Pacioles JR Vs Chuatoco-Ching - 127920 - August 9, 2005 - J PDF

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PaciolesJrvsChuatocoChing:127920:August9,2005:J.SandovalGutierrez:ThirdDivision:Decision
THIRDDIVISION
[G.R.No.127920.August9,2005]
EMILIOB.PACIOLES,JR.,INHISCAPACITYASADMINISTRATORANDHEIROF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHINGPACIOLES, petitioner, vs.
MIGUELACHUATOCOCHING,respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves
behind.Forindeath,apersonsestateremains,providingafertilegroundfordiscordsthatbreakthe
familialbonds.Beforeusisanothercasethatillustratessuchreality.Here,ahusbandandamotherof
thedeceasedarelockedinanacrimoniousdisputeovertheestateoftheirlovedone.
ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarifiledbyEmilioB.Pacioles,Jr.,hereinpetitioner,against
[1]
Miguela ChuatocoChing, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated
[2]
[3]
September 25, 1996 and Resolution dated January 27, 1997 in CAG.R. SP No. 41571. The
AppellateCourtaffirmedtheOrderdatedJanuary17,1996oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch
99, Quezon City denying petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife,
MiguelitaChingPaciolesandhismotionforreconsideration.
Thefactsareundisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of
P10.5million,stock investments worthP518,783.00,bankdeposits amounting toP6.54 million, and
interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two
minorchildren.
[4]
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the
settlementofMiguelitasestate.Heprayedthat(a)lettersofadministrationbeissuedinhisname,and
(b)thatthenetresidueoftheestatebedividedamongthecompulsoryheirs.
Miguelitasmother,MiguelaChuatocoChing,hereinrespondent,filedanopposition,specificallyto
petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is
incompetentandunfittoexercisethedutiesofanadministratorand(b)thebulkofMiguelitasestate
is composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be
[5]
issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix.
[6]
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving
[7]
spouse,hasthepreferentialrighttobeappointedasadministratorunderthelaw.
Respondentcounteredthatshehasdirectandmaterialinterestintheestatebecauseshegave
halfofherinheritedpropertiestoMiguelitaonconditionthatbothofthemwouldundertakewhatever
[8]
businessendeavortheydecidedto,inthecapacityofbusinesspartners.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/127920.htm
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[9]
Inheromnibusmotion datedApril23,1993,respondentnominatedhersonEmmanuelChing
toactasspecialadministrator.
OnApril20,1994,theintestatecourtissuedanorderappointingpetitionerandEmmanuelasjoint
[10]
regularadministratorsoftheestate.
andpostingtherequisitebond.
Bothwereissuedlettersofadministrationaftertakingtheiroath
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on
September12,19,and26,1994.However,noclaimswerefiledagainsttheestatewithintheperiod
setbytheRevisedRulesofCourt.
[11]
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate.

Emmanueldidnotsubmitaninventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
compulsoryheirsofMiguelita.
[12]
[13]
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among
others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes 2) partition and
distributionoftheestateamongthedeclaredheirsand3)paymentofattorneysfees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the
estate is premature and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the
[14]
properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.
Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and coowner.
Thus,sheprayedthatahearingbescheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and
attorneysfeesbutdeniedpetitionersprayerforpartitionanddistributionoftheestate,holdingthatit
isindeedpremature.Theintestatecourtratiocinatedasfollows:
Onthepartitionanddistributionofthedeceasedsproperties,amongthedeclaredheirs,theCourtfindsthe
prayerofpetitionerinthisregardtobepremature.Thus,ahearingonoppositorsclaimasindicatedinher
oppositiontotheinstantpetitionisnecessarytodeterminewhetherthepropertieslistedintheamended
complaintfiledbypetitionerareentirelyconjugalortheparaphernalpropertiesofthedeceased,oraco
ownershipbetweentheoppositorandthepetitionerintheirpartnershipventure.
PetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationbutitwasdeniedintheResolutiondatedMay7,1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and
setasidetheintestatecourtsOrderdatedJanuary17,1996andResolutiondatedMay7,1996which
deniedpetitionersprayerforpartitionanddistributionoftheestateforbeingpremature,indicatingthat
it(intestatecourt)willfirstresolverespondentsclaimofownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged
OrderandResolution,theintestatecourtdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretion.
TheAppellateCourtruled:
Regardingthesecondissueraised,respondentjudgedidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretioninentertaining
privaterespondentsunsupportedclaimofownershipagainsttheestate.Infact,thereisnoindicationthatthe
probatecourthasalreadymadeafindingoftitleorownership.Itisinevitablethatinprobateproceedings,
questionsofcollationorofadvancementareinvolvedforthesearematterswhichcanbepasseduponinthe
courseoftheproceedings.Theprobatecourtinexercisingitsprerogativetoscheduleahearing,toinquireinto
theproprietyofprivaterespondentsclaim,isbeingextremelycautiousindeterminingthecompositionofthe
estate.Thisactisnottaintedwithaniotaofgraveabuseofdiscretion.
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Petitionermovedforareconsiderationbutitwaslikewisedenied.Hence,thispetitionforreview
oncertiorarianchoredonthefollowingassignmentsoferror:
I
RESPONDENTCOURTSDECISIONWHICHAFFIRMSTHEINTESTATECOURTSORDERISAGRAVE
ERRORFORBEINGCONTRARYTOTHESETTLEDJURISPRUDENCEANDPOLICYOFTHELAW
THATESTATEPROCEEDINGSMUSTBESETTLEDEXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENTCOURTCOMMITTEDGRAVEERRORINSUSTAININGTHEINTESTATECOURTS
ORDERTOCONDUCTHEARINGONTHEISSUEOFOWNERSHIPCLAIMAGAINSTTHEESTATE,AS
SAIDFUNCTIONISOUTSIDEANDBEYONDTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEINTESTATECOURT.
III
RESPONDENTCOURTGRAVELYERREDINAFFIRMINGTHEINTESTATECOURTSORDERAND
RESOLUTIONNOTWITHSTANDINGTHATRESPONDENTCHINGSOWNERSHIPCLAIMSARE
CONFLICTING,FRIVOLOUSANDBASELESS.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear
and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents
estate?
Thegeneralruleisthatthejurisdictionofthetrialcourteitherasanintestateoraprobatecourt
relatesonlytomattershavingtodowiththesettlementoftheestateandprobateofwillofdeceased
personsbutdoesnotextendtothedeterminationofquestionsofownershipthatariseduring
[15]
theproceedings.
jurisdiction.
Thepatentrationaleforthisruleisthatsuchcourtexercisesspecialandlimited
[16]
A wellrecognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may
hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental
[17]
andprovisional.Thus,inPastor,Jr.vs.CourtofAppeals, weheld:
xxxAsarule,thequestionofownershipisanextraneousmatterwhichtheprobatecourtcannotresolvewith
finality.Thus,forthepurposeofdeterminingwhetheracertainpropertyshouldorshouldnotbeincluded
intheinventoryofestateproperties,theprobatecourtmaypassuponthetitlethereto,butsuch
determinationisprovisional,notconclusive,andissubjecttothefinaldecisioninaseparateactionto
resolvetitle.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced.Underthe
saidprinciple,thekeyconsiderationisthatthepurposeoftheintestateorprobatecourtinhearingand
passinguponquestionsofownershipismerelytodeterminewhetherornotapropertyshouldbe
includedintheinventory.Thefactsofthiscaseshowthatsuchwasnotthepurposeoftheintestate
court.
[18]
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition dated
September18,1995,respondentexpresslyadoptedtheinventorypreparedbypetitioner,thus:
6.SheadoptstheinventorysubmittedbythepetitionerinhisAmendedCompliancedatedOctober6,
1994,andfiledonlyonNovember4,1994notOctober5,1995aserroneouslyassertedinPar.12ofthe
OmnibusMotion.Oppositor,however,takesexceptiontothelowvaluationplacedontherealestateproperties
andreservesherrighttosubmitamoreaccurateandrealisticpricingoneach.
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Respondentcouldhaveopposedpetitionersinventoryandsoughttheexclusionofthespecific
properties which she believed or considered to be hers.Butinsteadofdoingso,sheexpressly
adoptedtheinventory,takingexceptiononlytothelowvaluationplacedontherealestateproperties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas
estate,didnotsubmithisowninventory.Hismandate,ascoadministrator,istosubmitwithinthree(3)
monthsafterhisappointmentatrueinventoryandappraisalofalltherealandpersonalestateofthe
[19]
deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge. He could have submitted an
inventory,excludingtherefromthosepropertieswhichrespondentconsideredtobehers.The
fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioners
inventory.
Obviously,respondentspurposeherewasnottoobtainfromtheintestatecourtarulingofwhat
properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to
securefromtheintestatecourtafinaldeterminationofherclaimofownershipoverproperties
comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this
pointasevidentinitsResolution
[20]
datedMay7,1996,thus:
OnpetitionersmotionforpartitionanddistributionoftheestateofthelateMiguelitaChingPacioles,itis
believedthatsinceoppositorhadinterposedaclaimagainstthesubjectestate,thedistributionthereofinfavorof
theheirscouldnotpossiblybeimplementedasthereisstillaneedforappropriateproceedingstodeterminethe
proprietyofoppositorsclaim.Itmustbementionedthatifitistruethatoppositorownsthebulkofthe
properties,whichsheallegedlyplaced/registeredinthenameofthedeceasedforconvenience,Oppositor,
therefore,hasamaterialanddirectinterestintheestateandhence,shouldbegivenherdayinCourt.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate
courtwasactuallytodeterminetheproprietyofoppositors(respondents)claim.Accordingtothe
intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties,thenitmeansthatshehasamaterialanddirectinterestintheestateand,hence,she
shouldbegivenherdayincourt.Theintendeddayincourtorhearingisgearedtowardsresolving
theproprietyofrespondentscontentionthatsheisthetrueownerofthebulkofMiguelitasestate.
Surely,wecannotbedeludedbyrespondentsingeniousattempttosecureaproceedingforthe
purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that
heronlyintentwastodeterminetheaccuracyofpetitionersinventory,however,aclosereviewofthe
factsandthepleadingsrevealsherrealintention.
Clearly,theRTC,actingasanintestatecourt,hadoversteppeditsjurisdiction.Itspropercourse
should have been to maintain a handsoff stance on the matter. It is wellsettled in this jurisdiction,
sanctionedandreiteratedinalonglineofdecisions,thatwhenaquestionarisesastoownershipof
propertyallegedtobeapartoftheestateofthedeceasedperson,butclaimedbysomeotherperson
tobehisproperty,notbyvirtueofanyrightofinheritancefromthedeceasedbutbytitleadverseto
thatofthedeceasedandhisestate,suchquestioncannotbedeterminedinthecourseofanintestate
or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions,whichmustbesubmittedtothecourtintheexerciseofitsgeneraljurisdictionas
[21]
aregionaltrialcourt.
Jurisprudenceteachesusthat:
[A]probatecourtoroneinchargeofproceedingswhethertestateorintestatecannotadjudicateor
determinetitletopropertiesclaimedtobeapartoftheestateandwhichareclaimedtobelongtooutside
parties.Allthatthesaidcourtcoulddoasregardssaidpropertiesistodeterminewhethertheyshouldorshould
notbeincludedintheinventoryorlistofpropertiestobeadministeredbytheadministrator.Ifthereisno
dispute,wellandgood,butifthereis,thentheparties,theadministrator,andtheopposingpartieshaveto
resorttoanordinaryactionforafinaldeterminationoftheconflictingclaimsoftitlebecausetheprobate
courtcannotdoso.
[22]
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Hence,respondentsrecourseistofileaseparateactionwithacourtofgeneraljurisdiction.The
intestatecourtisnottheappropriateforumfortheresolutionofheradverseclaimofownershipover
propertiesostensiblybelongingtoMiguelita'sestate.
Now,evenassumingthattheintestatecourtmerelyintendedtomakeaprovisionalorprimafacie
determinationoftheissueofownership,stillrespondentsclaimcannotprosper.Itbearsstressingthat
thebulkofMiguelitasestate,asstatedinpetitionersinventory,comprisesrealestatescoveredbythe
TorrensSystemwhichareregisteredeitherinthenameofMiguelitaaloneorwithpetitioner.Assuch,
theyareconsideredtheownersofthepropertiesuntiltheirtitleisnullifiedormodifiedinan
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid
thus:
[23]
relevant,
Itdoesnotmatterthatrespondentadministratrixhasevidencepurportingtosupportherclaimofownership,for,
ontheotherhand,petitionershaveaTorrenstitleintheirfavor,whichunderthelawisendowedwith
incontestabilityuntilafterithasbeensetasideinthemannerindicatedinthelawitself,which,ofcourse,does
notinclude,bringingupthematterasamereincidentinspecialproceedingsforthesettlementofthe
estateofdeceasedpersons.xxx
xxxInregardtosuchincidentofinclusionorexclusion,WeholdthatifapropertycoveredbyTorrensTitleis
involved,thepresumptiveconclusivenessofsuchtitleshouldbegivendueweight,andintheabsenceofstrong
compellingevidencetothecontrary,theholderthereofshouldbeconsideredastheownerofthepropertyin
controversyuntilhistitleisnullifiedormodifiedinanappropriateordinaryaction,particularly,whenas
inthecaseatbar,possessionofthepropertyitselfisinthepersonsnamedinthetitle.xxx
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration Decree, proscribes
collateralattackagainstTorrensTitle,hence:
Section48.Certificatenotsubjecttocollateralattack.
Acertificateoftitleshallnotbesubjecttocollateralattack.Itcannotbealtered,modifiedorcancelled
exceptinadirectproceedinginaccordancewithlaw.
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing
evidencetobolsterherbareassertionofownership.Wequotehertestimony,thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours
whichIquote:InaccordancewiththeChinesetraditionandcultureinthedistributionofpropertiesto
thelegalheirs,wedecidedtogiveonlyatokentoourdaughterMiguelitaandleavetheresttoour
onlysonEmmanuel,withtheundertakingthatbeingthesonhewilltakefullresponsibilityoftherest
ofthefamilydespitehismarriage.Madamewitness,doyourecallhavingstatedthatinyoursworn
statement?
A:Yessir,butitwasnotcarriedout.
QWhatwasactuallygiventoyourdaughterMiguelitaisonlyatoken,isthatright?
A:Notatoken,sir,butonehalfoftheshareoftheestatewasgiventoLitaandtheotherhalfwasgiven
toEmmanuel.
Q:WhatwenttoEmmanuelwasalso,isthatright?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:WhatmakesuptheonehalfshareofLita,ifyourecall?
A:Whatwasgiventoherwereallchecks,sir,butIcannotrememberanymoretheamount.
xxxxxx
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Q:Summingupyourtestimony,Madame,youcannotitemizetheonehalfshareoftheestateof
Miguelita,isthatright?
A:Yes,sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and
Miguelitawithrespecttotheestateofyourlatehusband?
A:IfIonlyknewthatthiswillhappen
Q:Samakatuwidpoaywalangdokumento?
[24]
A:Walapo.
Shefurthertestifiedasfollows:
Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank
accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS
PharmaceuticalsandMedicalSupplies,Inc.andvariousmotorvehicles,peryourpleasure,
MadamWitness,howshouldthesepropertiesbepartitionedorwhatshouldbedonewith
theseproperties?Accordingtoyouearlier,youareagreeableforthepartitionofthesaid
propertieswithEmilona5050basis,isthatright?
A:Kunganopoangsaakin,iyonangdapatnabumaliksaakin,sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in PagAsa, in
Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock.
Alinsunodsainyo,paanopoangdapatnapartihanohatianninyoniEmil?
A:Kunganoangsaakin
xxxxxx
QAngtanongkoposainyoayganito,itopobaanginyongiminungkahikayEmil?Itopoba
anginyongpaghahatianorhindi?
[25]
A:Iyoakintalaganahindinilapinaghirapan,sir.
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioners
inventorybelongtoher.Neithercouldshepresentanydocumenttoproveherclaimofownership.The
consistentlychangingbasisofherclaimdidnothingtoimproveherposture.Initially,sheinsistedthat
[26]
the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Sensing that such assertion
could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that
sheandMiguelitawerebusinesspartnersandthatshegavetothelattermostofherpropertiestobe
[27]
used in a joint business venture. Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties
listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership
overthemandupon her death, such properties would be vested to hercompulsoryheirs,petitioner
hereinandtheirtwominorchildren.
[28]
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive
respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We
reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be
[29]
submittedtotheRegionalTrialCourtintheexerciseofitsgeneraljurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.41571areherebyREVERSED.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban,(Chairman),CarpioMorales,andGarcia,JJ.,concur.
Corona,J.,onleave.
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[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Rolloat914.
Id.at1617.
EntitledEmilioB.Paciolis,Jr.versusTheHonorableJudgeFelixDeGuzman,asPresidingJudgeofRTCQuezonCity,
Branch99andMiguelaChing.
Recordsat19.ThecasewasfiledanddocketedasSPNo.Q92131555.
SeeOpposition,Recordsat2729.
SeeMotionfortheAppointmentofOppositorasSpecialAdministratrix,Recordsat3032.
SeeMotiontoStrikeOutOpposition,Recordsat9199.
SeeOppositiontoPetitionersMotiontoStrikeOutOppositiondatedDecember21,1992,Recordsat101106.
Recordsat137140.
[10]
[11]
The order, insofar as Emmanuel Ching is concerned as coadministrator, is the subject of an appeal before the 10th
DivisionoftheCourtofAppealsdocketedasCAG.R.CVNo.46763.
Recordsat337346.AmendedInventoryat347353.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
May17,1995,Recordsat360.
Recordsat366371.
SeeManifestation/OppositiontoOmnibusMotiondatedJuly20,1995,Recordsat383387.
Sanchezvs.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.108947,September29,1997,279SCRA647Ramosvs. Court of Appeals,
G.R.No.42108,December29,1989,180SCRA635.
InJimenez vs. IntermediateAppellate Court, G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, the Court
ruled:Itishornbookdoctrinethatinaspecialproceedingfortheprobateofawill,thequestionofownershipisan
extraneousmatterwhichtheprobatecourtcannotpassuponwithfinality.Thispronouncementnodoubtapplies
withequalforcetoanintestateproceedingxxx.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
HeirsofOscarR.Reyesvs.Reyes,G.R.No.139587,November22,2000,345SCRA541Jimenezvs.Intermediate
AppellateCourt,ibid.
G.R.No.L56340,June24,1983,122SCRA885.
Recordsat383387.
Section1,Rule83oftheRulesofCourt.
Recordsat437440.
Baybayanvs.Aquino,No.L42678,April9,1987,149SCRA186.
Sanchezvs.CourtofAppeals,supraMoralesvs.CourtofFirstInstanceofCavite,G.R.No.L47125,December29,
1986146SCRA373Cuizonvs.Ramolete,L51291,May29,1984,129SCRA495.
L45494,August31,1978,85SCRA213.
TSN,February26,1993.
TSN,May20,1993.
RespondentsOppositiondatedOctober28,1992reads:
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b) the bulk of the estate of the deceased consists of paraphernal property of the deceased most of which
were donations coming from the herein Oppositor, and therefore, the herein Oppositor has a better right to its
administration.(Recordsat2729)
[27]
OppositiontoPetitionersMotiontoStrikeOutOppositiondatedJanuary5,1993,reads:
3.That,thePetitionercannotdenythefactthatmajorityoftheestateleftbythedecedentcamefromtheOppositorbyway
of donation, and this was brought about by the fact that when the father of the decedent died, the latter did not
receive any kind of inheritance, as Chinese custom and tradition dictate that female children inherit nothing from
their deceased parents and the only heirs entitled to inherit are the surviving spouse and the male children, which
happenstobethehereinOppositorandtheonlybrotherofthedecedentinthepersonofEmmanuelChing.Butthe
hereinOppositor,intheexerciseofherliberalityandsounddirection,andwiththeendinviewofgivingthedecedent
a share of the estate of her deceased husband, gave half of her inherited property to the decedent, with an
undertaking that the latter herein Oppositor and they will undertake whatever business endeavor they
decidedto,inthecapacityofbusinesspartners.(Recordsat101106)
[28]
[29]
Pisueavs.HeirsofPetraUnating,G.R.No.132803,August31,1999,313SCRA384Bongalonvs.CourtofAppeals,
G.R.No.142441,November10,2004,441SCRA553.
Baybayanvs.Aquino,supra.
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Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate.

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