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examined with each case study following an identical structure: a discussion of the context of foreign policy in each
country; an outline of the actors involved in foreign policy
decision-making; an overview of the decision in question; the
parties involved and their position in the policy space; an
assessment of the disagreements and decisions made; and
finally an analysis of the role of coalition politics in the
process.
The multi-method empirical strategy produces some
important results for scholars of foreign policy decisionmaking. The quantitative analysis indicates that coalition
governments take more extreme decisions than singleparty governments. Furthermore, coalitions that contained
a greater number of parties were likely to take more aggressive policy decisions. However, coalitions that contained
rightist junior partners were found to produce more cooperative foreign policy. The case studies largely reinforce these
conclusions and offer more detailed explanations of how
coalition politics affected policy outcomes. Across the
cases, the most common explanatory factors behind policy
decisions were: party disunity, issue divisibility, locus
of authority, political calculations and the consistency of the
junior partners position. For example, the Japanese Socialists failure consistently to argue their opposition to Japans
participation in the 1995 Golan Heights peacekeeping operation meant that the party was unable to constrain its senior
coalition partner in the government. Of some importance is
the further explanation that the case studies offer for the
unexpected finding that governments with rightist junior
partners tend to produce more cooperative foreign policy.
In Japan, the conservative junior partner at the time of the
rice liberalization case advocated greater cooperation by
way of liberalization, though this may simply reflect that the
junior partners preferences coincided with those of the
leading party in the coalition. Another explanation put forward in the book is that rightist junior parties may have
advocated conflicting foreign polices but simply failed to
have any influence, which was the case in each of the Turkish foreign policy decisions examined.
While the quantitative analysis of coalition politics and
foreign policy decision-making represents just a single
chapter, it is also the weakest element of the book. A number
of problems are evident. First, the presentation of the data
and analysis is incomplete. There is a lack of descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models,
and the reporting of the results of the analysis is unusual. The
results tables fail to report the coefficients for any of the control variables included in the models and no overall model fit
statistics are reported. Second, the operationalization of the
Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making is a welcome addition to the scarce literature on how coalition politics influences foreign policy. While there have been few
direct examinations of the influence of coalition politics
in foreign policy decision-making, the literature has developed a number of theoretical expectations derived from
analyses of the role of institutions, accountability and group
processes. One is that coalitions will develop especially
peaceful foreign policy courtesy of the inherent constraints
of multiparty decision-making (for example, the need to
find a common position). Conversely, others have suggested that coalitions produce more aggressive foreign policy to compensate for a perceived weakness in domestic
politics or that smaller, ideologically extreme coalition
partners can hijack foreign policy if their presence in the
cabinet is crucial to its survival. Further expectations relate
to the quality of decision-making with some claiming that
coalitions produce delayed and fragmented policy while
others propose that multiparty governments deliver more
considered policy outputs as coalition partners act as natural devils advocates.
The book investigates the evidence for these theoretical
expectations using a mixture of quantitative comparative
analysis and case studies of prominent foreign policy decisions in three countries: The Netherlands, Japan and
Turkey. It is these case studies that provide the greater
part of the empirical evidence in this volume. Significantly, the decisions that are examined are not limited
to international conflict situations. Decision-making in
some conflict situations is examined for example, The
Netherlands participation in the Iraq War (2003) but
other general foreign policy situations are also considered, such as the liberalization of rice imports to Japan
(1993) and the abolition of the death penalty in Turkey
(19992002). In selecting these more prosaic matters of
foreign policy for assessment, Kaarbo ensures that the
case studies are not simply those decisions taken during
extraordinary circumstances that may naturally produce more
extreme reactions from within governments or result in the
suppression of intra-government dissent that is common during conflict situations. In total, 12 foreign policy decisions are
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