
presented to him for identification by the CIS, he only positively identified
Titing Aranas and Angelo Paracueles. He saw Elmer Manalili for the first
time when he was presented before Judge Napuli for investigation.8
Prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, 39, quartermaster of M/V J & N
Princess since 1991 to the present, testified that on December 15, 1992,
he was on board the said vessel which left the port of Ubay, Bohol bound
for Cebu at 10:00 o clock in the evening. He was off-duty then. At the
time of the robbery, he was on the second deck of the boat. He was lying
on his cot near the passage way leading to the upper deck when
someone shouted, "Ayaw paglihok kay duna miy pangitaon nga shabu ug
armas nga uzi," meaning, "Do not move, we are searching for shabu and
uzi gun." Then he saw their manager Gervacio Uy being escorted by two
armed men. One was armed with an armalite pointed at Uy. The other
man was also armed because something was bulging at his waist, but he
did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying. He could identify the two
armed men who escorted Uy, because he was about three to four meters
away from them and the place was well illuminated with fluorescent
lights. He identified one of the said armed men by pointing to a person
inside the court room who, when asked his name, answered that he was
Elmer Manalili. He declared that the other man carried a long firearm.
Describing the manner Uy was escorted, he said that the man holding
the armalite was also holding the collar of Uy and pushing him while
appellant followed. Uy and the two armed men eventually reached the
third deck where the armed men destroyed the radio. He came to know

that the radio was destroyed because the purser who came from the
third deck looking for him told him so. He tried to cover his face with his
malong, but ultimately a pirate saw him and struck him with his gun
hitting his right ear so he was forced to stand up and go with them to the
third deck. When he was at the third or upper deck, Uy was on his way
down to the second deck escorted by appellant. Immediately after his
locker was opened, he was instructed to return to his cot and ordered to
lie down.9
Magalona said that there were about eight (8) pirates. He could only
remember and identify the two armed men who escorted Gervacio Uy
because the movements of the pirates were so fast and coordinated. He
could remember Elmer Manalili because he was facing him and he saw
him frontally. The pirates divested the passengers of their belongings. His
wallet containing P1,000.00 was taken.10
On cross-examination, Magalona stated that when the robbers
announced a hold-up, he was lying down. They were ordered to remain
lying down, face down for less than an hour. The robbers were in pairs
stationed at the lower deck, second deck and third deck while the other
two made rounds of these decks. When the passengers were divested of
their belongings, operations manager Uy was at the third or upper deck
escorted by the two armed men, one of whom was the appellant. He was
positive that from the start, the two armed men escorted Uy from the
comfort room at the lower deck to the second deck and then the third or
upper deck where the radio room was located. They did not separate
from Uy but always followed him, and he had a good look at them when
they passed by the second deck.11
After the incident, Magalona saw the appellant at the office of the chief
of police in Ubay, Bohol and then during the investigation at the office of
the municipal judge. He also saw the appellant from pictures of suspects
shown to him at the office of the chief of police.12
Prosecution witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes, a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), Ubay, Bohol, testified that on December 15, 1992
he was a passenger of M/V J & N Princess bound for Cebu. He was asleep
when the boat left the port of Ubay, but was awakened by a gunfire.
Then he saw a pirate aiming an armalite rifle, and another one, about 16
years old, aiming his carbine rifle, at him. Another pirate got his bag, and
taken therefrom was his service revolver, a caliber .38 Smith and
Wesson, issued by the Chief of Police. The gun had twelve (12) rounds of
ammunition. After the incident, he went to the PNP in Bohol, and from
pictures that were shown to him, he identified the pirate who got his bag
as Angelo Paracueles. He did not see the appellant during the incident.13
Due to fright suffered at the time of the incident, SPO2 Reyes asked for
moral damages of P50,000.00, and actual damages of P50,000.00 for the
loss of the gun, and P288.00 for the 12 rounds of ammunition.14
Prosecution witness PO3 Saul Pino Cuyno,15 a member of the PNP, Ubay,
Bohol, testified that in the evening of December 15, 1992, he was also a
passenger of M/V J & N Princess. The pirates took from him P80.00 in
cash and his watch worth P4,000.00 The armed men mentioned by SPO2
Reyes were the same men who aimed their guns at him. From pictures
that were shown to him after the incident, he identified one of the armed
men as Angelo Paracueles.16

On the other hand, appellant Elmer Manalili denied that he was involved
in the piracy committed on board M/V J & N Princess in the evening of
December 15, 1992 in the seawaters of Ubay, Bohol inasmuch as he was
in his residence in Cebu City at that time.
Defense witness Jeffrey Dadula Perandos, 26, single, third year high
school, industrial painter, testified that he knew appellant since they
were neighbors at Cabantan St., Mabolo, Cebu City. Appellant started to
live there when he was eight (8) years old and stayed with his elder
brother Junior Manalili. He does not know appellants father because the
latter died in Camotes Island before appellant transferred to Mabolo,
Cebu City. In 1989, appellant married Cherry Mae Elimino from Lutopan,
Cebu. After their marriage, they stayed in Lutopan for a while, and
resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City in October or November 1992.17
Perandos said that he has been working as an industrial painter since he
was 15 years old. In December 1992, he was hired to paint the house of
Mr. Chua in La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. His companions were
appellant, Reynaldo Cardona, Ernesto Dadula and master painter
Nicomedes Baguio who was the head of their group. They started
painting the house of Mr. Chua sometime during the first week of
December, but he did not finish painting the house because he
transferred to another painting job at Basak, Mandaue and stopped
working with Mr. Chua about the end of January 1993.18
According to Perandos, when they started working at La Guardia, he and
Reynaldo Cardona slept at appellants house. On December 14, 1992, he,
appellant and Reynaldo Cardona started painting the house of Mr. Chua
at 8:00 o clock in the morning and stopped working at 5:00 o clock in
the afternoon. Then they proceeded to the house of appellant together
with Reynaldo Cardona and ate supper there at 8:00 o clock in the
evening. Appellants wife was not around because she was working as an
entertainer in a karaoke bar. Thereafter, they had a drinking spree, and
then slept in appellants house. The next day, December 15, 1992, they
went to work at the Chuas residence early in the morning and stopped
working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon. They proceeded to appellants
house and arrived there at 6:00 o clock in the evening. Appellants wife
was still around and they ate supper with her. She left for work at 6:30 in
the evening. Appellant was left to take care of their child. After supper,
he, Reynaldo Cardona and appellant were drinking until 10:00 o clock in
the evening. Appellant slept ahead of them at 11:00 o clock that
night.19
Perandos stated that appellant was working continuously at the Chuas
residence from the first week of December until his arrest at about 7:00
o clock in the evening of January 21, 1993. He knew of the arrest
because appellant was arrested at the side of his house. At that time,
appellant went to his house in order for them to borrow money from a
close friend, money lender Cecilia Cupta. After the arrest, he visited
appellant at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City and asked why he was
arrested. Appellant said he was only a suspect.20
On cross-examination, Perandos said that he was asked to testify by
appellants wife, Cherry Mae, and appellant himself in a letter
handcarried by Cherry Mae. In said letter, appellant also asked Reynaldo
Cardona, his neighbor, to testify for him. Appellants wife paid for his
fare.21
Defense witness Reynaldo Cupta Cardona, 21, single, elementary
graduate, painter, and a resident of 55-B Cabantan Street, Barangay

Mabolo, Cebu City, testified that appellant resided in Nivel, Lahug, Cebu
City. He knew appellant since they worked together in painting the house
of Alfonso Chua at La Guardia, Lahug, Cebu City. Aside from appellant,
his other companions were Jeffrey Perandos, Ernesto Dadula and Nicolas
Baguio. They started painting in December 1992 and finished the work in
February 1993. However, appellant was arrested on January 21, 1993 so
only four of them finished the painting job.22
Cardona stated that on December 14, 1992, he, appellant and Jeffrey
Perandos started painting the house of Mr. Chua at 7:00 o clock in the
morning, and stopped working at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon. Then
they proceeded to the house of appellant where they slept to save on
fare. They ate supper at 6:00 o clock in the evening together with
appellants wife Cherry Mae, who did not work as it was her day-off.
Appellant went to bed at past 7:00 o clock in the evening, and slept with
his child. He and Cherry Mae talked about her work, while Jeffrey
Perandos listened. They all slept at 10:00 to 11:00 o clock that night.
The following day, December 15, 1992, they went to work at Mr. Chuas
residence at 7:00 o clock in the morning. They stopped working at 5:00
o clock in the afternoon, then proceeded to appellants house. They ate
supper at 6:00 o clock in the evening with Cherry Mae as it was still her
day-off. Appellant slept ahead because he had to make his child sleep.
They conversed with Cherry Mae after they cleaned the house, and slept
at past 10:00 o clock that night. The following day, December 16, 1992,
he woke up ahead and prepared his "baon" at 5:50 in the morning.
Appellant and Jeffrey Perandos woke up at the same time. Appellant
played ball with his child. They left for work at past 6:00 o clock in the
morning, and started working at 7:00 o clock. His companions were
appellant, Jeffrey Perandos, Nicolas Baguio and Ernesto Dadula.23
On cross-examination, Cardona said that appellants wife requested him
to testify in this case, and gave him P70.00 for fare. On December 3,
1993, she gave him and Jeffrey Perandos more than P200.00.24
On re-direct examination, Cardona clarified that while they were staying
at appellants house when they were then painting the house of Mr.
Chua, they contributed money for their food.25
Defense witness Cherry Mae Manalili declared that she was appellants
wife. In December 1992, her husband was a painter. She knew Jeffrey
Perandos and Reynaldo Cardona since the time they had a painting job
together with her husband at the Chuas residence in La Guardia, Lahug,
Cebu City. At that time, her family consisting of her husband and oneyear-old child, was residing at Nivel, Lahug, Cebu City. They rented a
room and kitchen from one Nang Ason in the middle of November. She
was then working at the X-O Karaoke Bar. Her work was from 7:30 in the
evening to 2:00 o clock in the morning. In June 1993, she transferred to
Steves Karaoke Bar where she is presently employed.26
Cherry Mae said that while working with her husband at the Chuas
residence, Perandos and Cardona lived with her family at Nivel, Lahug,
Cebu City since December 7, 1992 to minimize travel expenses. They
contributed money for their food.27
She stated that on December 14, 1992, Perandos and Cardona were still
staying with them. When she left for work at 7:30 in the evening, her
husband was at home taking care of their child. On December 15, 1992,
she left for work at about 8:00 o clock in the evening. Her husband, their
son, Perandos and Cardona were left at home. She arrived home at about
1:20 in the morning after their Christmas party. It was her husband who

opened the door of their house; their child, Perandos and Cardona were
still sleeping.28
According to Cherry Mae, Perandos and Cardona stayed in their house
from December 7, 1992 to January 21, 1993. They left when her husband
was arrested. At the time of his arrest, she was in Lutopan, Toledo City as
she attended the burial of her grandmother on January 20, 1993. It was
Perandos who informed her that her husband was arrested at 7:00 o
clock in the evening of January 21, 1993 in Mabolo, Cebu City. He was in
Mabolo at that time because he wanted to borrow money.29
Appellant Elmer Manalili y Pogio, 24 years old, testified that he was a
painter by profession. He does not know the co-accused Titing Aranas,
Angelo Paracueles, Juan Villa, Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo Salas. He
denied that in the evening of December 15, 1992, he was at the wharf of
Ubay, Bohol.30
He is married to Cherry Mae Elemino who is employed as a disco karaoke
entertainer in Cebu City.1wphi1 They got married in 1989, and then
lived with his in-laws in Lutopan for about a year in 1990 before
transferring to Lahug, Cebu City.31
Appellant stated that in December 1992, they resided in Nivel, Lahug,
Cebu City. In the morning and afternoon of December 15, 1992, he was
working as a painter in the house of Mr. Chua in La Guardia, Lahug. In the
evening, he was at home with his wife and child, Reynaldo Cardona and
Jeffrey Perandos. That night, his wife left after 7:00 o clock in the
evening and attended a party given by her employer at the X-O Karaoke
Bar.32
He was arrested at 7:00 o clock in the evening of January 21, 1993, at
Cabantan Street, Mabolo, Cebu City by policemen without a warrant of
arrest. He was in Mabolo to borrow money from the spouses Cupta, who
were neighbors of Jeffrey Perandos. At that time, his wife was in Lutopan
as she attended the burial of her grandmother. After his arrest, he was
brought to Camp Cabahug, Cebu City and then brought to Bohol on
January 24, 1993 and detained at Camp Dagohoy in Tagbilaran City until
September 10, 1993. He was later transferred to the Bohol Detention and
Rehabilitation Center.33
According to appellant, while he was in the municipal jail of Ubay, Bohol,
about 30 people, whom he did not know, came to see him at his prison
cell. Two of them were prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto
Magalona. It was Magalona who asked him, "Who is Elmer Manalili?" He
answered that he was the one. There were four inmates then inside the
prison cell. Uy did not talk to him, but just took a good look at him.
Magalona pointed at him as one of the pirates and said "mao mao,"
which means, "looked like" one of the pirates.34
Appellant denied that he was in the vicinity of Ubay, Bohol in the evening
of December 15, 1992. He went to Bohol for the first time when he was
brought to Tagbilaran City after he was arrested by the police in Cebu
City.35
Although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy testified that one of the
pirates who opened the locker of the quartermaster had a tattoo with the
initials "GV" on his left hand, the court found no such tatoo mark on

appellants left hand. Moreover, appellants height is 5 feet 7 and 1/2

inches.36
The trial court found that prosecution witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto
Magalona identified appellant as one of the pirates. It held that the
defense of alibi could not prevail over said positive identification.37 On
September 2, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment against appellant,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, this Court finds
accused ELMER MANALILI GUILTY of Qualified Piracy beyond reasonable
doubt and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, accused Elmer Manalili is ordered to
reimburse and pay complaining witnesses the following:
Complaining witness Gervacio Ong Uy:
1.
2.
3.
4.

P30,500.00 - representing cash taken from him by the pirates:

P1,500.00 - value of his Seiko watch;
P4,000.00 - value of his diamond ring;
P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages.

B. Complaining witness Ernesto Rodriguez Magalona:

1. P1,000.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his wallet;
2. P10,000.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his
wallet;
C. Complaining witness SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes:
1. P200.00 - cash taken from him together with his wallet;
2. P15,288.00 - value of the government issued firearm and live bullets
taken by the pirates;
3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages.
D. Complaining witness PO3 Saul Cuyno Pino:
1. P80.00 - representing cash taken from him together with his wallet;
2. P4,000.00 - value of his Seiko watch;
3. P10,000.00 - representing actual, exemplary, and moral damages.
But without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Without pronouncement as to Costs.
SO ORDERED.38

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the

testimonial evidence of both the prosecution and defense which led to
his conviction. He argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he was one of the pirates in this case.
We agree. A careful review of the records shows that about twenty
minutes after the vessel M/V J & N Princess left the port of Ubay, Bohol
bound for Cebu on December 15, 1992, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy,
the operations manager of the vessel, urinated at the lower deck. After
urinating, two persons were standing behind him; one pointed a gun at
his back, while the other held his collar. He was ordered to go upstairs
with them to the third or upper deck where the radio room was located,
and they then destroyed the radio.40 When asked whether he could
identify the two armed men who initially pointed a gun at him, Uy replied
in the affirmative, and stated that he had identified them through
pictures presented by the CIS as Titing Aranas and Angelo Paracueles.
This is reflected in the records thus:
FISCAL:
Q. You said that initially there were two persons after they pointed a gun
at you, if you can see these persons, can you still identify them?

II. THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION

OF THE EVIDENCES FOR THE DEFENSE REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF
ACCUSED ELMER MANALILI, RESULTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.39
The appeal is meritorious.

From the foregoing, prosecution witness Gervacio Uy identified the two

armed men, who initially pointed a gun at him in the comfort room at the
lower deck, and who ordered him to go with them to the radio room at
the third or upper deck, as Titing Aranas and Angelo Paracueles. On the
other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona who saw Gervacio Uy
and the two armed men as they passed by the second deck on their way
to the third deck, identified one of those two armed men as appellant
Elmer Manalili.
Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on a vital question, such as
the identity of the offender, the element of reasonable doubt is injected
and cannot be lightly disregarded.45 The identity of the offender, like the
crime itself must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.46 In the case at
bench, there is no positive identification of the appellant inasmuch as
prosecution eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona contradicted themselves on
the identity of the alleged offender.

A. Yes, I identified them thru the pictures.

Q. Could you describe to this Honorable Court the description of these
two persons?
A. The one who pointed an armalite he was about 56" in height, regular
in built, brown complexion and his age is between 25 and 28 years old.
The second suspect is older, I think about 42 years old, 53" or 54" in
height , medium built, brown complexion.
Q. How about the hair?
A. The hair is straight.
Q. How about the second?
A. Black hair and he was carrying like an uzi gun.
Q. You said a while ago that you were showed pictures, where?
A. There were pictures presented by the CIS when I was investigated.
Q. And did you identify those pictures?
A. I positively identified two, one is Titing Aranas and the other
Paracuellos, all at large.41

Appellant Elmer Manalili ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCES BOTH FOR THE PROSECUTION AND THE
DEFENSE;

because their movements were so fast and coordinated.43 He stated

that from the start the two armed men, one of whom he identified as the
appellant, escorted Uy from the comfort room at the lower deck to the
second deck and then proceeded to the third or upper deck where the
radio room was located. They did always followed Uy, and he had a good
look at them when they passed by the second deck.44

On the other hand, prosecution witness Ernesto Magalona, quartermaster

of the same vessel, testified that while he was lying on his cot at the
second deck near the passage way to the upper deck, someone shouted,
"Do not move, we are searching for shabu and uzi gun." Then he saw
their manager, Gervacio Uy, being escorted by two armed men. One was
armed with an armalite pointed at Uy; the other was also armed but he
did not see the kind of firearm he was carrying at his waist. He could
identify the two armed men who escorted Uy because he was three to
four meters away from them and the place was well illuminated with
fluorescent lights. He identified one of the armed men as appellant. He
said that the other man holding the armalite was also holding the collar
of Uy while pushing him, while appellant "followed fast." Uy and the two
armed men eventually reached the third or upper deck where the armed
men destroyed the radio as reported to him by the purser who came
down looking for him from the upper deck.42 Of the eight pirates, he
could only remember and identify the two armed men who escorted Uy,

Moreover, although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy stated that one of

the pirates who opened the locker of Ernesto Magalona had a tattoo on
his left hand with the initials "GV," the trial court did not see any tattoo
mark on the appellants left hand.47
Further, witness Uy declared that he saw appellant for the first time
during the investigation before the municipal judge of Ubay.48 He told
the municipal judge that appellants face was "familiar among the eight
seajackers," but Magalona identified appellant as one of the pirates.49
Compared with the identification made by Magalona, Uys statement that
appellants face was familiar among the pirates is characterized by
uncertainty. His identification of appellant in the trial court based on the
aforementioned statement retained its doubtful tenor.
Significantly, the passenger named Boiser who allegedly identified the
appellant as one of the pirates before the municipal judge of Ubay was
significantly not presented as a witness by the prosecution. The records
show thus:
FISCAL LIGASON:
I would like to made (sic) manifestation, Your Honor, that I did not
present Ms. Alma Casil and Melecio Boiser, they were listed, but after I
confronted them that they did not identify this accused, so that I did not
present them, because there are others who can identify.50
From the foregoing, it appears that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was one of the eight men who
committed qualified piracy in the instant case.
Appellants defense of alibi is generally considered a weak defense.
However, it assumes importance when his identification as an alleged
offender in the crime charged is inconclusive or unreliable.51 Appellant

asserted that at the time of the piracy in the seawaters of Ubay, Bohol,
he was in his residence in Cebu City, and which alibi was corroborated by
Jeffrey Perandos, Reynaldo Cardona and his wife, Cherry Mae Manalili.
Although alibi can be fabricated, it is not always false and without merit,
and when coupled with the improbabilities and uncertainties of the
prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi deserves merit.52
Besides, the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt
of the accused.53 When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.54 In every criminal
prosecution, the identity of the offender or offenders must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.55 There must be moral certainty in
an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the
crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant.56 It is our view, therefore, and we
hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was one of the pirates who committed the crime charged.
Hence, the appellant must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and appellant Elmer Manalili is hereby ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to cause the immediate release
of appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and
to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED

Forensic Chemist Police Senior

Inspector Erickson Calabocal
(PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe specimen which contained 0.173 gram of
white crystalline substanceand found the same positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165 throughan Information dated
January 3, 2008 which states:

5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198694

That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines,

the said accused, without being authorized by law to possess any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ONE SEVEN
THREE (0.173) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug.5

February 13, 2013

RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ @ MON,

Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the June 30, 2011 Decision2 and September 20, 2011
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. (unreadable part)
which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08(unreadable part)
convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez
(Ramon) of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs punished under
Section 11(3) Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque
(PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3
Zeta), who wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID)
Section of the Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a
routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process,
they heard a man shouting "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?"
Forpurportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City
of Manila (Manila City Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace,
the man, later identified as Ramon,was apprehended and asked to empty
his pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover
from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and
brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where the former markedthe item with
the latters initials, "RMG." There, Police Superintendent Ferdinand
RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante) prepared a request for laboratory
examination which, together with the specimen, was brought by PO2
Soque to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the
incident. He narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the
afternoon, whilewalking alongBalingkit Street to borrow a welding
machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing approached and
asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was
immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually introduced himself
as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) wherethe
said officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial,
he was still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2
Soquepropositioned Ramon and asked for P20,000.00 in exchange for his
release.When Ramons wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the
20,000.00 which PO2 Soquehad asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to
the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime of
possession of dangerous drugs as charged, finding all its elements
tohave
been
established
through
the
testimonies
of
the
prosecutionsdisinterested witnesses. In this relation,it alsoupheld the
legality of Ramons warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was
disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during the
time of his apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment oftwelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum and
to pay a fine of 300,000.00. Aggrieved, Ramon elevated his conviction
to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramons appeal and thereby
affirmedhis conviction. Itupheld the factual findings of the RTC which
found that the elements of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs
were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in possession of a prohibited
drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on
Ramon as an incident of alawful warrantless arrest for breach of the
peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers,

notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace)subsequent

dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain of custody of the
prohibited drug wassufficiently establishedfrom the time PO2Soque took
the sameup to its actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramons claim of extortion as his
asseverationsfailed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police officers official duties.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in
affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime of
possession of dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a persons right against unwarranted
intrusions by the government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains
revered, effects secured by government authoritiesin contraventionof the
foregoingarerendered inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any
proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution
provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
[referring to Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription
is not, however, an absolute and rigid one.7 As found in jurisprudence,
the traditional exceptions are customs searches,8 searches of moving
vehicles,9 seizure of evidence in plain view,10 consented searches,11
"stop and frisk" measures12 andsearches incidental to a lawful arrest.13
This last-mentioned exception is of particular significance to this case
and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that
is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court14 which requires that the apprehending officer must have been

spurred by probable cause to arresta person caught in flagrante delicto.

To be sure,the term probable cause has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.15 Specifically
with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.16 In this light,
the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause
necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating
Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance which provides as follows:
Sec. 844. Breaches of the Peace. No person shall make, and,
countenance, or assist in making any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance,
or breach of the peace; or assault, beat or use personal violence upon
another without just cause in any public place; or utter any slanderous,
threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibit or display any
emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device,
instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any public place, meeting or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly.1wphi1
PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or fine not
more than Two Hundred pesos (PHP 200.00)
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinancepenalizes the
following acts: (1) making, countenancing, or assisting in making any
riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; (2) assaulting,
beating or using personal violence upon another without just cause in
any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous, threatening or abusive
language or expression or exhibiting or displaying any emblem,
transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or
thing; and (4) doing any act, in any public place, meeting or procession,
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons
in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose, or disturbance or disquiet
any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly. Evidently, the
gravamen of these offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity.
Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be
established that the apprehension was effected after a reasonable
assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance is being
committed.
In this regard, PO2 Soques testimony detailed the surrounding
circumstances leading to Ramons warrantless warrant, viz:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
ASST. CITY PROS. YAP:
Q: Tell the Court, what happened when you were there on patrol? PO2
Soque:
A: While we were on routinary patrol we heard a man shouting on top of
his voice telling "Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" pointing to his
right front pocket, sir.

Q: There was a shouting, where was this man shouting, where was the
shouting came from?
A: Along the street of Balingkit, sir.
Q: How far were you from this shouting, as you said?
A: About ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Tell the Court what happened, what next follows?
A: We proceeded to the voice where it came from, then, we saw a man,
sir.
Q: Who was that man?
A: Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: Ramon Martinez Goco, sir.
Q: Who is this Goco in relation to this case?
A: He is the one that we apprehended, sir.
Q: What was he doing then when you said you responded immediately,
when you saw a man?
A: We saw him shouting on top of his voice, sir.
Q: That is why you came near him, the one who shouted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, what did you do, Mr. Witness, together with your other
cooperatives?
A: We apprehended him for bringing [sic] the silence of the serenity of
the place, sir.
Q: What time was that already at that time, the incident of shouting?
A: Past 9:00, sir.
Q: Who actually accosted Goco, the one who shouted?
A: Me, sir.
Q: Tell the Court, how many were there at that time present with Goco?
A: They scampered away when they saw the police were coming near the
place, sir, they scampered in different directions.
Q: Tell the Court what were Cepe and Zeta doing also when you
approached the accused?
A: They followed me, sir.
Q: So, tell the Court what happened when you approached accused
therein Goco?
A: We apprehended Goco for violation for alarm scandal, sir.
x x x x17
CROSS EXAMINATION:
xxxx
ATTY. AMURAO:
Q: So, just like Leveriza, Balingkit is also thickly populated? PO2 Soque:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are many people outside their houses?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And I can imagine everybody there outside was talking also?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I was very noisy, everybody talking, altogether?
A: They were talking casually.
x x x x18
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of
probable cause when the police officers conducted their warrantless
arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thicklypopulated place, with many people conversing with each other on the
street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of

the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not making or

assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace;
he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another;
and,
the
words
he
allegedly
shouted

"Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and
thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot
considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still
teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever
complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the public. On the contrary,
a disinterested member of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal)
even testified that Ramon was merely standing in front of the store of a
certain MangRomy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2
Soque, approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed and took him
away.19
In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances
could not have engendereda well-founded belief that any breach of the
peace had been committed by Ramon at the time that his warrantless
arrest was effected. All told, noprobable cause existedto justify Ramons
warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the
reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at the
moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed
of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,20 this
should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a persons liberty be
subjected to ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw enforcers, it is largely expectedof
them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation at
hand. The determination of probable cause is not a blanket-license to
withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It
demarcates the line between legitimate human conduct on the one hand,
and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be
performedwisely and cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a
reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as constitutionally
guaranteed rightslie at the fore, the duty to determine probable cause
should be (unreadable portion)
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the
warantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject
shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for
being the (unreadable portion)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and
September 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
(unreadable part) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon
Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento,

Agusan del Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt
pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine,
and nine super .38 live ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were
covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999.5
Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner
an Information6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in
Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against
private respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative
Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs
Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG);7 and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for
Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the
Ombudsman.8
6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162808

April 22, 2008

FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C.
BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE
DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT,
respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution1 of the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices - Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for
lack of probable cause the criminal complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-020109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante2 (petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin
Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano,
and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention,
illegal search and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman
Order3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.

In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner

narrated how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long
firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention,
thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock
in the afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan,
Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire
about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together
with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a
ride from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down
of the jeep but before I could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform
blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido
PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company,
Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico
Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook,
Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to
fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the release of the safety lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido
saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your
firearm," to which I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I
have no firearm," showing my waistline when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised
their arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a
person in civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to
them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told
them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they did
not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;

6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4

Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a
search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of
my jeep and asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their
long arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the
asked [sic] document;
8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without
saying anything bringing with them the firearm;
9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento
Police Station where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver
tucked on his waist, to which I asked the police officers including those
who searched my jeep to apprehend him also;
10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to
apprehend the armed civilian person so I went to the office of Police
Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the armed civilian to his office
and when already inside his office, the disarming was done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said
person by Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing
cases of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against
SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido,
PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.9
Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo
Sanoria and Percival Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002,
where he interposed the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief
of Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba
who ordered the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his
own Complaint-Affidavit;11 and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even
though he was not armed with a warrant, he searched the person of
petitioner as the latter, in plain view, was committing a violation of
Comelec Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328 by carrying a firearm in his
person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their JointAffidavit dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of
private respondent Conde, viz:
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001
where we stated among other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani"
Galvante armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on his waist;"

2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is
that the said handgun was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who
was acting as our team leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from
the jeep of Mr. Galvante after searching the same; and
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated
August 28, 2001 after we have already affixed our signatures thereon.13
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25,
2002 with both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents
Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private
respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and
criminal cases.14
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No.
IASOB-020007, finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct
but penalized them with suspension only. The IAS noted however that
private respondents were merely being "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of
the arrest in line of duty." 15
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a
Motion for Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the
Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of Arrest.16 The RTC granted the same
in an Order17 dated August 17, 2001. Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II
Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss" dated
November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who conducted the
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the
security of his property."18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pagong approved said recommendation.19
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order20 dated
January 16, 2003.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047,
Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued
in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable
cause for any of the offenses charged against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of
the complaint, it appearing from the records that the incident stemmed
from a valid warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit
of desistance by the complainant rendered the complaint even more
uncertain and subject to doubt, especially so since it merely exculpated
some but not all of the respondents. These circumstances, coupled with
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, negates any
criminal liability on the part of the respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the
above-captioned case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.21
(Emphasis supplied)

Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy

Ombudsman for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman)
approved the October 30, 2003 Resolution.22
In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the
Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion
to Dismiss of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which
declared the warrantless search conducted by private respondents
illegal,24 which are contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman
Resolution declaring the warrantless search legal.
The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the latter offered "no new evidence or errors of law which
would warrant the reversal or modification"25 of its October 30, 2003
Resolution.
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman
Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents)
the following acts of grave abuse of discretion:
I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when, in their Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public
respondents found that the incident upon which petitioner's criminal
complaint was based stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest and
dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the fact that:
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private
respondents was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any
of the instances of valid warrantless searches.
B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was
arrested and detained by the private respondents.
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when, in their Order dated January 20, 2004, public
respondents denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. 26
In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that
public respondents acted within the bounds of their discretion in
dismissing OMB-P-C-02-0109-B given that private respondents committed
no crime in searching petitioner and confiscating his firearm as the
former were merely performing their duty of enforcing the law against
illegal possession of firearms and the Comelec ban against the carrying
of firearms outside of one's residence.

committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,

thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.31 The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman
to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the
latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy
Ombudsman,32 except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of
law as when judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on
caprice, whim and despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the
Ombudsman charges private respondents with warrantless search,
arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The
conduct of a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law.
What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service
of those legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the
offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his
authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a
public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall
search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the
absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default,
without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in
his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of
conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed with a valid
warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129
and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on
his vehicle is civil,35 under Article 32, in relation to Article 221936 (6)
and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:

Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for

himself.29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed
their separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004.30

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

The petition lacks merit.

xxxx

The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine

whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

xxxx
No costs.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act
No. 6975.37
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents
a complaint for damages with the regular courts38 or an administrative
case with the PNP/DILG,39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No.
IASOB-020007, and not a criminal action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search
which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents
was therefore proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for
dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied
solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private
respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which
petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his complaint.40 Public
respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint
was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal
offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a
groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense
under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or
not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search
for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly
dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for
arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender is a public
officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and (c)
the detention is without legal grounds.41 The second element was not
alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private
respondent Conde in his Comment42 and Memorandum,43 petitioner
himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief
Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did
petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were
in any other way involved in it.44 There was, therefore, no factual or
legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against
private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General
aptly pointed out that the same is based merely on petitioner's bare
allegation that private respondents aimed their firearms at him.45 Such
bare allegation stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule
applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official function.46 The IAS itself
observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their
"enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty."47 Petitioner
expressed the same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he
accepted that private respondents may have been merely following
orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

with high powered firearms conspiring, confederating and helping one

another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep
under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda.
Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring
the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against
his will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of
his civil liberty since then up to the present.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
All the four accused pleaded "Not Guilty" when arraigned. Trial ensued
and, based on the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found
the following antecedent facts to be undisputed.
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was
drinking beer at the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay
Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores,
Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran were at the same store drinking beer.
Sayam joined the four accused at their table. Sometime later, all the
accused and the victim left the store and walked towards the direction of
the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left the store
with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid
firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.2 That
was the last time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts
of Sayam's mother and relatives, he has not been found.

7
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 116488

May 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AARON FLORES @ "RONITO", SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @
"SULPING" and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accusedappellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry
Brigade detailed at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3)
members of the local Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
under his supervision, namely, Aaron Flores alias "Ronito", Sulpecio
Silpao y Ortega alias "Sulping" and Edgar Villeran y Magbanua, were
charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The information charged as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of
Ilog, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed

It was the prosecution's contention that on that fateful evening, all four
accused hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain
him at the detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their
plot and, the prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not
released Samson Sayam. All the accused, however, vehemently denied
committing the acts charged.
The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused.
More specifically, the prosecution failed to show an apparent common
design by and among the accused to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam
against his will. Thus, the trial court proceeded to determine the
individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree of their
participation in the commission of the offense charged.
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence that Samson
Sayam was seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled
towards the direction of the detachment headquarters by accused Aaron
Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not
been seen nor heard from since then, the trial court held that the three
accused were responsible for the former's disappearance.
As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store
ahead of the three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the
disappearance of Samson Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution
witnesses specifically or categorically mentioned Tampioc as among
those who actively participated in bringing Samson Sayam by force to
their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the place of
the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment
Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive
was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos

Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly

carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was armed with an
Armalite rifle,3 Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a short
firearm.4
More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc
as one of the perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because
notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even
before September 29, 1992,5 the original complaint filed before the
Municipal Circuit Trial court of Ilog Candoni, dated October 21, 1992,
which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not
mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits
merely mentioned an "unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine
Army, assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment." At the time of the execution
of the affidavits, the witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc
was a sergeant, and that he was a commander of the detachment.
Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner in which Wennie
Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial court's mind.6
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment,
the dispositive of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron
Flores, Edgar Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined
and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and there being
no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to pay him jointly
and severally, or in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable
doubt.
The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the
convicted accused ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an
appeal, in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated
January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.7
Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant
Sulpecio Silpao raised the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY
BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING
OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAM'S
DISAPPEARANCE.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED.
On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran
interposed a joint appeal based on the sole error that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON
FLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the
trial court, we find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the
offense charged against them.
The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. The elements of the offense are:
1.

That the offender is a private individual.

2.
That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty.
3.

That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4.
That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present:
(a)

That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

(b)

That it is committed simulating public authority;

(c)
That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d)

That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.8

Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the

crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element
of the said crime is that the offender must be a private individual. In the
case at bar, accused-appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the
time the alleged crime was committed.
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the
purpose of complementing the operations of the regular force formations
in a locality.9 It was composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to
maintain peace and order in their localities, as well as to respond to
threats to national security. As such, they were provided with weapons,
and given the authority to detain or order detention of individuals.10
The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting
accused-appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the
reason that the appellants are not private individuals, but public officers.
As such, the Solicitor General submits that, under the facts alleged,
accused-appellants can only be liable for the crime of Arbitrary
Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other elements

of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed

against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who,
without legal grounds, detains a person.11 Since it is settled that
accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be
resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court
proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by accusedappellants.
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,12 it was held that in the
crime of illegal or arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual
confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. The
deprivation of liberty must be proved,13 just as the intent of the accused
to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be established by
indubitable proof.14 In the more recent case of People v. Fajardo,15 this
Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be
uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as
well as actual confinement or restriction.
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an
enclosure, or in any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty.16
A careful review of the records of the instant case shows no evidence
sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by
accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses testified that
accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the
direction of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence
that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact that
Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen
with accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained and
deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that Samson
Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to
go with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him
to the detachment headquarters.
We assayed the testimonies of the prosecution's main witnesses, namely,
Carlito Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangit's
testimony was offered to prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken
from the store and that the latter tried his best to free himself from his
abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was that he saw Samson
Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain Moleng; that
the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his
residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam
and brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went
home after he saw Samson Sayam talking to the accused.17
It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangit's testimony failed to prove
the stated purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to
the detachment headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that
Samson Sayam was pulled, dragged, or coerced to go with accusedappellants. Neither did he say that Samson Sayam was taken at
gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that Samson
Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accusedappellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit
do not conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson
Sayam being apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it
cannot be logically explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home,18
instead of doing anything to help Samson Sayam. He admitted that he
did not immediately report the incident to the authorities.19 More telling
is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being

taken to the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was

protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering
that there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most
damaging is Carlito Manlangit's statement that he did not see Samson
Sayam in the detachment headquarters with any or all of the accused.20
In fine, Carlito Manlangit's testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam
was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his liberty.
Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the prosecution.
According to him, he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have
a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in the
evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry
Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused drinking beer.
Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his
residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron
Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda
Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of
Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed
behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard
gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.21
The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of
the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate
the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of
facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or
detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores
really inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of
Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay
evidence,22 which has no probative value.23 In summary, Jerry
Manlangit's testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were
guilty of arbitrary detention.
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who
identified the four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking
inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated
argument, the accused and Samson Sayam left the store and went
towards the direction of the detachment headquarters. He said that the
accused were "holding and pulling" Samson Sayam "towards the road."
Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed by rapid
firing.24
On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier
statement that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a
heated argument. Rather, he said he did not hear them arguing as they
were leaving the store. Although Nelson Golez attested that Samson
Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging him, he did not
do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.25
Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golez's
testimony. First of all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an
argument. The mere fact that Samson Sayam was being dragged
towards the road does not constitute arbitrary detention. There is no
showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his liberty such
that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was
indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public
place, where there were people milling about, many of whom were his
friends. It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody
bothered to report the incident, if indeed it happened, to the barangay
authorities. No one else came forward to corroborate the testimony of
Nelson Golez.

The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on

material points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct
or corroborative evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez.
It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the
accused may be convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Although the findings of fact made by trial courts are
generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are substantial facts which
were overlooked but which may alter the results of the case in favor of
the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the appellate
court.26 And where it appears that the trial court erred in the
appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual
findings of the trial court may be reversed.27

unbroken chain pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the Court must acquit the

accused.36

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all

the circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused-appellants are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that
they are innocent.30 Thus:

In the recent case of People v. Comesario,37 we had occasion to rule

that:

SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a)

There is more than one circumstance;

b)
and

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the
testimonial evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality,
this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to
sustain a conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whether illegal or
arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible evidence. There was no
showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or
prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no
proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to
arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there
must be a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain
the victim by or with force, because taking coupled with intent completes
the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention.28

c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.31

The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though

circumstantial, sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accusedappellants. It cites the following circumstances:

Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have
no relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the
gunshots came from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The
witnesses who testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a
kilometer away from the center of the barangay, while the detachment
headquarters itself was also some distance from the barangay. At night,
especially in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such as
gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every direction. An
ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the
exact location where the gunshots would be coming from. That would
otherwise be attributing expertise on such matters to the prosecution
witnesses.

1.
On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening,
accused-appellants, together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc
and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store of
Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. Later,
they were seen engaged in a heated argument.
2.
Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by
accused-appellants by holding and pulling him towards the road. From
another angle, another prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on
the road arresting Samson.
3.
Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of
the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.
4.
Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the
direction of the detachment followed by rapid firing.
5.
from.29

After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard

As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not

established by clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts
were proven to be true, the combination of all these circumstances would
still not be able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our
mind, the totality of these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an

The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances
which in complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than
that of the guilt of the accused.32 It is admitted that Samson Sayam was
seen drinking with accused-appellants on that fateful night. However, the
circumstances that there was a heated argument among them, and that
the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road and
brought him towards the direction of the detachment headquarters was
not sufficiently proven by material or relevant testimony.

That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the
basis for the trial court to render judgment convicting the accusedappellants. In fact, it has no bearing in this case because it is not one of
the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one
relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that accused-appellants were the
last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said circumstance does
not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him, then arbitrarily
detained him.33
Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was
a result of accused-appellants' alleged criminal acts and intentions is
insufficient to convict them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
required quantum of evidence.34 An uncorroborated circumstantial
evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself
is in serious doubt.35 The prosecution was not able to prove a possible
motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam.
In sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the
conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of
circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is

Accused-appellant's conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial

evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown
that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events
that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the
exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where
the evidence is purely circumstantial that there should be an even
greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution
cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction
must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused.
Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven,
a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved. In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence
relied on by the prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction
have failed to overcome the constitutional precept of the presumed
innocence of accused-appellants. Among other grounds, not only is there
a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is a
virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been
committed.
There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the
prosecution bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a
crime had been committed by accused-appellants.38 It is incumbent
upon the prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof which
leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.39 Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to
prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar
cases, this Court has often and consistently ruled that it is better to
acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one.40
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for
some lawful reason, accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED
immediately. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court,
within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time when accusedappellants are released pursuant to this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190293

March 20, 2012

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 190307

vs.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, RAUL C. PANGALANGAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,

JOEL R. BUTUYAN, EMILIO CAPULONG, FLORIN T. HILBAY, ROMEL R.
BAGARES, DEXTER DONNE B. DIZON, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL and
GILBERT T. ANDRES, suing as taxpayers and as CONCERNED Filipino
citizens, Petitioners,

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and

President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA,
Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP),
or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any
of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their
direction and control, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190294

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in his (sic) capacity as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, JR., in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, GENERAL
VICTOR IBRADO, in his capacity as Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief
of Staff, DIRECTOR JESUS VERZOSA, in his capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police, Respondents.

DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Petitioner,

vs.

x-----------------------x

EDUARDO R. ERMITA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO

GONZALES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, RONALDO
PUNO in his capacity as Secretary of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 190356

x-----------------------x

BAILENG S. MANTAWIL, DENGCO SABAN, Engr. OCTOBER CHIO, AKBAYAN

PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES WALDEN F. BELLO and ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN, THEODORE O. TE and IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ III, Petitioners,
vs.

G.R. No. 190301

NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES' LAWYERS (NUPL) SECRETARY GENERAL
NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE SATUR C.
OCAMPO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE LIZA L. MAZA,
ATTY. JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, ATTY. EPHRAIM B. CORTEZ, ATTY. JOBERT
ILARDE PAHILGA, ATTY. VOLTAIRE B. AFRICA, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR. and
ANTHONY IAN CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF
STAFF GENERAL VICTOR S. IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS A. VERZOSA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES EASTERN MINDANAO COMMAND CHIEF LIEUTENANT
GENERAL RAYMUNDO B. FERRER, Respondents.

8
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190380
CHRISTIAN MONSOD and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.
DECISION

x-----------------------x

ABAD, J.:

G.R. No. 190302

These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation

of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009
in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.

JOSEPH NELSON Q. LOYOLA, Petitioner,

vs.
HER EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ARMED
FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE (PNP), DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS VERZOSA, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, Respondents.

The Facts and the Case

The essential background facts are not in dispute. On November 23,
2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24

President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state

of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to
prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao
and secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms
against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that
province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her
report to Congress in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her
action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding
that lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao and risen against
the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the
nature, quantity, and quality of the rebels weaponry, the movement of
their heavily armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the
Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay
Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored
vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized "PNP/Police" markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of
the Presidents action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963,
lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R.
190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307, 190356, and 190380 brought
the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President
Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the
prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress could review it and
before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of
Maguindanaos inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its
constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government
dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that
assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,1 must be the very issue of the
case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable
for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint
houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same. The pertinent provisions of Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing
to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period
to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without any need of a call.
xxxx
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such
power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for
only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his
action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within
24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing
its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents
proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or
extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise
power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

the
law
the
the
the
the

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court

the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is
automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the
Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of

the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of

habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before
it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a
supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.2
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight
days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not
take over the operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting
Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No
indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested
during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.
Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the
President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively
small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion
was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.
In Lansang v. Garcia,3 the Court received evidence in executive session
to determine if President Marcos suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in 1971 had sufficient factual basis. In Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,4 while the Court took judicial notice of the factual bases for
President Marcos proclamation of martial law in 1972, it still held
hearings on the petitions for habeas corpus to determine the
constitutionality of the arrest and detention of the petitioners. Here,
however, the Court has not bothered to examine the evidence upon
which President Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely
because it felt no need to, the proclamation having been withdrawn
within a few days of its issuance.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that no probable cause exist
that the accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since the
prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime. But the Court
cannot use such finding as basis for striking down the Presidents
proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court did not delegate and
could not delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine the
factual basis for the presidential proclamation and suspension. Secondly,
there is no showing that the RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same
evidence that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
had in her possession when she issued the proclamation and suspension.
The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging these are.5 This is especially
true, said the Court in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
v. Secretary of Education,6 where the issues "reach constitutional
dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the courts duty to
avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
evasion." The Courts duty is to steer clear of declaring unconstitutional
the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department, given the
assumption that it carefully studied those acts and found them

consistent with the fundamental law before taking them. "To doubt is to
sustain."7
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court
has only 30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied)
More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present
actions to annul Proclamation 1959.1wphi1 When the Court did not
decide it then, it actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question
having become moot and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the
powers of the President and Congress respecting the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus as sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to
exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it.
But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the
Court to fulfill its duty without pre-empting congressional action. Section
18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in
person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension.
In turn, the Congress is required to convene without need of a call within
24 hours following the Presidents proclamation or suspension. Clearly,
the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress.
Whatever form that action takes, therefore, should give the Court
sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the
proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty
respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time
expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging
the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court
finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension. But
what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate?
Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day period
does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The
settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has
been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the
proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself
adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and
academic.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that
ordinarily would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do
not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial
review. The proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar

Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saberrattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the
ground that the same have become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
9
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

Olalia and Alay-ay were both found dead with their bodies riddled with
bullets on 13 November 1986. The double murders stirred considerable
public anger, given Olalias high profile as Chairman of the KMU at the
time of his death.
On 12 January 1998, private respondents Feliciana C. Olalia and Perolina
G. Alay-ay filed a letter-complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
charging petitioner Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr. (Kapunan, Jr.), petitioner
Oscar E. Legaspi (Legaspi), and other officers and men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) for
the complex crime of kidnapping with murder of Alay-ay and Olalia. The
affidavits of TSgt. Medardo Barreto (Barreto) and Eduardo E. Bueno were
annexed to the complaint, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-025.

Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 148213-17

March 13, 2009

EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, FELICIANA OLALIA, PEROLINA ALAY-AY, and THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 71, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 148243

March 13, 2009

OSCAR E. LEGASPI, Petitioner,

vs.
SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, FELICIANA C. OLALIA, PEROLINA ALAY-AY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioners face criminal charges in connection with the 1986 killing of
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor
Alay-ay. These consolidated petitions ask us to consider whether
petitioners are immune from prosecution for the Alay-ay/Olalia slayings
by reason of a general grant of amnesty issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos to rebels, insurgents and other persons who had committed
crimes in furtherance of political ends. The Court of Appeals, in its Joint
Decision1 dated 29 December 1999, as well as in its Resolution2 dated
22 May 2001, had held that they had not.
I.

Then Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas created a panel of

investigators3 (Panel) who were tasked to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the complaint. Bueno and especially Barreto provided
the crux of the factual allegations against petitioners.

On 26 February 1998, Kapunan, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss4 the charges

against him before the Panel. On the same day, Legaspi likewise filed a
motion to dismiss5 alleging that his criminal liability had been totally
extinguished by the amnesty granted to him under Proclamation No. 347,
entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons
Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other
Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the
Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission."6 The DOJ
Prosecutor refused to rule on the motions to dismiss and instead treated
them as their counter-affidavits.
In a Resolution7 dated 18 March 1998, the Panel recommended the filing
of two informations each for a separate count of murder against
Kapunan, Jr., Legaspi, Ricardo Dicon, Cirilio Almario, Filomeno Crizaldo
Maligaya, Edger Sumido, Jose Bacera, Jr., Dennis Jabatan, Freddie
Sumagaysay, Fernando Casanova, Gene Paris, Gilberto Galicia, and
Desiderio Perez. The Panel determined that Olalia and Alay-ay were
seized on the night of 12 November 1986 along Julia Vargas Avenue in
Pasig.8 Thereafter, the two were brought to a "safehouse" in Cubao, then
to a secluded area in Antipolo where they were shot dead. The alleged
perpetrators belonged to a team of members of the AFP.
The Panel rendered the following findings on the involvement of
Kapunan, Jr., and Legaspi in the Olalia/Alay-ay slayings, thus:
Respondent Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr. is alleged to have created the
Counter-Intelligence and special project team. He later ordered the
transfer of the agents of SOG-OMND to the Operation Control (OPCON)
headed by respondent Ricardo Dicon. On that occasion, he ordered
Barreto and Sabalza to help Sumido in his surveillance mission on
Rolando Olalia. When a news item came about the [sic] Lancer with Plate
No. BBB-678, used in the abduction of Olalia and Alay-ay, he called
Barreto and Sabalza and [discussed] the matter. He ordered the two (2)
to clean-up the mess. Upon the suggestion of Barreto and Sabalza to
change the paint of all the vehicles involved, he instructed the Finance
Officer, Evelyn Estocapio to extend the needed financial support.
Subsequently, in the [sic] small gathering in his office, he admonished
the agents involved in [the] Olalia-Alay-ay operation to keep everything
secret. In his defense, he denies his presence at the safehouse. Likewise,

he claims Barreto did not point to him as the one who gave the orders to
respondent Dicon. Similarly, he cannot be considered among those
superiors (itaas) of the group because Barreto, Sabalza and Sumido were
no longer under him. Also, he claims as grantee of Amnesty pursuant to
Proclamation No. 347, it [sic] extinguished his criminal liability.
We find the denial insufficient to prevail over the positive and clear
assertions of the witness about his participation (People v. Pasiliao, 215
SCRA 163). The specific acts committed by him before, during and after
the Olalia-Alay-ay SOG-OMND operation as pointed out by Barreto are
[sic] clear indication of his concurrence to the said operation in
pursuance of a common unlawful objective. Hence, it is inescapable for
us to conclude that he is a co-conspirator in the offense charged.
Respondent Oscar Legaspi, per allegations of Barreto, was present at the
safehouse when Sumido announced the arrival of Olalia and Alay-ay
upon their abduction. He went to the living room and peered over them
up to the moment they were brought upstairs by Matammu [sic]. Months
later, when the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was hotly pursued by the
authorities for investigation, he planned the sending abroad of the SOG
agents suspected of being involved in the killing, and gave respondent
Almario P80,000.00 to send Sabalza abroad. In his defense, he did not
controvert these points. Instead, he claims that the offense charged is
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. He being a grantee of amnesty
pursuant to Proclamation No. 347, his criminal liability is extinguished.
Thus, his presence at the safehouse, and the giving of the P80,000.00 to
Almario to send Sabalza abroad, are impliedly admitted by him [sic].
Such act, although apparently appearing as independent acts from the
commission of the offense, are however, suggestive of concurrence of
will in pursuance of the common unlawful objective. Accordingly,
probable cause against him exists as co-conspirator in the commission of
the offense.9
The Panel refused to consider petitioners defense of amnesty on the
ground that documents pertaining to the amnesty failed to show that the
Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the crimes for which the amnesty
was applied for. Moreover, the Panel pointed out that the criminal liability
of therein respondents (herein petitioners) was not obliterated by the
amnesty granted to them. It was held that the killings were not
committed in furtherance of a political belief because at that time, there
was no rebellion yet launched against the Cory Aquino government. The
rebellion mounted by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM)
against the government was made long after the killing.10
On 23 April11 and 9 May 199812 respectively, Kapunan, Jr., and Legaspi
appealed the said Resolution to the Secretary of Justice. Pending appeal
of the case, the Panel filed criminal informations before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Branch 71, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 981488113 and 98-14882.14
In a letter-resolution15 dated 28 July 1998, the Secretary of Justice
dismissed their appeal, citing the inapplicability of the two proclamations
invoked by petitioners. The Secretary ruled thus:
We are in accord with the findings of the Investigating Panel that in this
particular case, the grant of amnesty to the respondents concerned, does
not extinguish their criminal liability for the Olalia-Alay-ay killings. There
is no showing that this case was one of those crimes for which amnesty
was applied for and subsequently granted. Logic and reason dictate that
amnesty for a particular offense could not have been granted when it

was not even applied for. Besides, Proclamation No. 348 (granting
amnesty to certain AFP/PNP personnel who may have committed certain
acts defined herein) dated March 25, 1994, as amended by Proclamation
No. 348 dated May 10, 1994, provides that for amnesty to be granted,
the acts or omissions for which it is sought do not constitute serious
human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extra-legal execution,
arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity, or robbery of any
form (underscoring supplied). Evidently, the Olalia-Alay-ay murder
partakes of the nature of extra-legal execution and could not have come
within the ambit of the law.
Section 2(a) of Proc. No. 347 provides that amnesty under such
Proclamation shall extinguish any criminal liability for acts committed in
pursuit of a political belief. However, considering the circumstances and
factual backdrop of the instant case, it cannot be assumed or even safely
concluded that the Olalia-Alay-ay killing was committed in pursuance of a
political belief. At the time of the abduction and killing, there was no
rebellion yet launched against the Corazon Aquino government. As aptly
found by the Panel, the rebellion mounted by the RAM against the
government was made long after the killings.16
Kapunan, Jr. and Legaspi moved for reconsideration17 but their motion
was denied in another resolution dated 9 February 1999.
Kapunan, Jr. filed his second petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 5214218 while Legaspi brought his
first petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52188. In these petitions, they
impugned the 28 July 199819 and 9 February 1999 letter-resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice denying their appeal and approving their
prosecution for the double murder of Olalia and Alay-ay.
In a Joint Decision dated 29 December 1999, the Special Sixth Division of
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice, the appellate court
refused to rule on the applicability of amnesty to Kapunan and Legaspi
on the ground that this matter involves evaluation of evidence which is
not within its jurisdiction to resolve in a petition for certiorari.20 It held,
thus:
The Court of Appeals has held that:
x x x a perusal of the Certificate of Amnesty granted in favor of petitioner
Kapunan, Jr. x x x and the certification issued in favor of petitioner
Legaspi x x x inevitably brings us several questions of facts, to wit: (1)
whether or not the murder of Rolando Olalia and Leonor Alay-ay were
committed in pursuit of political beliefs; (2) whether or not said crimes of
murder were committed for personal ends; and (3) whether or not the
murder of victims Olalia and Alay-ay were disclosed in Legaspis
application because if only "mutiny" was invoked, then it follows that the
subject crime of murder is not covered by the amnesty in favor of
Legaspi matters which are not within the province of this Court to
determine in the present petitions.
xxx
Both Proclamations [Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348] unequivocally gives
the impression that Proclamation No. 347 covers rebels and insurgent
returnees and not personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP);

and, that Proclamation No. 348 applies to all personnel of the AFP and
the PNP, such as herein petitioners Kapunan and Legaspi who both hold
the rank of Colonel.
xxx
Thus, another set of questions involving both factual and legal issues
crop up (1) whether or not petitioners are rebels/insurgents or
personnel of the AFP, a factual issue which is not within the jurisdiction of
this Court to ascertain in the present petitions for certiorari; and
(2) whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi under
Proclamation No. 347 is valid; stated differently, are Kapunan and
Legaspi covered by Proclamation No. 347 or No. 348? a legal issue
which is likewise not within the jurisdiction of this Court to determine
under the present petitions for certiorari.
The determination of the above issues as to which proclamation covers
petitioners is crucial considering that the crimes that are not covered by
the amnesty under said Proclamations are different. Under Proclamation
No. 347, all persons, more particularly, rebels and insurgents, who
committed "crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for
personal ends" cannot avail of amnesty; while under Proclamation No.
348, all personnel of the AFP and PNP who committed crimes which
"constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extralegal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity, or
robbery of any form" are not entitled to amnesty.
Thus, it must be established first by competent evidence whether
petitioners are rebels or insurgents covered by Proclamation No. 347 or
members of the AFP covered by Proclamation No. 348. If petitioners are
rebels or insurgents, then they may invoke the amnesty granted to them
under Proclamation No. 347 at any stage of the criminal proceedings
before the RTC of Antipolo as earlier discussed in this decision subject to
the sound discretion of said court whether or not it will take judicial
notice of the amnesty or admit further evidence to satisfy itself that the
subject crimes of murder are covered by the amnesty granted to
petitioners by the National Amnesty Commission. If petitioners are
members of the AFP, then they should have been granted amnesty under
Proclamation No. 348 and not under Proclamation No. 347; in which case,
it becomes necessary to determine whether or not the subject crimes
constitute "acts of torture or extra-legal execution." If in the affirmative,
petitioners could not validly avail of the amnesty under Proclamation No.
348; and in the negative, then we go back to the question, is the
amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi under Proclamation No. 347
valid or not?
Clearly from the foregoing, Proclamation No. 347 or Proclamation No. 348
could not be applied automatically in favor of petitioners and they are
not entitled to instant exoneration from criminal prosecution without first
proving in court that the amnesty granted to them is not within the
exceptions provided for in the Proclamations.
Furthermore, respondent Secretary of Justice did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in not considering the finding of the Fact-Finding
Commission or Davide Commission sufficient to sustain petitioners claim
that the murders were in pursuit of political beliefs.

xxx
As can be readily gleaned therefrom, the findings were merely referred to
as allegations of the NBI and a mere suggestion that the murders of
Olalia and Alay-ay "could have been" part of simulated events to effect a
tense and unstable atmosphere necessary for a coup d etat.
And even if we are to consider the "findings" of the Davide Commission,
still another set of questions of fact arises are petitioners mere loyalists
or members of the RAM-HF?; are the murders of Olalia and Alay-ay in
pursuit of petitioners political beliefs?; are the petitioners covered by
Proclamation Nos. 347 or 348? issues which are ascertainable only after
due hearing in the RTC of Antipolo and not this Court in the present
petitions for certiorari as herein previously discussed.

the findings of probable cause determined by the Investigating Panel and

the Secretary of Justice.
As a rule, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the
Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do
not reverse the Secretary of Justices findings and conclusions on the
matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion.30

Consequently, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
Secretary of Justice in the absence of a showing that the latter has
committed a grave abuse of discretion. (Mantruste Systems, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 179 SCRA 136, 144-145)21

Earlier, we restated the rationale propounded by the Investigating Panel

for finding probable cause against petitioners. They do not possess any
inherent flaws that would ring alarm bells. Moreover, both petitioners do
not offer before this Court any argument that disputes such findings of
fact or probable cause offered by the Investigating Panel or the DOJ.
Instead, they squarely focus their arguments on whether the grant of
amnesty to them entitles them to shelter from prosecution for the
Olalia/Alay-ay killings.

xxx

III.

In time, Kapunan and Legaspi moved for a reconsideration22 but their

motion was similarly denied by the appellate court in its Resolution23 of
22 May 2001.
On 13 June 2001, Kapunan filed his petition for review on certiorari,24
docketed as G.R. Nos. 148213-17, for the reversal of the 29 December
1999 Court of Appeals Joint Decision and its 22 May 2001 Resolution and
the annulment of the 28 July 1998 and 9 February 1999 letters-resolution
of the Secretary of Justice. He likewise prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Secretary of Justice from prosecuting him for the Olalia-Alay-ay double
murder and/or the Presiding Judge of the RTC from proceeding with the
criminal cases during the pendency of the petition.25

Kapunan claims that he is a military rebel and that he committed crimes

in furtherance of a political end. He is no longer connected with the AFP
and has not committed any crime in connection with counter-insurgency
operations. Thus, Proclamation No. 347 and not Proclamation No. 348
should have been used by the Secretary of Justice in determining
whether criminal liability is extinguished by the grant of
amnesty.1avvphi1.zw+ He further argues that the exclusion of "serious
human rights violations, such as acts of torture and extra-legal
executions" from the coverage of amnesty under Proclamation No. 348
should not be applied to those who have been granted amnesty under
Proclamation No. 347 as it only covers "those crimes against chastity,
and other crimes committed for personal ends."31

Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons

who shall apply therefore and who have or may have committed crimes,
on or before thirty (30) days following the publication of this
Proclamation in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, in pursuit of
political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or
insurrection; coup d etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
insurrection or coup d etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees;
inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit
sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct
assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in
authority or the agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of
public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful
utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition or explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion or insurrection; and violations of
Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or
sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes)
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), and 97 (general
article) of the Articles of War: Provided, that the amnesty shall not cover
crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 348, as amended by Section 1 of
Proclamation No. 377, provides:
Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. Amnesty is hereby granted to all
personnel of the AFP and PNP who shall apply therefore and who have or
may have committed, as of the date of this Proclamation, acts or
omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War
or other special laws, in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with
counter-insurgency operations; Provided, that such acts or omissions do
not constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture,
extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against
chastity or robbery of any form; and Provided, That the acts were not
committed for personal ends. (Emphasis supplied)
Administrative Order No. 1-94, as amended, serves as the implementing
rules to the two proclamations.34 It provides further clarification as to
their respective coverage.

On 16 January 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate the two

petitions.29

Legaspi, on the other hand, assails the Court of Appeals refusal to rule
on the factual issue of whether he is covered by Proclamation Nos. 347
or 348. He insists that he is a grantee of amnesty under Proclamation No.
347 by virtue of the Certificate of Amnesty issued to him on 13
November32 1995 by the National Amnesty Commission (NAC).
According to Legaspi, the statement of the appellate court that
Proclamation No. 347 covers rebels and insurgent returnees and not
personnel of the AFP is unfounded. He ratiocinated that Proclamation No.
347 also applies to personnel of the AFP since the same covers crimes
committed in pursuit of political beliefs including rebellion, insurrection,
coup d etat or disloyalty of public officers. The crime of coup d etat can
be committed only by persons belonging to the military or police or those
holding any public office or employment. Therefore, the coverage of
Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348 differs not so much on the group or
classification of persons to which they may apply but on the nature of the
offenses covered.33

II.

A.

The main issues raised by Kapunan and Legaspi may be synthesized into
one, that is, whether or not the grant of amnesty extinguished their
criminal liability. Before we turn to those issues, let us focus briefly on

Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348 were issued on the same day, 25 March
1994, by President Fidel Ramos. Their respective texts warrant
examination. Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347 reads, thus:

(b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. Any member of the AFP
or PNP who have or may have committed acts or omission as defined in
Section 2(b) hereunder.

Kapunan invokes as grounds for the allowance of this petition the Court
of Appeals erroneous refusal to: (1) rule on the applicability of amnesty
to him; and (2) the issue of whether the Olalia-Alay-ay double murder
was committed in pursuit of a political belief.26
On 12 July 2001, Legaspi also filed a petition for review docketed as G.R.
No. 148243,27 praying for the same relief sought by Kapunan. He
submits the lone issue of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in failing to recognize the legal effects of the grant of
amnesty to him under Proclamation No. 347.28

RULE III
Section 1. Persons Who May Apply. The following persons may apply
for amnesty, whether or not they have been investigated, detained,
charged, convicted or have served sentence or escaped imprisonment,
or are serving sentence:
(a) Under Proclamation No. 347. Any and all rebels, insurgents, or
persons who have or may have committed acts or omissions as defined
in Section 2(a) hereunder.

Section 2. Crimes/Acts Covered. The following acts or omissions may

be subject to amnesty, whether or not punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, the Articles of War, or special laws:
(a) Under Proclamation No. 347. Crimes committed in pursuit of a
political belief on or before April 30, 1994, including, but not limited to,
the following:
a. Rebellion or insurrection
b. Coup d etat
c. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d
etat

h. Violation of the following Articles of War:

AW 94 (various crimes),
AW 96 (conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman)
AW 97 (general article)
Section 3. Crimes/Acts Not Covered. Amnesty shall not be extended
for the crimes committed for personal ends, and the crimes enumerated
hereunder:

B.
(a) Under Proclamation No. 347.

d. Disloyalty of public officers or employees

e. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection

i. Rape

f. Sedition

ii. Other Crimes Against Chastity

g. Conspiracy to commit sedition

h. Inciting to sedition
i. Illegal assembly
j. Illegal association
k. Direct assault
l. Indirect assault
m. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of
such person

(b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. Serious human rights

violations, including but not limited to:

ii. Extra-legal execution

iii. Arson
iv. Massacre
v. Rape

o. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances

vi. Other crimes against chastity

p. Alarms and scandals

vii. Robbery of any form (Emphasis supplied)

r. Violation of the following Articles of War:

AW 59 (desertion),
AW 62 (absence without leave),
AW 67 (mutiny or sedition)
AW 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition)
AW 94 (various crimes),
AW 96 (conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman)
AW 97 (general article)
(b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. Crimes/acts committed
in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with counter-insurgency
operations on or before March 25, 1994, including but not limited to the
following:
a. Willfull killing
b. Willful infliction of physical injuries
c. Illegal detention
d. Arbitrary detention
e. Coercion
f. Threats
g. Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives

At the same time, a close reading of Proclamation No. 347 reveals that it
is not a unilateral grant of amnesty. Section 1 states that it is granted "to
all persons who shall apply therefore."35 Pursuant to Section 4, it is the
NAC which is primarily tasked "with receiving and processing applications
for amnesty, and determining whether the applicants are entitled to
amnesty under this Proclamation."36 Pursuant to its functions, it has the
power to "promulgate rules and regulations subject to the approval of the
President."37 Final decisions or determinations of the NAC are appealable
to the Court of Appeals.

i. Torture

n. Tumults and other disturbances of public order

q. Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives committed in

furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion
or insurrection.

from the belief that rebels/insurgents were mutually exclusive with

military personnel. There is no doubting that "rebels" or "insurgents"
have acquired a connotative association with armed insurrectionists who
originate outside the forces of the government, as contradistinguished
from members of the AFP who take up arms against the State. Still, the
very text of Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347 extends to "all persons"
who committed the particular acts described in the provision, and not
just "rebels" or "insurgents." Nothing in the text of the proclamation
excludes military personnel by reason of their association, and indeed as
we pointed out, Section 2(b) makes it evident that they are included.

The Court of Appeals alluded to a measure of ambiguity in respect to

whether Proclamation No. 347 also extend to personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines considering that Proclamation No. 348, issued
on the same day, does specifically cover such class of persons. It
ultimately concluded that AFP personnel were not included in
Proclamation No. 347, the same including only "rebels and insurgent
returnees" in its ambit.lawphil.net
We note that on the contrary the text of Proclamation No. 347 is
sufficiently clear that members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are
indeed covered by the Proclamation. If AFP personnel were not under the
coverage of Proclamation No. 347, then Section 2(b) thereof would be
utterly inutile. The provision reads:
SECTION. 2. Effects. x x x
(b) The amnesty herein proclaimed shall not ipso facto result in the
reintegration or reinstatement into the service of former Armed Forces of
the Philippines and Philippine National Police personnel. Reintegration or
reinstatement into the service shall continue to be governed by existing
laws and regulations; Provided, however, that the amnesty shall reinstate
the right of AFP and PNP personnel to retirement and separation benefits,
if so qualified under existing laws, rules and regulations at the time of
the commission of the acts for which amnesty is extended x x x.
It appears that the interpretation of the Court of Appeals that military
personnel were not covered under Proclamation No. 347 was derived

The extension of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 takes effect only
after the determination by the National Amnesty Commission as to
whether the applicant is qualified under the terms of the proclamation. To
fulfill its mandate, the NAC is empowered to enact rules and regulations,
to summon witnesses and issue subpoenas. Evidently, the NAC does not
just stamp its approval to every application before it. It possesses the
power to determine facts, and therefrom, to decide whether the
applicant is qualified for amnesty. The fact that the decisions of the NAC
are subject to judicial review further supports the conclusiveness of its
findings.
Both petitioners had duly applied for amnesty with the National Amnesty
Commission, and both had been issued amnesty certificates. However,
an examination of these certificates reveals that the grant of amnesty
was not as far-reaching as the petitioners imply.
Kapunans Certificate of Amnesty states:
This is to certify that
EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR.
was granted AMNESTY for acts constituting Rebellion on March 23, 1995
pursuant to the provisions of Proclamation No. 347, issued on March 25,
1994 by His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos.
The amnesty granted to Kapunan extends to acts constituting only one
crime, rebellion. Thus, any inquiry whether he is liable for prosecution in
connection with the Olalia killings will necessarily rely not on the list of
acts or crimes enumerated in Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347, but on
the definition of rebellion and its component acts.
Let us now examine the Certificate of Amnesty issued in favor of Legaspi.

CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the amnesty application (No. A-270) under
Proclamation No. 347 of MR. OSCAR E. LEGASPI, filed with the Local
Amnesty Board of Metro Manila, was GRANTED by the NATIONAL
AMNESTY COMMISSION en banc on 13 November 1995 subject to the
qualification that the grant of amnesty shall cover only those offenses
which Mr. Legaspi disclosed in his application. In his application, Mr.
Legaspi stated that he participated in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts,
for which respective acts, he was charged with mutiny before a General
Court Martial and Rebellion (which was archived) before the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court. Mr. Legaspi further stated in his application that he
went on AWOL in 1987 (Please refer to attached resolution addressed to
Mr. Oscar Legaspi, dated 13 January 1995).38
The limited scope of the amnesty granted to Legaspi is even more
apparent. At most, it could only cover offenses connected with his
participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts.

The Final Report also concluded that among the possible classifications
for "triggering events" leading to military intervention was "simulated
events that could be created or provoked in order to effect the tense and
unstable atmosphere necessary for a coup."44 Political assassinations,
"which the brutal killing of Rolando Olalia could have been," were
described as "a good example" of such simulated events.45
We do not wish to denigrate from the wisdom of the Davide Commission.
However, its findings cannot be deemed as conclusive and binding on
this Court, or any court for that matter. Nothing in R.A. No. 6832
mandates that the findings of fact or evaluations of the Davide
Commission acquire binding effect or otherwise countermand the
determinative functions of the judiciary. The proper role of the findings of
fact of the Davide Commission in relation to the judicial system is
highlighted by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 6832, which requires the
Commission to "[t]urn over to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities
all evidence involving any person when in the course of its investigation,
the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that he
appears to be liable for any criminal offense in connection with said coup
d'tat."46

IV.
Given these premises, is there sufficient basis for us to enjoin the
prosecution of petitioners for the slayings of Olalia and Alay-ay?
A.
Let us first examine the circumstances surrounding Kapunan. On their
face, the murders of Olalia and Alay-ay do not indicate they are
components of rebellion. It is not self-explanatory how the murders of
two private citizens could have been oriented to the aims of rebellion,
explained in the Revised Penal Code as "removing from the allegiance to
[the] Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives."39
For exculpatory context, Kapunan cites the Final Report of the
independent fact-finding commission popularly known as the "Davide
Commission"40 created by Republic Act No. 6832 (R.A. No. 6832) to
"investigate all the facts and circumstances of the failed coup d'tat of
December 1989, and recommend measures to prevent similar attempts
at a violent seizure of power."41
The Final Report adverted to a planned coup detat codenamed "God
Save the Queen" in November 1986, the same month as the murders of
Olalia and Alay-ay. The Final Report recounted the killings as well as the
resulting nationwide protests in reaction thereto "where labor and other
cause-oriented groups denounced the military as the perpetrators of the
crime."42 The Final Report took note of the accusations as to the possible
motive for the military to execute the murders, and the investigation
undertaken by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which allegedly
found evidence to link some RAM officers to the killing. The Final Report
stated: "The argument was made that the timing and brutality of the
murders were meant to create an unstable situation favorable for a coup.
Perhaps, it was the realization that their actions could be exploited by the
ultra-right that radical labor unions and organizations desisted from
prolonged massive demonstrations at that time."43

Whatever factual findings or evidence unearthed by the Davide

Commission that could form the basis for prosecutorial action still need
be evaluated by the appropriate prosecutorial authorities to serve as the
nucleus of either a criminal complaint or exculpation therefrom. If a
criminal complaint is indeed filed, the same findings or evidence are still
subject to the normal review and evaluation processes undertaken by the
judge, to be assessed in accordance with our procedural law.
Any equation between rebellion and the Olalia/Alay-ay killings requires
accompanying context such as that possibly provided by the Final Report.
However, there is no such context that we are able to appreciate and act
upon at this juncture. Assuming that Kapunan, Jr. was intent to invoke the
amnesty granted him in his defense against the charges connected with
the Olalia/Alay-ay slays, it would be incumbent upon him to prove before
the courts that the murders were elemental to his commission or
attempted commission of the crime of rebellion, and not just by way of a
general averment, but through detailed evidence.
The same may be said of the affidavit of Barreto, which made two
relevant claims: that the entire force of the Security Group of the Ministry
of Defense was then actively preparing for the launch of a rumored
military exercise akin to the 1986 People Power Revolution;47 and that
he was told by another respondent, Captain Dicon, that the murder of
Olalia was needed to create an atmosphere of destabilization spurred by
the protest actions of the KMU which the RAM could then use as
justification for military intervention similar to the first EDSA
revolt.48 Based on these claims in Barretos affidavit, the Investigating
Panel itself stated in its findings that the killings of Olalia and Alay-ay
were undertaken on the premise "that their death would bring about
massive protest action that will contribute to the destabilization of the
Cory Aquino government and eventually a military take over of the
government."49
Barretos affidavit, as integrated in the findings of the Investigating
Panel, would have been extremely favorable to Kapunan had the relevant
question been whether the Olalia/Alay-ay murders were committed in

furtherance of a political belief. However, as we pointed out earlier, such

motive under Proclamation No. 347 operates only to the extent of
entitling the criminal to apply for amnesty. The actual grant of amnesty
still depends on the NACs determination as to whether the applicant is
indeed entitled to amnesty. In Kapunans case, the grant of amnesty
extended to him pertains only to the crime of rebellion.
Kapunan himself admits before this Court that the November 1986 "God
Save the Queen" coup plot "was pre-empted."50 We can take judicial
notice that there was no public uprising or taking up of arms against the
Aquino government that took place in November of 1986, and no serious
coup attempt until 28 August 1987. The tenor of Barretos claims make it
clear that the Olalia/Alay-ay killings were intended to spark immediate
instability which would be exploited for the coup attempt. The absence of
any immediate rebellion taking place
contemporaneous with or immediately after the Olalia/Alay-ay killings
calls to question whether there was a causal connection between the
murders and the consummated crime of rebellion. At the very least, that
circumstance dissuades us from concluding with certainty that the
killings were inherent to or absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Such a
matter can be addressed instead through a fulldress trial on the merits.
B.
What we said as to Kapunan, Jr. also answers Legaspis similar
contentions. In the latters case, the grant of amnesty was specifically
limited to his participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts against
the Aquino administration. The murders took place in November 1986.
They were supposedly intended to create an atmosphere that would
facilitate an immediate coup detat. It is difficult for the Court to
appreciate at this point how the Olalia/Alay-ay killings were connected
with the 1987 or 1991 coup attempts, though Legaspi is free to establish
such a connection through a trial on the merits.
The Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence for the
prosecution of the petitioners for the murders of Rolando Olalia and
Leonor Alay-ay. The arguments that petitioners are exempt from
prosecution on account of the grants of amnesty they had received are
ultimately without merit, on account of the specified limitations in the
said grant of amnesty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The assailed Joint Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 December 1999, as well as its Resolution
dated 22 May 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision1 and
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30061 that
affirmed the February 8, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64, Makati City.3 This RTC decision found petitioner Gilbert
Zalameda (petitioner) guilty of violating Section 114 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), and
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
as maximum. The trial court likewise found the petitioner and his coaccused Albert Villaflor (Villaflor) guilty of violating Section 125 of R.A.
No. 9165, and sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two
(2) years and seven (7) months, as maximum.
The prosecution charged the petitioner before the RTC with violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under the following Information:
Criminal Case No. 03-3559
That on or about the 14th day of September, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any
dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess one (1)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero three
(0.03) gram of Methylampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The petitioner and Villaflor were likewise charged before the same court
with violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Information
for this charge reads:
Criminal Case No. 03-3560
10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183656

September 4, 2009

GILBERT ZALAMEDA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

That on or about the 14th day of September 2003, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to carry dangerous
paraphernalia, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession two (2) aluminum foil strips and three (3)
unsealed transparent sachets with traces of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, three (3) other pieces of aluminum foils strips, one (1)
stainless scissor and one (1) disposable lighter which are instruments,
apparatuses or paraphernalia fit or intended for ingesting or introducing
any dangerous drug into the body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The petitioner and Villaflor pleaded not guilty to the charges.8 During
pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following:

DECISION
PRE-TRIAL ORDER

xxx
1. That these cases were investigated by PO1 Alex Inopia;
2. That after the investigation of PO1 Alex Inopia, he prepared the Final
Investigation Report;
3. That the Drug Enforcement Unit through SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan
made a Request for Laboratory Examination;
4. That the PNP Crime Laboratory through Police Inspector Karen Palacios
conducted an examination on the specimen submitted;
5. That Physical Science Report was issued by PNP Crime Laboratory
Office detailing the findings of the Forensic Chemist; and
6. The qualification of the Forensic Chemist.
The prosecution marked the following exhibits:
A Final Investigation Report
A-1 Signature of PO1 Alex Inopia
A-2 Signature of SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan
B Request for Laboratory Examination
B-1 Signature of SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan
C Duplicate Copy of Physical Science Report
C-1 Signature of Karen Palacios
D Original Copy of Physical Science Report
D-1 Signature of Karen Palacios

Acting on this information, SPO4 Orbeta dispatched PO2 Faustino De Guia

(PO2 De Guia), PO2 Renato De Guzman, (PO2 De Guzman), PO2 Gonzalo
Acnam, PO1 Donie Tidang (PO1 Tidang), and one Major Ancheta to D.
Gomez St., Barangay Tejeros to verify the report. They were in uniform.12
They reached their intended destination at 5:25 a.m. which they found to
be a house three by six (3 x 6) meters located along D. Gomez St.
They found the door of the house slightly open.13 PO2 De Guzman
peeped inside and saw the petitioner and Villaflor sniffing smoke14
"may sinisinghot sila na usok"15 while sitting on a bed.16 PO2 De
Guzman gave a "thumbs-up" sign to his companions who joined him in
immediately rushing inside the house. Villaflor was holding a tooter at
that point, which he threw away.17 The petitioner initially showed
resistance when the police introduced themselves as law enforcers.18
They frisked the petitioner and Villafor in accordance with police
procedure,19 and recovered from the petitioners right pocket a
rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances.20 The
police likewise found on top of the bed aluminum foils (later confirmed to
have traces of shabu), three (3) plastic sachets containing traces of white
crystalline substance, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a
plastic zipper, and an improvised tooter.21 The police handcuffed the
petitioner and Villaflor, informed them of their rights and their violation
of R.A. No. 9165, and brought them to the police station.22
At the police station, PO2 De Guzman marked the confiscated items,23
and turned them and the suspects to SPO4 Arsenio Mangulabnan (SPO4
Mangulabnan). The latter prepared a request for laboratory
examination;24 immediately after, the seized items were brought to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis and examination. Police Inspector
Karen S. Palacios (Police Inspector Palacios), Forensic Chemical Officer of
the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimens
submitted,25 and found them to be positive for the presence of shabu.26
Urine tests conducted on the petitioner and Villaflor also yielded a
positive result.27

D-2 Signature of Engr. Richard Allan B. Mangalip

D-3 Signature of Juanita A. Ramos
The prosecution reserved its right to present and mark additional exhibits
in the course of the trial.
The defense did not mark any exhibit but reserved the right to present
and mark them in the course of the trial.
With the stipulation entered into by the prosecution and the defense, the
testimony of Forensic Chemist Karen S. Palacios is dispensed with.
Pre-trial is terminated.9
Joint trial on the merits followed. The essential facts, based on the
records, are summarized below.
At around 5:15 a.m. of September 14, 2003, SPO4 Mignelito Orbeta
(SPO4 Orbeta), the desk officer of Precinct 1, Makati City, received a
phone call from a concerned citizen regarding an on-going "pot session"
at 2725 D. Gomez St., Barangay Tejeros, Makati City.10 The house
number was specified.11

The petitioner presented a different version of the events and narrated

that he and Villaflor were talking at around 11:47 p.m. of September 13,
2003 when four men in civilian clothes barged into his house on D.
Gomez Street.28 The door at that time was closed but not locked. These
men ordered them to stand, and then handcuffed them.29 PO2 De
Guzman frisked him and found P100.00 in his pocket. PO1 Tidang then
conducted a search on the room.30 Afterwards, the police brought them
to Precinct 1 where they were detained. At the police station, the police
asked them whether they had money to give in exchange for their liberty
(i.e. "pang-areglo"). The police initially demanded P20,000.00, but the
petitioner and Villaflor answered that they did not have this amount.31
The petitioner likewise denied that he and Villaflor were using drugs
when the police entered his house.32
On cross examination, he testified that Villaflor was a friend of his sister,
Julie; and that the latter requested Villaflor to borrow money from their
(his sisters and his) mother, whose house was located in a nearby
street.33 The money was for the baptism of Julies daughter scheduled
for the next day.34 He did not anymore accompany Villaflor to his
mothers house because her mother was already asleep.35 He declared
that he did not personally know the persons who arrested them prior to
their arrest.36 He also added that PO2 De Guzman demanded
P20,000.00 from him in exchange for his liberty.
The RTC, in its decision of February 8, 2006, convicted the petitioner and
Villaflor of the crimes charged, and sentenced them, as follows:37

1. In Criminal Case No. 03-3559, the accused GILBERT ZALAMEDA y

SUMILE is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS, ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as maximum pursuant to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, R.A. No. 4103, as amended, and to pay a
fine of P300,00.00.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-3560, the accused GILBERT ZALAMEDA y
SUMILE and accused ALBERT VILLAFLOR y HUERTE are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article
II, R.A. No. 9165 and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS,
SEVEN (7) MONTHS, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00.
In both cases, the period during which the accused were held under
detention shall be considered in their favor pursuant to existing rules.
The dangerous drug subject matter of Criminal Case No. 03-3559
consisting of 0.03 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
and the pieces of drug paraphernalia recovered from the accused and
subject of Criminal Case No. 03-3560 are hereby transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its appropriate
disposition.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner appealed to the CA and this appeal was docketed as CAG.R. CR No. 30061. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in its decision of
March 18, 2008.38 The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but
the CA denied his motion in its resolution of July 15, 2008.39
In the present petition,40 petitioner alleges that the items confiscated
from him were inadmissible, and that the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of the illegal drug.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the
argument that the testimonies of PO2 De Guzman and PO2 De Guia were
straightforward and consistent on material points.41 In addition, the
warrantless arrest conducted by the police was valid as the petitioner
and Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu. Since the arrest was lawful, the
search made incidental to the arrest of the two accused was also
lawful.42
The OSG further argues that the prosecution was able to show all the
elements of the crimes charged.43 The police also complied with the
procedure in the custody and disposition of seized drugs under Section
21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules.44
Finally, the OSG contends that the petitioners bare denial constitutes
self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical
and positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses.45
We DENY the petition for lack of merit. The records of the case records
support the conclusion that a lawful arrest, search and seizure took
place, and that the prosecution fully discharged its burden of establishing

all the elements necessary for conviction for the crimes charged beyond
reasonable doubt.46
The prosecution duly established the elements of the crimes charged
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165
carries the following elements: (1) possession by the accused of an item
or object identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) the possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the free and conscious possession of the drug
by the accused.47 On the other hand, the elements of illegal possession
of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs under Section 12 are: (1) possession or control by the
accused of any equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is
not authorized by law. The evidence for the prosecution showed the
presence of all these elements.
PO2 De Guzman, in his testimony of January 28, 2004, narrated the
circumstances that led them to go to the house of the petitioner;48 how
he saw the petitioner and Villaflor in the act of "sniffing smoke";49 and
how they arrested and searched the petitioner and seized evidence they
discovered in plain view.50
PO2 De Guzman duly and positively identified the petitioner as the
person he saw sniffing shabu with Villaflor, and as the same person from
whose right pocket he recovered a rectangular plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substances. He also narrated how the police
inadvertently found various drug apparatus and paraphernalia scattered
on top of the petitioners bed. Per Report No. D-1142-03S of Police
Inspector Palacios, the plastic sachet recovered from the petitioner was
examined and found to contain 0.03 gram of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a prohibited drug. The two aluminum foil strips and three
unsealed transparent plastic sachets recovered on top of the petitioners
bed also tested positive for the presence of shabu. Thus, the petitioner
knowingly possessed shabu a prohibited drug and had under his
control various drug paraphernalia without legal authority to do so, all in
violation of Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 9165.
PO2 De Guzmans testimony also presented a complete picture of the
police operation from the time the desk officer received a tip regarding
an ongoing pot session at the petitioners house on D. Gomez Street; to
the time the police went there and arrested the petitioner and Villaflor;
until they returned to the police station and marked the confiscated
items. PO2 De Guia corroborated PO2 De Guzmans testimony on all
material points. The defense did not contest the admissibility of the
seized items as evidence during trial. Significantly, the petitioner failed
to produce convincing proof that the prosecution witnesses had any
malicious or ulterior motive when they testified, or that the evidence
submitted by the prosecution had been tampered with.51
PO2 De Guzman testified in a spontaneous, straightforward and
categorical manner, proving all the elements of the crimes charged; he
never wavered despite the grueling cross-examination by the defense
counsel.
The Petitioners Defenses

a. The Legality of the Petitioners Arrest

The petitioner alleges that since the warrantless arrest conducted by the
police was illegal, the items seized from him as a result of said arrest
were inadmissible.
This argument totally lacks merit.
We stress at the outset that the petitioner failed to question the legality
of his warrantless arrest. The established rule is that an accused may be
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for
the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the courts acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived.52
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the
warrantless arrest conducted on the petitioner was valid. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the situations when a person
may be arrested without a warrant, thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto
arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.53
After carefully evaluating the evidence in its totality, we hold that the
prosecution successfully established that the petitioner was arrested in
flagrante delicto.
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the
petitioners house and to his arrest were triggered by a "tip" from a
concerned citizen that a "pot session" was in progress at the petitioners
house located on D. Gomez Street. Under the circumstances, the police
did not have enough time to secure a search warrant considering the
"time element" involved in the process (i.e., a pot session may not be for
an extended period of time and it was then 5:15 a.m.). In view of the
urgency, SPO4 Orbeta immediately dispatched his men to proceed to the

identified place 2725 D. Gomez Street to verify the report. At the

place, the responding police officers verified from a slightly opened door
and saw the petitioner and Villaflor "sniffing smoke" to use the words of
PO2 De Guzman, or "sumisinghot ng shabu" as PO2 De Guia put it. There
was therefore sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe
that the petitioner and Villaflor were then and there committing a crime.
As it turned out, the petitioner indeed possessed a prohibited drug and,
together with Villaflor, was even using a prohibited drug and likewise
illegally possessed drug paraphernalia, contrary to law. When an accused
is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized
but are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures, the
petitioner and Villaflor were frisked, which search yielded the prohibited
drug in the petitioners possession. The police, aside from seeing Villaflor
throw away a tooter, also saw various drug paraphernalia scattered on
top of the petitioners bed. These circumstances were sufficient to justify
the warrantless search and seizure that yielded one (1) heat-sealed
plastic sachet of shabu. In this regard, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court states:
Section 13. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.
The seizure of the various drug paraphernalia is likewise beyond
question. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view"
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. This doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion
or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.54
All the foregoing requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present
in this case. The police officers had prior justification to be at the
petitioners place as they were dispatched by their desk officer; they
arrested the petitioner and Villaflor as they had reason to believe that
they were illegally using and possessing a prohibited drug and drug
paraphernalia. The search of the petitioner incident to his arrest yielded
the confiscated crystalline substance which later proved to be shabu. In
the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various
drug paraphernalia scattered on the bed. As these items were plainly
visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them.
The petitioner also harps on the fact that the police did not conduct a
prior surveillance to verify the tipped information. We emphasize that the
"tip" has reference to an ongoing pot session an activity that does not
usually last for an extended period. We have held that when time is of
the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.55 Simply stated, a prior surveillance is not necessary where
the police operatives are pressed for time to capture a suspected
offender, as in this case. Thus, the absence of a surveillance did not
undermine the validity of the petitioners arrest.
b. Denial and Extortion

The petitioner denied that he and Villaflor were caught sniffing shabu,
and maintained that they were just talking to each other when the police
arrived at his house at 11:47 p.m. of September 13, 2003. According to
the petitioner, Villaflor was in his house because he (Villafor) had been
requested by Julie (the petitioners own sister) to borrow money from
their mother, Milagros, who lives in a nearby street. The money was for
the baptism of Julies daughter, scheduled for the next day.56 The
petitioner maintained that he did not bring Villaflor to Milagros house as
soon as he (Villaflor) arrived in the evening of September 13, 2003
because it was already late and Milagros was already asleep.57 He
maintained that he and Villaflor were arrested and detained on
September 13, 2003 and not on September 14, 2003.58
As the lower courts did, we find the petitioners story unworthy of belief.
We find the petitioners claim that he was arrested and detained in the
evening of September 13, 2003 to be self-serving and uncorroborated by
any separate competent evidence. The petitioner, in fact, admitted that
he has no proof of such detention in his testimony of March 31, 2004.59
The justification that the petitioner offered for Villaflors presence at his
place, in the absence of any corroborating evidence, is likewise
questionable. Allegedly, Villaflor was asked by Julie to borrow from
Milagros money to be used in a baptism to be held on the following day.
No reason exists in the records explaining why Villaflor would proceed to
the petitioners house and stay there, given the urgency of his task and
given that, by the petitioners own admission, Milagros was expecting
Villaflor that night. The questionable status of this basic component of
the denial, to our mind, renders the whole denial itself questionable. The
latin maxim "falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus"60 best explains our
reason.
The petitioners denial must likewise fail in light of the positive
identification and declarations made by the prosecution witnesses. As we
stated earlier, these witnesses testified in a straightforward and
categorical manner regarding the identities of the malefactors. They did
not waver despite the defense counsels rigid questioning.
Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the
facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As
evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot
attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who
testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various
aspects of the crime committed. One such positive evidence is the result
of the laboratory examination conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on
the various drug and drug paraphernalia recovered from the petitioner
and Villaflor which revealed that the following confiscated items tested
positive for the presence of shabu: (a) one heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet with marking "GSZ" containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance; (b) two aluminum foil strips both with markings
"AHV," each containing white crystalline substance; and (c) three
unsealed transparent plastic sachets all with markings "RSG" each
containing white crystalline substance. In addition, the drug tests
conducted on the petitioner and Villaflor both yielded positive results.
Petitioners claim of extortion is similarly untenable. An allegation of
frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard
defense in most dangerous drug cases. It is viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To substantiate such a defense,
the evidence must be clear and convincing.61 In the present case, the

petitioner was unable to support his allegation of extortion with any

other evidence. The petitioner also admitted that he did not know the
policemen previous to the arrest, hence negating any improper motive
on the part of the police. Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as
the findings of the trial court on the credibility of prosecution witnesses,
should prevail over the petitioners self-serving and uncorroborated
extortion claim. It is also worth noting that the petitioner has not filed a
single complaint against the police officers who allegedly attempted to
extort money from him.
c. Non-presentation of the Informant
The petitioner argues that the informant was never presented in court to
corroborate the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
We do not find this argument convincing.
The settled rule is that the presentation of an informant in an illegal
drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative.62 Moreover, informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and
preserve their invaluable service to the police.63 Thus, we held in People
v. Boco:64

substance from the petitioners possession and of the various drug

paraphernalia on top of the petitioners bed, the police immediately
brought the petitioner and Villaflor to the police station, together with the
seized items. PO2 De Guzman himself brought these items to the police
station and marked them. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance was marked "GSZ"66 (Exh. "F"); the improvised tooter
aluminum
foil
strips
and
aluminum
foil
with
traces
of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride were marked "AHV"67 (Exh. "G" and
"H"); the three pieces of unsealed transparent plastic sachet were
marked "RSG"68 (Exh. "I, "I-1", and "I-2"); the disposable lighter was
marked "RSG" (Exh. "J"); the stainless pair of scissors was marked "RSG"
(Exh. "K"); the transparent plastic sachet containing three aluminum foil
strips was marked "RSG" (Exh. "L"); and the Monsieur bag was marked
RSG" (Exh. "M"). These confiscated items were immediately turned over
to SPO4 Mangulabnan, who in turn, forwarded them to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Southern Police District for examination to determine the
presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination conducted
on the specimens, Forensic Chemist Palacios concluded that Exhibits "F,"
"G," "H," "I," "I-1," and "I-2" tested positive for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.69 When the prosecution presented
these marked specimens in court, PO2 De Guzman positively identified
them to be the same items he seized from the petitioner and which he
later marked at the police station, from where the seized items were
turned over to the laboratory for examination based on a duly prepared
request.70 We quote the pertinent portions of the records:
xxx

Under the circumstances, we do not find any necessity for additional

corroborating testimony, particularly that of the confidential informant.
Intelligence agents, due to the nature of their work, are often not called
to testify in court so as not to reveal their identities publicly. Once known,
they could no longer be used again and, worse, may be the object of
revenge by the criminals they implicate. The prevailing doctrine is that
their testimonies are not essential for conviction, nor are they
indispensable to a successful prosecution. With the testimonies of the
arresting officers, they would be, after all, merely corroborative and
cumulative.

PROSECUTOR ALEX BAGAOISAN:

d. The Integrity and Evidentiary Value of the

Q: If that sachet containing white crystalline substance will be shown to

you, will you be able to identify the same?

Examined and Presented Seized Items

The petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the
evidences chain of custody because the police operatives failed to
strictly comply with Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165. He adds that the
police did not immediately mark, photograph and inventory the drugs
and drug paraphernalia at the place where they were seized.
We disagree.

Q: Now Mr. Witness, you mentioned earlier that when you frisked accused
Zalameda, you were able to recover from his possession a sachet
containing white crystalline substance?
PO2 RENATO DE GUZMAN:
A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: I am showing to you,
crystalline substance. Will
relation does this have
substance, which you said

Mr. Witness, a sachet, which contains white

you please go over the same and tell us what
to the sachet containing white crystalline
was recovered from accused Zalameda?

A: This is the plastic sachet that I have recovered from the possession of
accused Zalameda, sir.
Q: Why are you certain that this is the same sachet containing white
crystalline substance, which you recovered from accused Zalameda?
A: I put markings, sir.
Q: What markings?

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be

preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.65

A: I placed GSZ.

Contrary to what the petitioner wants to portray, the chain of custody of

the seized prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken. After the
seizure of the rectangular plastic sachet containing white crystalline

Q: Could you tell us what does this marking GSZ stand for?

Q: Where did you place this marking?

A: Inside the headquarters, sir.
A: Gilbert Sumile Zalameda, sir.

Q: May I request, Your Honor, that this white crystalline substance

contained in a plastic sachet with markings GSZ be marked as Exhibit F,
Your Honor. Now, you mentioned also that you were able to recover drug
paraphernalia from the bed.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned of an improvised tooter aluminum foil?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I have here several pieces of evidence. Will you please step down and
identify the improvised tooter aluminum foil you have mentioned?
A: This one, sir.
Q: And why are you certain that this is the same improvised tooter
aluminum foil that you recovered from the accused?

Q: Will you be able to identify those three aluminum foils that you have
mentioned?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please point them out to us.
A: Here, sir.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that these three rolled aluminum foils with
markings RS be marked as Exhibit L. Now, why are the markings
different, there is the marking RSG, there is a marking AHV? [sic]
A: For identification, sir.
Q: You also mentioned a bag. Will you please identify that bag?
A: Here, sir.

Q: What is the markings that you placed?

Q: We request, Your Honor, that the bag identified by the witness be

marked as Exhibit M. Now, you also mentioned that you brought
Zalameda to the headquarters.

A: AHV, sir.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What does AHV stand for?

Q: How about accused Albert Villaflor?

A: Albert Huerte Villaflor, sir.

A: We also brought him to the headquarter[s].

Q: May I request, Your Honor that this improvised tooter aluminum foil
identified by the witnesses be marked as exhibit G with markings AHV.
Now, you also mentioned of one aluminum foil, which was made as a
tray, could you identify that particular object evidence that you have
mentioned?

Q: What did you do at the precinct?

A: Yes, sir, this is the one.

A: The investigator prepared a request addressed to the crime lab. for

laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence, sir.

A: I placed markings sir.

Q: And why are you certain that this is the same aluminum foil, which
was used as a tray?
A: I also placed markings, sir.
Q: What markings did you place in this particular object evidence?
A: AHV, sir.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that this aluminum foil identified by the
witness with markings AHV be marked as exhibit H. You mentioned of
three pieces plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. Now
could you point to us these sachets that you have mentioned?

A: Our desk officer prepared the necessary paper to turn over the two
suspects to the investigator.
Q: So, did you come to know what happened after that?

Q: How about the accused, what did you do with them after the
investigation?
A: The investigator also made a request for drug test examination
addressed to the Crime Laboratory.
Q: And did you come to know what was the result of the examination
conducted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was the result?

Inspector Palacios is a public officer, and her report carries the

presumption of regularity. Besides, Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.73 Police Inspector
Palacios findings that Exhibits "F," "G," "H," "I," "I-1," and "I-2" were
found positive for the presence of shabu are, therefore, conclusive in the
absence of evidence proving the contrary.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply
with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 916574 does not necessarily
render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.75
In the present case, we see substantial compliance by the police with the
required procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items,
thus showing that the integrity of the seized evidence was not
compromised. We refer particularly to the succession of events
established by evidence, to the overall handling of the seized items by
specified individuals, to the test results obtained, under a situation where
no objection to admissibility was ever raised by the defense. All these, to
the unprejudiced mind, show that the evidence seized were the same
evidence tested and subsequently identified and testified to in
court.1awphi1 In People v. Del Monte,76 we explained:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the
drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in
evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or
rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that
will accorded it by the courts. x x x

A: Yes, sir. These are the plastic sachets.

A: The result is positive, sir.

Q: And why are you certain that these are the same sachets which you
said contained traces of shabu?

Q: What do you mean positive?

A: I placed the markings, sir.

Q: How about the drug test?

Q: What markings did you place?

A: The accused also gave positive result.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that
will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized
drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be
given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said
evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.

x x x71 [Emphasis ours]

The Proper Penalties

Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody
of the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they
were brought for examination. Besides, as earlier stated, the petitioner
did not contest the admissibility of the seized items during trial. The
integrity and the evidentiary value of the drug seized from the petitioner
were therefore duly proven not to have been compromised.

The petitioner was caught in possession of 0.03 gram of shabu or

methamphetamine hydrochloride. The illegal possession of dangerous
drugs is punished under Section 11, paragraph 2(3), Article II of R.A. No.
9165, which provides:

A: Positive, sir, for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, sir.

A: My initial, sir, RSG.

Q: May I request, Your Honor, that these three pieces of plastic sachets
containing traces of shabu be marked as exhibit I, I-1, and I-2. Now, you
also mentioned of disposable lighter. Will you please identify the
disposable lighter that you have mentioned?
A: Yes, sir, this is the one.
Q: May I request, Your Honor, that the disposable lighter identified by the
witness with markings RSG be marked as Exhibit J. How about the
scissors, could you identify the scissors that you have recovered?
A: Yes, sir. This is the one.
Q: The witness identified stainless scissors, which we request to be
marked as Exhibit K. Aside from these object evidence, what other object
evidence did you find on the bed?
A: I also found three rolled aluminum foil, sir.

We also reject the petitioners claim that the non-presentation of the

forensic chemist was fatal to the prosecutions case. The petitioner never
raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Police
Inspector Palacios. In fact, the defense during the pre-trial agreed to
dispense with her testimony.72 It must also be stressed that Police

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" x x x

We sustain the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA in

Criminal Case No. 03-3559, as it is within the range provided for by law.
Meanwhile, Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other paraphernalia fit or
intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.

11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The courts a quo sentenced the petitioner to suffer the indeterminate

penalty of four months and one day, as minimum, to two years and
seven months, as maximum in Criminal Case No. 03-3560. Pursuant to
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, we increase the minimum to six (6) months
and one (1) day imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision and
resolution dated March 18, 2008 and July 15, 2008, respectively, in CAG.R. CR No. 30061 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal
Case No. 03-3560, petitioner Gilbert Zalameda is SENTENCED to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to two (2) years and seven (7) months, as maximum.
The CA decision finding the petitioner guilty of violation of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9165 in Criminal Case No. 03-3559 is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180992

September 4, 2009

ELMER DIAMANTE y SIOSON and TANNY BOY STA. TERESA y

LINTAG Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Along with Archimedez Lintag y Fausto (Lintag) alias Medes, Maricar
Manalang y Mallari (Maricar) alias Marie, and Virgilio Gerardo y Supatan
(Gerardo), herein two petitioners Elmer Diamante y Sioson (Diamante)
alias Romeo Diamante and Mengoy and Tanny Boy Sta. Teresa y Lintag
(Sta. Teresa) alias Tanny were charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong with robbery1 and carnapping2 in two separate
Informations, both dated July 13, 2000.
When arraigned, petitioners and their co-accused pleaded not guilty.3
Upon motion of the prosecution, Amended Informations were admitted
impleading as additional accused Arnold Loza (Loza) alias Bimbo and
Ronald dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) alias Ronnie.4 They, too, pleaded not guilty
on arraignment.5
From the testimony of private complainant Wilfredo Cadorniga
(Cadorniga),6 a dentist, the following version of the prosecution is culled:
At about 2:00 o clock in the afternoon of July 9, 2000, while Cadorniga
was in his clinic inside his house at San Rafael Street, Mandaluyong City,
Maricar, accompanied by petitioner Diamante, knocked on the door
seeking a dental check-up. Cadorniga let them in and entered an inner
room to fix himself. After he emerged from the inner room, he saw that
there were already five persons inside.
Cadorniga went on to conduct the check-up, after which someone
grabbed him and announced a hold-up. Sta. Teresa quickly tied him down
to a stool and wrapped his entire body, including his face and eyes, with
a clear scotch tape. Lintag and Dela Rosa poked guns at him, prompting
him to cry, "Kunin niyo nang lahat, huwag niyo lang akong saktan." The
assailants soon ransacked the clinic for around 15 minutes and left

carrying Cadornigas personal effects. Cadorniga thereafter heard his car

alarm sound off, putting him on notice that his car, a Daewoo racer, was
likewise taken.
Still tied to a stool, Cadorniga struggled to reach the main door which he
opened. A neighbor who saw his condition helped him untangle himself.
Cadorniga thereupon called the police who swiftly arrived at the crime
scene, gathered fingerprints thereat, and took Cadornigas statement.
At about 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. of the following day, Gerardo turned up at
the clinic and advised Cadorniga that they had to rush to Pandacan
because his car would be sold to a buyer in Cavite. Accompanied by
officers of the Manila police, Gerardo led Cadorniga and his brother to the
house of Sta. Teresa who promptly confessed being one of those who had
robbed Cadorniga. Sta. Teresa subsequently led them to the house of
Loza where the other accused were hiding. The police thus apprehended
Sta. Teresa, Diamante, Maricar, and Lintag and brought them to the
police station. Some of the stolen items, including the Daewoo racer,
were recovered.
Corroborating Cadornigas account, accused-turned-state
Gerardo,7 a taxi driver, testified as follows:8

witness

On July 9, 2000, in Pandacan, Manila, Gerardo was flagged down by a

male passenger, later identified to be Dela Rosa, who instructed him to
head to Boni Avenue corner San Rafael Street, Mandaluyong City. Along
the way, they picked up Dela Rosas companions, later identified as
Diamante, Sta. Teresa, Lintag, and Maricar. Upon reaching their
destination, Diamante and Maricar alighted from the taxi and entered the
clinic of Cadorniga. The remaining passengers shortly followed upon
Diamantes signal.
Gerardo waited outside as told. His passengers went out of the clinic
after about 30 minutes carrying things. Lintag boarded Gerardos taxi,
while the others rode in the Daewoo racer parked behind it. Gerardo was
asked to tail the Daewoo racer, but lost sight of it when they reached
Makati. He was thus instructed to, as he did, proceed to Dela Rosas
house in Pandacan where Lintag got off and came back with Maricar.
Gerardo was then told to drive on. They reached the house where the
Daewoo racer had been brought, whereupon two other members of the
group again boarded Gerardos taxi. Gerardo overheard that they would
take the Daewoo racer to Cavite.
His passengers having been brought to their final destination, Gerardo
demanded payment for his services. Dela Rosa poked a gun at him,
however, and told him to go away and keep quiet about everything.
Gerardo returned to Dela Rosa the next day to demand payment once
more, but the latter again poked a gun at him and asked him to leave.
Gerardo thus left.
That night on his way home, Gerardo dropped by the clinic of Cadorniga
and talked to him. It was then that he realized what had happened the
day before. He accompanied Cadorniga in seeking police assistance; and
led him and the police to Sta. Teresa who, in turn, led them to the other
assailants and the location of the Daewoo racer.
PO3 Robert Eugenio (PO3 Eugenio) and PO2 Virgilio Bismonte (PO2
Bismonte) of the Mandaluyong City police testified that they conducted

the investigation and took the sworn statement of Cadorniga.9 PO2

Bismonte identified the items recovered from the accused.10

Carnapping Act of 1972 (R.A. 6539), the court hereby sentences them as
follows:

SPO4 Alfredo Villarosa (SPO4 Villarosa) of the Pandacan Police Station

testified that he and one SPO1 Cenia apprehended Diamante, Sta.
Teresa, Lintag, Maricar, and Gerardo as accomplice, all without a warrant,
but with the express consent of the owner of the house where Gerardo
had led them and pointed to the suspects. SPO4 Villarosa likewise
identified some additional items recovered.11

In Criminal Case No. MC00-2728 for Robbery, accused ELMER DIAMANTE

y SIOSON, TANNY BOY STA. TERESA y LINTAG, MARICAR MANALANG y
MALLARI @ MARIE and RONALD DELA ROSA, to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of Prision Mayor as maximum,
each.

Now, the defense.

Archimedes Lintag y Fausto having voluntarily pleaded to the crime

charged under plea bargaining in Criminal Case No. MC00-2728, is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, one (1) month and ten
(10) days of prision mayor as maximum.

Lintag admitted his involvement in the robbery that took place in

Cadornigas clinic (and accordingly changed his plea to guilty upon rearraignment for the robbery case), but denied complicity in the
carnapping of the Daewoo racer, claiming that when the situation
became tumultuous, he just took the cash register and traveling bag,
then ran away on board Gerardos taxi. He identified the other persons
who participated in the robbery Diamante, Maricar, Dela Rosa, Sta.
Teresa, Loza, and Gerardo who acted as their driver.12
Dela Rosa, denying the charges, proffered alibi. He declared that he was
either in Bataan or some place other than the crime scene on the day the
robbery and carnapping were committed; and that he had not known any
of his co-accused until he was detained at the city jail following his
arrest.13
Petitioner Diamante, for his part, denied the charges too and put up alibi,
stating that while the alleged ransacking of Cadornigas clinic was
happening, he was at home with his live-in partner and their child; that
Sta. Teresa arrived in their house with Maricar at about 6:00 p.m. on the
day of the incident requesting him to sell a Rolex watch which Sta. Teresa
would not explain where he got; that of all his co-accused, he only knew
Sta. Teresa and Maricar; and that Sta. Teresa probably implicated him in
the case only out of jealousy over his closeness to Maricar.14
Petitioner Sta. Teresa, on the other hand, averred that on the day of the
incident, Maricar and her boyfriend Loza, followed by a taxi with
approximately five unfamiliar passengers, went to his house requesting
for help in moving Maricars things from her mothers house to her new
apartment. He obliged. When they arrived at the house, Maricar and her
companions went inside to pick up some things, while he waited outside
and later helped in loading the items picked up in the taxis
compartment. Maricar then told him he could already go home. He thus
left, and learned only at the trial that the house which Maricar said was
her mothers was actually the clinic and residence of Cadorniga.15
By consolidated Decision of January 27, 2006,16 Branch 211 of the
Mandaluyong RTC found all the accused guilty as charged, except
Gerardo who had been discharged to be a state witness, and Loza whose
demurrer to evidence resulted in the dismissal of the cases as to him by
Order of even date.17 It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELMER DIAMANTE y SIOSON, TANNY
BOY STA. TERESA y LINTAG, ARCHIMEDEZ LINTAG y FAUSTO, MARICAR
ISIP-MANALANG y MALLARI and RONALD DELA ROSA @ RONNIE DELA
ROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery, defined
and penalized under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and Anti-

In Criminal Case No. MC00-2729 for Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (R.A.

6539), accused ELMER DIAMANTE y SIOSON, TANNY BOY STA. TERESA y
LINTAG, ARCHIMEDEZ LINTAG y FAUSTO @ MEDES, MARICAR MANALANG
y MALLARI @ MARIE and RONALD DELA ROSA @ "RONNIE DELA ROSA",
to suffer imprisonment of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, each.
The case/s against ARNOLD LOZA @ "BIMBO" will be resolved separately
in relation to accuseds Demurrer to Evidence he filed before this court,
in the above-entitled case.
Likewise, the bail bonds posted by Elmer Diamante, Tanny Boy Sta.
Teresa, Maricar Manalang and Ronald Dela Rosa for their provisional
liberty are hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government.
Let alias warrant for the manhunt of Maricar Isip-Manalang be issued.
The evidence custodian of the court is hereby directed to turn over to
private complainant, Dr. Wilfredo Cadornia, all his personal belongings
marked as Exhibits "F-1", "F-2", "F-3", "F4" and "F-5". (Copied verbatim.)
The trial court credited the version of the prosecution, primarily the
testimony of Gerardo, to be clear and coherent; and appreciated the
presence of conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. It deemed the
alibi of the defense inherently weak.
Petitioners Diamante and Sta. Teresa, as well as Lintag and Dela Rosa,
timely filed a notice of appeal, hence, the case was elevated to the Court
of Appeals.18 Maricar has remained at large.
By Decision of July 31, 2007,19 the appellate court affirmed in toto the
Decision of the trial court, upon a finding that the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, particularly those of Cadorniga and Gerardo, were
not only consistent, reliable and trustworthy, but also corroborative of
and in harmony with each other. It likewise observed that, in contrast,
the testimonies of the therein appellants were incongruous.

Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated

December 3, 2007,20 petitioners seek relief from this Court via Petition
for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners argue that their identification as among the assailants by
Cadorniga is dubious in view of the confusion and extreme pressure he
went through during the incident; that the tale of Gerardo could not be
believed as his participation was limited to bringing his passengers to
their destination; that they were illegally arrested without a warrant by
SPO4 Villarosa, he having relied solely on Cadornigas subjective
identification; and that since the prosecutions evidence emanated from
an illegal arrest, the same cannot produce a conviction pursuant to the
exclusionary rule under the Constitution.21
The Solicitor General counters that the factual findings of the trial court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, are amply supported by evidence and
must be respected; and that petitioners are estopped from assailing the
legality of their arrest, not having raised any objection thereto prior to
their arraignment.22
The appeal lacks merit.
On the legality of petitioners arrest, the Court finds that, indeed, they
are barred from assailing the same for failure to take issue thereon
before their arraignment. Objections to the legality of an arrest must be
made prior to the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are
considered waived.23 An accused may also be estopped from assailing
the legality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashal of the
Information against him before his arraignment.24
To be sure, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused, hence, any defect therein may be
deemed cured when, as here, the accused voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.25 An illegal arrest is thus not a sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error.26
Regarding the admissibility of physical evidence obtained as a result of
petitioners arrest, the Court need not belabor this question as it is not
even a material consideration in petitioners conviction. It suffices to
state that physical evidence would be merely corroborative because, as
will be discussed later, there are credible witnesses who testified on the
complicity of petitioners in the crimes charged.27
On the merits, what petitioners essentially want is for this Court to weigh
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses vis--vis the defense
witnesses and to take this case out of the purview of the general rule in
order to review it in its entirety, a task entrusted to the trial court, which
is in the best position to discriminate between truth and falsehood
because of its untrammeled opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses during trial.
Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to respect and are not to be
disturbed on appeal, unless some facts and circumstances of weight and
substance, having been overlooked or misinterpreted, might materially
affect the disposition of the case.28 In the case at bar, the Court finds
that the trial court did not overlook, misapprehend, or misapply any fact
of value to warrant a reversal of its findings. Prevailing jurisprudence

uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are binding upon this Court.29
Nevertheless, from a review of the records, the Court does not appreciate
a conclusion different from the trial courts, as affirmed by the appellate
court.
The elements of robbery are: (1) the subject is personal property
belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property; (3) the
taking is with intent to gain; and (4) there is violence against or
intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.30 Carnapping, on
the other hand, has these elements: "taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things."311avvphi1
The trial and appellate courts found that petitioners were among those
who committed robbery and carnapping against Cadorniga as shown by
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which both courts
considered to be straightforward, clear, and consistent. The Court finds
no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
That Cadorniga was tied down to a stool at gun point to facilitate the
commission of the crimes speaks unequivocally that petitioners and their
cohorts employed violence and intimidation in taking away Cadornigas
personal effects and the Daewoo racer without his consent and with
intent to gain. This is clear from the testimony of Cadorniga alone which,
as reflected earlier, is categorical on all material points. The records
being barren of proof of any ill motive on the part of Cadorniga to testify
falsely against petitioners, his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit. Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy,
and credible witness is sufficient for conviction.32
The finding of the trial court on the presence of conspiracy merits the
Courts concurrence too, it being evident from the orchestrated manner,
indicative of a common design, in which petitioners and their cohorts
pursued their unlawful purpose. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.33
Respecting petitioners identification as among the assailants, Cadorniga
remembered petitioner Diamante as the person who entered the clinic
with Maricar when the latter sought a "dental check-up," and Sta. Teresa
as the one who later tied him down to a stool and wrapped his entire
body with a clear scotch tape. Cadorniga, therefore, saw petitioners
faces before his eyes were covered. Such being the case, there is no
reason to consider as fuzzy Cadornigas recollection of petitioners
participation in the commission of the crimes. Besides, even with his
eyes covered with a clear scotch tape, Cadorniga emphasized that he
could still slightly open his eyes.34
There is nothing contrary to human experience about Cadorniga being
able to recall petitioners as among those who robbed him and how they
did it. As the appellate court observed, while a startling event does not
elicit a standard form of human behavioral response, experience shows
that it oftentimes creates an indelible impression in the mind that can be
recalled vividly.35

While Cadornigas testimony alone pointing to petitioners as among the

assailants would have sufficed for purposes of identification, it bears to
stress that the prosecution still provided corroborating evidence. As the
trial court noted, Gerardo also identified petitioners, and his testimony
was corroborated by Lintag and petitioner Sta. Teresa himself that they
went to San Rafael Street corner Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong, entered the
clinic of Cadorniga, and took certain things therefrom.36 And while
Lintags confession is binding only as to him, his court testimony pointing
to his co-principals is a judicial admission of an eyewitness admissible in
evidence against those it implicates.37
Gerardos testimony should thus not be doubted merely because his
participation was limited to bringing his passengers to their destination.
He positively identified petitioners as among those he had brought to the
clinic of Cadorniga and who entered the same on the day of the incident.
At the very least, this is further proof of petitioners presence at the
crime scene when the robbery and carnapping were committed, belying
all uncorroborated allegations to the contrary.
In fine, petitioners guilt is indubitable.
As to the penalties imposed, the Court resolves to modify them to
conform to applicable jurisprudence.
In the robbery case, the felony committed by petitioners was simple
robbery by means of violence against or intimidation of persons which,
under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code,38 is punishable with
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium (4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 10 years). There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in the medium period, i.e.,
prision mayor minimum, which has a range of 6 years and 1 day to 8
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioners are entitled
to a minimum term to be taken within the penalty next lower in degree to
that imposed by the Code, or arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional medium, which has a range of 4 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment to be imposed
should be 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum, and
8 years of prision mayor as maximum.39
In the carnapping case, since the crime was similarly committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the imposable
penalty under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 is imprisonment for not
less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years.40
Furthermore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court
should have imposed an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term
not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special penal law and a
minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.41 Therefore, the proper penalty is imprisonment for an
indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4 months as minimum to 30
years as maximum.42
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The challenged Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29967 affirming in toto that of Branch
211 of the Mandaluyong RTC in Crim. Case Nos. MC00-2728 and MC002729 is MODIFIED in that for robbery, the penalty imposed on petitioners
is imprisonment for Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum, and Eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum; and for carnapping, the penalty imposed on petitioners is

imprisonment for an indeterminate sentence of Seventeen (17) years

and Four (4) months as minimum to Thirty (30) years as maximum. In all
other respects, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

12
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 180693

September 4, 2009

BONIFACIO DOLERA Y TEJADA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Bonifacio T. Dolera (petitioner) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 (R.A. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
under an Information reading
xxxx

That on or about the 14th day of August, 2003 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or
use any dangerous drug, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in [his] possession and control, Zero point twenty (0.20)
grams of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine
[sic] hydrochloride a dangerous drug.1

The trial court, by Decision11 of July 20, 2005, convicted petitioner and
sentenced him "to suffer a jail term of twelve years and one day as
minimum and thirteen years as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000."
The trial court observed:

reiterates his lament that he was arrested without a warrant, asserting

that "there was nothing unusual in [his] behavior then which w[ould]
engender a genuine reason to believe that he was committing something
illegal which would compel the police officers to approach him."14

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The court finds it quite improbable that police officers in broad daylight
would just stop and take away with them a person who is doing nothing
but standing on the street in front of his house.

Respecting the Chemistry Report, petitioner contends that it is hearsay,

as the forensic analyst who prepared the document was never presented
to identify it and testify thereon.15

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered.

xxxx

On August 14, 2003, at 3:30 in the afternoon, PO2 Reynaldo Labon (PO2
Labon), PO1 Arnold Pealosa (PO1 Pealosa) and PO2 Victor Aquino,
having received a report of drug trafficking in the vicinity of Bicol Street
in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City, conducted a surveillance along the
area.2

The accused was brought to the police station for investigation and when
asked if it is true that he has shabu, the answer of the accused: "Wala
naman po" does not inspire the confidence that an innocent person, who
is 35 years old and married with a baby, would have said.

Moreover, petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the

chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs to thus cast serious doubt on
whether the specimens presented in court were the ones allegedly
confiscated from him.16

While at the target area, PO2 Labon saw petitioner, at a distance of

seven meters, standing near an alley adjoining Bicol Street, scrutinizing a
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2
Labon, who was in civilian clothes, thus alighted from the vehicle,
followed by PO1 Penalosa, and approached petitioner.3 After introducing
himself as a policeman, PO2 Labon asked petitioner what he was holding,
but the latter, who appeared "natulala,"4 did not reply.
Suspecting that the white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet
was shabu, PO2 Labon confiscated the same5 and handcuffed petitioner.
PO1 Pealosa then frisked petitioner and recovered a heat-sealed plastic
sachet also containing white crystalline substance from the right front
pocket of petitioners pants. After informing him of his constitutional
rights, petitioner was brought to the police station for further
investigation.6
At the police station, PO2 Labon and PO1 Pealosa marked the plastic
sachets with their respective initials "RL" and "AP"7 before turning them
over to the case investigator. Later in the day, the two plastic sachets
including their contents were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. The Chemistry Report8 which recorded the result of the
laboratory examination showed that each of the sachets contained 0.10
grams of shabu, a dangerous drug.
The parties9 having stipulated that forensic analyst Leonard M. Jabonillo
examined the substances and came up with his findings in his Report, his
testimony was dispensed with.
Upon the other hand, petitioner, denying the charge, gave the following
version:
He was standing infront of his house waiting for a ride to the public
market when three men in civilian clothes alighted from a white "FX" and
forced him to board the vehicle. The three brought him to the police
station where he was asked to identify a drug pusher in their place. When
he replied that he did not know of any, they told him that "tutuluyan nila
ako." He was then detained and was subjected to inquest proceedings
after four days. 10

Moreover, the defense of the accused becomes more unconvincing in

view of the fact that not even his wife with a baby and his auntie who
lives in the same house with him came to court despite the lapse of a
long time, to vouch for the accused. His neighbors whom the accused
said saw him being arrested likewise did not come forward to corroborate
his claimed innocence. (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General, maintaining, on the other hand, that the arrest of
petitioner needed no warrant as it was done while petitioner was
committing illegal possession of shabu, posits: Since PO2 Labon and PO1
Pealosa were conducting a surveillance based on a report of rampant
drug trafficking in the area, the chance encounter with petitioner who
was holding a plastic sachet with white crystalline contents gave the
police officers reasonable suspicion to accost him and ask about the
contents thereof. The police officers suspicion was all the more
heightened when petitioner was dumbfounded when asked about the
plastic sachet.17

The Court of Appeals, before which appellant appealed and questioned,

among other things, his warrantless arrest, by Decision12 of October 30,
2006, affirmed petitioners conviction. In brushing aside appellants
questioning of his warrantless arrest, the appellate court held that he
had waived the same when he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.

The Solicitor General further posits that the prosecution did not have to
present the forensic analyst in view of petitioners stipulation that the
two plastic sachets seized from him were found to be positive for shabu.

On the merits, the appellate court held:

Finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the seized plastic sachets
were properly submitted to the police crime laboratory for testing, and,
at all events, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in
the performance by the police officers of their official duties.

The bare denial of accused-appellant that shabu was found in his

possession by the police officers deserves scant consideration. Accusedappellant testified that his arrest was witnessed by several persons who
know him and who are known to him, however, he did not present
anyone of them to corroborate his claim that no shabu was recovered
from him when he was arrested by the police officers. It has been ruled
time and again that a mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving
negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail. Moreover, accused-appellant admitted that he does not know the
police officers who arrested him as it was the first time that he saw them.
In fact, accused-appellant does not impute any improper motive against
the police officers who arrested him. The presumption that the police
officers performed their duties in a regular manner, therefore, stands.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution13 of
November 21, 2007, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
Petitioner initially takes issue on the appellate courts ruling that he
waived any objection to his arrest when he entered a plea upon
arraignment and actively participated in the trial. Underscoring that an
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review, petitioner

The petition is meritorious.

Prefatorily, the Court finds in order the appellate courts observation that
it is too late for petitioner to question the legality of his arrest in view of
his having already entered his plea upon arraignment and participated at
the trial. Having failed to move to quash the information on that ground
before the trial court,18 and having submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court, any supposed defect in his arrest was deemed waived.
For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
his person.19
It is with respect to the failure of the prosecution to prove the chain of
custody of the allegedly seized evidence that the Court departs from the
findings of the appellate and lower courts to warrant a reversal of
petitioners conviction.
For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it
must be shown that (a) the accused was in possession of an item or an
object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (b) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug.20
Thus Mallillin v. People21 emphasized:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates [sic]

that the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be
established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the same is
not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it
may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create
in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of
guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit must also be established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The standard operating procedure on the seizure and custody of
dangerous drugs is found in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which
provides:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 21(a) of Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 9165 more specifically mandates that:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, with respect to the marking of dangerous drug by the
apprehending officer or team in case of warrantless seizures such as in
this case, it must be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. This is
in line with the "chain of custody" rule. People v. Sanchez22 elucidates:

police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is

practicable; however, nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team
from immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of
the items at the place where they were seized, as it is more in keeping
with the laws intent of preserving their integrity and evidentiary value.

FIS. ARAULA: After you turned over the specimen to the investigator,
what happened to the specimen?
WITNESS: It was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory sir.

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from
dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the
apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of
evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending
officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s
seized. If the physical inventory and photograph are made at the nearest
police station or office as allowed by the rules, the inventory and
photography of the seized items must be made in accordance with Sec. 2
of Board Resolution No. 1, Series of 2002, but in every case, the
apprehended violator or counsel must be present. Again, this is in
keeping with the desired level of integrity that the handling process
requires. Thereafter, the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or
an evidence bag unless the type and quantity of the seized items require
a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or
container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned
over to the next officer in the chain of custody. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ranged against these evidentiary norms, the prosecutions terse
treatment of its exacting duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused-petitioner founders. Consider PO1 Pealosas following
testimony:
FIS. ARAULA: You said you turned over the confiscated item to the
investigator?
WITNESS: Yes sir.
FIS. ARAULA: Before you turned over the item what did you do with that
item?

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 23

From the foregoing testimony of prosecution witness PO2 Penalosa which
was essentially echoed by prosecution witness PO2 Labon, there is no
showing how the flow of the custody of the drugs went from the time of
the arrest of petitioner and alleged confiscation of the sachets up to the
turnover thereof at the police station to the investigator according to PO2
Penalosa, to the desk officer according to PO2 Labon.
Neither is there a showing that the items were inventoried or
photographed and marked in the presence of petitioner in accordance
with statutory requirements. In fact, where in the police station and at
what stage of the investigation was the supposed marking of evidence
done were not even indicated.
And there is no indication whether the investigator and the desk officer
were one and the same person, and what steps were undertaken to
insure the integrity of the evidence.
Notably, the record shows that it was PO1 Pealosa who delivered the
items to the crime laboratory.24 How they were turned over to him by
the investigator or desk officer, the prosecution failed to give even a
simple indication thereof.
There is thus a reasonable likelihood of substitution along the chain in
that the two plastic sachets that tested positive for shabu were different
from the items allegedly seized from petitioner. The Court has long
considered such possibility of substitution as fatal for the prosecution.25
Worse, the two marked plastic sachets were not even presented, hence,
not identified in open court by the police officers-witnesses and there is
no explanation extant in the record of what happened to them after their
laboratory examination.
Segueing to the Solicitor Generals assertion that appellant already
admitted that the two plastic sachets were seized from him and that the
contents thereof were tested positive for shabu as contained in the trial
courts Order of September 13, 2004 reading:

WITNESS: We marked it sir.

FIS. ARAULA: What markings was placed on the items before it was given
to the Police Investigator?
WITNESS: Our initial sir.
FIS. ARAULA: What is your initial?
WITNESS: AP sir.
FIS. ARAULA: What about the items, what markings?

. . . [I]n case of warrantless seizures such as a buy- bust operation, the

physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the nearest

xxxx

WITNESS: RL Reynaldo Labon sir.

It is hereby stipulated by the parties that the items allegedly confiscated

from the accused were submitted to the crime lab for examination and
the findings were put into writing and the same were marked by the
prosecution as EXHIBIT B-Request for laboratory examination; EXHIBIT C
Chemistry Report No. D-765-2003; C-1 Findings; EXHIBIT D
Certification; EXHIBIT E Specimen A; E-1 marking lmj; E-2 marking RL;
EXHIBIT F Specimen B; F-1 marking lmj; F-2 marking AP and EXHIBIT G
Brown envelope.
In view of this stipulation, the testimony of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo is
hereby dispensed with.

x x x x (Italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied),

the same fails to impress.
The above-quoted stipulation of facts is self-explanatory. What was
stipulated was that, among other things, "the items allegedly
confiscated" were submitted for laboratory examination.
The Chemistry Report only confirmed the contents of two plastic sachets.
Whether they were the same packets allegedly confiscated from
petitioner, the prosecution failed to establish as there was yet again an
unexplained break in the chain.
That the prosecution offered in evidence the request for laboratory
examination, the chemistry report and the certification from the forensic
analyst26 has no bearing on the question of whether the specimens
submitted for chemical analysis were the same allegedly seized from
petitioner. All that these exhibits proved were the existence and
authenticity of the request for laboratory examination and the results of
said examination, but not the required chain of custody from the time of
seizure of the evidence until its presentation in court.

cons of the evidence offered by both the prosecution and defense in

determining the merits of a case.29
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, petitioner, BONIFACIO T. DOLERA, is ACQUITTED of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City who is ORDERED to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause,
and to inform this Court of action taken within ten days from notice.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

While there is no need to present all persons who came into contact with
the seized drugs to testify in court,27 the prosecution still has to
convincingly establish that the chain of custody remained unbroken
throughout, and the seized items specifically identified. This the
prosecution failed to discharge.
The appellate courts reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions would not suffice to uphold petitioners
conviction. Once challenged by evidence, such as in this case, the
presumption of regularity cannot be regarded as binding truth and
cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of petitioneraccused.281avvphi1
Although petitioners defense is denial which, standing alone, is
inherently weak, the Court has repeatedly stressed that the conviction of
an accused must rest on the strength of the prosecutions evidence and
not on the weakness of his defense.
The prosecution having failed to overturn the constitutional presumption
of innocence in favor of petitioner, his acquittal is in order.
A final word. The Court notes the trial courts seemingly haphazard
consideration of the circumstances of the case as mirrored in its decision.
Its three-paragraph ratio decidendi only discussed the defense evidence
and even rendered judgment on the basis of conjectures and
suppositions. Noticeably, the decision never alluded to the prosecution
evidence, nor even tackled in passing the basis of the penalties it
imposed.
Exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug-related cases, courts should
give more than lip service to the mandate of administering justice by
undertaking a serious and comprehensive consideration of the pros and

13
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

Manila

Each and everyone of the accused Amsah Laih, Jundai Halisan, Taraman
Adil, Kahiral Dastan, Boyongan Sabiban, Sakkam Hussin, Baybayan Asao,
Abdurahman Sahol, Palicta Dugong and Kaligogan Ladialawan is hereby
acquitted of the charges against him with the portionate costs de oficio.
Their immediate release from custody is hereby ordered.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12686

October 24, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

Crim. Cases Nos. 1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 are hereby ordered
dismissed with costs de oficio. The release from custody of all the
accused in those cases, except those who are charged or convicted in
another case, is hereby ordered.

KAMLON HADJI, ET AL., defendants,

KAMLON HADJI, defendant-appellant.
Alonto Law Offices for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Kamlon Hadji, together with a number of other defendants, was charged
in the Court of First Instance of Sulu for different crimes in various cases,
to wit: in Criminal Case No. 1162 for rebellion; in Criminal Cases Nos.
1162-A to 1162-N and 1348 for multiple murder and multiple injuries;
and in Criminal Case No. 1353, together with Ulloh Kaddam, et al., for
kidnapping with murder and attempted murder.
The parties stipulated to have these cases tried jointly whereafter the
trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 1162, the Court hereby sentences the
accused Kamlon, leader of the sedition, to an indeterminate
imprisonment of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a fine of P10,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
proportionate costs.
Each of the accused, Adjudi Asarani and Amsajen Jamah is hereby
sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment of THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6)
MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to
FIVE (5) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of prision
correccional as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00, each, and in case
of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
which, however, shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty; and
to pay the proportionate costs.
Each and everyone of the accused Jumla Abdukari Abdulialim Adin, Ulloh
Urong Angkang Adiad, Angkang Illama, Sahidula Ajad, lbbing Janah,
Kakari Damboa, Akbara Abduhasman, Hatib Hala Amsajen, Hatib Jaron
alias Baito Haron, Awah Kamsa; Waliul Adjudi; Jaujali Gadjali; Suhalili
Jamli; Sinihag Salihan; Sarahan Ibba; is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTH IMPRISONMENT and
ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE
(9) MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of prision correccional as maximum; to
pay a fine of P3,000.00 and in case of insolvency to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment which, however, shall not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty; and to pay the proportionate costs.

In Crim. Case No. 1353, the Court hereby sentences the accused Kamlon
to the death penalty for the kidnapping of Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibon
complexed with the murder of Jamalul Alling; to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P3,000.00, without imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.

instantly. Kamlon then ordered Ulluh to cut the neck of the dead man
whereupon Ulluh, with a barong or native bolo, did as he was bidden.
Ulluh then brought the headless body and the severed head to his vinta
by the shore and paddled out far into the sea. When he returned, he no
longer had with him his gruesome load.
Meanwhile, Kamlon decided to spare Hatib Ajibun from the fate he
imposed on Jamalul Alling. Instead, Ajibun was conducted back to
Kamlon's house where he was "tried' by Kamlon for his alleged
participation in the disappearance of two of his followers. The "trial" must
have caused Kamlon to doubt Ajibun's guilt because at its end, he was
merely told to raise the sum of P105.00 as fine and thereafter he was set
free.

The instant appeal pertains solely to Criminal Case No. 1353 for which
the accused, Kamlon, was found guilty and sentenced to the death
penalty. A co-accused in this ease, Ulluh, was still at large at the time the
lower court rendered its judgment.

The account of Alling's murder as above established by the trial court

was denied, disavowed and disputed by the defendant. He offered an
entirely different version of the killing. According to Kamlon, the
deceased was shot to death, not by him, but by some relatives of a
woman who, on that occasion, Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibun were
attempting to abduct.

In connection with the conviction of Kamlon, however, it must be stated

that the trial judge recommended the commutation of the penalty
imposed to life imprisonment, The trial judge based his recommendation
upon his finding that the defendant agreed to surrender principally
because he was made to believe by the authorities "that he would be
paroled." In the words of the decision of the lower court, "If the
Constabulary officers concerned did not promise any condition to Kamlon
for his surrender, said officers deliberately misled the negotiator Arolas
Tulawie and Kamlon into believing that Kamlon's parole would be
respected or be enforced after all outlaws had surrendered. In one word,
the officers concerned dealt with Arolas Tulawie and Kamlon in double
talk. They were not frank.

The defendant's version of the killing of Jamalul Alling was sought to be

established by the sisters, Bariha Imam Habilul and Muhayla Iman
Habilul, who testified that one day they went to take a bath at a watering
place some 100 brazas from where they were living. While washing their
clothes at the same place and gathering water in bamboo tubes, Bariha
suddenly heard Muhayla shout: "Bariha, you better run away. I am being
embraced and held by Ajibun and Jamalul." Muhayla made the outcry
because Jamalul and Ajibun who emerged from the nearby bushes
suddenly took hold of the hands of Muhayla and pulled her towards the
eastern part of the place, a sitio called Buhangin Mahaba. Upon hearing
the scream of Muhayla, Bariha ran away but was able to see Ajibun and
Jamalul holding the hands of Muhayla.

The trial court rendered the judgment of conviction upon the following
factual findings:

Bariha ran and screamed for help. Among those who came to her succor
were her uncle, Adu, and some other men-folk of the village, Biteng, Tanji
and Uttung, who forthwith armed themselves with guns and went after
Ajibun and Jamalul.

One morning some two years prior to the trial of this case, the herein
defendant, together with two other armed companions, Ulluh and
Angkang, set out to look for two men whom they suspected were
responsible for the disappearance of two of the followers of the
defendant. The search ended when the defendant and his companions
chanced upon their quarry, Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling, in the vicinity
of Buhangin Mahaba gathering vines. Thereupon, threatening to kill
unless Ajibun and Alling went with them, Kamlon and his companions
seized the pair and brought them to Tigbas, Luuk District where, at that
time, Kamlon was residing. At the market place of Tigbas, Kamlon made
known to his captives the reason for their abduction, and, although
Ajibun and Alling disavowed any knowledge or responsibility for the
disappearance of the two persons Kamlon was seeking to avenge, their
protestations of innocence were disbelieved and altogether unheeded.
Hatib Ajibun and Jamalul Alling were detained overnight. The following
day, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, they were brought to the
market place and, in a store, they were made to sit on chairs, one beside
the other. On being ordered by Kamlon, their hands were then tied to the
roof by Ulluh. Thus seated and with their hands tied to the roof, Kamlon
leveled his automatic carbine at Jamalul Alling and fired, killing him

Meanwhile, at Buhangin Mahaba, Jamalul and Ajibun tried to force

Muhayla into a vinta. Ajibun went inside the vinta and pulled the hands of
Muhayla as Jamalul pushed her into the craft in an effort to place her on
board. Muhayla, however, succeeded in frustrating their efforts by
pushing the vinta, and while being engaged in this struggle, she heard
her uncle Adu yell: "Muhayla, duck;" Muhayla ducked by dropping herself
on the sea, face downwards, and as her body hit the shallow water, she
heard bursts of gunfire coming from the place where Adu had given out
his order.
After the shots, Muhayla ran towards her uncle. The burst of fire hit
Jamalul who fell on the water almost falling on Muhayla. Ajibun was fired
upon, but he was able to paddle himself away out to the sea.
We cannot find any just or valid cause for rejecting the version accepted
by the trial court. While the defendant had indeed insisted that the
prosecution version was false and untrue, he has failed to demonstrate
to this Tribunal exactly in what area of the proceeding or evidence such

fallacy and untruth obtain. This case has resolved itself into a question of
who among the witness at the trial were telling the truth. We can hardly
hold ourselves in a better position to answer that than the trial judge who
had his five physical senses to aid him reach the fair, correct and just
conclusion. While we have merely the records to guide Us by, the trial
judge saw the witnesses, heard them speak, watched them move. He
was, therefore, in the far advantageous position of being able to
discriminate more competently than Us the prevaricators among the
witnesses from those who testified the truth. Consequently, as the
evidence on record sufficiently attest to the findings of the lower court,
We shall not disturb the same.
The defendant contend that the length of time which intervened between
the actual commission of the crime charged and the filing of the same in
the trial court a period of 21 months attests to the unreliability of
the prosecution witnesses. We are told that if those who testified for the
government did actually witness the defendant commit the murder, they
would have forthwith reported the incident to the authorities and this
case would have been filed sooner. It is vigorously impressed on Us that
the delay betrays the truthfulness of the case for the prosecution.

(U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is
the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at
common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully
kills any human being, in the peace of the sovereign, with malice
aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are
perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected
in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses com nomine different, but the
allegations in the body of the information are different. The gist of the
information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the
constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the
object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the
police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the
city of Manila; that gist of the information in the murder case is that the
Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight
persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and
serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information
for sedition; and the defendants could not have been convicted of these
crimes under the first information. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot sustain the view of the defendant on the last point raised.
Although it is true that undue delay in the prosecution of criminal actions
speaks of the suspicious veracity of the state's claim, the same
observation cannot be made where the delay or inaction, long though it
may be, was imposed on the government by causes over which it has no
control. In the premises and as explained by the Solicitor General's
Office, "the incident took place 15 days before the last military
operations against Kamlon. People in the area affected were in the grip of
fear and felt no other than for their personal safety. The witnesses could
have preferred to remain in silence of what they knew against Kamlon in
the hope, however, that with the military operations about to be set
afoot, retributive justice would catch up with Kamlon and his henchmen
that they might perish in the battle."

And, in the case of People v. Umali, supra, after rejecting the

government's theory that the crime committed was rebellion complexed
with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, but rather
sedition and the said common crimes, We proceeded to convict the
defendants therein of the said crime of sedition and the common crimes
of murder, frustrated murder, etc. The dispositive portion of this last
cited case read: "In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition,
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. . . ."

The more transcendental aspect of this appeal refers to the view of the
defendant that, by the doctrine enunciated in the cases of People v.
Hernandez, et al., 52 O.G. 5506 and People v. Geronimo, 53 O.G. No. 1, p.
68, "the trial court erred in convicting herein accused for kidnapping with
murder in spite of the fact that said acts of violence were committed in
furtherance of sedition and therefore absorbed in this latter crime."

In citing the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo, supra, it seems to Us

that the herein defendant missed a very significant point. When We held
in those two cases that murder and other acts of violence were absorbed
by "rebellion," the common crimes alleged to have been committed in
furtherance of the rebellion were specifically charged in the information
and, for that reason, were consequently necessarily alleged to have been
committed for political ends. In the prosecution at bar, however, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, "the information makes no
allegation of political motivation, and the evidence is totally devoid of
any such motivation, for on the contrary, the proof adduced shows that
the killing had no political or social color, but purely motivated by
personal vengeance."

There is neither law nor jurisprudence which can allow this Court to
uphold the defendant's claim that acts of violence like murder and
kidnapping are absorbed by sedition. The aforecited cases of Hernandez
and Geronimo, supra, cannot properly be invoked as authority for that
legal proposition since those two cases involved the crime of rebellion
and not sedition.
Indeed, as this Court adheres to and is guided in great measure by the
rule of stare decisis, We deem ourselves unfree at the moment to
disregard our rulings in the cases of People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, and
People v. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, Nov. 29, 1954. In the Cabrera case, this
Court held:
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same
offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a
crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence
of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public
tranquility; murder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals.

Clearly then, the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction allows for the
treatment of the common offenses of murder etc. as distinct and
independent acts separable from sedition.

There is yet one significant fact in this case which must be made of
record before this Tribunal hands down Its judgment on appeal. The
defendant Kamlon, prior to his prosecution for the case at bar, had been
convicted for rebellion with multiple murder and multiple physical injuries
in Criminal Case No. 763 of the Court of First Instance of Sulu. Soon after
his conviction, however, he was extended a conditional pardon by the
late President Elpidio Quirino. There were four (4) conditions to the
pardon, namely: (1) that Kamlon was to report monthly to the nearest
constabulary or Justice of the Peace; (2) that Kamlon would assist the
authorities in the surrender of firearms; and (3) that Kamlon would allow
himself to be visited by any authority of the Government and allow him
to question him freely; and (4) that he would cooperate with the

Government in the surrender and apprehension of wanted persons in

Luuk.
Instead of honoring the aforementioned conditions, however, Kamlon
brazenly violated the same. He did not only fail to report regularly to the
authorities as required; he even violently prevented legitimate
government agents from visiting and questioning him. It was these
lawlessness and defiance which ultimately precipitated and resulted into
the various criminal prosecutions enumerated at the start of this
decision, including this one on appeal.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court affirms in full the findings
and judgment of the lower court. The crime committed is kidnapping
complexed with murder. We find the death penalty as well as the
indemnity in the amount of P3,000.00 imposed in accordance with law
and affirm the same with costs against the defendant.

FERNANDO, J.:p

14
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34022

March 24, 1972

MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to which no

authoritative answer has been yielded by past decisions, is the scope to
be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in
going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony
and breach of the peace. 1 Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin 2 and
Fernando Bautista, Sr., 3 as delegate of the present Constitutional
Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the
above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee
who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member
thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable
under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor." 4 For under
the Constitutional Convention Act, 5 delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. 6 Both
petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against
petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document
and two informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for
violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of
the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, 7 would dispute such a
contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover
any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil
cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the
Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be
unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. A careful study of the
above constitutional provision, in the light of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, adopting the then well-settled principle under
American law and of the purposes to be served by such an immunity,
persuade us that the stand taken by the Solicitor General is correct.
These certiorari proceedings cannot prosper.

FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Baguio and Benguet, Second Judicial District, Branch III, et al.,
respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Amelito Mutuc, Reynaldo Villar, Alberto K. Jamir
Anacleto Badoy, Jr., Emmanuel Santos, Sedfrey Ordoez, Antonio Tupaz,
Arturo Pacificador, Dominador F. Carillo, Antonio Borromeo, Augusto
Cesar Espiritu, Dandy K. Tupaz and Eugene A. Tan for petitioner Manuel
Martinez Y Festin.
Remulla, Perez and Estrella, Fernando P. Cabato and Gaudencio N.
Floresca for petitioner Fernando Bautista Sr.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo P. Pardo, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and
Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza for respondents Judges.
Kaulayao V. Faylona, Manuel Imbong, Jacobo Gonzales, Fernando P.
Camaya, Jose Tablizo, Romeo Kahayon and Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for
respondents Pulido and Tamayo.

The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner
Martinez y Festin 8 alleged that on June 10, 1971, an information against
him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis was his stating
under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to that
Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in
truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. There was
on July 9, 1971, a special appearance on his part questioning the power
of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that the
information be quashed. On the same day, there was an order from the
lower court suspending the release of the warrant of arrest until it could
act on such motion to quash. Then came on July 22, 1971 an omnibus
motion from him, with previous leave of court, to quash the information,
to quash the warrant of arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding
in the case. It was not favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971,
respondent Judge rendered an order denying the petitioner omnibus
motion to quash. In his belief that the information and the warrant of
arrest in this case are null and void, the petitioner did not post the
required bond. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of
September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the petition he was
confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden of
Manila. He was on his way to attend the plenary session of the
Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was against his will and over his
protest. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at such a
time a motion by petitioner to reconsider the court's order of August 21,
1971. It was denied in open court. On the very same day, he filed the
petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but having been released
thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the petition is now in the
nature solely of a certiorari proceeding. 9

As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is a duly

elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
He took his oath of office and assumed the functions of such office on
June 1, 1971. He has continued since then to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two criminal complaints,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed
with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio and Benguet by a certain
Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th in the order
of votes garnered against the petitioner, and his co-accused for alleged
violation of Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and
distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public
meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in
Province of Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the
preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints. Thereafter on
August 7, 1971, he issued an order for the filing of the corresponding
informations. Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could be
issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked the privilege of
immunity from arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in
relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the very same day, issued an
order, holding in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest and setting
the hearing of said Motion on August 23, 1971. As scheduled on August
23, 1971, there was a hearing on such motion. Petitioner however did not
prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim for immunity,
a warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day. On September 11,
1971, there was a motion to quash such order of arrest filed by
petitioner. He was unsuccessful, respondent Judge, in an order of said
date, ordering his immediate arrest. His petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed with this Court on September 15, 1971. 11
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is
that the respective warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on
the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as
delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the
Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
Code, they are immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y
Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a public document
punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the
penalty that could be imposed for each of the Revised Election Code
offense, of which he is charged, is not higher than prision mayor. 13
The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer by
resolutions of this Court issued on September 10 and September 20,
1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of respondent Judge Jesus P.
Morfe in the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin was filed on September
20, 1971 with an answer in intervention filed by respondent Executive
Sheriff of Manila and the Chief of Warrant Division likewise filed on the
same date. His petition was duly heard on September 14, 1971, Delegate
Estanislao A. Fernandez vehemently pressing his claim to immunity.
Thereafter on October 29, 1971, a memorandum, comprehensive in
scope and persuasive in its analysis of the constitutional question
presented, was filed on behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor
General Felix Q. Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General Bernardo P.
Pardo and Rosalio A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. A
memorandum on behalf of President Diosdado Macapagal of the
Constitutional Convention, who was given permission to submit such a
pleading, was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the Committee on Legal
Affairs of the Constitutional Convention. 14
As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of respondent
Judge was filed on September 29, 1971. When the matter was heard on

October 14, 1971, he appeared through counsel, Delegate Juanito R.

Remulla, while respondent Judge was represented by Assistant Solicitor
General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. With the
submission, on October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of
respondent judge, again, by the same counsel from the Office of the
Solicitor General as well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of
petitioner Bautista, Sr., on December 1, 1971, the matter was deemed
submitted for adjudication.
As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants of
arrest issued against petitioner Martinez y Festin as well as petitioner
Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional provision which for them
should be supplemented by what was provided for in the Revised Penal
Code is futile. There is no justification then for granting their respective
pleas.
No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and explicit
command of the Constitution. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI,
the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason,
felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies
war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and
comfort. 15 A felony is act or omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of
the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code
or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the
public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one
susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit language of
the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation as shown by
the debates of the Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter discussed,
petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of
the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took
effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative
on November 15, 1935. As will be shown, the repugnancy between such
an expansion of the congressional immunity and the plain command of
the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption
that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event
that he did arrest one entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less
than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope. This is so considering
not only the history of such a Constitutional grant of immunity but also
its basic purpose and objective.
1.
Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of
freedom from arrest were clothed in language less clear, its history
precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was worded as follows: "The
Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, open
disturbance of public order, or other offense punishable by death or
imprisonment of not less than six years, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going
to and returning from the same." On December 4, 1934, upon its being
considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate
Aldeguer so that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same." What was
sought by him was to retain the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act
of 1916, with phraseology identical to that found in the American
Constitution.
He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the
same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to the members of the
Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary

immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting

parliamentary immunity to members of the various state legislators of
the Union. Now, in reading the draft proposed by the Sub-Committee of
Seven, I found out that it is a broad rule. Mr. President, the question is
not whether we should grant privilege of immunity to the members of
the National Assembly ... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of order
raised, but he was allowed to continue. He went on: "As I was saying, Mr.
President and Gentlemen of the Convention, the draft gives to the
member of the National Assembly more privileges than what the nature
of the office demands. My question is that if the members of the
Congress of the United States, if the members of the Parliament, if the
members of the various State Legislatures were able to perform their
functions as members of law-making bodies with the privileges and
immunities granted by the phrase "breach of peace." I wonder why the
members of the future National Assembly cannot perform their duties
with the same limitations and with the same privileges. Mr. President and
members the Convention, the history of parliamentary immunity shows
that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly
from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into
these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This
theory of government places every man equal before the eyes of the law.
The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means the
abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law.
Another reason, Mr. President and Members of the Convention, is this:
The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of
the Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of selfpreservation. The right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact
that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must
also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The
State is the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime is
committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the State. Giving
more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of
the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. So that, Mr.
President, and Members of the Convention, believing that under the
phrase "breach of peace", our future members of the Assembly can very
well perform the duties incumbent upon them. I submit my amendment
for the consideration of this Convention." 18
Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of seven did not
object. As a matter of fact, he was for such amendment. He considered it
"well-founded" and was for such immunity complying "with the wording
of the [Philippine Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The Convention
readily approved the amendment by acclamation.
It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is
granted by the Constitution was understood in the same sense it has in
American law, there being a similar provision in the American
Constitution. 20 Its authoritative interpretation in the United States was
supplied by the Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the
opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the peace," as used in
the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of
the privilege all criminal offenses, ... " 22 He traced its historical
background thus: "A brief consideration of the subject of parliamentary
privilege in England will, we think, show the source whence the
expression "treason felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn, and
leave no doubt that the words were used in England for the very purpose
of excluding all crimes from the operation of the parliamentary privilege,
and therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a
civil nature." 23 Story's treatise on the Constitution was likewise cited,
his view on the matter being quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are

offenses against the peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would
seem to extend to all indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact
attended with force and violence, as those which are only constructive
breaches of the peace of the government, inasmuch as they violate its
good order." 24
As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25 and
Willoughby 26 could use practically identical appraising such immunity,
the former stating that it "is not now of great importance" and the latter
affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the person is now
almost never authorized except for crimes which fall within the classes
exempt from the priviledge." The state of the American law on this point
is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By common parliamentary law, the
members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process
during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and
after, to enable them to go to and return from the same." 27 A
prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus excluded from this grant of
immunity. So it should be Philippine law, if deference were to be paid to
what was explicitly agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.
2.
Would it make a difference however in the availability of the
writs of certiorari sought by petitioners considering that Article 145 of
the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public officer or
employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or special session,
arrest or charge any member thereof except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor? 28
The assumption here indulged is that the effect of the above in the
Revised Penal Code was to expand the grant of parliamentary immunity
under the Philippine Autonomy Act, although its literal language does not
go that far. It is to be remembered, however, that it took effect on
January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the present Constitution in
1935. Considering that both under the then organic law, the Philippine
Autonomy Act and equally so under the present Constitution, such a
more generous treatment accorded legislators exempting them from
arrest even if warranted under a penal law, the question as to whether it
did survive becomes unavoidable. It is our opinion that the answer must
be in the negative.
The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws of the
Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution until amended,
altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all
references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines
shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v.
Linsangan 30 decided in December, 1935, barely a month after the
Constitution took effect, the continued applicability of Section 2718 of
the Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a
person who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 31 this
Court, in its opinion thru the pen of the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the
imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems too
clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III
of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for
non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that
upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said
section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative,
and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon." 33

So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the provision of the

Revised Administrative Code the President could remove at pleasure any
of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City of Baguio. 35
Relying on such a provision, the then President Quirino removed
petitioner De los Santos who was appointed City Engineer Baguio of on
July 16, 1946, and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. The
Revised Administrative Code was a legislation that dates back to 1917,
36 eighteen years before the Constitution prohibited any officer or
employee in the civil service being removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law. 37 Again this Court, in the light of aforecited
provision in an opinion of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike legislation that
is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the
questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the
way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and
eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express
mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the language of the
constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a
public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or
special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he
has committed a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by
policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force
except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in
free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a
delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering
that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not
go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting
arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of
an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse
of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would main
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of
judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate
Manuel Martinez by Festin in L-34022 and the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047
are hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

CamarinesSur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus

Eligio Orbita, accused," so as to include, as defendants, Governor
Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of
Camarines Sur; as well as the order dated February 18, 1970, denying
the motion for the reconsideration of the said order.
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Eligio Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity
in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished under Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed, as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of
Taculod, municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur
and specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody and
vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did then and there with
great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence leave the latter
unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run
away and escape, as in fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did
run away and escape from the custody of the said accused. 1

15
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31839

June 30, 1980

EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA

1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of
Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminay injunction, to annul and set aside the order of the respondent
Judge, dated January 26, 1970, directing the petitioners, Provincial Fiscal
and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, to amend the information
filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of

In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the crossexamination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial
warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forht and confronted the
witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov.
Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the
construction of a fence at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines
Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Jose
Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded
the note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature
appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was made
and signed by Gov. Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo
Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose
Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the
offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged, the
defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the
information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
defendants therein. 3
Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution
officers 4 and finding that "the court cannot grant the motion or order
the inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage unless an
investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office,
within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of the case,
taking into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in relation to
Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine
once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his
assistant have any criminatory participation in the circumstances of
Pablo Denaque's escape from judicial custody. 5
In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the
case for December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera
Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden, and the accused
Eligio Orbita to be present thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date
set for the reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda
and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear.
Neither was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional evidence
was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that
"after conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and

intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case
against Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot
be charged. 7
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court dated
December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to
reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce
during the trial of this case, he be ordered to amend the information on
to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on record that their
inclusion is warranted. 8
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained
of, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about
by the prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so amended by including in
the information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the person or
persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions of
Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. 9
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the
motion was denied on February 18, 1970. 11 Hence, the instant recourse.
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge
committed an error in ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as
to include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants in
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It
is the rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion
to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to support the allegations thereof. 12 Although this power
and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence
at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed
an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would be
embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute
a case when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does
not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not
convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to
appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a
special prosecutor.
Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and whimsically
refused to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda.
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further
reinvestigation of the case, the respondent Judge candidly ad. muted
that without a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot determine once and
for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the
information. Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted by the
fiscals office. Summonses were issued. But, no additional fact was
elicited since Eligio Orbita did not appear thereat. Neither was the note
(Exh. 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny
the genuineness of the signature appearing in the note since it was not
on hand. Such being the case, the prosecuting officers had reason to
refuse to amend the information filed by them after a previous pre
examination and investigation.

Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima

facie case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend
the information is based upon the following facts:
1.
Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while
working at the Guest House of Governor Cledera on September 12, 1968;
2.
The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the
province and its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province
of Camarines Sur,
3.
That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was
charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and the detainee from
the jail to the residence of the governor.
4.
That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order of
the Governor (Exhibit 2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and
5.
That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked
the group of Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968. 14
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. The city Of arrests mayor in
its maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be
imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal
establishment t any person confined therein or shall help the escape of
such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If
the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments
by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in
their minimum period.
The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person
confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a
person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the
place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the
person released To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or
penal institution means to furnished that person with the material means
such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. 15
The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the
offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he
is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty under
Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is
the jailer of the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo
Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise
no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of
the Revised Penal Code, which reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any Public officer
who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge,
shall be punished

1.
By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and temporary disqualification in its minimum period to perpetual special
disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final
judgment to any penalty.
2.
By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary
special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally
convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation
of law or municipal ordinance.
In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code,
it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in,
the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in
the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an
essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the
custody of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of
guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated
the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the
escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita
can be deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking
for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does
not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest
house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to
compose the work party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and
Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article
punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has
escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite
amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty. 18 In the constant
case, the respondent Judge said:
We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape.
of Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's or . his assistants
negligence. According to law, if there is any negligence committed it
must be the officer who is charged with the custody and guarding of
the ... 19
We find no reason to set aside such findings.
WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita,
accused are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent Judge or any
other judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with the trial of the
case. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Honorio V. Garcia and Bernardo Abesamis for defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
On October 16, 1958, Marcial Ama y Perez, Ernesto de Jesus and
Alejandro Ramos were charged with murder before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in an information the pertinent portions of which read:
That on or about the 27th day of August, 1958, in the New Bilibid Prison,
municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
armed with deadly weapons to wit: sharp-pointed instruments, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Almario Bautista, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on the
different parts of his body an as a result of which, said Almario Bautista
died instantaneously.
That the accused are quasi-recidivist having committee the abovementioned felony while serving their respective sentences after having
been convicted of final judgment.
That the crime was committed in the presence of public authorities who
were then engaged in the discharge of their duties.
After the accused pleaded not guilty, upon arraignment, the trial court
set the case for hearing on November 25, 1958. On the same date,
however, De Jesus and Ramos moved for postponement on the ground
that they were asking the fiscal to reinvestigate their case, which motion
was granted. Marcial Ama y Perez, on the other hand moved that he be
permitted to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute it for
that of guilty. Granting said motion, the court directed that the
information read and explained again to him, after which Marcial Ama,
with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, sponstaneously and
voluntarily pleaded guilty as charged.
16
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14783

April 29, 1961

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCIAL AMA Y PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
MARCIAL AMA Y PEREZ, defendant-appellant.

Then, counsel for the accused moved that the minimum penalty be
imposed in view of his plea of guilty, which motion was objected to by
the prosecution, contending that since the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present which cannot be offset by the
mitigate circumstance of plea of guilty, the imposable penalty should be
the maximum or death. And after the fiscal had submitted proof relative
to the presence of the aggravating circumstance alleged in the
information, the court rendered decision sentencing Marcial Ama y Perez
to death penalty, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P6,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. Whereupon, the case was elevated to this Court for review
pursuant to Section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.
The main error assigned by counsel is that the lower court erred in
allowing appellant to change his plea of not guilty to that of guilty
without informing him that his plea cannot offset the aggravating
circumstance of quasi recidivism alleged in the information as to obviate
imposition of death penalty. According to defense counsel, had the trial

court informed appellant that despite his plea of guilty he would still be
sentenced to death, he would have chosen to go to trial no matter how
slim might be his chance of being acquitted. Counsel further avers that
the attorney who assisted appellant in the lower court committed an
oversight in advising him to plead guilty overlooking the provisions of
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code on quasi-recidivism, while the
lower court erred in sentencing him to death relying merely on his plea of
guilty.
There is no merit in this appeal. When an accused is arraigned in
connection with a criminal charge the only duty of the court is to inform
him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend it, as
well as the circumstances attendant thereto.1 And when the charge is of
a serious nature it becomes the imperative duty of his counsel not only
to assist him during the reading of the information but also to explain to
him the real import of the charge so that he may fully realize the gravity
and consequences of his plea. But there is nothing in the law that
imposes upon the court the duty to apprise him of what the nature of the
penalty to be meted out to him might be if he would plead guilty to the
charge, its duty being limited to have him informed of the nature and
cause thereof. In the instant case, the lower court did just that. In fact, it
did even more. Considering the gravity of the charge it asked the fiscal to
produce the evidence in his possession relative to the aggravating
circumstance alleged in the information so that appellant's counsel may
peruse it, and this was done without any objection on his part, and
thereafter, the court rendered its decision. The error that counsel now
imputes to the lower court is, therefore, untenable. Indeed, if appellant
expressed his desire to plead guilty, it is for no other reason than that his
conscience persuaded him to do so, and so he has to suffer its
consequences.
With regard to counsel's contention that the lower court erred in
convicting appellant merely on his plea of guilty without requiring the
fiscal to produce evidence in support of the charge, suffice it to quote
hereunder what we said in a recent case:
We are fully convinced that before the appellants entered their plea of
guilty, they were apprised of the import a consequences thereof. They
did not plead, without the assistance of counsel. Counsel de oficio was all
the time at hand. The presumption of regularity and faithfulness in the
performance of official functions, on the part of counsel de oficio, has not
been overcome. No evidence appear on record that he ha failed in his
duty to advice the appellants of what to do. It would be creating a
dangerous precedent to say now that the advice to plead guilty by the
appointed counsel de oficio improvident.
The issues raised by counsel in his brief were already answered by us in
a number of cases. In U.S. v. Barba, 29 Phil. 206, and U.S. v. Santiago, 35
Phil. 20, it was held that plea of guilty is an admission of all the material
fact alleged in the complaint or information. In subsequent cases we
ruled that a plea of guilty when formally entered in arraignment is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense charged in the
information, without the necessity of requiring additional evidence, since
by so pleading, the defendant himself has supplied the necessary proof
(People v. Valencia, 59 Phil. 42; People v. Palupe, 69 Phil. 702.) It matters
not even if the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers
both the crime as well as its attendant circumstances (People v. Acosta,
G.R. No. L-7449, March 23, 1956). The allegation that the defendants did
not get any practical benefit in pleading guilty to the crime charged, is
not a plausible argument to dub the plea of guilty, as improvidently
made. As well observed by the Solicitor General, "The matter of pleading

guilty to a charge is not a game. An accused pleads guilty because he

believes that he is guilty. The advantages that he may get by so pleading
are mere secondary considerations. Using the very argument of
appellants that their plea of guilty did not improve their situation, we
ask, what advantage would appellant achieve by undergoing a trial?"
xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision

pronouncement as to costs.

appealed

from

is

affirmed,

without

xxx

Undoubtedly, . . . the trial judge must have been fully satisfied that the
appellants entered the plea of guilty, with full knowledge of the meaning
and consequences of their act, more so when, as in this case, the lives of
the appellants were involved. The record does not reveal that appellants
or counsel ever complained or protested at the time of arraignment that
they did not understand the information and the effect of their plea of
guilty. (People v. Yamson and Romero, G.R. No. L-14189, October 25,
1960.)

17

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372

(2) Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Control Act of 1990);

AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM

(3) Republic Act No. 5207 (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of
1968);

SECTION 1. Short Title. This Act shall henceforth be known as the

"Human Security Act of 2007."
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is declared a policy of the State to protect life,
liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to
the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a
crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations. cDAITS
In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic
rights and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.
The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive
approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into
account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist
and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict
peace-building, addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and promoting
equitable economic development.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of
constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be
understood, however that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the
executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect for human rights which
shall be absolute and protected at all times.
SECTION 3. Terrorism. Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine
Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d'Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
(1) Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);

(4) Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);

(5) Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974); and,
(6) Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on
Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition
or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty
of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment,
without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SECTION 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. Persons who conspire to commit the
crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the
same.
SECTION 5. Accomplice. Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of
the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the
execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or
simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to
twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 6. Accessory. Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated therein,
either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or
assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by
harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime,
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall
not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,

descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of
subparagraph (a).

conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or
being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which the
authorization shall be used or carried out.

SECTION 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of

Communications. The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the
contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team
may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of
any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism.

SECTION 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. Any authorization granted by

the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only
be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of
the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or
law enforcement official.

Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between

lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business
correspondence shall not be authorized.
SECTION 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any
person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall
only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written
application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing
by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application,
and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has
been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that there is probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is
essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or
prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means
readily available for acquiring such evidence. ICacDE
SECTION 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. The written order
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend
or renew the same, the original application of the applicant, including his application to extend
or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed
and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or
whose communications, letters, papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or
written words and effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law
enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement
authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the
interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such as
name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic
(whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or
spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be
tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such
person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do
so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the
police or of the law enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses,
and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially
authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages,

The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest: and Provided, further, That
the ex parte application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant,
has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the
application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the
members of the team named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals shall file the application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice
to the liability of the police or law enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant
police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period
granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the
appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, interception
and recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception and recording. The
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to notify the person subject of the
surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified above.
SECTION 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. All tapes, discs,
and recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or
memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the
expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any extension or renewal granted
by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing Division of
the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be
accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the
members of his team.
In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the
required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named
in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the
members of the team that required affidavit.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs
and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in
whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the
items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items
enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.

SECTION 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. The joint affidavit of the police or of the law
enforcement official and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the number of
tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and
summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in
connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and
recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number of excerpts
and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in connection
therewith that have been included in the deposit; and (d) the date of the original written
authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex
parteapplication to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as
the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole
or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the
whole or any part of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and memoranda, have
been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope
or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or exclude
from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section. aCHDAE
Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed in
the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. The sealed envelope or sealed
package and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information, and the sealed
envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs,
and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda
made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read, replayed, or used as
evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
which written order shall be granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice
filed before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the
Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file
the application with proper written notice the person whose conversation, communication,
message discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance,
monitoring, recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the
sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify
in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six
years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SECTION 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. The
written application with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed envelope or
sealed package shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or
sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging,
and or reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and
summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); and, (d)
for using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and
summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith) as
evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify
as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of
imprisonment.
SECTION 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. Any listened to, intercepted,
and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their
existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation
of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence
against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation,
inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SECTION 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings.
Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in
whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written word of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten
(10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office shall be imposed
upon any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the
Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form
any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism:Provided,
That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall be
allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence
for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said
authorization.
SECTION 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons.
Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in
terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize
mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand
shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court,
with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of
persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group
of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
SECTION 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. The provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law
enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in
the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the
moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained,
and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the
arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must
result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27
of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person
suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's

residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night.
It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or
law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before
him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by
questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any
physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written
report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper
court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith
submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to
his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall
notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided,
That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the
written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused
was arrested.cEAIHa
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall
be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge
as Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SECTION 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack.
In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more
than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of
a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan
or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement
personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned
above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any
of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned
within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however,
That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack
or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.
SECTION 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority
within Three Days. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has
apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three days.
SECTION 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. The moment a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the
arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to
whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the
nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice,
the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal
assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to
immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with legal assistance. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b)
informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed
to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without
restriction; (d) allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the

members of his family or with his nearest relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed
freely to avail of the service of a physician or physicians of choice.
SECTION 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. Any police or law
enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit
that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall
suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or
detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police
officer or hear or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time
the violation was done.
SECTION 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. The
police or other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has
been placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained
official logbook, which is hereby declared as a public document and opened to and made
available for the inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or
any member of his or her family or relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree or his or her physician at any time of the day or night without any form of restriction.
The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and address
of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest
and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or physicians who examined him
physically and medically; (d) the state of his health and physical condition at the time of his
initial admission for custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each removal of the detained
person from his cell for interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date and time of his return to his
cell; (g) the name and address of the physician or physicians who physically and medically
examined him after each interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical findings on
the detained person after each of such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his family
members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names and addresses of persons
who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time of each of such visits; (1) the date and time
of each request of the detained person to communicate and confer with his legal counsel or
counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date and time of each departure of his legal
counsel or counsels; and, (n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant details
regarding the treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.
The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the
aforementioned lawyer or lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the person under custody or his or her physician issue a
certified true copy of the entries of the logbook relative to the concerned detained person
without delay or restriction or requiring any fees whatsoever including documentary stamp tax,
notarial fees, and the like. This certified true copy may be attested by the person who has
custody of the logbook or who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize it at the time the
demand for the certified true copy is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the
preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. No threat,
intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or
mental, moral, or psychological pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise, the evidence obtained from said detained
person resulting from such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain

or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not
admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative,
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SECTION 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation
and Interrogation of a Detained Person. Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation,
or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure,
which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation and
interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be
guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20)
years of imprisonment. TEcADS
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a
consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence of the
infliction on him of such physical pain or torment, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of
such mental, moral, or psychological pressure, the penalty shall be twelve (12) years and one
day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 26. Restriction on Travel. In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and
the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to
bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right
of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is
pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section
6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the
court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be
forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual
place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails,
computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence
until otherwise ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused
or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on
motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.
SECTION 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and
Records. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary
notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle
anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing
called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law
enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the antiterrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the
gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned shall
not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information, when so ordered by
and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals.
SECTION 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. The
written order of the Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons, or (3) of any member of such organization,

association, or group of persons in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering of any
relevant information about the same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that
effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing to file
such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file
such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of
examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1)
of the person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of
persons; or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons.
SECTION 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the
Examination of Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the
same, the original ex parte application of the applicant, including his ex parte application to
extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council, shall be
deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the person whose
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records have been examined, frozen,
sequestered and seized by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of
the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she
intends to do so, the legality of the interference. The written order of the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the identify
of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism; (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or
group of persons; and (3) member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons, as the case may be, whose deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information to be gathered; (b) the
identity of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will conduct the
said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time the
authorization shall be carried out.
SECTION 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain Information
on Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. The authorization issued or granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to examine or cause the examination of and to
freeze bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records, or to gather information
about the same, shall be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days
from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said
authorization for another period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable to another
thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest:
and, Provided, further, That the application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the
original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the
application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the
members of the ream named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court
of Appeals shall file the application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice
to the liability of the police or law enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant
police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period
granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the
appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.

If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify in writing the person subject of the bank
examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records. The
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to notify in writing the person
subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records. HIDCTA
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify
in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of
imprisonment.
SECTION 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after Examination of
Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. All information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from
the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) a member of any such organization, association, or group of persons shall, within
forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration
of the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be
deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed
package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant
police or law enforcement official and the persons who actually conducted the examination of
said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records.
SECTION 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the
identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records examined; (b) the identity and address of the bank or financial institution where such
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the
number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records discovered,
examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of each of such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working
sheets, reports, documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed
package deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the
original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex
parte application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original
written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; and (g) that
the items enumerated were all that were found in the bank or financial institution examined at
the time of the completion of the examination.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and
documents acquired from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are placed
in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and
information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the
items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.

Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys
the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. The sealed envelope or sealed package
and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information and the sealed
envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents shall not be divulged,
revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only upon a written
application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in
writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party
concerned not later than three days before the scheduled opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and
use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify
in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of
imprisonment.
SECTION 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. The written application,
with notice in writing to the party concerned not later than three days of the scheduled opening,
to open the sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose and reason: (a)
for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing and disclosing its classified
contents; and, (c) for using the classified information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes,
memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as evidence.
SECTION 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. Any information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents acquired from the
examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a
person charged or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism: (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or group of persons, which have
been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and
usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative
investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SECTION 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a
Financial Institution. Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association, or group of persons, without being
authorized to do so by the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other
offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority
from the Court of Appeals to examine the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or
records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 33 of this Act, the party
aggrieved by such authorization shall upon motion duly filed be allowed access to the sealed
envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any
police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.

SECTION 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization.
An employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial institution,
who refuses to allow the examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons; or (3) a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons in said bank or financial institution, when duly served with the
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and
shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment. HEASaC
SECTION 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material
Fact in Joint Affidavits. Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact
in the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall
constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10)
years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 39. Seizure and Sequestration. The deposits and their outstanding
balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution,
moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other
implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging: (1) to any person suspected
of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially declared and outlawed organization,
association, or group of persons; or (3) to a member of such organization, association, or group
of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or
conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to
the interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably
needed by the monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel and his or
her family's medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use any of his
property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a
terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the
Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance
of his/her family or to use any of his/her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen
for legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 40. Nature of Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements,
Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or charged
with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be deemed as property held
in trust by the bank or financial institution for such person and the government during the
pendency of the investigation of the person suspected of or during the pendency of the trial of
the person charged with any of the said crimes, as the case may be and their use or disposition
while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or
cases are pending.
SECTION 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits,
Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Record. If the person suspected of or charged with
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after his investigation, to be
innocent by the investigating body, or is acquitted, after his arraignment or his case is
dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the seizure, sequestration and freezing

of his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall forthwith be deemed
lifted by the investigating body or by the competent court, as the case may be, and his bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such
seizure, sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay by the bank
or financial institution concerned without any further action on his part. The filing of any appeal
on motion for reconsideration shall not state the release of said funds from seizure,
sequestration and freezing.
If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is
convicted by a final judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered and frozen
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be automatically forfeited in
favor of the government.
Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the
amount of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) a day for the period in which his
properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid to him on the concept of liquidated
damages. The amount shall be taken from the appropriations of the police or law enforcement
agency that caused the filing of the enumerated charges against him/her.
SECTION 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized,
Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. Any
person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and
frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of
or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected
person has been found innocent by the investigating body or after the case against such
charged person has been dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer
the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SECTION 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized,
Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. Any
person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part
of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SECTION 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. Any public officer who has
direct custody of a detained person or under the provisions of thisAct and who by his
deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such
detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12)
years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has already
been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted
and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court.
SECTION 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the contrary
notwithstanding, the immunity of government witnesses testifying under this Act shall be
governed by Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court: Provided, however, That said
witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to witnesses under said Republic Act No. 6981.
SECTION 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. The penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any
person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being
authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified
information under this Act.
SECTION 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious
Evidence. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment

shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or
spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing under this Act. STcDIE

(5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance; and (7) the
NationalSecurity Advisor, as its other members.

SECTION 48. Continuous Trial. In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism, the judge shall set the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other
short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.

The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and
effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council shall keep
records of its proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be subject to
such security classifications as the Council may, in its judgment and discretion, decide to adopt
to safeguard the safety of the people, the security of the Republic, and the welfare of the nation.

SECTION 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any Special Penal Laws. When a person has been prosecuted
under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to
the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under
this Act.
SECTION 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. Upon acquittal, any person
who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or
deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount
of damages shall be automatically charged against the appropriations of the police agency or
the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned the filing of the charges against the
accused. It shall also be released within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the
accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the
acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for
charging him with the case of terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to
release the amounts awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as directed in
the paragraph immediately preceding shall suffer the penalty of six months of imprisonment.
If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount
needed to complete the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations for
intelligence, emergency, social or other funds of the Office of the President.
In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police or
law enforcement agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in the
appropriations of the said agency for the coming year.
SECTION 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the Informant. The
police or law enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism was
first revealed shall record the real name and the specific address of the informant.
The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name
and address to their superior officer who shall transmit the information to the Congressional
Oversight Committee or to the proper court within five days after the suspect was placed under
arrest or his properties were sequestered, seized or frozen.
The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not
be unnecessarily revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have been
terminated.
SECTION 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. The provisions of Book I of the
Revised Penal Code shall be applicable to this Act.
SECTION 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred
to, for brevity, as the "Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are: (1) the
Executive Secretary, who shall be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice, who shall be its
Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary of National Defense;

The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the Council.
The Council shall define the powers, duties, and functions of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as Secretariat of the Council. The National Bureau of Investigation, the
Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil Defense, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the Anti-Money Laundering Council, the Philippine Center on Transnational
Crime, and the Philippine National Police intelligence and investigative elements shall serve as
support agencies for the Council.
The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and
effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and eradicate
terrorism in the country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism. Nothing herein shall be
interpreted to empower the Anti-Terrorism Council to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power
or authority.
SECTION 54. Functions of the Council. In pursuit of its mandate in the previous
Section, the Council shall have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the
people as mandated by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists
and acts of terrorism in the country;
2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the
country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act;
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained
for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other
offenses punishable under this Act, and monitor the progress of their cases;
4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on terrorism,
terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations;
5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as
amended;
6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information
leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction of
person or persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism;
7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of
other nations in the struggle against international terrorism; and
8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals
and Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the
case may be, to handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism and all matters incident to said crimes. The Secretary of
Justice shall assign a team of prosecutors from: (a) Luzon to handle terrorism
cases filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila; (b) from the Visayas to handle

cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) from Mindanao to handle cases filed in
Cagayan de Oro City. ISEHTa
SECTION 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission
on Human Rights shall give the highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations
of civil and political rights of persons in relation to the implementation of this Act; and for this
purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute public officials, law
enforcers, and other persons who may have violated the civil and political rights of persons
suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
SECTION 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. There is hereby created a
Grievance Committee composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an
undersecretary from the Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and evaluate
complaints against the actuations of the police and law enforcement officials in the
implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold office in Manila.
The Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be respectively headed by the
Deputy, Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The subcommittees shall respectively
hold office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three Assistant Solicitors General designated
by the Solicitor General, and the regional prosecutors of the DOJ assigned to the regions where
the Deputy Ombudsmen hold office shall be members thereof. The three subcommittees shall
assist the Grievance Committee in receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints against
the police and other law enforcement officers in the implementation of thisAct. If the evidence
warrants it, they may file the appropriate cases against the erring police and law enforcement
officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by the complainants, decisions or
judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of other cases based on the same cause or
causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance Committee or its branches.
SECTION 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. No person suspected or convicted of
the crime of terrorism shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country unless his or
her testimony is needed for terrorist related police investigations or judicial trials in the said
country and unless his or her human rights, including the right against torture, and right to
counsel, are officially assured by the requesting country and transmitted accordingly and
approved by the Department of Justice.
SECTION 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. Subject to the provision of an
existing treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of
preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who
commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior
waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any
of the crimes defined and punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3)
to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to individual
persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises
belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity; (5) to individual
persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said
crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or
ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly
against the Philippine government.
SECTION 59. Joint Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Oversight
Committee to oversee the implementation of this Act.
The Oversight Committee shall be composed of five members each from the Senate
and the House in addition to the Chairs of the Committees of Public Order of both Houses who
shall also Chair the Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership of the

Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority members. The Joint
Oversight Committee shall have its own independent counsel.
The Chair of the Committee shall rotate every six months with the Senate chairing it for
the first six months and the House for the next six months. In every case, the ranking opposition
or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice Chair.
Upon the expiration of one year after this Act is approved by the President, the
Committee shall review the Act particularly the provisions that authorize the surveillance of
suspects of or persons charged with the crime of terrorism. To that end, the Committee shall
summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members of the Anti-Terrorism Council
and require them to answer questions from the members of Congress and to submit a written
report of the acts they have done in the implementation of the law including the manner in
which the persons suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism have been dealt with in
their custody and from the date when the movements of the latter were subjected to
surveillance and his or her correspondences, messages, conversations and the like were
listened to or subjected to monitoring, recording and tapping.
Without prejudice to its submitting other reports, the Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of Congress. The report may include where necessary a
recommendation to reassess the effects of globalization on terrorist activities on the people,
provide a sunset clause to or amend any portion of the Actor to repeal the Act in its entirety.
The courts dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the President
a report every six months of the status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with them
starting from the date this Act is implemented.
SECTION 60. Separability Clause. If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is
declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected
thereby shall remain and continue to be in full force and effect.
SECTION 61. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or
regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed,
amended, or modified accordingly.
SECTION 62. Special Effectivity Clause. After the bill shall have been signed into law
by the President, the Act shall be published in three newspapers of national circulation; three
newspapers of local circulation, one each in Ilocos Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga; three
newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cebu, Iloilo and Tacloban; and three newspapers of
local circulation, one each in Cagayan de Oro, Davao and General Santos city.
The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished
shall be aired everyday at primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over three
national television and radio networks; three radio and television networks, one each in Cebu,
Tacloban and Iloilo; and in five radio and television networks, one each in Lanao del Sur,
Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato City and Zamboanga City. The publication in the
newspapers of local circulation and the announcements over local radio and television networks
shall be done in the dominant language of the community. cACDaH
After the publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall take effect two
months after the elections are held in May 2007.
Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be automatically suspended one month
before and two months after the holding of any election.
Approved: March 6, 2007
Published in The Manila Times on March 9, 2007.
||| (Human Security Act of 2007, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372, [2007])

b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and

cargo from one place to another through Philippine Waters. It shall
include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing.

18
MALACAANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 August 8, 1974
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless
elements are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another, thereby distributing the peace, order and tranquility of
the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged
from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty
on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and
pursuant to proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No.
1104, dated January 17, 1973 and General Order No. 1, dated September
22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the
following:
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not
limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the
Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth,
length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by
historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction.

c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway

and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within the
Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles,
or property or both.
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and
punished as hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property
of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or
force upon things of other unlawful means, committed by any person on
any Philippine Highway.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competents court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a
result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the
victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty
of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or
brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or
extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy
or highway robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by
such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom;
or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of
the principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided
in this Section has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

orders or instructions, or parts thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent

with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815,

otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or

Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.