A.C. No.

8384

April 11, 2013

EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez
(respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary public in
Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the
Municipality of Cordon.
This alleged act violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 028-13-SC). To support her allegations, complainant attached the following documents
to her pleadings:
a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive
Judge Efren M. Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries public
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the years
2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.1 Respondent's name does not appear on
either list;
b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by
respondent in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and
c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a jointaffidavit notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as to
respondent's seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was issued
upon him at the time of the document's notarization." 2
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never
been notarizing any document or pleadings"3 and added that he has "never
committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers (sic) oath". 4 He
dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated
and x x x meant to harass or intimidate him". 5
Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were
"tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature." 6
He failed to attend the mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position
Paper.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being

commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner but increased the penalty of suspension
from six (6) months to one (1) year. Respondent did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration or any other subsequent pleading.
On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution to the
Supreme Court for its action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 8
The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.
Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had
notarized various documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that
respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries public commissioned by
the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.
Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.1wphi1
Per Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,9 the burden of proof is vested upon the
party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v.
Gutierrez,10 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the
violation is sustained. Respondent merely posited that the notarized documents
presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were results of
forgery, but he failed to present any proof.11 Respondent also resorted to a sweeping
and unsupported statement that he never notarized any document. Accordingly, the
reasonable conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized documents without
the requisite notarial commission.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one
of the most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an
officer of the court."12 Accordingly, '"lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."13
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.14 "Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for
notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution."15
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants,
courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents
posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit

pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent's

conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that he be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial
practice without a notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for two (2) years and DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9116

March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the
February 19, 2009 Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months
for breach of Rule 12.03,2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011
Resolution7 of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido
Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment
against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17;
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and
willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative
liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowners
association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate
lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general
supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said
handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer,
appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter
personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement
with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was
caused to the Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the
election for President of the homeowners association in 1996, Figueras and his
compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other
assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were
sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed
the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and
other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others, the
legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed
by the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass
him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment
complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over
the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

The facts are as follows:

Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the
affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7,
1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages
against the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property
and denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that
said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71
which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the
public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community
street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal
counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling
lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in
favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm,
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a
Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the
original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days even before the first
motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the
grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for
extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment

case for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment
of damages for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found
respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.14
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII2009-1415 adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03,

Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.

which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in
IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors
noted that respondents motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed
and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP
correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12,
Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyers failure to file
brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.
The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no
personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and
that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact,
the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct "is in no
sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome."17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court
motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment
proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining
suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of
the charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance
of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
Records show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file
appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said
brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowners association. To
justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the
supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention,
however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA
an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm,
stating that a previous motion had been filed but "due to the health condition of the
undersigned counselhe was not able to finish said Appellants Brief within the
fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him."19 Thus, it is clear that respondent
was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants
brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel
as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence.1wphi1 (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure
to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.
(People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious
lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay
litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22,
Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada,
43 SCRA 515).
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be
disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or other pleading
range from reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases,
disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension
for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of
respondents violation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found
administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal
record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5377

June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this
court does not render advisory opinions.13

LEONEN, J.:
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this
court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist
from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the
period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government
requiring the authority to practice law.
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension from the practice of law.1
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib
and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility3 and of the Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to
notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the
Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of law for one
year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment
as notaries public for two years.
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that
respondents be disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the
resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory
pleading with leave of court.9
In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006,
complainant Lingan wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the
Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the latter's suspension from the
practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission
on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007,
suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on
Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him]
from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime
that his authority to practice law is suspended."11
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his
functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty.
Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office. He prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated June 15, 2006
"to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12

On May 8, 2009, this court received a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14
dated May 4, 2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and
discharging his functions as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in
violation of this court's order of suspension.
Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights
En Banc 's resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's
motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead
admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a notary
public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of Atty.
Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16
Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is
designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice
of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the
position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."17
The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director.
Complainant Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on
the matter."18
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
report and recommendation.19
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar
Confidant found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had
already lapsed. It recommended that respondents be required to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension with certifications from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel
and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform
his functions as Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the
Bar Confidant said that the Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's
order of suspension. According to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on
Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's
resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that
this court require him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human
Rights stating that he desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director
while he was suspended from the practice of law.23
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the
Commission .on Human Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's

allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to perform his functions as Regional Director
while he was suspended from the practice of law.
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension
from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga
said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of [his suspension from the practice of law] to [his]
public office would be tantamount to [violating] his constitutional rights [sic] to due
process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included is deemed
excluded."25
In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to
file their respective motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the
period of suspension. This court further ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on
Human Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga
continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended
from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:
Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents
have [sic] already elapsed, this Court resolves:
(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE
their respective motions to lift relative to their suspension and
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public and SUBMIT
certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge
of the Court where they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents
have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the
entire period of their suspension and disqualification, unless already
complied with in the meantime;
(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the
Commission on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been suspended
from office and has stopped from the performance of his functions for the
period stated in the order of suspension and disqualification, within ten (10)
days from notice hereof;
(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the
allegations of complainant against them, both within ten (10) days from
receipt of notice hereof; ...27 (Emphasis in the original)
In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their
respective motions to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment
on complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his functions as
Regional Director during his suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional
Director, he "perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require
the practice of law. These managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ...
the day to day operations of the regional office and its personnel";31 "monitoring
progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights]

Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services and

assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at
the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation
and disbursement of funds and expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The
Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the legal
services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law,
Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution
suspending him from the practice of law]."36
The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It
argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is
separate and distinct from any penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public
official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga's suspension
from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a
Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does
within the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's
resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court]
arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant
Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga failed to
submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he was
suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional
Director.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as
Regional Director and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant
Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty.
Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager,"43 which under
the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law.
Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI
requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a
"lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his position as Regional
Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his
position as Regional Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were
really in good faith, he should have followed the initial resolution of the Commission
on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty. Baliga did not even furnish this
court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on Human Right's
resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of
law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty.
Baliga "[no longer has that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47
Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty. Baliga be disbarred.
On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48
He was allowed to resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to
compliance with the requirements for issuance of a notarial commission.

On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report, and recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
suspension and the respective comments of Atty. Baliga and the Commission on
Human Rights.49
In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar
Confidant stated that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his
functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional Director] which [required acts
constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he did
not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice of law, the
Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be
required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also
recommended holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift
suspension "pending [the Commission on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the
resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on
Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not
practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.
In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated
that the penalty imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from
the penalty that might be imposed on him as Regional Director. The Commission
added that it is "of honest belief that the position of [Regional Director] is
managerial and does not [require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it
will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of
suspension should be granted.
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore,
suspend him further from the practice of law for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."59
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice.
of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the
Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent"61 is
practice of law.
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the
Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into regional offices with each office having
primary responsibility to investigate human rights violations in its territorial

jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is given
the position of Attorney VI.
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human
Rights Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional
Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on
Human Rights] matters;"65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights
complaints in the absence of the legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and
discuss "immediate courses of action and protection remedies and/or
possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices,
letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of
the regional office;69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared
by the legal officer.70
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and
affirmations are usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries
public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the bar.72 Investigating human
rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer.73
Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and
approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer
require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an
attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law.74
When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary
qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer
must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15,
2006, "effective immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's
order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has been without authority to practice law.
He lacked a necessary qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on Human Rights correctly
resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga
from assuming his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to
practice law is suspended. This is without prejudice to the investigation to be
conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all Regional
Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated
April 13, 2007, reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional
Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly
warned him that repeating the same offense will cause his dismissal from the
service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007 reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the
Philippines resolved to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC
decision by decreeing the suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his
functions and responsibilities as Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao
City for the period for which the Supreme Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis
in the original)

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga prays before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as
Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office
No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission
on Human Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only
suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and
Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to
be heard when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by
the record. It was also immaterial.1wphi1 He held the position of Commission on
Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to practice law. Without this
authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding
his position as Regional Director.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful
order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from
the practice of law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's
previous order of suspension.
We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional
Director despite lack.of authority to practice law.1wphi1

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission
that Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate
penalty for breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the
transgression by Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As
records have it, the Commission granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a
commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary public in
accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions expressly set
forth by the Commission.
With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC
Administrative Case No. 5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its
eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer
reposed with public trust.
This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and
censure Atty. Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his commission as a
notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of
which requires such high esteem to be in equal footing with the constitutional
mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the
Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the
Commission grants of every official and employee.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension
imposed on him pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes
that the further suspension of Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the
meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being served. This Commission is
prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is sufficient to
complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No.
A2007-013 and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a penalty of dismissal from the service.80
(Emphasis in the original)
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13,
2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional
Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions
and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of suspension from the
practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint
its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary
qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened
with conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere]
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,]
and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession."84
WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for
six ( 6) months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of
suspension from the practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy
of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.
SO ORDERED
CASE #4

recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then
to a suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex
crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas manner of prosecuting the
case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 1 Atty. Catalan also
alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and
have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accuseds
favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by
arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor
Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling
the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16
November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment
of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In
a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalans brother was a respondent, Pros.
Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.

A.C. No. 7360

July 24,2012

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against
Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case
for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticses father-in-law,
Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two
years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case
and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty.
Silvosa. GMA 7s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual
entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and
viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosas defense of instigation, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No.
27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one
year, one month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up
to three years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as
maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accuseds
bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not amount to a crime." He further claims
that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a
public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling
under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found
that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said case would
be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the
facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such
would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently,
[Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such
act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations
are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosas] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone

unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more
than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant
has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa]
was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case
nor was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not
binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should
be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty
of Atty. Silvosas suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the
Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1
March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand,
relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which
provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public
prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited
only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of
our ruling in Hilado v. David:4

An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a

lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
clients pleadings, or advocating his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients
cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern
rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As
has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not
only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies
although the attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. 5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its
veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm.
Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with
certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling,
however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed
bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the
IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of
the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape
the disciplining arm of the Court.7

acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government
service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness
in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans judgment in
Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty.
Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the
Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself
admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of
conviction.10

We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are
not binding in a disbarment proceeding.

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11

First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can
be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority

we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime
of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the
public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of
the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must
be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to
do; and

AC No. 99-634

June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause
and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship.
Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.
The Case

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is

connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of
his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing
Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1wphi1 Atty. Silvosas final
conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of
Atty. Silvosas conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more
severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the
exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His
excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer,
is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all
courts in the country.

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary

action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June
14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the
following:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C.

Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio,
Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St.,
Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and
possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for
me the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I
have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary
complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as
Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on
January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that
I needed the case filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the
complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice
of its progress;

SO ORDERED.
AC NO 9920

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or
from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such

that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just
to wait;

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait
[every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999,
he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland,
Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he
personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon,
within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was
absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided
to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's
complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my
behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where
he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by
the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money
for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he
offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and
June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively,
copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer,
I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation,
dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"
xxx

xxx

x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of
complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly
been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their
meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill
Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one
of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested
that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the letter
to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the
owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also
requested by complainant to do the following:

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on
withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement
was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract.
Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told
the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted
to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised
to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's
secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When
informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees
before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had
paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the
meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another
company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a
parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months,
but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in
filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In
response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of
respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant
demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own
personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the
time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks
were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived
complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it
was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the
Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that
was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his
client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation
due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money
deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the
respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year." 4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his nonfiling of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of
the money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent
alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999
was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with
diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the
ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty,
and integrity of the profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services
rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal
favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any

retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney

consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer
with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established.7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the
former's fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law
partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant
as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the
complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause
of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in them.9 They owe entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the
exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. 10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by
his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly
noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be
prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for
something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should
have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should have
issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business.11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a moneymaking venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12
The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. 13
Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a
byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much
money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced
by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the
rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them
in their professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that
may come into their possession.

DECISION
REYES, J.:

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds, documents
and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain
them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may
apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys
they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any
event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the
bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public.18 Respondent fell short of this standard when he
converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus
failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount
does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent
from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. 19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant,
which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela)

and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty.
Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and
violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.
The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:
That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty.
Pablo Bernardo with the help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres
Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses,
deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging
to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the acquaintance of complainants
herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver
to him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling
of the subject land and further by means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting
himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject land,
who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he
is the one handling William Gatchalians business transaction and that he has
contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which representation
he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the
complainant[s] to give and deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in
possession of said amount, far from complying with his obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his personal use and
benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he failed and
refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.2

SO ORDERED.
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated
December 7, 19983 and June 22, 19994 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable
cause for the filing of the criminal information 5 against both Atty. Bernardo and
Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his Comment.6 On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment,7 wherein he denied the allegations against
him and averred the following:
A.C. No. 6368

June 13, 2012

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Respondent.

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April
15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn
sought the legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who
received the said money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and
respondent. The arrangement for titling of the land was made by Teresita N.
Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and
allowed in law practice.8
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the
respondents undated comment filed with the Court was not verified. 9
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen
(15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to
his medical confinement.10
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion 11 for extension
praying for another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still
recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference.12 The respondent
failed to appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent in default for his failure to
appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then
submitted for report and recommendation.13
Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala made the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the
help and in connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat ("Magat"), by
using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed
fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land
belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of
complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to
them the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they would expedite the
titling of the subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of
William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the subject land once it has been
titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false,
fraudulent and were only made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them
the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the said amount, far from
complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the said amount to their personal use and benefit and despite
demand upon them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a

complaint for Estafa against the former before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary investigation
conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and
Magat for trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7
December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga conducted a re-investigation of the case. During the re-investigation
thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of
[P]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be
reimbursed by respondent considering that the said amount was turned over to
respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of the
subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for time
to pay back their obligations to the complainants. However, despite extensions of
time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay
back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was
construed to be an implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of the investigating judge
and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999
before the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice
on several occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for his oath of
office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent
committed a crime that import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to obey the
laws of the land. The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral
turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral
conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138,
Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case
only on 16 April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, "A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the
professional misconduct" (Section 1, Rule VIII). 14
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO
YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a
member of the Bar. 15
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution
of the amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with
Warning that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this
Order then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.16
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration 17 of
the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP
resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was filed
more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been
dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela
to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was hired as a lawyer
through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of
Agreement18 signed by the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the
Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the
representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long
restituted the amount of P225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on
his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresitas declaration that he had to stop
acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent
pointed out the admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC
that she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.
In an Order19 dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to
comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is
untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not
prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act
to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long
as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for.25
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for
several extensions of time to file the same, the respondent failed to appear during
the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is
considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront
on the courts authority which can not be countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of
justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or in their
private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and
good demeanor.26
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

20

In her Comment, Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the
administrative case because they took into consideration the possibility of an
amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the
respondents reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which
prompted them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to
trace the respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly accorded the
opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus
corresponding interest has yet been made by the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation21 stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and
Magat "guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum."22
In a Letter23 dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution
of the present action as she was already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion
to Resolve the Case24 dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In
another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty.
Bernardos restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she can use the money to
buy her medicine and other needs.

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He
himself admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the
complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly
purchased. While he begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the
complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties.
He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants
in the amount of P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The
duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary

consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.27
It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having involved the same set of facts.
Jurisprudence has it "that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondents
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively." 28
In Yu v. Palaa,29 the Court held that:

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from
receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with
a STERN WARNING that failure to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final
resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted
upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission
to, and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.30 (Citations omitted)

SO ORDERED.

As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of
Estafa for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and
one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the
respondents moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides
that:

Before the court is a Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign in the Roll of
Attorneys dated April 22, 2002 filed by Caesar Z. Distrito, a successful 2001 Bar
Examinee.

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment
commensurate to all his acts and to accord the complainants, especially the 88-year
old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

[B.M. No. 1209. July 1, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE BAR MATTER NO. 1209 LAWYER'S OATH
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 1
2003.
RESOLUTION. B.M. No. 1209(In Re: Petition to Take the Bar Matter No. 1209 Lawyer's
Oath, Caesar Z. Distrito, petitioner.)

The petitioner is a former Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Chairman of Barangay

Singcang Airport, Bacolod City.On September 18, 1999, an Information for
Usurpation of Authority or Official Function under Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code[1]cralaw was filed against him which read:
That on or about the 18th day of September, 1999, in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused,
not being the President of the Bacolod City Sangguniang Kabataan Federation, a
government agency, did then and there under pretense of official position and
without being lawfully entitled to do so, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously preside
over the special session of the said Federation, in violation of the aforestated
law.[2]cralaw
The petitioner was conditionally allowed to take the 2001 Bar Examinations [3]cralaw
and passed the same.He could not, however, take the Lawyer's Oath nor sign in the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the above-mentioned case.
On August 2, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter [4]cralaw
from a certain Mr. Benjie Montinola informing the said office that there were other
cases filed against the petitioner which were not duly disclosed in the latter's
petition to take the bar examinations, to wit:

1.Two counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.) 22 filed sometime in 1999,
docketed as B.C.I.S. 99-6735 and 99-6736, before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Bacolod;
2.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on July 26, 2001, before the MTCC,
Bacolod, in which an adverse decision dated April 1, 2002 was rendered;
3.Civil Case No. 27447 for "Sum of Money" filed on March 15, 2002, before MTCC,
Bacolod.
Mr. Montinola also alleged in his letter that the petitioner took his oath as an
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) member, knowing fully well that he had not
yet taken his oath as a lawyer before the Supreme Court nor signed in the Roll of
Attorneys Mr. Montinola further averred:
The fact that CAESAR Z. DISTRITO have (sic)not disclosed the above-mentioned
criminal and civil case filed against him in his application form despite his personal
knowledge of the same when he applied for the Bar Exams sometime in 2001, is
tantamount to PERJURY and that should be acted upon by your respectable office to
protect the integrity of our present lawyers who will be our future Prosecutors,
Judges, Justices or even High Ranking Cabinet or Government Officials or even
President of our country.
The unethical act of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO when he took his oath as a lawyer/member
before a testimonial dinner tendered by the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter and
witnessed not only by it's Officials, present members and honored guests but by
thousands of Television viewers not only in Bacolod City but the whole of Western
Visayas if not the whole country, despite also of his personal knowledge that he is
not qualified to do so for the same reason above-stated, is tantamount to
IMPERSONATION that should be properly acted upon by the said body who will be
furnished a copy of this information and to also protect their integrity and to avoid
similar incident that may happen in the future for lack of proper screening.
Mr. Montinola attached to his letter copies of the complaint as well as a copy of the
decision in Civil Case No. 26837.
On August 15, 2002, the OBC received another letter from a certain Ms. Christine
Angelie M. Espinosa, then SK Federation President of Bacolod City, which read:
Your Honor:
May I inquire from your good office, whether a bar passer who has not taken his oath
in view of the pending criminal case filed against him can attached (sic) to his name
the nomenclature atty.?Such is the case of Mr. Caesar Z. Distrito , SK Federation,
Bacolod City Vice-President whopassed the bar last May 2002, but has not taken his
oath due to the pending criminal case lodged in MTCC branch 4, Bacolod City for
Usurpation of Power charge against him by the undersigned.
Ms. Espinosa attached a copy of an attendance sheet of a Sangguniang
Panglungsod committee hearing dated June 21, 2002 where the petitioner's name
appeared to have been signed, along with the word "Atty."

On April 23, 2003, the petitioner filed his Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath and to
sign the Roll of Attorneys alleging that on April 4, 2003, the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod, rendered a decision acquitting him in Criminal Case No.
99609.[5]cralaw Attached thereto was a certified true copy of the decision in the said
criminal case and a certificate of finality of judgment.[6]cralaw The OBC informed the
petitioner of the above-mentioned charges and required him to comment on the
same.
In his Comment dated May 12, 2003, the petitioner avers that when he filed his
petition to take the 2001 bar exams, the criminal case for usurpation of authority or
official function was the only pending case against him at the time.He did not
mention I.S.B.C. Case Nos. 99-6735 and 6736 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in his
petition because he was of the honest belief that it was no longer necessary for him
to do so, considering that the cases had long been settled and dismissed without
even reaching the arraignment stage.[7]cralaw The said criminal cases apparently
stemmed from the debts of some 50 fish vendors at Magsungay Village.The
petitioner's father, as the punong barangay, had guaranteed the same in order to
help the fishermen.But as the drawer of the two checks, the complainant filed the
action against the petitioner when the debts remained unpaid.
As regards the civil cases, the petitioner avers that the same stemmed from salary
loans that he, along with other barangay officials and employees, obtained from FilGlobal Credit and Asset Management Inc. and SWIP Lending Corporation on January
13, 2000 and August 22, 2000, respectively, when he was Barangay SK
Chairman.The barangay treasurer regularly deducted from his salary the payment
for the said loans until such time when he completed the payment to Fil-Global on
January 31, 2001 and for SWIUP Lending on April 30, 2001.The barangay treasurer
thereafter issued a certification of complete payment. [8]cralaw When the petitioner
came back to Bacolod after the bar exams, he was surprised to learn that their
barangay officials and employees were facing cases for sum of money filed by FilGlobal and SWIP Lending because apparently, their payments were not duly
remitted.He received summons only on October 22, 2001 and April 4, 2002 from the
MTCC, Bacolod City.The finance officer and the treasurer promised to settle
everything, but they failed to do so until their term expired on August 15, 2002.After
the decision was rendered by the MTCC, the petitioner paid the plaintiffs in the said
cases, as evidenced by official receipt nos. 8169[9]cralaw and 9019[10]cralaw issued
by Fil-Global and SWIP Lending respectively dated May 7, 2003.Thereafter, an order
of satisfaction of judgment[11]cralaw was correspondingly issued by the court in civil
cases 26837[12]cralaw and 27447.[13]cralaw
Anent the IBP incident, the petitioner stated that an invitation [14]cralaw was sent to
him by the IBP Negros Occidental Chapter to attend the testimonial dinner and the
annual judicial excellence awarding ceremonies, but that there was no mention of
any induction ceremony.Considering the he in fact successfully passed the bar
examinations and was being recognized therefore he was inspired to attend the
occasion.He admitted that during the occasion, all those who just passed the bar
exams were called for the induction of new members, and that he was left with no
choice but to join the others onstage when his name was called.However, the
petitioner did not intend to deceive or to keep the IBP in the dark, as he in fact
informed them of his status.To prove the absence of malice on his part, he did not
sign any document that night.
The petitioner also stated that after some verification as to the identity of the
complainant in the Letter-complaint dated August 22, 2002, he found out that Benjie
Montinola awas a non-existing person who cannot claim to be a "guardian of proper

civi[c] responsibility" considering that he is not even a registered voter of Bacolod

City and that he could not be located in the address given, as indicated in a
Certification issued by the Commission on Elections, Bacolod City [15]cralaw and the
Office of the Barangay Council of Barangay Singcang Airport.[16]cralaw

The petitioner insists that he had not read any requirement in the petition to include
cases that had already been dismissed.[19]cralaw This, the Court cannot quite
fathom.As stated by Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Ma. Cristina B.
Layusa:[20]cralaw

Regarding the use of the appellation "Atty.", The petitioner admitted writing the
same in the attendance sheet in a committee hearing of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Bacolod City.He reasoned that he was of the notion that a bar passer
can be called "Attorney," and that what is only prohibited is to practice law, such as
appearing in court and notarizing docunments without the requisite oath-taking
before the Supreme Court and signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

The petitioner's contention is quite hard to accept.In the ready-made petition form to
take the Bar Examination, the following is written clearly:

The petitioner averred that the complainant in this case, Ms. Matus Espinosa, had in
fact executed an affidavit of desistance[17]cralaw to attest that there was indeed no
misrepresentation on his part.
The petitioner manifested his sincere apology to the Court for any mistake he may
have committed.
On May 22, 2003, the OBC made the following recommendation:
Considering that there is no more pending civil, criminal or administrative cases
against herein petitioner, he may now be admitted as a member of the Bar.
Foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that Mr. CAESAR Z. DISTRITO
be now allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon
payment of the required fees.[18]cralaw
There are thus three important matters raised before this Court, the
determination of which would materially affect the fate of the present petition:
First.The petitioner's non-disclosure of a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and of
two other civil cases filed against him, albeit already dismissed at the time of the
filing of his petition to take the 2001 bar examinations.
Second.The petitioner's attendance and participation in an IBP testimonial dinner for
new lawyers, when he had not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor signed in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Third.The petitioner's admitted use of the appellation "Atty." When he had no
authority to do so as yet.
The Court sees fit to discuss each one, to serve as reminder to law students and
prospective applicants to the bar.
The petitioner's non-disclosure of a
Criminal case for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and two other civil cases filed
against him, albeit already dismissed
at the time of the filing of his petition
to take the 2001 bar examinations.

"Note: Indicate any pending or dismissed civil, criminal or administrative case

against you and attach pertinent documents:____________________________."
If petitioner had not read the notation, as what he claimed, why did he disclose his
pending case for Usurpation of authority or Official Function.Moreover, the said
instruction is written in the middle of the form, so if petitioner had not really read
the same, he was not mindful of what he was doing which should not be the case of
a Bar applicant.
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the requirements for
all applicants for admission to the bar, to wit:
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Whether or not the petitioner shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great
extent in the sound discretion of the Court.An applicant must satisfy the Court that
he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to practice law. [21]cralaw The
practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it.Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.[22]cralaw
It has been held that moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.[23]cralaw
Admittedly, the petitioner was less than honest when he failed to disclose the two
other cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and the civil cases involving sums of money
which were filed against him, in his petition to take the bar examinations.He should
have known that the said petitionis not to be taken lightly as it is made under
oath.The petitioner, in so doing, violated Rule 7.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[24]cralaw which requires of every applicant candor and
truthfulness.Every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement
in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine the applicant's moral character. [25]cralaw The petitioner
should have realized the implication of any omission on his part, even if
inadvertently made.

In the case of People v. Tuanda,[26]cralaw the Court held that "violation of B.P. Blg. 22
is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public
order," and considered the same an offense involving moral turpitude.The erring
lawyer was consequently suspended from the practice of law.
In this case, the fact that the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 did not
even reach the arraignment stage is of no moment; it was the petitioner's duty to
disclose the same as it was a material fact which could affect his application for
admission to the bar.
It has also been held that an applicant for the admission to the bar who made a false
statement in his application is not of good moral character. [27]cralaw The
concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that an applicant has been
charged with or indicated for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification of the
applicant to take the bar examination, or for revocation of the license to practice, if
he has already been admitted to the bar.If what the applicant concealed is a crime
which does not involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of concealment and not the
commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer.It
should be noted that the application was made under oath, which he lightly took
when he made the concealment.[28]cralaw
The petitioner's attendance and
participation in an IBP testimonial
dinner for new lawyers, when he had
not yet taken his oath as a lawyer nor
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.
As to the IBP incident, the petitioner claims that he though the occasion was just a
plain and simple testimonial dinner for successful bar examinees that included an
awarding ceremony for judges.It was only later when he discovered that the
program was actually a testimonial for new lawyers. [29]cralaw However, a perusal of
the invitation[30]cralaw sent by the IBP to the petitioner reveals that there was an
express mention that the affair was for new lawyers, to wit:
Dear Atty. Distrito:
The IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter will hold its Chapter's Judicial Award of
Excellence to Outstanding Judges and Proscutors and Testimonial Dinner for
new lawyers on June 28, 2002, 7:00 P.M., at the Ballroom-A, Business Inn,
Lacson Street, Bacolod City.

The petitioner's admitted use of the

Appellation "Atty." When he had no
Authority to do so as yet.
The petitioner's erroneous belief that a person who passed the bar examinations
may allow himself to be called an attorney should be corrected.An applicant who has
passed the required examination or has been otherwise found to be entitled to
admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.[31]cralaw The Court shall thereupon admit the applicant
as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order
to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be
given to him by the clerk of court, which certificates shall be his authority to
practice.[32]cralaw The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a Roll of Attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he
receives his certificate..[33]cralaw
The Oath is thus a prerequisite to the admission to the practice of law, while the
signing in the Roll is the last act that finally signifies membership in the bar, giving
the applicant the right to call himself "attorney".Continued membership in the IBP
and regular payment of membership dues and other lawful assessments that it may
levy are conditions sine qua non to the privilege to practice law and to the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[34]cralaw
The unauthorized use of the said appellation may render a person liable for indirect
contempt of court.[35]cralawThe Court may deny the applicant's petition to take the
Lawyer's Oath for grave misconduct, such as calling himself and "attorney" and
appearing as counsel for clients in courts even before being admitted to the
bar.[36]cralaw Although the evidence in this case does not include that the petitioner
actually engaged in the practice of law, the fact is that he signed in an attendance
sheet as "Atty. Caesar Distrito."He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well that
he was not yet admitted to the bar.[37]cralaw
Thus, we disagree with the findings of the OBC, and find that the petitioner is unfit to
become a member of the bar.The petitioner must show this Court that he has
satisfied the moral requirements before he can be admitted to the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of CAESAR Z. DISTRITO to be allowed to take the oath
as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DENIED.
B. M. No. 1154

In behalf of the Officers and members of the IBP-Negros Occidental Chapter, I

am inviting you to attend said after being one of the new members of the
Bar.Please come in formal attire.
Your presence on this occasion will be highly appreciated.
The Court can only conclude that the petitioner did not take his petition to take the
Lawyer's Oath and to sign in the Roll of Attorneys seriously.He would have us believe
that he attended an affair, believing in good faith that it was meant for those who
recently passed the bar, when the invitation he himself attached to his petition
states otherwise.The petitioner's forthrightness and candor with the Court leave
much to be desired.

June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.

MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R.
MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is
ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking
the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.

a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling
are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations
are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is
his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa.
15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in
front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and
hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he
is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a
person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes
him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar."5
As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Pursuant to this Courts R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed

his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed
against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former
professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in
good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving
the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to
him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of
the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him
in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have
known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of
the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever
may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law,
the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling"
knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar
Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render
a person liable for indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar
Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar
be suspended until further orders from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however,
did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks
to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys,
moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the
appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution
and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement
of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged
with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge,
officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court
or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the
form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn
or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases
against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in
the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not
entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the
occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of
the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent
therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City,
used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission
of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While
one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this
case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are
privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest
employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice
the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish
the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet
that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before
the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders
from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate
sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar,
the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul
Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from
being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a
notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission 4 to the
Bar and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial
partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. 6 She also accused Atty.
Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. 7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the
services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an
annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against
her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan
(Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by
appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the
representation of conflicting clients' interests.9
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the
same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her. 10 In another civil
case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his
opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one
of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate,
offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his
dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not
notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the
notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were
superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who
actually notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his
signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he
needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite
offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their
growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his
notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not
personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he
previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in
their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's
partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing
conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in
his pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.
18

In his report and recommendation dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A.
Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for
violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using
abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial
Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial registers in different
offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain,
protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial
acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep
only one active notarial register at any given time." 19

However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held
administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating
commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to
prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. 20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno
was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that
Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend them in their
annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all
its lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating
commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the
Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate,
offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in
one of his pleadings.22
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that
Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for
employing abusive and insulting language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that
the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner.
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a
notary public.24
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011
resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution. 26
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended
penalty, and accordingly confirms them.
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that
the parties identified.
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete
evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio
Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his
name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial
commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true
information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the
document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register
and was never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He
contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it
appear that he was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty.
Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He
was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained
and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP
number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this
date, particularly on March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's
claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the
conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his
Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after
his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this
happened is not clear from the evidence before us.
b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different
notarial registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized
documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Yea
Document27
Date
Doc. No.
Page
Book
r
Special Power of
200
6/20/05
273
55
18
Attorney
5
200
Secretary's Certificate
10/28/05
226
46
18
5
200
Affidavit of Quitclaim
10/31/05
272
55
18
5
200
Affidavit of Loss
4/17/06
54
11
25
6
Affidavit of Two
200
4/17/06
310
61
25
Disinterested Persons
6
Petition for Issuance of
200
4/17/06
72
15
25
Owner's Duplicate copy
6
Affidavit of Parental
200
4/19/06
461
93
23
Consent
6
200
Confirmation of Sale
4/21/06
283
56
25
6
200
Deed of Absolute Sale
4/27/06
304
60
25
6
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall
keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules,
a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides
that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given
time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active
notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one

active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged.
The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from
assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who
perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also
personally administer the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This
important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the
notary public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological
sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank
spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to
maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices so he could
accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions
as his powers and duties are impressed with public interest. 30 A notary
public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that
each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must
faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial
commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
[should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held
liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is
guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty.
Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an

entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint
that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her
family pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this
case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where
Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint
against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to
her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are
totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time
Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly,
nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any
confidential information which he acquired while he was still their counsel
in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the
prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a
lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other
person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman
case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language
in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in
particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence
and poor performance as a prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that the
Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her
mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words
a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. 36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from
any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified. 37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommended penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in
violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CASE AC NO. 8560

A.C. No. 5581

January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant
Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera
(respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie
R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres
Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid
and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and
that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful
authority.

Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his
marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of
a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent
to file a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the
copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639.
Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that
respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to
file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an
administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause
thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or
any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus
Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her
husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former
residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that
he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his
law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her
younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send
a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to
mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig
has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a
sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to
furnish respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof
of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint
against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of
the administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which
is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by
Registry Receipt No. 2167.9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment
despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to
receive a copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied
with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He
requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be
furnished a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the
complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics
allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of
receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for
his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a
copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy
of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as
shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to
comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the
complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show
Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It
likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently
indicated in his correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino
Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served
upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server.
Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel
with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint
as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE
upon Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to

COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required
thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to
comply with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court
resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the
complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for
non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of
compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn
M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that
respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora
Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared
that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant
lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot
be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's
Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41
Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings
set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and
the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was
received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However,
respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended
that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but
is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to
be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the
court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to
answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has

been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted
a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that
respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with
Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the
Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San
Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church,
Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that
respondent entered into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still
subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year
from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage
was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with
Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided
for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being
admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second
marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of
the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of
the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as

a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his
first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents
defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has
dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued
numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have
preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The
Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He
claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment
on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause
order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that
indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court
which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude
towards this case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations
and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as
evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach
respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and
complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent.
However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter,
however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When
said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of
speaking, respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court
in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his
actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the
judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor.

- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but
also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.
CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders
rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of
Attorneys, effective immediately.1wphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall
forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its
Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
B. M. No. 1036

June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,

vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this
Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to
the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately,
or selectively." Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral
integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of
greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a

privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit
cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.

The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the
Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of
Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took
the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up
to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges
that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and
in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in
any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan
("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims
that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the
lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that

he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the
same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted
the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend
specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily
Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition.
When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and
(2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim
that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers
oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes
that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to
the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was
a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before
the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show
that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before
respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor
dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana
as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained"
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed
the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the
legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel
for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19
May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for
mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine
Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law
is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations,
if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v.
Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and
signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law
even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court.7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers
oath.1wphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes
one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer
still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body
since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to
the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter
dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon
your acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11
May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted
as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that
Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2540

September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the
matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to
this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be
denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14
It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner
Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor
of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general
weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on
his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll
of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he
was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved
in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had
already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys
lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." 9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. 11

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant
petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent
to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty
that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the
Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was
not a third party who called this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka
kung anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same
time, its a combination of apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And,
finally its the right thing to do. I have to come here sign the roll and take the oath
as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from
the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who
were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics
of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the
character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner,
having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, 18 Petron, Petrophil
Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar.1wphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this
Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown
mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for
his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning
more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." 22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law
cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated
under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However,
the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record,
he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act
of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge,
he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete
all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a fullfledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it
fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of
the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that
he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1)
YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of
P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 2112

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be
an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must
be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. 30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has
been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of
'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself
is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's
duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when
he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that
on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition

were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof,
to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of
law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true
copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the
IBP;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and
intended to resume his practice of law.

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof
means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege
to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in
Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1wphi1 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership
fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership
dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by
the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter
attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of
annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period;
and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,

Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting
to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with
the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to
resume his practice of law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and
sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,

subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set
by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.

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