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ERNESTO SYKI, petitioner, vs. SALVADOR BEGASA, respondent.

(GR No. 149149, October 23, 2003, 3rd Division)


FACTS:Respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger jeepney
driven by Joaquin Espina and owned by Aurora Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger
jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger
jeepney), a truck driven by Elizalde Sablayan and owned by petitioner Ernesto Syki bumped the rear
end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone. Respondent filed a
complaint for damages for breach of common carriers contractual obligations and quasi-delict against
Aurora Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Ernesto Syki, theowner of the
truck;, and Elizalde Sablayan, the driver of the truck. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the
complaint against Aurora Pisuena, the owner and operator of the passenger jeepney, but ordered
petitioner Ernesto Syki and his truck driver, Elizalde Sablayan, to pay respondent Salvador Begasa,
jointly and severally
ISSUES:1. Whether or not petitioner is liable for the act of his employee. 2. Whether he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family.
HELD: In the present case, was respondent partly negligent and thus, should not recover the full
amount of the damages awarded by the trial court? We rule in the negative. In sum, the sole and
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver who, as found by the lower
courts, did not slow down even when he was already approaching a busy intersection within the city
proper.[16] The passenger jeepney had long stopped to pick up respondent and his three companions
and, in fact, respondent was already partly inside the jeepney, when petitioners driver bumped the
rear end ofrear-ended it. The impact was so strong such that respondent fell and fractured his left
thigh bone (femur), and suffered severely woundeds in his left knee and leg. No doubt that
respondentpetitioners driver was reckless speeding.
Since the negligence of petitioners driver was the sole and proximate cause of the accident, in the
present case, petitioner is liable, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, to pay damages to respondent
Begasa for the injuries sustained by latterhim. Petition denied.
MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC. Petitioner,
vs. PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK/MCGEE & CO., INC., Respondent.
(G.R. No. 162467, May 8, 2009, 2nd Division)
FACTS: Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) contracted petitioner Mindanao Terminal and
Brokerage Service, Inc. (Mindanao Terminal), a stevedoring company, to load and stow a shipment of
146,288 cartons of fresh green Philippine bananas and 15,202 cartons of fresh pineapples belonging
to Del Monte Fresh Produce International, Inc. (Del Monte Produce) into the cargo hold of the vessel
M/V Mistrau. The vessel was docked at the port of Davao City and the goods were to be transported by
it to the port of Inchon, Korea in favor of consignee Taegu Industries, Inc. Del Monte Produce insured
the shipment under an open cargo policy with private respondent Phoenix Assurance Company of New
York (Phoenix), a non-life insurance company, and private respondent McGee & Co. Inc. (McGee), the
underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix.[4]
Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes aboard the M/V Mistrau. The vessel set sail from
the port of Davao City and arrived at the port of Inchon, Korea. It was then discovered upon discharge
that some of the cargo was in bad condition. The Marine Cargo Damage Surveyor of Incok Loss and
Average Adjuster of Korea, through its representative Byeong Yong Ahn (Byeong), surveyed the extent
of the damage of the shipment. In a survey report, it was stated that 16,069 cartons of the banana

shipment and 2,185 cartons of the pineapple shipment were so damaged that they no longer had
commercial value.[5]
Del Monte Produce filed a claim under the open cargo policy for the damages to its shipment. McGees
Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the claim and recommended that payment in the amount
of $210,266.43 be made. A check for the recommended amount was sent to Del Monte Produce; the
latter then issued a subrogation receipt[6] to Phoenix and McGee.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Terminal is liable to pay for damages.
HELD: No.It was established that Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes of Del Monte
Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau in accordance with the stowage plan, a guide for the area
assignments of the goods in the vessels hold, prepared by Del Monte Produce and the officers of M/V
Mistrau. The loading and stowing was done under the direction and supervision of the ship officers.
The vessels officer would order the closing of the hatches only if the loading was done correctly after
a final inspection. The said ship officers would not have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel if
they were not properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand the voyage in open seas. They would
order the stevedore to rectify any error in its loading and stowing. A foremans report, as proof of
work done on board the vessel, was prepared by the checkers of Mindanao Terminal and concurred in
by the Chief Officer of M/V Mistrau after they were satisfied that the cargoes were properly loaded.
The petition is GRANTED.
People, appellee, vs. Danny Delos Santos, appellant403 SCRA 153, GR No. 135919, May 9,
2003
Facts: On November 1997, De Leon witnessed the gruesome killing of Flores, while drinking with 3
men, onewas the witness Tablate. The two were positive of Delos Santos as the perpetrator but
testified only on January1998. Despite Delos Santoss alibi, he was found guilty of murder.
Issue: WON the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after the 2-monthperiod
Held: Yes. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly
when thecrime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the perpetrator, the fear of
retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the witnesses. Besides, settled is the rule that positive
identification x x x prevails over alibiand denial. Decision is affirmed with modification.
VICTORINO D. MAGAT, petitioner, versus HON. LEO D. MEDIALDEA and SANTIAGO A.
GUERRERO, respondents. (G.R. No. L-37120 April 20, 1983 2nd Division) ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS: Defendant Santiago Guerrero entered into a contract with the U.S. Navy Exchange, Subic Bay,
Philippines for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs. Guerrero and his aforesaid agent Isidro Aligada
were able to import from Japan with the assistance of the plaintiff Magat and his Japanese business
associates the necessary taximeters for Guerreros taxicabs in partial fulfillment of commitments with
the U.S. Navy Exchange, Subic Bay, Philippines.
Guerrero and his agent have repeatedly assured Magat of his financial capabilities to pay for the goods
ordered by him and in fact he accomplished the necessary application for a letter of credit with his
banker, but he subsequently instructed his banker not to give due course to his application for a letter
of credit and that for reasons only known to him, he failed and refused to open the necessary letter of
credit to cover payment of the goods ordered by him.
Meanwhile, Guerrero has been operating his taxicabs without the required radio transceivers and when
the U.S. Navy Authorities were pressing defendant for compliance with his commitments with respect

to the installations of radio transceivers on his taxicabs, he impliedly laid the blame for the delay upon
Magat, thus destroying his reputation with the said Naval Authorities of Subic Bay, Philippines, with
whom he transacts business.
Victorino Magat filed a complaint for alleged breach of contract against Santiago Guerrero.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for breach of contract states a valid cause of action.
HELD: Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides: those who in the performance of their obligation are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are
liable for damages.
The phrase "in any manner contravene the tenor" of the obligation includes any ilicit act or omission
which impairs the strict and faithful fulfillment of the obligation and every kind of defective
performance.
The damages which the obligor is liable for includes not only the value of the loss suffered by the
obligee (dao emergente) but also the profits which the latter failed to obtain (lucro cesante). If the
obligor acted in good faith, he shall be liable for those damages that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted; and in case of fraud, bad faith, malice
or wanton attitude, he shall be liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
In the case at bar, petitioner had fulfilled his part of the bargain while private respondent failed to
comply with his correlative obligation by refusing to open a letter of credits to cover payment of the
goods ordered by him, and that consequently, petitioner suffered not only loss of his expected profits,
but moral and exemplary damages as well. Therefore he is liable for the damages he caused to the
petitioner.
FIDELA DEL CASTILLO Vda. DE MISTICA, petitioner, versus Spouses BERNARDINO NAGUIAT
and MARIA PAULINA GERONA-NAGUIAT, respondents.
(G.R. No. 137909 December 11, 2003 1st Division)
Art. 1182. Potestative Condition
Facts

Predecessor-in-interest of Petitioner and herein Defendants entered into a contract to sell in


which the latter prayed the initial payment and undertake to pay the remaining by installment within
10 years subject to 12% interest per annum

Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission alleging failure and refusal of Defendants to pay the
balance constitutes a violation of the contract which entitles her to rescind the same

Petitioner argues that period for performance of obligation cannot be extended to 10 years
because to do so would convert the obligation to purely potestative
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the application of Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
as it ruled that there is no breach of obligation inspite of the lapse of their stipulated period and the
failure of the respondent to pay.
Held

Under Art. 1191 of Civil Code, the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on
violation between parties brought about by breach of faith by one of them. Rescission,

however, is allowed only when the breach is substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment
of the obligation

In this case, no substantial breach in the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that payment could be
made even after 10 years from execution of contract, provided they will pay the 12% interest

Civil Code prohibits purely potestative, suspensive, conditional obligation that


depend on the whims of the debtor. Nowhere in the deed that payment of purchase price is
dependent whether respondents want to pay it or not, the fact that they already made partial payment
shows that parties intended to be bound by the Kasulatan

HEIRS OF GAITE VS THE PLAZA INC.


G.R. No. 177685 January 26, 2011
FACTS: On July 16, 1980, The Plaza, Inc. (The Plaza), a corporation engaged in the restaurant
business, through its President, Jose C. Reyes, entered into a contract with Rhogen Builders (Rhogen),
represented by Ramon C. Gaite, for the construction of a restaurant building in Greenbelt, Makati,
Metro Manila for the price of P7,600,000. On July 28, 1980, The Plaza paid P1,155,000 down payment
to Gaite and soon after Rhogen commenced construction of the restaurant building. 2 Months later,
Engineer Angelito Z. Gonzales, the Acting Building Official of the Municipality of Makati, ordered Gaite
to cease and desist from continuing with the construction of the building for violation of The National
Building Code.
The Plazas Project Manager Architect Roberto evaluated the Progress Billing and Tayzon stated that
actual jobsite assessment showed that the finished works fall short of Rhogens claimed percentage of
accomplishment and Rhogen was entitled to only P32,684.16 and not P260,649.91 being demanded
by Rhogen. On the same day, Gaite notified Reyes that he is suspending all construction works until
Reyes and the Project Manager cooperate to resolve the issue he had raised to address the problem.
Gaite informed The Plaza that he is terminating their contract based on the Contractors Right to Stop
Work or Terminate Contracts as provided for in the General Conditions of the Contract and demanded
the payment of P63,058.50 representing the work that has already been completed by Rhogen. Reyes
also informed Gaite that The Plaza will continue the completion of the structure utilizing the services of
a competent contractor but will charge Rhogen for liquidated damages as stipulated in Article VIII of
the Contract The Plaza filed a civil case for breach of contract, sum of money and damages against
Gaite and FGU in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. The RTC Makati rendered its decision
granting in favor of the Plaza against Gaite. The Court of Appeals affirmed such decision with
modification.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rhogen had factual or legal basis to terminate the General Construction
Contract.
HELD:The construction contract between Rhogen and The Plaza provides for reciprocal
obligationswhereby the latters obligation to pay the contract price or progress billing is conditioned on
the formers specified performance. Pursuant to its contractual obligation, The Plaza furnished
materials and paid the agreed down payment. Rhogen, having breached the contractual obligation it
had expressly assumed specifically to comply with all laws was already at fault. Respondent The Plaza,
on the other hand, was justified in withholding payment on Rhogens first progress billing. Upon the
facts duly established, Rhogen committed a serious breach of its contract with The Plaza, which
justified the latter in terminating the contract. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who

in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. Petition DENIED
VALENTIN MOVIDO, substituted by MARGINITO MOVIDO, Petitioner, versus LUIS REYES
PASTOR, Respondent. (G.R. No. 172279 February 11, 2010 3rd Division) CORONA, J.:
FACTS: Respondent Luis Reyes Pastor filed a complaint for specific performance in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, praying that petitioner Valentin Movido be compelled to cause the survey
of a parcel of land subject of their contract to sell. In his complaint, respondent alleged that he and
petitioner executed a kasunduan sa bilihan ng lupa where the latter agreed to sell a parcel of land
located in Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite with an area of some 21,000 sq. m. out of the 22,731 sq. m.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 362995 at P400/sq. m. Respondent further alleged
that another kasunduan was later executed supplementing the kasunduan sa bilihan ng lupa. It
provided that, if a Napocor power line traversed the subject lot, the purchase price would be lowered
toP200/sq. m. beyond the distance of 15 meters on both sides from the center of the power line while
the portion within a distance of 15 meters on both sides from the center of the power line would not
be paid. Respondent alleged that he already paid petitioner P5 million out of the original purchase
price of P8.4 million stated in the kasunduan sa bilihan ng lupa. He was willing and ready to pay the
balance of the purchase price but due to petitioners refusal to have the property surveyed despite
incessant demands, his unpaid balance could not be determined with certainty.
ISSUE: Whether or not rescission is tenable.
HELD: No. Rescission is only allowed when the breach is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat
the object of the parties in entering into the contract. We find no such substantial or material breach.
It is true that respondent failed to pay the 7th and 8th installments of the purchase price. However,
considering the circumstances of the instant case, particularly the provisions of the kasunduan,
respondent cannot be deemed to have committed a serious breach. In the first place, respondent was
not in default as petitioner never made a demand for payment.1avvphi1 Moreover, the kasunduan sa
bilihan ng lupa and the kasunduan should both be given effect rather than be declared conflicting, if
there is a way of reconciling them. Petitioner and respondent would not have entered into either of the
agreements if they did not intend to be bound or governed by them. Indeed, taken together, the two
agreements actually constitute a single contract pertaining to the sale of a land to respondent by
petitioner. Their stipulations must therefore be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful

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