PEACE

P.O.
'SEARCHER
Box 2
Lincoln College
Canterbury incorporatins

Off BflSIJ
Newsletter of Citizens for the Demilitarisation of Harewood
ausust 198'2' no. 14

�D APPEAL - CDH REPRESENTATIVE TO PINE JAPiALICE SPRINJS

The Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition (AABCC) is planning an

international week of action against the CIA spy facility at Pine }ap in
October this year. CDH will be sending at least one representative to Alice
Springs to present the Aotearoa perspective on the U.S. military/intelligence
presence in our two countries. Our representative will need return air
transport Sydney-AIice Springs at a cost of $NZS20. CDH can bear part of this
cost. But we appeal to our supporters to contribute what they can to help in
this action.

Our presence at Pine 3ap during this action is very important. The
Christchurch Starlifter flights are a key link in supplying the CIA base. Our
perspective should be conveyed directly to the Australian movement. Our
problem at Harewood may seem small compared to the massive U.S. presence in
Australia. But the 'neither confirm nor deny' Starlifters not only supply the
CIA and U.S. military bases under cover of the Antarctic Treaty and the Deep
freeze agreement, the flights represent a massive loophcle in Our nuclear-free
law. It is an inconsistency in Labour policy that has been exploited by
National whc have proposed that the exemption for Starlifters be extended to
U.S. nuclear capable ships.

We will be holding our own Pine Gap support action at Christchurch

Airport on Sunday, October 18. More information will be in the next issue of
'Peace Researcher'.

Please send a contribution, large or small, to CDH Pine Gap Pund'. P.O.
Box 2258, Christchurch.

Thanks for your support!

The Untold Story: Trident-l and first Strike

The Silent Screw: A Threat to first Strike?

National Party Links to U.S. Dirty Tricks

A Tale of CDH, CANTA, and the USIS

The Mili tary Mentality of a �ormer Ally

 NOTE TO THE READER:
2

The following article by Robert C. Aldridge is ah update on a subject

covered in 'Peace Researcher' No. 4 in 1934. That er-ticle, .e1so by Bob
Aldridge, was entitled - First Strike is closer than we think'. Bcb is the
author of the book '8'irst Strike: The Pentagon's strategy fcr Nuclear War',
South End Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 1983.

THE UNTOLD STORY: TRIDENT-l AND FIRST STRIKE

by Robert C. Aldridge

(originally published in • Ground Zero ', Winter 1987)

The earliest possible date for attaining a V.S. first strike capability
seems to hinge on the full operational status of the Navstar global
pogitioning system (GPS). The Challenger disaster has postponed cleploymel1t: of
the full GPS constellation of 18 satellites from 1988 to about 1990. It is
tragic that it took the deaths of seven astronauts to delay the deadly and
unstable first strike capability by a couple of years. Nevertheless, any
missile capable of receiving in-flight course corrections from operational
Navstar satellites would heve a first strike target accuracy of about 300 feet
circular error probability (CEP).

NAVSTAR

The concept of putting Navstar GPS receivers in missiles has been

considered for some time (1). In early 1983 , Deputy Defense Secretary Donald
C. Latham told Congress that the armed forces plan to purchase 17,322 receiver
terminals for Navstar (2). That number will certainly accomodate strategic
weapons. �urthermore, since the Pentagon is preparing to put GPS receivers in
6-inch diameter artillery shells, with all the necessary guidance and control
to guide them more accurately to their destination, it certainly wouldn't
neglect putting similar equipment in missiles (3). That is confirmed by a
Rockwel1 advertisement which indicates that Navstar receivers will be used in
cruise missiles (4). - ---;

MISSINJ PAGES IN ISSUE NO. 13?

If your last issue of Peace Researcher" contained blank pages, please

let uS know and we'11 send you the missing bits. We will tighten up our
collation system and hope this doesn't happen again. Apologies for the
inconv'eniencee
 Mr Latham also revealed that the Defanse Department plans to spend over
half a billion dollars by 1988 to integrate Navstar user terminals into the
various platforms (5). It doesn't take that much effort to put receivers on
airplanes, trucks, ships, or even the 20-pound backpacks. Integrating
receivers into sophisticated missile guidance systems, however, is a little
more complicated.

Pentagon officials have been very noncommittal regarding putting 1PS

receivers in missiles. When pinned down during early 1395 Congressional
hearings, however, they reluctantly gave testimony. (Excerpts quoted in the
full Aldridge article available from 'Peace Researcher' on request.) The
dialogue betwecm committee members and Pentagon experts showed that Navstar
GPS receivers in missiles are not a wild concept. Even this small amount of
information had to be pried lODse 3.nd one fnust wonder how much more is not
being told. Nevertheless, the Navy admIts N'lVstar has b,een studied and
receivers have been used Of! test missiles. In the Navy'"s own vJords� :iPS
updates for missiles have been thoroughly examined. Modifications are 1.1ways
made to look difficult when the Pentagon doesn't want to make them.
just isn"t a big problem� A division of Rockwell has a $6-million contract to
develop a miniaturized cigarette-package-size ::iFS receiver as well as J.nother
miniature receiver for the Marine Corps (6).

TRIDENT-l

When initially deployed, the Trident-l missiles had an �ccuracy goal �f

1,500 feet CEP, although it was reported to be about 1,000 feet durina the
test program. Twelve Poseidon submarines have already been modified t� carry
>

I!'.';�
'
�C
of
&cMooL T�e MaSSive
PRoLiF"eR<JTioH
LW/CUeS.
OMiNOU� of c.oLLeGe
SPeCTeR of GRdDl.I"le�.
, ' .
fbcR PeoPle
GeTTiN6
L€6al aiD.

US involvement in
the Fiji coup d'etat
This article presents an analysis
of United States involvement in
Ihe coup in Fiji. The authors sup­ availaBle from 'Peace
port the demands made in Wash­ �esearcher'. 6 pages,
ington by deposed Fijian P:rime $1 .00.
Minister, Dr Bavadra, tor a Con­
gressional investigation ot Amer­
ican involvement. Published by Wellington ConfidentiaL
PO. Box 9034, Wellington. New Zealand
June 1987
4

16 Trident-l missiles each. Trident-l missiles are also being fitted into the
first eight Trident submarines which carry 24 mi';siles each. That sums up to
a total of 384 deployed Trident-l missiles capable of dispens 3,87)
warheads to different targets (each missile can carry eight lOO-kiloton
bombs) •

An accuracy improvement program has been in effect since Trident-l '�:est

flights began. According to Congressional testimony, the Navy planned );0 at
least improve the accuracy of Trident-l missiles (7) � We have already sF·;'en
that Navstar receivers were used and were studled for an operational systeTn�
Deputy Assi:';tant Defense Secretary Latham, replying to the question ·::.;f hJW
much GPS would improve the accuracy of Trident-l (C-4) missiles, ! liThe
major importance of 3PS to the C-4 and future SLBM [sub launched ballist:.tc
missiles J programs is thE: precision dL).ta available during te�::;t launche:�:;.
Navstar }PS fixes the missile positioD during boosted flight .::lnd bus '-csitioD
until reentry vehicle separation . . The available current Navstar
� .

constellation is us(:::!d for that now when i1': proper :Josi tiOD ,
• It is al:3o
. � .

important to note that wj. th the full constellation, fix information

availability will be constant • " (8).
• .

Trident-l test flights were complete at the time of this testimony so

references to using the full GPS constellation must pertain to operational
Trident-l missiles. More recent information confirms that: Trident-l test
missiles actually received Navstar signals to determine their true position
while in flight, and transmitted that informatio;l to ground stations (3). It
would certai::ly not be an unthinkable task to send that same information to
the :nisqile"s guidance ind cot:trol system for course corrections.

The 3,072 operational Trident-1 warheads would be more than erough tD

send two bombs to each SDviet missile silo. Even the Trident missiles on
submarines in port could reach trH3ir targets 80 ther� would be no ne<,'d 7;C.\ i,\r���;'l
the Soviets by flushing all the submarines to sea. Using Navstar to cichieve Cl
300-foot CEP, this force could destroy 82 percent of the Soviet silos when t,t.!c
warheadS from different m.i.r:::stles are sent to eaCr\ si1e - 3ven if those silos
are hardened to 5,000 p.s�i� overpressure. I doubt that they are th(':;t :�;,.0,: rd,
however, and the probability of destroying them could be much higher. This
itself could be perceived as :?" first strike force.

EFFECT WITH THE ADDITION 01" MX AND TRIDENT-2

By 1990 there are also scheduled to be 100 MX missiles carrying a totJ.l

of 1,000 warheads of 330 kilotons each, The 9th "nd 10th Trident submarines,
carrying a total of 334 warhe9.ds of 475 kilotons explosive power, 3:r8 :�lls:)
slated to be roaming the seas. By a;Jding a few accuracy-improved Minuteman
missiles � there would be :3nough warheads to send one to each Soviet missile
silo, If that were done, using Navstar GPS navigation updates, 76 percent of
those silos would be destroyed.

Now, if we used a 2-on-l cross targeting mix: that is, two warheads from
different missiles to attack each silo - one from MX/Trident-2/Minuteman and
the second from Trident-1 - they could demolish at least 9Cl percent of the
silos. That is a very potent first strike force.

HOW A I"IRST STRIKE MIGHT WORK IN 1990

Now let us look at the combined capability of all the weapons planned to
 5

be operational by 1990, including the Pershing-2's and cruise missiles. An

escalation from conventioal war to nuclear, as announced in the NATO/Pentagon
"Flexible Response" doctrine for Europe, would require a massive first strike.
Among the first weapons unleashed would be the 108 Pershing-2's deployed in
West Germany. There is indication that their advertised range of 1 , 000
nautical miles is more like 1,200 (10). which means their target-homing
maneuverable warheads could reach Sovet command and control centers around
Moscow in less than 15 minutes. Since all first echelon command and control
centers of the Soviet government and its armed forces are within an SO-mile
radius of Moscow (11), the Pershing-2 would fill the vital function of
decapitating the Kremlin leadership before it had a chance to launch its
missiles.

Some combination of Minuteman-3/Trident-2/Mx missiles paired with

Trident-l missiles would also be launched in a 2-on-1 cross targeting pattern
to destroy at least 'gO percent of the U.S.S.R.'s missile silos, thus
devastating the Soviets' land-based missile force which contains 80 percent of
their strategic warheads.

Ground-launched, air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles will also

be in place by 1990 if Defense Department plans are fulfLled. Shculd the
fratricide environment (blast, radiation, heat, dust, debris, ionized
atmosphere) be so severe that hi"h-speed, hi"h-flyIng ballistic mi(3siles would
not work, cruise missiles flying low and slow could more easily penetr"te to
destroy remaining Soviet silo-based missiles while those miusiles are "lso
being held down by the fratricide environment.

As for the Soviet missile-launching submarines at sea, anti-subm"rine

warfare units of the U.S. Navy would have started sinking those boats at the
onset of conventional hostilities. Those U.S.S.R. submarines in part would
also be destroyed by strategic missiles or by torpedo-powered mines dispatched
into Soviet harbors.

Including improved-accuracy Minuteman-3 missiles, it appears there would

be an excess of first strike capable weapons by 1,j90� I-c, must be remembered,
however, that s1.l08 are not the only hard I have already mentioned
the U.S�S*R�"s submarines in port, but there are also many and varied command
posts which would' require pinpoint accuracy. Other more vulnerable land
targets could be destroyed with the leftover Minuteman-3 and Trident-l
warheads, uupplemented by Poseidon and Minuteman-,2 warheads as needer.:l.

Finally, there would be more than enough U.S. strategiC warheads

remaining to deter the Soviets from retaliating with remaining mic,s iles by
threatening total destruction of what remains of their cities.

CONCLUSION

Trident missiles now use the "star tracker". Its proper name is Stellar
Inertial Guidance (SIG) system. The missile is basically flown by a
self-contained inertial system which keeps track of every maneuver and shake
to determine where it is - as Trident's predecessors did. Trident-l has the
addition of what is called single-star SIG, or one-dimensional SIG. It takes
a periodic reading on a prescribed star in the star field to correct the
inertial system and stay on course. (Once above the atmosphere, even in
daytime, all the stars are visible. ) To serve as a guide in a one-dimensional
system, the star must be pretty well in line with the target so the missle can
follow it.
6

Trident-2 will use an improved SIG system which takes fixes from two
stars, sometimes referred to as two-dimensional SIG. Simply stated, it
triangulates on two stars to get its correct position in two dimensions. That
is why Trident-2 is expected to be so much more accurate than Trident-I, and
one of the reasons it is expected to be as accurate as MX. If Navstar fixes
were used, however, the true position would be in three directions. So we
have Trident-l as a star follower, that star often referred to in a
reprehensible sense as the "star of Bethlehem". Then there is Trident-2 with
two-dimensional accuracy which makes it a first strike instrument in it own
right. both systems could be upgraded to three-dimensional guidance with
Navstar.

There may be some truth in Dr Wang's implication (in Congressional

testimony) that the Trident-2 accuracy increase using GPS would be minimal
(closing the possible 400-foot miss distance to 300) . Trident-1 is another
matter, however, because it is less accurate and carries smaller bombs. It
needs Navstar to become a silo-killer.

I often get rebuttals that the Navy has only studied Navstar accuracy
improvements and has discarded any notion of its use. May I refer to Mr
Paisley-s statement (in CongreSSional testimony) that the Navy has used
Navstar and if satellite survivability is assured it will be serious about
putting receivers on Trident. Air Force testimony assures US that there is
confidence in satellite survivability (12). Satellite vulnerability becomes a
moot point, however, when the missiles are perceived as first strike
instruments. Nevertheless, if we are to believe our government, then the
testimony indicates that Navtstar will guide at least Trident-l missiles. Our
other alternative is to suspect disinformation, in which case I suggest that
we don-t have the full story regarding Navstar and Trident. Either way. I
have presented the official testimony and the technological facts. and drawn
the pattern they form. This type of analysis is necessary because if we wait
for the government to enlighten uS we will be forever ig:10rant.

All of the forces discussed above are planned to be available by 1990.

The Un! ted states will then have achieved a breakout first strike capabiE ty.
Whereas each weapons system alone does not consitute a first strike force, the
entire array does.

Trident-l missiles could accelerate the date of a U.S. first strike

capability. If the Pentagon had to wait for enough MX and Trident-2 weapons
to accomodate a first strike force, the date would be in the late 199::18.
probably 1998. Trident-l missiles already in place, assisted by Navstar, will
advance that date by eight years.

I mentioned above that Minuteman-3 missiles have also been improved to be

more lethal. However. they could only attack the Soviet Union over the north
pole. If they were used exclusively to pair with the available MX/Trident-2
warheads in 1990, most of the attacking force would be coming from a known
direction. Scviet early warning sensors would know where to look. In
addition, all of those warheads coming from the north would take half an hour
to get there. That would allow more time for Soviet missiles to be launched
on warning�

Trident-l missiles, however, are a more versatile breed. They have the
launch platform maneuverability to approach the Soviet Union from many places
in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Furthermore, they can be close
enough to reach their targets in half the time it takes Minuteman or MX. Both
 7

of these factors enhance the element of surprise which is 80 necessary for a

successful first strike. Once again I emphasize that Trident is the ultimate
first strike weapon.

NOTES

1. See �iscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements, March 1979, p. 125,
where the application of Navstar to ballistic missiles is discussed#
2. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1934, hearings
before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 11 May 1933.
Part 8, p. 394.
'
3. Aviation Week" Space Technology , 23 September 1983, p. 157.
'
4. Air Force M�gazine , August 1986.
5. Department of Defense appropriations for 1984, op. cit.
' '
6. Defense Electronics , May 1986, p. 96.
7. Hearings on military Posture for �iscal Year 1982, before the House
Armed Services Committee, 26 March 1981, Part 2, p. 760.
S, Department of Defense appropriations for 1984, op. eit., p. 395.
" '
9. Aviation Week & Space Technology , 30 September 1985, pp. 77 & 79.
10. Congressional Record - House, 16 June 1983, pp. H-406l, H-40SS,
and H-4067.
11. United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1977, by Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown, 20 January 1976, p. 36.
12.. For instance see testimony of Lt General James A. Abrahamson�
director of the SDI: Department of Defense Appropriations for 1986,
op.cH., 7 May 1985, Part 7, pp. 6 65-672.

((No, no. When I say this new secret weapon can slip past their de/ernes
undetected, I'm not referring to the RUHiam, I'm referring to Congress."
DraWing by 51evenson; <-!\IlI6
the New York�r M."""inc, In�
8
THE SILENT SCREW: A THREAT TO FIRST STRIKE?

Two corporations, one Japanese and one Norwegian, have sold the Soviets
the technical ability to make silent screws (propellers) for their nuclear
submarines. In so doing, they have given the V.S. military a screw of a
different kind, or at least that is the view of many self-righteous V.S.
Congresspersons (1). The 'New York Times' had the editorial gall to complain,
from the profiteering capital of the world, that "Soviet submarines will now
become much harder to detect, all so that Toshiba and Kongsberg could turn
some extra profit" (2).

Rear Admiral Richard 8'� Pittenger, director of the NavY�8 antisubmarine

warfare division, commented recently on silent submarines! "The newest Soviet
submarines are 80 quiet that our current systems can�t always hear them well
enough to track them reliably. We expect ,this quieting trend to continue in
future classes. Were we to do nothing, over time our capability agai.nst the
Soviet submarine fleet would d,iminish steadilY, and eventually disappear.
This new development is a challenge to our ASW supremacy which must be met!!
(3 ) •

Elsewhere in the same article Pittenger said "Oeterrence is the primary

mission oi:' the Navyll. If deterrence is based on a reasonable balance of power
and ability of adversaries to mutuaLly obliterate each other, just how can
Pittenger s statements be reconciled? Ei'ollowing the same line of questioning,
how can Tosbiba and Kongsberg be accused of damaging Western security (2) if
they have helped the Soviets to restore some ba,lance against the overwhelming
U.S. superiori. ty in anti. -submarine warfare?

To date no-one seems to have asked such questions in the fury of

condemnation over the exports from Japan and Norway.

Western supporters of deterrence doctrine can:lot have both U.S. nuc1ear

superiority and deterrence at the same time� The two concepts are mutually
exclusive. No less an authority than :], U�S. Library of C.:)ngresG report makes
this point succinctlY: H If the United states achieves a disarming first
• • •

strike capability against Soviet reBMs. and also develops an ASW li ty

that together with attacks on Naval facilities oould practically negate the
Soviet SSBN forceJ then the strategic balance as it has come to be broadly
defined and accepted would no longer be stable" (4).

At best, the outraged response of the U .S� Congress to the Toshib3 ';;,;:0
sales to the Soviets may be rooted in ignorance of the basic
elements of strategic balance, the heart of deterrence. At worst. it ffi'?t : '/
reflect an ir�tent on the part of the UoS. Govern.ment ;.3.nd milit:3.ry to deve a
first strike capability.

(Also see the article entitled Trident 1 and First Strike by Robert Aldridge
in thL3 issue.)

Ref8r�-;;nces

(1) Jane's Defence WeeklY', July 11, 1987, p. 57; The Press', July 2
n37.

'
(2) New York Times', June 22, 1987, quoted in The Press , June 23, 1937.
 9

'
(3) San Jose Mercury News , June 14. 1937, p. lP.

(4) "Evaluation of Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control lmpact Statements: Toward
More Informed Congressi,onal Participation in National Security Pol icym,:1. k ingl1•
a report prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Libar,","! of
Congress, January 3, 19i30. p. 119: cited in 'First Strike' by Robert Aldridge,
South End Press, Boston, (1933). p. 183.

"""""'
, -- ,,..

1HI fAil SIDII !ly GARY lARSON

"How many limes did I soy I� HOlokf/

How many ft...-1 '1iIkII<e ""''' lha! bomb
sl>ell1e(sgOl a coo �' - al,,'
much good "",hou' a con 0_: I said,"
�-"5"�\! "'1

NATIONAL PARTY LINKS TO V.S, DIRTY TRICKS

by Nuclear Free Kiwis

The National Party has 80me interesting friends, Richard AIlen, for
example, is a founder and the first full-time member of Jeorgetown
University 's Centre for strategic and International Studies. This Centre is
currently the base for Or. Ray Cline's notorious ANZUS think tank. Two
pro-ANZUS New Zealanders were at Cline's think tank in 1936: Or Dalton West
and far right activist, 8ruce Larsen.

The Jeorgetown Centre is not an aC3demic research institute but rather Cl

propaganda and political activist centre. Its activities have become so
em barrassing that in 1938 3eorgetown University�s president ordered an
investigation (Houston Chronicle, June l, 1936).

Richard AlIen s connections to the Jeorgetown Centre are just part of 3,

�

network that ties the National Party to U.S. intelligence. Allen himself ',!as
to have been the star guest speaker at National 's 50th annual conference last
year. He declined to attend at the last moment. One sees from his background
(l) how em barrassing it would have been for this friend and advisor of Re3ge,n
to have come to New Ze31and.
10

With the so-called Maori loan scandal reeking of CIA involvem0nt, it is

important to monitor and publicize the National Party�s American connections.
Loans scandals, evidently manufactured by the CIA, helped overthrow the
Whitlam goverrment in Australia (see 'Nuclear Free' , December 1930), Anc!
Cline is an record as explaining how the CIA leaked Information to desta b ilise
Whitlam ("The Ties That Bind", by J, Richelson and D, Ball, p. 237). Nationa l.
Party spokesmen have been quick to draw parallels here between the so-calied
Maori Loan affair and the embarrassing scandals that plagued Whitlam. But the
numerous parallels are far more revealing of U.S. intervention in the
democratic process in the South Pacific ("Foreign Control Watchdog�, No� 3i3,
June 1937, p. 2; 'The Press ', ,'eb, 2, 1937),

Orwel1ian democracy for the National Party

TV reports have shown that Richard Allen has been intimately associated
vJith the National Party in centain actIvities in the South Pacific. Allan wa s
involved In 1982, when still Reagan's first National Security Advisor. in
setting up the Pacific Democratic Union to which the National Party is close}y
linked. It has been disclosed (e ,g., TV EyeWitness News, 8"eb, 16, 1987) that
AlIen worked with various National Party people, among others, in getting this
outfit under way. The Pacific Democratic Union incorporates the Nationccl
Party along with other conservative parties.

The same TV items revealed that the Pacific Democratic Union was partly
funded by Project Democracy or the National Endowment fon Democracy which has
been shown to be operating a world-wide American covert action program:r!8 (�NZ
Monthly Heview' , No. 2,19, June/July 1987, p, 11). The covert action prograi.me
operated by Project Democracy comprises a secret network of envoys1
communications systems, ships and planes, as well as bank accounts and
corporations. It has been helping fund the contra terro:1:'ists aga.inst
Nicaragua (' Dominion - , "'eb. 16, 1987).

TV' 8 '8'oreign Conrespondent' (Mar. 3, 1937) described in detail the COV01"t

side of Project Democracy � The interviewer asked St,,}nsfield Turner! former
Director of the CIA, if he thought that Col NortJl was 3. cowboy out of control,
carrying out a one-man fore policy� Admiral. Turner replied, III thj.nk he
was c3.rrying out precisely the foreign policy the President of the U.S.
wantedlt•

OlUe North' 8 document shredder was busy just prior to his downfall. We
might wonder just how many documents relevant to the activities of Project
Democracy in the South Pacific were shnedded in that period of panic.

The ultimate funding agency for Project Democracy itself (excluding :,"ncls
generated from the sale of arms to Iran and similar activities) is the United
States Information Service which has been funding a campaign against New
Zea,land s nuclear free zone, following an instruction to do so from the
�

National Security Council.

Project Democracy channelled $NZl44,OOO to the Pacific Democratic Unior

in 1336. Although Allen failed to attend the 50th National Party Conf,,'rence
at the last minute, there was still a very strong Pacific Democratic Unio:­
contingent there. A further disclosune on TV (6 :30 News, 8'eb. 19, 1937)
reported that Project Democracy had funded OVerseas trips for some National
Party people.

All this information raises serious questions about just what sort of
democracy the National Party stands for (2) . Does it want the sort of
 1 1

democracy promoted b y its friend, Richard AlIen? Alle;} 8 ver�;ion ef de:Tl()Cl"�;1

includes countries like South Africa and Juatemala (in the grip of death
squads). Project Democracy"s links to the NationG),l party would s e:_rn l�O IVi'/c
ominous implications for democracy in New Zealand.

References

Cl) Backgrounder on Richard Allen. advisor to Reagcln ;."d friend 0" the
National Party'. paper No. 9-35 in the catalogue of the NZ Nuclear fi'r.c lone
Committee, P.O. Box 18541, Christchurch. Price $0.40.

(2) There was a very interesting i�cident at the time of the so-called Maori
Loan Affair. The U�S. AmbaBsador was overheard saying to Mr Bolger, l e a d e r of,

the Nationa.l Party, "We gave it to you on a platter and yoU blew i t!l. My
Bolger"'s reply to a reporter in response to a question on the meaning of the
Ambassador s remark was bizarre to say the least: "r don t normal.ly ex"pL:�i:'
� �

private conversations � But I repeat - and I understand the Ambassa.dor lY':3

repested - that my recollection of the conversation was 100 correct l:ha,- he
war:; SUDDorting the fort.hright rejection of a CIA connection the
Prime Minister, ]eoffrey Palmer" (3:30 News, TV1, 8'eb. 10, 1937).

Off

Newsletter of Citizens for the Demilitarisation of Harewood,

P.O. Box 2258, Christchurch, New Zealand
12

A TALE Of COH, CANTA AND THE USIS

CANTA" , the University of Canterbury student newspaper, published 3n

article on Operation Deep Preeze 3nd the objectives of COH in a June, l337,
issue. Based on an interview with a CDH representative, and enfitled �Cold
ComfoT't�
� the article was an excellent summary of the present situation at
Harewood. In a subsequent issue � a hand-scrawled note on United State::.:;
I nformation Service letterhead was published in the letters column. As
reported in "The Press" on 7 July, Mr Patrick Linehan of the USIS was not
amused.

For your amusement, we here reprint the hoax letter and an 3rticle in
"CANTA' describing the whole affair. It is worth noting that Mr Linehan WClS
offerred a chance to comment on the original article about CDH and F'rs2z·
but declined. CDH feel it is interesting that he would declIne comment m­
such a substantial issue, but then jump in with both feet t:o complain bit�erl'!
about a prank.

I t is also interesting that Mr Linehan was recently transferred to 3 post

in Japan after about 20 months in Christchurch. He kept El rather low proFile
during his tenure except for his parting shot at "CANTA".
CANTA Threatened by V.S.
CANrA slaff were aslon'sh.d last week to find
them$elves the targets of a vitriolic attack
th'otljJh Ihe news media by U.S.I.S. (United
Stales IlIfermation Senrit:e' Public Affairs Of·
licer, M. Patrick lineIIan.
Mr lineban deseribed CANrA's publication of a
hoax letter on U,5.1.S. notepaper as "besmir·
ching the Uniled States Government itself"
Moreover, he claimed that CANTA's action "is a
blnw to the I.ee exchange of information" bet·
ween the U.8. and New Zealand.
The conlfoversy had its origins when CANTA
published a critical article about the U.S. base at
Harewood. The following week the letter whiCh
caused the U.S.lS. reaction appeared in the
CANTA oflice, and was printed In tpe 1 si July
Issue,
The letter read "Oenny, we read the article on
Harevvood and we know where your mother
lives"
Th. first hint of the U.S. reaction came when
Mr lmehan rang the journalism school m the
mIstaken belief Ihat they wrote and published
CANTA. Mr linehan told journalism student
Rachel Forde that CAPITA was "dishonest, im·
moral and cheap" and had indulged in "the worst
type of yeHow iDumalism".
linehan's comments and a brief statement by
CANTA Assistant Editor Andrew Gutler were
broadcast on Radio U on Friday before U.C.S.A.
President Peter fenton banned any further corn·
ment by Association members.
lIIews of the U.8. reaction was broadcast on
Radio New Ze.land on Sunday afternoon and
was followed up by the Christ church Press on
Tuesday July 71h. In a statement reported in the
Press, Mr linehan said that he had written to
the university vice-chancellor to complain about
the "illegal forgery" Mr lmehan subsequently
left New Zealand.
CANTA editor Charlotte Denny expressed
astonishment at the U.8.1.S. response to the let
ter. In an interview with the Christchurch Press
she said that "I won't comment._. except to say
that he can'l see a joke and has oveneacted."
To the charges that CANTA was "yellow" and
"cheap" she replied that it was actually Red and
free.
At no stage during the incident did CANTA
receive any direct correspondence from Patrick
linehan. His vendetta against CANTA through
the news media was an example of cheap
diplomacy which did the U.S.I.S. no credit what·
soever.
To suggest, as Mr linehan did, that CANTA
had harmed the relationship between the U.S.
and New Zealand was an over-reaction of the
grossest kind. To make such an mllamatory
statement to the news media only weeks before
a general election can only call into question the
U.S.1.8.'s motives for persuing their vendetta.
In any ellent, the general reaction to the
U.S.l.S.'s statements seems to have been that
they have simply damaged the" credibility on
front of several hundred thousand Cantabrians
and have shown themselves to be more gung-ha
than Col. OIiver North. So watch out Should you
ever laugh at the U.S.I.S.'s expense you may hnd
them lumping on where Ollie fears to tread.
CAM TA"
Andrew Cutler
";<Uy /s>F�

THE MILITARY MENTALITY 8, A FORMER ALLY

USAF obscenities'

A booklet containing violent and obscene scngs was on sale to the public
during an open day at USAF Upper Heyford (England).

The booklet, compiled by five members - including four captains - of the

USAF 77th Tactical Fighter Squadron, consists of 52 pages of monotonous
misogyny and belligerence.

Apart from decribing in relentless detail what the FiLL pilots would liKe
to do to women (in terms that would make even the Yorkshire Ripper blanch).
the songs give a rare inSight into the relish with which they look forward to
nuclear war.

Heyford's Own Victor Alert Song', which is sung to the tune of MY

fi'avourite Things', describes the pilots desire to 'Burn all those Ruskies
[sicJ and cover 'sm with dirt'. It ends with the rousing lines: 'When the
shit fills up your flight suit/ And you're feeling bad, just simply remember
that/ Big mushroom cloud, and then you won't feel SO BAD • • . •

Another, entitled, . Jingle BellS', finishes with · he line What fun it is �

to burn and blow up things everywhere', And another, Phantom fi'lyers [sic J In
The SkY' talks of an attack on Iran: 'No more they'll pillage, kill and
C
rape,/ ' ause we fried 'em, with our nape [napalm]'

[* reported by Joan Smith in ·Sanity·. No. 7, July 1 987.J

14

THE laSS U.S. f'LDHT DATA �OR CHRISTCHUIlCH AIRPOIlT

The chart on the following page is a summary of the 12 months of U.3.

military I Antarctic flight data for Christchurch Airport. COH purch,\Gad thI"
data for the period B'ebruary 1, 1935 through January 31, 1936 , }t a co,;t of
$330 from the Ministry of Transport. We publish it here because althou"h it has
,
been used extensively in support of articles, media reports including
television news, and parliamentary testimony, it has not been published in
this concise form as yet in "Peace Researcher Or anywhere D18�3.
#

The bar-graph should be self-explanatory, but the following breakdcwn ef

some of the data should be useful with respect to the infamous St'rlIflc;rs"

Total shuttle flights 209 77.7%

TotJ.l ICE flights 60 22.3%

Total St;:,rlifter flights 269 100.0%

Total flights all U. S, aircraft for the twelve month period 419

34.2% wera Starlifter flights

J.5% were Radar 19 flights (military)

35.3% were Hercules and support tanker flights

50.0% were Shuttle flights

Note the dominance of Starlifter flights over the 12 months. And of that
number over three quarters were on military/intelligence support businet3s.
t

THESE ARE THE U . S. MILITARY AIRCRA�T THAT MAY BE VIOLATINJ OUR NUCLEAIl WEAPON
"" ""

Ei'REE LAW. They carry the neither confirm nor de'lY nuclear weapons policy.

[A note on te'ICms: "" shuttle"", "" channel' and 'milk run are used by U. S"
authorities and others somewhat interchangeably to refer to the StarlIfters on
miH tary I intelligence support flights (not flights to Antarctica) J •

PEACE RESEARCHER
P.O. Box 2
Lincoln College
Canterbury

published by
Educate for Nuclear Disarmament (E.N. D.)
Christchurch, New Zealand
 United States Military and National Science Foundation Aircraft Movements at Christchurch Airport

Febru�ry 1 1985 through 31 January 1986

90r

Movement a flight into or out of the airport TANKER

ICE

TOTAL FLIGHTS SERVING THE ANTARCTIC (ICE) 208

801-
TOTAL MILITARY SHUTTLE FLIGHTS (C-141) 211
and other military (?)

701- 12-MONTH TOTAL 419 -

HERCULE
ICE

COMPILED AND PREPARED By

-
601-
Citizens for the Demilitarisation of Harewood
P.O. Box 2258
Christchurch, New Zealand RAOAR 18

11 _1
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501-
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....
FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN V1
1985 1986
 CELINK SURVIVE

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