RICARDO VS JOSELITO

ATTY. RICARDO M. A.C. No. 7820

SALOMON, JR.,
Complainant, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JOSELITO C. FRIAL,
Respondent. September 12, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn complaint [1] filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on December 22, 2006,
complainant Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon, Jr. charged respondent Atty. Joselito C. Frial with violating his
Lawyers Oath and/or gross misconduct arising from his actuations with respect to two attached
vehicles. Complainant, owner of the vehicles in question, asked that Atty. Frial be disbarred.
The instant complaint has its beginning in the case, Lucy Lo v. Ricardo Salomon et al., docketed as Civil
Case No. 05-111825 before the Regional Trial Court in Manila, in which a writ of preliminary attachment
was issued in favor of Lucy Lo, Atty. Frials client. The writ was used to attach two (2) cars of
complainanta black 1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra.
According to Atty. Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the
court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Los counsel. Atty. Salomon claimed that on several
occasions, the Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals. For instance,
on December 26, 2005, barangay captain Andrew Abundo saw the Nissan Sentra in front of a battery
shop on Anonas St., Quezon City. On February 18, 2006, Architect Roberto S. Perez and three others saw
and took video and photo shots of the same car while in the Manresa Shell station at P. Tuazon Blvd.
corner 20th Avenue, Quezon City. Also sometime in June 2006, Robert M. Perez, complainants driver,
saw the said car in another Shell station near Kamias Street. On December 16, 2006, Arlene Carmela M.
Salomon spotted it driven by bondsman Ferdinand Liquigan allegedly with Atty. Frials consent. As Atty.
Salomon further alleged, when the misuse of the car was reported, paving for Liquigans apprehension,
Atty. Frial, in a letter, acknowledged having authorized Liquigan to bring the car in custodia legis to a
mechanic.

As to the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial deliberately withheld
information as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but the
court was not immediately put on notice of this development.
In his Answer,[2] Atty. Frial admitted taking custody of the cars thru his own undertaking, without
authority and knowledge of the court. The subject vehicles, according to him, were first parked near the
YMCA building in front of the Manila City Hall where they remained for four months. He said that when
he went to check on the vehicles condition sometime in December 2005, he found them to have been
infested and the wirings underneath the hoods gnawed by rats. He denied personally using or allowing
others the use of the cars, stating in this regard that if indeed the Nissan Sentra was spotted on Anonas
St., Quezon City on December 26, 2005, it could have been the time when the car was being transferred
from the YMCA. The February 18, 2006 and June 2006 sightings, so Atty. Frial claimed, possibly
occurred when the Nissan Sentra was brought to the gas station to be filled up. He said that the car could
not have plausibly been spotted in Project 3 on December 13, 2006, parked as it was then in front of
Liquigans house for mechanical check-up.
During the mandatory conference/hearing before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, the parties
agreed on the following key issues to be resolved: (1) whether or not Atty. Frial used the cars for his
personal benefit; and (2) whether or not Atty. Frial was guilty of infidelity in the custody of the attached
properties.
Thereafter and after the submission by the parties of their respective position papers, the Commission
submitted a Report dated October 9, 2007 which the IBP Board of Governors forthwith adopted and then
transmitted to this Court. In the Report, the following were deduced from the affidavits of Andrew
Abundo, Roberto Perez, Robert Perez, and Dante Batingan: (1) at no time was Atty. Frial seen driving the
Sentra; (2) Abundo learned that at that time the car was spotted at the battery shop, the unnamed driver
bought a new battery for the car which was not inappropriate since a battery was for the preservation of
the car; (3) Atty. Frial admitted that the Nissan Sentra was seen gassed up on February 18, 2006 and in
June 2006 and there was no reason to gas up the Nissan Sentra on those times unless it was being used;
(4) Roberto Perez said the Nissan Sentra was used to buy goats meat; and (5) photos of the Nissan Sentra
in different places obviously showed it was being used by others.
In the same Report, the Commission observed that while there is perhaps no direct evidence tying up
Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact remains that it was being used by other
persons during the time he was supposed to have custody of it. In addition, whoever drove the Nissan
Sentra on those occasions must have received the car key from Atty. Frial. When Atty. Frial took custody

of the Nissan Sentra and Volvo cars, he was duty bound to keep and preserve these in the same condition
he received them so as to fetch a good price should the vehicles be auctioned.
As to the burnt Volvo, Atty. Frial admitted receiving it in excellent condition and that there was no court
order authorizing him to remove the car from the YMCA premises. Admitted too was the fact that he
secured the release of the Volvo on the strength alone of his own written undertaking; [3] and that the car
was almost totally destroyed by fire on February 4, 2006 at 1:45 a.m.[4] while parked in his residence. He
could not, however, explain the circumstances behind the destruction, but admitted not reporting the
burning to the court or the sheriff. While the burning of the car happened before the mediation hearing,
Atty. Frial, upon inquiry of Atty. Salomon, did not give information as to the whereabouts of the cars.
The destruction of the Volvo in Atty. Frials residence was not an ordinary occurrence; it was an event that
could have not easily escaped his attention. Accordingly, there is a strong reason to believe that Atty.
Frial deliberately concealed the destruction of said vehicle from the court during the hearings in Civil
Case No. 05-111828, which were the opportune times to reveal the condition of the Volvo car.
On the basis of the foregoing premises, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial committed acts clearly
bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to observe the diligence required of him as
custodian of the cars. The Commission thus recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
The findings and the recommendation of the Commission are well-taken.
A writ of attachment issues to prevent the defendant from disposing of the attached property, thus
securing the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper
party.[5] When the objects of the attachment are destroyed, then the attached properties would necessarily
be of no value and the attachment would be for naught.
From the evidence adduced during the investigation, there is no question that Atty. Frial is guilty of grave
misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics that states:
11. Dealing with trust property
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he
abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should
not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. (Emphasis
ours.)

A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect the courts order
and processes. Atty. Frial miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled with the writ of
attachment the court issued.
Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He
also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform
the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody
of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
For his negligence and unauthorized possession of the cars, we find Atty. Frial guilty of infidelity
in the custody of the attached cars and grave misconduct. We must mention, at this juncture, that the
victorious parties in the case are not without legal recourse in recovering the Volvos value from Atty.
Frial should they desire to do so.
The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect
the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. [6] With the
view we take of the case, there is no compelling evidence tending to show that Atty. Frial intended to
pervert the administration of justice for some dishonest purpose.
Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such
as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. [7] This is as it should be considering
the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person. In the case of Atty.
Frial, the Court finds that a years suspension from the practice of his legal profession will provide him
with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Frial is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct and infidelity in the
custody of properties in custodia legis. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let notice of this Decision be entered in his
personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same served on the
IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

CARANDANG VS OBMINA

CARLITO P. CARANDANG, A.C. No. 7813

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA, Promulgated:

Respondent. April 21, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a complaint filed by Carlito P. Carandang (Carandang) against Atty. Gilbert

S. Obmina (Atty. Obmina). Atty. Obmina was counsel for Carandang in Civil Case
No. B-5109 entitled Sps. Emilia A. Carandang and Carlito Carandang v. Ernesto
Alzona. Carandang brought suit for Atty. Obminas failure to inform Carandang of
the adverse decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 and for failure to appeal the
decision.

The Facts

The facts of CBD Case No. 06-1869 in the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) read
as follows:
Complainants Sworn Statement is hereto reproduced as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
Ako si CARLITO P. CARANDANG, nasa wastong
gulang, may asawat mga anak, at nakatira sa 5450 Alberto
Apt., St. Francis Homes, Halang Bian, Laguna.
Na ako ay may kasong isinampa kay ERNESTO T.
ALSONA tungkol sa aming bahay at lupa, at isinampa sa
BIAN RTC BRANCH 25, CIVIL CASE NO. B-5109.
Na ang naturang kaso ay natapos at nadisisyunan noong
Enero 28, 2000 at ako ay natalo sa naturang kaso.
Na ang aking naging abogado ay si ATTY. GILBERT S.
OBMINA, tubong Quezon at bilang kababayan ako ay
nagtiwala sa kanyang kakayahan upang maipagtanggol sa
naturang kaso, ngunit taliwas sa aking pananalig sa kanya
ang nasabing kaso ay napabayaan hanggang sa magkaroon
ng desisyon ang korte na kunin ang aking lupat bahay, sa
madalit sabi kami ay natalo ng hindi ko man lang
nalalaman at huli na ang lahat ng malaman ko dahil hindi
na kami pwedeng umapila.
Na nalaman ko lang na may desisyon na pala ang korte
pagkatapos ng anim na buwan. Ang aking anak na si
ROSEMARIE ay nagpunta sa BIAN, sa RTC ay binati at
tinatanong kung saan kayo nakatira at ang sagot [ng] aking
anak BAKIT? At ang sagot naman [ng] taga RTC, HINDI
MO BA ALAM NA ANG INYONG KASO AY TAPOS
NA. Nang marinig yon ay umuwi na siya at sinabi agad sa
akin. Tapos na daw yung kaso [ng] ating bahay at ako ay
pumunta sa opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA at aking tinanong
BAKIT DI MO SINABI SA AKIN NA TAPOS NA ANG
KASO? At ang sagot niya sa akin AY WALA KANG
IBABAYAD SA ABOGADO DAHIL WALA KANG
PERA PANG-APILA dahil sa sagot sa akin ay para akong
nawalan [ng] pag-asa sa kaso.

Lumapit ako sa Malacaang at binigay yung sulat pero doon

ay aking nakausap yung isang abogado at akoy kanyang
pinakinggan at aking inabot ang papeles at aking pinakita
at ang sabi ay hindi na pwede dahil anim na buwan na
[nang] lumipas ang kaso. Kaya aking sinabi sa ATTY. ng
Malacaang na hindi sinabi sa akin agad ni ATTY.
OBMINA na may order na pala ang kaso.
Kaya ang ginawang paraan ay binigyan ako ng sulat para
ibigay sa IBP, at nang mabasa ang sulat ay sinabi sa akin
na doon sa SAN PABLO ang hearing, at tinanong ako
kung nasaan ang ATTORNEYS WITHDRAWAL NYO?
Ang sagot ko ay WALA HO, kaya inutusan ako na kunin
ang ATTORNEYS WITHDRAWAL at agad akong
nagpunta sa opisina ni ATTY. OBMINA at tinanong ko sa
sekretarya niya kung nasaan si ATTY. OBMINA ang sagot
sa akin ay nasa AMERICA NA! Kayat aking tinanong
kung sinong pwede magbigay sa akin ng attorneys
withdrawal at ang sabi ay yung anak nya na si
CARMELITSA OBMINA. Bumalik ako noong araw ng
Biyernes at aking nakuha, pero hindi na ako nakabalik sa
IBP dahil noong araw na iyon ay hindi ko na kayang
maglakad, kaya hindi na natuloy ang hearing sa SAN
PABLO.
CARLITO P. CARANDANG
Affiant
CTC No. 21185732
Issued on March 7, 2006
At Bian, Laguna
On November 16, 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Rogelio A. Vinluan, the then Director for Bar Discipline (now the
incumbent Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines), issued an Order directing respondent Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina to submit his Answer, duly verified, in six (6) copies, and
furnish the complainant with a copy thereof, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the Order.
On December 12, 2006, this Commission was in receipt of a
Manifestation dated December 11, 2006 filed by a certain Atty. Ma.
Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa. Allegedly, she is the daughter of
respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina. She further alleged that [her] father

is already a permanent resident of the United States of America since

March 2001 and had already retired from the practice of law.
That on February 20, 2007, undersigned Commissioner [Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr.] scheduled the Mandatory Conference/Hearing of the case on
March 20, 2007 at 9:30 a.m.
On March 19, 2007, Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa filed a
Manifestation and Motion reiterating her earlier Manifestation that the
respondent, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is already a permanent resident of
the United States for the last six (6) years and likewise, she reiterated her
request that summons be served on her father thru extraterritorial service.
Atty. Muaa likewise requested the cancellation of the mandatory
conference and resetting of the same on April 10, 2007.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference on March 20, 2007,
complainant Carlito P. Carandang appeared. The undersigned
Commissioner directed Atty. Carmelita Muaa to appear before this
Commission on May 18, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and to bring with her the
alleged withdrawal of appearance filed by her father and to bring proof
that her father is now really a permanent resident of the United States of
America.
That on May 18, 2007, Atty. Muaa again filed a Manifestation and
Motion informing this Honorable Commission that she cannot possibly
appear for the reason that she is the legal counsel of a candidate in
Muntinlupa City and that the canvassing of the election results is not yet
finished. She likewise submitted copies of her fathers Passport and US
Permanent Residence Card. That with respect [to] the Withdrawal of
Appearance, Atty. Muaa alleged that copies of the same were all given to
complainant Carlito P. Carandang.
That an Order dated May 18, 2007 was issued by the undersigned
Commissioner granting the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion. Atty.
Muaa was likewise directed to appear before this Office on June 22,
2007 at 2:00 p.m.
On June 22, 2007, in the supposed Mandatory Conference, Atty.
Carmencita Obmina Muaa appeared. Likewise presented was Mr. Carlito
Carandang who is the complainant against Atty. Gilbert Obmina. In the
interest of justice, Atty. Muaa was given a period of ten (10) days within
which to file a verified answer. The Mandatory Conference was set on
August 3, 2007 at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon.

On June 29, 2007, Atty. Muaa filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
file Answer.
On July 3, 2007, this Commission is in receipt of the verified Answer
filed by respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina.
On August 3, 2007, during the Mandatory Conference, complainant
Carlito Carandang appeared. Atty. Muaa appeared in behalf of [her]
father. After making some admissions, stipulations and some
clarificatory matters, the parties were directed to submit their verified
position papers within ten (10) days. Thereafter, the case will be
submitted on report and recommendation.
On August 10, 2007, complainant, by himself, filed an Urgent Motion
for Extension of Time to File Position Paper. Likewise, respondent,
through Atty. Muaa, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Position Paper on August 13, 2007.
On September 3, 2007, the Commission on Bar Discipline received copy
of the Respondents Memorandum.
On September 12, 2007, this Commission received copy of complainants
Position Paper.[1]

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report[2] dated 2 October 2007, IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline

Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) found that Atty. Obmina was
still counsel of record for complainant at the time the decision was rendered and up
to the time of the issuance of the writ of execution. Atty. Obmina received the
Decision dated 28 January 2000 on 1 March 2000. Atty. Carmencita Obmina-Muaa
manifested in Court that her father has been living in the United States of America
since 2001. There is nothing on record that will show that Atty. Obmina notified
complainant in any manner about the decision.
Although Commissioner De La Rama observed that complainant is partly to
blame for his loss for failure to maintain contact with Atty. Obmina and to inform
himself of the progress of his case, Commissioner De La Rama nonetheless

underscored the duty of Atty. Obmina to notify his client as to what happened to
his case. Thus:
One cannot escape the fact that the complainant himself failed to
communicate with his counsel for quite sometime. There is nothing in
the complainants Sworn Statement that would show that he regularly
visited the office of the respondent, Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina. Complainant is partly to blame for his loss and it should not be
attributed solely to the respondent.
The Supreme Court held that clients should maintain contact with their
counsel from time to time and inform themselves of the progress of their
case, thereby exercising that standard of care which an ordinary prudent
man bestows upon his business (Leonardo vs. S.T. Best, Inc., 422 SCRA
347)

However, the respondent who has in his possession the complete files
and address of the complainant, should have exerted efforts to even
notify Mr. Carandang as to what happened to his case. Whether the
decision is adverse [to] or in favor of his client, respondent is duty bound
to notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Ethics which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Lastly, under
Rule 18.04, a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for
information.
That as a result of the respondents failure to notify the complainant, the
latter lost the case leading to his eviction.
In the case of Mijares vs. Romana 425 SCRA 577, the Supreme Court
held that as an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform
his client of whatever information he may have acquired which it is
important that the client should have knowledge of. In another case, the
Supreme Court held that respondents failure to perfect an appeal within
the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed
by the Code of Professional Responsibility (Cheng vs. Agravante, 426
SCRA 42).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with head bowed in sadness, it

is respectfully recommended that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of
America and accordingly retired from the practice of law, this
Commission will not close its eyes on the negligence that he has
committed while in the active practice.
SO ORDERED.[3] (Emphasis in the original)

In a Resolution[4] dated 19 October 2007, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner De La
Rama. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and
the records of the case on 14 March 2008.

The Ruling of the Court

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations. Atty. Obmina
violated Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Atty. Obmina Failed to Serve Complainant
with Competence and Diligence
Canon 18 states that [a] lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Rules 18.03 and 18.04 provide that [a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable and [a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
In his Memorandum, Atty. Obmina admitted that he was counsel for Carandang in
Civil Case No. B-5109. Atty. Obmina blamed Carandang for the adverse decision
in Civil Case No. B-5109 because Carandang did not tell him that there was a
Compromise Agreement executed prior to Atty. Obminas filing of the complaint in
Civil Case No. B-5109. Carandang, on the other hand, stated that Atty. Obmina

made him believe that they would win the case. In fact, Carandang engaged the
services of Atty. Obmina on a contingent basis. Carandang shall pay Atty. Obmina
40% of the sale proceeds of the property subject matter of the case. Atty. Obmina
promised to notify Carandang as soon as the decision of the court was given.
Contrary to Atty. Obminas promise, there is no evidence on record that Atty.
Obmina took the initiative to notify Carandang of the trial courts adverse
decision. Atty. Obmina again put Carandang at fault for failure to advance the
appeal fee. Atty. Obminas version of Carandangs confrontation with him was
limited to this narrative:
Sometime in the year 2000, complainant went to respondents law office.
He was fuming mad and was blaming respondent for having lost his
case. He asked for the records of the case because according to him, he
will refer the case to a certain Atty. Edgardo Salandanan. Respondent
gave complainant the case file. Complainant did not return to pursue the
appeal or at least had given an appeal fee to be paid to Court in order to
perfect the appeal.[5]

Atty. Obminas futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to
emphasize his failure to notify Carandang that the trial court already promulgated a
decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was adverse to Carandangs interests. Atty.
Obmina cannot overlook the fact that Carandang learned about the promulgation of
the decision not through Atty. Obmina himself, but through a chance visit to the
trial court. Instead of letting Carandang know of the adverse decision himself,
Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted Carandang, explained the
decision to him, and advised them on further steps that could be taken. It is obvious
that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal because of Atty. Obminas
inaction. Notwithstanding Atty. Obminas subsequent withdrawal as Carandangs
lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record at the time the trial court
promulgated the decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.
In Tolentino v. Mangapit, we stated that:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform her
client of whatever information she may have acquired which it is
important that the client should have knowledge of. She should notify
her client of any adverse decision to enable her client to decide whether
to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the

developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and [loss] of

trust and confidence in the attorney.[6]

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the
need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important
developments affecting the clients case. The lawyer should not leave the client in
the dark on how the lawyer is defending the clients interests.[7]
The Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty.
Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year. In the cases of Credito v.
Sabio[8] and Pineda v. Macapagal,[9] we imposed the same penalty upon
attorneys who failed to update their clients on the status of their cases. Considering
Atty. Obminas advanced age, such penalty serves the purpose of protecting the
interest of the public and legal profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.Accordingly, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is
found GUILTY of violation of Canon 18 and of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court SUSPENDS Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina from the practice of law for one year, and WARNS him that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI,

Complainant,

A.C. No. 8920

Present:
BRION, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
DEL CASTILLO,**
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,*** and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG,
Respondent.

September 28, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before us is the resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for violating Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending
that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent,
Atty. Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo
St., Tuguegarao City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment[2] with the Commission on
Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter violated
Canons 11[3] and 12[4] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting
while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but
instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he
would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite
me![5] Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of
P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the
courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not
afraid of you![6] Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of
the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at the
hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent again
shouted in a threatening tone, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I
am not afraid of you! He kept on shouting, I am not afraid of you! and
challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the
building.[7]
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom, he
continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of Court. [8]
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in
Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No.
2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision
became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a certificate of
finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the previously issued writ of
execution, raising as a ground the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for
lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer
that ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the
latter was merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The respondent filed his Answer,[9] essentially saying that it was Judge
Baculi who disrespected him.[10] We quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law
against him once inside the court room when he was lambasting
me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He did not
like that I just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral
argument because he wanted to have an occasion to just
HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the public that I am A
NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said YOU JUSTIFY YOUR
NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS COURT making it an impression
to the litigants and the public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT,
INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and
IRRESPONSIBLE
LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue the Motion,
Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an order that the Motion
for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution, but what he did
was that he forced me to argue so that he will have the room to
humiliate me as he used to do not only to me but almost of the
lawyers here (sic).

Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.

The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through Commissioner
Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioners Report, [11] Commissioner De la Rama
stated that during the mandatory conference on January 16, 2009, both parties
merely reiterated what they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties
agreed that the original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the
courtroom would be submitted for the Commissioners review. Judge Baculi
submitted the tape and the transcript of stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.

Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:[12]

At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was
observed that the respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but
the voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the
mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed, the complainant
maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the TSN, where
there was already an argument, the complainant stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of
voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to
appear before my court, then you better attend to your cases
and do not appear before my court if you do not want to be
corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words we are very sorry [ were]
actually uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was
saying the quoted portion of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the
following questions when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung
shouted at the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure?
*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed
because we were asked to present our evidence ex
parte. Your Honor, so, if should we were ordered (sic) by
the court to follow the rules on summary procedure. (TSN
page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at
the complainant.

Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at

each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge
that is why he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the
undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at
the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting
for their cases to be called. They must have observed the incident. In
fact, in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they
stood as one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the
judge that is why the latter cautioned him not to shout.
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN
reads as follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of P100.00.
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court
for gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like (not finished)
Court: The next time
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in
record. If you want to see me, see me after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza
vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)

Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to
observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial officers. The respondent
also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The
respondents argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given
due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the presiding
judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge could be
tolerated. What the respondent should have done was to file an action before the
Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge Baculi did not act
according to the norms of judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence
submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the respondent had misused the
judicial processes to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent be reprimanded.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the IBPs finding that the respondent violated Rule 11.03,
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung disrespected
Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in
the presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent
even came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses,
cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi
and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for his position even after the
latter had cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially leaving the court, the
respondent returned to the courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings.

These actions were not only against the person, the position and the stature of
Judge Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly and
flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and
avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and
disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it is the duty of a lawyer, as

an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect
for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the
latters role, stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent
publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for
gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a
manner tending to erode the public confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in
his ability to decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be
handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an
objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a
bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be
reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a penalty of six
(6) months suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the offense.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State

Prosecutor,[14] we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule 11.05,
Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and for violating the Lawyers Oath for airing his grievances against a judge in
newspapers and radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battungs violations are no less
serious as they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial
proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before
the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to
the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the
judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year effective upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to the respondents personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Yu vs PALANA
EN BANC
CATHERINE & HENRY YU,
Complainants,

A.C. No. 7747

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
ATTY.
PALAA,

ANTONIUTTI

K.
July 14, 2008

Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a

complaint[1] for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for alleged
acts of defraudation, before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). [2] Complainants attached therewith their
Consolidated Complaint-Affidavit[3] which they earlier filed before the City

Prosecutors Office of Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the
criminal case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(BP 22).
The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:
Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy (Mr. Uy)
who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth Marketing and General
Services Corporation (Wealth Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency
trading.[4] Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to
invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said
company. They were made to believe that the said company had the so-called stoploss mechanism that enabled it to stop trading once the maximum allowable loss
fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions, would be reached. If, on the other hand,
the company would suffer loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the
principal amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth
Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated checks covering the
principal investments.[5]
It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketings promises were false and fraudulent,
and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason account
closed. The investors, including the complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketings
office. There, they discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its
operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (UrLink) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the
former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the
respondent. As Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent
assured the complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former
company.[6] To put a semblance of validity to such representation, respondent
signed an Agreement[7] to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to
further deceive the investors.[8] This prompted the complainants to send demand
letters to Wealth Marketings officers and directors which remained
unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa against
the respondent and his co-accused.[9]
Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has
been successful in defying the law, to this date.

In an Order[10] dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio B.
Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter
failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare him in default filed by the
complainants.[11] The case was thereafter referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la
Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner) for investigation. In his continued defiance of the
lawful orders of the Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory
conference and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in
default and the case was heard ex parte.
In his report,[12] the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketings executives
(which included respondent herein) conspired with one another in defrauding the
complainants by engaging in an unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors
to invest in foreign currency trading business where, in fact, no such business
existed, as Wealth Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was bolstered by the fact
that Wealth Marketings financial status could not support the investors demands
involving millions of pesos. It also appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link
was created only to perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner
likewise found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court for
committing similar acts of defraudation. [13] Considering the gravity of the acts
committed, as well as his previous administrative case and defiance of lawful
orders, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of the
documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by the
complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of the
Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned
commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.
Palaa be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the Honorable
Supreme Court.[14]

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Commissioners report and recommendation.[15]
This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.

Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of

our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the
peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor. [16]
In the present case, two corporations were created where the respondent played a
vital role, being Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board and Ur-Links
representative. We quote with approval the Commissioners findings, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, it
appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation
conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging in
unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign
currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was no
actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly
licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to
perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex I) of Wealth Marketing and
General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is
only P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation
is (sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show, has
been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with the
hope that their money would earn interests as promised.However, their
company resources and financial status will show that they are not in the
position to meet these demands if a situation such as this would arise.
xxxx
Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for
the return of their investments, said respondent even formed and made
him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which according to
the complainants, when they met the respondent, would assume the
obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation. It is also
evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.[17]
To be sure, respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards expected of
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the same set
of facts is still pending in court is of no moment. Respondent, being a member of
the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal
cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.[18] Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution
of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to,
and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that
the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. [19]Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law.[20] The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. [21]
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.

Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised
with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a member of the bar. [22]
The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an
administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law

in Samala v. Palaa[23] and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaa. [24] In Samala,
respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial
Resources Incorporated (FIRI), being its legal officer.As in this case, respondent
committed the same offense by making himself part of the money trading business
when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes for which FIRI was
created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty of suspension for three (3) years
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with
more severely. [25]Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his
continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.[26]
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the
warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending)
exacerbates his offense.[27]
Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted by his lack of regard
for the charges brought against him. As in Tejada, instead of meeting the charges
head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer and verified position paper,
nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his
conduct.[28] The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member
of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof
that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.[29] Verily, respondents failure to comply with the orders of the
IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. [30] As
a lawyer, he ought to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely
deputized by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against
lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and blatant
disrespect of the Court.[31] By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent
exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court. [32]
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior
misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized with a three-year
suspension with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be
dealt with more severely; and another six-month suspension thereafter, the
contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades
the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --disbarment.[33] Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very

bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. [34]
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Antoniutti
K.
Palaa
is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the
Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

IN RE: LETTER OF DIAZ

EN BANC
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC
AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 37,
APPEALING
FOR
JUDICIAL
CLEMENCY.
Present :
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 19, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of
Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, informed the Court that
he is an applicant for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court branches

in Metro Manila. In connection therewith, he was interviewed by the Judicial and

Bar Council on July 10, 2007. He was told to seek judicial clemency due to the fact
that he was once fined P20,000 for not hearing a motion for demolition. He claims
that this lapse happened only once as a result of oversight. He requests judicial
clemency and, in particular, that he be allowed to again be nominated to one of the
vacant branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila or in any of the cities where
[his] application [is being] considered.
In a subsequent letter,[1] Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding
judge of Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City since March 1,
1995. He expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he was held
administratively liable in Alvarez v. Diaz.[2] He confessed that [t]he stain of the
penalty has taught [him] a bitter lesson and promised to avoid the commission of
the same or similar acts. He submitted himself to the judicious discretion of this
Court for whatever action the Court may take on his plea for judicial clemency.
In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when
he granted the following motions: (1) a motion for execution which was fatally
defective for lack of notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition
without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for demolition also made him
liable for grave abuse of authority. [3] He was fined P20,000.[4]
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from
being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman
or Deputy Ombudsman:
1.
2.

Those with pending criminal or regular administrative

cases;
Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or
tribunals; and

3.

Those who have been convicted in any criminal case;

or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed
is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has
been granted judicial clemency. [5] (emphasis supplied)

Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated
for appointment to any judicial post, until and unless his request for judicial
clemency is granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has
come down hard[6] and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the
judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial
conduct.[7] This is because a judge is the visible representation of the law and of
justice.[8] He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties
but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. [9] His
character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation
of the peoples faith in the judicial system.[10]
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will
grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise are indispensable. [11]
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over
all courts and all personnel thereof, [12] the Court lays down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. [13] These shall include
but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community
with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise
to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty[14] to
ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving
him a chance to redeem himself.[15]
4. There must be a showing of promise[16] (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for public service. [17]
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past
malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years
have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has
learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary
may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now
open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.
Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is
hereby NOTED. His request for judicial clemency is GRANTED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336. July 25, 1996]

JOCELYN TALENS-DABON, complainant, vs. JUDGE

ARCEO, respondent.

HERMIN E.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Once again, this Court must strike hard at an erring member of the
Judiciary.
The case before us stemmed from a sworn-complaint filed by Jocelyn C.
Talens-Dabon, Clerk of Court V of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando
Pampanga, charging Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the Executive Judge thereat
with gross misconduct. The complaint was later amended to include
immorality. Judge Arceo filed his answer with counter-complaint to the main
complaint and his answer to the amended complaint. He likewise submitted
the affidavits of his witnesses.
After considering the answers, we issued a Resolution dated February 1,
1996 referring the case to Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the
same time, placing Judge Arceo under preventive suspension for the duration
of the investigation (p. 61, Rollo).
After requests for postponement from both parties, hearings were held on
March 4, 19, 20, 21, 22, and on April 1, 8, 10 and 18, 1996. Both parties
presented their respective witnesses. Except for Atty. Arnel Santos and
Prosecutor Ramon S. Razon, all of Judge Arceo's witnesses were court
employees assigned at either the Office of the Clerk of Court or Branch 43 of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga.
In due time, the Investigating Justice submitted her Report and
Recommendation with the following findings:
The evidence shows that complainant Atty. Jocelyn "Joy" C. Talens-Dabon, 29, a
resident of Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga, is the Assistant Clerk of Court of the
RTC, San Fernando, Pampanga which item she assumed on August 10, 1995, after
working for more than a year as Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Kalookan City under
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. At the time of her assumption to office, she was about

to get married to Atty. Dabon, a lawyer who work at the Court of Appeals. She is a
Methodist, the same religion as that of respondent's wife and family.
Respondent Judge Hermin E. Arceo, 54, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan is the
Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 43 in San Fernando, Pampanga. He was newly
designated Executive Judge therein vice Judge Teodoro Bay who transferred to
Quezon City. His wife is ailing and on dialysis, and has been residing in the U.S. with
their daughter since 1989. His family is in the printing business and his translations of
some laws and books have been published (Exhs. 15-23). He has pursued further legal
studies abroad either as participant or guest. He is President of the Pampanga-Angeles
City RTC Judges Association and was designated Presidential Assistant for
Operations of the Philippine Judges Association (PJA).
Three days after complainant first reported at the Office of the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Elenita Quinsay, she was summoned by respondent. He was typing when she came in
and at this first meeting, she was surprised that without even looking up at her, he
asked her in a loud voice what she wanted. When he did look at her she was bothered
by the way he looked at her from head to foot "as if he were undressing her."
Respondent told her that she was going to be detailed to his office as his assistant, a
situation which she did not welcome having heard of respondent's reputation in the
office as "bastos" and "maniakis" prompting her to work for her transfer to Branch 45
under Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina.
On August 21, 1995, complainant received respondent's Executive Order No. 001-95
(Exh. H) requiring her to report to the office of the Executive Judge effective August
28, 1995. Her work was to draft and file memos and circulars, pay telephone and
electric bills and other clerical duties assigned to her by respondent. At one time she
was designated to act as Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 43 in the absence of OIC
Bernardo Taruc.She observed respondent to be rude and disrespectful to her and the
other court personnel. He talked in a loud voice and shouted at them; used offensive
words such as "walang isip", "tanga"; told green jokes and stories; made harsh and
negative comments about court personnel in the presence of others. Whenever he had
the opportunity he would make bodily contact ("chancing") with her and certain
female employees. Twice as she was about to go out the door respondent would
approach it in big strides so that his body would be in contact with hers and he would
press the lower part of his body against her back. When complainant introduced her
fiance to him, respondent asked her why she was playing with her forefinger, at the
same time gesturing with his to signify sexual intercourse. Sometime in November
1995, respondent kissed complainant on the cheek, a fact admitted by him in his
testimony. He also admitted kissing witnesses Marilyn Leander, Ester Galicia and
other female employees.

Sometime in October 1995, the Courts of San Fernando transferred to the Greenfields
Country Club due to the inundation of their regular offices with lahar. Ester Galicia
whose house was also affected was allowed to house her appliances in the staff room
of RTC Branch 43. These included a VCR on which, as testified by witness Bernardo
Taruc, a VHS tape entitled "Illegal in Blue" brought by respondent was played at
respondent's bidding. The tape contained explicit sex scenes and during its showing
respondent would come out of his chamber and tease the female employees about
it. Taruc further related that at one time respondent brought and showed to the
employees a picture which when held in some way showed figures in coital position.
Adding to complainant's apprehensions about respondent's sexual predilection were
the revelations of Marilyn Senapilo-Leander, 23, a stenographer of Branch
43. Testifying on her own experiences with respondent, Leander stated that
respondent wrote a love poem to her (Exh. A) and that many times while taking
dictation from respondent in his chamber, he would suddenly dictate love letters or
poems addressed to her as if courting her (Exhs. B to E). He kissed her several times,
pointedly stared at her lower parts when she wore tight pants and made body contacts
("chancing"). At one point bursting into tears -- which prompted this Investigator to
suspend her testimony; she was so agitated -- Leander testified of the time that
respondent summoned her to his chamber and she found him clad only in
briefs. When she turned around to flee, respondent called after her saying "why are
you afraid. After all, this is for you."
Leander took into her confidence the most senior employee in Branch 43, OIC Clerk
of Court Bernardo Taruc who then took it upon himself to accompany Leander in
respondent's office whenever he could or ask other female employees to accompany
her. Taruc asked Leander to report the matter to Deputy Court Administrator
Reynaldo Suarez but Leander expressed fear of retribution from respondent. When
Leander's wedding was set in late 1995, respondent taunted her by saying "Ikay, ang
dami ko pa namang balak sa 'yo, kinuha pa naman kita ng bahay sa isang subdivision,
tapos sinayang mo lang, tanga ka kasi!" This is admitted by respondent who said it
was only a joke. Asked why she did not file any complaint against the respondent for
sexually harassing her, Marilyn Leander explained:
"I am afraid considering that I am just an ordinary employee. And I know for a fact
that Judge Hermin Arceo is a very influential person, he is very rich. I know he has
lots of friends in Pampanga like the Governor. I know I cannot fight by myself alone."
(TSN, March 20, 1966, p. 30).
For the complainant, these personal and vicarious experiences hit bottom with the
incident that happened in the afternoon of December 6, 1995. As testified by
complainant, corroborated in parts by Bemardo Taruc, Yolanda Valencia and Rosanna
Garcia, complainant was summoned at about 1:30 p.m. to respondent's temporary

chamber at Greenfields Country Club by respondent who himself came to the Staff
room. By this time, only the Office of the Clerk of Court and RTC Branch 43 had
been left at Greenfields; the other RTC branches had returned to their usual offices at
the Hall of Justice. The Sangguniang Panglalawigan which had also occupied
Greenfields had likewise vacated the building only the day before.
At his temporary chamber at Greenfields, respondent occupied two (2) small
adjoining rooms while the personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court and RTC
Branch 43 occupied a bigger room called the Maple Room (Please see Exhs. "J", "K"
and "2"). In respondent's Floor Plan marked Exhibit "2" it appears that from
respondent's chamber, one had to pass a chapel and bar lounge before reaching the
staff room. The door to the outer room of the chamber was equipped with a knob and
an automatic door closer. When locked from inside, it could not be opened outside
except with a key. Since there was no airconditioner, this door was usually held open
for ventilation by a chair or a small table. The outer room had filing cabinet and sacks
of rice lined up on two (2) sides of the wall. The inner room also had a door but
without a knob. Respondent had his desk here.The window in this room opened to the
lawn of the Country Club.
Amid this backdrop in what may have been a somnolent afternoon at Greenfields,
complainant entered respondent's office. Already made cautious by respondent's
reputation and Mrs. Leander's experience, she took care to check the outer door and
noted the chair which prevented it from closing. Her apprehension increased because
the hallway was clear of people and only the personnel of Branch 43 and the Office of
the Clerk of Court were left holding office there. She entered the inner room, and sat
on a chair in front of respondent's desk. They talked about the impending construction
of the Hall of Justice. Their conversation was interrupted when Bemardo Taruc
dropped by to tell respondent of a phone call for him. Respondent left the room but
told complainant to remain for the signing of her Certificate of Service which she was
then bringing. After a few minutes respondent returned and they resumed their
conversation. When the talk veered to his wife, complainant became uneasy and
directed respondent's attention to her unsigned Certificate of Service. After respondent
signed it, complainant prepared to leave the room. At this juncture, respondent handed
to her a folded yellow paper containing his handwritten poem (Exh. M; p. 22,
Record).
Hereunder quoted is the poem and complainant's interpretation of it as contained in
her Memorandum:
"Dumating ka sa buhay ko isang araw ng Agosto
Ang baon mo ay 'yong ganda at talinong abogado
Ang tamis ng 'yong ngiti ang bumihag sa puso ko

Malakas na pampalubag sa mainit kong ulo."

"Indeed, the last two lines of the first stanza are consistent with complainant's claim
regarding respondent's rude manner and erratic mood swings.
"The second stanza of respondent's poem also jibes with his own testimony that he
would often look for complainant whenever he would not see her, and with
complainant's testimony that respondent's behavior towards her -- his propensity to
utter remarks with sexual connotations, his acts of making physical contact with her,
among others -"Ang akala ko'y gayong lamang magiging pagtingin sa iyo
Ako itong amo at ikaw ang empleyado
Bakit habang tumatagal isip ko'y nagugulo
Pag di ka nakikita'y laging nagagalit ako."
"The third stanza is most descriptive of respondent's attitude towards complainant
which complainant and her witnesses described as rude. It is also consistent with the
testimonies of witnesses that respondent would shout at complainant and would crack
green jokes towards her:
"Damdamin kong sumusumpling pilit kong itinatago
Sa malalakas na mga tinig asik at mga biro
Ngunit kung nag-iisa puso ko'y nagdurugo
Hinahanap ng puso ko ang maganda mong anyo.
"The fifth stanza jibes with complainant's testimony that respondent gave her an
unexpected kiss on at least two occasions:
"Bawat patak ng luha ko'y mga butil ng pag-ibig
Na siya kong kalasag sa pagnanakaw ng halik
Sa pisngi mo aking mahal, aking nilalangit
Patak ng ulan -- sa buhay kong tigang ang nakakawangis."
"Finally, the fourth and last paragraphs of the poem provides the context of the
lascivious acts committed by respondent against complainant on 6 December 1995:

"Sawingpalad na pagibig nabigong pangarap

Na ikaw ay maangkin, mahagkan at mayakap
Pag-ibig mo'y ibinigay sa higit na mapalad
Ako ngayo'y naririto bigong-bigong umiiyak."
Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita makatalik
Sa ngayon o bukas pagkat di mo ibig
Aangkinin kita kahit sa panaginip
Gano'n kita kamahal Joy, aking pag- ibig."
(Complainant's Memorandum, pp. 32-33)
Complainant found the poem repulsive (obscene) particularly the line saying
"Kapalaran ay malupit, di kita makatalik sa ngayon at bukas pagkat di mo ibig." In her
testimony, complainant said she considered the poem malicious because they were
both married persons, and he was a judge and she was his subordinate. Although
outraged, complainant respectfully asked permission to leave while putting the poem
in the pocket of her blazer. She then proceeded towards the outer room where she was
surprised to find the door closed and the chair holding it open now barricaded it. The
knob's button was now in a vertical position signifying that door was locked.
Complainant was removing the chair when respondent walked to her in big strides
asking her for a kiss. Seconds later he was embracing her and trying to kiss
her. Complainant evaded and struggled and pushed respondent away. Then panicking,
she ran in the direction of the filing cabinets. Respondent caught up with her,
embraced her again, pinned her against the filing cabinets and pressed the lower part
of his body against hers. Complainant screamed for help while resisting and pushing
respondent. Then she ran for the open windows of the inner room. But before she
could reach it respondent again caught her. In the ensuing struggle, complainant
slipped and fell on the floor, her elbows supporting the upper part of her body while
her legs were outstretched between respondent's feet. Respondent then bent his knees
in a somewhat sitting (squatting) position, placed his palms on either side of her head
and kissed her on the mouth with his mouth open and his tongue sticking out. As
complainant continued to struggle, respondent suddenly stopped and sat on the chair
nearest the door of the inner room with his face red and breathing
heavily. Complainant angrily shouted "maniac, demonyo, bastos, napakawalanghiya
ninyo". Respondent kept muttering "I love you" and was very apologetic offering for
his driver to take her home. Complainant headed for the Maple Room where, when

she entered, she was observed by Bernardo Taruc and Yolanda Valencia to be flushed
in the face and with her hair disheveled. Yolanda particularly found surprising
complainant's disheveled hair because complainant considered her (long straight) hair
one of her assets and was always arranging it. Rosanna Garcia in her testimony
observed that complainant was really angry as shown by the way she grabbed her bag
"talagang galit."
It is to be noted that Mrs. Rosanna Garcia, 36, was a most reluctant witness. When
first subpoenaed, she did not appear and sent a medical certificate (p. 120, Record)
that she was suffering from hypertension. She testified that she was asked by
respondent to sign an affidavit (Exh. F, pp. 56-57, Record) prepared by him and that
eventually, she executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay in her own handwriting (Exh. G)
wherein she stated that some of the statements in her earlier affidavit were false and
that she was only forced to sign because respondent shouted at her when she refused;
that she was afraid of respondent who was her boss. She corroborated complainant's
declaration that respondent went to the door of the Maple Room in order to call her
(complainant), adding that his call could not be made from his office because he could
not be heard as his office was far from the Maple Room. T his is in direct contrast to
respondent's testimony that he did not summon complainant but she came to him to
get the poem that she asked him to make for her.
When complainant angrily left the Maple Room, Yolanda Valencia followed and
walked with her outside. On the road, complainant told Valencia "napakawalanghiya
ni Judge, bastos, demonyo" and vowed that she would tell her family about what
respondent did to her so that her father would maul him. As testified by Yolanda
Valencia, complainant was so angry "nagdadabog talaga siya" (TSN, March 19, 1996,
p. 194). But as they were already on the road, complainant did not tell Valencia what
happened.
The next day complainant related her experience to Bernardo Taruc with whom she
rode to the office. As testified by Taruc:
"A She was telling me about the incident which happened that afternoon of December 6,
1995.
Q Can you tell us what she told you about the December 6, 1995 incident?
A She told me that she was kissed by the Judge inside his office.
Q What else did she tell you, if any?
A She said that she was pushed on the floor and she was very disorganized in relating the
incident it was as if she was trying to say all things at the same time. But what I got
from her was that she was kissed by the Judge in the office on December 6 on the lips
and she was fuming mad.
Q What was your reaction when you heard that from Atty. Talens-Dabot?
A I was . . . I was shocked . . . I don't know the proper term. I was shocked.

Q What did you say or do upon learning the incident?

A When she later on was pacified, she asked me, 'what am I going to do? Am I going to
press charges?'
Q What did you say?
A I told her it is up to her and before doing it she has to weigh all things, the consequences
if she would file a case.
Q Was that the end of the conversation?
A No, she kept on retelling it all over again till we reach the office."

(TSN, March 20, 1966, pp. 127-128).

Complainant also related what happened to witness Atty. Elenita Quinsay but, as
testified by Atty. Quinsay, complainant did not want anybody (else) to know about the
kissing incident at that point. Atty. Quinsay advised complainant to talk with
respondent and ask for a transfer.
On December 12, 1995 complainant went to the Hall of Justice where respondent was,
and as he was about to board his car, approached him and verbally broached her
request for transfer. He acceded. Thus in the morning of December 18, 1995,
complainant brought her written request for transfer dated December 12, 1995 (Exh.
N) for respondent's signature, reminding him of his earlier verbal approval. He
refused saying he needed her for two (2) administrative cases that he was
investigating. When she insisted, he shouted at her saying it was his decision and had
to be obeyed. However, he eventually signed the memorandum (Exh. O) transferring
her later that morning.
Two days later, on December 20, 1995, complainant, after consulting her family,
reported the matter to the police and filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness (Exh. 3), Violation of
Anti-Sexual Harassment Law (Exh. 5) and this administrative case the following day.
For his part, respondent mostly denied complainant's allegations. He presented his
version of some specific incidents or conduct such as that he was merely imitating
complainant's gesture with her forefinger as she nervously introduced her boyfriend to
him. He admitted that he kissed her ("November incident was not the first but it was
the last") and other female employees; admitted the pre-wedding incident where he
told Mrs. Leander "tanga ka kasi" but said it was only a joke; admitted that his voice
is louder than others but he does not shout; admitted that he tells green but "never
vulgar" jokes. Denying Marilyn Leander's allegations and disclaiming any knowledge
of Exhs. A to E, he described Leander as a "very young funny person, always
laughing." In his testimony he never showed why Marilyn Leander, Rosanna Garcia
or Yolanda Valencia would testify against him to corroborate complainant's
testimony, reserving his venom for Bernardo Taruc. He said Taruc's research work

were "not usable. He insinuated that Taruc perjured himself because he was jealous
about Marilyn Leander with whom he (Taruc) has a relationship.
He declared that nothing happened on December 6, that it was complainant who
entered his room to get the poem she herself asked him to make. He called the
December 6 incident a "mere fabrication" of complainant in vengeful retaliation of
four (4) incident that he either scolded or humiliated her namely: in September 1995
when he reminded, but did not scold, her to report to Branch 43; in November 1995
when he reproached her for not reflecting in her Certificate of Service that she had
gone to Hongkong; in the first week of December 1995 when she committed an error
in the notice for a judges' meeting; and finally on December 18, 1995, when he
scolded her for insisting to allow her to return to the Office of the Clerk of Court. He
asserted that he never noticed any change of complainant's behavior towards him and
that he was never attracted to her.
He dismissed the poem marked Exhibit "M" as nothing more than an intellectual
creation "too apocryphal to be true", that it was exaggerated and meant only to praise
and entertain complainant. He declared that he had in fact written other poems (Exhs.
25 to 30) including the one published through a certain Fred Roxas (Exh. 25). Belying
the kissing incident, he contended that there had been a gardener working at 3:00 to
5:00 that afternoon on the lawn just outside the window of his office, implying that if
indeed complainant had screamed, it would have been heard by the gardener. But it is
to be noted that this alleged gardener was never presented.
(pp. 11-31, Report and Recommendation)
Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice made the
following conclusions: a) that there is sufficient evidence to create a moral
certainty that respondent committed the acts complained of, especially the
violent kissing incident which transpired last December 6, 1995; b) that
complainant and her witnesses are credible witnesses who have no ulterior
motive or bias to falsely testify against respondent; c) that respondent's
denials can not prevail over the weight and probative value of the affirmative
assertions of complainant and her witnesses; d) that respondent's poem has
damned him, being documented proof of his sexual intentions towards the
complainant; e) that by filing her charges imputing to respondent a crime
against chastity and with her background as a lawyer and a court employee,
complainant was well-aware that her honor would itself be on trial; f) that it is
unbelievable that complainant, a demure newly-married lady and a religious
person, would fabricate a story with such severe implications on respondent's
professional and personal life just to get even with respondent for an alleged
simple scolding incident; and g) that by doing the acts complained of,
respondent has tempted the morals of not only complainant but also the other

court employees over whom he exercised power and influence as Executive

Judge. The Investigating Justice thereupon, recommended that respondent be
dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-appointment in any other
government position and with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges
appertaining him, if any.
The Court has reviewed the record of this case and has thereby satisfied
itself that the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice are in
truth adequately supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable
legal principles. The Court agrees and adopts such findings and
recommendations.
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times,
the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may
not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is
served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they
must possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral
uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be
reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and
equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, we
have the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality
and decency which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat vs.
Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). A magistrate is judged not only by his
official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private

morals are externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should
not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity
for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 SCRA 493
[1981]), the Court laid down the rationale why every judge must possess
moral integrity, thusly;
The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must
be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the
people in the administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who
dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity
and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to public decency. In fact, moral
integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary.
(at p. 504.)
In Castillo vs. Calanog (199 SCRA 75 [1991]), it was emphasized that:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no
dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very
recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or separated from
his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life
should be above suspicion.
(at p. 93.)
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has
behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral
uprightness. He has betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished
the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
We need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed by
respondent judge in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in
office. The audacity under which the same were committed and the seeming

impunity with which they were perpetrated shock our sense of morality. All
roads lead us to the conclusion that respondent judge has failed to behave in
a manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary. His actuations, if
condoned, would damage the integrity of the judiciary, fomenting distrust in
the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form of
disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service.
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant
is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he
being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in
order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed
on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
Noteworthy then is the following observation of the Investigating Justice:
But the very act of forcing himself upon a married woman, being himself a married
man, clearly diverts from the standard of morality expected of a man of less than his
standing in society. This is exacerbated by the fact that by doing the acts complained
of, he has tempted the morals of not only the complainant but also the young Mrs.
Marilyn Leander and the other employees in the court over whom he exercised power
and influence as Executive Judge.
(pp. 36-37.)
Respondent may indeed be a legally competent person as evidenced by
his published law books (translations from English to Tagalog) and his legal
studies abroad, but he has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral
integrity. He has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every
judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and
to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds
without any hesitation, must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary
sanction -- dismissal from the service.
As a reminder to all judges, it is fitting to reiterate one of the mandates of
the Court in its Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, to wit:
Finally, all trial judges should endeavor to conduct themselves strictly in accordance
with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Ethics that they be
exemplars in the communities and the living personification of justice and the Rule of
Law.

WHEREFORE, Judge Hermin E. Arceo is hereby DISMISSED from the

service for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,

versus

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL

EALA,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 7136

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline
(CBD)
against
Atty.
Jose
Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had
three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that

from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you
at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together
on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which
Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled
off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the
aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of
us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your
vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes
on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your
single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us
to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my
mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG
AS IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at
No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card
on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of
French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala. A photocopy of the report

is attached as Annex C. [4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;

CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4.
Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondents adulterous conduct with the complainants wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his
gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership
in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling
it a piece of paper. Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter
to complainants bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to
continue his love for her until we are together again, as now they
are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15
of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondents relationship
with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as
his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware
of Respondents special friendship with Irene.
xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to

the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a
mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and
Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article
XV, Sec. 2).[9]

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing
obsessively his illicit love for the complainants wife, he mocked the
institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the
complainants marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades
the legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondents ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, [12] alleging that

Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live
Birth as the girls father.Complainant attached to the REPLY, as Annex A, a copy

of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing Irenes signature and naming respondent as

the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February
14, 2002 at St. Lukes Hospital.
Complainants REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having
personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainants
Reply.[15] Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a
civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending
before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainants ComplaintAffidavit and REPLY to ANSWER were adopted as his testimony on direct
examination.[16] Respondents counsel did not cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [18] dated October 26,
2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be disbarred for
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring
supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed
the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed

pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for
lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution
shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment [23] on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him. [24] The contention fails. As the
IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7,
2000 (Exh. C) and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. D), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
complainants wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which
support the accusation of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit:
Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile
and known only to immediate members of their respective families . .
. , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19
of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low

profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous

circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . .
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an
admission that there is indeed a special relationship between him
and complainants wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex
H-1) sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth
of the child Samantha. In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
it should be noted that complainants wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make
any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied
that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondents ANSWER, he does not deny carrying on an

adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have
sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such
relationship, he maintaining that it was low profile and known only to the
immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying

circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is

admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondents denial of having personal knowledge

of Irenes daughter Samantha Louise Irene Mojes Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent a lawyer, 38 years old as the childs father. And
the phrase NOT MARRIED is entered on the desired information on DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE. A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage Certificate [29] shows that they were
affixed by one and the same person. Notatudignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Lukes Medical Center, in
his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the witness stand, declared
that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the childs father
is Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala, who was 38 years old and a lawyer. [31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has
been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other [32] which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant evidence is all that is
required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended

from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.[34]

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct, not under scandalous
circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or
shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse
with a woman elsewhere.

Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on
the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether
the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of

law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. [40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of
the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation [41] on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case,

which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal,
the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though
no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage
was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And
he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing
the
City
Prosecutors
Resolution,
DOJ
Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all
the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant
that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and

text
messages
to
her. Complainant
also
personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having
a
rendezvous
on
two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to
be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which
was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance
that
it
was
in
that
said
address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had
formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly
beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants
motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were
to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge

is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case [47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06

passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of
the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
JERRY T. WONG,

A.C. No. 6972

Complainant,
Present:

- versus -

ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:

October 17, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a complaint[1] dated December 1, 2003 for the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Salvador N. Moya II filed by complainant Jerry T. Wong with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1172 for violation of Batas Pambansa 22 (B.P. 22)
and non-payment of debt.

Complainant avers that he is the owner of J & L Agro-vets, a company

engaged in the business of selling agricultural and veterinary products and
medicine.Sometime in 1997, he retained the services of respondent for the purpose
of collecting due and demandable debts in favor of the company. Respondent also
handled personal cases of complainant and his wife.

As their relationship prospered, respondent asked financial help from

complainant for the construction of his house and purchase of a car. Complainant
willingly helped him. Pursuant to their arrangement, complainant purchased a car
on installment basis from Transfarm for respondent. He issued postdated checks to
cover its payment to Transfarm. The respondent in turn issued checks in favor of
the complainant to reimburse the latter.

The checks issued by complainant in favor of Transfarm were duly encashed

upon presentment. However, the checks issued by respondent to reimburse
complainant were dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Respondent refused
to comply with the repeated demands of the complainant to replace the dishonored
checks.

Furthermore, complainant introduced respondent to Quirino Tomlin and to

the owner of Unisia Merchandising Corporation, from whom respondent obtained
construction materials for the construction of his house on credit in the amount
of P164,000.00. Respondent also failed to pay this indebtedness, which remained
unsettled and thus caused embarrassment to complainant.

Respondent as well handled another case of complainant against Berting

Diwa, docketed as Civil Case No. 1482 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. It was decided on September 21, 2000. After the decision
became final and executory, complainant and his wife sought the execution of the
judgment through respondent.

On August 15, 2001, Diwa paid the amount of P15,680.50 for the
satisfaction of the judgment. As complainants counsel, respondent received the
payment but he did not inform complainant about it. Complainant had knowledge

of it only when he got hold of a copy of the Manifestation with Prayer to

Terminate Proceedings filed by respondent before the MTC of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.
On December 1, 2003, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to file his answer to
the complaint for disbarment within 15 days from receipt of thereof. He filed three
motions for extension of time to file his responsive pleading/answer. The first
motion dated January 5, 2004 asked for a 15-day extension from January 5,
2004 or until January 20, 2004 within which to file his responsive pleading. He
filed on January 20, 2004 his second motion for extension of time for another 15day or until February 4, 2004.[2] On February 4, 2004, he filed a
Manifestation/Explanation for Extension of Time to File Responsive
Pleading/Answer/Motion to Dismiss, citing that as early as October 1, 2003,
complainants third cause of action pertaining to a debt with Unisia Merchandising
was already filed in court.
Subsequently, he filed his Motion to Dismiss [3] dated February 27, 2004 on
the following grounds:
That complainant is not the proper party in interest and has no cause of
action.
That complainant has prematurely prejudged respondent relative to the
latters intention of not paying his debt as the former impresses the
honorable body that respondent would not pay at all.
That complainants action in the Berting Diwa case should be addressed
to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and not to the IBP.

In the aforesaid motion, respondent never denied and even acknowledged

what he described as honest debts to Unisia Merchandising and Mr.
Tomlin,[4] which he admitted he was unable to pay on time due to financial
constraints. He added that the IBP, being not a collection agency, was not the
proper forum to lodge the complaint against him that merely concerned the
collection of his monetary obligations which were then subject of pending court
suits. Similarly, respondent argued that the complaint against case should be
addressed to the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

On April 28, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an Order[5] denying respondents

motion to dismiss as it is prohibited pleading under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission. Respondent was given a new period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file his verified answer.
On May 28, 2004, respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration[6] which
was denied in an Order dated June 16, 2004.[7]

On June 28, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to Give

Respondent Extension of Time to File His Answer/or Responsive
Pleadings,[8] requesting for a fresh period of fifteen (15) days or until July 13, 2004
to file his answer. In the Order dated June 30, 2004, respondents motion was
granted with warning that no further request for extension shall be entertained. [9]

On July 13, 2004, respondent filed another Very Urgent Motion for
Extension to File Answer,[10] seeking another period of ten (10) days within which
to file his answer or responsive pleading. On July 21, 2004, the IBP-CBD issued an
Order finding the ground for extension not justifiable. Respondent was also
declared in default and complainant was directed to file his verified position paper
within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, after which, the case shall be
considered submitted for report and recommendation, with or without the position
paper.

On July 23, 2004, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to

Terminate Proceedings on the Ground of Prescription, considering that six (6)
months had already passed from the date of discovery of the offense. [11]

On August 10, 2004, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Order

Dated July 21, 2004[12] in the interest of higher justice and fair play.

On January 3, 2005, the IBP-CBD issued an Order giving both parties a

period of ten (10) days to file their respective verified position paper, as follows:

Respondent should be informed that a complaint for disbarment,

suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the
date of the professional misconduct. (Section 1, Rule VIII, Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline). And records show that
the acts complained of took place in 2002.
In the interest of justice, both parties are given ten (10) days from receipt
of this Order to file their respective verified position papers. After the
expiration of the said period, with or without the position paper, the case
shall be considered submitted for report and recommendation.

Respondent did not file any responsive pleading at all.

Thus, on April 27, 2005, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala submitted her Report and Recommendation.[13] She recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. The
pertinent portions of the said Report and Recommendation read as follows:
After a careful study and consideration of the facts and evidence
presented, we find merit to warrant disciplinary action against
respondent. His failure to answer the complaint for disbarment despite
due notice on several occasions and to appear on the scheduled hearings
set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which
deserves disciplinary sanction. (Ngayan v. Tugade, 193 SCRA 779).
Respondents contention that there were cases already filed in
court against him is of no moment. The pendency of a criminal action
against a respondent from the facts of which the disciplinary proceedings
is predicated, does not pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the
issues in the disbarment case (In re Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1; Calo v.
Degamo, 20 SCRA 447).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is hereby recommended that
respondent ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II be SUSPENDED for a
period of ONE YEAR from receipt hereof from the practice of his
profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[14]

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala in its
Resolution No. XVII-2005-113.[15] Respondent was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years with a notification that this suspension of two (2)
years must be served in succession to the initial recommendation of the IBP Board of
Suspension of two (2) years in CBD Case No. 03-1171, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondents violation of B.P. 22 and for failure and refusal to
comply with his obligations, Atty. Salvador N. Moya is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a notification
that this suspension of two years must be served in succession to the initial
recommendation of the IBP Board of Suspension of two years in CBD
Case No. 03-1171.[16]

On January 12, 2006, respondent through counsel filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) a notice informing it that respondent is filing an Appeal
Memorandum. On the same date, respondent filed his Appeal Memorandum with
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS
SUSPENSION FORM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2)
YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO FILE HIS
ANSWER ON THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT DESPITE
DUE NOTICE.
II
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2)
YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE BOUNCING
CHECKS LAW.

III
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES ERRED IN RECOMMENDING RESPONDENTS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR TWO (2)
YEARS FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY REFUSED TO SETTLE HIS
OBLIGATIONS.

On January 31, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution noting the aforesaid
Notice of Resolution No. XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of the IBP.[17]
On various dates,[18] the Court issued Resolutions noting the following
pleadings filed by the respondent:
1. Appeal Memorandum filed on January 12, 2006;
2. Manifestation/Supplement[19] to the Appeal Memorandum With Motion
to Give Due Course To said Pleading More So That The IBP Had Gone
Beyond the Period Provided For By Law To Conduct Investigation As In
The Case of Malonzo v. Principe, 447 SCRA 1.
3. Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the Case to the IBPCBD and Treat the Appeal Memorandum as Motion for Reconsideration
to the Resolution of the IBP-CBD filed on November 3, 2006.

At the outset, respondents Urgent Manifestation with Motion to Remand the

Case to the IBP-CBD and Treat the Appeal Memorandum as Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution of the IBP-CBD, is denied. It is not necessary to
remand this case to the IBP because the latter no longer have jurisdiction over the
case which had already been endorsed to this Court for final action. Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
Xxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,

determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of
law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case,
shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

Regarding the merits of the case, we sustain the findings and conclusions of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala, as approved, adopted and modified by the IBP
Board of Governors.

Respondent was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks as payment for his loan from complainant and the latters friends
which were incurred at the time when he was engaged as complainants counsel. He
did not deny the aforesaid allegations but he contended that he committed neither a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility nor any dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct because he never denied his debts and he was only unable to pay
them on time due to financial constraints.

Respondents contention is untenable.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so.[20]
In Lao v. Medel,[21] we ruled as follows:
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all
members of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for

law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In Co v.
Bernardino, [ A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 102] the
Court considered the issuance of worthless checks as violation of this
Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct.

Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino,[22] we also ruled that the issuance of

checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action. Similarly, Sanchez v. Somoso[23] held that the persistent refusal to settle due
obligations despite demand manifests a lawyers low regard to his commitment to
the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing
the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. This conduct
deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary action.
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient
funds to cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as
to undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his
act of issuing worthless checks by his dire financial condition. Respondent should
not have contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he
suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have explained with particularity the
circumstances which caused his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized and
unsubstantiated allegations as to why he reneged in the payment of his debts
promptly despite repeated demands and sufficient time afforded him cannot
withstand scrutiny.

The Court finds unmeritorious the justification of the respondent as to his

failure to immediately deliver to the complainant the payment made by Diwa for
the satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1482 of the MTC of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan. Respondent is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due
to his client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare
allegation that the same had already been transmitted to the complainant.

His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter
of serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several
extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and belated
plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous disregard of
the lawful orders of the duly constituted authority, which caused undue delay in the
IBP proceeding. This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of
Professional Responsibility[24] and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon
every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. Respondent has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal
Profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of
the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over
attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden
duty as well. [25] Sadly, herein respondents conduct falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a member of the legal profession. Accordingly,
administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct.

We
come
now
to
the
penalty
imposable
in
this
[26]
[27]
case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel we held that the deliberate failure
to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice
of law.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed

by the IBP-CBD, i.e., respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay
his debts, respondent also had seriously breached his clients trust and confidence to
his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBPs Orders in
the course of its proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVII-2005-113 dated October 22, 2005 of

the IBP which found that respondent Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
AFFIRMED in toto. He is hereby SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of
law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of
the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal
record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5916. July 1, 2003]

SELWYN
F.
LAO, complainant,
MEDEL, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ROBERT

W.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by
Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an attorney.
[1]

The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD

in this wise:
The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four
(4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These
dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks
issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it
appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith
effect immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr.
Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June
2000. Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final
extension of only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000),
within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the
initiation of this present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty.
Medel never made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his
indebtedness.
[2]

In his Answer dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all
of his proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to
comply with his promise to pay complainant. Respondent maintains that the
Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of
the following:
[3]

(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully
appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present
case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the
complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity),
which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for
brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or
a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank,
through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule
138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for
payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule
138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court
would not countenance;
(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly
shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a
member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as
attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22,
does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law
profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear,
palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in
violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the
benefit of the doubt.
[4]

On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply. Thereafter, IBPCBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by
the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on
October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29,
2002. In that hearing, respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed
himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000
for attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle
the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees in the
next hearing.
[5]

On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their
scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent
suddenly insisted on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency.
Complainants counsel objected and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still
conducting a hearing in another case, ordered him to wait.He, however,
retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is
more important. And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly
left. He made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his
indebtedness before leaving.
[6]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his September 19, 2002 Report, Commissioner Cunanan found
respondent guilty of violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to the latters claim,
violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved moral turpitude. Further, he
observed that [w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted against
[respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1)
but four counts of violation of BP 22. The refusal [by respondent] to pay his
indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude towards
complainants counsel and the [commission sufficiently] warrant the imposition
of sanctions against him. Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.
[7]

[8]

[9]

In Resolution No. XV-2002-598, the Board of Governors of the

adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan
resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to
Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
[10]

The Courts Ruling

IBP
and
The
this

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of

Governors, but reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of
our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so
doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
[11]

In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure
to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless
checks, he contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the
records that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he
reneged on his obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he
refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred the blame to
complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to accept
the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no
obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with
earlier payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed
himself to the payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That
he had no real intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed
commitments. His cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of
paying for them puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must
promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or
suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.
[12]

It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of

worthless checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public
interest and public order.
[13]

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members

of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01
of the Code specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In Co v. Bernardino, the Court
considered the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an
act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:
[14]

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court
may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his nonprofessional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where,
however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a
character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege
which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad
checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The
Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that
he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal
services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation
from this Court.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567
(1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes
which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the
respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x
x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,
as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of
good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him x x x.

Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year
from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm
reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties
which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of
the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all
persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound
to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent
dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the
former was expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot
countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the
IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.
[15]

Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer
assigned to investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important
personal matter to attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament
to the investigating commissioner and asked permission to leave
immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior by raising his
voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. It
demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a guardian of law and justice.
[16]

[17]

[18]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross

misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, in line
with Co v. Bernardino, Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr. and Saburnido v. Madroo -which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers -- we find the suspension of
one year sufficient in this case.
[19]

[20]

[21]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct

and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and

served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it
to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7204

March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of
the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As
promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the
concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the
possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle
their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is
about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks
coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court.
After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along
the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from
bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and
forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast.
Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided
to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The
communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46 pm

- forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm

- "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant
at 6:17:59 pm

- I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of

the situation.

Follow-up message
Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm

- wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont

have relationship with her.

Replied by respondent

- "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2

At 6:32:43 pm

put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im

very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to
put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)

Follow up message
by respondent
at 6:42:25 pm

- Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show

u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again. Will
you still see me so I can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32
pm saying "I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know
what to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at
4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry.
Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that
he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters
relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel
and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his
car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that
the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a
busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to
him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she
remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their
marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband;
and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who
always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and
adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the
behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with
or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months.5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral
or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations
shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined.
Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law. 6 In
Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the
Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made
him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained
in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if

it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate
in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes,
namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek
and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently
on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it
and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her
lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding
was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual
harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue,
Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa
and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes
then she arrived. And so I said she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you
like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is
along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then
a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two
glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or
beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I
went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her
where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the
last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before
she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and
with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when shes
already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car,
thats it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.

xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we
went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So
before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I
kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand,
pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x
x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned
her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction
with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of
her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.

In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a
"bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal
remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent
undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the
rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other
fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a
grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession," warranting respondents disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the
bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and
integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the
practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude,
or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a
lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof
rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who
denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the
burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.

Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote
place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors. 33 When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to
protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession;
and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of
protecting the administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it
is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an
erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court,
to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases
of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the
act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is
also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter
of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and
raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first
offense, reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her
lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective
and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more
prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
FIDELA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 3569

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. MANUEL G. SAN JOSE, Promulgated:

Respondent.
February 23, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De
Enriquez against respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose for gross negligence.
Complainant alleged that on August 28, 1989, she hired the services of respondent
Atty. San Jose for the purpose of filing an unlawful detainer case against
one RugerioAlipante, who defaulted in the payment of monthly rentals on
complainants property in Taban, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. According to the
complainant, respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite payment to
him of P2,000 attorneys fees, so she decided to withdraw the case from
respondent. She demanded the return of the pertinent documents but despite
repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the documents. As a
result, the action for unlawful detainer prescribed.Complainant alleged further, that
her daughter who worked for respondent was not paid her salary. Complainant
prayed that Atty. San Jose be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
In his Comment,[2] respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received
a letter from the complainant informing him that the lessee had already agreed to
vacate the premises, and thus, the filing of an unlawful detainer case had become
unnecessary. Respondent also explained that he did not file the case even before
receiving complainants letter because there was a vacancy in the sala of the

Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Libmanan-Cabusao, Camarines Sur. He

claimed that he informed complainant that the case could not be filed until a new
judge was appointed, but he promised to file the case before the action
prescribed. Respondent claimed further that the attorneys fee was P3,000 and that
he had paid complainants daughter P700 per month.
The Court referred[3] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation by the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD). The investigating officer found that respondent was indeed
remiss in the performance of his professional duties as counsel. According to
Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo, the only complete work respondent rendered to
his client was sending a demand letter for the lessee to vacate the subject premises
within ten days from receipt of the demand letter. The Commissioner also found
respondents explanation for his failure to file the case unsatisfactory and concluded
that respondent was guilty of negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer
for abandonment of his clients cause. The Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. [4]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of the
Commissioner finding respondent liable for negligence but only imposed the
penalty of one-month suspension from the practice of law. [5]
On December 17, 1997, respondent filed a petition seeking the dismissal of the
case against him and prayed that he be exonerated. He denied being negligent. He
claimed that the IBP Board of Governors misinterpreted the complainants letter,
which stated that the complainant and her lessee came to an agreement for the
latter to vacate the leased premises. He claimed that he relied on that letter thereby
negating the necessity of further filing a case for unlawful detainer.
In our Resolution, dated December 6, 1999, we resolved to remand the case to the
IBP which, in turn, assigned the case to the IBP-CBD for further investigation.
The Investigating Commissioner in her report, dated August 5, 2004,
recommended that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. Said
recommendation was adopted by the IBP, which passed a resolution to that effect,
and approved by the IBP Board of Governors on October 7, 2004.
After a thorough review of the records in this matter, we are in agreement with the
IBP that respondent Atty. San Jose be held liable for negligence; thus, his petition
for exoneration should be denied for utter lack of merit.

The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to

neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.[6] A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the
responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. It is the duty of
a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his
best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not
enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to
prepare adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work.[7]
In Santos v. Lazaro,[8] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a
clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal
profession, the courts and society.Until the lawyers withdrawal is properly done, the
lawyer is expected to do his or her best for the interest of the client. [9]
In this case, respondent fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted
with a case. It is undisputed that respondent was hired by the complainant
on August 28, 1989, and that respondent sent the notice to vacate to the lessee
before the appropriate unlawful detainer case could be filed. However, after nine
months, respondent had done nothing further in connection with the case.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion.[10] However, respondent in this case failed to file the appropriate civil
case after sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by itself
inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent. [11] Moreover, this Court finds
reprehensible respondents failure to heed the request of his client for the return of
the case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable explanation for that
failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent aggravates his misconduct by blaming the courts. Respondents excuse
that the MCTC having jurisdiction over the case was vacant; that filing of a case
would be useless; and that the best thing to do was to wait for the vacancy to be
filled, finds no support in the practice of law. The vacancy in court did not suspend
the courts official existence, much less render it functus oficio.
Respondent also relies in vain on complainants letter dated August 16, 1990,
wherein complainant informed respondent of her decision to withdraw the

case. According to the complainant, she resorted to the letter so she could retrieve
the records she previously handed over to the respondent, but he continued to
refuse to return them. It may be noted that the letter was sent to respondent a few
days before the lapse of the one-year prescriptive period. If respondent had earlier
filed a case, there would have been no need for complainant to resort to that letter
to get the records in line with her plan to have the Public Attorneys Office assist in
filing the appropriate case. Needless to stress, because of the respondents failure to
file the appropriate case, and his refusal to return the documents, time ran out and
the action for unlawful detainer case was barred by prescription. Damage and
prejudice to the clients cause was undeniable.
Finally, we find the recommended penalty of one-month suspension from the
practice of law too light. In previous cases, we have imposed six months
suspension for violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the
offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal
profession. In Reyes v. Vitan,[12] for failure to take the appropriate actions in
connection with his clients case, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six months and was required to render accounting of all the
sums he received from his client. Considering precedents, in the light of
circumstances in this case, we find no reason to deviate now from the penalty
meted previously for similar infractions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty of
violation of Canon 18 specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon notice of this Resolution. He is ordered to return to
complainant, within five (5) days from notice, the sum of P2,000 with 12% interest
per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Resolution until the full
amount shall have been returned.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into respondents personal records as an
attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar, and furnished the Court
Administrator for distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, and the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.