Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Author(s): Tung-Hui Hu
Source: Discourse, Vol. 34, No. 2-3 (Spring/Fall 2012), pp. 163-184
Published by: Wayne State University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13110/discourse.34.2-3.0163
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Discourse
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Tung-Hui Hu
leaves in its wake interchangeable media in the global simultaneity of real time.2 The words he uses to discuss the regime of the
digital are striking, because real time aptly describes the very
thing he opposes to digital media: analog cinema.
Quoting a character of Nathaniel Hawthorne, who exclaims
that by means of electricity, the world of matter has become a
great nerve, Mary Ann Doane has suggested that electricity produced instantaneity roughly a hundred years before digital technologies such as the Internet.3 In her investigation of films such
as the Execution of Czolgosz (1901), in which bodies were burned
with electricity and other stimuli, she notes that electricity generates a virtually instantaneous bodily responsethe nerve of the
world. By annihilating delay, electricity tied together the globe,
producing its own global simultaneity.4 Electricity also pointed to
the delay or dead time that occurs between action and response
in everyday life. Doane uses this idea to argue that by structuring
time through narrative and editing, cinema achieves a maximum
reduction of wasted time, a real time that is much more real
than real time itself.5 In other words, a hundred years before
Newmans critique of global simultaneity, cinema too was billed as
global, simultaneous, a real time medium that annihilated all earlier forms of media.
What my example suggests is that real time may at the present
moment be synonymous with digital technology, but the term is
much more malleable; it has a way of adhering to the latest technology. Within the history of computer technology, the effort to
locate the earliest moment of real time often results in ever more
diffuse examples. We know that real-time technologies came largely
out of the machine of war; we know, for instance, that the SemiAutomatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system, deployed in 1958
to track incoming Soviet bombers, was the first computer system
that offered the ability to interact with the screen in real time and
led to the first real-time business applications.6 The phrase is first
used in J. P. Eckerts 1946 description of a digital real time computing machine that might replace analog (or true) computing
machines in gun positioning, missile guidance, flight simulation,
and industrial control.7 Eckert limits himself to four applications,
because analog devices would have been considered more suitable
for real-time applications than their cumbersome digital counterparts. It would take a decade and a half for this advantage to
change. But open our historiography to analog technologiessuch
as the radar screen, which Lev Manovich argues was the first screen
continuously updated with real-time information8and locating a
start to real time becomes very complicated indeed.
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Tung-Hui Hu
Figures 1a and 1b. On Guard! The Story of Sage (1956), IBM Corporation,
Military Products Division.
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Tung-Hui Hu
the disaster that SAGE was meant to anticipate and also forestall,
a disaster that always threatened to happen more quickly than
SAGEs displayscope could register. As it turns out, time zero was
also the elusive goal of the national television networks, which
finally managed to broadcast a live detonation of an atomic bomb
on April 22, 1952.15 We typically think of television and computer
networks as separate entities that are only recently converging, but
in the 1950s, SAGE used the same microwave relay stations and Bell
System circuitsthe same root structure, as it werethat carried
television signals.
This suggests a curious overlap between early television networks and even earlier computer networks in 1952. The telecast
was the first time that an electronic image of local liveness fed
back into and became network live, to use the terms of television scholar Mark J. Williams.16 Using a newly built series of microwave relays, a local station, KTLA, fed live signals from the bomb
test into the national network, setting the stage for local and network data to become fused into a bidirectional structure of liveness. Television signals, in other words, could no longer be cleanly
categorized as network or local; they were increasingly something
of both.17 SAGE later adopted this bidirectional or feedback structure in its data link network. Connecting more than one hundred
radar installations around the country to its twenty-four Direction
Centers, SAGEs network relayed signals to its computers, which
then flowed back to the world in real time. SAGEs data links
influenced ARPAnet, and in turn the present-day Internet, where
the definition of the word network includes and is inextricable
from local transmission.
The Internet did not directly evolve out of television networks.
Nevertheless, the story of the first televised weapons test, related
below, will allow us to uncover a moment of coincidence around
the idea of time. Just as the speed of nuclear missiles challenged
SAGEs real-time displays, the quickness of the bombs explosion
strained at the limits of televisions ability to capture it (or, after
1963, to mobilize the population quickly through the Emergency
Broadcast System). The mediums glitches and failures resulted in
a corresponding fantasy of real time that would cover over those
very failures. After describing the weapons telecast, I then turn to
one of its afterimages to ask how we can imagine the time of the
real differently. Calling attention to a mediums capacity to register alternate temporalities, a found footage film by Bruce Conner, Crossroads (1976), may offer a different way to understand the
recording of time in a digital age.
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*An atomic bomb detonates over Yucca Flat, Nevada in 1952 and
appears on national television. But the one place you could not
watch the test, strangely enough, was in Nevada, for the state was
not yet connected to the national network.18 Crossing through the
northern part of the state, the coaxial cable relay left Las Vegas and
its surrounding area out of the transcontinental system that had
just arrived the previous winter in California. To feed the national
broadcasters, the Atomic Energy Commission turned to KTLA,
an independent television station in Los Angeles that took on
the challenge of building its own connection to Yucca Flat. KTLA
head and Paramount vice president Klaus Landsberg rigged his
own microwave relay system across 275 miles of desert, engaging
U.S. Marine Corps helicopters to parachute four relay stations onto
nearby mountain peaks.
Engineers were concerned not just with the jury-rigged system
but also with the optics. Billboard reported that Its feared that the
power of the blast will blow out the cameras even from the 11-mile
distance from Frenchmans Flat and the Mount Charleston camera site. . . . [M]otion picture cameras will be on the scene to take
footage of the explosion in case the blast knocks out the TV connections.19 Radio interference from televising the event was also
a concern: television frequencies were largely identical to those
used by nuclear test equipment. In the end, the engineers fears
came true, but not in the way they had imagined. Atomic Energy
Commission generators and, in turn, the camera feed failed before
detonation time.20 The power went out at 9:16 a.m., fourteen minutes before time zero; the newsmen worked frantically to cool off
the television tubes and restart the feed from the backup camera
forty miles away. Three minutes after detonation, the closest camera had finally warmed up; the feed switched back to it, showing
the aftereffects of the smoke. The transmission was so variable that
some newspapers declared the test a success, while others reported
only a blank screen on their television sets.
First Atom-Bomb Telecast a Dud, Billboard proclaimed a week
later. Varietys headline was snarkier: A-Bomb in TV Fluff Fizzles
Fission Vision.21 An officer at the Atomic Energy Commission
recounted the event: The response in those precious seconds of
the burst and formation of the fireball apparently depended on
individual [television] sets. Two newspapers in Los Angeles got
good pictures all the way through. The sets in the other two newspaper offices got only a black flicker and then the picture tore
up for almost a minutethe most important minute in the telecast.22 Other viewers reported geometric swirls and diagonal bars
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Tung-Hui Hu
Figures 2a and 2b. KTLA telecast of the April 22, 1952, atomic test, via
Critical Commons.
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What is striking about the telecast is how flat it feels.24 A contemporary viewer of the recording can barely make out a puff of
smoke above a grainy and overexposed black-and-white image
while the commentator describes the beautiful, tremendous, and
angry spectacle. ...Looking into the cloud you see the orange,
the brown, and the dirty black, and the fringe white. You cant
see, and therein lies the reason for the voice-off, for the temporary
shift from image to voice and the temporary reversion from television to radio. Because even the auditory shockwave is delayed
by about thirty seconds, the viewer is blind. The viewer is almost
entirely reliant on the military announcer counting seconds after
the bomb has been dropped (bombs away, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30)
and seconds until the explosion is about to happen (5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
The atomic test manifests itself primarily through the sound of
the countdown: when viewers cant actually see what is going on,
the only thing they can be sure about is the time to the detonations time zero.25
Yet if the countdown hinges on how many seconds before or
after time zero, the actual moment of detonation is a bit of a fantasy.
As the Atomic Energy Commission officer put it, those precious
seconds of the burst ... the most important minute in the telecast
are lost.26 And the mushroom cloud itself is, by definition, an aftereffect. Any sense of presence from the April 22 telecast is due to
an imaginative slippage between the pinhole spot and the detonation, between the absence of any image on the television tube and
the plenitude of the bombs explosion. The bomb also bursts far
too quickly for traditional optical technology; scientists have since
turned to Harold Edgertons Rapatronic film camera, which can
shoot the nuclear explosion at ten nanosecond intervals and generate thousands of meters of film in less than a second. Time zero is
precisely the moment that can never been seen, recorded, or filmed
by conventional means; it can only be approximated.
We are left to conclude that the moment of time zero may
always be a lacuna, a missed moment. Time zero is zeroed out; it
becomes zero time.27 Like melodrama, the pathos of the telecast is
that we are always too late to see what happens; we are delayed, and
those precious seconds are irretrievably lost. There is no question that the network feed quickly improved.28 But the blackout
of the orthicon tube may be a more honest take on the bombs
true nature as a light weapon (as Virilio terms it), a weapon that
disrupts the optical order, than the beautiful, tremendous, and
angry spectacle of the mushroom cloud itself.29 At least the blackout preserves that loss, just as a fizzle may be a more honest way of
capturing the belatedness of any countdown.
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bombs cloud, a cloud that Bob Mielke calls the expensive money
shot of this nuclear technoporn,31 for the grande mort of the
actual bomb. We think we are seeing death onscreen, but in fact we
have missed it; we are seeing something related but imperceptibly
different.
Now there is something like a biopolitics of media at work
whereby the injunction of contemporary power to make live, as
Foucault puts it, to manage, control, and even produce life, tilts
the mediation of time toward liveness.32 In contemporary visual
culture this takes the form of technologies that allow moments of
deathfor example, a weapons strike in Afghanistan or a database
of casualties in Iraqto be mapped, visualized, streamed, and
rebroadcast, and even to become interactive.33 Although the image
of death requires time to bear witness, grieve, or mourn, real time
sutures over this death and transforms the event into a melancholic
reconstruction of it.
Yet real time is not the only way that these events can be mediated. In the next section, I move to another way to look at the
bomb and, in turn, to inhabit its temporality differently.
Image/afterimage. This time, the atomic test is Operation crossroads, the maritime detonation at Bikini Atoll in 1946 that was
the most widely filmed event in the world. Mielke reports that the
test exposed 1.5 million feet of motion picture film at various slowmotion camera speeds, causing a worldwide shortage of film for
months afterward.34 It was, again, a miracle of liveness: to avoid
flying too close to the detonation a television camera mounted
on a drone plane beamed the signal to television receivers.35 The
tests afterimage comes from experimental filmmaker Bruce Conners Crossroads (1976). Using footage that had been declassified
and stored at the National Archives,36 Conner edited together several takes of Operation crossroads underwater test into a film
that plays havoc with the expected temporality of the countdown
(figures 3a and 3b).
Crossroads is a frustrating film by intention. It moves from stillness to explosion and back again, layering an electronic soundtrack
by Patrick Gleeson and Terry Riley to capture the desperate rhythm
and pacing within the explosion. The spectacle itself comes from
what is outsidethe sea that initially appears to be empty background but then abruptly swells up, roiling, the water itself turned
into part of the cloud. Then the explosion ends, the water is calm,
and we are again waiting for the test to commence. This effectthe
time counter reset to a few minutes before the event, the extreme
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Tung-Hui Hu
slow motion of the footagedisrupts our basic expectations of causality and resolution.
Grappling with the film shortly after its release, William Moritz
and Beverly ONeill document the rush of questions that it raises
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This essay began by claiming that the real time of the digital is a
construct that has less to do with its technology than with disavowing the dead time or zero time at its center. In different but related
ways digital media, television, and film convert war and death into
live, interactive events; this is readily visible in TVs around-theclock coverage of 9/11 and the websites that allow users to map
and aggregate civilian deaths. The way we watch is always tinged
with melancholy. Unable to recognize that our vision is always
enabled through zero time, we are barred from the recuperative
time of mourning.
In addition, a second story is at work. At the same time that
the speed of nuclear strikes motivated the development of what
we now call real-time computation, the bomb left its own trace on
film and television. Exposed and irradiated by the light weapon,
optical media recorded the bombs violence through nonpictorial
meansthrough the fogging of film stock, for example. In turn,
years after the event, the media begin to transfer that sense of violence and loss back to us. The essential unrepresentability of death
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Notes
1.
Justice Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio (378 U.S. 184
[1964]): [C]riminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.
2.
Michael Newman, Medium and Event in the Work of Tacita Dean, in Tacita
Dean, edited by Clarrie Wallis (London: Tate Gallery Publishing, 2001), 26.
3.
Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the
Archive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 150.
4.
Ibid., 151.
5.
Ibid., 16263.
6.
See the numerous references to real time and SAGE in, for example, Paul
Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Programmed Visions:
Software and Memory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011); Patrick Crogan, Gameplay
Mode: War, Simulation, and Technoculture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2011). Note that SAGEs predecessor, the 1951 Whirlwind computer, was the first
computer that did not receive input in batches to be output later but instead processed input as it was received.
7.
Eckert begins by cautioning us that real time is not the same thing as speedy
or quick; a real time computer instead takes in account reaction time. A non-real
time computer, Eckert explains, might compute results too quickly (or too slowly)
for a human to handle. John Presper Eckert, Continuous Variable Input and Output
Devices, in The Moore School Lectures, eds. Martin Campbell-Kelly and M. R. Williams
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 394.
8.
Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001),
9.
Paul Virilio, Open Sky, translated by Julie Rose (London: Verso, 1997), 25.
99.
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10.
I am by no means suggesting that time and delay are exclusively postwar
phenomena, but instead am building on a recent scholarly conversation that uses the
intersection of cybernetics, war technology, and media studies to investigate postwar
anxieties about time. This conversation includes Pamela Lee, Chronophobia: On Time
in the Art of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), and Charlie Gere, Art, Time,
and Technology (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2006).
11.
This is a formula that Doane, revisiting an earlier essay on television history,
writes as follows: real time = liveness + interactivity. Mary Ann Doane, Epilogue (2003)
to Information, Crisis, Catastrophe, in New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory
Reader, edited by Thomas Keenan and Wendy Chun (New York: Routledge, 2005), 263.
12.
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Tung-Hui Hu
18.
Vegas Linked: First Telecast of Atom Bomb Set Tuesday, Billboard, April
26, 1952, 2, 6.
19.
Ibid., 2.
20.
21.
22.
Charter Heslep was chief of the Radio-Visual Branch at the Atomic Energy
Commissions press office and was assigned to the joint Atomic Energy Commission/
Department of Defense information office during the time of the telecast. Heslep,
They Said It Couldnt Be Done, in New Horizons in Journalism: Press, Radio, Television,
Periodicals, Public Relations, and Advertising as Seen through Institutes and Special Occasions
of the Henry W. Grady School of Journalism, 195152, edited by John Eldridge Drewry
(Athens: University of Georgia, 1952), 72.
23.
Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 9.
24.
This flatness is particularly felt when viewed next to the Atomic Energy Commissions film of the same blast, which was released later as Operation Tumbler-Snapper.
(The press dubbed the event Operation Big Shot, but the military refers to the
April 22 event as Charlie shot in Operation tumbler-snapper.) For more on the
telecast, see Mark J. Williams, History in a Flash: Notes on the Myth of TV Liveness,
in Collecting Visible Evidence, edited by Jane Gaines and Mark Renov (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 309.
25.
In an editorial cited by Heslep, the Dayton News wrote that the hazy and erratic
. . . dim image of the telecast was vastly exceeded in quality by the atomic monster
movies popular at the time, even if it nevertheless gave a sense of the physical,
momentary presence. . . . It was a living event. Heslep, They Said It Couldnt Be
Done, 73.
26.
Ibid., 72.
27.
Here one might recall John Cages use of the term zero time (as in his
piece 0'00"): Zero Time exists when we dont notice the passage of time, when we
dont measure it. Cage derived the term from musician Christian Wolff, who had
used the term to designate variable duration. See John Cage, For the Birds: John Cage
in Conversation with Daniel Charles (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1981), 207.
The Wolff reference, in the context of real time, comes from Gere, Art, Time and
Technology, 104, who calls zero time the inchoate time of the now.
28.
29.
John Harwood, The White Room: Eliot Noyes and the Logic of the Information Age Interior, Grey Room 12 (Summer 2003): 31.
31.
Bob Mielke, Rhetoric and Ideology in the Nuclear Test Documentary, Film
Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2005): 30.
32.
Foucault contrasts sovereign power, the power to take life, with the power
to regulate and even promote life: this technology of biopower . . . is continuous,
scientific, and it is the power to make live. Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended:
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Lectures at the Collge de France, 19751976, translated by David Macey (New York:
Picador, 2003), 247.
33.
In a parallel tactic, Chun has described the way that software produces a series
of real-time crisis points; by doing so, it creates a false sense of a user as the ultimate
decision maker. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Crisis, Crisis, Crisis, or Sovereignty and
Networks, Theory Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2011): 91112.
34.
35.
United States Joint Task Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial
Record (New York: W. H. Wise, 1946), 77.
36.
Scott MacDonald, The Garden in the Machine: A Field Guide to Independent Films
about Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 438.
37.
Williams Moritz and Beverly ONeill, Fallout: Some Notes on the Films of
Bruce Conner, Film Quarterly 31, no. 4 (Summer 1978): 37.
38.
Ibid., 38.
39.
Ibid.
40.
41.
Box cover for Crossroads and Looking for Mushrooms, DVD, by Bruce Conner (Los
Angeles: Michael Kohn Gallery, 1996). Fogged film was a pervasive problem; Kodak
even threatened to sue the Atomic Energy Commission because of it. In a settlement,
the Atomic Energy Commission agreed to secretly warn the company in advance
of nuclear tests. Kodak apparently discovered the problem in the 1950s after film
packed in irradiated corn husks became fogged. Matthew L. Wald, US Alerted Photo
Film Makers, Not Public, about Bomb Fallout, New York Times, September 30, 1997.
42.
The term mortal, from the Latin mortalis (meaning subject to death;
human), is understood here in contrast to the immortal, who is deathless and
therefore atemporal.
43.
Walter Benjamin, Paralipomena to On the Concept of History, in Walter
Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol. 4, 19381940, edited by Howard Eiland and Michael
W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 405.
44.
William J. Broad, The Bomb Chroniclers, New York Times, September 13,
2010.
45.
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada
Field Office, Historical Test Films, http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/testfilms.
aspx.
46.
This point is made elegantly by Wolfgang Ernst, Between Real Time and
Memory on Demand: Reflections on/of Television, South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no.
3 (Summer 2002): 634.
47.
Operation DOMINIC Nuclear Tests 1962, The Internet Archive, http://
www.archive.org/details/OperationDOMINICNuclearTests1962.
48.
Respectively, the descriptions for Atomic Weapons Orientation Part Five and
Six (Videotape, No. 800070, no date), Operation Dominic FireballsPacific Testing
(Videotape, No. 800029, 1962), Operation Doorstep and Operation Cue (Videotape, No.
800033, 1953), Atomic Blasts, Operations Greenhouse through Upshot-Knothole (Videotape,
No. 800042, 195153), and Starfish Prime Test Interim and Fishbowl Auroral Sequences
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Tung-Hui Hu
(Videotape, No. 800062, 1962), all available for ordering via the U.S. Department of
Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, Historical
Test Films, http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/testfilms.aspx.
49.
Jon Else, on the footage of The Day after Trinity, quoted by Michael Renov,
Filling up the Hole in the Real: Death and Mourning in Contemporary Documentary
Film and Video, in The Subject of Documentary, edited by Michael Renov (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 120.
50.
As an analog, one might think of Bruce Conners film Report (1967), where
holes punched into the leader accompany the radio announcement of President John
F. Kennedys death. These perforations are normally visible only to film projectionists,
but in Report, they serve as visible lacunae in the heart of the films body.
51.
The punctum could accommodate a certain latency. Roland Barthes, Camera
Lucida, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 53.
52.
Ibid., 81.
53.
Ibid.
54.
Akira Lippit, Atomic Light (Shadow Optics), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 80.
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