Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge

Author(s): C. Wright Mills

Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Nov., 1940), pp. 316-330
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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METHODOLOGICAL
SOCIOLOGY

OF THE
CONSEQUENCES
OF KNOWLEDGE

C. WRIGHT MILLS
ABSTRACT
An epistemologicalhaziness has preventeda fruitfulgrasp of those juncturesof
influences.The mootedproblemofthe
actual thinkingthatare open to social-historical
logicalconsequencesofsociologyofknowledgehas not been adequately instituted.One
of the implicationsof the Americanpragmatismof Peirce, Dewey, and Mead for a
and solutionofthisissue. This articlederives
sociologyofknowledgeis a freshdefinition
and elaboratesthisimplication.Concretestudies,instances,and modusoperandiof the
methodologicalconsequencesof sociologicalstudiesof inquiryare cited and analyzed

Many thinkerswho have addressed themselvesto the problem

hold that the sociologyof knowledgehas no relevanceforepistemology; that sociological investigationsof inquiries have no consequences fornormsof "truth and validity."' It is possible that the
problemhas been institutedin too narrowand yet in too gross a
fashion. It is true that fromknowledgeof the "social position" of a
thinkerone cannot deduce that his statementsare true or false. In
this crudesense sociologyof knowledgeis epistemologicallyinconseI Von Schelting'sreviewof Mannheim'sIdeologieund Utopieconcludes: "The nonsense firstbeginswhen one believes that factual originand social factors.... in any
way affectthe value ofideas and conceptionsthus originated,and especiallythe theoreticvalue .... whichis to say, thetruth. . . . of cognitiveachievements"(American
SociologicalReview,I, No. 4, 634). Thus the relatingof modes of thoughtto socialhistoricalsituationsis conceivedto carrywithit no legitimatecriticismor reformulation of "traditional" criteriaof validity and truth (cf. T. Parsons' review of von
[AmericanSociologicalReview,I, No. 4,
Schelting'sMax WebersWissenschaftslehre
675 f.]). Hans Speier,in recordinga similarbelief,speaksofthe "encroachmentofsociology upon a philosophicdomain" and distinguishesbetween "promotive"and "theoretical" thought;the latter,conceivedto have "truth" alone as its aim, apparentlyis
Speiersays: "The validityofa judgnot to be analyzedsociologically.WithGruinwald,
mentdoes not depend upon its genesis" (AmericanSociologicalReview,I, No. 4, 682,
in reviewingE. Grulnwald'sDas ProblemeinerSoziologiedes Wissens; cf. also Speier,
"The Social Determinationof Ideas," Social Research,V, 2). Thus, on epistemological
grounds,von Scheltingand Speier would limitthe subject matterand implicationsof
sociologyof knowledge.R. K. Merton apparentlyaccepts this negative position in
"The Sociologyof Knowledge,"Isis, XXVII, No. 3 (75), 502-3. R. Bain and R. M.
McIver, in papers read at AtlanticCity, I937, also indicatethat theysee no epistemological consequencesof sociologyof knowledge.G. H. Sabine takes this position in
"Logic and Social Studies," PhilosophicalReview,XLVIII (I939), I73-74.

3I6

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

3I7

quential. But the matteris morecomplicated;the consequencesare

less direct.
An analytic examinationof the negativepositionsconcerningthe
epistemologicalconsequencesofsociologyofknowledgeand a resolution of the genericissue to whichit is presumablyaddressedwill advance obliquelyand will includeanswersto the questions: (i) What
is the genericcharacter,derivation,and functionof epistemologic
forms,criteriaof truth,or verificatory
models? (2) Exactly wherein,
at what junctures,and in what types of inquirymay social factors
enteras determinantsof knowledge?
It is apparent that "truth" and "objectivity" have application
and meaningonlyin termsofsome accepted model or systemofverification.He who asserts the irrelevanceof social conditionsto the
truthfulness
ofpropositionsoughtto state the conditionsupon which
he conceives truthfulnessactually to depend. He ought to specify
exactlywhat it is in thinkingthat sociologicalfactorscannot affect
and upon which truth and validity do rest. Those who take the
negative position must state what sort of things these criteriaof
truthand validityare, how theyare derived,and how theyfunction.
There have been and are many ways of determining"truth" and
"validity." Which specificcriteriado theyhave in mind? The canons of Aristotelianlogic?
Fritz Mauthner conducteda vigorous,if brief,sociologicalexaminationofthesecanons,suggestingthat the diffusion
ofIndian grammatic studiesand traditionalculturalfactorsinfluencedtheirformulation and persistence.2Dewey has offeredan empiricallybased
theorywhichviews this logic culturallyas formulatoryof the categoriesof speech prevalentin Greek society. He has also shown the
operation of class and consequent social-aestheticfactorsin these
criteriaof validity,and the conditionsunderwhich they arose.3
The officialand monopolisticparadigm of validation and truth
accepted by medieval scholasticismwas most certainlyinfluenced
by such factors as "the hierarchicallycentralizedposition of the
intellectualelite with its Dolitical as well as intellectualpower and
Aristotle,trans. C. D. Gordon(New York, I907).
Experienceand Nature (New York, I1929), pp. 48-50, 87, 9I-92.
For references
to
and a statementofa sociologicaltheoryofthecharacterand shiftsin logicscf.my "Language,Logic, and Culture,"AmericanSociologicalReview,IV (I939), 5.
2

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3I8

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

its strictmemory,faith,and dialectical normsof recruitment.Also

by the fact that by virtueof thissocial organizationforseveral centuries,the logiccautensand the perceptualschema of each individual
thinkerwere commonto major sectorsof the elite."4
Does the position under question invoke some more modern
epistemological formulations,say those of the seventeenth and
eighteenthcenturies?Mannheim has soundly suggestedthat these
were conditionedby the revolutionarystatus of the middle class,
particularlyby its "individualistic" character.5E. Conze has capably suggestedthe "Bourgeois Origins of Nominalism."6 Certainly
Descartes's protestantepistemologyis open to sociologicalinvestigation. And the "utilitarian" and "experimental"canons of verificationwerecertainlygivenimpetusby the social ethos of seventeenthcenturyPuritanism.7
There have been and are diverse canons and criteriaof validity
and truth,and these criteria,upon which determinationsof the
of propositionsat any time depend, are themselves,in
truthfulness
theirpersistenceand change, legitimatelyopen to social-historical
relativization.8Moreover,we have at hand sociologicaltheoriesconcerningthe characterand emergenceof certainof them. Criteria,or
observationaland verificatory
models,are not transcendental.They
are not drawn theoreticallypure froma Greek heaven, although
"choice" and usage of one set of themmay be so justified.Nor are
they part of an a priori,or innate, equipment of "the mind" conceived to be intrinsicallylogical.9
4 C. WrightMills, "Types of Rationality" (unpublishedMS).
5 K. Mannheim,Ideologyand Utopia,trans.L. Wirthand E. Shils (New York, I936);

Part I, esp. pp.

24-28.

Marxist Quarterly,I, i; Nos. 2 and 3 contain discussions;see also P. P. Wiener,

"Notes on Leibnitz's Conceptionof Logic and Its Historical Context,"Philosophical
Review,November,I939.
in Seventeenth-Century
7 See R. K. Merton,Science,Society,and Technology
England
(Bruges, Belgium,I938), and referencestherein.
8 In addition to studies cited above, see Sorokin,who isolates and utilizes several
formsof validation as key items for study (Social and CulturalDynamics
different
[New York, I9371, Vol. II).
9 E.g., Hans Speier speaks of "a propertyof human nature whichenables man to
searchfortruth" ("The Social Determinationof Ideas," op. cit.,pp. i86, I93). For a
RobotsorGods? (New York, I193I), p. 53.
contraryviewsee below;also A. Goldenweiser's
6

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

3I9

On the contrary: the historicaldiversityof such models supports

Dewey's view that they are generatedby and are drawn frominquiriesproceedingin given timesand societies. Dewey's thesisconcerningthe characterand historicaloccasion oflogical and epistemological (re)formulationsloempirically accounts for the historical
models
data. For fortyyears he has contendedthat the verificatory
rest are formsdrawn from
upon which imputationsof truthfulness
existentinquiries and have no meaningapart frominquiries: "Inquiry (logic, e.g.) is the causa cognoscendiof logical forms,primary
inquiryis itselfcausa essendiof the formswhichinquiryinto inquiry
discloses."", Careful examinationreveals no fundamentaldisagreement betweenDewey's and Mannheim's conceptionsof the generic
characterand derivationof epistemologicalforms.I2 "The indirect
approach to truth,"states Mannheim, "throughsocial historywill
in the end be more fruitfulthan a directlogical approach." Mannheim's view overlaps the program that Dewey has pursued since
1903, when he turnedfromtraditionalconcernsand squabbles over
the ubiquitous relationof thoughtin general to realityat large to
a specificexaminationof the context,office,and outcome of a type
of inquiry.I3
In termsof the norms upon which ideas were accepted and rejected, C. S. Peirce analyzed four segments from Western intellectual history.I4His comparativeand quasi-sociologicalwork was
preliminaryto his own acceptance of an observational and verificatorymodel whichhe himselfanalyzed out and generalizedfrom
laboratory science. But not all thinkers,even philosophers,have
-o Logic; The Theory
ofInquiry(New York, I938), chap. i; "Philosophy,"Research
in Social Science,ed. W. Gee, pp. 25I ff. See also H. Reichenbach,Experienceand
Prediction(Chicago, I938), chap. i.
Il Dewey, Logic,p. 4.

fromwhicha
t2 E.g., "....
the representative
modesof thoughtand theirstructure,
conceptionis built up as to the natureof truthin general.... the conceptof truthitselfis dependentupon the already existingtypes of knowledge"(Mannheim,op. cit.,
p. 262).
r3

Studiesin Logical Theory(Chicago, I909), chaps. i-iv.

r4 "Methods of Fixing Belief," Collected

Papers

(Cambridge,Mass., I934) Vol. V,

Book II, chap. iv, sec. v. Peirce's pragmaticpapers contain very suggestiveleads for
the sociologistof knowledge(see esp. secs. ii and v).

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320

THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

goneabout the "choice"of whatverificatory

modelwas to guide
theirthinking
so consciously
and thoroughly
as Peirce.The "acceptance"(usage) and "rejection"of verificatory
modelsby individual thinkersand by elitesis anotherjunctureat whichextralogical,possiblysociological,factorsmay enterand be of consequenceto thevalidityofan elite'sthinking.
Mannheim's"total,absolute,and universal"typeof "ideology"
in whichsocialpositionbearsupon "the structure
of consciousness
initstotality,"
including
formas wellas content,
maybe interpreted
to meanthissocial-historical
relativization
of a modelof truth,or
of a "social position"upon "choice"of one modelas
theinfluence
overagainstanother.Mannheim'sremarksdo not contradictthis
moreexplicitand analyticstatement.
Those who contendthat sociologicalinvestigations
of thinking
forthetruthor validityofthatthinking
haveno consequences
misunderstandthe sourceand characterof the criteriaupon which
truthand validityare at any timedependent.They also overlook
and theselectiveacceptances
thefactthatthesecriteriathemselves
ofone or anotherofthemby variouselitesare open
and rejections
and sociological
to culturalinfluence
investigation.
Apparently
they
thepossibilities,
thatwhatevervalidity
assume,withoutsurveying
and sociologically.
dependsupon,it cannotbe examinedempirically
This view is underpinned
by a blurredtheoryof knowledgeand
mindthatprohibits
analysisofthoseaspectsor juncturesin knowlfactorsmay enterand be
edge processesat whichextra-logical
of results.For theirattack is often
relevantto the truthfulness
againsttheviewthatthevalidityof a judgmentdependsuponits
genesis,and theyare inclinedto interpret
"genesis"in termsofan
forthought.'5
individual'smotivation
drawnin
It is truethatthe current"scientific"
thought-model,
bethemainfrompost-Renaissance
physicalinquiry,distinguishes
tweenthetruthoftheresultsand themotivesand socialconditions
of an inquiry.For thisparadigmdemandsthatassertionsbe verifiedby certainoperations
whichdo notdependuponthemotivesor
I5 E.g., Speier distinguishesthe type of thinkingthat in his view is not open to
sociologicalinvestigationfromthe "promotive"typewhichis on the basis of the individual thinker'sepistemologicalmotivationand intention(see below).

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

32I

socialpositionoftheassertor.Socialpositiondoesnotdirectly
affect
the truthfulness
of propositions
testedby thisverificatory
model.
But socialpositionsmaywellaffect
whether
or notit or someother
modelis used by typesof thinkers
todayand in otherperiods.By
no meanshave all thinkersin all timesemployedthisparticular
verificatory
model.Indeed,manydo notnowacceptit. Manyconmodelby
temporary
socialscientists
onlyknowthisphysical-science
name,and their"usage" is limitedto thesprinkling
ofa fewterms
throughtheirwritings.This particularmodeldid not and could
not have existedpriorto the wholesaleriseof physicalsciencein
westernEurope,forit was drawnfromthistypeofinquiry.
But even in inquiriessatisfying
this paradigmthe motivesor
socialpositionsofthethinker
do notexhausttheaspectsofinquiries
whichmay be relativeto social factors.Any observationaland
and the"selecverificatory
patternmayitselfbe sociallyrelativized,
tion"and use ofany model(as wellas its specificdiffusion
pattern
acrossvariegatedelites)is open to sociologicalexplanation.Two
otheraspectsofinquiriesthatare open to possiblesocial-historical
influences
and thatmaybearon criteria,
and henceon truthfulness
and validityofresults,maybe mentioned:
i. The categories
uponwhichall discourse
andinquirydependare
relatedto socialsituations,
to culturaldeterminants.
Numerousinhave
of societal
vestigators'6 indicatedhowconcepts,as surrogates
contexts,may shape inquiriesthat apparentlyare footloose and
sociallyfree.Detectionofthesocietally
conditioned
meanings
ofthe
termsuponwhichan inquirydependsmaybe viewedas a critique
of the warrantability
of this inquiry'sresults.In C. W. Morris'
termsthe "pragmatic"(whichincludesthesociological)dimension
ofthelanguageprocessis basicallyrelatedtothesemantical
andsyntactical.17
Whatis takenas problematic
andwhatconceptsareavailA6 Dewey, Logic: The Theory
ofInquiry,chap. i; E. Vivas, "A Note on the Question
of Class Science,"MarxistQuarterly,
I, No. 3, 437 ff.;see Mills, "Language, Logic, and
Culture," op. cit., pp. 676-80, for a statementand references;and particularlyM.
Granet'sapplicationofDurkheim'ssociologicaltheoryofcategories,La Penseechinoise
(Paris, I938); also C. WrightMills, "M. Granet'sContributionto Sociologyof Knowledge" (mimeographedmaterial,Department of Sociology,Universityof Wisconsin
upon request.
[I9401)-available
17 Fozndationsof the Theoryof Signs ("InternationalEncyclopedia of UnifiedSciences," Vol. I, No. 2 [Chicago, I938]). This book and the movementsit representsare
verysuggestiveAmericansourcesforsociologyof knowledge.

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THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

able and usedmaybe interlinked

in certaininquiries.'8It shouldbe
notedthatwithinthe sociologicalperspective,
theproblemswhich
occasionreflection
maybe viewedfromnumerous
anglesas connective of intellectand culture.Viewingthe selectionof problemsin
termsof motivating
valuesis onlyone, thegrossest,modeof connection.
2. Closelylinkedwith such a view of categories
is the social
theoryof perception.In acquiringa technicalvocabularywithits
thethinker
is acquiring,
termsand classifrcations,
as it were,a setof
coloredspectacles.He sees a worldof objectsthatare technically
tintedand patternized.A specializedlanguageconstitutes
a veritablea prioriformofperception
and cognition,I9
whicharecertainly
relevantto the resultsof inquiry.Epistemologies
have differed
widelyas to the mannersin whichempiricalelementsenterinto
knowledge.But howevervariouslythey have incorporatedemin lookingat the worldforverification
piricalelements,
theirconcepts have conditionedwhat theyhave seen. Different
technical
elitespossessdifferent
perceptualcapacities.Empiricalverification
mirror-like
cannotbe a simpleand positivistic
operation.Thus the
of any verificatory
dimensions
modelare influenced
observational
bytheselectivelanguageofitsusers.Andthislanguageis notwithofthissocialviewof
out social-historical
imprint.The implications
theoriesof truth,e.g., are
perceptionforsimplecorrespondence
obvious.Failure to recognizesuch juncturesin inquirythat are
and "impartiality"
of
relevantto the"truthfulness,"
"objectivity,"
of thelegitilimitation
theresultsofinquiryissuesin an arbitrary
matesubjectmatterofan empiricalsociologyofknowledge.
An argument
longused againstall formsofrelativism
frequently
of the presentproblem: eitherthe relaappearsin discussionS20
8 Mills, "Language, Logic, and

Culture,"op. cit.,pp. 675 ff.

p. 344 and Index: "Perception";
I9 See G. A. DeLaguna, Speech(New Haven, I927),
ofSocial Norms(New York, I936) (see references).
also M. Sherif,The Psychology
20 E.g., von Schelting,AmericanSociologicalReview,p. 667. I am leaving open
whetheror not von Schelting'sis an adequate statementofMannheim'sposition. I am
concernednot with defenseor appraisal of Mannheim'swork,nor of von Shelting's
in toto,but onlywiththe one point. In general,however,I findMannheim's"relationism" (Ideologyand Utopia, esp. pp. 253 ff., 269-70) quite tenable. The position is
onlyfroman absolutistviewpoint.
logicallyimperfectand unsatisfactory

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

323

inwhich
tivist'sownassertion
andargument
arethemselves
relative,
case he has no groundsfordenying
orimputing
truthto thethought
of others,or his argumentand assertionare unconditionally
true,
and hencerelativism
is self-contradictory.2I
This argument
maybe
putin strictlogicalform:(a) Thinking
is functional
ofculturalfactors. (Hence,its "objective,""impartialvalidity,"is destroyed.)
(b) The sociologyofknowledge
is a typeofthinking.(c) Therefore,
ofculturalfactors.(Hence,
thesociologyofknowledge
is functional
it cannotbe "objective,""valid.") Now Mannheimhimselfhas
documented
He has indicatedthecultural
empirically
abc-linkage.22
and politicalconditionsof the sociologyof knowledge.It is the
premiseshungafterthe "hence's"and theirassumptions
thatwe
needto examine.
Theseantirelationistic
arguments
apparently
ignorethecharacter
and statusofepistemological
forms(see secs. i and 2 above). They
to
assumetheexistenceof an absolutetruthhavingno connection
inquiry;and theyare significant
onlyfroman absolutistviewpoint.
The imputations
ofknowledge
ofthesociologist
maybe testedwith
reference
to theverificatory
modelgeneralized,
e.g.,by Peirceand
Dewey. Theirtruthfulness
is thenin termsofthismodel. Granted
thatthismodelis no absolute
guaranty,
it seemsthemostprobable
we have at present.(As a practicalfact,if we wouldsocializeour
thoughtamongprofessional
thinkers
today,we mustcastit in such
terms.)Criteriaare themselves
developingthings.A precondition
for"correcting"
themodelforfutureuse is self-consciously
to use it
now. "Inquiryintoinquiry[logic]is .... a circularprocess,it does
not depend on anythingextraneousto inquiry."23

The assertions
of thesociologist
ofknowledge
escape the "absolutist'sdilemma"becausetheycan referto a degreeof truthand
becausetheymayincludetheconditions
underwhichtheyare true.
are translatable
to
Onlyconditional
assertions
fromone perspective
another.Assertions
can properly
be statedas probabilities,
as more
or less true. And onlv in this wav can we account forthe fact that
21

Cf. E. Vivas' statementand able dissectionof thisargument(op. cit.,p. 443).

Ideology
andUtopia,chap.i.
23 Dewey, Logic:TheTheory
ofInquiry,
chap. i.

22

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THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

scientific
inquiryis self-correcting.
The sociologistmay without
contradiction
also pointoutsocialfactorsconditioning
failureto use
thisparticularmodel.Mannheimquite correctly
claimsthat new
forsocialsciencemayemergefromtheinquiries
criteria
ofthesociology of knowledge.It is entirelypossible.I shall elaboratethe
pointbelow.It is enoughhereto realizethat"traditional
criteria"
emergefromlogicalanalysesof "traditional"typesofinquiry.The
attemptto restrict
theobjectmatterand implications
ofthesociolinorderto saveitsassertions
ogyofknowledge
is mislocated
andnot
consonantwithmoderntheoriesofknowledge.24
Anothersuchattemptis advancedby thosewhowouldlimitthe
to investigation
oftheconsciousattemptsof
sociologyofknowledge
a promoter
to finda public;the social conditions
of typesof proideas persuasiveof values,etc.25From
moters;meansof diffusing
thispointofviewthesociologyofknowledge
can haveno epistemologicalrelevanceor objectmatterbecauseit can studythoroughly
only a "promotive"type of thought.In so far as it examines
"theoreticalthinking"("the aim of [which]is ....

simplytruth"),

limitedto examination
of "the selectionof certain
it is apparently
thereis a second
problems."In additionto individualmotivation,
of the two types of thinking:the public of the
differentiation
is "the timelessranksofthosewhoseekthe
philosopher
(theoretic)
of
is analyticenough.It does
truth."Neither thesedifferentiations
nothelpany to say thattheyare different
"qualitiesof thinking."
thinker
I takethispublicofthe"theoretical"
to be themembers
of
delimitedas (a) thosewho read his
a technicalelite,generically
moreorless
workorwhohe thinkswill;thatis,thoseparticipating,
in hisuniverseofdiscourse.(b) Theyare personsenmeaningfully,
and fixing
theirbeliefs,i.e., in thinkgagedin doubting,
criticizing,
24 Moreover,in his criticism
of Mannheim,von Scheltingdoes not appear to take
does not necessarily
into account the fact that the existenceof purposeand perspective
mean that the resultsofinquirymust be false; it merelymeans that its truthis always
conditional,not absolute. Since the turn of the centurymany logicians and social
psychologistshave contendedthat all inquiryhas a purposiveelementand is withina
as it is, does
particularperspective.Mannheim's epistemologicalwork,fragmentary
not denythefactofpurposeand perspectivein an effortto save some "traditionalconceptionof truth"framedon a spectator,godliketheoryof mind.
25

E.g., Speier,"Social Determinationof Ideas," op. cit.,pp. igg and 200.

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

325

ing,26(c) in a way that satisfiesthe conditionsof some thoughtmodel,theformsofwhichtheyare moreor lessawareofand which
theystriveto follow.This is what "seekingtruth"means.Thus
analyzedsociologically,
"philosophers"and "theoretic"thinking
ofknowledge.The very
constitute
data forthesociologist
certainly
existenceof such a groupis sociologically
The origins
significant.
and consequences
of suchgroupsin variouscontextshave received
littleexplicitattention.I have alreadyindicatedhow the "selecare open to sociological
tion" of criteria,and criteriathemselves,
oftechnical
investigation,
howthecategories
discourse,
theproblems
andperceptualschematamayinfluence
thedirection
and
addressed,
validatingformsofthinking.27
fora thinker
Furthermore,
merelyto wish,or to be motivated,
to
or not his asserattaintruthdoes notguaranteeor implywhether
tionsare true.Much less, whetherhe or theyare open to social
"True" is an adjectiveappliedto propositions
relativization.
that
In themodel
satisfytheformsofan acceptedmodelofverification.
now dominantamongsecular,professional
thinkers,
verification
is
independent
of theindividual'smotiveforthinking,
whetherit be
"truth"or "persuasion."I do notsee thatwe are justified
at this
stage of researchin differentiating
typesof thinkingin termsof
motivation.Suchare notthekindoftypeswe need
epistemological
and can use in dissection.For it wouldtake a social-psychological
or nothe reallywas,or
whether
to determine
analysisofa thinker
orattempting
believedhe was,aimingat truth,i.e.,following
to follow a verificatory
model.One couldproperlyidentify
"theoretic"
model.In research
we
thinking
onlyin termsofa givenverificatory
cannotfruitfully
impose"ours" upon past thinkers.There have
and I have alreadyindibeen severalmodelsin Westernthought,
26

See Peirce,op. cit.AlsoE. Freeman,TheCategories

ofPeirce("ChicagoSeries"

[Chicago, I937]),

pp.

39-40.

thesepointsas opento socialinfluence

is probably
Speier'sfailureto recognize
concern
conditioned
by exclusive
withone typeofsocio-psychologic
mechanism
connectingideationand culture.In his articlehe acceptsonly"need,""problem,"
and
27

"interests"of the thinker."The relationsbetweenideas and social realityis .

. .

. con-

in themediumofneeds"("SocialDetermination
ofIdeas," op. cit.,p. I83).
stituted
See my"Language,Logic,and Culture,"op. cit.,in whichthisviewis criticized
and
othermodesofrelation
advanced.

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THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

relativizaopen to social-historical
catedthattheyare themselves
tion.28

formofvalidationtowhichall will
Thereis inourtimenocommon
presentsan
condition
submittheirassertions.This epistemological
thediversenormsthemselves,
to studycomparatively
opportunity
diversity
and genesis.In the face of epistemologic
theirfunction,
to someone
it seemsfoolishto callourworkirrelevant
and confusion
selectedsetofnormswhichwerederivedfroma particuarbitrarily
beliefs.But
lar gamutof inquiryor concoctedfrommiscellaneous
impliedby suchstatements
ofknowledge
thetasksforsociologists
are not too clear. They need to be indicatedmoreprecisely.Of
to "thesocialweaspireto contribute
course,as Wirthhasindicated,
itself."I am
elaborationof the theoryof knowledge
psychological
here concernedwithpointingup the usefulnessof such workto
ofsociologyofknowlfunction
i.e., themethodological
sociologists,
edge.
ofknowledge
neednotrestwithfactualexaminaThe sociologist
ofaspectsofknowledge
processes.For such
tionand relativization
and contextual
on a comparative
placeshimstrategically,
experience
We need here to
construction.
basis, forpositivemethodological
withmethodology.
of epistemology
realizeDewey's identification
This realizationcarriesthe beliefthatthe derivingof normsfrom
some one type of inquiry (even thoughit have wide prestige,e.g.,

In its"epistemo"physicalscience")is nottheendofepistemology.
logic function"the sociologyof knowledgeis specificallyproforthe social
of soundmethodology
paedeuticto the construction
recognizedthis,he would
sciences.29Had Mannheimconsistently
in hiswork.But,on the
and mislocations
haveavoidedambiguities
28
Speier'spaper ("Social Determinationof Ideas," op. cit.), is valuable in its acute
remarkson "social actions" and theambiguityoftheterm"need" as it appearsin many
sociologiesofknowledge;but he has failedto analyze what he terms"theoretic"thinking. The limitationshe would exact of sociologyof knowledgeare withoutadequate
justification.
29 L. Wirth has correctly
indicated that an incipientsociologyof knowledgehas
oftenbeen an unexploitedby-productofmethodologicaldiscussions(Prefaceto Mannheim,op. cit.,pp. xvii-xxiii).

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

327

whole,Mannheimas epistemologist
is concerned
withthedetection
and correction
oflimitations
ofsocial-political
In hisreinquiries.30
viewofRice's Methods3'he abstractssomenotionsand formswhich
controlinquiriesof Americanand Germansociologists,
criticizes
each styleof studyby the otherin supplementary
fashion,and
briefly
linksthe twoin a generalresearchmodelwhichhe submits
socialinquiryshouldfollowifit wouldissuein firmknowledge.
in implying
Von Scheltingis incorrect
thatMannheimdoes not
"postulatethepossibility
ofobjectivevalidityforcognitive
achievements."32
In fact,Mannheimdoes not stopwiththemereassumption.He goeson as a soundmethodologist
to attemptformulations
of criteriaforsocial inquiryin termsof existentmodesof social
thoutght
as empirically
ascertained
by logicand a contextual
sociologyofknowledge.If Mannheimhas fallenshortin his attemptsto
enunciatesoundcriteriaforsocialinquiries,
it is notdue to misconceptionsofthecharacter
ofepistemological
formsnorto "epistemologicalinconsistency."
The desireto treatpolitically
important
problems
without
beinga victim
to bias was responsible
forthe development
in Germany
of.... WissensThisnewbranchofresearch,
soziologie.
selfintended
tobe an organofcritical
control
hasalreadysucceeded
in detecting
andsubjecting
to control
important
sourcesoferror.33
This certainlyis indicativeof one genericmeaningof the epistemological relevance of sociology of knowledge. The sociologist of
knowledgejoins the alive logician and social methodologistin the
criticalbuildingof soundermethodsforsocial research.
30 As was Spencer,StudyofSociology(I873) and J. S. Mill, A SystemofLogic,Book
VI. Notice the mannerin whichSpencermoves fromdiscoveryof proceduralfallacies
having social sources,from"the many modes in whichevidencemay be vitiated,"to
the constructionof methodologicaltechniquesdesignedto obviate such fallaciesand
vitiations.The idea that detectionof social sources of errormay lead to sounder
methodologyis clearly evidenced. In this connectioncf. E. Durkheim,Regles de la
methode
sociologique(Paris, I895), chap. ii.
3' AmericanJournalofSociology,
Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (I932).
32 Op. cit.,p. 667.
33 Mannheim,op. cit., p. 28I; also see Mannheim,Man and Societyin an Age of
Reconstruction
(New York, I940), in which methodologicalproblemsof "social planning,"as a typeof thought,are constructively
presented.

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328

THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

Among the specificissues which he may fruitfully

problematize
are those concerningthe respectivemethodsof physical and social
inquiry. There are those who, in the name of science,would impose
theproceduralformsof theformeron the latterin wholesalefashion;
and there are social students who will have nothing to do with
physical science. The sociologist of knowledge grounded in comparative understandingmay not only establish social sources for
the two extremepositions,but, constructively,
he may implement
the planned alterationof certainphysical formsthat are foundadvisable to achieve fruitfully
the transfer.
"Experiment" as a verificatoryform is an instance in point.
Dewey, e.g., has abstractedthisformfromphysicalinquiryand has
attemptedto generalizeit forall "inquiryqua inquiry." His writings
are informedby failureto see fullyand clearlythedifficulties
and the
ambiguitiesassociated with the physical paradigm of inquiry and
particularly,"experiment,"when applied to social data. Experiment in a societal situationdoes have characteristicsand problems
which experimentin a laboratory does not possess. For instance,
the "control" and manipulationnecessaryto "experimental"work
as it occursin physicalscienceoftenassume politicaland evaluative
dimensionsthat experimentin laboratorycontextsdoes not.34And
the "reconstitution"of an object, which according to Dewey is
necessarybeforeit can functionas an object of knowledge,involves
many issues. To say the least, the attemptto carrythis laboratory
techniqueover into social data precipitatesmethodologicaland political problemsto whichDewey and his discipleshave not squarely
addressed themselves.
Inadequacy at this point,and others,suggeststhat thereis need
to analyze social researchesin their cultural and intellectualcontexts and attempt to articulate the inchoate rules implicitwithin
them. In this manner we may empiricallysupplant the a priori
assumptionsthat thereis or is not, that thereshould or should not,
be any essential difference
between social inquiryand physical sci34See L. H. Lanier's recentpresentationofthepoint (SouthernReview,Vol. V, No. i,
cf.my "Reflection,
documentationand partialramification
[I9391). For comprehensive
available at the Universityof Texas library.
Behavior,and Culture,"pp. 9I-I02,

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

329

ence. Such analysiswould also enable explicitand sophisticated

ofproblemspeculiarto socialinquiry.
formulation
Problemsof"value" arisewithinand frustrate
socialinquiry.To
state one aspect of the problem: how do the researchproblems
actuallyaddressedby socialscientists
involveevaluationsand how,
ifat all,do suchinvolvements
condition
thetruthfulness
ofresults?35
Locatedas snarls
Questionsofvalueshouldnotbe takeniiberhaupt.
in social inquiry,questionsof value becomespecificand genuine.
They need to be answeredby sociologicalanalysesof specific
and problemsarisingin them.Not onlythe contentof
disciplines
valuesin socialinquiriesshouldbe detected,but howvalues creep
in,andhow,ifat all,theycondition
and
thedirection,
completeness,
oftheresultsofresearch.In thiswaywe maygaina
warrantability
positionfromwhichto formulate
rulesofevidencethatwillprevent
our results.Such contextualexaminaexhortation
frominforming
tionswillpermitprecisedefinition
ofissuesthatare nowvague.
Perhapsthecentralmethodological
problemofthesocialsciences
springsfromrecognition
that oftenthereis a disparitybetween
lingualand social-motor
typesof behavior.Now the sociologist
of
is explicitly
ofthe
knowledge
concerned
withfactualinvestigations
verbalcomponents
ofaction,withthe"commonsense,"e.g.,articulationsof variouscultures.In thisfieldone of his problemsis the
of differential
ascertaining
disparities
obtainingbetweenovertsystemsofbehaviorand whatis said by theactorsin different
cultural
contexts.Such systematic
investigations
wouldhave consequences
forthe construction
of techniquesof investigation.36
They should
enablethemethodologist
tobuildintohismethodsstandardmargins
oferror,
different
ratesofdiscountfordifferent
milieux.Theywould
show (forvariousculturalactions,typesof subjects,and various
modesof verbalization)howmuchand in whatdirection
disparities
betweentalk and actionwillprobablygo. In thisway factualin35 Cf. T. Parsons' (Structure
ofSocial Action[New York, I937], PP. 593,6oI ff.)references to and discussionof Max Weber's "Wertbeziehung."
36 Since the writingof thispaper, R. K. Mertonhas indicatedthe pointwithreference to a specificstudy ("Fact and Factitiousnessin Ethnic Opinionnaires,"American

Sociological
Review,
February,
I1940,

pp.

2I-22).

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330

THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY

vestigations
shouldprovidea basis forrulesforthe controland
guidanceofevidenceand inference.37
Becauseofits dominantly
academicposition,in Americansociologysystematic
theorizing
has proceededin textbooks
forstudents,
notforresearch.Whateffect
has thishad on theresearchmodelto
whichsociologists
have lookedforverification
of theirwork,and
henceon itsvalidity?
The ideal of intimacyof contactto whichCooley practically
assimilatedthe conceptionof society,withconsequentdistortion
and partiality,
has itsrootsin certainAmericanculturaltraditions38
and in compensation
fortheactualdepersonalization
and secondary
character
oflifein an urban-industrial
order.
The emphasisupon continuous
processas a centralcategoryin
American
sociology
has perhapsaidedtheoverlooking
ofrevolutionin "social change."Safemultiple-factor
arydislocations
viewsas to
historicalcausationare veryconvenient
to a "liberaldemocratic"
socialchange.Pluralisticcausesare
viewofpolitically
implemented
easilycarriedto a pointat whichno actionis possible;revolutionary
callsforbeliefin a monisticcause.
manipulation
itemscloseat handwhichthesociologist
These are fragmentary
ofknowledge
is in a positionto examine.The detailedself-location
of social science,if systematically
and sensitively
not
performed,
onlywilllead to detectionoferrorsin methodsunderwaybut conof sounderparadigmsfor
will resultin presentations
structively
futureresearch.
UNIVERSITY

OF WISCONSIN

37 Here sociologistscan garnersuggestionsfromcriticalhistoriography

which attemptsto locate (culturallyand biographically)observers(e.g., Roman popes) ofsocial
eventsin orderproperlyto discounttheirrecordedobservations.This methodis aware.
of the differences
of societal occurrencesas seen and writtenof by variouslysituated
reporters.See A. W. Small, OriginsofSociology,esp. pp. 48, 84, 85, 98; H. E. Barnes,
A HistoryofHistoricalWritings(Norman,Okla., I937), chap. x.
38 T. V. Smith, Beyond Conscience(New York, I934),
e.g.: "Social distance is
[considered]a direfate .... immoralin our Christiantradition"(p. iii).

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