BPI v.

CA
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When a strict and literal application of
the rules on non-forum shopping and
verification will result in a patent denial of
substantial justice, they may be liberally
construed. This guideline is especially
true when the petitioner has satisfactorily
explained the lapse and fulfilled the
requirements
in
its
motion
for
reconsideration.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, challenging the January 26, 2001
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA)
in CA-GR SP No. 59858. The Resolution
reads as follows:
Up for consideration is petitioners
motion for reconsideration of this Courts
resolution of dismissal which was
promulgated on August 25, 2000. Taking
note of the comment by the Office of the
Solicitor
General
for
the
public
respondent on said motion, the same is
hereby
denied. The
resolution
of
[4]
dismissal stands.
Earlier, in its August 25, 2000
Resolution,[5] the
CA[6] resolved
to
DISMISS the above-entitled petition on
the ground that the verification was
signed
only
by
petitioners
vicepresident, sans any board resolution or
power of attorney authorizing anybody to
sign the same and the certificate on nonforum shopping.[7]
The Facts
On January 30, 1990, 49 workers filed
a Complaint[8] against Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) and Diars
Assistance, Inc. (Diar). Docketed as NLRC
Case No. 00-01-00580-90, the Complaint

was for the Regularization of Work Status

and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for
Restraining
Order. Complainants
claimed that they were working in the
respondent
BPI
performing
clerical,
messengerial and general utility work as
they [had] been assigned in the bank by
their agency x x x Diars Assistance,
Inc.[9]
In a Manifestation and Motion[10] filed
on February 23, 1990 during the
pendency of the case, the 49 workers
prayed for the inclusion of 121 more as
complainants after the latter had signified
their
intention
to
join
the
union. Thereafter, the Complaint was
amended
and
the
name
of
the
complainant changed to that of the
organization, Diars Employees Labor
Union (BPI Unibank Chapter).[11] The union
prayed that the employment status of
their members be regularized and that
BPI be ordered to absorb them as regular
employees.
In an Order[12] dated July 18, 1991,
Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu Jr.
dismissed the Complaint. The dismissal
was affirmed by the NLRC[13] and by this
Court.[14]
On
January
31,
1994,
Diars
Employees
Labor
Union,
through
Normando Beguelme (its president) and
Jose Laron (a member), filed a new
Complaint[15] for the declaration of its
members as regular employees of
BPI. The Complaint was docketed as
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-01-0082994. After Labor Arbiter Potenciano S.
Canizares Jr. dismissed the case for lack
of merit,[16] the union appealed to the
NLRC. BPI and Diar opposed the appeal
and interposed forum shopping as one of
their defenses.
The NLRC (First Division) set aside the
labor arbiters Decision and declared
complainants as regular employees of

BPI.[17] On the issue of forum shopping,

the NLRC ruled thus:
A check with the record of this case did
not show that the complainants in the
first case are the same complainants in
this third case. Although the causes of
action in the first case and this third case
are the same for the regularization of
the members of complainant union
there is no identity of the parties
involved. The
second
case
is
for
injunction and the same is, therefore, not
similar to this case.[18]
Diar
and
BPI
moved
for
a
reconsideration. In its March 28, 2000
Order,[19] the
NLRC
denied
both
Motions: BPIs, for being filed beyond the
reglementary period; and Diars, for lack
of merit.
Thereafter,
BPI
filed
with
the
appellate
court
a
Petition
for
Certiorari[20] under Rule 65, assailing the
NLRC Decision. As earlier stated, the CA
dismissed the recourse on the ground
that the verification has been signed only
by petitioners vice president, without
express authority from any board
resolution or power of attorney.
Presently before the CA is a similar
Petition (CA-GR SP No. 59093) filed by
Diar, BPIs co-respondent.[21]
Hence this appeal.[22]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues
for the resolution of this Court:
1.
Whether or not BPI has a clearly
meritorious case so as to warrant the
review and the declaration as null and
void by this Honorable Court of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing BPIs petition for certiorari on a
mere technicality and notwithstanding
substantial compliance thereon by BPI in
its motion for reconsideration.

2.
Whether or not this Honorable
Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 129067
which disposed of NLRC NCR Case No. 0001-00580-90 (FIRST REGULARIZATION
CASE) constitutes a bar by former
judgment to NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-0100829-94 (SECOND REGULARIZATION
CASE) and whether or not the filing of the
SECOND REGULARIZATION CASE violates
the prohibition on forum-shopping.[23]
In simpler terms, the issues are as
follows (1) whether BPIs Petition before
the CA should have been given due
course; and (2) whether the second
regularization case is barred by res
judicata.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue:
Dismissal
of
Technicality

the

Appeal

on

Petitioner
pleads
for
a
liberal
construction of the rules on verification
and forum shopping. On the other hand,
respondents insist on a strict application
of these rules.
The rules on verification and forum
shopping are laid out in Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 4. Verification. -- Except when
otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that
the allegations therein are true and
correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which
contains
a
verification
based
on
information
and
belief
or
upon

knowledge, information, and belief, or

lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading. (As
amended, A.M. No. 00-2-10, May 1,
2000.)

certificate of non-forum shopping had

been signed by the vice president of the
bank without any board resolution or
power of attorney empowering him to do
so.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum

shopping. -- The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification
annexed
thereto
and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.

On the other hand, petitioner

contends that it did authorize the vice
president to act as its representative, as
shown
in
its
Motion
for
Reconsideration. However,
respondent
union argues that his action was ratified
by the Executive Committee of BPI only
on September 6, 2000. Thus, the
belated authority was given 11 days
after the 60-day reglementary period for
filing a Petition for Certiorari.

Failure to comply with the foregoing

requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided,
upon
motion
and
after
hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any
of
the
undertakings
therein
shall
constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly
constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well
as a cause for administrative sanctions.
It cannot be denied that the BPI
Petition before the CA was dismissed,
because
the
verification
and
the

After
carefully
considering
the
arguments of both parties, we hold that a
liberal construction of the rules on
verification and forum shopping are in
order.
Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations
in the pleading are true and correct and
not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the
pleading
is
filed
in
good
[24]
faith.
Meanwhile, the purpose of the
aforesaid certification is to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum shopping.
[25]
We see no circumvention of these
objectives by the vice presidents signing
the verification and certification without
express authorization from any existing
board resolution.
As explained in BPIs Motion for
Reconsideration,
he
was
actually
authorized to sign the verification and the
certification,[26] as shown by the written
confirmation
attached
to
the
Motion. Furthermore, he is presumed to
know the requirements for validly signing
those documents.
Rules of procedure are used to help
secure and not override substantial
justice. Even
the
Rules
of
Court
mandates a liberal construction in order

to promote their objective of securing

a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding. Since
rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, their strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be
avoided. Thus, the dismissal of an appeal
on purely, technical ground is frowned
upon especially if it will result to
unfairness.[27]
We shall not rule on the merits but, in
the interest of fair play and the orderly
administration of justice, we find that the
reinstatement of the Petition and its
consolidation with Diars CA appeal is
warranted. BPI is an indispensable party
to the controversy, considering that its
inclusion is necessary for the effective
and complete resolution of the case.
The fact that respondent union
commenced the case against BPI and Diar
in a single Complaint is an indication of
the indispensability of both parties to the
action. The Rules state that [p]arties in
interest
without
whom
no
final
determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.[28]
In BA Finance Corporation v. CA, [29] the
Court explained:
x x x. An indispensable party is one
whose interest will be affected by the
court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of
the case can be had. The party's interest
in the subject matter of the suit and in
the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties' that his
legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. In
his absence there cannot be a resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the
court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.

Conversely, a party is not indispensable

to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct
and divisible from the interest of the
other parties and will not necessarily be
prejudiced by a judgment which does
complete justice to the parties in
court. He is not indispensable if his
presence would merely permit complete
relief between him and those already
parties to the action or will simply avoid
multiple litigation.
Without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment
of a court cannot attain real finality. [30]
In all stages of an action -- including
those
involved
in
motions
for
reconsideration, petitions for certiorari
and appeals -- the rule on joinder of
indispensable parties must be extended,
as long as such extension is practicable
and the reason for it, as explained above,
subsists.
The ultimate issue brought up for
review in the instant case is: who is the
employer of the members of respondent
labor
union
-BPI,
Diar
or
both? Moreover, a review of the facts of
the case reveals that (1) there is a service
contract between BPI and Diar; (2) Diar
pays the salaries of the members of
respondent union; and (3) the members
of respondent union perform their tasks in
the premises of BPI.
These facts reveal close factual and
legal relationships among respondent
union, BPI and Diar -- relationships that
are so inextricably intertwined that the
issues raised in the Complaint cannot be
finally determined without considering
the rights of all three parties. Thus, it is
essential that when the case is brought
up for review to determine the real
employer of the members of respondent
labor union, all these parties must be
heard.
Second Issue:

Res Judicata
Unquestionably, any ruling on the
issue of res judicata would affect the final
determination on the merits of the
Complaint. This determination will, in
turn, affect Diar, which is not impleaded
as a party in the present appeal.
Hence, it would not be proper for this
Court to resolve the issue of res
judicata without Diar as a party before it,
in view of the pendency of CA-GR SP No.
59093[31] -- a similar petition for the
review of the same NLRC Decision, the
subject of the case at bar.
A consolidation is thus warranted,
based on the foregoing circumstances:
BPI and Diar are indispensable parties,
who have filed separate but similar
petitions to review the same NLRC
Decision.
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is
hereby GRANTED,
and
the
assailed
Resolutions REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDEDto the
Court of Appeals, which is DIRECTED to
consolidate BPIs case (CA-GR SP No.
59858) with Diars (CA-GR SP No.
59093). No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Heirs of Lunoy
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking (a) the reversal of the
Resolution[1]dated 13 July 2005 of the
Twenty-Second (22nd) Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365, which

dismissed the Special Civil Action for

Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of
Emancipation Patents, Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order; and (b) the reversal of
the Resolution[2] of the Twenty-First (21st)
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00365 dated 22 September 2006,
which
denied
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned
Resolution.
The
factual
and
procedural
antecedents of the case are set forth
hereunder.
Action for Reversion of Title
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman
(Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria)
were the owners of a parcel of agricultural
land situated in Tambo, Iligan City,
consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject
property), upon which they likewise
erected their residence. Living with them
on the subject property were Virgilio
Nanaman (Virgilio), Gregorios son by
another woman, and fifteen tenants.
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria
administered the subject property with
Virgilio. On 16 February 1954, Hilaria and
Virgilio executed a Deed of Sale [3] over
the subject property in favor of Jose C.
Deleste (Deleste).
Upon Hilarias death on 15 May
1954, Juan Nanaman (Juan), Gregorios
brother, was appointed as special
administrator of the estate of the
deceased spouses Gregorio and Hilaria
(joint estate). On 16 June 1956, Edilberto
Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular
administrator of the joint estate.
The subject property was included
in the list of assets of the joint
estate. However, Noel could not take

possession of the subject property since it

was
already
in
Delestes
possession. Thus, on 30 April 1963, Noel
filed before the Court of First Instance
(CFI), Branch II, Lanao del Norte, an
action against Deleste for the reversion of
title over the subject property to the
Estate, docketed as Civil Case No. 698.
Through the years, Civil Case No.
698 was heard, decided, and appealed all
the way to this Court in Noel v. Court of
Appeals. On 11 January 1995, the Court
rendered its Decision[4] in Noel, affirming
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
subject property was the conjugal
property of the late spouses Gregorio and
Hilaria, such that the latter could only sell
her one-half (1/2) share therein to
Deleste. Consequently,
the
intestate
estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held
to be the co-owners of the subject
property, each with a one-half (1/2)
interest in the same.
Operation Land Transfer Program
While Civil Case No. 698 was still
pending before the CFI, Presidential
Decree No. 27[5] was issued on 21 October
1972, which mandated that tenanted rice
and corn lands be brought under the
Operation Land Transfer Program and be
awarded to farmer beneficiaries. In
accordance
therewith,
the
subject
property was placed under the Operation
Land Transfer Program.
On
12
February
1984,
the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs)
in
the
names
of
herein
private
respondents, the tenants and actual
cultivators of the subject property. The
CLTs were registered on 15 July 1986.

Subsequently, on 1 August 2001,

Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) and
Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued in
favor of the private respondents over
their respective portions of the subject
property. Private respondents OCTs, EP
numbers, and dates of registration with
the Register of Deeds of Iligan City
Expropriation Case

Deleste passed away sometime in

Petition for
Emancipation
Deleste)

Nullification of the
Patents
(Heirs
of

On 28 January 2002, the Heirs of

Deleste,[8] filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify
private respondents EPs. The petition
was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN2002.

1992.

About a year earlier, in 1991, the

subject property was surveyed. The
survey of a portion of the land consisting
of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot
No. 1407, was approved on 8 January
1999.

On 22 November 1999, the City

of Iligan filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
4, Iligan City, for the expropriation of a
5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4979. On 11
December 2000, RTC Branch 4 issued a
Decision[7] granting
the
expropriation. Since the true owner of
the expropriated portion could not be
determined, as the subject property had
not yet been partitioned and distributed
to any of the Heirs of Gregorio and
Deleste, the just compensation for the
expropriated portion of the subject
property in the amount of P27,343,000.00
was deposited with the Development
Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, in
trust for RTC Branch 4.

The Provincial Agrarian Reform

Adjudicator
(PARAD)
rendered
a
[9]
Decision on 21 July 2003 declaring that
the EPs were null and void in view of the
pending issues of ownership and the
subsequent reclassification of the subject
property into a residential/commercial
land.

On appeal, docketed as DARAB

Case No. 12486, the DARAB reversed the
ruling
of
the
PARAD
in
its
Decision[10] dated 15 March 2004. The
DARAB held, inter alia, that the EPs were
valid, since it was the Heirs of Deleste
who should have informed the DAR of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the
time the subject property was placed
under the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer Program. It further found that
the question of exemption from the
Operation Land Transfer Program lay
within the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary
or
his
authorized
representative. The Heirs of Deleste filed
a Motion for Reconsideration [11] of the
aforementioned Decision, but the Motion
was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution
dated 8 July 2004.

The Heirs of Deleste thereafter filed

a Petition for Review[12] with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85471, challenging the Decision and
Resolution
in
DARAB
Case
No.
12486. The Petition was denied by the
Court of Appeals in aResolution[13] dated
28 October 2004 as material portions of
the record and other supporting papers
were not attached thereto, in accordance
with Section 6 of Rule 43. [14] The Motion
for Reconsideration[15] of the Heirs of
Deleste was likewise denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution[16] dated
13 September 2005 for being pro forma.
[17]

Secretary, the Land Registration Authority

(LRA), the DARAB, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), as well as the RTC,
Branch 4 of Iligan City, from enforcing the
EPs and OCTs in the names of private
respondents
until
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
00365 was resolved. Petitioners further
prayed that judgment be subsequently
rendered declaring the said EPs and the
OCTs null and void.

In a Resolution[19] dated 13 July

2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 on the
following grounds:

Petition for Prohibition

During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP

No. 85471 before the Court of Appeals, a
Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of
Nullity of Emancipation Patents Issued by
DAR and the Corresponding [Original
Certificates of Title] Issued by the [Land
Registration Authority], Injunction with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)[18] was filed on 7 June 2005 by
herein petitioners Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy, et al. with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00365.

Petitioners are more than one

hundred twenty (120) individuals who
claim to be the descendants of Fulgencio
Nanaman, Gregorios brother, and who
collectively assert their right to a share in
Gregorios estate. Arguing that they were
deprived of their inheritance by virtue of
the improper issuance of the EPs to
private respondents without notice to
them, petitioners prayed that a TRO be
forthwith issued, prohibiting the DAR

perusal,
however, of the instant
petition
disclose
the
following
defects
and/or
infirmities which constrain us
to dismiss the petition:

(a.) Annexes V,
W, HH, LL, NN, QQ,
UU and VV are not
duplicate
originals
or
certified true copies in
violation to Section 3, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court,
hence, sufficient ground for
the dismissal of the petition.

(b.) There is no
explanation why personal
service was not resorted to
by petitioner in serving
copies of the petition to
adverse parties contrary to
the provision of Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Sec. 11. Priorities in

modes of service and filing.

Whenever practicable, the

service
and
filing
of
pleadings and other papers
shall
be
done
personally. Except
with
respect to papers emanating
from the court, a resort to
other modes must be
accompanied by a written
explanation
why
the
service or filing was not
done
personally. A
violation of this Rule may be
cause to consider the paper
as not filed.

(c.)
Petitioners
in
the
instant case are not parties to the
Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) case
whos (sic) Decision they now seek
to be nullified in this present
petition for prohibition.

(d.) Although a Special

Power of Attorney (SPA) was
obtained in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy
who signed in the verification and
certification
of
non-forum
shopping, it can be gleaned,
however, that other heirs whose
names appeared in the SPA have
not signed therein. It is also
apparent that there was only one
person who signed for the first four
(4) heirs of Donny Ruedas and only
one person who signed in some of
the heirs of Jose Febe Nanaman in
the Special Power of Attorney
executed in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy.

Resolution[21] dated 22
2006, which reads:

September

After
a
careful
evaluation of petitioners
arguments vis--vis public
respondents comment, We
resolve to deny the instant
motion.

While litigation is not

a game of technicalities, and
the rules should not be
enforced strictly at the cost
of substantial justice, still it
does not follow that the
Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of
the orderly presentation,
assessment
and
just
resolution
of
the
issues. Procedural
rules
should not be belittled or
dismissed simply because
they may have resulted in
prejudice
to
a
partys
substantial rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be
followed except only for
compelling reasons.

WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED and Our July
13,
2005
Resolution
is
MAINTAINED.

WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioners
filed
a Motion
for
[20]
Reconsideration
of the aforequoted Resolution, but the said
Motion was denied by the appellate
court
in
another

Aggrieved, petitioners now come to

this Court via the

present Petition

Review, raising the following issues:

for

THE
COVERAGE
AGRARIAN REFORM.
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE

COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE
OR
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HASTILY
DISMISSING
THE
PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION, ETC. IN CAG.R. SP NO. 00365 ON
PURELY
TECHNICAL
GROUNDS SOME OF WHICH
ARE PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
OR UNTRUE.

OF

IV.

WHETHER
OR
NOT
RESPONDENTS SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA,
AND
DARAB
VIOLATED
PETITIONERS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS BY DEPRIVING
THEM
OF
THEIR
INHERITANCE
SHARES
IN LOT 1407
WITHOUT
IMPLEADING
THEM
AS
INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES
AND WITHOUT SERVICE OF
SUMMONS UPON THEM.

V.
II.

IN THE EVENT THAT THE

OUTRIGHT
AND
HASTY
DISMISSAL OF CA-G.R. SP
NO. 00365 WILL BE SET
ASIDE, WHETHER OR NOT
THE OTHER ISSUES SHOULD
BE
RESOLVED
BY
THIS
HONORABLE
COURT
INSTEAD OF REMANDING
THE CASE TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS.

III.

WHETHER
OR
NOT
RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN
PLACING
THE
RESIDENTIAL-COMMERCIAL L
OT OF PETITIONERS UNDER

WHETHER
OR
NOT
RESPONDENTS SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA,
AND
DARAB
VIOLATED
SECTION 6, RA 6657
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW, BY PLACING
THE
INDIVIDUAL
INHERITANCE SHARES OF
PETITIONERS IN LOT 1407
WHEN THE SAME IS WAY
BELOW THE LANDOWNERS
RETENTION LIMIT OF FIVE (5)
HECTARES [OR SEVEN (7)
HECTARES UNDER PD 27].

VI.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC

RESPONDENTS COMMITTED
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK
OR
EXCESS
OF

JURISDICTION IN MAKING
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS
AGRARIAN
REFORM
BENEFICIARIES DESPITE THE
UNDISPUTABLE ABSENCE OF
CONSENT,
AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTION, SHARING OF
HARVESTS,
AND
OTHER
ELEMENTS OF A LEGITIMATE
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP.

GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK
OR
EXCESS
OF
JURISDICTION
IN
EXPROPRIATING
THROUGH AGRARIAN REFOR
M LAND ALREADY JUDICIALLY
EXPROPRIATED
FOR
THE
INTEGRATED BUS TERMINAL
AND BAGSAKAN MARKET.[22]

VII.
The
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS
ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN REVIEWING
[AND] OVERRULING JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
CONSIDERING
THAT
THE
POWER
OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS
OF THE EXECUTIVE OR
LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH
BELONGS TO THE JUDICIARY
AND NOT VICE VERSA.

primary

issue

for

resolution of this Court is whether or

not the Court of Appeals was correct
in dismissing outright petitioners
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365,
without

considering

the

merits

thereof.

In

its

assailed

Resolution

dated 13 July 2005, the appellate

[VIII.]

court

dismissed

00365
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS
ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
REVIEWING
AND
OVERRULING THE EARLIER
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF
JUST COMPENSATION BY RTC
BRANCH
4, ILIGAN CITY,
RE LOT 1407
PORTION
AFFECTED
BY
THE
INTEGRATED BUS TERMINAL
[AND] BAGSAKAN MARKET.

grounds,

on

CA-G.R.

several
among

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC

RESPONDENTS COMMITTED

No.

procedural
which

was

petitioners failure to attach to their

Petition the duplicate originals or
certified true copies of some of their
annexes, in violation of Section 3,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

The

Court

of

Appeals

mistaken in this regard.

[IX.]

SP

was

It

should

be

recalled

that

petitioners initiated before the Court of

Appeals, in its original jurisdiction, CAG.R.

SP

No.

00365,

Petition

for

Prohibition.

or office involved or by his

duly
authorized
representative. The other
requisite number of copies
of the petition shall be
accompanied
by
clearly
legible plain copies of all
documents attached to the
original.

Section 3 of Rule 46 of the

Rules

of

Court

states

the

requirements for a petition originally

filed before the Court of Appeals,
relevant

portions

of

which

are

Reference is also made to Section 2

of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
particularly
governing
petitions
for
prohibition, which pertinently provides:

reproduced below:
Sec.
3. Contents
and filing of petition;
effect of non-compliance
with requirements.
xxxx
It shall be filed in
seven (7) clearly legible
copies together with proof
of service thereof on the
respondent with the original
copy intended for the court
indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall be
accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original
or certified true copy of
the
judgment,
order,
resolution, or ruling subject
thereof,
such
material
portions of the record as are
referred to therein, and
other documents relevant or
pertinent
thereto.
The
certification
shall
be
accomplished by the proper
clerk of court or by his duly
authorized representative,
or by the proper officer of
the court, tribunal, agency

Sec. 2. Petition for

Prohibition.
xxxx
The petition shall
likewise be accompanied
by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or
resolution
subject
thereof, copies
of
all
pleadings and documents
relevant
and
pertinent
thereto,
and
a sworn
certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46.

Section 3 of Rule 46 does not

require that all supporting papers and
documents accompanying a petition be
duplicate originals or certified true
copies. What it explicitly directs is that all
petitions originally filed before the Court
of Appeals shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution
or
ruling
subject

thereof. Similarly,
under
Rule
65,
governing the remedies of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, petitions for
the same need to be accompanied only
by duplicate originals or certified true
copies of the questioned judgment, order
or
resolution.[23] Other
relevant
documents and pleadings attached to
such petitions may be mere machine
copies thereof.[24] As to petitioners
Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No.
00365, the attached annexes that were
not duplicate originals or certified true
copies,
namely,
[25]
[26]
[27]
Annexes V,
W,
HH,
LL,[28]
NN,[29] QQ,[30] UU[31] and VV,[32] were
mere
supporting
documents
and
pleadings referred to in the petition and
were not themselves the judgments,
orders or resolutions being challenged in
said Petition. At any rate, petitioners
were able to attach certified true copies
of these annexes to their Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of their
Petition.

Another ground for which CA-G.R.

SP No. 00365 was dismissed by the Court
of Appeals was the alleged failure by
petitioners to provide an explanation as
to why the Petition therein was served
upon adverse parties by registered mail
instead of personal service, as required
by Section 11, Rule 13[33] of the Rules of
Court. To
the
contrary,
petitioners
provided such an explanation,[34] except
that it was incorporated into the main
body of the Petition, right before the
statement of the Relief prayed for. It was
clearly stated therein that:

EXPLANATION
SERVICE BY MAIL

FOR

Copies of this petition

were
served
upon
respondents SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA,
DARAB, LBP, and counsels of
other respondents to save
time and costs considering
the number of parties to be
served and the far distance
of [the] LBP Office in
Cagayan de Oro City, the
DAR/DARAB
offices
in
Diliman, Quezon City, and
the LRA office in East Ave.
corner NIA Road, Diliman,
Quezon City.

The Court, however, agrees with

the Court of Appeals that the failure of all
the petitioners to sign the Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Rodolfo
Lonoy, authorizing him to sign the
verification and certification against
forum shopping on their behalf, was fatal
to their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365.

Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of

Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against
forum shopping. The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief,
or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the

same or similar action or claim has

been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply
with
the
foregoing
requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment
of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall
be cause for the dismissal
of
the
case
without
prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and
after
hearing.
The
submission
of
a
false
certification
or
noncompliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to
the
corresponding
administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly
constitute
willful
and
deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for
summary
dismissal
with
prejudice
and
shall
constitute direct contempt,
as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
In PET

Plans,

Inc.

v.

Court

of

Appeals,[35] this Court affirmed the Court

of Appeals dismissal of the petition, since
the verification and certification of nonforum

shopping

companys

vice

was

signed

president

by

for

Indeed, ample jurisprudence exists

to the effect that subsequent and
substantial compliance of a petitioner
may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure in the interest of justice. But
to merit the Court's liberal consideration,
petitioner must show reasonable cause
justifying non-compliance with the rules
and must convince the Court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice.
[36]
Hence,
deviation
from
the
requirements
of
verification
and
certification against forum shopping may
only be allowed in special circumstances.

In the present case, petitioners

failed to provide the Court with sufficient
justification for the suspension or
relaxation of the rules in their favor. In
their Motion for Reconsideration of the 13
July 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, petitioners merely claimed that
some of them signed for their copetitioners, while others were at work so
that they could not sign the SPA in favor
of Rodolfo Lonoy. Needless to say, the
reason is flimsy and unsatisfactory. That
other petitioners were at work does not
make it impossible to secure their
signatures,
only
a
little
more
inconvenient. It
is
not,
therefore,
unreasonable for the Court to demand in
this
case
compliance
with
the
requirements for proper verification of the
Petition and execution of the certificate
against shopping.

the
legal

affairs/corporate secretary without any

showing that he was authorized to do so.

Furthermore, the Court takes note

of another procedural lapse committed by
petitioners justifying the dismissal of their
Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No.

00365, for it was the wrong remedy for

them to pursue.

Prohibition is a legal remedy,

provided

by

the

common

law,

extraordinary in the sense that it is

According to Section 2 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, a petition for
prohibition may be availed of under the
following circumstances:

ordinarily available only when the

usual and ordinary proceedings at
law or in equity are inadequate to
afford

Sec.
2. Petition
prohibition.

for

When the proceedings

of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in
excess
of
its
or
his
jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain,
speedy,
and
adequate
remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a
verified
petition
in
the
proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be
rendered
commanding
the respondent to desist
from further proceedings
in the action or matter
specified
therein,
or
otherwise
granting
such
incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.

redress,

prerogative

in

character to the extent that it is not

always

demandable

of

right,

to

prevent courts, or other tribunals,

officers, or persons, from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which
they have not been vested by law.[37]

The writ of prohibition, as the

name

imports,

is

one

which

commands the person to whom it is

directed not to do something which,
by suggestion of the relator, the
court is informed he is about to
do. If the thing be already done, it is
manifest
cannot

the
undo

writ
it,

of
for

prohibition
that

would

require an affirmative act; and the

only effect of a writ of prohibition is
to suspend all action and to prevent
any

further

prohibited

proceeding

in

the

direction.[38] Prohibition,

as a rule, does not lie to restrain an

act that is already a fait accompli.
[39]

In this case, a close reading of the

Petition for Prohibition filed by the
petitioners before the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 would reveal that
the same is essentially more of an action
for the nullification of the allegedly invalid
EPs and OCTs issued in the names of
private
respondents. The
writ
of
prohibition is only sought by petitioners
to prevent the implementation of the EPs
and OCTs. Considering that such EPs and
OCTs were issued in 2001, they had
become indefeasible and incontrovertible
by the time petitioners instituted CA-G.R.
SP No. 00365 in 2005, and may no longer
be judicially reviewed.

Section
Registration
provides:

32 of
Decree

the Property
unequivocally

Sec. 32. Review of decree

of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.

The
decree
of
registration shall not be
reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority,
or other disability of any
person adversely affected
thereby,
nor
by
any
proceeding in any court for
reversing
judgments,
subject, however, to the
right
of
any
person,
including the government
and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by
such
adjudication
or
confirmation
of
title
obtained by actual fraud,
to file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now

Regional Trial Court] a

petition for reopening
and review of the decree
of registration not later
than one year from and
after the date of the
entry of such decree of
registration, but in no
case shall such petition be
entertained by the court
where
an
innocent
purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an
interest
therein,
whose
rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever
the
phrase
"innocent
purchaser
for
value" or an equivalent
phrase
occurs
in
this
Decree, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer
for
value. Upon
the
expiration of said period
of one year, the decree
of registration and the
certificate of title issued
shall
become
incontrovertible.
Any
person
aggrieved
by
such
decree
of
registration in any case
may pursue his remedy
by action for damages
against the applicant or
any
other
persons
responsible
for
the
fraud.

In Estribillo v. Department of
Agrarian Reform,[40] the Court affirmed
the long-settled doctrine that certificates
of
title
issued
in
administrative
proceedings are as indefeasible as
certificates of title issued in judicial
proceedings. In the case at bar, the DAR
had already issued the corresponding

OCTs after granting EPs to the tenantbeneficiaries

in
compliance
with
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Section
105[41] of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise
known
as
the
Property
Registration Decree. Hence, the OCTs
issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs
have
already
acquired
the
same
protection accorded to other certificates
of
title
issued
judicially
or
administratively.

A
certificate
of
title
becomes indefeasible
and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of the issuance of
the order for the issuance of the
patent. Land covered by such title may
no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be
decreed to another person.[42]

Private respondents EPs were

issued in their favor on 1 August 2001
and their OCTs were correspondingly
issued and subsequently registered with
the Register of Deeds of Iligan City on 21
September
2001
and
1
October
2001. Petitioners directly went to the
Court of Appeals, instead to the Regional
Trial Court as mandated by Section 32 of
the Property Registration Decree, to seek
the nullification of the said EPs and OCTs
and only on 7 June 2005, or almost four
(4) years after the issuance and
registration thereof. Petitioners failed to
vindicate their rights within the one-year
period from issuance of the certificates of
title as the law requires.

action for reconveyance,[43] or if the

property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, Section 32
of the Property Registration Decree gives
petitioners only one other remedy, i.e., to
file an action for damages against those
responsible
for
the
fraudulent
registration.

WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant Petition for Review
is hereby DENIED. No costs.

Yujuico v. Atienza
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on

After the expiration of the one-year

period, a person whose property has
been wrongly or erroneously registered in
anothers name may bring an ordinary

Certiorari instituted by Teresita M. Yujuico,

petitioner in the case for mandamus
docketed

as Civil

Case

No.

02-

103748 before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Manila, Branch 15. Petitioner is

RTC of Manila and docketed as Civil Case

questioning

No. 96-79699.[5]

the

propriety

of

the Order[1] dated 25 June 2004, granting

respondents Petition

for

Relief

from

Judgment under Section 2, Rule 38 of the

On 30 June 2000, the RTC rendered

a Decision[6] in the expropriation case in
favor of the City. The dispositive portion

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

reads:
The

operative

facts

are

not
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:

disputed.
On 8 December 1995, the City
Council

of

Manila

1.)

The lots including the

improvements therein of
defendant Teresita M.
Yujuico, as described in
the
complaint,
are
declared
expropriated
for public use;

2.)

The fair market value

of the lots of defendant
is fixed at P18,164.80
per square meter. The
fair market value of the
improvements of lots
subject of this action is
fixed at P 978,000.00;

3.)

The plaintiff must pay

defendant
the
sum
of P72,279,555.68
(3,979.10
sq.
m.
x P18,164.80)
representing the value
of
the
subject
lots plus P978,000.00
representing the value
of the improvements or
the
total
amount
ofP73,257,555.00 as just
compensation for the
whole
property
(including
the
improvements)
minus
the
sum
ofP5,363,289.00
that
plaintiff deposited in
Court per Order dated
April 30, 1997, hence
the
balance
ofP67,894,266.00
with
interest at the rate of

enacted

an Ordinance[2] authorizing the City Mayor

to acquire by negotiation or expropriation
certain parcels of land for utilization as a
site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary
School.[3] The property chosen is located
along Solis St. near Juan Luna St. in the
Second District of Manila and contains an
approximate area of 3,979.10 square
meters.

It

is

covered

by

Transfer

Certificates of Title Nos. 71541, 71548,

24423, 71544 and 71546, all in the name
of

petitioner.

The Ordinance provides

that an amount not to exceed the fair

market value of the land then prevailing
in the area will be allocated out of the
Special Education Fund (SEF) of the City
of Manila (City) to defray the cost of the
propertys acquisition.[4]
Failing

to

acquire

the

land

by

negotiation, the City filed a case for

eminent domain against petitioner as
owner of the property. Filed on 22 August
1996, the case was raffled to Branch 15,

6% per annum from July

15,
1997
(date
of
possession of subject
property for the purpose
of this proceedings) until
the day full payment is
made to defendant or
deposited in Court.[7]

release.

The amount of P5,363,269.00,

representing fifteen percent (15%) of the

assessed value of the property, had been
deposited in court at the start of the
expropriation

proceedings

and

subsequently received by petitioner. In

line with the manifestation made by the
The judgment became final and
executory,

no

appeal

having

interposed by either party.

been

[8]

for

Judgment

[9]

ordered the release to petitioner of the

amount of P31,039,881.00 deposited with

On 6 April 2001, petitioner filed

a Motion

counsel for the City, the trial court

Execution

of

which the trial court granted.

Pursuant to a Writ of Execution[10] dated

28 June 2001, the branch sheriff served

the Land Bank, in partial payment of the

just compensation adjudged in favor of
petitioner.[13]
The trial court further stated in
the Order:

a Notice of Garnishmenton the funds of

the City deposited with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, YMCA Branch, Manila
(Land Bank) to satisfy the judgment
amount of P67,894,226.00, with interest
at 6% per annum.[11]
Invoking jurisprudence holding that
public funds cannot be made subject to
garnishment, the City filed a motion to
quash
[12]

the Notice

of

Garnishment.

Acting on the motion, the trial court

issued an Orderdated 2 August 2001.

In

the Order,

the

lower

court

recalled that during the hearing on the

motion,

the

manifested

counsel
that

for
the

the

City

amount

of P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated

by the City School Board (CSB) under CSB
Resolutions

Nos.

613

and

623,

of

which P31,039,881.00 was available for

Considering that
this case is on all fours with
the case of the Municipality of
Makati vs. Court of Appeals
(190 SCRA 206), wherein it
was ruled that x x x Public
funds are not subject to levy
and execution, the Court
therefore grants plaintiffs
Motion to Quash the Notice of
Garnishment and the Notice
of
Garnishment
to
the
Landbank of the Philippines
issued by the Branch Sheriff
of this Court is hereby
ordered lifted.
There
being
no
opposition for the release of
the Thirty One Million Thirty
Nine Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty
One
Pesos
(P31,039,881.00) deposited
with the Land Bank, YMCA
Branch as Special Education
Fund, the Manager of the
Landbank of the Philippines,
YMCA, Manila is hereby
directed to release the said
amount to defendant Teresita

M. Yujuico in partial payment

of the just compensation
adjudged by this Court in its
Decision dated June 30, 2000.

As there was no action from the CSB,

on 1 February 2002, petitioner filed a
petition for contempt of court against

Upon manifestation of
the counsel for the plaintiff
that it is the City School
Board
which
has
the
authority to pass a resolution
allocating funds for the full
satisfaction
of
the
just
compensation fixed, the said
body is hereby given thirty
(30) days from receipt of this
Order to pass the necessary
resolution for the payments
of the remaining balance due
to defendant Teresita M.
Yujuico.[14]

respondents Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Dr.

Ma. Luisa S. Quioes, Roger Gernale,
Arlene

Ortiz,

Miles

Roces,

Percival

Floriendo, Liberty Toledo, Isabelita Santos

and Isabelita Ching in their capacities as
officers and members of the CSB. [19] The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02102837 of the Manila RTC.[20]
Countering

the

petition

for

contempt, respondents filed a Motion to

Dismiss,[21] wherein

A copy of the Order dated 2 August

alia that

they

they

allegedinter

never

disregarded

2001 was served on the CSB on 3 August

the Order as the matter had in fact been

2001.[15]

calendared and deliberated upon during

the meetings of the CSB.[22]

On

30

August

2001,

petitioner

submitted a manifestation before the trial

In their

subsequent Omnibus
[23]

Reply,

respondents argued that petitioners

court requesting that she be informed by

failure to avail of the proper recourse to

both the City and the CSB if a resolution

enforce

had already been passed by the latter in

judgment[24] should not be a ground to

the Order.[16] Earlier,

hold them in contempt of court. Citing the

compliance

with

petitioner

sent

letter

to

the

the

final

and

executory

case of Municipality of Makati v. Court of

Superintendent of City Schools of Manila

Appeals,[25] respondents

to

petitioner should have filed a petition for

verify

the Order.

the

CSBs

compliance

with

[17]

Not having been favored with a reply

to her queries even after the lapse of the
(30)-day

compliance

September

2001,

compliance with the Order.[18]

resolution

for

immediate

payment of the balance of the just

compensation awarded in her favor.[26]

period,
According

petitioner sent a letter to the CSB dated

10

that

mandamus to force the CSB to pass the

necessary

thirty

asserted

demanding

to

respondents,

petitioner took the Order as a writ of

mandamus when in fact it was a mere
order

in

furtherance

of

the Writ

of

Execution.[27]

This

interpretation,

respondents insisted, should never be

court-adjudged compensation still due

petitioner, ratiocinating as follows:[36]

allowed since petitioner merely wanted to

escape the payment of docket fees in the
filing of the petition for mandamus.[28]
In an Order[29] dated 17 May 2002,
the trial court denied the petition for
contempt of court.
On 6 June 2002, petitioner filed
a Petition for Mandamus[30] against the
members

of

the

CSB,

the

same

respondents in the petition for contempt

of court, seeking to compel them to pass
a resolution appropriating the amount
necessary to pay the balance of the just
compensation awarded to petitioner in
the expropriation case, Civil Case No. 9679699. The petition was docketed as Spl.
Civil Action No. 02-103748 and raffled to
Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. [31]
Upon petitioners motion,[32] Branch
51 of the Manila RTC before which the
mandamus
an Order
directed

[33]

case
dated

its

was
23

pending,
August

consolidation

with

in

2002,
the

expropriation case before Branch 15.[34]

In a Decision[35] dated 9 October
2002, the lower court (Branch 15) granted
the petition for mandamus. Specifically, it
ordered respondents to immediately pass
a resolution appropriating the necessary
amount

and

the

corresponding

disbursement thereof for the full and

complete payment of the balance of the

This case is on all

fours with the case of
Municipality
of Makati
v.
Court of Appeals (190 SCRA
206).
The
States
power of eminent domain
should be exercised within
the bounds of fair play and
justice. In the case at bar,
considering that valuable
property has been taken, the
compensation to be paid
fixed and the municipality is
in full possession and utilizing
the property for the public
purpose, for three (3) years,
the Court finds that the
municipality has had more
than reasonable time to pay
full compensation.
The arguments of the
herein
respondents
that
passing the ordinance or the
act of appropriating special
educational
fund
is
a
discretionary act that could
not
be
compelled
by
mandamus should be thrown
overboard.
It
must
be
stressed that what we have
here is a final and executory
judgment,
establishing
a
legal right for the petitioner
to demand fulfillment which
on the other hand became an
imperative duty on the part
of the respondent to perform
the act required.
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition is GRANTED, and the
respondents
are
hereby
ordered to immediately pass
a resolution appropriating the
necessary amount; and the
corresponding disbursement
thereof, for the full and

complete payment of the

remaining balance of the
court-adjudged
compensation due and owing
to petitioner Teresita M.
Yujuico.

fact that the decision of the trial court

had already attained finality.
Finding

the Order unacceptable,

petitioner elevated it to this Court by way

of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.

SO ORDERED.[37]

In her petition, petitioner asks that the

Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration,

which

the

trial

court

denied in an Order[38] dated 13 December

order of the lower court giving due course

to respondents appeal be reversed and
set aside on a pure question of law.[46]

2002.

Before resolving the substantive

With respondents not interposing

issues raised by the parties, the Court will

an appeal, the Decision became final and

first address the procedural infirmities

2003[39] and

ascribed by respondents to the petition at

executory

on

January

eventually, the corresponding Entry of

bar.

Judgment was issued on 15 January 2003.

[40]

The court granted petitioners Motion

for Execution

[41]

in an Order

[42]

dated 12

March 2003.

Respondents assail the correctness

and propriety of the mode of appeal
resorted to by petitioner.[47]According to
them, the order granting the petition for

2003,

relief from judgment is an interlocutory

respondents filed a Petition for Relief

order which cannot be made the subject

However,
from

on

14

March

Judgment,[43] wherein

they

also

of

an

appeal.[48] Respondents

likewise

prayed for a temporary restraining order

argue that petitioner failed to respect the

(TRO)

preliminary

rule on hierarchy of courts. This Court,

invoked

they aver, had consistently held that its

excusable negligence as a ground for

original jurisdiction to issue a writ of

their failure to seasonably file an appeal.

certiorari

and

writ

of

injunction. Respondents

[44]

in

While it denied the application for TRO

view

of

its

petitioners Motion

prior
for

order

granting

Execution,

the

court granted the Petition for Relief from

Judgment in an Order[45] dated 25 June
2004. This had the effect of giving due
course to respondents appeal despite the

is

not

exclusive

but

is

concurrent with that of the RTC and the

Court of Appeals in certain cases.[49]
Respondents

have

correctly

pointed out that an interlocutory order

cannot be made subject to an appeal.
However, when viewed in context, the
recitals of the petition clearly disclose and
the Court is convinced that the lower

court

committed

grave

abuse

of

not an iron-clad dictum.[52]The rule may

discretion amounting to lack or excess of

be

relaxed

when

exceptional

jurisdiction when it granted respondents

compelling

petition for relief from judgment. While

exercise

this case should have been elevated to

jurisdiction.[53] In this case, the judgment

this Court not by way of a petition for

sought to be satisfied has long attained

review under Rule 45 but through a

finality and the expropriated property has

special civil action for certiorari under

been utilized as a school site for five (5)

Rule 65, in the exercise of our sound

years

discretion and in order to write finis to

compensation has not been fully paid.

this case which has needlessly dragged

These

on for so long, we shall treat the petition

estimation, merit the relaxation of the

as a special civil action for certiorari. After

technical rules of procedure to ensure

all, it was filed within the reglementary

that substantial justice will be served.

circumstances
of

now;

this

warrant

Courts

yet,

the

circumstances,

and

primary

awarded
in

the

the

just

Courts

period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition.

Concerning

As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,[50] in the

interest of justice, this Court has often
judiciously treated petitions erroneously
captioned as petitions for review on
certiorari

as

special

civil

actions

for

certiorari. This is in line with the principle

that the strict application of procedural
technicalities

should

not

hinder

the

speedy disposition of the case on the

merits.[51]

petitioners

alleged

failure to implead the CSB or its new

members
[54]

before

the

trial

court,

respondents argue that since there are

five (5) new members in the CSB any

decision in the case requiring the CSB to
act as a body would prove to be legally
impossible. The former members of the
CSB could no longer be compelled to act
according to the orders of the Court since
they no longer have the capacity to do

Accordingly, facial allegations of

reversible error in the petition will be
treated, as they should be, as contextual
averments of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the court a quo. Appropriately,
petitioner impleaded the RTC Presiding
Judge as party-respondent in the instant
petition.
Anent the alleged breach of the
rule on hierarchy of courts, the doctrine is

so.

On the other hand, respondents

continue, the new members cannot be

directed

to

comply

with

the

Courts

judgment either; they have never been

impleaded in the case; thus, the Court
never acquired jurisdiction

over their

persons.[55]
The
neutered

arguments
in

were

effectively

our Resolution dated

August 2005. There, we declared:

new
Considering
the
arguments posited by both
parties, this Court is of the
view that a substitution of
the original respondents by
the members of the CSB
who
replaced
them
is
warranted. The phrase or
such time as may be
granted by the Court in
Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
denotes that the Court
before whom the motion for
substitution is filed may
grant a period longer than
thirty (30) days for the
purpose.
In any event,
technical
rules
on
substitution of a party
should not be so narrowly
construed as to prevent this
Court
from
taking
cognizance of a case and
deciding it on the merits.
Moreover,
petitioner
did
make an attempt to implead
the new members of the
CSB by making the CSB
itself a respondent before
this Court. There is also no
showing
that
the
new
members of the CSB have
deviated from the stand of
their
predecessors-ininterest; hence, there is a
substantial
need
for
continuing or maintaining
petitioners action against
them.[56]

CSB

Assistant

Secretary

Vicente

Macarubbo in substitution of Isabelita

Ching.[57] Only

Manuel

a Comment[58] dated
through

new

30

Zarcal
August

counsel,

filed
2005

adopting in

toto the comment of his co-respondents.

Hence, the other four newly impleaded
party respondents are deemed to have
retained the Office of the City Legal
Officer (OCLO) as their counsel and to
have adopted the Comment already filed
by the OCLO in behalf of their corespondents.
Thus, the proper substitutions of
some party respondents have already
taken place in this case.
The last procedural hurdle thrown
petitioners way by respondents refers to
the supposed failure of the petition to
comply with the requirements of Section
4, Rule 7 and Section 4, Rule 45 of the
1997

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure [59] as

amended by Supreme Court Circular A.M.

No. 00-2-10-SC.[60] Respondents claim that
there was failure to include a verified
statement indicating the material dates
relative to the receipt of the judgments
and the filing of the pleadings. The

In the same Resolution, the Court

ordered the impleading of the new CSB
members

Roger

Gernale,Manuel

M.

verification, moreover, allegedly failed to

state

that

petition

[61]

petitioner

has

read

the

and that the copies attached

Zarcal, Benjamin Valbuena and Francesca

thereto are based on authentic records.

Gernale as party respondentsthe last

[62]

three in substitution of Arlene Ortiz,

render the petition without legal effect

Percival Floriendo, Miles Rocesand the

and constitute grounds for its dismissal.

The defects of the verification allegedly

equity. It is an act of grace which is

The

purpose

of

requiring

allowed only in exceptional cases. [65]

verification is to secure an assurance that

the allegations of the petition have been
made in good faith; or are true and
correct, not merely speculative.
requirement

is

simply

[63]

This

condition

In

this

respondents

case,

they

according

were

unable

to
to

seasonably file a notice of appeal due to

negligence.[66] One

excusable

Ronald

affecting the form of pleadings and non-

Silva (Silva), an employee of the OCLO,

compliance

allegedly

therewith

does

not

failed

to

forward

necessarily render it fatally defective.

the Order denying

[64]

for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 02-

Perusal of the verification in question

shows

that

there

was

respondents

motion

sufficient

103748 to the handling lawyers. When

compliance with the requirements of the

the order was delivered to the OCLO on

Rules and the alleged defects are not so

17 December 2002,[67] Silva was the one

material as to justify the dismissal of the

who received it because the employee

petition.

designated to do so was out on official

business.[68] Since the employees were

Now, the substantial issues.

Up

for

determination

busy preparing for the office Christmas

is

the

tenability of the RTCs favorable action on

respondents

petition

for

relief

from

judgment. This engenders a look at the

grounds and defenses relied upon by
respondents in support of their petition.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the 1997

party that day,[69] Silva forgot all about

the order. He only remembered it when
the order for entry of judgment in the
case was received on 29 January 2003. By
that time, however, the order dated 17
December

showing that (1) through fraud, accident,

mistake or excusable negligence, a party
has

been

prevented

from

taking

an

appeal, and (2) the party has a good and

substantial cause of action or defense.
The

above

requisites

notwithstanding, it bears stressing that

relief from judgment is premised on

had

already

been

misplaced.[70]

Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a

petition for relief may be granted upon a

2002

Clearly,

the

situation

does

not

present a case of excusable negligence

which would warrant relief under Rule 38.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that
the inability to perfect an appeal in due
time by reason of failure of a counsels
clerk to notify the handling lawyer is not a
pardonable oversight.[71] As held in one
case:
. . . The excuse offered
by respondent . . . as reason

for his failure to perfect in

due time his appeal from the
judgment of the Municipal
Court, that counsels clerk
forgot to hand him the court
notice,
is
the
most
hackneyed
and
habitual
subterfuge
employed
by
litigants who fail to observe
the procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of
Court.
The
uncritical
acceptance of this kind of
common-place excuses, in
the face of the Supreme
Courts repeated rulings that
they are neither credible nor
constitutive
of
excusable
negligence
(Gaerlan
v.
Bernal, L-4039, 29 January
1952; Mercado v. Judge
Domingo,
L-19457,
17
December 1966) is certainly
such whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be a grave
abuse of discretion.
....
In the face of all these
facts and circumstances, . . .
the
respondent
judge
revealed a simple-minded
willingness to swallow a story
patently concocted to delay
as much as possible the
satisfaction of a judgment
against respondent . . . .This
indiscriminating
credulity
does not conform to what is
to be expected of a judicial
mind.[72]

firms

does

not

exempt

respondents

herein from the same treatment. For all

intents and purposes, the set-up at the
OCLO is akin to that of a law firm, the
only difference being that the former
serves a public entity while the latter
caters to private clients. The following
pronouncement

in Negros

Stevedoring

Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[74] is apropos:

The
negligence
committed in the case at bar
cannot
be
considered
excusable,
nor
is
it
unavoidable. Time and again,
the Court has admonished
law firms to adopt a system
of distributing pleadings and
notices, whereby lawyers
working
therein
receive
promptly
notices
and
pleadings intended for them,
so that they will always be
informed of the status of
their cases. The Court has
also often repeated that the
negligence of clerks which
adversely affect the cases
handled by lawyers is binding
upon the latter.[75]

Without doubt, it was grave abuse

of discretion for the lower court to have
given due course to respondents appeal
through the grant of their petition for

Reiterated in numerous cases is the

rule that the clerks faults are attributable
to the handling lawyers. [73] Thus, excuses

relief from judgment based on the flimsy

ground they proferred.
Even assuming that the negligence

offered based on the formers negligence

invoked

are not deemed excusable. That the

considered excusable, still the petition

admonitions issued out by this Court were

should not have been granted. It must be

mostly directed against lawyers in law

borne in mind that two requisites must be

by

respondents

could

be

satisfied before a petition under Rule 38

....

may be granted, the other being the

Upon manifestation
of the counsel for the
plaintiff that it is the City
School Board which has
the authority to pass a
resolution
allocating
funds
for
the
full
satisfaction of the just
compensation fixed, the
said body is hereby given
thirty (30) days from receipt
of this Order to pass the
necessary resolution for the
payments of the remaining
balance due to defendant
Teresita M. Yujuico. (Emphasis
supplied.)[77]

existence of a good and substantial cause

of action or defense.
Respondents defense consisted of
their claim that the CSB has a personality
separate and distinct from the City such
that it should not be made to pay for the
obligations.[76] However,

Citys

the

argument is undercut by the particular

circumstances of this case.
It is worthy of note that the records
of this case clearly show that the same
counsel, the OCLO, represented the City
in the expropriation case and now, all
except one of the individual respondents
in the case at bar. Worthy of note are the
following manifestations relied upon by
the lower court in issuing the order on the
motion

to

quash

the Notice

of

Garnishment over the funds of the City, to

wit:
The Motion to Quash
Notice of Garnishment was
heard by this court this
morning and Atty. Joseph
Aquino appeared for the
plaintiff (City of Manila) and
Atty. Federico Alday, for the
defendant. Atty.
Aquino
manifested
that
the
amount
of Thirty Six
Million
Four
Hundred
Three
Thousand
One
Hundred Seventy Pesos
(P36,403,170.00)
had
been appropriated by the
City School Board (CSB)
under
CSB
Resolution
Nos. 613 and 623 for this
purpose.

The manifestation was made by

the same counsel now claiming that it is
actually the City which should be made
liable

for

the

payment

of

its

own

obligations. This, after it trotted out the

CSB as the entity with authority to pass a
resolution

that

would

satisfy

the

obligation it had vigorously pursued.

The above circumstances, coupled
with the rule that an act performed by
counsel within the scope of a general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of
the client,[78] render the City and, through
it, respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is
meant

that

representation

an
is

admission

rendered

or

conclusive

upon the person making it and cannot be

denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.[79]

Petitioner and the

courts acted in accordance with the Citys

own manifestations by running after the

CSB. At this point, respondents and the

OCLO can no longer turn around and toss
the obligation back to the City. After all, it
was the legal counsel of both the City and
respondents who made a big production
out of showing that the liability incurred
by the City will be borne by the CSB.
Contrary to respondents claim, the
law does not make the CSB an entity
independent from the City of Manila. This
is evident from the provisions of the Local
Government
providing

for

Code
the

of

1991,

creation

the
of

boards. It states:
TITLE
IV.SCHOOL BOARDS

LOCAL

Section
98. Creation,
Composition
and Compensation.(a)
There
shall
be
established
in
every
province, city or municipality
a
provincial,
city,
or
municipal
school
board,
respectively.

law

school

representative
of
the pederasyon
ng
mga
sangguniang
kabataan in
the sangguniang
panlungsod, the duly
elected president of
the city federation of
parents-teachers
associations, the duly
elected representative
of the non-academic
personnel of public
schools in the city, as
members;
...
Section
101. Compensation
and
Remuneration.The
co-chairmen
and
members of the provincial,
city or municipal school
board shall perform their
duties as such without
compensation
or
remuneration.
Members
thereof
who
are
not
government
officials
or
employees shall be entitled
to traveling expenses and
allowances
chargeable
against the funds of the
local
school
board
concerned,
subject
to
existing
accounting
and
auditing
rules
and
regulations.[80]

(b)
The composition of
local school boards shall be
as follows:
...
(2) The city school
board
shall
be
composed of the city
mayor and the city
superintendent
of
schools
as
cochairmen;
the
chairman
of
the
education committee
of
the sangguniang
panlungsod, the city
treasurer,
the

The fact that the highest ranking

official of a local government unit (LGU) is
designated as co-chairman of the school
board negates the claim in this case that
the CSB has a personality separate and
distinct from the City. The other fact that
government officials in the school board
do not receive any compensation or
remuneration while NGO representatives

merely receive allowances underscores

Clearly, mandamus is a remedy

the absurdity of respondents argument

available to a property owner when a

all the more. Indeed, such would not be

money judgment is rendered in its favor

the situation if the school board has a

and against a municipality or city, as in

personality separate and distinct from the

this case.

LGU.

Moreover,
Respondents also argue that the
members of the CSB cannot be directed
to decide a discretionary function in the
specific manner the court desires. [81] The
question of whether the enactment of an
ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a
final money judgment rendered against
an LGU may be compelled by mandamus
has already been settled in Municipality
of Makati v. Court of Appeals.[82]
Nevertheless, this is
not to say that private
respondent and PSB are left
with no legal recourse.
Where a municipality fails or
refuses, without justifiable
reason, to effect payment of
a final money judgment
rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the
remedy of mandamus in
order
to
compel
the
enactment and approval of
the necessary appropriation
ordinance,
and
the
corresponding disbursement
of municipal funds therefore
[SeeViuda De Tan Toco v. The
Municipal
Council
of
Iloilo, supra, Baldivia v. Lota,
107
Phil
1099
(1960);
Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108
Phil 247 (1960)].[83]

authorizing

the

the

very

ordinance

expropriation

of

petitioners property categorically states

that the payment of the expropriated
property will be defrayed from the SEF. To
quote:
An amount not to
exceed the current fair
market value, prevailing in
the
area
appraised
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
existing
laws, rules and regulations,
of the property to be
acquired or so much thereof
as may be necessary for the
purpose shall be allocated
out of the Special Education
Fund of the City to defray the
cost of acquisition of the
above-mentioned parcels of
land.[84]

The legality of the above-quoted

provision is presumed. The source of the
amount necessary to acquire petitioners
property having in fact been specified by
the City Council of Manila, the passage of
the resolution for the allocation and
disbursement

thereof

is

ministerial duty of the CSB.

indeed

Furthermore,

respondents

had

argued in the petition for contempt filed

against

them

latters

failure

by
to

petitioner
invoke

that

the

play are served.

ruled:

the
. . . This Court will not
condone petitioners blatant
refusal to settle its legal
obligation
arising
from
expropriation proceedings it
had in fact initiated. It cannot
be
over-emphasized
that
within the context of the
States inherent power of
eminent domain,

proper

remedy of mandamus should not be a

ground to penalize them with contempt.
In their haste to have the contempt
petition

dismissed,

consistently

contended

respondents
that

what

petitioner should have filed was a case for

mandamus to compel passage of the

.
.
.
(j)ust
compensation means not
only
the
correct
determination of the amount
to be paid to the owner of
the land but also the
payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its
taking.
Without
prompt
payment,
compensation
cannot be considered just
for the property owner is
made
to
suffer
the
consequence
of
being
immediately deprived of his
land while being made to
wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope
with his loss (Consculluela v.
The Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 77765,
August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA
393, 400. See also Provincial
Government of Sorsogon v.
Vda. De Villaroya, G.R. No.
64037, August 27, 1987, 153
SCRA 291).[86]

corresponding resolution of the CSB if she

wanted
relied

immediate
on

these

As we have already

payment.[85] Having
representations

of

respondents and having filed the action

they adverted to, petitioner cannot now
be sent by respondents on another wild
goose chase to obtain ultimate recovery
of what she is legally entitled to.
While this Court recognizes the
power of LGU to expropriate private
property for public use, it will not stand
idly by while the expropriating authority
maneuvers to evade the payment of just
compensation of property already in its
possession.
The notion of expropriation is hard
enough to take for a private owner. He is
compelled to give up his property for the
common weal. But to give it up and wait
in vain for the just compensation decreed
by the courts is too much to bear. In
cases like these, courts will not hesitate
to step in to ensure that justice and fair

The

decision

rendering

just

compensation in petitioners favor was

promulgated way back in the year 2000.
[87]

Five years have passed, yet the award

still has not been fully satisfied. Recently,

in Republic v. Lim,[88] this Court made the

grant of their petition for relief, is before

following pronouncement:

the Court of Appeals where it is docketed

as

. . . while the prevailing

doctrine is that the nonpayment
of
just
compensation
does
not
entitle
the
private
landowner
to
recover
possession
of
the
expropriated lots, however,
in
cases
where
the
government failed to pay
just
compensation within
five (5) years from the
finality of judgment in
the
expropriation
proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the
right to recover possession
of their property. This is in
consonance
with
the
principle
that
the
government cannot keep
the property and dishonor
the judgment. To be sure,
the
five-year
period
limitation will encourage the
government to pay just
compensation
punctually.
This is in keeping with
justice and equity. After all,
it is the duty of the
government, whenever it
takes property from private
persons against their will, to
facilitate the payment of just
compensation.[89] (Citations
omitted)
Given

the

above

ruling,

CA-G.R.

86692.[90]

No.

The

courts Decision in this case would have

obvious consequences on said appeal;
hence, referral of this Decision to the
Court of Appeals is in order.
WHEREFORE,

the

petition

is

GRANTED. The Order of the trial court

dated

25

June

respondents Petition
Judgment is

2004,
for

REVERSED

granting

Relief

from

and SET

ASIDE and its Decision dated 9 October

2002,

ordering

respondents

to

immediately pass a resolution for the

payment of the balance of the courtadjudged compensation due petitioner,
is REINSTATED.

Let

copy

of

this Decision be

furnished the Court of Appeals for its

information and guidance in relation to
CA-G.R. No. 86692 entitled Teresita M.
Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al.
the

reversion of the expropriated property to

the petitioner would prove not to be a
remote prospect should respondents and
the City they represent insist on trudging
on their intransigent course.
One final note. Respondents appeal
from the Decision dated 9 October 2002
of the lower court, made possible by its

SO ORDERED.

As a general rule, the issuance of a

writ of possession after the foreclosure sale
and during the period of redemption is
ministerial. As an exception, it ceases to be
ministerial if there is a third party holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor.
In this case, we find that petitioners
right over the foreclosed property is not
adverse to that of the judgment debtor or
mortgagor. As such, they cannot seek the
quashal or prevent the implementation of
the writ of possession.
Factual Antecedents

The facts of this case as summarized

by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its assailed
Decision[1] dated November 29, 2006 are as
follows:
Sometime in 2001, the
spouses Denivin Ilagan and
Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan)
applied for and were granted a
loan by the [Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co.] in the amount of
x x x (P4,790,000.00) [secured
by] x x x a Real Estate
Mortgage over the parcels of
land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title with Nos.
300203, 285299, 278042,
300181, 300184, 300191,
300194,
and
300202,
respectively.

PTA
St.
MetroBank
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Matthew

v.

Upon
default,
an
extrajudicial foreclosure was
conducted with [Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co.] being the
highest bidder x x x and for
which a Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor.
During the period of
redemption, the respondent

Bank filed an Ex-Parte Petition

for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession docketed as LRC
Case No. 6438 by posting x x x
the required bond which was
subsequently approved. x x x
[On June 30, 2005], the
St. Mathew Christian Academy
of Tarlac, Inc. filed a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for
Restraining Order docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 9793
against the respondent Bank
and the Provincial Sheriff of
Tarlac.
On August 16, 2005,
the x x x Judge issued a Joint
Decision in LRC Case No. 6438
and Special Civil Action No.
9793, the contents of which
are x x x as follows:
JOINT DECISION
Metropolitan Bank x x x
is now entitled to a writ of
possession, it being mandatory
even during the period of
redemption.
The school, St. Mathew
Christian [Academy] filed the
petition for injunction on the
ground that it cannot be
ejected being a third party.
x
x
x St. Mathew Christian Acade
my is practically owned by the
mortgagors, spouses Denivin
and Josefina Ilagan. Firstly, the
lease to St. Mathew by the
Ilagans, as lessor, was for a
period of one year from the
execution of the lease contract
in 1998. Therefore, the lease
should
have
expired
in
1999. However, since the
lease continued after 1999, the
lease is now with a definite
period, or monthly, since the
payment of lease rental is
monthly. (Articles 1670 and
1687, Civil Code). Therefore,

the lease expires at the end of

each month.
Secondly, the lease was
not registered and annotated
at the back of the title, and
therefore, not binding on third
persons. (Article 1648, Civil
Code)
Thirdly, the spouses are
the owners or practically the
owners of St. Mathew. Even if
it has a separate personality,
nevertheless, piercing the veil
of corporate entity is resorted
to for the spouses should not
be allowed to commit fraud
under
the
separate
entity/personality
of
St.
Mathew.
In connection with the
allegation of the spouses
Ilagans that the mortgage
contract contains provision
which is pactum commisorium,
the
Court
does
not
agree. What is prohibited is
the automatic appropriation
without the public sale of the
mortgaged properties.
The interest charges
may be exorbitant, but it does
not of itself cause the nullity of
the
entire
contract
of
mortgage.
There
is
also
no
violation on the proscription on
forum
shopping. What
is
important is that, there is really
no other case between the
parties involving the same
subject matter.
In fine, St. Mathew is
not really a third person. It is
bound
by
the
writ
of
possession issued by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the writ of
possession issued by this Court
dated April 22, 2005 is hereby

affirmed, Civil Case No. 9793 is

dismissed. No costs.

Decision dated November 29, 2006. It held

thus:

Pending resolution of the motion for

reconsideration of the said Joint Decision,
herein

petitioners

Parents-Teachers

Association (PTA) of St. Mathew Christian

Academy (SMCA) and Gregorio Inalvez, Jr.,
Rowena

Layug,

Malou

Malvar,

Marilou

Baraquio, Gary Sinlao, Luzviminda Ocampo,

Marife Fernandez, Fernando Victorio, Ernesto
Aganon, and Rizalino Manglicmot who are
teachers and students of SMCA, filed a
Motion

for

Leave

to

file

Petition

in

Intervention[3] in Special Civil Action No.

9793, which was granted by the trial court in
an
[4]

Order

dated

However,

in

November
a

10,

2005.

subsequent

Order

dated December 7, 2005, the trial court

reversed its earlier Order by ruling that
petitioners intervention would have no
bearing on the issuance and implementation
of the writ of possession. Thus, it directed
that the writ be implemented by placing
respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (MBTC) in physical possession of
[5]

the property.

Without

filing

motion

for

reconsideration, petitioners assailed the trial

courts

Order

for Certiorari and

through
Prohibition

Petition

before

the

CA. However, said petition was dismissed by

the CA for lack of merit in its assailed

Considering that in this

case the writ of possession had
already been issued x x x
petitioners remedy was to file
x x x a petition that the sale be
set aside and the writ of
possession cancelled. Instead,
petitioners filed the instant
Petition for Certiorari.
Moreover, no motion for
reconsideration of the said
Order directing the issuance of
a writ of possession was filed
neither was there any motion
for reconsideration of the
assailed Order of 7 December
2005 prior to the institution of
the
instant
Petition
for Certiorari to
afford
the
respondent
Court
an
opportunity to correct its
alleged error. The rule is
that certiorari as a special civil
action will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is
filed before the respondent
tribunal to allow it to correct its
imputed error. While there are
exceptions to the rule, none
has
been
invoked
by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant Petition
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[6]

Petitioners

filed

Motion

for

Reconsideration but the motion was denied

in a Resolution dated January 29, 2007.

Hence, petitioners filed this Petition

for Review on Certiorari.

Issues
1.

THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED
AND
REFUSED
TO
CONSIDER THE GROUNDS
RELIED UPON IN THE
PETITION BEFORE IT WHEN
THE SAME ARE CLEARLY
MERITORIOUS AND ARE
BASED ON THE LAW AND
JUSTICE;

2.

THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED
AND
REFUSED
TO
CONSIDER
THAT
THE
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO
HEREIN PETITIONERS IS
THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
OF CERTIORARI AND NOT A
PETITION TO SET ASIDE
THE FORECLOSURE SALE
IN LRC CASE No. 6438;
3.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN RULING THAT A
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS STILL
NEEDED
BEFORE
THE
PETITIONERS COULD FILE A
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF
CERTIORARI; and
4.

THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A
CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT HOLDING
THAT CONSIDERATIONS OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY, AND
NOT
TECHNICALITY,
SHOULD BE THE BASES
FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
THE PETITION BEFORE IT.[7]

Our Ruling

Petitioners are not Third Parties against

whom the writ of possession cannot be
issued and implemented.

As a rule, it is ministerial upon the

court to issue a writ of possession after the
foreclosure sale and during the period of
redemption.[8] Section 7 of Act No. 3135
explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of
possession during the redemption period by
filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or
in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or place
where the real property or any part thereof is
situated, in the case of mortgages duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon
filing of such motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond, the law also directs in
express terms the said court to issue the
order for a writ of possession.[9]

However, this rule

is

not

without exception. In Barican v. Interme

diate
Appellate

Court,[10] we

held

that

the

obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ

of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial once it appears that there is a

The petition is bereft of merit.

third party in possession of the property who

is claiming a right adverse to that of the

relationship as contractual in nature. As

debtor/mortgagor. This ruling was reiterated

such, it would be specious to conclude that

in Policarpio v. Active Bank[11] where we held

the teachers and students hold the subject

that:

premises independent of

school. Besides, their contracts are with the

school and do not attach to the school
premises. Moreover, the foreclosure of the
current school premises does not prevent the
SMCA

from

as

third

continuing

its

operations

elsewhere.

At this point, it is relevant to note that

in the Joint Decision dated August 16, 2005,
the trial court found that SMCA was not a
third party and was therefore bound by the
said writ of possession.[15] Consequently, it

In this case, we find that petitioners

considered

to

premises is necessarily inferior to that of the

affirmed

be

adverse

SMCA. In fact, their interest over the school

Ordinarily, a purchaser
of property in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale is entitled to
possession of the property.
Thus, whenever the purchaser
prays for a writ of possession,
the trial court has to issue it as
a matter of course. However,
the obligation of the trial court
to issue a writ of possession
ceases to be ministerial once it
appears that there is a third
party in possession of the
property claiming a right
adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor. Where
such third party exists, the trial
court should conduct a hearing
to determine the nature of his
adverse
possession. (Emphasis
supplied)

cannot

or

the

issuance

of

the

writ

of

possession.

parties

because they are not claiming a right

MBTC thus correctly argued that

adverse to the judgment debtor. Petitioner-

petitioners did not have superior rights to

teachers

claim

that of SMCA over the subject property

ownership of the properties, but merely

because their supposed possession of the

averred actual physical possession of the

same emanated only from the latter. Since

premises.[12] Petitioner-

petitioners possession of the subject school

teachers possession of the said premises

premises stemmed from their employment

was based on the employment contracts

or enrollment contracts with the school, as

they have with the school. As regards the

the case may be, necessarily, their right to

petitioner-students, Alcuaz

Philippine

possess the subject school premises cannot

Business

be adverse to that of the school and of its

Dames

owners. As such, the petitioners cannot be

subject

and

students

school

School

v.

of

Administration[13] and Non

II[14] characterized

did

the

v.

not

school-student

respondent
denominated
its pleading as a petition, it
is
more
properly
a
motion. What distinguishes a
motion from a petition or other
pleading is not its form or the
title given by the party
executing it, but its purpose.
The purpose of a motion is not
to initiate litigation, but to
bring up a matter arising in the
progress of the case where the
motion is filed.[20] (Emphasis
supplied)

deemed third parties as contemplated in

Act No. 3135, as amended.
The lack of authority to sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping attached to the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession
was an insignificant lapse.

Petitioners further claim that the lack

of authority to sign the certificate on nonforum shopping attached to the Petition for
the Issuance of the Writ of Possession

It is not necessary to initiate an

rendered the same worthless and should be

original action in order for the purchaser at

deemed as non-existent.[16] MBTC asserts

an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property

otherwise, citing Spouses Arquiza v. Court of

to

Appeals[17] where we held that an application

application for the writ of possession was

for a writ of possession is a mere incident in

denominated as a petition, it was in

the registration proceeding which is in

substance merely a motion.[22] Indeed, any

substance merely a motion,[18] and therefore

insignificant lapse in the certification on non-

does not require such a certification.

forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not

acquire

render
Petitioners
basis. In Green
Development

contention
Asia

v.

writ

irregular. After

if

all,

the

no

lacks

verification and certification on non-forum

and

shopping need be attached to the motion.

Construction

Corporation

the

possession.[21] Even

Court

of

[23]

Appeals,[19] where the issue of validity of the

Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was

Hence, it is immaterial that the

questioned in an application for the issuance

certification on non-forum shopping in the

of a Writ of Possession, we held that:

MBTCs petition was signed by its branch

x x x it bears stressing
that a certification on nonforum shopping is required
only in a complaint or a
petition
which
is
an
initiatory pleading. In this
case, the subject petition for
the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by private
respondent is not an initiatory
pleading. Although private

head. Such inconsequential oversight did not

render the said petition defective in form.

The trial courts Order did not violate the

petitioner-students
right
to
quality
education and academic freedom.

We

disagree

with

petitioners

assertion that the students right to quality

education

and

violated. The

academic

freedom

constitutional

mandate

v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola

School of Theology,[28] we held that:

was

[I]t is to be noted that

the reference is to the
'institutions of higher learning'
as the recipients of this boon. It
would follow then that the
school or college itself is
possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to
attain them. It is free from
outside
coercion
or
interference
save possibly
when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint.
It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not
to be construed in a niggardly
manner or in a grudging
fashion. That would be to
frustrate its purpose, nullify its
intent. x x x It is the business
of a university to provide that
atmosphere which is most
conducive
to
speculation,
experiment and creation. It is
an atmosphere in which there
prevail the 'four essential
freedoms' of a university - to
determine
for
itself
on
academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.

to

protect and promote the right of all citizens

to quality education at all levels[24] is directed
to the State and not to the school.[25] On this
basis, the petitioner-students cannot prevent
the MBTC from acquiring possession of the
school premises by virtue of a validly issued
writ of possession.

There is likewise no violation of the

so-called academic freedom. Article XIV,
Section 5(2) of the Constitution mandates
"that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning." Academic
freedom did not go beyond the concept of
freedom

of

intellectual

includes

the

freedom

inquiry,[26] which
of

professionally

qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish

and teach the truth as they see it in the field
of their competence subject to no control or
authority except of rational methods by
which truths and conclusions are sought and
also

In this case, except for their bare

pertains to the right of the school or college

allegation that if the school will be ejected

to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,

because of the writ of possession, the

and how best to attain them - the grant

students

being given to institutions of higher learning -

also[29] and thereby their learning process

free from outside coercion or interference

and other educational activities shall have

save possibly when the overriding public

been

welfare calls for some restraint. [27] In Garcia

failed to show the relevance of the right to

established

in

these

disciplines. It

will

necessarily

be

disrupted,[30] petitioners

ejected

miserably

quality education and academic freedom to

their case or how they were violated by the

This ex parte petition for the issuance

Order granting the writ of possession to the

of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act

winning

No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial

bidder

in

the

extrajudicial

process" as contemplated in Article 433[34] of

foreclosure sale.

the Civil Code.[35] As a judicial proceeding for

Th
e
pe
titi
on
ers
we
re
ac
cor
de
d
du
e
pr
oc
es
s.

the enforcement of one's right of possession

as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an
ordinary suit by which one party sues
another for the enforcement of a wrong or
protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.[36]

In Idolor v. Court of Appeals,[37] we

described the nature of the ex parte petition
for issuance of possessory writ under Act No.
3135 to be a non-litigious proceeding and
summary
The petitioners argue that the court

in

nature. As

an ex

parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit

the

of one party only, and without notice to, or

presentation of evidence to support its

consent by any person adversely interested.

below

did

not

conduct

trial

for

conclusion that the intervention would have

[38]

It is a proceeding where the relief is

and

granted without requiring an opportunity for

implementation of the writ of possession,

the person against whom the relief is sought

no

[31]

bearing

on

the

issuance

thereby depriving them of due process.

to be heard.[39] It does not matter even if the

herein

petitioners

were

not

specifically

without

named in the writ of possession nor notified

merit. It is settled that the issuance of a writ

of such proceedings.[40] In Sagarbarria v.

of possession is a ministerial duty of the

Philippine

court.[32] The purchaser of the foreclosed

therein petitioner's contention that he was

property, upon ex parte application and the

denied due process when the trial court

posting of the required bond, has the right to

issued the writ of possession without notice.

Petitioners

contention

is

Business

Bank,[41] we

rejected

acquire possession of the foreclosed property

during the 12-month redemption period.[33]

Here in the present case, we similarly

reject petitioners contention that the trial

court should have conducted a trial prior to

Respondent, on the other hand, avers

issuing the Order denying their motion to

that certiorari is available only when there is

intervene.[42] As it is, the law does not

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

require that a petition for a writ of possession

or excess of jurisdiction and there is no

may be granted only after documentary and

appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate

testimonial evidence shall have been offered

remedy in the ordinary course of law.[48] In

to and admitted by the court.[43] As long as a

the instant case, the respondent argues that

verified petition states the facts sufficient to

the court merely granted the Writ of

entitle the petitioner to the relief requested,

Possession

the court shall issue the writ prayed

jurisprudence[49] and

for. There is no need for petitioners to offer

ofcertiorari does not lie because there is an

any documentary or testimonial evidence for

available remedy which is an appeal.[50]

in

accordance
that

with
the

settled
remedy

the court to grant the petition.[44]

The proper remedy for the petitioners is a
separate, distinct and independent suit,
provided for under Act No. 3135.

We hold that the CA correctly held

that the proper remedy is a separate, distinct
and independent suit provided for in Section

Petitioners assert that Section 8 of Act

No. 3135 specifically refers to the debtor
as the party who is required to file a petition
for the cancellation of the writ of possession
in the same proceeding in which possession
was requested.[45] As they are not the
debtors

referred

to

in

the

said

law,

petitioners argue that the filing of a petition

for the cancellation of the writ of possession
in the same proceeding in which possession
was requested, does not apply to them.
[46]

Hence, they allege that it was improper

for the CA to conclude that the Petition

forCertiorari was the wrong remedy in the
case where the writ of possession was
issued.[47]

8 of Act No. 3135[51] viz:

SEC. 8. The debtor may,
in the proceedings in which
possession was requested, but
not later than thirty days after
the purchaser was given
possession, petition that the
sale be set aside and the writ
of
possession
canceled,
specifying
the
damages
suffered by him, because the
mortgage was not violated or
the sale was not made in
accordance with the provisions
hereof, and the court shall take
cognizance of this petition in
accordance with the summary
procedure provided for in
section one hundred and
twelve of Act Numbered Four
hundred and ninety-six; and if
it finds the complaint of the
debtor justified, it shall dispose
in his favor of all or part of the
bond furnished by the person
who
obtained
possession.

Either of the parties may

appeal from the order of the
judge in accordance with
section
fourteen
of
Act
Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-six; but the order of
possession shall continue in
effect during the pendency of
the appeal.

any alleged errors committed in the exercise

of its discretion will amount to nothing more
than mere errors of judgment, correctable by
an appeal if the aggrieved party raised
factual and legal issues; or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if
only questions of law are involved.

In De Gracia v. San Jose,,[52] we held

that:
x x x the order for a writ
of possession issues as a
matter of course upon the
filing of the proper motion and
the
approval
of
the
corresponding
bond. No
discretion is left to the
court. And any question
regarding the regularity
and validity of the sale
(and
the
consequent
cancellation of the writ) is
left to be determined in a
subsequent proceeding as
outlined in section 8. Such
question is not to be raised
as
a
justification
for
opposing the issuance of
the writ of possession,
since, under the Act, the
proceeding for this is ex
parte. (Emphasis supplied)

As a general rule, a motion for

reconsideration must be filed before resort
to the special civil action of certiorari is
made.

As a general rule, a motion for

reconsideration should precede recourse
to certiorari in order to give the trial court an
opportunity to correct the error that it may
have

committed. The

said

rule

is not

absolute and may be dispensed with in

instances where the filing of a motion for
reconsideration

would

serve

no

useful

purpose, such as when the motion for

reconsideration would raise the same point
stated in the motion[56] or where the error is
patent for the order is void[57] or where the
relief is extremely urgent, as in cases where

Since the writ of possession had

already been issued in LRC Case No. 6438

execution had already been ordered where

the issue raised is one purely of law.[58]

per Order dated November 29, 2005, the

proper remedy is an appeal and not a

In the case at bar, the petitioners

petition for certiorari,[53] in accordance with

stated in their Petition for Certiorari and

our ruling in Metropolitan Bank and Trust

Prohibition before the CA as follows:[59]

Company v. Tan[54] andGovernment Service

Insurance System v. Court of Appeals.

[55]

As

long as the court acts within its jurisdiction,

18.
Respondent
sheriff and his deputies are
now set to implement the said
writ of possession and are now

poised to evict the students

and teachers from their
classrooms,
grounds
and
school facilities;

resort to a motion for reconsideration prior to

the institution of the Petition for Certiorari.
Considerations of equity do not apply in
the instant case.

19. Petitioners did

not anymore file a motion for
reconsideration of said order x
x x and is proceeding directly
to
this
Honorable
Court
because the filing of a motion
for
reconsideration
would
serve no useful purpose x x x
Besides the relief sought is
extremely urgent as the
respondent sheriff is set to
implement the questioned
orders x x x and the
circumstances herein clearly
indicate the urgency of judicial
intervention x x x hence, this
petition.

The petitioners claim that the challenged

decision of the CA would show that the
petition was decided on the basis of pure
technicality and that the appellate court
did not pass upon the merits of the
petition.[61] They further assert that
considerations of justice and equity and not
technicality, should be the bases for the
resolution of the petition.[62] MBTC, on the
other hand, argues that equity may not
apply if there is applicable law and
jurisprudence.

In San
Plainly,

the

petitioners

have

the

burden to substantiate that their immediate

resort to the appellate court is based on any
of the exceptions to the general rule. They
have to show the urgent and compelling
reasons for such recourse. The afore-cited
allegations of the petitioners in their petition
before the CA did not dispense with the
burden of establishing that their case falls
under any of the exceptions to the general
rule. Unlike the case of Ronquillo v. Court of
Appeals[60] cited by the petitioners, where not
only was a writ of execution issued but
petitioners

properties

were

already

scheduled to be sold at public auction on

April 2, 1980 at 10:00 a.m., the herein

Luis

v.

San

Luis,[63] we

expounded on the concept of justice by

holding that:
More
than
twenty
centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice as the constant and
perpetual wish to render
everyone his due. That wish
continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in every case
brought
to
it
for
decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when
the
facts warrant, we interpret the
law in a way that will render
justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.

petitioners failed to show the specificity and

imminence of the urgency confronting their
immediate recourse to the appellate court.

While equity which has been aptly

described as "justice outside legality" is
applied only in the absence of, and never

We

therefore

hold

that

the

CA

against, statutory law or judicial rules of

correctly found the necessity for a prior

procedure.[64] Positive rules prevail over all

abstract arguments based on equity contra

is available only in the absence of law and

LBL Industries
Lapulapu

not as its replacement.[66]

VELASCO JR., J.:

legem.[65] For all its conceded merit, equity

In this case, justice demands that we

v.

City

of

The Case

supplanting the express provisions of the

Before Us is a Petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing and
seeking the annulment of the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July
11, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 05877 as well
as its Resolution dated April 19, 2012
denying reconsideration of the first
assailed issuance.

law.

The Facts

conform to the positive mandate of the law

as

expressed

in

Act

No.

3135,

as

amended. Equity has no application as to do

so would be tantamount to overruling or

In

our

Resolution[67] dated June

4,

2007, we issued a Temporary Restraining

Order enjoining respondent to desist from
implementing the Writ of Possession. We also
required petitioners to post a cash or surety
bond in the amount of P50,000.00 within five
days from notice, otherwise the temporary
restraining order shall be automatically
lifted. The petitioners posted a cash bond in
the amount of P50,000.00 on June 27, 2007
pursuant to our June 4, 2007 Resolution.[68]

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

the

Petition

for

on Certiorari is DENIED for

merit. The

temporary

Review
lack

of

restraining

order

heretofore issued is hereby LIFTED and SET

ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 2006 and its
Resolution

dated January

2007 are AFFIRMED.

29,

Petitioner is the registered owner of a

40,634-square meter parcel of land. Lot
No. 4839, situated in Mactan, Lapu-Lapu
City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title
(TCT)
No.
34555.
On January 25, 2006, respondent City of
Lapu-Lapu
(respondent)
filed
a
complaint1 before the Regional Trial Court
seeking to expropriate, among others, a
300-square meter portion of Lot No. 4839
for its road opening project from Saac II to
Bag-ong Silingan, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City.
Later, or on February 19, 2006, the
complaint was amended, captioned as
"Second Amended Complaint," increasing
the area sought to be appropriated to
2,750
sq.m.
Upon deposit of an amount equivalent to
15% of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax
declaration, respondent took possession
of and utilized the property. On February
28, 2006, petitioner filed its Answer,
accompanied by a Secretary's Certificate,
which
states,
in
part:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That at the Special Meeting of the Board
of the Corporation on February 14, 2006,
the following resolution had been adopted
and
approved[.]
to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to
authorize ELSIE TAN MARIO[Mario],

an officer of the corporation, to

commence any action for and in behalf of
the corporation as she may deem fit and
necessary to do any and all acts that may
be essential in the prosecution and
defense of the cases of the corporation[,]
more particularly involving and in
connection with the Eminent Domain case
filed by the City of Lapu-Lapu[,] including
the execution/signing and verification of
the
Answer
of
other
necessary
pleadings[,] and do such other acts
necessary and proper in connection
therewith."2

the conduct of a joint survey and for the

setting of the case for trial had not yet
been resolved. And as an additional
reason for its action, the RTC cited the
non-observance of the three (3)-day
notice rule noting that the motion to
dismiss was received by the plaintiff on
January 31, 2008, but the motion was set
for hearing on the following day, or on
February 1, 2008. The fallo of the Order
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Motion
to
Dismiss
is
denied.

Meanwhile, petitioner interposed a Motion

to Conduct Joint Survey and Set Case for
Pre-trial.

Plaintiff [respondent] is directed to

prosecute this case within thirty (30) days
from
receipt
of
this
order.

Later, or on March 3, 2006, petitioner

filed its Answer to the Amended and
Second
Amended
Complaint.

Furnish copies of this order to counsels.

Meantime, the RTC issued two Orders,

dated July 10, 2006 and March 28, 2007,
directing the issuance of a writ of
possession. The branch clerk of court,
however, failed to comply with any of the
orders.3cralawlibrary
A year later, or on January 25, 2008,
petitioner moved for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that respondent failed
to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
length of time as provided for under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
According to petitioner, respondent has
yet to move for the setting of the case for
pre-trial and it had done nothing to
ensure compliance with the Orders for the
issuance of the writ of execution.
Respondent
opposed
the
motion,
explaining that the reason for the delay
was that it is awaiting the RTC's resolution
on the motion filed by petitioner for the
conduct of a joint survey and for the
setting of the case for pre-trial. Petitioner
filed a Reply to respondent's Opposition
and Comment on the Motion to Dismiss
on
February
14,
2008.
In its Order4 dated February 18, 2008
denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC
ruled that respondent cannot be faulted
for the alleged delay in prosecuting the
case as, indeed, petitioner's motion for

SO ORDERED.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the RTC's February 18, 2008 Order was
likewise denied in that court's January 26,
2011 Order,5 the dispositive portion of
which states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
For the third time, the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby directed to issue a writ of
possession.
Furnish copy of this order to counsels.
SO ORDERED.
In the latter Order, the RTC attributed the
fault to its branch clerk of court for failing
to comply with its twin orders directing
the issuance of a writ of possession.
On April 15, 2011, petitioner went to the
CA on a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 assailing the said February 18, 2008
and January 26, 2011 Orders of the trial
court, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 05877. Attached to the petition is
a Secretary's Certificate executed on April
12, 2011, by Elsie T. Mario, petitioner's
assistant
corporate
secretary.
Said
certificate states, among others, that at
the special meeting of petitioner's board
on April 8, 2011, the following resolution
was adopted:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to

authorize Mr. Roberto Z. Sison [Sison]
or Ms. Elsie T. Mario, to commence
any action and. or represent the
corporation as he/she may deem fit and
necessary and to do any and all acts that
may be essential in the prosecution and
defense of the cases of the corporation
more particularly involving theComplaint
for Eminent Domain filed with the
RTC
of
Lapu-Lapu
City,
any
proceedings for just compensation for its
lots in Lapu-Lapu City including the
execution/signing and verification of the
necessary documents and do such other
acts necessary and proper in connection
therewith.6
CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the petition in its July
11, 2011 Resolution7 owing to the
following
infirmities,
viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. a One Hundred and Fifty
Peso (PhP 150) deficiency in
docket fees;
2. the absence of the serial
number, as well as the
province
or
city
of
commission of the Notary
Public
in
the
Notarial
Certificate of the Verification
and Certification of NonForum Shopping
3. lack of proper
service; and

proof

of

4. absence
of
a
board
resolution evincing the
authority
of
Roberto
Sison, petitioner's Chief
Operating
Officer,
to
represent it in the case.
The fallo of the CA's July 11, 2011
Resolution
reads
as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of the foregoing premises,
petitioners' Petition for Certiorari dated
April 11, 2011 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

As regards the absence of a board

resolution, the CA held that "the Petition
is subject to dismissal if a certification
was submitted unaccompanied by proof
of the signatory's authority."8 Petitioner,
thus, moved for reconsideration, offering
explanations for the defects cited by the
CA including the absence of the board
resolution.
CA
Ruling
on
Reconsideration

Motion

for

The appellate court, in its April 19, 2012

Resolution,
accepted
petitioner's
explanation as regards the first three (3)
defects but ruled that the person signing
the petition lacked authority to do so
because
the
Secretary's
Certificate
appended to the petition is insufficient
proof of said authority. The CA ruled that
the failure to attach the Board Resolution
for the filing of the Petition was fatal x x
x.9 In disposing of the case, the CA
stated:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises,
petitioner's
Motion
for
Reconsideration dated August 10, 2011,
is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.10
The Issues
Petitioner now comes before this Court
assailing the foregoing Resolutions of the
CA and raising the following issues, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I.

[WHETHER
THE
CA]
SERIOUSLY
ERRED
IN
HOLDING
THAT
THE
SECRETARY'S
CERTIFICATE
EXECUTED BY ASSISTANT
CORPORATE
SECRETARY
ELSIE
T.
MARIO
AUTHORIZING ROBERTO Z.
SISON TO ACT FOR AND ON
BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
CORPORATION IN FILING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DOES
NOT
CONSTITUTE
SUFFICIENT
PROOF
OF
[SISON'S] AUTHORITY TO
REPRESENT
THE
CORPORATION.

II.

[WHETHER
THE
CA]
SERIOUSLY
ERRED
IN
DISMISSING
THE
CASE
BASED ON A TECHNICALITY
WHEN
PETITIONER
HAS
SUBSTANTIALLY
RAISED
VALID GROUNDS TO SET
ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE
TRIAL
COURT
DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS THE CASE FOR
FAILURE
OF
THE
RESPONDENT
TO
PROSECUTE THE CASE FOR
AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH
OF TIME.11

Accompanying the Petition is a copy of

the April 8, 2011 Minutes of the Special
Meeting of the Board of Directors of
petitioner authorizing Sison to represent
petitioner
in
the
expropriation
case.12cralawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The

petition

is

partly

meritorious.

On the first issue, petitioner argues that

the Secretary's Certificate executed by
Assistant Corporate Secretary Marina
reflecting the Board's resolution that
authorized its Chief Operating Officer,
Sison, to file the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CAis sufficient
proof
of
authority.
We
agree.
The Court, in several cases, has
recognized the sufficiency of a Secretary's
Certificate as proof of authority for an
individual named in it to represent a
corporation
in
a
suit.13 In Vicar
International Construction, Inc. v. FEB
Leasing
and
Finance
Corp.,14 We
held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals, the petitioner had not attached
any proof that its resident manager was
authorized to sign the Verification and the
non-forum shopping Certification, as a
consequence of which the Petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Subsequent to the dismissal, however,
the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, to which was already
attached a Certificate issued by its

board secretary who stated that, prior

to the filing of the Petition, the resident
manager had been authorized by the
board of directors to file the Petition.
Citing
several
cases
excusing
noncompliance with the requirement of a
certificate of non-forum shopping, the
Court held that "with more reason should
x x x the instant petition [be allowed,]
since petitioner herein did submit a
certification on non-forum shopping,
failing only to show proof that the
signatory was authorized to do so." The
Court further said that the subsequent
submission
of
the
Secretary's
Certificate,
attesting
that
the
signatory to the certification was
authorized to file the action on
behalf of petitioner, mitigated the
oversight. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
A simple perusal of the records shows
that
separate
authorizing
board
resolutions,
as
evidenced
by
the
Secretary's Certificate, were executed a
few days prior to the filing of the Answer
to the basic complaint to expropriate and
the petition for certiorari interposed
before the CA. The Answer was filed
on February 28, 2006. Prior to this date,
the board of petitioner already authorized
Mario "to do any and all acts that may
be essential in the prosecution and
defense of the cases of the corporation,
more particularly involving and in
connection with the Eminent Domain case
filed by the City of Lapu-Lapu" during
its February 14, 2006 special meeting.
Similarly, the Petition for Certiorari before
the CA was filed on April 15, 2011,
accompanied by a secretary's certificate
executed onApril 12, 2011 by Mario,
which states, among others, that the
latter, as well as Sison, was authorized by
the Board on April 8, 2011 to represent
petitioner in said eminent domain case.
Clearly
then,
Sison,
petitioner's
representative, was duly authorized to
sign the verification and certificate of
non-forum
shopping
and
that
a
Secretary's Certificate is sufficient proof
of said authority, it not being limited to
the Board Resolution itself. Accordingly,

We hold that the CA erred in dismissing

petitioner's certiorari petition and in
denying its motion for reconsideration.
This is not to say, however, that the
petition before the CA is meritorious.
Taking into consideration the length of
dormancy of Civil Case No. 653 8-L and a
review of the developments in said case
convinces Us that the issue of whether
the denial of petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss by the RTC is proper, which issue
the CA has yet to resolve, should be
resolved in respondent's favor. The Court
likewise finds it apt to settle said issue
once and for all instead of directing the
appellate court to proceed with CA-G.R.
SP. No. 05877 in order to avert further
delays in its resolution.15 Thus, for
practical reasons and in the greater
interest of justice, the Court shall now
address the issue of whether the RTC
erred in denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss.
Petitioner contends that the trial court
erred in not dismissing the case for
respondent's failure to prosecute the case
for an unreasonable length of time in
violation of Sec. 1, Rule 18 and Sec. 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
Sec.
1,
Rule
18
on
Pre-Trial,
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1. When conducted. - After the last
pleading has been served and filed, it
shall be the duty of the plaintiff to
promptly move ex parte that the case be
set
for
pretrial.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
Related to the above section is Sec. 3 of
Rule
17,
which
states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintif. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff
fails x x x to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, x x x the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion x x x.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set
the case for pre-trial after the last
pleading is served and filed. With this in
mind, We have, in several cases, 16 ruled

that the plaintiffs omission to promptly

move that the case be set for pre-trial is a
ground for the dismissal of the complaint
due to his fault, particularly for failing to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule
17.
The parties, as well as the courts below,
however, failed to consider that the aforequoted Sec. 1 of Rule 18 had already
been superseded by A.M. No. 03-1-09SC,17 which took effect on August 16,
2004,
Item
1.2
of
which
states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I.
PRE-TRIAL
A.

Civil

Cases

1. Within one day from receipt of the

complaint:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1.1. Summons shall be prepared and shall
contain a reminder to defendant to
observe restraint in filing a motion to
dismiss and instead allege the grounds
thereof as defences in the Answer, in
conformity with IBP-OCA Memorandum on
Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002.
xxx.
1.2 x x x Within five (5) days from date of
filing of the reply, the plaintiff must
promptly move ex parte that the case be
set for pre-trial conference. If the
plaintiff fails to file said motion
within the given period, the Branch
[Clerk of Court] shall issue a notice
of pre-trial.
Thus, the present rule is that if the
plaintiff fails to file a motion to set the
case for pre-trial within five (5) days from
the filing of a reply, the duty to set the
case for pre-trial falls upon the branch
clerk of court. However, this does not
relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute
the
case
diligently.
For a plaintiff, as herein respondent, to be
excused from its burden to promptly
prosecute its case, it must convince the
court that its failure to do so was due
to justifiable reasons. If the neglect is
justified, then a dismissal of the case on
said
ground
is
not
warranted.

In an attempt to convince Us that it was

not remiss in its duty to diligently
prosecute its case, respondent proffered
the
following
reasons,
to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Respondent was constrained to
await the trial court's resolution of
petitioner's Motion to Conduct Joint
Survey and Set the Case for PreTrial, which the RTC has not yet
resolved to this date;18cralawlibrary
2. Respondent's right to due process
i.e., the right to be given a
reasonable or ample opportunity to
be heardis violated since the RTC
has not yet resolved said Motion to
Conduct
Joint
19
Survey; cralawlibrary
3. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is a
mere scrap of paper, petitioner
having violated the three-day
notice rule under Sec. 4, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court;20 and
4. Respondent cannot be faulted for
the alleged delay not only because
of the pendency of the resolution of
said Motion and because of
petitioner's
failure
to
strictly
comply with the three-day notice
rule, but also because the branch
clerk of court failed to comply with
the July 10, 2006 and March 28,
2007 directives of the RTC that a
writ of possession be issued.21
A consideration of the events that
transpired in the said expropriation case
readily shows that the delay cannot solely
be attributed to respondent City of Lapu
Lapu but is in fact due to the failure of the
branch clerk of court to set the case for
pre-trial pursuant to A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,
as well as the trial court's delay in
resolving petitioner's Motion to Conduct
Joint Survey and Set the Case for Pre-Trial.
We find good reason to believe
respondent's assertion that it acted in
good faith when it did not move to set the
case for pre-trial, since petitioner already
moved for the pre-trial setting. Another

motion from respondent can be simply

repetitive of petitioner's earlier motion.
The Court, however, is mindful of
petitioner's predicament that the delay in
the resolution of the expropriation case
and respondent's continued occupation
and enjoyment of the subject property for
more than half a decade is extremely
disadvantageous and prejudicial to said
corporation without any payment of just
compensation. To prevent further damage
to petitioner, the trial court is directed to
immediately resolve petitioner's Motion to
Conduct Joint Survey, set the case for pretrial, and take all appropriate measures to
expedite the resolution of said case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
pronouncements,
the
petition
is
hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED.
The
assailed CA Resolutions dated July 11,
2011 and April 19, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP. No.
05877 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for the reason that petitioner's
representative was duly authorized to
sign the verification and certification
against
forum
shopping.
The February 18, 2008 and January 26,
2011
Orders
of
the
RTC
are
hereby AFFIRMED. However, in the
interest of substantial justice, the RTC,
Branch
27
in
Lapu-Lapu
City
is
hereby DIRECTED to
take
immediate
action on all pending matters in Civil Case
No. 6538-L, set the case for pre-trial, and
expedite the resolution of said case.
No pronouncement as to costs.

2007 and Resolution3 dated April 14, 2008

of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94838 which reversed and set aside
the: (a) Order4 dated December 1, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16 granting the
petitioners motion for the issuance of the
alias writ of execution of the Decision
dated December 27, 2002 in G.R. No.
120004, which ordered HOLCIM to pay
the amount equivalent to the total
volume of limestones extracted from the
subject
property
in
the
sum
5
of P91,872,576.72;
(b)
Order dated
December 20, 2005, which reiterated the
issuance of the alias writ of execution;
and (c) Order6 dated June 7, 2006, which
denied the motion for reconsideration of
the above-mentioned orders and the
manifestation and motion for ocular
inspection filed by HOLCIM. The CAs
Resolution dated April 14, 2008 denied
herein
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration of the CAs Decision
dated August 31, 2007.
Antecedent Facts

Esguierra v. Holcim
REYES, J.:
The present petition is an offshoot of our
final and executory decision promulgated
on December 27, 2002 in G.R. No.
120004, entitled "Iluminada de Guzman v.
Court
of
Appeals
and
Jorge
Esguerra."1 Ligaya
Esguerra
(Ligaya),
Lowell Esguerra (Lowell), and Liesell
Esguerra (Liesell) (petitioners) are heirs of
Jorge Esguerra (Esguerra) while herein
respondent, HOLCIM Philippines, Inc.
(HOLCIM) is the successor-in-interest of
Iluminada de Guzman (de Guzman).
In the instant petition, the petitioners
assail the Decision2 dated August 31,

As a backgrounder and as stated in our

Decision dated December 27, 2002 in
G.R. No. 120004, therein respondent
Esguerra filed on December 12, 1989 with
the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16 an
action to annul the Free Patent in the
name of de Guzman. Esguerra claimed
that he was the owner of Lot 3308-B,
located at Matiktik, Norzagaray, Bulacan,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-1685-P (M) of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan, with an approximate area of
47,000 square meters. Esguerra learned
that the said parcel of land was being
offered for sale by de Guzman to HiCement Corporation (now named HOLCIM
Philippines, Inc.). The former possessor of
the land, Felisa Maningas, was issued Free
Patent
No.
575674
which
was
subsequently issued in the name of de
Guzman over said parcel of land located
at Gidgid, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an
area of 20.5631 hectares and described in
Psu-216349,
covered
by
Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-3876.
Esguerra also demanded that the portion
of his property, which has been
encroached upon and included in de

Guzmans Free Patent, be excluded. He

later amended his complaint to implead
Hi-Cement as a co-defendant since the
latter was hauling marble from the
subject land. He also prayed that HiCement be ordered to desist from hauling
marble, to account for the marble already
hauled and to pay him.7
The RTC dismissed Esguerras complaint
but on appeal, the CA reversed in the
Decision dated February 28, 1995 in CAG.R. CV No. 40140. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another judgment is
hereby rendered:
"1. Declaring [de Guzmans] OCT
No. P-3876 (Exh. B) null and void
insofar as the disputed area of
38,641 square meters, which is
part of Lot 3308-B, covered by TCT
No. 1685-p (Exh. C) in the name of
[Esguerra];
"2. Ordering [de Guzman] to cause
the segregation, at his expense, of
the disputed area of 38,641 square
meters from OCT No. P-3876;
"3. Ordering [de Guzman] to
surrender her owners copy of OCT
No. P-3876 to the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan who is in turn ordered to
exclude from said OCT No. P-3876
the disputed area of 38,641 square
meters included in [Esguerras] TCT
No. T-1685;
"4. Ordering [de Guzman] to
immediately vacate and surrender
to [Esguerra] possession of the
disputed area of 38,641 square
meters;
"5. Ordering defendant-appellee HiCement
Corporation
to
immediately cease and desist from
quarrying or extracting marble
from the disputed area;

"6. Ordering defendant-appellee HiCement Corporation to make an

accounting of the compensation or
royalty it has paid to defendantappellee Iluminada de Guzman for
marbles quarried from the disputed
area of 38,451 square meters from
the time of the filing of the
amended complaint on March 23,
1990.
"7.
Ordering
and
sentencing
defendant-appellee Iluminada de
Guzman to pay and turn over to
[Esguerra] all such amounts that
she has received from her codefendant Hi-Cement Corporation
as compensation or royalty for
marbles extracted or quarried from
the disputed area of 38,451 square
meters beginning March 23, 1990;
and
"8. Ordering defendant-appellee
Iluminada de Guzman to pay the
costs.
"SO ORDERED."8
In our Decision dated December 27, 2002
in G.R. No. 120004, the Court affirmed in
toto the aforesaid CAs decision. After
attaining finality, the case was remanded
to the RTC for execution.9
Thereafter, the heirs of Esguerra, herein
petitioners,
filed
an
Omnibus
Motion10 dated September 28, 2004 with
the RTC, manifesting that the Courts
decision in G.R. No. 120004 has yet to be
executed,11 and thus prayed:
xxxx
1. That Sheriff Perlito Dimagiba be
directed to submit his Return on
the execution of the judgment;
2. That defendant Iluminada de
Guzman and Hi-Cement (now Union
Cement
Corporation
Matictic,
Sapang Kawayn [sic], Norzagaray,
Bulacan) be diverted [sic] to
appear before this Honorable Court
x x x;

3. That the plaintiffs be granted

other legal and equitable reliefs.12
On December 1, 2004, the RTC issued an
Order13, to wit:
Acting on the Omnibus Motion filed by the
Heirs of Jorge Esguerra, through counsel,
Atty. Orlando Lambino, and pursuant to
Secs. 36 and 37, Rule 39 of [the] 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby
GRANTS the same
AS PRAYED FOR, x x x Sheriff Perlito
Dimagiba is hereby directed to submit his
return of a Writ of Execution dated
October 28, 2003 within five (5) days
from receipt of this Order.
Accordingly, defendant Iluminada de
Guzman of Tanza, Malabon, Metro Manila
and the Hi-Cement (now Union Cement
Corporation, Matictic, Sapang Kawayan,
Norzagaray, Bulacan) are hereby ordered
to appear before this Court on December
6, 2004 at 8:30 oclock in the morning to
be examined on the dispositive portion of
the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
affirmed by the Supreme Court.14
However, contrary to the Order dated
December 1, 2004, de Guzman and
HOLCIM were not examined. Rather, the
petitioners presented Engineer Louie
Balicanta who testified that upon an
examination of the topographical maps
covering the land of the deceased
Esguerra, the estimated volume of
limestone hauled or quarried therefrom
covering the years 1990 to 2003 was
3,535,020.471 cubic meters. On May 16,
2005, the petitioners filed their Formal
Offer of Exhibits.15
Later, the petitioners filed a Supplement
to the Motion for Execution16 dated
August 16, 2005 and a Motion for Alias
Writ of Execution17 dated November 9,
2005. They claimed that the royalties due
them amounted to P10.00 per metric ton.
Thus, for the 9,187,257.67 metric
tons18 of
limestone
which
HOLCIM
allegedly acquired, the petitioners should
receive
a
total
royalty
19
of P91,872,576.72.

On December 1, 2005, the RTC made a

finding that the total volume of limestone
which HOLCIM allegedly quarried from the
subject
land
amounted
to P91,872,576.72. It also ordered the
issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for
the royalties which were purportedly due
to the petitioners.20 The said order states:
Acting on the motion for alias writ of
execution filed by the [petitioners],
through counsel, to be meritorious, the
same is hereby granted, it appearing that
the decision subject matter of the writ of
execution has not been satisfied by [de
Guzman] and Hi-Cement Corporation, and
considering, further, that the Total Volume
Extracted Materials (LIMESTONE) at Lot
#3308-B PSD-102661 (Annex A) was
properly proven during the hearing for the
examination of judgment debtors showing
the claim of Php91,872,576.72 to be
substantiated based on the Monthly
Mineral Commodity Price Monitor for
January 2005 (Annex B), together with the
O.R. for Certification fee (Annex C).
AS PRAYED FOR, let an alias writ of
execution
be
issued
for
the
implementation of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in relation to the total
volume extracted by Hi-Cement (now
HOLCIM) which is now the successor of
defendant Iluminada de Guzman. 21
On December 8, 2005, the petitioners
filed
an
Urgent
Motion
for
Clarification22 praying that the alias writ
of execution be clarified for the purpose
of directing [de Guzman] and/or HiCement Corporation and/or HOLCIM to
pay
the
petitioners
the
amount
of P91,872,576.72.
As prayed for, the RTC issued an
Order23 on December 20, 2005, stating
thus:
In view of the Urgent Motion for
Clarification filed by the [petitioners],
through counsel, and there being no
comment/opposition
filed
by
[de
Guzman], let an alias writ of execution be
issued directing [de Guzman] and/or HiCement Corporation and/or HOLCIM to

pay the [petitioners] the amount of Php

91,872,576.72 representing their liability
for the minerals extracted from the
subject property pursuant to the Order of
the Court, dated December 01, 2005.24
Subsequently, an alias writ of execution
and notices of garnishment on several
banks, garnishing all amounts that may
have been deposited or owned by
HOLCIM, were issued on December 20,
2005
and
December
21,
2005
respectively.25
On January 5, 2006, HOLCIM filed a
motion for reconsideration.26 It alleged
that it did not owe any amount of royalty
to the petitioners for the extracted
limestone from the subject land. HOLCIM
averred that it had actually entered into
an Agreement27 dated March 23, 1993
(Agreement)
with
the
petitioners
governing their respective rights and
obligations in relation to the limestone
allegedly extracted from the land in
question. HOLCIM further asserted that it
had paid advance royalty to the
petitioners from year 1993, in an
aggregate
sum
of P694,184.22,
an
amount more than the P218,693.10 which
the petitioners were entitled under the
Agreement.28
On January 13, 2006, the petitioners filed
its Opposition to [the] Motion for
Reconsideration29 dated January 7, 2006,
claiming
that
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration is barred by the omnibus
motion rule because HOLCIM failed to
question the petitioners motion for
execution of this Courts decision in G.R.
No. 120004. The petitioners also averred
that HOLCIM is barred by estoppel to
question the execution of the decision
based on the Agreement, because said
Agreement is in contravention with the
trial courts previous orders which
required HOLCIM to deposit to the clerk of
court the royalties due the deceased
Esguerra. The petitioners also argued that
the Agreement is a way to evade the trial
courts orders and has been procured by
taking advantage of the petitioners
financial distress after Esguerra died.30

On February 21, 2006, HOLCIM filed a

Manifestation and Motion (for Ocular
Inspection).31 It asked the court to
conduct an ocular inspection, advancing
the argument that HOLCIM did not extract
limestone from any portion of the 47,000sq m property which Esguerra owned; and
that the pictures, which the petitioners
presented to prove that HOLCIM has been
extracting limestone from the subject
land until year 2005, were actually
photographs of areas outside the
contested land.
On June 7, 2006, the RTC denied
HOLCIMs motion for reconsideration and
motion for ocular inspection. It held that
the petitioners proved their entitlement to
the royalties totaling to P91,872,576.72.
The RTC also blamed HOLCIM for not
presenting its own witnesses and
evidence. It further stated that to grant
the motions for reconsideration and
ocular inspection is to reopen the case
despite the fact that the trial court has no
more power to do so since the execution
of this Courts decision in G.R. No. 120004
is now a matter of right on the
petitioners part.32
On June 13, 2006, HOLCIM filed a Petition
for Certiorari (with Urgent Applications for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction)33 with the CA.
On June 30, 2006, the petitioners filed
their Comment on [the] "Petition for
Certiorari" and Opposition,34 to which
HOLCIM filed a Reply35 on July 25, 2006.
On August 31, 2007, the CA promulgated
the now assailed decision finding merit in
HOLCIMs
petition.36 The
dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered,
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED
and the assailed Orders REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.37
The motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied in the CAs Resolution 38 dated
April 14, 2008.
Issues

Thus, the petitioners filed the present

petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, raising the
following assignment of errors:
A. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT [HOLCIM] IS
ESTOPPED TO QUESTION THE
JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO CONDUCT A HEARING ON THE
EXACT PAYMENT WHICH [HOLCIM]
WAS SUPPOSED TO PAY TO THE
PETITIONERS;
B. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT
DISMISSING
[HOLCIMS]
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON
[THE] GROUND OF LACK OF BOARD
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE
FILING OF THE PETITION;
C. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
[CERTIORARI], IT BEING NOT THE
PROPER REMEDY, BUT AN APPEAL;
D. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN THE EXECUTION OF THE
DECISION
BY
CALLING
FOR
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE EXACT
AMOUNT WHICH [HOLCIM] HAS TO
PAY TO THE PETITIONERS;
E. THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE ORDERS OF
THE TRIAL COURT OF DECEMBER 1,
2005, DECEMBER 20, 2005, AND
JUNE 7, 2006 MODIFIED THE
DECISION OF THE CA G.R. CV NO.
40140 OF FEBRUARY 28, 1995[.]39
Our Ruling
The present petition has substantially
complied with the requirements.
HOLCIM alleged that the present petition
is fatally defective since all of the most
important pleadings before the RTC and
the CA have not been attached to the
present petition. However, a review of the
records of the case shows that the
petitioners attached to their petition the

following: (a) the CAs Decision in CA-G.R.

SP No. 94838 dated August 31,
2007;40 (b) the CAs Resolution in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94838 dated April 14, 2008; 41 (c)
the RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 725-M89 dated December 1, 2005;42 (d) the
RTCs Order in Civil Case No. 725-M-89
dated December 20, 2005;43 (e) the RTCs
Order in Civil Case No. 725-M-89 dated
June 7, 2006;44 (f) HOLCIMs Manifestation
and Motion (for Ocular Inspection) in Civil
Case No. 725-M-89 dated February 21,
2006 and its attachments;45 (g) the
Memorandum of Agreement between
Republic
Cement
Corporation
and
Spouses Juan and Maria Bernabe dated
December 1, 1991;46 (h) the Price Monitor
of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) on the price
per
metric
ton
of
non-metallic
mines;47 and (i) the Special Power of
Attorney executed by Ligaya and Liesell
appointing Lowell as their attorney-infact.48
From the foregoing, the Court finds the
same substantially compliant with the
requirements of Section 4, Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. All of the
pertinent documents necessary for the
Court to appreciate the circumstances
surrounding the case and to resolve the
issues
at
hand
were
attached.
Furthermore, the parties subsequent
comment and reply have sufficiently
provided
the
Court
the
needed
information regarding the proceedings
and acts of the trial court during the
execution of the final and executory
decision of this Court in G.R. No. 120004
which are the matters being questioned.
In Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v.
Magsalin,49the Court proceeded to give
due course to the petition when it found
the same and its attachments sufficient
for the Court to access and resolve the
controversy.50
On the other hand, the petitioners claim
that HOLCIMs petition for certiorari in the
CA failed to comply with the rules on
Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping because the latter did
not secure and/or attach a certified true
copy of a board resolution authorizing any
of its officers to file said petition. 51 Thus,

the CA should have dismissed outright

HOLCIMs petition before it.
The general rule is that a corporation can
only exercise its powers and transact its
business through its board of directors
and through its officers and agents when
authorized by a board resolution or its
bylaws. The power of a corporation to sue
and be sued is exercised by the board of
directors. The physical acts of the
corporation,
like
the
signing
of
documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the
purpose by corporate bylaws or by a
specific act of the board. Absent the said
board resolution, a petition may not be
given due course.52
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court
of Appeals,53 the Court held that the
application of the rules must be the
general rule, and the suspension or even
mere relaxation of its application, is the
exception. This Court may go beyond the
strict application of the rules only on
exceptional cases when there is truly
substantial compliance with the rule.54
In the case at bar, HOLCIM attached to its
Petition for Certiorari before the CA a
Secretarys Certificate authorizing Mr.
Paul M. OCallaghan (OCallaghan), its
Chief Operating Officer, to nominate,
designate and appoint the corporations
authorized
representative
in
court
hearings and conferences and the signing
of court pleadings.55 It also attached the
Special Power of Attorney dated June 9,
2006, signed by OCallaghan, appointing
Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan
and/or any of its lawyers to represent
HOLCIM;56 and
consequently,
the
Verification and Certification of Non
Forum Shopping signed by the authorized
representative.57 To be sure, HOLCIM, in
its Reply filed in the CA, attached another
Secretarys Certificate, designating and
confirming
OCallaghans
power
to
authorize Sycip Salazar Hernandez &
Gatmaitan and/or any of its lawyers to file
for and on behalf of HOLCIM, the
pertinent civil and/or criminal actions in
Civil Case No. 725-M-89 pending before
the RTC, including any petition to be filed

with the CA and/or the Supreme Court in

connection with the Orders dated
December 1, 2005, December 20, 2005
and June 7, 2006.58
The foregoing convinces the Court that
the CA did not err in admitting HOLCIMs
petition before it. HOLCIM attached all the
necessary documents for the filing of a
petition for certiorari before the CA.
Indeed, there was no complete failure to
attach a Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping. In fact, there was such a
certificate. While the board resolution
may not have been attached, HOLCIM
complied just the same when it attached
the Secretarys Certificate dated July 17,
2006, thus proving that OCallaghan had
the authority from the board of directors
to appoint the counsel to represent them
in Civil Case No. 725-M-89. The Court
recognizes the compliance made by
HOLCIM in good faith since after the
petitioners pointed out the said defect,
HOLCIM
submitted
the
Secretarys
Certificate dated July 17, 2006, confirming
the earlier Secretarys Certificate dated
June 9, 2006. For the Court, the ruling in
General Milling Corporation v. NLRC 59 is
applicable where the Court rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner despite
its failure to attach the Certification of
Non- Forum Shopping. The Court held that
there was substantial compliance when it
eventually
submitted
the
required
documents. Substantial justice dictates
that technical and procedural rules must
give way because a deviation from the
rigid enforcement of the rules will better
serve the ends of justice. The Court
ratiocinated:
The rules of procedure are intended to
promote, rather than frustrate, the ends
of justice, and while the swift unclogging
of court dockets is a laudable objective, it,
nevertheless, must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. Technical
and procedural rules are intended to help
secure, not suppress, the cause of justice
and
a
deviation
from
the
rigid
enforcement of the rules may be allowed
to attain that prime objective for, after all,
the dispensation of justice is the core
reason
for
the
existence
of
60
courts. (Citation omitted)

HOLCIMs filing in the CA of a petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is proper.

the aggrieved party may file an

appropriate special civil action under Rule
65.

The petitioners also argue that the CA

gravely erred when it did not dismiss
HOLCIMs petition for certiorari on the
ground
of
improper
remedy.
The
petitioners contend that HOLCIM should
have filed an appeal because when the
RTC allowed the petitioners to adduce
evidence to determine the exact amount
to be paid by HOLCIM during the
execution stage, it was implementing the
dispositive portion of the decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as affirmed
by the Court. As ruled by the trial court, a
case in which an execution has been
issued is regarded as still pending so that
all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. Accordingly, the
court that rendered the judgment
maintains a general supervisory control
over its process of execution, and this
power carries with it the right to
determine questions of fact and law,
which
may
be
involved
in
the
execution.61 Thus, for the petitioners, the
RTC neither acted in excess of its
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion, which would call for HOLCIM to
file a petition for certiorari.62

The foregoing provision is explicit that no

appeal may be taken from an order of
execution and a party who challenges
such order may file a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.63 An order of execution, when
issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting
to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, may be the subject of a
petition
for
certiorari
under
Rule
65.64 Thus, HOLCIM did not err in filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court disagrees with the petitioners

mental acrobatics. Their arguments are
contrary to Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be
appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(f) an order of execution;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the
judgment or final order is not appealable,

HOLCIM is not estopped to question the

jurisdiction of the trial court to conduct a
hearing and to accept evidence on the
exact amount of royalty HOLCIM should
pay the petitioners.
The petitioners argue that HOLCIM is
estopped
from
questioning
the
jurisdiction of the RTC in conducting a
hearing on the exact amount of royalty
that HOLCIM must pay the petitioners.
They allege that: (a) HOLCIM expressed
willingness to pay the royalty to whoever
would be adjudged the rightful owner of
the subject land; (b) HOLCIM and de
Guzman did not appear in the hearing nor
oppose the Omnibus Motion dated
September 28, 2004; (c) HOLCIM did not
file any opposition or comment on the
petitioners Formal Offer of Evidence,
Supplement to the Motion for Execution
and Motion for Alias Writ of Execution;
and (d) HOLCIM is now the new owner of
de Guzmans property. As such, it has
acquired the rights, interests and
liabilities of de Guzman. The petitioners
insist that HOLCIM must not only account
for the royalty it paid de Guzman, but it
must also turn over said payments to the
petitioners.65
HOLCIM counter-argues that when it
expressed willingness to pay the royalties
to whoever would be declared the rightful
owner of the subject land, it simply
manifested its good faith in fulfilling its
obligations. It adds that the petitioners

and HOLCIM entered into an Agreement

regarding the amount of royalty it should
pay to the landowner; and subsequently,
the petitioners voluntarily accepted and
retained the amount of P694,184.22 paid
by HOLCIM. In fact, HOLCIM stresses that
the said amount was more than what was
stipulated in the Agreement. HOLCIM also
asserts that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and not by laches, estoppel or by
agreement among the parties and such
lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings.66 Furthermore,
HOLCIM avers that it is even the DENR
panel of arbitrators which has jurisdiction
over the case pursuant to Section 77 of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.67 Lastly,
HOLCIM claims that it eventually acquired
de Guzmans property, maintaining that
the said property did not overlap with
Esguerras property. Thus, HOLCIMs
ownership and quarrying operations on
lands outside the disputed area would
have no bearing whatsoever on the
petitioners claim for royalties on
extractions done within the disputed area.
HOLCIM also asseverates that the
obligation to turn over any royalty paid to
de Guzman is not a real obligation which
attaches to the disputed area or to the
land itself or which follows the property to
whoever might subsequently become its
owner; rather, HOLCIM argues that the
obligation is purely a personal obligation
of de Guzman and thus, not transferable
to HOLCIM.
What is clear is that the present case
emanates from the petitioners desire to
implement the CA decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 40140 which was affirmed by the
Court in the Decision of December 27,
2002 in G.R. No. 120004. At the execution
stage, the only thing left for the trial court
to do is to implement the final and
executory judgment; and the dispositive
portion of the decision controls the
execution
of
judgment.
The
final
judgment of this Court cannot be altered
or modified, except for clerical errors,
misprisions or omissions.68
In the instant case, the CAs decision
which this Court affirmed in G.R. No.
120004 rendered, among others, the
following judgment:

(a) Insofar as then defendantappellee de Guzman is concerned,

the CA declared OCT No. P-3876 in
her possession null and void in
relation to the disputed area of
38,641 sq m; the same CAs
decision subsequently ordered de
Guzman
[i] to segregate at her
expense the disputed area of
38,641 sq m from OCT No. P3876;
[ii] to surrender her owners
copy of OCT No. P-3876 to
the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan;
[iii] to immediately vacate
and
surrender
to
then
plaintiff-appellant Esguerra
possession of the disputed
area;
[iv] to pay and turn over to
plaintiff-appellant Esguerra
all the amount she received
from her co-defendant HiCement Corporation (now
HOLCIM) as compensation or
royalty for marbles extracted
or
quarried
from
the
disputed area of 38,451 sq
m beginning March 23,
1990; and
[v] to pay the costs.
(b) Insofar as HOLCIM is concerned,
the CAs decision ordered HOLCIM
[i] to immediately cease and
desist from quarrying or
extracting marble from the
disputed area; and
[ii] to make an accounting of
the royalty it paid to de
Guzman.
Indeed, the final judgment does not direct
HOLCIM nor its predecessor Hi-Cement to
pay a certain amount to Esguerra and his
heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to

do was merely to account for the

payments it made to de Guzman.
Apparently, this was not enforced. It may
be deduced from the records that when
the petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion
dated September 28, 2004, they asked
for the examination of de Guzman and HiCement (HOLCIM) under Sections 36 and
37 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This
motion was subsequently granted by the
trial court.
Sections 3669 and 3770 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court are resorted to only when
the judgment remains unsatisfied, and
there is a need for the judgment obligor
to appear and be examined concerning
his property and income for their
application to the unsatisfied amount in
the judgment. In the instant case, the
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as
affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to
simply make an accounting of the royalty
paid to de Guzman. Unfortunately, the
trial court, instead of facilitating the
accounting of payments made by HOLCIM
to de Guzman, proceeded to adduce
evidence on the amount of limestone
extracted from the disputed area and
imposed the monetary liability on
HOLCIM.
It is rather unfortunate that HOLCIM did
not register a whimper upon petitioners
presentation
of
evidence.1wphi1Notwithstanding,
it
cannot be denied that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned orders without
giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard.
Indeed, when the decision has been
rendered unenforceable on account of the
undetermined amount to be awarded, it
was incumbent upon the trial court to
receive evidence from both parties to
determine the exact amount due to the
petitioners.71 Since HOLCIM was not given
an opportunity to rebut the petitioners
evidence, considering that the formers
Manifestation and Motion for Ocular
Inspection was denied, justice will be
better served if the trial court determines
first the existence of documents relative
to HOLCIMs payments made to de
Guzman, and if the same is not done, to
receive further evidence, this time, from

both parties. It must be emphasized,

however, that the evidence to be
adduced here is in relation to the amount
of royalty paid to de Guzman by HOLCIM
for marbles extracted from the disputed
area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23,
1990 up to the time HOLCIM ceased to
operate in the subject area. In the event
that the petitioners claim is beyond the
subject area and period, and HOLCIM
denies such indebtedness, the governing
rule should be Section 43, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness
denied or another person claims the
property. If it appears that a person or
corporation, alleged to have property of
the judgment obligor or to be indebted to
him, claims an interest in the property
adverse to him or denies the debt, the
court may authorize, by an order made to
that effect, the judgment obligee to
institute an action against such person or
corporation for the recovery of such
interest or debt, forbid a transfer or other
disposition of such interest or debt within
one hundred twenty (120) days from
notice of the order, and may punish
disobedience of such order as for
contempt. Such order may be modified or
vacated at any time by the court which
issued it, or by the court in which the
action is brought, upon such terms as
may be just. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to this Rule, in the examination
of a person, corporation, or other juridical
entity who has the property of such
judgment obligor or is indebted to him
(Rule 39, Section 37), and such person,
corporation, or juridical entity denies an
indebtedness, the court may only
authorize the judgment obligee to
institute an action against such person or
corporation for the recovery of such
interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules
gives the court the authority to order
such person or corporation to pay the
judgment obligee and the court exceeds
its jurisdiction if it orders the person who
denies the indebtedness to pay the same.
In Atilano II v. Asaali, 72 the Court held that
an "[e]xecution of a judgment can only be
issued against one who is a party to the
action, and not against one who, not

being a party thereto, did not have his

day in court. Due process dictates that a
court decision can only bind a party to the
litigation and not against innocent third
parties."73
Finally, the Court does not agree with
petitioners argument that the person of
de Guzman is "now merged in the person
of HOLCIM or that HOLCIM has assumed
her personal liability or the judgment
rendered against her."74Nothing in the
records shows that HOLCIM admitted of
assuming all the liabilities of de Guzman
prior to the sale of the subject property.
HOLCIM,
however,
expresses
its
willingness to pay royalty only to the
rightful owner of the disputed area. Thus,
in the event that the amount paid by
HOLCIM to de Guzman has been proven,
de Guzman is ordered to turn over the
payment to the petitioners.75 If the

petitioners insist that HOLCIM owed them

more than what it paid to de Guzman, the
petitioners cannot invoke the CAs
decision which was affirmed by the Court
in G.R. No. 120004 to ask for additional
royalty. As earlier discussed, this must be
addressed in a separate action for the
purpose. All told, the Court finds no
reversible error with the decision of the
CA in nullifying the orders of the RTC for
having been issued in excess of its
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August
31, 2007 and the Resolution dated April
14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 94838 are hereby AFFIRMED.