c



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FACTS:
On 7/3/61, a decision was rendered in SP in favor of resps. P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, et. al. and against
petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of 1.7 M, subject of SP. On 6/24/69, resp. Judge
issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, QC
as well as Manila to execute the said decision. A corresponding alias writ of execution was then issued. On the
strength of said writ, the sheriff served notices of garnishment w/ several banks, specially on the 'monies due the
AFP in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the writ;' the Phil. Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment. Hence, this original action for certiorari and prohibition w/ the SC.

HELD:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the
state as well as its govt is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be
so. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not bec. of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on w/c the right
depends. (J. Holmes, Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 US 349.) Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not
dissimilar. [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from
such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to
be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. This is based on considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. c 


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FACTS:
Gaudencio Begosa, plaintiff-appellee, was an "enlisted men of the Phil. Commonwealth Army, inducted in
the service of the USAFFE" having taken "active participation in the battle of Bataan" as well as the "liberation
drive against the enemy" thereafter became "permanently incapacitated from work due to injuries he sustained in
line of duty xxx."
Pltff. filed his claim for disability pension as far back as 3/4/55; but it was erroneously disapproved on
6/21/55, bec. his dishonorable discharge from the Army was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval,
and that on reconsideration asked for by him on 11/1/57, w/c he continued to follow up, the Board of
Administrators, Phil. Veterans Admin., finally approved his claim on 9/2/64, at the rate of P30/mo. Judge Soriano
noted that: "had it not been for the said error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so
the latter was valid and meritorious even as of the date of its filing on 3/4/55, hence to make the same effective
only as of the date of its approval on 9/2/64-- according to def's stand-- would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to
pltff.
The appeal assigns as one error what it considers to be the failing of the LC in not holding that the
complaint in this case is in effect a suit against the State w/c has not given its consent thereto.
HELD: It does not admit of doubt that if the suit were in fact against the State, the LC should have dismissed the
complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly an action may be against a public official, the def. may in
reality be the govt. As a result, it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on
the public treasury, whether in the disbursement of funds or loss of prop., the public official proceeded against not
being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no
application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted bec. of his failure to comply w/
the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of pltff. or petitioner. Such is the present
case.
xxx However, where the judgement in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of
the prop. in favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liab. of the Govt, then the suit should be
regarded as one against the govt itself, and consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts
except w/ the consent of said Govt. c 


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FACTS:
Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a duly
recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the
service on 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim presented and after
hearing and adjudication, the Phil. Veterans Bd granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective 1/28/47; that in
3/50, the said Bd. discontinued payment of monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar pension
from the US Govt, thru the US Veterans Admin. by reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East
during the war, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote
the said Bd. twice, demanding the continued payment of his monthly pension but his demands went unheeded.
And petition for mandamus was filed w/ CFI-Cebu w/c rendered judgment upholding Del Mar's claim.
The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try the civil case bec. it involves a money
claim against PVA- a mere agency of the Govt performing governmental functions w/ no juridical personality of its
own- and, in reality, partakes of an action against the Phil. Govt w/c is immune from suit w/o its consent.

HELD:
As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Govt from suit w/o its consent holds true in all
actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of
prop. Needless to say, in such actions, w/c, in effect, constitute suits against the Govt, the court has no option but
to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant institutes
an action against a functionary who fails to comply w/ his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the
public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. As clearly discernible from the
circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception. c 


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Doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

FACTS:
By reason of her non-selection to a position at Clark Air Base, Shauf filed an equal opportunity complaint
against officers of Clark Air Base, for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex.
She then filed a complaint for damages with the RTC. Respondents filed a MTD on the ground that as officers of
the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them, they are immune
from suit.
Shauf contends that the officers are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts performed
beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the US Govt. which would require its consent.
According to respondents, the complaint is barred by the immunity of the US since the acts sued upon are
governmental activities of the US.
HELD:
1. The general rule is that a state may not be sued without its consent. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials
or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
3. The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his individual capacity
such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official may be liable in
his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. In this case, the officers are liable for damages. $
# $ 


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]erein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held
liable for damages.

FACTS:
The heirs of the 12 rallyists who perished during the Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages. Such
action was filed against the government. This was by virtue of a recommendation made by the Citizen's Mendiola
Commission (created for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that
took place during the Mendiola incident.) that the heirs and wounded victims of the incident be compensated by
the Govt. Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation was received by the victims.
The Caylo Group (the group of marchers in the said incident) filed a formal letter of demand from the govt. Still
unheeded for almost a year, the group filed an action against the govt, together w/ the military officers and
personnel involved in the incident before the trial court. Resp. Judge dismissed the complaint as against the RP on
the ground that there was no waiver by the Sate.

HELD:
1. The principle of immunity from suit is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It
also rests on reasons of public policy -- that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in
the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government.
2. This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Mendiola
Commission regarding indemnification of the heirs and the victims of the incident by the government does not in
any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The Commission was merely a fact-finding body
and its recommendation was not final and executory. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that President Aquino
may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its immunity from suit. Although
consent to be sued may be given impliedly, such consent was not given in this case.
3. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:
1.? when the Republic is sued by name;
2.? when the suit is against an unincorporated govt. agency;
3.? when the suit is on its face against a govt. officer but the case is such that the ultimate liability
will belong not to the officer but to the govt.

In Republic v Purissima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977), the SC held that a contract entered into by the Rice and Corn
Administration stipulating that in the event of breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the basis of a
money claim against the RCA, a government entity under the Office of the President, since the RCA had no
authority to bind the government to be sued. Only a statute could.

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uuability of the utate. The Need for a utatute Giving Consent

FACTS:
The Rice & Corn Administration (RCA) entered into a contract w/ the Yellow Ball Freight Lines in w/c they
agreed that in the event of breach, action may be filed w/ the courts of Mla. In 1972, Yellow filed a money claim
against RCA. The case was assigned to resp. Judge, who denied a motion to dismiss filed by RCA relying on the
stipulation in the contract of the parties.

HELD:
The RCA is part of the govt, being in fact an office under the Office of the Pres. and therefore cannot be
sued w/o the consent of the State. The consent to be effective.... must come from the State, acting thru a duly
enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for def. RCA agreed to had no binding force in the govt. That was clearly
beyond the scope of his authority.
In Republic v Feliciano, 148 SCRa 424, the SC held that the Proclamation of the President of the
Philippines (recognizing private rights to the land) cannot be the source of consent, since the Proclama-tion is not a
legislative act.

#* ' !#( )!!#  !$# !!$ +# ,  ! !# )# "

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Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippines hereby consents and
submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which
could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has
presented his claim to the Commission on Audit and that the latter did not decide the same within two months
from the date of its presentation.
Sec. 3. Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila or of the province where the claimant resides, at the option of the latter,
upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.
Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and
appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.
Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippines is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar
action between private parties.
Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippines pursuant to the authority
granted in this Act shall be served upon the Solicitor-General whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense,
either himself or through delegates.
Sec. 7. No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the
Philippines under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which
judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the President of the Philippines, within five days after
the same becomes final.
Sec. 8. The President of the Philippines, at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature,
shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that
payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay,
including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 16, 1923.
 #% !#./!# 0 +#!+# $# , ! c !$ 1(  !!$
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Sec. 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable officers,
the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested,
the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him. With respect to the accounts of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one
hundred days after their submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.
In case of accounts or claims already submitted to but still pending decision by the Auditor General on or before
the approval of this Act, the periods provided in this section shall commence from the date of such approval.
Sec. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or
claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing:
(a) xxx
(b) To the President of the Philippines, or
(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is a private person or entity.
If there are more than one appellant, all appeals shall be taken to the same authority resorted to by the
first appellant.
From a decision adversely affecting the interests of the Government, the appeal may be taken by the
proper head of the department or in case of local governments by the head of the office or branch of the
Government immediately concerned.
The appeal shall specifically set forth the particular action of the Auditor General to which exception is
taken with the reasons and authorities relied on for reversing.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1938.

  % )% ! !$ $-  ' )"(!$-  
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Sec. 50. 2ppeal from decisions of the Commission.-- The party aggrieved by any decision, order, or ruling
of the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof appeal on certiorari to the Supreme
Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order, or ruling adversely affects
the interests of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (PD 1445.)
Sec. 35. 2ppeal from Decision of the Commission.-- Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. When the decision, order or ruling adversely affects
the interest of any government agency, the appeal may be taken by the proper head of that agency. (Subtitle B,
Title I, Book V, Administrative Code of the Philippines.

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FACTS:
Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the land authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land in
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. He alleged that the lot in question should be excluded from the NARRA settlement
reservation program of the government under Proc. No. 90, since it's his private property being covered by a
possessory information title in the name of his predecessor-in- interest. (Proc. No. 90 reserves for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the NARRA, now the Land Authority, a tract of land situated in the
Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur.) Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful owner of
the property in question.
 A motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the RP cannot be sued without its consent and hence
the action cannot prosper, was filed by 86 settlers (as intervenors) of the land in question.
The CFI granted the motion to dismiss, which was then reversed by the IAC on appeal. Hence this petition
by the RP.

ISSUES:
R. WON the doctrine of non-suability of the state can be invoked in this case. (YEu
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded
the RP as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to
court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of
property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under
settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing of consent in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court
a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the
courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings."
2. WON the consent of the RP may be read from Proc. No. 90 itself. (NO
The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation established by Proc. no. 90 cannot be construed as a
waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be
inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State Immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body. $
# $ 


- ! ! !c%%

FACTS:
In 1/67, the Office of the District Engr. requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8 Bulldozer.
A public bidding for the said items was conducted wherein the awards committee accepted the winning bid of
P43,530 given by Singkier Motor Service owned by resp. Singson. Said award was approved by the Sec. of Public
Works and Comm. who then directed the immediate delivery of the parts. In due course, the voucher w/c covered
the transaction reached the hands of petitioner Highway Auditor Sayson who then made inquiries about the
reasonableness of the price. After finding the price reasonable (as was evidenced by the indorsements of the Div.
Engr. and the Comm. of Public Highways, the approval of the Sec. of PW & C, and the verification of the
representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination), petitioner approved and effected payment of the voucher
and withheld the 20% equivalent of P8,706 in order to submit the documents covering the transaction to the
Supervising Auditor for review. After making a canvass, the General Auditing Office determined the transaction to
be overpriced by at least P40,000. Malversation charges were failed against the district engr. and civil engr.
involved. A mandamus suit was filed by the resp. w/c sought to compel petitioner government auditors to approve
the payment of the voucher covering the balance. The LC decided in favor of resp. Singson. Hence this appeal by
certiorari.

HELD:
It is apparent that resp. Singson's cause of action is a money claim against the Govt, for the payment of
the alleged balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways. Assuming
momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against
the State ***, but an ordinary action for specific performance***. Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, w/c cannot
prosper or be entertained by the Court except w/ the consent of the State***. In other words, the resp. should
have filed his claim w/ the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of CA 327*** w/c prescribe the conditions
under w/c money claim against the government may be filed.
xxx It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted.
Also, in the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the
party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor Gen. Even had there been such , the court to w/c the
matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the LC could not legally act on the matter. $
# $ 


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FACTS:
Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance owned by the Philippine General Hospital. It
was driven by a driver employed by the hospital. In order for Merritt to sue the Philippine government, Act No.
2457 was enacted by the Philippine Legislature authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit was then filed
before the CFI of Manila which fixed the responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance driver and
determined the amount of damages to be awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff
Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in rendering the amount against the government.

ISSUE:
Did the defendant in enacting Act No. 2457 simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its
liability to the plaintiff?

HELD:
By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Act No. 2457 authorizes E. Merritt to bring suit for the purpose of fixing the responsibility for the collision
and determining the amount of damages, if any, to which E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision. The
government did not assume any liability under the Act.
The Government of the Philippine Islands is only liable, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of A1903, OCC (par. 6, Art. 2180, NCC). 2
special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of
his office if he is a special official. The special agent acts in representation of the state and executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions w/c are inherent in and naturally pertain
to his office and w/c are regulated by law and the regulations. The responsibility of the State is limited to that w/c
it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged w/ some definite purpose w/c gives rise to the claim, and not were the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged w/ some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent. $
# $ 


5   %c&

FACTS:
Resp. was employed as barracks boy in Camp O'Donnel, and was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by petitioners, who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators. Petitioners filed charges against resp. for violation of RA 6425 and testified against him at the trial.
Resp was dismissed from employment as a result of the filing of the charge. Resp. filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners for his removal. Defendants (petitioners herein) filed the affirmative defense that they had only
done their duty in the enforcement of Phil. laws inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US MBA. Later, their
counsel filed a motion to withdraw answer and moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
defendants were acting in their official capacity and that the complaint against t hem was in effect a suit against
the US w/o its consent.

HELD:
Petitioners cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal w/c has not given its consent
to be sued. Petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation.
Pvt resp. invoke Art. 2180, NCC w/c holds the govt liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it
would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated as "special agents," the US govt
should be liable for their torts.

SSS V. CA, 120 SCRA 707 (1983)

FACTS:
The Spouses David and Socorro Cruz obtained a loan from SSS on the security of a lot located in Sto.
Rosario, Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that the couple had defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations, the
SSS applied for the foreclosure of the mortgage. As a result the sheriff scheduled the sale of the prop. mortgaged
and notice of the sale was published. It turned out that while the couple failed to pay some of the amortizations on
time, at the time of the application for foreclosure, their account was up to date. The SSS mistook the couple's
account for that of another one bearing the same name Socorro Cruz, although w/ different middle name. The
spouses sued SSS for damages.

HELD:
(1) Having accepted the late payments of the monthly installments, the SSS could not suddenly and w/o
prior notice to the couple apply for the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgage. There was negligence on the
part of the SSS when it mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was
called to the error but it refused to acknowledge its mistake. SSS should, thus, be held liable for nominal damages.
(2) Under its charter [RA 1161, sec. 4(k)] the SSS can sue and be sued. So, even assuming that the SSS
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions by virtue of the explicit provision of the
enabling law, it can be sued. The government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS,
although it does not thereby concede its liability.
Makasiar, dissenting:
xxx. The provision that it can be sued and be sued merely allows a private citizen a remedy for the enforcement of
his rights but always subject to the defense of the govt. Since under Art. 2180, NCC the State is liable for tort only
when it acts through special agents but not when it acts through officials to whom the task done properly pertains
and who alone are liable for their torts, the SSS cannot be held liable for damages in this case.



?
"*2ccà
 
?
In PNB v CIR, 81 SCRA 314 (1978), the SC held that since the PHHC had the capacity to be sued, any judgment
against it could be enforced by a writ of execution, and its funds could even be garnished.

c- .2 )!'c&


FACTS:
Petitioners are among the many victims of the flooding caused by the simultaneous opening of the three
floodgates of Angat Dam during the height of typhoon "Kading". The complaints they filed before the CFI of
Bulacan were dismissed for the reason that the NPC in the operation of the Angat Dam is `performing a purely
governmental function,' thus it `can not be sued without the express consent of the State.' Respondent CFI denied
MRecon, hence, this petition.

HELD:
The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be
sued in any court under its charter [RA 6395, Sec. 3(d)]. As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has
a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government (NASSCO v CIR). Moreover, the charter
provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and
accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by petitioners. $
# $ 


5!# $##  )  c6&c
utate Immunity from uuits Extends to contracts Relating to uovereign Functions.

FACTS:
In 5/72, the US advertised for bid projects involving the repair of wharves and certain works on the
shorelines at its naval base in Subic, Zambales. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. (EG & Co.) submitted proposals in
connection w/ w/c it received 2 telegrams from the US govt asking it to confirm its price proposals and the name
of its bonding co. However, in 6/82, EG & Co. was informed that its proposals had been rejected and the projects
had been awarded to 3rd parties. EG & Co. brought suit in the CFI to compel the US govt to allow it to perform the
work on the projects. It also asked for a writ of prel. inj. to restrain the US govt from entering into contract w/ 3rd
parties for work on the projects. The US govt moved to dismiss the complaint, but its motion was denied. Hence
the petition for review.

HELD:
It has been necessary to distinguish bet. sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis.) The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. However, the resp. Judge held that by entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shorelines the
State did not act in its governmental capacity.
A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. The rule does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base w/c is devoted to the defense of both the US and the
Phils., indisputably a function of the govt of the highest order; they are not utilized for, nor dedicated to,
commercial or business purpose.




 !"*cc&
PNR not Immune from uuit

FACTS:
The petitioners sued the Philippine National Railway (PNR) for damages for the death of their son who fell
from an overloaded PNR train on 10/30/77. However, the trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that, under
its charter as amended by PD 741, the PNR had been made a government instrumentality, and that as such it is
immune from suit.

HELD:
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for w/c the entity is organized." When
the govt enters into a commercial transaction it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corp. In this case, the state divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR, w/c is no different
from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Co. VV.
   !c&'

In Amigable v Cuenca, (43 SCRA 360), Alfonso v Pasay and Ministerio v CFI, 40 SCRA 464, the SC allowed
suit for the recovery of possession of titled lands previously (decades) taken over by the government for expansion
of roads without just compensation and the proper expropriation proceedings. In so holding, it said that it would
be unjust for the government to invoke immunity after it has itself violated the rights of the parties-claimant by
taking over the possession of the lands.

!#  c
c%
Consent to be uued Presumed where 2llowance of Immunity Would be Inequitable
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for the revocation of a deed of donation w/c he and
his wife had made to the Bureau of Plant Industry. He claimed that the donee failed to comply w/ the condition of
the donation that the donee should install a lighting and water system on the prop. and build an office building w/
parking lot thereon not later than 12/7/74. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign
immunity.

HELD:
Ordinarily, a suit of this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly unfair for the govt, as
donee, w/c is alleged to have violated the condition under w/c it received gratuitously certain prop., to invoke its
immunity. Since it would be against equity and justice to allow such a defense in this case, consent to be sued
could be presumed. VV.

  !  )"1+- &c'

FACTS:
Priv. respondent Victoria Amigable was the owner of a parcel of land in Cebu City; sometime in 1924 the
Government took this land for road-right-of-way purpose. In 1959, she filed in the CFI of Cebu a complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession plus damages. This complaint was dismissed on the grounds of estoppel and
the statute of limitations and also on the ground of non-suability of the Government. The SC on appeal reversed
the CFI and remanded the case for the purpose of determining the compensation to be paid Amigable, directing
that to determine just compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the
taking. Respondent judge, however did not heed the directive but instead took into account supervening inflation
of the currency and adjusted the value in accordance with the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate. His basis was
Article 1250 of the Civil Code. The Sol-Gen appealed the decision.

HELD:
Art. 1250 applies only to cases where a contract or agreement is involved. It does not apply where the
obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract. The taking of private property by the Government in
the exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. The value of the
property at the time the govt took possession of the land in question, not the increased value resulting from the
passage of time, w/c invariably brings unearned increment to real estate, represents the value to be paid as just
compensation for the prop. taken. Adapted.

. !7 !#"!

!%c%&,c89&'&'
# ''

FACTS:
Froilan purchased from Shipping Commission a vessel for P200,000 paying P50 T downpayment. A CM was
executed to secure the payment of the balance. For various reasons including non-payment of installments, the
Commission took possession of the vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed from the action of the Commission and he
was restored to all the rights under the original contract. However, Pan Oriental retained the possession of the
vessel. Froilan filed a complaint to recover possession of the vessel. A writ of replevin was issued. The Govt
intervened alleging that Froilan failed to pay the balance to the Commission; that the intervenor was entitled to
the possession of said vessel under the terms of the original contract or in order for it to effect the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. Pan Oriental answered the complaint in intervention praying that if RP succeeded in
obtaining the possession of the vessel, to comply w/ its obligation of delivering it to Pan Oriental pursuant to their
contract of bareboat charter w/ option to purchase. Complaint in intervention was dismissed upon Froilan's
payment of his account to the RP. RP filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim w/c Pan Oriental had filed against
it in view of the court's order dismissing the complaint in intervention. Counterclaim of Pan O. against RP was
dismissed. Hence, this appeal. RP raised, among others, as ground for the dismissal of Pan O's counterclaim, the
State's immunity from suit.

HELD:
By filing its complaint in intervention, the govt in effect waived its right of non-suability. Stated otherwise,
by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the State surrendered its privileged position and came
down to the level of the def. The latter automatically acquires, w/in certain limits, the right to set up whatever
claims and other defenses he might have against the State. Adapted.

In Froilan vs Oriental Pan Shipping, GR L-6060 (Sept. 30, 1950), the SC held that when the State itself files a
complaint, the defendant is entitled to file a counterclaim against it. This is based on equitable grounds. The SC
ruled that the govt. impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of
asserting a claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of a vessel.

  !  )"1+-!(  c&&'

FACTS:
On 11/20/40, the Govt filed a complaint for eminent domain (ED) in the CFI for the expropriation of land
belonging to N.T. Hashim needed to construct EDSA. On 11/25/40, the Govt took possession of the prop. upon
deposit w/ the city treasurer of the sum fixed by the court as the provisional value of all the lots needed to
construct the road. In 1958, the estate of Hashim, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas Hashim, filed a money
claim w/ the QC Engr's Office, w/c was alleged to be the FMV of the prop. in question. Nothing having come out of
the claim, the estate filed a complaint for the recovery of the FMV against the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH.)
The parties entered into a compromise agreement w/c was approved by the CFI. The estate filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution, w/c the court granted. A notice of garnishment, together w/ a writ of execution
was served on PNB, notifying it that levy was thereby made upon the funds of petitioner Bureau and the Auditor
General on deposit. Resp. Coruna, in his capacity as Chief, Documentation Staff of PNB's Legal Dept., authorized
the issuance of a cashier's check of the bank in the amount of the judgment/ compromise agreement. Petitioners
contend that PNB acted precipitately in having delivered the amount w/o affording petitioner Bureau a reasonable
time to contest the validity of the garnishment. It demands that the bank credit the petitioner's account w/ the
amount garnished.

HELD:
Although the govt, as pltff. in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and
thereby waives its immunity from suit, the judgement that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award
determined as just compensation for the condemned prop. as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title
thereto in its favor, cannot be realized upon execution. xxx [It] is incumbent upon the legislature to appropriate
any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay the award
determined in the judgment, since the Govt cannot keep the land and dishonor the judgment.
xxx The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's claim "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts end when the judgment is rendered, since govt funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated
by law. c 

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 ? ? ?

 ?resignation is a factual question and its elements are

beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to for. It can be oral. It can be written. It can
be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
?
V? The Petition questioned the legitimacy of the assumption of office by then Vice President GMA
V? Lawyer's League case was cited by respondents; that the case presented apolitical question, hence not
subject to judicial review
V? SC held that the case of Lawyer's League is inapplicable; the government offormer President Aquino was
the result of a successful revolution by the sovereignpeople, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the
Freedom Constitution declared that theAquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." It is
familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is
beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In
checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that
she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of
the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution. The case at bar pose legal and not political
questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
1987 Constitution, notably Sec. 1 of Article II and Sec. 8 of Article VI, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.