A New Phenomenological Marxism

Karl Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality by Michel Henry; Kathleen McLaughlin

Review by: James Bohman
Human Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1990), pp. 163-172
Published by: Springer
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13: 163-172,
1990.
Academic Publishers.

Human Studies
? 1990 Kluwer

Printed

in the Netherlands.

Review Essay

A new phenomenological

Marxism

JAMES BOHMAN
Department

Michel

Saint Louis University,

of Philosophy,

Henry,

McLaughlin.

Karl Marx:
Bloomington,

St. Louis, MO 63103

A philosophy
of human reality. Trans.
IN: Indiana University
Press, 1983.

Kathleen

sets for itself the task of reinvent?

of modern
Every generation
philosophy
master
its
In
this century, this phenomenon
has
the
thinkers
of
tradition.
ing
been borne out by repeated
substantial
of Marx,
par?
reinterpretations
so
movements
where
in
France
1945
since
emergent philosophical
ticularly
have

infused

new

informs

into Marxism.
concepts
philosophical
infusion is a condition
for the possibility

us, such
vitality of any tradition, whether
interplay with other philosophical

As

hermeneutics

of the continued

or otherwise.
This
political,
philosophical
movements
and their new vocabularies

has been a particular strength of Western

non-orthodox
Marxism.
European,
"Existential" Marxism
in France is perhaps the greatest expression
of the
came
lack of orthodoxy
in Western
Marxism.1
Its most
influential works
after World

War
and Sartre in the face of the
II, written by Merleau-Ponty
of post-War Europe. The various versions
of Existential Marxism
the interpretation
of Marx
influenced
in the entire post-war generation
and
introduced a rich phenomenological
into historical materialism,
vocabulary

situation

its abstract,
with ones more
large-scale
descriptions
sociological
to phenomena
of subjectivity,
and
life.
intersubjectivity
everyday
now
the rise of Althusser
with
and
the
post-structuralism,

replacing
adequate
However,
influence
toward
Henry's

of

existentialism

anti-humanism
work

has

waned

the trend
considerably.
Against
to phenomenology
and existentialism,
a revitalization
of this important Western Marxist

in reaction

represents

philosophical tradition, informing it with the criticism of Western

metaphysics that has been developed by Levinas and Heidegger. While in
some ways

it is a return
a new

to this older movement,

Henry's
Marxism
phenomenological
appropriate

importantly
situation in France.
porary philosophical
fell out of favor primarily
Existential Marxism

because

book

is more

to the contem?
of its humanism.

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164
For all their
see humanism
with

modern

internal

both structuralism
and post-structuralism
differences,
as the enemy of thought, responsible
for much
that is wrong
can
seen
As
the
title
be
of Henry's
from
very
philosophy.
A Philosophy
it is evident that Henry means
of Human Reality,

work, Marx:
an answer
to provide

to such criticism.
is not just another
His answer
new
a
of it
but
of old Enlightenment
humanism,
interpretation
a
more
far
radical concept of
through Marx. He argues that Marx uncovered
or
human
than
been
either
liberalism
has
forward
put
by
subjectivity

defense

and
of Merleau-Ponty
previous Marxism,
including the existential Marxism
School. On
and the Frankfurt
Sartre and the Hegelian Marxism
of Lukacs
nor
an
a
of
Marx
economic
is
neither
history
Henry's
reading,
philosopher
is the constant attempt to
criticism
theorist; he is a social critic for whom
rescue

from the invasions

of living individuals
subjectivity
As
construed
and false objectifications.
of social mediations
by Henry,
a
to
find
such
of
Marx's
endeavor
concept
subjectivity
requires
primary
more
is none
The main obstacle
than the standard critique of institutions.
the irreducible

from the original French

itself. Reduced
metaphysics
to
work attempts
in English,
edition
into one dense long volume
Henry's
of
the
retrieve Marx's
hitherto forgotten
living, non-representa?
discovery
tional subject of praxis, a new subject entirely distinct from the Idealistic

other

than Western

or
or history. Marx,
not Nietzsche
of cognition
subject
from
the most
successful
attempt at a radical departure
begins
Heidegger,
are
even
Husserl
and
in
which
all previous Western
Heidegger
metaphysics
of
is
in
Marx's
For
any genre
writing
Henry,
question
persistent
implicated.

metaphysical

the recovery of the reality of a living monadic

subject.
new philosophy
to Marx's
of praxis and his thorough-going

one:

a metaphysical
This

is the key
of capitalist

criticism
The

theme

the Western

society.
in
of recapturing
squarely
places Henry
subjectivity
original
The
of
Lukacs.
that
with
tradition
Marxist
category
began
as the
of the proletariat
informed Lukacs's Hegelian
description

subjectivity
as well as
subject of history,
the individual
which
subject
historical
epochs. Moreover,
the creation
of the society

his

attempt

experiences
the humanist

to describe
objects
Marxist

in individual

social

the diverse

forms by
in various

in the world
theme

of alienation
further

and

focused

activity
on collective
not merely
social structures but on their
Mar?
and action. But previous Western
effects on individual
subjectivity
a basically
and hence
xism,
Hegelian,
by Lukacs,
adopted
inspired
as
seen
the
human
Action
is
of
model
objectification
activity.
problematic,

Western

of some

Marxism

inner creative

essence.

that the philosophical

key
Henry proposes
is to see just how far he got beyond Hegelian
all the assump?
of action, both of which
embody

to understanding
Marx
and
theory
metaphysics
tions of Western
philosophy.

This

insight was

spurred by Marx's

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realization

165
did not go far enough
left-wing Hegelians
to
still had
However,
Henry, Marx
according

that Feuerbach

and the other

in

their criticisms

of Hegel.

to

struggle to get beyond the superficial and internal criticisms of Hegel he

the favored work of Western Marxists.
in the 1844 Manuscripts,
developed
in its concepts
this
calls
work
Feuerbachian"
of alienation
Henry
"strictly
Marx's
and universal
But
in
1845,
species being.
thought finally undertook
a fundamental
turn in the way that Althusser,
opponent,
Henry's
thought it
reasons. The innovative
turn is not to some
did, but for entirely different
but is a reversal
in the Heideggerian
of history or to economics,
sense. To get beyond Hegel, Marx turns away from all Western
ontology.
What
is interesting about Henry's
is that he locates Marx's
interpretation
criticism of Hegel at a much deeper conceptual
level than have the previous
texts.
usual
these
of
crucial
The
litany of the sins of Idealism
interpretations
science

more
radical point of departure. What Marx
pale in the face of Henry's
to criticize was not just Hegel's
notion of some ideal realm of
wanted
or
or of some enlarged
historical
consciousness
subject he called Geist
to repeat the error Parmenides
and the
essence
sum?
of the ultimate
of being. In a nutshell, Henry
an
not
like
is
identifiable
Marx's
this:
within
discovery
"Reality

Spirit. Hegel's
Western
view
marizes

real mistake

was

of objectivity"
(p. 12). This reversal provides
and most
of Marx's
texts": Marx's
crucial

ontology
"theory

was

philosophical
discovery
criticized Feuerbach,
Stirner,
he
arrived
friends,
Hegelian

the key
fruitful

to Henry's

of
period
in 1845 when,
in The German
he
Ideology,
and Proudhon.
From this criticism of his left
at his most

fundamental

discoveries:

the

of the living individual,

of history,
and of praxis. Nonetheless,
concepts
even in his most anti-metaphysical
Marx
remains a philosopher.
moments,
to claim
for Henry
it is absurd
that Marx
calls for an end to
Thus,
or
some
substitution
of
discourse
for
philosophy
positivist
philosphical
or
Even
economic
theories.
in Capital,
scientific,
sociological
Henry
Marx

claims,

focuses

on philosophical,

"exclusively

indeed

ontological,

concepts."

How

did Marx

come

to this radical

reversal

of

the Western

tradition?

Why did Marx turn the philosophical tradition upside down? Here Henry
not Heidegger:
like Levinas,
the turn was motivated
not by
man
as
a
of
that
discloses
to
itself
heteronomy
Being
passive
but a radical, non-intentional
notion of subjectivity.
Such a

sounds much
some

new

instrument,

notion is the fruit of Marx's

concepts
traditions

of "historical
of orthodox

repeated criticism of Hegel

materialism."

in the basic

and

the predominant
Against
Engels
claims
that materialism
does not
Henry

Marxism,
new version
the independence
of nature and matter. Marx's
a
"the
from
to another,
certain
of
passage
required
conception
subjectivity
from an intuitive
an
and
the
subjectivity
establishing
receiving
object,

merely

assert

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166
'objective'

to a subjectivity

subjectivity,

that is no

longer

to a

'objective,'

radical subjectivity from which all objectivity is excluded" (p. 145). This
sense

is Marx's
greatest
philosophical
subjectivity
a
no
in the Western
is
since such
achievement,
longer trapped
subject
world
and self so
between
and pendulum
swings
ontological
problems
This
self-consciousness.
and Kantian
characteristic
of less radical Cartesian
"radical"

new,

of

new

in that pure, non-relational

activity Marx called praxis.
subject engages
nor represent
itself as an
into an objective
It cannot be subsumed
ontology,

object in the world. Once subjectivity is rid entirely of an "objectivity,"

is seen

action

then

to some

oriented

as non-teleological,
object. For Henry,

as

rather

self-generating,
this means
that Marx

than

is a radical

subjectivist. Being itself is praxis, and reality is defined entirely as the

In elucidating
this subject, Henry's
activity of sensuous, needy individuals.
and phenomenological,
Marx
tries to be descriptive
remaining
always
of
life. When made
into a method
within
the stream of some individual's
such

reflection,

phenomenological
When
applied

immanence
version

to a kind

leads

of

extreme

nominalism,

razor.

of Ockham's

reductionis
becomes
nominalism
reality, Henry's
"real" higher-order,
reality. For ex?
intersubjective
a
as
race
an
event
would
such
of
the
simply be the plurality
reality
ample,
ran
or
it as a spectator.
in it
witnessed
of those who
of the lived experiences
tic. There

We

to social

can be no

not hypostatize
"the race" into some shared social object.
such
in particular,
and Hegel
all Western
posited
metaphysics,
radical
But
as appearing
to some cognitive,
subject.
objective

should

Indeed,
objects

is always
"monadic,"
subjectivity
concrete
and specific.
individual,
Marx's
concept of praxis precisely

and

by

this Henry means

sees the ontological

Henry
in that it makes

this monadic

that
move

it is
in

subjec?

structure" of all being.

tivity the "ground" and "fundamental
the problem with such a concept of praxis is
For all the light it generates,
never faces the horns of the dilemma
that it remains ambiguous.
Henry
Either
all human
the content
of this concept
which
poses.
specifying

activity is to be included within "pure" subjectivity, and then the concept

are to be so
some
or only
such forms
amorphous;
entirely
and then we can hardly think that "praxis" in this more restricted
privileged
tends toward the
sense will
lead us to a concept of human reality. Henry
He calls praxis "individual
first difficulty.
life," or "the process
subjective
like a kind of unmediated
of living," by which he seems to mean
something
remains

interiority of life as lived, something which Kierkegaard found primarily in

The closest Henry comes to this option is to identify
religious experiences.
to the world and to others. If we do
self-relation
need as a non-objective,
not go by way
any adequate

to imagine
it is truly difficult
of Kierkegaard's
specificity,
acts
concrete
of
and
of
living (such as
ordinary
description

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167
even
in some way
that is not
eating)
making
something,
so
a
and
in
thousand
with
mediated
ways
objectivity
sociality
"objective,"
as to make
to
if
that
it
be
it "impure".
Indeed,
said, contrary
Henry,
might
so
a
the
idea
then
of "pure subjectivity"
Marx
is
radical nominalist,
very
speaking,

would

not

pass Marx's

own

internal

it would

strictures;

fade

into pale

abstraction.
new phenomenological
is the core of Henry's
this concept
Nonetheless,
and it brings phenomenology
Marxism,
very close to old style empiricism.
a
out
to
makes
Marx
be
strident
individualist;
methodological
Henry
like "fetishism"
and "reification"
indeed, critical concepts
to their subjective
false objectivities
origins and founding
of
all
wholesale
holistic
is certainly
rejection
explanation
flies

in the face

more

of most

reduce
actually
acts. While
this
anti-Hegelian,

it

of Marx.

obvious

Henry
simply
readings
in all its forms with the structuralist misinterpretations
of
equates holism
a
or the orthodox
Althusser
excessive
of
the
later
Such
objectivism
Engels.
we
too
far.
if
wholesale
holistic
Even
of
goes
grant a
rejection
explanations
healthy

scepticism,

view

Henry's

would

not

do away

only with

the very

possibility of typical social scientific explanations, but with any viable

of

notion

intersubjectivity
like the same old

as well.
isolated

In

seems
the end, Henry's
subject
to
create
in
its
powers
subject
has replaced
and
intersubjectivity

Idealist

strangely
the world, except that now individuality
life has taken over the function of thought.

This new phenomenology,

like
a
It
than
is
thinks.
Henry
conceptual
empiricism,
not a fundamental
of consciousness
in
mutation,
revision, of the categories
the German
Idealist
At
tradition.
best,
Henry's
phenomenological
the old

is less

radical

is insufficiently
radical for the very task which he claims Marx
to try. It is no less insufficient
for the foundational
and theoreti?
to under?
cal rethinking which
historical
materialism
needs
contemporary

vocabulary
is the first

take at this time when

it is being challenged
from all sides.
no
claim
is
less
Henry's
suspect. He sees The German
interpretive
as
turn
that
in
work
Marx's
which
the definitive
corpus
Ideology
represents
In
from
and
Western
Marx
the
this
makes
work,
away
Hegel
metaphysics.
basic

familiar

assertion

that

living

subjectivity

is "the
in one

historical

materialism,
and teleological

basic premise"
of all
stroke all false, objective
they be Spirit, classes or

thereby eliminating
subjects of history, whether
of production. Much
modes
of Henry's
book is a close reading of various
the basis for historical materialist
texts, showing how this premise provides
theories of ideology
and history.
In order to support his crucial claim,
social

gives familiar passages

asserts
when Marx
example,

Henry

activities
premise

inMarx's
in The

corpus
German

a transcendental
that

twist. For
individual

Ideology
of production
for the sake of the fulfillment
of needs is "the first
on
of history", Henry construes
this as "metahistorical
reflection"

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168
the conditions
Marx's

out

pointing
philosophy,

the

illusions
now

but

of

is able

objectivity.
Henry
its "meta-economic

seem

it would

of possiblity
of history. Thus,
as Kant's
criticism as reflective

social

Dialectic

of metaphysics
armed
"life" and "praxis"
rather
to find

reflection,"

sees
that Henry
of the first Critique,
a transcendental
with
than knowledge
and
turn in
transcendental

in Capital

the same

providing

a "transcendental

of

genesis"

economies.

capitalist
Henry's

of this style of transcendental

development

reflection

inMarx

is

surprisingly fruitful for making sense of difficult passages, particularly in

to incorporation
that are resistant
in
concepts
or
as
are
theoretical
such
economics
discourses
sociology
typical
intelligble
in light of this return to living subjectivity.
Surplus value can be readily
not as part of Marxian
but in terms of meta
understood
economics,
Certain

Capital.

Marxian

on subjectivity
i.e. "dead" rather

In socialism,
in capitalist
exchange.
will
the
than
labor,
"living"
approach
capital,
this
textual
of
limit of zero. But for all its illuminating
power,
interpretation
seems
one?
Marx as philosophical
inventor of a new concept of subjectivity
to
there is no absence
of texts in The German
sided. Certainly,
Ideology
reflection

economic

variable

thesis; but the same is

support Henry's main
as
well, and much of what Marx
says
reading
be entirely consistent with his Hegelian
precis
to The Critique
famous "Preface"
of Political
Even

entirely misleading.
ideological
structures
that Marx

have argued,
in the concept
remains
implicated

many
even

Marx's
concept
materialist

Marxist

is complex
enough to
in the
of his basic principles

a text Henry finds

Economy,
Marx
Ideology,
clearly argues for
on
the level of social
scale changes

in The German

of large
explanations
that he calls "modes of production."
still insists that these structures
Nonetheless,
his Hegelian

activity.
abandon

true of the orthodox

in 1845

is correct to point out

Henry
are constituted
by individual

do not
entirely
explanations
worse.
or
In fact,
for
better
heritage,
teleological
that
Kostas Axelos,
Marxist
such as the Heideggerian
Marx's

historical

of productive
praxis which Henry finds so radical, Marx
of nature.2
in the Western
project of the domination

1844 Manuscripts
of the subject

may
outside

be a more
of

likely place for the invention

the
tradition. Unlike
the Western

is aimed
the early Romanticism
Marx,
to
to
others.
world
and
relation
the
non-objective

at a recovery

of

of a
later
some

uses the individualistic

of "social
reduction
it may, Henry
as a
or at times "social
to pure subjectivity,
transparency",
sense
of
form
to
social
Marx's
criticism.
make
of
tool
Every
powerful
test.
to
This
basic
this
reductive
and mediation
is put
social representation
Be

that as

totalities"

of ideology
and is carried
argument
early critique
begins with Marx's
to show that
tries
forward in his later critique of political
economy.
Henry
are tied together
in Marx
forms of social criticism
the various
by the

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169
common

to uncover
the "reality" underlying
the
the attempt
On
this
the
economic
social
view,
distorting
ideality.
sphere is
are
so
are
its
the
laws
strict
because
laws of
ideal;
"eidetic,"
simply
they
thread

of

mirror

of

non-norma?
criticism
is decidedly
consciousness.
Such reductive
objective
in criticism, Marx begins with what Henry
tive. Every time that he engages
a description
calls a "genealogy,"
of the subjective
reality underlying
can then give an
structures.
various social
Once
they have emerged, Marx
ideal or eidetic
genesis,"
from which
in 1845

of them, which Henry calls their "transcendental

description
of regional ontology
of the very objective
consciousness
we must
The
liberate ourselves.
theory of ideology developed

a kind

shows

a representation
declares
technique; Marx
to refer to reality,"
to underlying
it "ceases

this basic

because

ideological

to be
pure

subjectivity (p. 181). Ideology can be explained precisely because it is still

in the now

grounded

and

buried

distorted

creative

principle

of

living

its genealogical
origin.
subjectivity,
In this way, Marx's metaphysical
in social

useful

structures
This

tivity.

criticism

since

and representations
same form of

methodologies
Althusser
simply

of

various

impulse and search for reality becomes

the function
is to trace back
of analysis
to various "founding
acts" of living subjec?
a way
provides
as well.
The
theories

reflection
social

to criticize

the

structuralism

of

mistake
of an objective
universal. As all
repeats Hegel's
it ignores Marx's
Marxism,
metaphysical
insight and commits
the transcendental
illusion of the Western
of objectivity.
metaphysics

orthodox
again
"The

of the real, an illusion which finds

its modern
in 'structuralism,'"
is clear in any explanation
which
expression
or
"structures"
causal
either
autonomy
gives
efficacy
(p. 184).
illusion

of the ideal determination

seems
to amount
entire ontological
to this
reversal
Henry's
really
concern
to deny the reality of the "objective
But to call this
universal."
seems to be an exaggeration;
more appropriately,
in
insight metaphysical
the passages Henry himself
is concerned with the methodologi?
cites, Marx
as nascent
cal error of political
social
its tendency
science,
economy
towards

as if
and treatment of explanatory
constructs
category mistakes
criticism
they were real rather than abstract. But even this methodological
seems to have some limits. Taken to the extreme Henry does, it would have
forms of social scientific
but all
only most
explanation
and all representations.
More
characteristic
of the theory of
to
is
true
or
the
from
false
authentic
from
attempt
ideology
distinguish
ones. Henry
inauthentic
the critique of ideology with
totalizes
the usual
absurd consequence
that all social mediations
become
false, to be criticized
as attempts
to eliminate
the irreducible
condition
of the plurality
of in?

Marx

deny
mediations

dividuals
is not

not

in a society. In the end, it would

seem Marx's
it is the return to Heraclitus's
insistence

so new:

insight into Being

on plurality
and

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170
of modern
tendencies
thought,
becoming,
against the Eleatic
and orthodox Marxism
included. Whatever
the merits
of

structuralism
this

sort

of

of modern

the extremity
of Henry's
Heraclitian
rejection
metaphysics,
alternative makes Marx's
historical materialism
implausible
fundamentally
as a social theory. In fact, it is the denial of the very idea of a social theory,
of methodologi?
since there can be no reality on the level of society. Typical
as well. Such is the
cal exaggerations,
social life itself is thereby eliminated
cost of not separating
the philosophical
criticism
of the representational
from
the
social
of the reifying
and
Western
criticism
subject
metaphysics
effects

of capitalist
society.
Iwant to suggest that Henry's
tivity is based on two unstated,

entire rejection of higher order intersubjec

and implausible,
The first is a
assumptions.
In his
the immediacy
about
of reflection.

methodological
assumption
account
critical
of Marx's
reference

of ideological

not

does

arguments,
Henry
terms on the semantic

level;

the false
analyze
rather, the underlying

is established

of

any representation
on the immediacy
of lived subjective
in this century have
the criticisms
of Husserl

reality
reflection

like Merleau-Ponty,
seems unwarranted,
in
reflection
immediacy
or
mediated
social, historical,
symbolically

existential
and
with

through phenomenological
and activity. As
experience
some by
shown,
including
the assumption
of pure givenness

seems

Marxists

dealing
Second, Henry
experience.
be
that representations
may

an

to make

when

particularly

assumption
empirical
is
that a society without
ineliminable,
ideology
completely
one
lived
mediation
of
without
be
it
would
because
any symbolic
possible
seems
to me
to be extremely
conclusion
of reality. This
experiences
somehow

implausible. The justifiable desire to perserve plurality in social life ends in

the

of

impossibility
solitary creatures

fruitful
worked

procedure
out by

social

wandering
in regard

monadic
life; Henry's
about in Rousseau's
to the criticism

of forms

self-conscious

Habermas's

be the
subjects would
state of nature. A more
of

intersubjectivity
turn. Instead

linguistic
to point out

Habermas

those

forms

is
of
of

attempts
rather than suppress subjective plurality
is not the only possible
universality
objective
Hegelian
relations
in
communicative
model
for achieved
genuine
intersubjectivity;
one
on
sort
find
the
of "free
mutual
based
between
consent,
may
persons
a
for
rational society. In
association"
among social actors that Marx posited
denying

intersubjectivity,

intersubjective
and autonomy.

general,

reality

Henry

that preserve

eschews

all normative

reflection

structures

are declared

to be false

intersubjective
is true, his ideal of socialism
pure

can be no more

and transparency,
immediacy
it a worthy
content that could make

social

political
All these

implications

become

most

since all
and distinctions,
If this
the beginning.

from

than the simple projection

of any normative
devoid

project.
goal of a collective
final chapter
in Henry's
evident

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of
or
on

171
in which

socialism,

an ideal that is at once

he formulates

anti-political,

non

rational and technologically determined. This conception of socialism is the

exact opposite from that of the Heideggerian Marxist description of the
spread of
associated

as "planetary
nihilism."3
technology
are
with
reversed:
phenomenology
will

lead

struggle
political
Althusser's
automatic

to the "liberation

history,

Here

all

the old

technology

of

subjective
advancement

values

rather

than

in
praxis."
by itself makes
As

technological
alone, not through
possible
subjective
through overabundance
activity
structure of social
life. As early as
the reorganization
of the normative
account
to
have rejected
is supposed
of the
1843, Marx
any political
free

of

fantasy

as one more

to socialism

transition

specificity

is the
"Revolution
fantasy.
Hegelian
or
which
historical
heaven"
ontic
life,"
political
gives
on a more general,
to something
that Marx meant
ontological
"the

level (p. 99).

sees technology
as rescuing
of political
Hanry
emancipation,
reason
will
But
the
that
the
socialism
be
liberation
only
subjectivity.
of praxis
it is "an entirely
automatic
is because
system of production"
same
error with
not
to
Does
here
commit
the
(p. 282).
Henry
regard
In place

human

technology
revolution?

that he
How

an unambiguously
the discovery
of
assumptions

can

finds

in Marx's

to
calls
left-Hegelian
future be anything more
than

criticism

the ideal

technological
and ethnocentric

of

even at odds with

projection,
because
of
the metaphysical
Hence,
living subjectivity?
in this projected
contained
ideal, there is little reason to see
Western

as some radical departure from Western

It
"pure subjectivity"
metaphysics.
seems more an expression
not
of Marx's
and
militant
modernism,
yet
early
affected by the vagaries and disasters of the next century which cloud such
The following
true of
easy and undialectical
quote thus is more
optimism.
rather than Marx's
"No philosophy
has given to
Henry's
hope for socialism:
nor has any, by the
this pure concept of subjectivity
such a radical meaning,
reduction of all objectivity,
satisfied
its most extreme,
if not to say wildest,
exigencies"
(p. 275).
It may well be that the basic
lies not

so much

in his

textual

flaw of Henry's
vision
anarchist, apolitical
own
in
Marx's
but
analysis,
fundamentally

of the place of politics

and his pervasive
eth
conception
But with his method
nocentrism.
of phenomenological
and close
reflection
a
textual reading, Henry
radical
of
gives
philosophically
interpretation
inconsistent

Marx

as the first

philosophical

and greatest
radicalism
does

critic
not

of Western

translate

But all this

metaphysics.
into anything
like the political

radicalism of thought sought by Marx and by critical social theorists ever

can finally have no social or political
If Henry
is right, Marx
nor
of political
and
any comprehension
life, social struggle,
philosophy,
collective
Unlike Lukacs, Henry's
return to subjectivity
finds
organization.
since.

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172
no agent

for social

transformation

of technological
change.
for
agent
subjective
granted. The

process

is how

Marxists
when

other

than the anonymous,

uncontrollable
a
took such
transformative
Perhaps Marx

real problem
for contemporary
and future
the possibility
of fundamental
social change
longer apparent. Such a task requires the search

to think of

such a subject

is no

not some simple assumption

for genuine
that pure im?
intersubjectivity,
or
even
either
is
desirable.
possible
mediacy
For all its merits, Henry's
falls prey to a certain seduc?
reading of Marx
to Heideggerians
tive rhetoric common
and post-structuralists.
Somehow,
now
we
even
must
in
its
modern
end
they proclaim,
philosophy,
guises. But
Marx

seemed

more

in

rather
transforming
He did this not by inventing a new philosophical

philosophy.

interested

than

ending
or

vocabulary

ontology, but by embedding the traditional philosophical questions of ethics

in normative
and epistemology
social theory. Henry's
achievement
positive
concerns
is to revive
with
the demands
its
of existentialist
Marxism,

subjectivity and the plurality of individual points of view. While

concerns
Marxist

as a needed

could

serve

ideals

of human

these

to the grand visions

of past
of
wholesale
Henry's
rejection

corrective

emancipation,

politically and symbolically mediated intersubjectivity leads him to place

the hope

of the future

in the dubious

effects

In a model

of technology.

of

social criticism thatmight be able to distinguish true from false intersubjec?

tivity, such hope could be put back in the hands of just those subjects Henry
writes
While

about

so eloquently.

Henry

effectively
Althusser,

uses

existential

Marxism

lack of normative

as

a foil

reflection

for his
reduces

against
Henry's
polemics
to a merely
thinker in the bad old sense, as Althusser
Marx
philosophical
a concern with
social scientist. Henry makes
reduced him to a positivist
more
fundamental
than
and changing
Western
rethinking
metaphysics
It is no wonder
that Henry never
and political
arrangements.
sort
his analysis
of political
the
less answers,
raises, much
questions
structures
leave
How might political
suggests. They are quite provocative.
balance
How could institutions
intact the interiority of human subjectivity?

existing

social

to a normative
of solidarity and plurality? This is the challenge
as the most
reading of Marx
thoughtful
theory left by Henry's
and plurality.
advocate of human subjectivity

the demands
political
extreme

Notes
in
isMark Poster, Existential Marxism
1. The best discussion of this movement
Post-War France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
2. I owe this point to a discussion with Tsenay Serequeberhan.
3. Kostas Axelos, Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), p. 292.

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