1

Red Star Over Indochina

By Nevin Gussack
The communist attempt to conquer all of Indochina from the 1940s until the 1970s could
be characterized by three factors:
1) Conscription of Western and American leftists to demoralize the home front and
disseminate propaganda on behalf of the communist enemy.
2) Constant military buildup of the North Vietnamese armed forces, even in violation of
the Geneva Accords.
3) The subversion of South Vietnamese and other noncommunist Indochinese nations.
4) North Vietnam (later Vietnam) working part and parcel with the USSR in promoting
international revolution.
5) Absorption of American technology and military equipment as a consequence of the
Nixon-Kissinger betrayal and leftwing subversion.
The North Vietnamese/Viet Minh laid out a psychological warfare strategy during their
struggle against the French and their Vietnamese supporters. Such a propaganda and
psychological warfare campaign conducted by the Vietnamese Communists (called the Viet
Minh during the period of the war against the French and their Indochinese allies) helped
accelerate the defeat of the French forces and their Vietnamese allies. In 1946, top Vietnamese
Communist Truong Chinh noted Concerning our foreign policy what must our people do? We
must isolate the enemy, win more friends. We must act in such a way that the French
peoplewill actively support usthat all peace loving forces in the world will defend us and
favor the aims of our resistanceThe French people and soldiers should oppose the war by
every means: oppose the sending of troops to Indochina, oppose military expenditure for the
reconquest of VietnamThey should demand from the French government peaceful negotiations
with the Ho Chi Minh government. The French soldiers in Vietnam should demand repatriation,
protest against the setting up of a puppet government. 1 North Vietnamese General Giap noted
that Our foreign policy was directed to winning the support of the people throughout the world,
and particularly to influence the French public opinion against the war. North Vietnamese
General Nguyen Van Hinh said In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more
strongly will compel the adversary to accept its conditions. 2 The French Communist Party
(PCF) maintained links with the Viet Minh throughout the period of the First Indochinese War of
1946 to 1954. The Party and its sympathizers sabotaged the war effort in France. Forty percent of
weapons and supplies for French forces in Indochina were sabotaged before they reached their
destination. The North Vietnamese and the PCF also cooperated in carrying out propaganda
work among South Vietnamese students studying in Paris. 3 Over 25% of the French Parliament
during the First Indochina War (1946-1954) was composed of Communists and this provided a
liaison with the Viet Minh to provide valuable intelligence. The Viet Minh exploited the
divisions within the French communities in Hanoi and Paris. French Communist mobs stoned

Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1975) page 80.
2Miranda, Joseph. Political Warfare The Decisive Strategy The Journal of Social, Political, and
Economic Studies, Winter 1983 pages 427-448
3 Greig, Ian. The Assault on the West (Foreign Affairs Publishing Company 1968) pages 140169.

trains unloading wounded soldiers in their home towns and abused departing troops at the train
stations.4 The defecting Hungarian communist diplomat Janos Radvanyi noted that Not
surprisingly, the French Communist party mobilized itself behind Ho Chi Minh's war effort.
Together with the Confederation General du Travail, it organized protest demonstrations,
strikes, and walk-outs, and party intelligence workers began sabotaging military hardware
moving through French ports to Indochina.5
During the formative years of the Indochinese Communist Party (later the Workers Party
of Vietnam), Ho Chi Minh and his comrades laid out their plans for the subjugation of Southeast
Asia. Contrary to the propaganda of the American Left, the Vietnamese Communists maintained
that their long-term goal was an Indochinese Communist Federation under Hanois domination.
The communist war in Indochina did not stop with the conquest of South Vietnam. In 1932, Ho
Chi Minh and the Indochinese Communist Party drew up the Action Programme which called
for a fraternal union of all nationalities of Indochina. In 1951, the Workers Party of Vietnam
called for the federation of the states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. 6
After the defeat of the French and their allies in 1954, some of North Vietnams allies felt
that political and diplomatic warfare could be used to split the Western bloc apart on the issue of
reunification of the two Vietnams through elections. Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai noted
to Ho Chi Minh that It is possible to gain all Vietnam through peace It is possible to unite
Vietnam through elections when (the) time is ripe. This requires good relations with south -east
Asian countries as well as among the Indochinese countriesThe answer is to unite them
through peaceful efforts. Military means can only drive them to the American sidePeace can
increase the rift between France and the USAPeace can drive Great Britain and the USA
apartAll in all, peace has all the advantages. It can isolate the USAIf the Americans should
block peace, we cannot but fight onWe will be morally in the right. Everyon e will sympathize
with us. Peace will come eventually after a period of fighting. By that time, the USA will be more
isolated.7
North Vietnam also pursued the strategy of possible military conquest of South Vietnam
through its regular forces and irregular guerrillas and terrorists. Hanoi quickly increased its troop
numbers for its regular army and started to acquire both light and heavy weapons from the USSR
and China. Hanoi soon violated the Geneva Accords on the number of troops and types of
equipment held by its armed forces. Governor Tran Van Lam of South Vietnam charged that
North Vietnam kept sleepers in the non-communist zones. These sleepers were composed of
demobilized soldiers and civilians who were drafted into a popular army.8 In 1955, the US and
South Vietnam charged that North Vietnam increased their army by four to six divisions,
equipped with Soviet bloc-made weapons that were shipped to Hanoi via China. 9 In June 1956,
it was reported that the North Vietnamese army had a little less than 20 divisions, who were
advised by 5,000 Red Chinese personnel. The North Vietnamese army received T-34 tanks,
4

Joes, Anthony. Victorious Insurgencies (University Press of Kentucky 2010).

Radvanyi, Janos. Delusion and Reality (Gateway Editions, University of Michigan 1978) page
4.
6The World and I Volume 2 Issue 4 1987 page 140.
7 Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know (Clarendon Press, University of Michigan1997) pages
158-161.
8 Reds Said to Plant Fifth Column New York Times October 8, 1954 page 8.
9 Geneva Breach Cited New York Times July 1, 1955 page 10.
5

artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons from the communist countries. 10 South Vietnamese President
Diem charged that the North Vietnamese army increased its number of troops from 450,000 to
500,000 in 1957.11 It was reported that in the mid-1950s, an estimated 5,000-10,000 Viet Minh
political workers remained in the South to agitate against South Vietnam and to support a French
and North Vietnamese-endorsed plebiscite that would have benefited Hanoi. Later estimates
revealed that the Viet Minh left 50,000-60,000 political and military cadres in the South in the
mid-1950s.12 In 1954-1955, Viet Minh agents remained in the South undetected and launched
occasional attacks in rural areas and infiltrated into the Diem government and other institutions
in the cities. The North Vietnamese forces that withdrew in the period 1954-1956 looted and
destroyed public buildings, railroads, destroyed or stole files and documents from government
offices and the land registries located in the South Vietnamese provinces near the 17 th Parallel.13
Such pilferage and selective destruction mirrored the actions taken by North Vietnam in its
conquest and occupation of South Vietnam in April 1975. It also mimicked the systematic
looting and exploitation undertaken by the Soviet Red Army in 1944 and 1945 as it invaded
much of Eastern Europe and Germany.
It also appeared that the demoralization and withdrawal of the French from North
Vietnam in 1954 and 1955 inadvertently left the communists with American and French-made
firearms. Paris foolishly allowed the communists to retain these weapons, while other Americanmade arms were forwarded by the Red Chinese, who in turn inherited or captured them from
Chiang Kai-sheks betrayed Nationalist forces. In 1954, the Viet Minh captured at least two
American-made M-24 tanks and they were consequently used for propaganda purposes. In 1956,
the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) formed an armored company which consisted of M-8
armored cars and M-3 half-tracks. These weapons either were captured from the French or
passed from captured Nationalist stocks held by the Chinese Communists. These American-made
armored vehicles participated in a parade in Hanoi in 1956.14 In 1959, the 202nd Armored
Regiment was formed by the North Vietnamese army and had as its equipment Soviet-made SU76 guns, US-made M-8 armored cars, US-made M-24 tanks, and some World War II era
Japanese arms.15
Evidence also existed regarding the North Vietnamese transferring of Western-made
weapons to various leftist and communist revolutionaries in foreign countries. The General
Military Party Committee and the Ministry of Defenses Ordnance Department in North Vietnam
passed firearms to the leftist Algerian FLN rebels in that French-held colony in 1958. The
declassified document noted that the North Vietnamese arranged for a large quantity of Tulle
submachine guns (weapons captured by our forces during the resistance war against the French)
to be wrapped and packaged so that they could be provided to the Algerian people to help them
in their resistance war against the French colonialists. The Tulle submachine guns actually
were the MAT-49s captured by the Viet Minh from the defeated French forces and their

10Viet

Minhs 20 Divisions Times (London) June 12, 1956 page 9.

Ngo Says Reds Have 3-to-1 Troop Margin New York Times October 30, 1957 page 11.
12 Hennessy, Michael Strategy in Vietnam (Praeger Publishers Westport CT 1997) page 40.
13 Trager, Frank N. Why Vietnam?(Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) page 164.
14 North Vietnamese Armored Forces Accessed From:
http://15thengineer.50megs.com/9th_&_vn_history.htm
15 Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 48.
11

Vietnamese allies. The weapons were transferred onto a Polish merchant ship and then unloaded
under the guise of commercial goods for the FLN. 16
Large stores of captured Western and Japanese-made weapons were also transferred by
the North Vietnamese to their puppet Viet Cong forces in the South during the 1950s and early
1960s. Between 1965 and 1968, these older Western and Japanese-made firearms were passed
down to the VC Local Forces. These weapons included French MAS 36 rifles, MAS 38 SMG,
Berthier rifles, Mle 1892 and Mle 1916 carbines, and Japanese Type-38 and Type-99 rifles and
light machine guns. These were left behind by French and Japanese forces in the 1940s and
1950s. The Soviets, East Germans, and Czechoslovaks also sent ex-Nazi STG-44 assault rifles,
Mauser K-98 rifles, MP-40 submachine guns, and MG-34 light machine guns to North Vietnam.
These firearms were then forwarded to VC forces in the South. 17
The North Vietnamese quasi-diplomatic representatives in South Vietnam sought to
exploit their presence for the purpose of subverting and ultimately weakening the quasi-fascistic
dictatorship of President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVNNorth Vietnamese) officers were present in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam after the 1954
Geneva Conference. Senior North Vietnamese officers were stationed in South Vietnam, along
with their interpreters and political cadres. They were members of the Joint Commission, its sub
commissions and teams, and liaison officers attached to the ICC headquarters. The ICC and its
personnel were formed to monitor elections that were originally intended to reunify the two
Vietnams. After the mid-1950s, the ICC monitored alleged violations of the Geneva Accords by
both the North and South. The North Vietnamese officers stationed in South Vietnam asserted
their control over the local communist movement. North Vietnamese Colonel Ha Van Lau was
the head of the PAVN Liaison Mission to the ICC since 1954. 18 In 1955, North Vietnam set up a
liaison mission in South Vietnam (RVN-Republic of Vietnam) and set up radio communications
equipment to pass information from Hanoi to Viet Cong cells in the RVN. Diem requested that
the North Vietnamese mission be withdrawn in 1958 and the radio equipment was removed.19
Amazingly, even US defectors and some captured POWs were brainwashed into
supporting the Vietcong and North Vietnamese on the battlefield and propaganda front. Clearly,
they were not a majority. However it is true that even a small, well organized cadre of
individuals can make a difference in assisting a country in promoting their interests. Once again,
the North Vietnamese/Viet Minh made use of captured POWs There were reports that some
French POWs intensive indoctrination in communist revolutionary doctrine and anti-colonialism
at re-education centers before they were repatriated to French African and North African
colonies. The Viet Minh separated officers, non-commissioned officers, and other enlisted
troops. They separated colonials from Legionnaires, and French regulars from all other troops.
They separated the prisoners by race and emphasized the differences in races between
Ordnance: Chronology of Historical Events Volume 1 June 23, 1958 Accessed From:
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110524
17 Weapons of the Vietnam War Accessed From:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weapons_of_the_Vietnam_War#Small_arms_2
18 Nutt, Anita Lauve. Prisoners of War In Indochina (Rand Corporation Santa Monica CA
January 1969) Accessed From:
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Personnel_and_Personnel_Readiness/POW_MIA/34.pdf
19 Bergen, John D. Military Communication: A Test for Technology (Center of Military History
Government Printing Office 1985) page 20.
16

Europeans, the blacks, and the Arabs. African and North African colonial troops were subjected
to Marxist-Leninist reeducation. Ex-French colonial soldiers became revolutionaries after return
to their home states and interestingly, Legionnaires and paratroopers became the French fascist
extremists.20
George Boudarel was a Frenchman who served as the Deputy Political Commissar in
Vietnamese prison camps during the First Indochina War. Boudarel was in charge of the Viet
Minh brainwashing program of French prisoners. He served in the COMINTERN underground
in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. French POWs in Viet Minh prison camps were subjected
to forced labor and separated according to race. Re-education in Marxism-Leninism was
concentrated on the African and Northern African colonial troops of the French Army. It was
reported by the National Alliance of Families that French colonial soldiers became
revolutionaries after return to their home states; and, oddly, Legionnaires and paratroopers
became the French extreme right-wing militarist.21
The Viet Minhs Enemy Proselytizing Department (EPD) also targeted French POWs
from its overseas colonial empire serving in its Foreign Legion and regular armed forces for
recruitment and brainwashing. The Communist Parties in Algeria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, France, Greece, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Tunisia assisted the North
Vietnamese EPD in these efforts. French Communist Party members and undercover
communists in the French armed forces such as Navy Petty Officer Henri Martin distributed
flyers and leaflets to the French soldiers and officers. Martin was arrested in 1951. The ruling
East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) also sent flyers to German-speaking Foreign Legion
personnel via China and the USSR to Viet Minh zones for distribution to EPD personnel. Three
East German SED members also worked with the EPD in Vietnam in targeting German-speaking
personnel and were involved in brainwashing activities against captured German-speaking
Foreign Legion troops. Their units also posed as French forces before attacking French positions.
Another ethnic Vietnamese who collaborated with the Nazis in Paris and Berlin Hoang Van Nhi
(Willy Hoang) headed the effort to write psychological warfare leaflets against German-speaking
units of the Foreign Legion. He was assigned to the Nam Bo/COSVN Political Staff EPD and
was a political commissar for German speaking Foreign Legion defectors to North Vietnam. The
North Vietnamese EPD also arranged prisoner releases of French soldiers and civilians who were
double agents for Hanoi and were assigned to create a fifth column in the French armed forces.
The Military Proselytizing Department (MPD) maintained agents in South Vietnamese (RVN)
territory. They consisted of agents in South Vietnam who communicated through secret radio
networks, couriers flown on ICC flights to Hanoi, land courier lines across the Demilitarized
Zone (DMZ), and the official North Vietnamese delegation to the International Control
Commission (ICC) in Saigon. The Moroccan, Tunisian, French, and Algerian Communist Parties
induced the defection of 500 African Foreign Legion troops to Viet Minh zones at the behest of
the USSR.22
The French Experience Accessed From:
http://www.nationalalliance.org/vietnam/ovrvw12.htm
21 The French Experience Accessed From:
http://www.nationalalliance.org/vietnam/ovrvw12.htm
22Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations.Intelligence and Security Operations
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense Enemy Proselytizing
Department December 1979 Accessed From: http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi20

Defectors and brainwashed US POWs also served the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in
military and propaganda capacities. In 1968, a communist defector told an Air Force Intelligence
official in South Vietnam of an African-American serviceman who defected to the VC. This
defector assisted the VC in marksmanship, tactics, and helping the VC 303rd Battalion plan their
attacks. One captured communist charged that US defectors to the VC were sent into contested
areas to turn villagers against the US by raping and killing civilians. The Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) received a total of 150 reports on defectors to the VC were engaged in
propaganda for the communists. In one South Vietnamese VC camp, the Defense Department
reported that 18 foreign POWs were being brainwashed, including Americans, South Koreans,
and Filipinos. The report noted After peace comes to Vietnam and the nation is unified the
POWs will be allowed to return to their homes where they will become active in the communist
party.23 A captured US Air Cavalry private with the initial L and whose second name began
possibly with the letter A was observed on several occasions writing propaganda leaflets for
the Viet Cong. Progressives who had been brainwashed were selected for counterespionage operations. They were used to intercept American communications, monitor American
radio broadcasts, and conduct propaganda. Others still were seen fighting with VC and North
Vietnamese units. 24
Despite the anti-fascist image of the Viet Minh (and later the North Vietnamese), they
also stooped to the low moral level of using the military and technical skills of Nazis and
Japanese militarists for their battle against the French. Even worse, there were some reports that
formerly ardent admirers of Hitlers National Socialism retained elite positions in North
Vietnamese society. Tran Dai Nghia, the Vietnamese communist Chairman of State
Commissions and the Vice President of Hanoi University Dr. Le Van Thiem were examples
mentioned by P.J. Honey of many North Vietnamesesenior officials who actively supported
Hitler.25 In 1945, 1,500 to 4,000 Imperial Japanese officers and troops joined the Viet Minh.
These ex-Japanese forces were led by Lt. Col. Mukayama and included Kempetai military police
officers. The Viet Minh built their first artillery units around personnel from the old Japanese
51st Mountain Artillery Regiment. Former Nazi officials and Wehrmacht soldiers also served
with the Viet Minh in their war against the French and their Vietnamese allies. 26 In 1951, it was
reported that former German Luftwaffe and SS officers to serve with the communist Viet Minh
forces. A former Luftwaffe officer in West Germany supervised the recruitment of former
Luftwaffe and SS officers and he reported to the Viet Minh representative in East Germany
Wang Chiang-Cha. Czech highway engineers and German mechanics and engineers were also
recruited by the former Luftwaffe officer for service with the Viet Minh. The German and Czech
volunteers were sent to the Viet Minh-occupied zones through the Soviet Union and Sinkiang
Province in China to northern Indochina. The German SS officers were ordered to join the
French Foreign Legion and then to desert immediately to the Viet Minh once they arrived in

bin/starfetch.exe?9L866cKpsKhTejnUbNEYsz80Uzgpn6@93HCAeAV01ZwX@yIEP1aAo6M
LxfIixnAnnQhic0gazZBCpEk550ktN@M.zNL10SFKeRqiSTXcAJQ/11271303001a.pdf
23Sauter, Mark and Sanders, Jim.The Men We Left Behind (National Pr Books: 1993) page 232.
24 Cawthrone, Nigel. Bamboo Cage (SPI Books: New York NY 1991) page 24.
25 McDonald, Congressman Lawrence P. Hanoi Prepares a Bloodbath Congressional Record
April 21, 1975 page 11121.
26 Nofi, Albert A. and Dunnigan, James F. Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War (St. Martins
Press: New York) pages 38-39.

Indochina. One such defector, an SS major, worked with other German Nazis who served as Ho
Chi Minhs bodyguard force. 27 Some Pathet Lao leaders collaborated with the Japanese such as
Phay Dang and Phoumi Vongvichit. 28
The Viet Minh also forged opportunistic alliances with the French colonial forces against
rival communists, nationalists, and religious sects. When Trotskyite Communists opposed Ho
Chi Minhs temporary alliance with the French, Viet Minh official Nguyen Van Tao warned All
those who have instigated the peasants to seize the landowners property will be severely and
pitilessly punished In 1946, Ho Chi Minh noted at the 2nd National Congress of the
Vietnamese Workers Party in reference to the pact with France that Lenin said that even if a
compromise with bandits was advantageous to the revolution he would do it. The Viet Minh
and General Leclerc issued a joint communiqu urging the residents of North Vietnam to
welcome the French troops. Ho Chi Minh himself stated I love France and French soldiers.
You are welcome. You are all heroes. In 1971, Le Duan wrote a manuscript (approved by the
Politburo) which stated We would at one time reach a temporary compromise withthe French
in order to drive out the Chiang Kai Shek troops and to wipe out the reactionaries, their agents,
thus gaining time to consolidate our forces and prepare for a nationwide resistance to French
colonialist aggression, which the Party knew was inevitable. In June 1946, the Viet Minh
newspaper Cuu Quoc attacked reactionary saboteurs of the March 6 agreement. The French
troops and Viet Minh police jointly suppressed the Nationalists. The Viet Minh also received
weapons from the French including artillery. Lucien Bodard noted that Ho Chi Minh allowed
Leclercs soldiers to come and how the Expeditionary Force let the Viet Minh wipe out the
Nationalists with all their hatred of the French and their xenophobia. It had meant extermination
or very nearly. Truong Chinh noted that the 1946 Franco-Vietnamese treaty that it was a
temporary measure in order to give our people a moments breathing space in which to
consolidate the position of the democratic republican regimeand to strengthen our real forces
to march towards a new stage. The elections held in October 1946 for the National Assembly
was watched by Viet Minh security police. 29
North Vietnam also became a hub for international revolutionary and terrorist cadres.
They were conscious of their role in exporting world revolution as a part of the international
communist empire. As early as 1962, Western intelligence services reported that they captured
documents indicating that North Vietnamese agents provided advice to communist terrorists in
Portuguese Guinea and Kwiliu Province in the Congo. It was also reported that PLO terrorists
received training in North Vietnam. 30 The North Vietnamese Dac Cong (Special Tasks) trained
the Indonesian Army Airborne units (RPKAD) in 1964 near Xuan Mai in North Vietnam
(DRV).31 A special North Vietnamese army unit was formed in 1955 and 1956 which contained

Eastern Germany: Viet-Minh Reporting Recruiting Secretly In Eastern Germany Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute Accessed From:
http://storage.osaarchivum.org/low/62/53/6253354a-3dca-4d3d-8ea4-c1748fcf4368_l.pdf
28 Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains (Indiana University Press 1993) page 21.
29 Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University,
1975) pages 62-63.
30 Greig, Ian. Subversion (Tom Stacey, 1973) pages 152-153.
31 Akhmad Bukhari Saleh. Jakarta Axis August 12, 2002 Accessed From: http://www.mailarchive.com/yonsatu@mahawarman.net/msg01473.html
27

300 French, Algerian, and Moroccan POWs. Some were pro-communists while others stayed
and married Vietnamese wives. 32
South Vietnamese society was also targeted by active measures propaganda
campaigns. Such measures included manipulation of South Vietnamese officials and military
leaders and fomenting division within all levels of society. In April 1955, Ho Chi Minh wrote in
Pravda that our struggle shifts now from the stage of armistice to that of political struggleThe
present political struggle is only a stage in our national democratic revolution. A captured VC
document noted that After the armistice the peace movement in the Saigon and Cholon area
was very active.33
The North Vietnamese governmental defector Dr. Dang Tan noted that the Peoples
Democratic Peace Front is just a plot of the communists. The VC is organizing the mass
organizations through which to influence a large majority of the people. In proposing a coalition
government, the communists hope to gain power legallyIn addition the communists are
preparing to surface overt offices which will serve as a screen behind which the party
committees will be hidden and continue to operate. 34
General Lu Mong Lan of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) General Staff recalled
that the enemy was infiltrating our society at the highest level. Sometimes students speaking
English would approach GIs at beaches like Nha Trang and talk about politics. They would
denounce the Diem regime and couch their arguments in terms that wo uld sway Americans who
were nave to the whole situation in Vietnam and isolated from the Vietnamese society because
they could not speak the language. The first person who would communicate with these
Americans was a pre-positioned VC underground agent claiming to be an ordinary student.35
In September 1972, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the North Vietnamese Army
General-Lieutenant Chan Van Kuang (Tran Van Quang), outlined at the Vietnamese Workers
Party Politburo session the measures which are being carried out by the leadership of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in South Vietnam to develop opportunities for
cooperation with and for the recruitment of representatives of the Saigon government and army
to the side of the Patriots. With this in mind, contacts have been established and meetings
conducted with several civilian and military leaders, to include generals Ngo Din Dzu
(Commander, 2nd regional Corps), Nguyen Khanh and Zyong Van Min (former leader of the
Saigon administration), Khoang Suan Lam (former Commander, 1st Regional Corps) and
others.The meetings and contacts which we initiated were conducted with complete equality of
rights and helped us recruit representatives of all strata of South Vietnamese society to our side.
This is our grandest victory, won in the course of these contacts with the aim of resolving the
Jensen, Holger. Frenchmen Aid Hanoi Defector May 1, 1971 Accessed From:
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?AiM6FiWKkhc3ABvUVWDI3F6XtKUGVzG6cUG@xYrOvrPJ6OMBkYNjh
1EODeIXOhWRY2.Yke7FtvbCVjOuPzhLitF9yXHWZbST4JeEntommr4/11271611010.pdf
33 Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1975) page 173.
34Dang Tan. A Red Defector Speaks Out July 1971 Accessed From:
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?NOEHc4mMGCwhdSjajenhcMo13UnEjFHkdiEHKRzry6mmLeIRsrUsoi0X6j
0cI0PXBQPTuZoVCTJvgXv0pdoDSTUtIusF09NtR3jToVix678/2311711023.pdf
35Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press 1999) page 118.
32

Vietnamese issue.Thus, thanks to these contacts we understand which part of the population
considers the course we are taking to be just i.e. we have exposed all of th ose who are against
Nixons politics for the prolongation of the war, against Nguyen Van Thieus clique, and will
join with us in the creation of a coalition government. Quang noted that The political views of
puppet army officers captain and above are very reactionary.
ARVN General Khoang Suan Lam was cited by General-Lieutenant Quang as a very
reactionary man(who) came out against our revolution. Quang noted that Lam had a secret
meeting with PAVN officials. According to Quang, Lam stated to the PAVN that the Saigon
puppet army will not be able to carry out missions, led by the plan of the Vietnamization of its
forcesthe revolutionary forces will gain the victory and that the puppet army will not be able to
stop it. The pace must be increased to realize this plan. We have to quickly throw these people
from North to South Vietnam in order to destroy a large amount of the enemys kinetic energy
from within. Quang also noted that We must attract the neutral forces to our side; those who
are fighting for national independence; against the USA; forces who earlier fought against the
regime of Ngo Din Dhiem and now fight against the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. We must to do
everything necessary in order to successfully carry out the Ba Be plan. Quang summarized
the North Vietnamese political warfare strategy (the Ba Be Plan) directed at South Vietnam in
this fashion:The goal of Plan BA BE is introduction of division into the ranks of the enemy
and lowering of his will to resist. Successful implementation of Plan BA BE will help us to
attain successes at the Paris negotiations on Vietnam. 36
Many progressive leftist and communist elements in the United States were more than
willing to assist communist forces on the path to military victory. During the Vietnam War,
American New Leftists, along with the Old Left (the Communist Party USA and its fronts)
played a major role in demoralizing elite and popular opinion concerning a willingness to
prosecute the Vietnam War. One of element of the North Vietnamese Armys Political Dau
Tranh or political warfare was called Dich Van. Dich Van stipulated the implementation of a
massive demoralization/disinformation program to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and
disloyalty among enemys population.37 This program was carried out by Hanoi and its
communist allies through the manipulation and funding so-called peace movements and
communist fronts, the duping of Western journalists, and other methods of political warfare.
These measures were intended to turn public opinion against South Vietnam and its Western
allies and force a withdrawal of military and economic support for the Saigon regime. The
Information and Press Departments of the North Vietnamese government issued permits for
foreign journalists, television crews, leftist, pacifists, communists, and other antiwar delegations
on visitations to Hanoi. Americans were divided by the North Vietnamese communist planners
into ruling circles and good Americans. Hence, the Communists sought to split the
American masses and intellectuals from their leaders. Foreigners were billeted at the wellappointed, formerly French-owned Metropole Hotel in Hanoi. 38
Report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VNA (Vietnamese Peoples Army)
General-Lieutenant Tran Van Quang at the Politburo Meeting of the Tsk PTV (Moscow 1972)
Accessed From: http://www.aiipowmia.com/sea/quang.html
37 Viet Cong and PAVN Strategy, Organization and Structure Accessed From:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viet_Cong_and_PAVN_strategy,_organization_and_structure
38 Salisbury, Harrison. Hanoi Inviting Westerners to Inspect Bomb Damage New York Times
January 11, 1967 page 1.
36

10

Early on, the North Vietnamese and their Vietcong allies recognized the role played by
leftist-progressive, antiwar, and pacifist movements in undermining the American war effort in
South Vietnam. The communists sought to manipulate these movements in order to pressure the
elites in the United States to withdraw troops and abandon all assistance to the non-communist
governments in South Vietnam. In December 1963, the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of
the ruling Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) noted we must step our diplomatic struggles for
the purposes of isolating warmongers, gaining the sympathy of antiwar group s in the US and
taking full advantage of the dissensions among the imperialists to gain the sympathy and support
of various countries which follow a peaceful and neutral policy.
The 4th Congress of the Vietcong (VC) Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) in
March 1966 noted that the more the American imperialists will be isolated from the rest of
the world and even from their own people, the stronger will be the antiwar movement in the
world and in the US and the better the opportunity for the other imperialist nations to take
advantage and seize the interests of the US in many areas of the world.
A captured document of a VC Party cadre noted that Within the United States public
opinion is fervently demanding the end of aggressive warfare in South Vietnam. With this it can
develop into a special victory for us. The 9th Conference of the VC COSVN in July 1969 noted
that the internal contradictions between the US rulers andthe American people were in its
view the greatest weak point of the Americans at this time.
Lt General Nguyen Van Vinh, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army
and head of the ruling Vietnamese Workers Party Unification Board, noted to the 4th Congress of
the COSVN Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making
the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemys internal
contradictions, and thereby making him more isolated in order to deprive him of propaganda
weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who misunderstood the Americans
clearly see their nature A captured VC cadre notebook from late 1967 noted that Our
efforts will then be devoted to the isolation of the US and acquisition of the sympathy of the
countries of the world.39
The Viet Cong document titled Circular on Antiwar Movements in the US noted that
The spontaneous antiwar movements in the US have received assistance and guidance from the
friendly (VC/NVN) delegations at the Paris Peace Talks. 40
The COSVN Subcommittee on Foreign Activities prepared a Report on Propaganda and
Foreign Affairs in June 1966 which stated In capitalist countries, such as the United States, we
always keep abreast of the American peoples opinions and try to motivate youths, intellectuals
and religious sects to protest the war of aggression waged by their government in Vietnam. At
the same time, we motivate families of the US troops dispatched to Vietnam to protest the
sending of troopsMake every effort to persuade the people of America and its sa tellites to
support us, to oppose the US Governments aggressive policy, and to exploit the anti-war spirit
of American and satellite soldiers in the SouthMotivate the American people against the (US)
crimes, and request an end to the war of aggression in South Vietnam. Every effort should be
made to motivate soldiers dependents to launch anti-war demonstrations
39

Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1975) pages 235-249.
40 Lipscomb, Thomas. Hanoi Approved Of Role Played By Anti-War Vets The New York Sun
October 26, 2004 page 1.

11

The document noted further that the VC and North Vietnamese needed to Isolate the
Americans and their lackeys The document also noted that Make every effort to persuade
the people of America and its satellites to support us, to oppose the US Governments aggressive
policy, and to exploit the anti-war spirit of American and satellite soldiers in the South 41 The
North Vietnamese Ambassador Xuan Thuy called for the progressive American people and all
antiwar organizations to unite closely.42
North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong noted in 1970 in Hanoi that The
Vietnamese people are sincerely grateful for the warm sympathy and very effective support given
them bythe peace-and democracy-loving people of the world, including the progressive people
of the United States.43
Nguyen Khac Vien, a North Vietnamese propagandist told an imprisoned future Admiral
Stockdale that: Our country has no capability to defeat you on the battlefield. But war is not
decided by weapons so much as national willWe will win this war on the streets of New
York.44
Pham Van Dong noted in a 1970 speech that Contradictions among the US ruling
circles have become acute in regard to many domestic as well as foreign policies, chiefly the Viet
Nam and Indochina problems. Many influential political and economic circles and many wellknown figures in both houses of the US Congress have used all in their power to oppose the
Vietnamization of the war.45
In 1975, the North Vietnamese journal Hoc Tap noted in an article by Truong Chi Cuong
that the internal ranks of the United States are seriously divided and that the US was reeling
from the effects of inflation and recession. 46
The North Vietnamese, along with their Soviet and international communist allies,
actively participated in the destruction of American morale during the Vietnam War. Funds in
hard currency, propaganda, and international solidarity conferences all were examples of the
tangible forms of support that the USSR, China, Cuba, and the Warsaw Pact provided to the
North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. Such support enabled the North Vietnamese to undermine
the popular will for the United States to prosecute the war on behalf of our Indochinese allies.
French intelligence reported that the USSR remitted hard currency to North Vietnam under the
guise of economic aid, which was then transmitted to the antiwar movement. Over $1 million in
peace contributions was sent to the antiwar groups via money disbursed to Swiss and Swedish
banks from the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Allendes Chile. For ten years,
the numbered account of the Skandinaviska Banken in Stockholm Sweden (#5210-10-045-34)

41

Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall: How Disunity Leads to Defeat (Authorhouse 2006) pages
7-8.
42 Powell, S. Steven. Covert Cadre (Green Hill, University of Michigan 1987) page 42.
43 Pham Van Dong. Twenty-Five Years of National Struggle and Construction (Foreign
Languages Publishing House: Hanoi 1970) page 64.
44 Hirsch, James S. Two Souls Indivisible: The Friendship That Saved Two POWs in Vietnam
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005) page 36.
103 Pham Van Dong. Twenty-Five Years of National Struggle and Construction (Foreign
Languages Publishing House: Hanoi 1970) page 83.
46 Hoc Tap Shows How Congress Aided Hanoi Human Events April 26, 1975 page 3.

12

was the repository of such funds. Indirect funding was sent via the Communist states to the 1970
Stockholm Conference on Vietnam and War Crimes Trials of Bertrand Russell. 47
The defecting Soviet GRU Colonel Stanislav Lunev revealed that the GRU had a
massive presence in both North and South Vietnam; their operatives worked under the cover of
the North Vietnamese Special Services Our instructors also told us about how the GRU
influenced the American public. The GRU and KGB helped to fund just about every antiwar
movement and organization in America and abroad. Funding was provided via undercover
operatives or front organizations. These would fund another group that in turn would fund
student organizations. The GRU also helped Vietnam organize its propaganda campaigns as a
whole. What will be a great surprise to the American people is that the GRU and KGB had a
larger budget for antiwar propaganda in the United States than it did for economic and military
support for the Vietnamese. The antiwar propaganda cost the GRU more tha n $1 billion, but as
history shows, it was a hugely successful campaign and well worth the cost. The antiwar
sentiment created an incredible momentum that greatly weakened the US military. 48
Despite certain sectarian, doctrinal differences, much of the American Left was united in
the effort to assist the North Vietnamese and the VC on the material and political fronts. In
testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Max Friedman noted that While
there is a definite doctrinal split between the two major communist parties, CPUSA and SWP
there is however unity in their efforts to weaken the will of the United States in resisting
communist aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. 49 Tom Hayden admitted when he wrote
in Trail that the antiwar left gave encouragement to the Vietnamese revolutionaries while
demoralizing the American military and the puppets they supported. 50
The CIA was not unaware of the negative power and influences the leftist/antiwar/pacifist
movements played in slowly demoralizing the American war effort in South Vietnam. A CIA
Intelligence Information Cable noted that North Vietnamese morale has been boosted
considerably by the Civil Rights and the Black Power movement in the United States. The
North Vietnam government has indicated to the French Mission in Hanoi that the riots and the
emergence of the Black Power movement signal the beginning of a popular revolution in the
United States against the ruling classes. The North Vietnamese government also believes that the
Civil Rights disturbances will adversely affect American participation in the Vietnam War. The
United States government will be forced to divert large sums of money to educational, housing,
and other social reforms to maintain the loyalty of the underprivileged elements and prevent
them from joining the ranks of the Civil Rights dissidents. The North Vietnamese further believe
that the United States will have to maintain more troops in the United States to control the
rioters. The North Vietnamese government has also indicated that it expects the Black Power
movement to spread in perhaps two or three years to the American military establishment.
Within that time span the North Vietnamese expect the American forces in Vietnam to be

47

Warner, Denis Ashton. Certain Victory (Sheed Andrews and McMeel 1978) page 295.
Stanislav and Winkler, Ira. Through the Eyes of the Enemy (Regnery Publishers 1998)
pages 72-79.
49 Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall: How Disunity Leads to Defeat (Authorhouse 2006) page
81.
50 Ibid, page 94.
48Lunev,

13

seriously weakened by racial tensions which might possibly result in actual clashes between the
Negro and white troops.51
High-ranking defectors from the VC and North Vietnam admitted the central role of
propaganda and disinformation in forcing an American withdrawal from Indochina. Some of the
top communist officials from the North even bragged of their success in duping Western liberals
and journalists. The reality of the hard-line Stalinist murderers and militarists in North Vietnam
were transformed into the image of patriotic liberators and crusaders for social justice by many
American liberals, leftists, and journalists. Former Vietcong Minister for Justice Truong Nhu
Tang stated: We had been preparing for the Tet Offensive since 1966 to create pressure and to
help the anti-war movement in the United States. We needed to deliver a dramatic blow so that
public opinion in the world and the United States would turn against the American
government. After pointing out that over half their fighting forces were wiped out in the Tet
Offensive, he continued: I believe that the Americans at Tet did not sustain great losses of human
lives, but from the political point of view it was a very heavy blow for President Johnsons
government....So what we lost on the military front we won on the diplomatic and
psychological fronts. Above all on the fourth front--the mass media, the press, television and
the liberals in the United States.52
Tang recollected that Another section of the NLF was responsible for working with
groups in the West opposed to the war and Western media to weaken the resolve of the American
government. He also noted In South Vietnam religious organizations like Buddhists or
Catholic, protested against the regime. But behind them were always some political activists who
were communists. This is a tactic we call the watermelon-green on the outside and red on the
inside. These tactics were used in South Vietnam before 1975. This is a tactic of the Soviet bloc
for propaganda against the Free World.53
Tang also recalled that the American media and antiwar groups worked to weaken the
resolve of the American government. And the American media is easily open to suggestion and
false information given by communist agents. The society is completely hypnotized by the media.
(For example Pham Xuan An manipulated several important American reporters in Vietnam for
years. Today An is a high ranking intelligence officer in communist intelligence in Ho Chi Minh
City). Pham Xuan An was also a high-ranking North Vietnamese intelligence officer during the
war and later served in the Vietnamese Mission to the United Nations (UN) in New York in the
post-1975 period.54
Stephen Young, a Minnesota attorney and human rights activist interviewed Colonel Bui
Tin, who served on the General Staff of the North Vietnamese Army and became editor of the
Peoples Daily of the Vietnamese army. Colonel Tin noted that Visits to Hanoi by people like
Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that
Central Intelligence Agency. Comments on the Effect of Food Shortages, Bombing Raids and
the American Race Riots on North Vietnamese Morale August 28, 1967 Date Declassified:
September 20, 1979 Accessed From:
http://www.aavw.org/served/racetensions_riots_abstract01.html
52 How Not to Win a War AIM Report February A 1991 Accessed From:
http://www.aim.org/publications/aim_report/1991/02a.html
53 Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press: Bloomington Indiana 1999) page
166.
54 How Reds Influence the Media Human Events July 6, 1985 page 3.
51

14

we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing
a red Vietnamese dress, said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in
the war and that she would struggle along with us. 55
Colonel Tin also noted that American antiwar leftists were essential to our strategy.
Support for the war from our rear was completely secure while the American rear was
vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to
follow the growth of the American anti-war movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda
and former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in
the face of battlefield reversesThose people represented the conscience of America. The
conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in
our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest, it lost the ability
to mobilize a will to win.56
Even well after the collapse and conquest of South Vietnam in April 1975, the
Vietnamese Communists were forever grateful to their American leftist allies for their
propaganda support. Many elements of the American Left continued to express their amicable
feelings for the ruling communists in Hanoi. In April 1985, Dave Dellinger and American
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) official John McAuliffe attended the massive military
parade of Vietnamese troops commemorating the collapse and surrender of South Vietnam. 57 In
April 1985, Mai Chi Tho, Chairman of the Peoples Committee of Ho Chi Minh City, noted at
this parade that This victory was achieved by our people at great sacrificeWhen we fought the
Americans, we received assistance from the American people. 58
Liberal and left-wing American journalists were notorious in allowing themselves to be
manipulated by the VC and North Vietnamese into either providing outright support for the
communist cause or overly magnifying the alleged sins of American and its allies, while ignoring
the crimes of Hanoi. At first, the North Vietnamese were hesitant in reaching out to liberal
American journalists. Mieczyslaw Maneli, a Polish Member of the International Control
Commission (ICC), was impressed by the hostility expressed by the American journalists Neil
Sheehan and David Halberstam towards the US Embassy and Military Assistance Command
Vietnam (MACV). Maneli urged Pham Van Dong to grant Sheehan and Halberstam visas to
enter North Vietnam. However, the communists turned that idea down, stating we are not
interested in building up the prestige of American journalists.59 By the mid-1960s, Hanoi had a
change of heart. Intelligent and articulate English-speaking VC and North Vietnamese agents
influenced American journalists who were lodged in the luxurious Caravelle and Continental
Hotels in Saigon. These communist agents would chat with the American journalists and provide

Bui Tin Interviewed by Stephen Young How North Vietnam Won The War Wall Street
Journal August 3, 1995 Accessed From: http://www.viet-myths.net/BuiTin.htm
56 Holzer, Henry Mark and Holzer, Erika. Aid and Comfort: Jane Fonda in North Vietnam
(McFarland & Co., 2002) page 80.
57 Ho Chi Minh City Marks Liberation Anniversary and May Day Vietnam News Agency May
1, 1985
58 Anderson, Paul. Vietnamese Leader Credits Americans in Fall of Saigon United Press
International April 28, 1985
59 Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975 (Simon & Schuster: New York 2000) page
243.
55

15

false stories to the newsmen who rarely ventured outside their hotels. 60 The British historian of
Vietnamese Communism P.J. Honey commented that Reading the Hanoi papers you would
think that the only Senator in the US is Wayne Morse and the only columnist Walter Lippmann.
They offer all this as proof that their cause will succeed. 61 The formerly pro-Hanoi French
leftist journalist Jean Lacouture confessed that he was sorry that his articles and reporting in
Vietnam contributed to the installation of one of the most repressive regimes history has ever
known. Lacouture noted that he and other liberal journalists served as intermediaries for a
lying and criminal propaganda - ingenuous spokesmen for tyranny in the name of libertyI
conducted myself as a militant, sympathetic to their cause and concealed the Stalinist aspect of
their system, of which I was well aware.62
Early on, the North Vietnamese also sought to lobby the Western countries for trade in
vital capital goods for industries and some strategic items. A main tool in this lobbying effort
was the stationing of North Vietnamese trade representatives in capitalist and developing
countries. As of 1963, North Vietnam maintained trade representatives in the following noncommunist countries: Burma, Cambodia, France, Hong Kong, India, and Laos. Leftist Third
World countries with North Vietnamese trade offices were, as of 1963: Algeria, Iraq, Egypt,
Indonesia, and communist Guinea. 63
Hanoi initially utilized Red China as an intermediary in its trade relations with the West
during the 1950s. It was reported in 1955 that Not only will the North Vietnam Democratic
Republic benefit from Chinese production, but, at least before any direct trade is established
between Hanoi and Western States, China will act as a valuable intermediary, importing goods
via Hong Kong for re-export to North Vietnam. As for the other countries of the Soviet bloc,
Czech-and Polish economic and commercial delegations are expected here shortly, and
Communist sources have hinted. Here that the USSR not only supplies goods, but may later join
Hanoi in triangular trade agreements, purchasing goods from- third parties with rubles for reexport to the Vietminh thus indirectly granting Hanoi credits to make up for the Vietminh
government's shortage of foreign exchange.64
Sometimes, the North Vietnamese capitalized on the war damage and lost American lives
to earn hard currency. In 1974, it was reported that North Vietnam sold scrap copper from
downed US aircraft for hard currency. The North Vietnamese occupied parts of South Vietnam
(Quang Tri Province) and collected valuable copper and sold it on the international market. This
business was conducted through North Vietnamese representatives in Hong Kong. It was shipped
out of the North Vietnamese port at Dong Ha. 65

60

Harrison, Benjamin L. Hell on a Hill Top (iUniverse Inc 2004)

Budenz, Louis. The Bolshevik Invasion of the West (Bookmailer, 1966) page 155.
62 Jasper, William F. Seven Myths About the Vietnam War The New American March 25,
2002 Accessed From: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1021097/posts
63 Chamber of Commerce of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. List of Export and Import
Goods of State Foreign Trade Enterprises Hanoi 1963 Accessed From:
http://www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/virtual/vva/servlet.starweb
64 Bloodworth, Dennis. Vietnamese Nationalistic After Years Of Struggle Winnipeg Free
Press January 26, 1955 page 4.
65 McArthur, George. Hanoi Held Selling US War Scrap Los Angeles Times July 5, 1974 page
A7.
61

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At the height of the Vietnam War, Hanoi imported goods that were crucial for the North
Vietnamese economy and its heavy industries. In 1966, it was reported that North Vietnam
continued to trade with capitalist countries. For example, North Vietnam received the following:
Italy shipped mechanical and electrical spare parts; West Germany sent metal working
machinery and electrical apparatus; Britain sent electrical equipment and chemicals; Hong Kong
shipped Canadian rice; Japan sent tinned plates and sheets; France sent wheat; and Cambodia
sent rice.66
Hanoi sought to continue North Vietnams economic relationship with France. In October
1954, a French delegation discussed the provisioning of French credits for North Vietnam. It was
reported that the Vietminh/North Vietnam purchased Saigon piasters to finance essential
imports.67 In April 1954, the French agreed with the Vietminh that they would turn the Frenchowned Tonkin coal mines to the communists. The Vietminh would provide 1 million tons of coal
to France per year. 68 In October 1955, France and North Vietnam signed a trade agreement worth
over $2.8 million. The North Vietnamese would ship hard coal, silk, some farm products, and
handicrafts. The French would ship spare parts, cars, trucks, bicycles, food, drugs, chemicals,
machines, and other products. 69
Since 1955, North Vietnam shipped to France anthracite coal, high quality handicrafts,
and specialty rice. Some of these handicrafts were sold by French department stores, such as
Galeries Lafayette. France sells to North Vietnam machine tools, trucks, some linen products,
pharmaceuticals, and wheat. These products were shipped back and forth on Polish ships. 70
While the North Vietnamese stonewalled on its initial promises to return the remains of
French POWs, Hanoi nevertheless gained quantities of hard currency from Paris. From 1955 to
the 1970s, the French government paid the North Vietnamese about $30 million for the
maintenance of French military graves in North Vietnam. These French payments were made to
the North via communist Hungarian banks. 71 The French were required to pay the Vietnamese
Communists $10 million US dollars from 1954 until 1986 for remains of French soldiers and
officers. The Enemy Proselytizing Department (EPD) cadres manipulated the French out of this
money.72
In 1955, it was reported that the British traded with North Vietnam. British coastal
vessels from Hong Kong secretly docked at Vietminh ports. The British exported to North
Vietnam cotton, rice, and other scarce goods, while the North exported to Britain/Hong Kong
Cromley, Ray. U.S. Slashes Free World's Trade With North Viet Nam Evening Standard
December 28, 1965 page 4.
67 Durdin, Tillman. Credit for Vietminh Studied by French New York Times October 15, 1954
page 1.
68 Troop Move Set by France, Reds Palm Beach Post April 10, 1955 page 38.
69 France Makes Pact With North Vietnam New York Times October 15, 1955 page 3.
70 Farnsworth, Clyde H. Trade by France with Hanoi Small New York Times November 1,
1970 page 5.
71 National Alliance of Families for the Return of Americas Missing Servicemen Accessed
From: http://www.nationalalliance.org/vietnam/namdx.htm
72 Garnett Bill Bell and George J. Veith. POWs and Politics: How Much does Hanoi Really
Know A Paper Presented on 19 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict
Symposium After the Cold War: Reassessing Vietnam, at Texas Tech University
Accessed From: http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/jay3.htm
66

17

timber, meat, lacquer, abrasives, vegetable oil, and tea. A respectable firm in Hong Kong
handled this trade.73 Bernard Fall noted: A British consulate in Hanoi, though severely limited
in its activitiesis the official intermediary for D.R.V.N. trade with Hong Kong, where Hanoi
also maintains a purchasing office. For prestige reasons and also in order to obtain some badly
needed foreign exchange, Hanoi exported foodstuffs to Hong Kong even when its supply was
grimly short.74 In 1966, North Vietnam exported $1.03 million worth of rice to Hong Kong. 75
Such currency could have been used to purchase vital capital goods, sent to American antiwar
leftists, or was channeled to VC espionage agents in the South.
Despite the fact that Japan was Vietnams wartime enemy, Tokyo and Hanoi opened
trade ties in the mid-1950s on a barter basis. In 1954, several Japanese trading companies started
to deal with North Vietnam. Trade was initially conducted through intermediaries such as
Czechoslovakia and France. In August 1955, Japanese companies established the Friday Club
which later became the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association (JVTA). In May 1955, JVTA signed
the first non-official trade protocol with North Vietnam. Trade at this point was conducted
through Hong Kong.76
In June 1956, Japanese business leaders and the North Vietnamese signed a trade
agreement worth $8.4 million. The North Vietnamese were to carry on this trade via Hong Kong
and then would later open the ports of Hongay and two others to Japanese ships. North Vietnam
would ship Japan raw materials and minerals and some agricultural products and Japan would
ship to North Vietnam machine tools, radios, iron and steel products, ships, railroad equipment,
electric appliances, fertilizers, textiles, movie equipment, and other products. 77 In 1958, it was
reported that North Vietnam and a private Japanese group signed a private trade pact. The value
of the trade pact was not publicized. 78
As a result of the Northern First Five Year Plan, Japanese-North Vietnamese trade
relations and interactions increased in the early 1960s. In March 1962, a North Vietnamese trade
delegation visited Japan for the first time. In August 1963, the North Vietnamese Chamber of
Commerce signed a new trade protocol with Japan. 79
By the 1960s, trade ties between North Vietnam and Japan deepened to a point where
mutual trade fairs were held. Japan was to hold a trade fair in Hanoi in 1965 to exhibit
machinery. Two-way trade was expected to grow to $30 million in 1964. 80 On occasion, Tokyo
exported strategic items to North Vietnam for the war effort against the South. In 1966, Japan
sold North Vietnam $275,800 worth of military field wire. 81
In January 1969, officials of the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association, a private
businessmens association, traveled to North Vietnam to discuss ways of increasing trade. The
73

US News and World Report Volume 38 1955 page 32.

Fall, Bernard. The Two Vietnams (Praeger, 1967) page 194.
75 Fall, Bernard. Report on North Vietnam The Other Side Of the 17th Parallel New York
Times July 10, 1966 page 181.
76 Shiraishi, Masaya. Japanese Relations With Vietnam (SEAP Publications, 1990) pages 37-39.
77 Hailey, Foster. Tokyo and Hanoi Sign Trade Pact New York Times June 1, 1956 page 5.
78 Pact With Vietnam Reds Signed New York Times March 20, 1958 page 2.
79 Shiraishi, Masaya. Japanese Relations With Vietnam (SEAP Publications, 1990) pages 37-39.
80 Japan Plans Fair at Hanoi New York Times August 23, 1964 page 86.
81 Major purchase of military field wire by North Vietnam July 6, 1966 Accessed From:
http://library2.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=581
74

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Japanese delegation was invited by the North Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce. 82 As a result
of some American pressure, trade ties between Tokyo and Hanoi were reduced.
Japanese-North Vietnamese trade fluctuated between 1968 and 1972, as a result of US
bombing. However trade relations were never ruptured due to the efforts and pressure of the
North Vietnamese government and JVTA. 83 In 1972, trade between North Vietnam and Japan
totaled $5.6 million both ways. 84 In 1972, the North Vietnamese sent a trade delegation to Japan
which visited several factories and companies and conferred with Foreign Ministry officials. In
late 1972 and early 1973, North Vietnam sent a small number of students, agricultural experts,
and engineers to Japan for education and training. In March 1975, North Vietnam sent an official
economic mission to Tokyo. In April 1973, Japan resumed the importation of Hon Gay
anthracite coal. Japanese trade with North Vietnam increased to $5 billion in 1974 and to $7
billion in 1975. In May 1973, an NGO Association for Japan-Vietnam Scientific and Technical
Exchanges was established in Tokyo and signed an agreement with North Vietnam in May 1974
with the official Vietnam Scientific and Technical Association. 85
The North Vietnamese also launched influence operations to subvert the South
Vietnamese economy. This included opening up of trade ties between Saigon and Hanoi as a
means of binding the Diem regime to the communists in the North. It appeared that before the
outbreak of open hostilities, there was trade between North and South Vietnam. The South
Vietnamese shipped to North Vietnam farm products and Hanoi shipped raw materials and some
finished goods to the South. 86 In 1954-1955, Red China and South Vietnam (RVN) sent rice to
North Vietnam. Even at that time, the North hoped to re-establish meaningful trade relations with
South Vietnam.87 A large portion of Saigon piasters were budgeted by North Vietnam to
purchase rice from South Vietnam in the mid-1950s. In May 1963, top-ranking South
Vietnamese official Ngo Dinh Nhu (Diems brother in law) offered via the Polish Communist
ICC official a proposal for a barter trade deal where Southern rice and Northern coal would be
exchanged.88
Hanoi successfully cultivated an image of a regime beholden to the ideals of austerity and
incorruptibility. Well hidden from many sympathetic foreign progressives were the privileges
extended to the Party, government, and military elites and Western visitors (businessmen,
diplomats, and leftwing activists).
The privileges of the North Vietnamese elite became very apparent even in the mid1950s. It was reported in a 1958 research paper that 1,000 students from North Vietnam were
being trained in the Soviet bloc technical schools at great expense to Hanoi, which pays for
their tuition and upkeep abroad. The Hanoi periodical Cuu Quoc noted in 1957 that The
emergence of a new class of bureaucrats-venal and luxury lovingThe article recounted the rise
Japanese Seek Hanoi Trade New York Times January 12, 1969 page 11
Shiraishi, Masaya. Japanese Relations With Vietnam (SEAP Publications, 1990) pages 37-39.
84 Halloran, Richard. Tokyo and Hanoi Open Formal Ties New York Times September 22,
1973 page 10.
85 Shiraishi, Masaya. Japanese Relations With Vietnam (SEAP Publications, 1990) pages 37-39.
86 The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies and Programs Summary
Volumes 1-2 Joint Development group 1969 page 34.
87 Gordon, David F. and Allen, John K. Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975 (GPO 2005)
page 78.
88 Porter, Gareth. Perils of Dominance (University of California Press 2005) pages 124-125.
82
83

19

of one Minh, director of the Duyen Hai factory in Haiphong from modest living to a life of
corruption and self indulgence. Minh became increasingly corrupt especially after marrying a
wife who appeared at first glance to be a woman of wide experience. While the couple treated
the factory as their own property, embezzling machinery and funds freely, living in luxury in the
house of the former French owner, and driving frequently to Hanoi in a Frigate car bought with
the factorys money, any worker who protested was threatened with dischargeLittle by little,
Minh acquired all the negative characteristics of the bourgeois class i.e. ruse and tyranny.
Nowadays, all over the country, there are many similar cases of corruption. In March 1956,
managers of cotton mills in Nam Dinh embezzled 20 million piastres for their personal use. 89
P.J. Honey noted that Senior Party and state officials are, of course, given everything
they may require in the way of material comforts either free of charge or at a small nominal cost.
Such persons receive a large house, servants, food, clothing, a car, and much else besides from
the state. Their cash salaries are small, a fact fully exploited by the propagandists, but there is
little for them to spend these on since all they need is supplied. Numerically, this superprivileged class is small and its standard of living is so vastly above that of ordinary Vietnamese
that the latter hardly bother to draw comparisons any longer. 90
Even the allegedly austere Ho Chi Minh enjoyed lifes little luxuries while the average
North Vietnamese citizen starved. As of July 1965, Ho Chi Minhs salary was the equivalent of
$480 per year. This was ten times the average annual income of the average North Vietnamese.
He did enjoy luxuries such as US-made Philip Morris and Camel American cigarettes and his
favorite food was a rare delicacy called swallows nest, which was a meringue of sea algae
and swallows saliva. Time magazine commented that No such luxuries are available to the
average North Vietnamese.91
The elites and foreigners also had access to special stores in Hanoi. The stores for higher
cadres of the Workers Party of Vietnam were established in Hanoi in 1962. 92 Some foreign
visitors reported on the existence of these stores and the reactions of the average North
Vietnamese to these oases of plenty in the sea of poverty and privation. In 1963, there were two
to three shops in Hanoi with imported luxuries for diplomats, foreigners, and Workers Party of
Vietnam cadres. Ordinary people formed goggle eyed bunches at the windows outside these
shops.93 In 1969, foreign diplomats and senior Vietnamese Workers Party members enjoyed the
privilege of shopping at a special store in Hanoi to which ordinary citizens were not permitted
access. The goods on sale there would not be accounted very special anywhere in the outside
world, the range of items offered for sale is enormous by comparison with the few goods found in

89

Benson, George. North Vietnam: A Communist Showpiece with Cracks 1958 Accessed From:
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?c0rrUYcGTRVLzUcEzrtM7YPQVCxVrs9dLbeXRB58L5Cwc55SqPHSRG9a
ermWq5eV@vUs7yt0PU6GTOC3eA8KdeK@DGl9KzscxOgfGW4sNnM/2320102010.pdf
90 Honey, P.J. North Vietnam Today: Profile of a Communist Satellite (Praeger 1962) pages 2023.
91 The Jungle Marxist Time Magazine July 16, 1965 Accessed From:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,833974,00.html
92 Porter, Gareth. Vietnam: the politics of bureaucratic socialism (Cornell University Press, 1993)
page 62.
93 The Geographical magazine, Volume 36 page 122.

20

the other stores.94 In 1967, the diplomatic store in Hanoi offered high quality consumer goods
of North Vietnamese origin and items from China, the USSR, France, Bulgaria, and Romania. 95
Some American leftists reported on the comparative luxury of their lodging in North
Vietnam during the 1960s. Susan Sontag reportedly visited the diplomatic store in 1968 and
witnessed a tailor making pants for customers. Visiting diplomats and foreign guests, along with
very high government officials patronized this store. Meals at the Thong Nhat Hotel consisted of
meat and fish at lunch and dinner, along with chauffeured Volga limousines courtesy of the
North Vietnamese Peace Committee. 96 Mary McCarthy also reported on the luxurious
accommodation at the Thong Nhat Hotel: plentiful hot water, toilet paper tastefully laid out in a
box in a fan-like pattern, unlimited tea, candies, cigarettes, and a mosquito net draped over the
bed.97
In 1961, the state guest house in Hanoi was reportedly a luxurious facility for visiting
foreigners to North Vietnam. The dining room was described as bright and the furnishings
ornate Chinese. A perfectly poised Vietnamese communist official poured French
champagne.98
More experienced foreign communist experts trained the North Vietnamese state hotel
staff in the maintenance of luxury accommodations for visitors from abroad. Ten North
Vietnamese traveled to East Germany in February 1975 to receive training in hotel keeping and
other related functions at various Interhotels, such as the Panorama. They were to return to North
Vietnam to staff and manage the modern Hotel Thang Loi.99
In 1967, the Metropole Hotel in Hanoi reportedly served French Cointreau, Beefeater gin,
Johnnie Walker Scotch, and Cuban cigars. Poles, Soviets, Chinese, North Vietnamese army
officers, Cubans, French, English, Canadians, East Germans, Indians, Mongolians, North
Koreans, Romanians, and African all were lodged or had access to this hotel. 100
Foreign diplomats were well-provided for by the North Vietnamese government. The
ICC was based in the Thong Nhat Hotel during the war years. In 1966, the French Embassy
reportedly had 15 North Vietnamese workers employed there. Embassies in Hanoi were supplied
with rice and buffalo meat by North Vietnamese officials; fresh and frozen food were flown in
from Phnom Penh Cambodia; groceries and drinks were imported from Hong Kong via
Haiphong.101 It also appeared that North Vietnam retained a small hard currency shop system. In
1973, a duty-free gift shop was reported to be located at Gia Lam airport and it sold high quality

94

China news analysis, Issues 751-800 1969 page 36.

Salisbury, Harrison. Keep Them Rolling pages 109-110 Accessed From:
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?LtEczZ.ChcIsvYSPVu78DXKVXGbkuK9coSTu2eeo1XGGR9ybNyUFjinehv
GpzrdFF8NpJ32ytFQkFRcx3tEVKVN2JPRDZ2Tm7GQJXOfhzz8/2130806007.pdf
96 Enzensberger, Magnus. Critical essays, Volume 98 (A&C Black, 1982) pages 180-181.
97 Hollander, Paul. Political Pilgrims (Oxford University Press, 1981) pages 363-364.
98 Hanoi Run Down Under Red Rule New York Times March 8, 1961 page 10.
99 Whitney, Craig R. North Vietnamese Learn East German Hotel Keeping New York Times
February 2, 1975 page 10.
100 Lockwood, Lee. Recollections of Four Weeks Life Magazine April 7, 1967 page 448.
101 Logan, William S. Hanoi: Biography of a City (UNSW Press, 2000) page 165-167.
95

21

North Vietnamese goods such as lacquered chessboards, beer, silver products, and jewelry.
These items reportedly were sold for US dollars. 102
VC and North Vietnamese delegations abroad occasionally indulged in high living in the
West. In October 1968, it was reported that the Vietcong information office in Paris and its head
Pham Van Ba chose the George V Hotel as a location for a conference. It is a luxury hotel
favored by wealthy Arabs and one South Vietnamese official joked that I guess they have more
money than we do.103
The Pathet Lao also followed a similar strategy of the North Vietnamese in co-opting
Western leftists to boost the image of its communist regime in the court of world public opinion.
By 1980, the ruling Pathet Lao government used Westerners to convince world public opinion
that the postwar concentration camps were closed by late 1980. An American professor Dr.
MacAlister Brown gave a lecture in Thailand that indicated he was told by Laotian ministry
officials that the communist concentration camps were closed. The Mennonite and American
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) were the only private religious groups from the United
States that were allowed to conduct outreach efforts in Laos. One Mennonite official named
Frederick Swartzendruber served in Laos from 1979 to 1981. He was given guided tours of the
country aboard Soviet helicopters. Swartzendruber advanced the theory that the damages and
deaths caused by the yellow rain chemical weapons dropped by Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
troops were simply the result of the proliferation of bee feces. Swartzendruber also
participated in tours of alleged Hmong markets, where people were supposedly shopping.
American antiwar activists denounced the anti-Pathet Lao Hmong resistance led by former Royal
Lao General Vang Pao. Vietnamese-trained Laotian agents trained were dispatched to the United
States under the guise of political refugees. The INS allowed many of these agents into the
United States as a result of a sloppy screening process. These Laotian agents also threatened
former Royal Lao Army General Vang Pao with untraceable poisoning and other death threats.
One refugee Thao Yia expressed his concerns about Pathet Lao infiltration of the United States:
Im worried that American Reds and the US will make relations with Laos so we cant take
back Laos. I see Red Lao who come here as refugees. In Fresno I see Red Lao come here to visit
sent by the Lao government to tell the refugees propaganda. They also collect money from
refugees here saying theyll take it to their families in Laos. They are only here to make money
for themselves. There were four Red Hmong in Fresno last week. These Red Hmong and Red Lao
start rumors in California to cause problems for Hmong living in America. The US Committee
on Refugees and the Mennonites blamed the Hmong resistance for the violence and atrocities in
Laos at a human rights conference with the Laotian charge d affaires to the United States
present. A State Department official and the Laotian charge d affaires traveled to this
conference together. This illustrated the fact that the Bush Administration also helped to collude
with American leftists and the Pathet Lao in covering up communist atrocities.104
The Khmer Rouge also praised the role of the antiwar Left in assisting in their seizure of
power in April 1975. The peace movement and the New Left played a critical role in pressuring
Congress and the Ford Administration in reducing and eliminating American aid for the Lon Nol
American Military Men Shop at Hanoi's Airport New York Times March 6, 1973 page 9.
Smith, Hedrick. N.L.F. to Compete With Saigon On the Cocktail Circuit in Paris New York
Times October 29, 1968 page 4.
104Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains (Indiana University Press 1993) pages 448-449 and
502-503.
102
103

22

government. In September 1975, the Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sary visited New York
City and met with American leftists and antiwar activists. Sary commented that the Khmer
Rouge always remembered that the American people were supporting us. He stated This
victory is not the victory of the Cambodian people alone, it is the victory of all the people, the
American people included-especially the American youth and the people that love peace and
justice. Sary stated The Cambodian people know you very well, especially students who are
fighting on our behalf, especially your students at Jackson state and Kent Statewe always
remembered the American people as friends, and especially the people of New York City. 105
Historian Sophal Ear noted that the pro-Hanoi and pro-Khmer Rouge Indochina Resource Center
was the Khmer Rouges most effective apologists in the West. By 1978, the Chinese launched a
propaganda campaign to defend the Democratic Kampuchea regime and distributed films such as
Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward and printed glossy magazines. When Foreign
Minister Ieng Sary traveled to New York in 1978, he hosted a viewing of the film Democratic
Kampuchea is Moving Forward and distributed the glossy propaganda magazines. 106
Vietnamese Senior General Van Tien Dung wrote an article in the Army newspaper Nhan
Dan titled the Great Spring Victory in April 1976. General Dung described the South
Vietnamese forces as being weakened to the point where the North Vietnamese forces was
altogether superior and as being passive and utterly weakened by late 1974. According to
General Dung, the reduction of US aid forced the ARVN to fight a poor mans war.General
Dung noted that Enemy firepower had decreased by nearly 60 percent because of bomb and
ammunition shortages its mobility was also reduced by half due to the lack of aircraft,
vehicles, and fuel. In October 1974, the Vietnamese Workers Party Politburo and Central
Committee determined that the US could not assist South Vietnam due to the internal
contradictions within US administration and among US political parties The North
Vietnamese later revealed that the purpose of the Paris Agreement was to get the Americans out
and gain time to make preparations to overthrow the GVN which had been forced to concede its
heretofore basic requirement-the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from South
Vietnam. By September 1973, eight months after the Paris Agreement, the North Vietnamese
sent an additional 140,000 tons of weapons and 100,000 additional troops to the communist-held
zones in South Vietnam. 107 In the first two months after the Paris Peace Accords (1973), more
than 30,000 North Vietnamese personnel were infiltrated into South Vietnam through Laos and
Cambodia. By late 1973, 70,000 North Vietnamese troops infiltrated illegally and in early 1975,
the number increased to 170,000. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was converted into a four lane hard top
superhighway. During 1973, the North Vietnamese constructed 12 airfields in the South,
installed SA-2 SAMs in Khe Sanh, and built an oil pipeline in the western part of their
occupation zones in South Vietnam. Polish and Hungarian ICC officials sabotaged Canadian
efforts to being North Vietnamese violations of the Paris Peace Accords to light. In March 1973,
the VC/North Vietnamese Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) issued a top secret
document that stated that Hanoi needed to exploit the Paris Peace Accords as an additional
Address by Mr. Ieng Sary September 6, 1975 on Indochina Resource Center Letter Head
Accessed From: http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?eKnmuFLMs0BEHzdQSHSWJL9TFpaRTIjB04Ae.apzZ@yApeOvZ1QJRKK
eitDCRTg5ObPAOf4IYbmFJBdPDGKsWpY9UQjFtbJ6it706BGseps/2430803022.pdf
106 Maguire, Peter. Facing Death in Cambodia (Columbia University Press 2013) page 55.
107 Rothrock, James. Divided We Fall (AuthorHouse, 2006) pages 73-75.
105

23

sharp weapon with which to attack the enemy. VC cadres were instructed to develop the new
assault posture and to launch continuous attacks to demand the enemy implement the CeaseFire Agreement strictly. COSVN announced that the Paris Peace Accords must not be
considered a replacement for the other types of struggle and warned that the ratio of forces is
actually the decisive factor. COSVN emphasized that We must use national concordto aim a
sharp point at our enemies.108
When the North Vietnamese invaded and defeated South Vietnam, the communists
conditioned the conquered population to accept a fall in their material living standards. Top
Vietnamese Communist leader Le Duan noted Those people in the south who, as a result of the
U.S. imperialist war of aggression, had attained a living standard much too high for the
country's economy and their own working capacity, should understand that this prosperity was a
sham one was misery and death for millions of their countrymen, destruction for innumerable
villages and towns, degradation for many young people and humiliation for countless women in
areas under enemy occupation, and enslavement of the country. They should know that the
frantic needs and vulgar tastes of that consumer society are the complete opposite of a truly
happy and civilized life. Such people today can and should come back to reality and the life of
the nation, and live by their work. This is the way to a happy, beautiful life with meaning and
dignity, a life of true and lasting happiness for themselves and their children.109
Much of the wealth and goods of South Vietnam were pillaged by the North Vietnamese
administrators and officers and sent back to the North. Hence, the North Vietnamese conquered
and pacified the South with an exploitative streak similar to the old Western colonialists and to
Stalins Red Army in the closing stages of World War II. Soviet military forces traveled on the
heels of the North Vietnamese Army as South Vietnam collapsed in 1975. The Soviets inspected
radar facilities captured by the North Vietnamese Army before the fall of Saigon. Within hours
of the capture of Da Nang in April 1975 by the North Vietnamese Army, Soviet naval officers
arrived to inspect the captured facilities. Within days, the Soviets restored the radar facilities. 110
In April 1975, when the North Vietnamese captured Saigon, they quickly captured the IBM
computers which provided top secret data that identified the members of the ARVN (Army of
the Republic of Vietnam), policemen, CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) agents, and other
members of the South Vietnamese military, intelligence, and law enforcement community. This
was confirmed by North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung, the field commander during the
conquest of South Vietnam. 111 In 1975, North Vietnam plundered South Vietnam and carted
goods to Hanoi. Workers at the port in Saigon reported in 1975 that North Vietnamese ships and
trucks were loaded with South Vietnamese cars, air conditioners, refrigerators, TVs, motor
scooters, and other consumer goods. Weapons and Big John cranes were also removed. Broken
naval and commercial vessels and armaments were repaired and then shipped north. 112 In

Nash, George H. Dissolution of the Paris Peace Accords National Review October 24, 1975
Duan, Le. This Nation and Socialism are One: Selected Writings of Le Duan (Vanguard
Books, 1976) page 186.
110 Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987) page 192.
111 Hoar, William P. The Human Coast of Betrayal American Opinion October 1977 pages 7783.
112 Situation in South Vietnam According to Refugees November 1975 Accessed From:
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi108
109

24

November 1975, the International Store in Hanoi also sold captured US and Western-made
consumer goods from South Vietnam, such as cosmetics, champagne, and whiskey. 113
Another feature of the Vietnam War that was often covered up or denied by the US
Government and the Left during the 1960s and 1970s was the involvement of a veritable
international communist army of troops and advisers who assisted the North Vietnamese and VC
forces who fought to conquer South Vietnam. One SDS questionnaire posed the following: The
war in South Vietnam is supposed to be part of our policy to contain Communist Chinese
aggression. How many Communist Chinese troops are actively engaged in combat in Vietnam?
The answer provided by SDS was The correct answer is (A) None. Neither the U.S. Government
or Saigon claim Communist Chinese troops are involved in the war. 114 Hence, the American
public was largely unaware of the massive, covert presence of military forces from the
communist bloc countries in Indochina.
During the First Indochina War (1946-1954), the Viet Minh received Japanese-made
rifles from Red China and the Soviet Union. The Japanese-made rifles that were sent by the
USSR originated from captured stocks in Soviet-occupied Manchuria. The Viet Minh also
smuggled weapons from Thailand and the Philippines. These arms were paid for by the sale of
rice and opium produced in Viet Minh-occupied areas.115 In March 1946, the Viet Minh provided
the First Regiment of the Chinese Red Army with assistance such as food and medicine. The
Viet Minh received training by the Chinese Red Army. By July 1947, 830 Viet Minh
commanders and soldiers were trained by the Chinese Red Army. The Chinese Communist Party
Hong Kong Sub-Bureau provided funds to the Viet Minh. In the spring of 1947, the Chinese
Communists and Viet Minh established direct telegram communications links. US intelligence
reported in 1946 that the Viet Minh government was in touch with the Soviets and Mao Tsetungs headquarters. It was also reported in 1946 that the Chinese Communist Party and the
Soviet advisers trained Viet Minh troops. 116
In May 1989, the Red Chinese admitted that 300,000 Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
troops participated in fighting with the North Vietnamese and VC during the Vietnam War.
Chinese officials noted that more than 4,000 Chinese soldiers were killed during the war.117
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Red Chinese newspapers openly bragged that 20,00030,000 PLA troops assisted the Viet Minh. 118

bin/starfetch.exe?WLgTM6I9oyGOoyaZXVSCGBFXN@4Oi21eHdLFBsGG6L.qI2pdPGAQLC
XpTKD4GBleLInnJO9BaHgPMv09d6w5lYUv@A3X3qg9epjgDsH305A/2322511076.pdf
113Hard Times for our Man in Hanoi Times (London) November 26, 1975 page 26.
114National Vietnam Examination Prepared By Students for a Democratic Society and InterUniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy http://www.sds-1960s.org/exam.htm and
http://www.sds-1960s.org/answers.htm
115 Windrow, Martin. The French Indochina War 1946-54 (Osprey Publishing 2013)page 24.
116 Zhai, Qiang. China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (University of North Carolina Press,
2000) pages 12-13.
117 Van Atta, Michael. Seven New Areas That Were Classified In Kiss The Boys Goodbye
Nam Vet Newsletter December 14, 2000 Accessed From:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/vietnam/nvet_archive/nvet0412.t
xt
118 McLean, Jim. How Mao Tse-Tung Planned to Unleash Nuclear War in Vietnam Scotland
on Sunday March 15, 1998 page 7.

25

In July 1950, China sent 400 PLA soldiers to assist the Viet Minh. In August 1950,
French intelligence reported that Viet Minh cadres received tank training in Canton China. In the
mid-1950s, the North Vietnamese sent 202 soldiers to the USSR and China for armor
training.119A military trade agreement was signed between the Viet Minh and China in January
1950. The Chinese provided the Viet Minh with 150,000 Japanese rifles and 10,000 US-made
carbines. In mid-1951, 4,000-6,000 Chinese troops were assisting the Viet Minh. In early 1952,
7,000-8,000 Chinese troops helped the Viet Minh. In the siege of Dien Bien Phu, the Chinese
and Soviets provided 100 105mm howitzers, several batteries of Katyusha multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs), and 180 antiaircraft guns. Chinese PLA drivers manned Soviet-made
Molotova trucks and PLA laborers constructed roads along the attack routes. 120
The South Vietnamese complained to the International Control Commission (ICC) in
August 1964 that Chinese advisers assisted the VC in its territory. The Chinese PLA reportedly
led the VC 514th and 261st Battalions in an attack on Sung Hieu. In July 1966, South
Vietnamese Special Forces captured VC documents in Tay Ninh Province. These documents
revealed that the Chinese PLA fought with VC troops in South Vietnam. These documents were
never made public in the US. In January 1973, a Pathet Lao defector reported that the Red
Chinese stationed 700-800 PLA troops in communist-held sections of Laos.121 Mao Tse-tung
threatened to drop atomic bombs on Saigon and other South Vietnamese bases and cities if the
United States used tactical nuclear weapons against North Vietnam. Maos threat was made in
the presence of PLA generals in the mid-1960s.122
During the anti-French war of 1946-1954, Viet Minh commanders had a number of
Soviet advisers attached their staffs. They oversaw logistics and advised on tactics. Two Soviet
officers reportedly were killed in the Plain of Reeds and Ben Tre in 1951. Soviet officers also
interrogated French POWs, with an emphasis on Foreign Legionaries. They also developed
excellent propaganda into inducing them to defect. 123 In 1957, Soviet officers served in North
Vietnamese artillery and engineering schools. 124 In 1954, the KGB established relations with the
North Vietnam and a KGB Advisory Group arrived in Hanoi in 1958. The KGB established
relations with the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security, the North Vietnamese Armys
Military Security Department, while the GRU established relations with the North Vietnamese
Army General Staffs General Research Department. 125
A Diem-era South Vietnamese report indicated that the North Vietnamese hosted Soviet
and Chinese military advisers in the DMZ. It also reported that the North Vietnamese imported
training aircraft, MiG-15 jet fighters, Ilyushin and Antonov transport planes, helicopters, anti119Conboy,

Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing Limited 2012)
page 45.
120 Turner, Robert F. Vietnamese Communism, Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1975) page 85.
121 Silva, Luis. Ho Chi Minhs Foreign Legion Accessed From:
http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm
122 McLean, Jim. How Mao Tse-Tung Planned to Unleash Nuclear War in Vietnam Scotland
on Sunday March 15, 1998 page 7.
123 Brown, F.C. Soviet Cong: Ivan in Indochina Soldier of Fortune November 1985 pages 7074.
124 Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987)page 116.
125 Harrison, Benjamin L. Hell on a Hill Top (iUniverse Inc 2004)

26

tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and gunboats. After the 1954 Geneva Accord, the North
Vietnamese established a unit of marines, self-defense forces at factories and farms, and the socalled Popular Security Army. In October 1959, it was reported that the North Vietnamese
negotiated a military alliance with the USSR, China, and North Korea. In early 1960, the Soviets
sent a military mission to North Vietnam to reinforce the military bases. North Vietnamese antiaircraft weapons at Hoi-Xuan, Hanoi-Haiphong, and Hoi-Xuan-SonTay were supervised by
Chinese PLA advisers. 126
In 1954 and 1955, the North Vietnamese expanded existing airfields. In 1956, North
Vietnamese air force students were sent to Czechoslovakia and the USSR. By the end of 1956,
Chinese advisers were also training future pilots in North Vietnam. By 1957, North Vietnamese
pilots learned how to fly the MIG-15 in Soviet Air Force schools. By 1957, two new airfields
were built in Cao Bang and Do Son. By 1958, the USSR sent to the North Vietnamese IL-14, Li2 and AN-2 transports and Mi-4 helicopters. These aircraft were used by North Vietnam to
supply the Pathet Lao. By 1959, at least 13 airfields existed in North Vietnam. In 1960, North
Vietnam pilots went to China for training on MIG-17 fighters. By December 1960, an air bridge
was developed between the North Vietnam and Xam Nua airfield in Laos. This bridge was
manned by Li-2 transports piloted by joint teams of North Vietnamese and Soviet pilots. By
1962, Soviet air force advisers left and the USSR provided MIG-17 and MIG-15 fighters.127
In the early 1960s, South Vietnamese forces nearly captured a Soviet delegation touring
VC-held territory in the eastern Mekong Delta in South Vietnam. Former US Ambassador to
Laos William Sullivan reported that in 1961, the USSR stationed over 500 troops in Laos. In the
fall of 1967, South Vietnamese Military Intelligence reported that VC regiments in Phouc Tuy
Province were accompanied by advisers from Red China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and North Korea. 128
Two Soviet trawlers electronically equipped were stationed near the US Air Base in
Guam (four miles offshore) and relayed data to the North Vietnamese. In 1969-1973, East
Germany and Czechoslovakia provided 25% of the North Vietnamese armys war materials.
From 1973-1975, the USSR provided the North Vietnamese with $2.5 billion of war material. 129
In April 1989, the USSR admitted that it awarded Soviet officers who helped shoot down 24 US
bombers. In 1970, VC defector Bui Con Tuong reported that in 1967, he accompanied a Soviet
delegation that included a one star Red Army general and a captain to Kien Hoa in South
Vietnam to inspect a liberated hamlet. This delegation was evacuated after a South
Vietnamese and US attack in the area. In May 1965, communist defector Nguyen Van Ton
revealed that he escorted Russians on military operations in War Zone C. In 1967, a US Navy
SEAL killed a Soviet adviser in combat in the Kien Gia Province. In September 1969, defecting

126Government

of the Republic of Vietnam. Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the VietMinh Communists From July 1959 to June 1960 (Saigon 1960) Accessed From
http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?YMaoFm1Szf2U9Nojk@9L@usLXKXOyN69Mxn@ZCj@a98gCwt3DvvlLU
Zfp7vDr94hnUwyY@Nx1jAbT@fe6jEgGYaVj2C04ZxiYw2MXlcbhlE/2410403027.pdf
127Toperczer, Istvan. Air War Over North Vietnam (Squadron/Signal Publications 1998) pages 47.
128 Silva, Luis. Ho Chi Minhs Foreign Legion Accessed From:
http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm
129 Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987) pages 121-125.

27

North Vietnamese official Dr. Dang Tan revealed that he personally saw Soviet advisers in South
Vietnam and Laos that carried weapons. Dr. Tan was also in contact with 4 to 5 groups of
foreign advisers from Cuba, Red China, the USSR, and North Korea. 130
In May 1965, a VC defector named Nguyen Van Ton stated that he worked with a Soviet
officer, Ivan Esnot, who was involved in propaganda efforts and the Australian Communist
journalist Wilfred Burchett. He also escorted a French collaborator with the VC, Madeleine
Riffaud. Navy SEALS reportedly killed Soviet advisers in Kien Giang Province in 1967. Major
Len Campbell also claimed hearing Soviet voice transmissions in Takeo Province in
Cambodia.131
In 1971, Soviet GRU/Spetsnaz operatives operated in South Vietnam. Soviets that were
disguised as Americans also targeted the US Special Operations (SOG) forces, gauging their
effectiveness. In 1969, Soviet-piloted Mi-6 helicopters reportedly transported troops and supplies
in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. A VC defector reported that Soviet Navy submarines
unloaded personnel and munitions along the South Vietnamese coast. Soviet troops
operated with North Vietnamese troops in Camau in February 1973, at An Loc in November
1973, and outside of Danang in February 1974. 132 One South Vietnamese officer noted in 1974
that he saw members of the Russian Engineering Corps bulldozing earth near a North
Vietnamese manioc farm. This officer also witnessed Soviet personnel manning tanks attacking
South Vietnamese forces at base 801 at Le Tanh. 133
The Soviets also compromised the SOG groups by forming counter-raider teams that
mimicked Americans and South Vietnamese troops in every fashion. They were first deployed in
1971 and operated in the tri-border region. Many bona fide SOG teams were compromised and
defeated. These fake SOG teams also purchased A-1E aircraft, command helicopters, and UH1Hs from Third World countries and international business concerns and transported to North
Vietnam on Soviet and Eastern European freighters. The Soviet allegedly painted and marked the
craft so well that they were indistinguishable from bona fide SOG aircraft. The fake SOG teams
were believed to be either KGB or GRU. Soviet piloted Mi-6 and Mi-4 helicopters reportedly
operated in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. 134
South Vietnamese security officials also claimed that KGB agents stirred up anti-US
dissent in Saigon and disseminated disinformation. KGB officers worked underground in Saigon,
Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Macao. 135
A Pathet Lao defector indicated that Soviet liaison officers were attached to Pathet Lao
HQ at Ban Na Kay Neua. He also reported that large Soviet helicopters were manned by Soviets

130
131

Colvin, Rod. First Heroes (Ardent Media, 1987) pages 48-49.

Brown, F.C. Soviet Cong: Ivan in Indochina Soldier of Fortune November 1985 pages 70-

74.
Van Atta, Michael. Seven New Areas That Were Classified In Kiss The Boys Goodbye
Nam Vet Newsletter December 14, 2000 Accessed From:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/vietnam/nvet_archive/ nvet0412.t
xt
133 Colvin, Rod. First Heroes (Ardent Media, 1987) pages 48-49,
134 Brown, F.C. Soviet Cong: Ivan in Indochina Soldier of Fortune November 1985 pages 7074.
135 Ibid.
132

28

who flew between Hanoi and Sam Neua. Soviet forces were also sighted Camau (February
1973), An Loc (November 1973), and the foothills west of Danang (January/February 1974). 136
Reportedly, ex-French Foreign Legionnaires joined the Viet Minh as advisers. A French
unit called the International Combatants also fought with the Viet Minh and even serves as
spies who disguised themselves as US news correspondents. Former North Vietnamese Defense
Ministry official Dr. Dang Tan reported that French military advisers assisted the VC and North
Vietnamese. It was believed that these Frenchmen assisted Hanoi in fighting imperialism as
radical leftists or deserters from French colonial forces present in Indochina before 1954.
Reportedly, Western leftists from The Netherlands, Australia, and the United States volunteered
to fight with the VC and North Vietnamese well into the 1970s. 137
The East Germans stationed a National Peoples Army engineer battalion in Laos, while
East Berlins advisers assisted VC and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.138 East
Germany sent 200 troops to man missile and communications facilities. They were attached
officially as a study group affiliated with the East German Embassy in Hanoi. 139 In the late
1950s, the Stasi exported listening devices to North Vietnam for telephone and room
surveillance. By the mid-1960s, the Stasi assisted the North Vietnamese in developing a modern
technical department for Hanoi to combat USA Imperialism.
During the 1980s, the East Germans also provided the Vietnamese intelligence services
with Western-made Ricoh and Robot cameras, a Swiss-made Aciera milling machine, and
supplies for disguising agents. 140 In 1982, Lt-Col Helmut Foerster, Navy and Air Force Attach
at the East German Embassy in Vietnam, praised the co-operation between the armed forces of
the two countries. He said that many infantry officers from the GDR had assisted the
Vietnamese army in building the technical NCO school in Ho Chi Minh City and formulating its
teaching and training programmes, while many Vietnamese officers had been sent to the GDR
for long-term training to become lecturers and instructors in the Vietnamese army. 141
Between 1965 and 1985, East Germany provided North Vietnam with $35 million worth
of military aid. It consisted of light weaponry, grenades, mines, and ammunition. East Germany
also trained 400 Vietnamese military officers, while $700,000 worth of equipment was provided
for the Vietnamese Army Officers School in Ho Chi Minh City. The East German Stasi
provided technical equipment and advice to the North Vietnamese intelligence services starting
in 1959. The Stasi even acquired Western-made intelligence equipment for their Vietnamese
comrades. The Vietnamese intelligence service then clandestinely acquired Japanese technology,
which was then passed onto the Stasi. 142

136

Ibid.
Silva, Luis. Ho Chi Minhs Foreign Legion Accessed From:
http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm
138 Ibid.
139East German Aid to Hanoi Detailed New York Times October 14, 1966 page 14.
140 Macrakis, Kristie. Seduced by Secrets (Cambridge University Press 2008) Accessed From:
http://worldtracker.org/media/library/Intelligence%20&%20Espionage/Seduced%20by%20Secre
ts%20Inside%20the%20Stasi's%20Spy-Tech%20World.pdf
141 GDR Military Attache On Co-Operation With Vietnam Hanoi Home Service March 9, 1982
142 Quinn Slobodian. Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World (Berghahn
Books, 2015) pages 101-102
137

29

At the end of the 1950s, North Vietnamese Minister Tran Quoc Hoan requested the
assistance of the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, North Korea, and Czechoslovakia to build
up its intelligence service. In 1957, the North Vietnamese Public Security Ministry requested
small tape recorders and cameras from the East German Stasi. According to Stasi files and
official Vietnamese-language publications, the North Vietnamese intelligence service received
assistance from Poland, Hungary, East Germany, the Soviet Union, and China since 1965.
The Stasi also purchased intelligence related equipment from West Germany and other
Western countries for the North Vietnamese intelligence service. In March 1966, for example,
the Stasi ordered special devices worth 38,000 Deutsch Mark in the West, including a Swissmade Aciera milling machine for micromechanics.
Much of the East German intelligence equipment provided was considered by East Berlin
as tangible forms of solidarity contributions in the common struggle against American
imperialism. East German State Security Minister Erich Mielke requested that the North
Vietnamese ship captured American weapons and other equipment to East Germany: Thus we
can gain new insights. Starting in 1966, the Stasi trained North Vietnamese intelligence officers
in the field of electronics. This training extended to the head of the North Vietnamese radio
signals security department. The Stasis Operational-Technical Sector also provided Westernmade equipment to the North Vietnamese intelligence service for the production of forged Green
Dragon South Vietnamese government ID cards. The East Germans also provided the North
Vietnamese with an automated 1,500-line telephone switchboard and with sufficient equipment
so that each of the city and provincial public security offices in Vietnam could have its own
telephone switchboard and an automated telephone network.
In 1977, the East Germans also provided the Vietnamese intelligence services with
assistance in dealing with remaining anti-communists, unemployed people, and other
ideologically suspect elements. Since 1975, the Stasi also stepped up the training of
(Vietnamese) cadres, supply of equipment for operational work, support and cooperation in the
fight against hostile secret services and subversive activities, the protection of airports and
harbors, passport control. In October 1980, the East German and Vietnamese intelligence
services signed an official treaty of cooperation to support each other in the struggle against
hostile activities of secret services of imperialist states. The Soviets, Hungarians, Cubans, and
the Czechoslovaks also signed similar treaties with the Vietnamese in late 1980. Even as late as
1989, the Stasis Communications and Technical Operations Departments provided equipment
and trained to Vietnamese intelligence officers. 143
In April 1971, VC and NVA units in the Soi Ba Huyen area, near the Phu Cat Air Base
were accompanied by five North Korean military advisers.144 By December 1966, 25-50 North
Korean pilots assisted the North Vietnamese in engaging US aircraft. North Korean soldiers and
pilots continued to assist North Vietnam until April 1975. Communist Vietnam then transferred
US-made weapons captured from South Vietnamese to their North Korean allies. Such

Martin Grossheim Fraternal Support: The East German Stasi and the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam during the Vietnam War September 2014 Accessed From:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_Working_Paper_71_East_German_Stas
i_Vietnam_War.pdf
144 Silva, Luis. Ho Chi Minhs Foreign Legion Accessed From:
http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000018.htm
143

30

equipment included M-113 APCs and M-48 tanks, which were transferred to North Korean
special reconnaissance forces. 145
In January 1973, 4,000 Cuban army engineers landed in Hanoi and commenced the
reconstruction of the Phuc Yen/Da Phuc Airfield. Cuba also reportedly piloted MIG aircraft for
the North Vietnamese and also accompanied Hanois forces in the conquest of South Vietnam. 146
Soviet specialists selected a variety of advanced aircraft in Da Nang in November 1975.
They included F-5s, A-37s, internal equipment of an AC-119, CH-47 helicopters, and UH-1
helicopters. The captured planes were then sent to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for
study and analysis by military engineers in those nations. 147 In 1979, the Soviets dispatched to
ex-US naval base at Cam Ranh Bay various warships such as F class submarines. The Soviets
reconstructed the former US facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and added on 7 piers. Between 1979 and
1984, the Soviets based Tu-95/Tu-142 Bear reconnaissance planes, Tu-16 Badger bombers,
MIG-23 fighter/bombers, Ka-25 anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and Yak-36 V/STOL
fighters. The Soviets also stationed several hundred naval infantrymen at Cam Ranh Bay. 148
General Van Tien Dung attended the West-81 Warsaw Pact exercises as a Vietnamese Army
observation team in 1981. North Vietnamese officers took part in other Warsaw Pact war games.
In 1984, a battalion of Soviet naval infantry staged amphibious landings along the central
Vietnam coast 100 miles south of Haiphong. Nine Soviet naval vessels took part in this
exercise.149 After 1979, the KGB and GRU increased their relations with Vietnam. In mid-1980,
the GRU cooperated with the Vietnamese Army Signals Intelligence units. 150
Perhaps some of the most prized items captured by the North Vietnamese were the
American-made arms of the old South Vietnamese armed forces. Since some of the weapons
were manufactured with high quality technologies, Hanois communist allies requested samples
of the leftover US-made weapons. Other captured South Vietnamese arms were passed to North
Vietnams allies in the Third World and various national liberation (terrorist) movements
throughout the world. A large number of these American-made armaments were also utilized in
combat by the North Vietnamese against their erstwhile communist allies in Democratic
Kampuchea and China.
The Soviets and Warsaw Pact sensed that they inherited a treasure trove of potentially
advanced American weapons and requested samples from North Vietnam. Soviet specialists
selected a variety of advanced aircraft in Da Nang in November 1975. They included F-5s, A37s, internal equipment of an AC-119, CH-47 helicopters, and UH-1 helicopters.151 By 1977,
Poland and Czechoslovakia received sample A-37B and F-5E aircraft.152 On May 30, 1975 two
new regiments of the North Vietnamese Air Force was set up consisting of captured F-5s and A145

Bermudez, Joseph S. Terrorism: The North Korean Connection(Crane Russak 1990)page 166.
Benge, Michael. Cuban War Crimes Against American POWs During the Vietnam War
October 4, 1999 Accessed From: http://www.nationalalliance.org/cuba/benge4.htm
147Toperczer, Istvan. Air War Over North Vietnam (Squadron/Signal Publications 1998) page 58.
148 Smith, Frederic N. Cam Ranh Bay Just an R and R Port? Defense & Foreign Affairs April,
1988 page 37.
149Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Westview Press, 1987) page 199.
150 Harrison, Benjamin L. Hell on a Hill Top (iUniverse Inc 2004)
151 Toperczer, Istvan. Air War Over North Vietnam (Squadron/Signal Publications 1998) pages
49 and 58.
152 Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. Red Ladies in Waiting (Squadron/Signal Publications 1994) pages 46-48.
146

31

37s. They were the 935th and 937th Regiments.153 By 1979, reports indicated that the Vietnamese
Air Force had captured US-made F-5 and A-37 fighter bombers, C-130, C-47, and C-7
transports, AC-119K gunship planes, and UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters.154
Clearly, these aircraft were quickly conscripted by the North Vietnamese in their
occupation of South Vietnam and to engage in combat with their communist rivals in Democratic
Kampuchea. By the end of 1975, captured C-130As were shuttling personnel and supplies
between Saigon, Hanoi, and Vientiane (Laos). 155
In 1977, A-37B Dragonfly fighter-bombers attacked targets in Democratic
Kampuchea.156 In 1978, F-5 fighter bombers and A-37 jet light bombers were used by the
PAVN to bomb Democratic Kampuchean positions, while C-130A transports launched pallet
bombing missions at Stung Treng. 157 In the early 1980s, the Vietnamese deployed captured
American-made UH-1H Huey helicopters to assist their allies in the Peoples Republic of
Kampuchea.158 In 1979, US-made C-130 transport planes were utilized to airlift Vietnamese
troops to northern Vietnam during the war with China. 159
The North Vietnamese Navy acquired 1,300 mostly American-made South Vietnamese
vessels, including Admiral-class corvettes. Some were conscripted into combat service with
Hanois forces. These corvettes were later used in 1978 against the navy of Democratic
Kampuchea.160
Throughout the early to mid-1980s, Hanoi still utilized albeit a dwindling number of
serviceable US-made F-5 aircraft. One of the last known public appearances of captured USmade jets occurred when F-5 fighter bombers flew during the anniversary parade in 1985 that
commemorated the fall of Saigon. 161
Some reports indicated continued Vietnamese use of captured US aircraft even as late as
the end of 1989. As of November 1989, old American-made F-5As and F-5Es were reportedly in
storage at Vietnamese hangers, while some were still utilized as active combat aircraft. US-made
transport planes and A-37B Dragonfly fighter-bombers saw continued use by the Vietnamese Air
Force.162
Leftover American-made heavy weapons were also incorporated into the North
Vietnamese Army. By July 1975, 25 US-made 105 mm howitzers were reportedly shipped from
the occupied South Vietnamese territory to the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam. It was
153

Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. Red Ladies in Waiting (Squadron/Signal Publications 1994) pages 46-48.
Vietnam Air Force: 1979 Air Forces Intelligence Study Directorate of Research DIA
October 1, 1979 Accessed From: http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?2KZrLZwwQgcs4URjUTLedYzA7Q60DUNEeB3o177eMruR7Yrn8LOtZsFx
5eKGqddPptkSOco.p7Sl3CYMCv863RwAEL6OGpwiuNokOIdyWrs/2123309006.pdf
155 Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 49.
156 Conboy, Kenneth. How Vietnams People's Army Achieved Regional Power With A
Bankrupt State at Home Defense & Foreign Affairs August, 1990 page 6.
157 Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 49.
158 Conboy, Kenneth. How Vietnams People's Army Achieved Regional Power With A
Bankrupt State at Home Defense & Foreign Affairs August, 1990 page 6.
159 Ibid.
160 Conboy, Ken and Bowra, Ken. The NVA and Viet Cong (Osprey Publishing 2012) page 51.
161 Ibid, page 49.
162 Vietnam-Air Forces Flight International November 29, 1989
154

32

shipped in a former US-made South Vietnamese landing ship that was conscripted by the North
Vietnamese navy. It was believed that the North Vietnamese was able to acquire ammunition and
spare parts from Red China for the 105 mm howitzers. 163 As of 1990, the Vietnamese actively
utilized US-built M-113 armored personnel carriers that were retrofitted with Soviet-made
engines.164
There were attempts by Hanoi to procure spare parts for these captured weapons from
corporations based in Hong Kong and Japan. After all, these were relatively high-performance
weapons that added a higher quality to North Vietnamese firepower. In 1975, it was reported that
Vietcong officials were meeting with Third World and European Communist buyers in Hong
Kong to purchase captured American-made equipment. This business was conducted from the
North Vietnamese trade office in the Peoples Bank of China office building in Hong Kong. 165
North Vietnam also reportedly approached the Japanese looking for private firms to repair
captured aircraft.166
The North Vietnamese also handed US air and naval infrastructure to the Soviets as
military bases. As of November 1989, the Soviet Navy and Air Force retained the former US
armed forces bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Soviet Navy and Air Force units based at Da
Nang and Cam Ranh Bay were equipped with Tu-95 Bear bombers, Il-38 reconnaissance
aircraft, and Tu-26 Backfire bombers. 167
Other captured US firearms and weapons systems were provided to terrorist movements,
communist parties, and ideological allies who also possessed vast stores of American-made
weapons from the old governments displaced by Islamists and Communists. In 1977, the Soviets
reportedly urged the communist Ethiopian military dictatorship to approach the Vietnamese for
spare parts for American-made weapons. At that time, the Ethiopian army used predominantly
US-built weapons.168 Vietnam also shipped spare parts for captured American-built F-4 Phantom
aircraft to Islamist Iran. These parts originated from captured South Vietnamese stocks at the old
American airbase at Danang. 169 Starting in 1980, Vietnam shipped spare parts and arms from its
US-made stocks to Iran. 170 Communist Vietnam then transferred US-made weapons captured
from South Vietnam to their North Korean allies. Such equipment included M-113 APCs and M48 tanks, which were transferred to North Korean special reconnaissance forces. 171 The North
Koreans would then disguise themselves as South Korean forces and thus gain an advantage in a
potential attack on the government in Seoul.

Captured US Arms Are heading for Hanoi Evening Capital July 25, 1975 page 2.
Conboy, Kenneth. How Vietnams People's Army Achieved Regional Power With A
Bankrupt State at Home Defense & Foreign Affairs August, 1990 page 6.
165 Hughes, Richard. Captured US Arms to be Sold in Vietnam Times (London) September 9,
1975 page 7.
166 Anderson, Jack. US Weapons Left in Vietnam Turning Up Around the World The Progress
August 23, 1979 page 4.
167 Vietnam-Air Forces Flight International November 29, 1989
168 Conflict in the Horn of Africa Heritage Foundation Report July 13, 1977 Accessed From:
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1977/pdf/bg24.pdf
169 Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes (Palgrave Macmillan 1999) page 50.
170 Hiro, Dilip. The Longest War (Psychology Press, 1989) pages 71-72.
171 Bermudez, Joseph. Terrorism, the North Korean connection (Crane Russak, 1990) page 166.
163
164

33

Hanoi also dumped vast stores of small arms and infantry weapons to communist
movements and terrorists all over the world. In late December 1975, the North Vietnamese
agreed to transfer to the USSR ten thousand captured American-made rifles and 10 million
rounds of ammunition to be utilized for assistance in struggle with the imperialism and for
providing aid to the national liberation movements.172
Congressman Wolff (D-NY) reported in 1977 that some of the American weapons
captured by the North Vietnamese in 1975 were transferred to Communist guerrillas fighting on
the Thai-Malaysian border.173 In 1980, US-made M-16 rifles were stockpiled in the Cuban
Embassy in Jamaica for use by leftist Prime Minister Michael Manleys leftist forces during a
nation-wide election that year. A portion of these M-16s found in Jamaica had serial numbers
that signified that they saw usage in South Vietnam by the ARVN and US forces. 174
In October 1980, the Cuban Military Attache in Vietnam visited one of the warehouses
which stored captured American-made weapons that were being transferred to revolutionary
forces all over the world. A declassified Vietnamese document noted that This visit to your unit
is of special significance because all of the officers and enlisted men of the General Warehouse
have completed a task that, although relatively simple, is of tremendous significance for the
success of the Asian and Latin American revolutions and for all peoples who have or are
prepared to fight for their own permanent liberation. 175
From August to October 1980, the Soviets, Cubans, and Vietnamese coordinated their
efforts to send captured 60-80 tons of American-manufactured weapons to the Salvadoran
FMLN rebel forces. The Soviet airline Aeroflot transported these firearms from Hanoi to
Havana.176
In June 1975, the North Vietnamese invited French experts to inspect leftover US-made
IBM computers in Saigon. The French team reported that South Vietnamese had more computers
than Thailand and Philippines combined. 177 The French Commercial Bank of Northern Europe
aided the North Vietnamese in retrieving South Vietnamese assets in the United States and
trained North Vietnamese banking officials in France. 178

172

KGB report. Shipments of American weapons captured in Vietnam to the USSR December
31, 1975 Accessed From: http://bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/terr-wd/0915_gb75-1-Eng-ybz.pdf
173 The Associated Press April 13, 1977
174 United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Cubas Renewed Support of
Violence in Latin America December 14, 1981 Accessed From:
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/guerrilla/report-90.htm
175 Military Attach of the Cuban Embassy in Vietnam Visits General Warehouse 767
October 12, 1980 Accessed From: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/vietnam-covertlysupplied-weapons-to-revolutionaries-algeria-and-latin-america
176 A request from leadership of the Communist Party of El Salvador. Shipment of 60-80 tons of
Western-made small arms and ammunition from Hanoi to Havana for Communist Party of
Salvador in September-October 1980.August 20, 1980 Accessed From: http://bukovskyarchives.net/pdfs/terr-wd/0959_ct225b80-Eng-Sklyar.pdf
177 Beech, Keyes. US Legacy Aids Vietnam Economy The Calgary Herald June 14, 1976 page
73.
178 Gottesman, Evan. Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge (Yale University Press, 2003) pages
121-122.

34

Despite the collapse of communism in Europe, the remaining socialist bloc and
traditional allies of Vietnam continued to maintain or redevelop military relations with Hanoi.
Despite the chatter about Glasnost and Perestroika, Gorbachev continued to cooperate with the
Vietnamese in the effort to undermine the West and the United States. This even extended into
the realms of espionage and military cooperation between other Soviet bloc countries and
Vietnam. In June 1991, FBI officials reported that the Cuban and Vietnamese intelligence
services increased their intelligence activities on behalf of their masters in the Soviet KGB. The
FBI reported that the KGB has turned to the Cubans and Vietnamese because of the loss of its
allied intelligence services in the former East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In
1991, US intelligence sources reported that the KGB sought to acquire Western technology and
recruit foreigners as spies, with the assistance of Cuban and Vietnamese intelligence services
acting as surrogates. 179 In March 1990, Vietnamese General Lee Duc Anh visited Cuba and
signed a military cooperation agreement which stipulated the mutual building the armies and
consolidating the national defense of both countries. The Vietnamese Army provided
refresher training for high ranking military cadres of the Cuban Armed Forces. 180 In March
1991, a North Korean military delegation visited Cuba and met with Revolutionary Armed
Forces officers. Cuba and North Korea signed an act of understanding between the armed
forces of the two countries which foresees the continuous development of close military
cooperation in the years ahead.181
According to journalist Servando Gonzalez and Dr. Manuel Cereijo, Castros Tropas
Especiales (Special Troops) were trained since 1990 for attacks against the United States.
Vietnamese and Red Chinese military personnel advised the Tropas Especiales to conduct
operations in the continental United States. Gonzalez detailed their specific regimen: Since
1990, Cuban Special Forces troops (the ones under the direct command of Castro himself) have
been training for the possibility of an attack directed at some parts of continental United States,
most likely Florida. Intensive training courses have been underway, at least since 1990, under a
program provided by Vietnam, at the Vietnam Peoples Army base at Hoa Binh, an inland town
south-west of Hanoi. Personnel attending the school specialize in commando attacks and
infiltration. They are considered by experts to be a very professional group, with great potential
to inflict damage to a country. They are between 20 and 35 years old, and speak fluent English
These men are trained in infiltration techniques and operations and can be effectively used to
carry bacteriological and chemical warfare to the United States. 182

Gertz, Bill. KGB Chief Visits Cuba to Boost TiesThe Washington Times June 4, 1991 page
A3.
180 Gaffney, Frank. Lifting Embargo Under Present Circumstances Will Produce New Vietnam
Quagmire For Clinton Center for Security Policy September 9, 1993 Accessed From:
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/1993/09/09/lifting-embargo-under-presentcircumstances-will-produce-new-vietnam-quagmire-for-clinton-2/
181 Cuba DPRK Military Delegation Meets Fidel Castro; Signs Agreement; Departs BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts March 11, 1991
182 Gonzalez, Servando. Castros Cuba: Asymmetric Threat to the US? Part One: Castros
Capabilities July 1, 2002 http://www.newswithviews.com/news_worthy/news_worthy9.htm
See also: Cereijo, Dr. Manuel. State Sponsored Terrorism: Cuba undated
http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagmc205.php
179

35

The Sapper (special forces) Command in Hanoi published the Sapper Handbook in 1992,
which noted In addition to successfully participating in combat operations on the battlefields of
friendly nations, the Sapper Branch also received foreign friends who came to visit, study, and
exchange experiences in training and combat operations. The branch also directly trained many
sapper cadre and enlisted personnel for allied nations. During the Gorbachev period, the
Soviets dispatched 24 students in May-November 1988 to Vietnam; and Colombian Communists
sent 9 students to Vietnam from August 1990 to January 1991. The Handbook also noted that in
November 1988 a delegation of representatives of the Sapper Branch led by Major General Tu
Cuong, the Sapper Branch Commander, and Senior Colonel Mai Nang, the Deputy Branch
Commander, visited Cuba and concluded an agreement on sapper cooperation between the two
countries which covered the period 1989-1991. In December 1988, Major General Tu Cuong, the
Sapper Branch Commander, and Senior Colonel Mai Nang, the Deputy Sapper Branch
Commander, visited the Soviet Union and concluded cooperation agreements on sapper
activities.183
According to the defecting Vietnamese Peoples Army Colonel Bui Tin, the Vietnamese
Communist Party Central Committee redefined foreign policy in late 1992. It stipulated that the
United States remained the chief enemy of the Vietnamese Communists: In the first category
are China, Cuba, and North Korea together with Cambodia and Laos since they are all
considered to be Marxist Leninist states. Second come the countries of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union because our leadership believes they have the capability to revert to
communism. India too is included in this category as a former close ally of the socialist bloc.
Third come Vietnams neighbors in ASEAN who have to be won over to cooperate. Next are
friends in the Third World such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Algeria. Also falling within this
category are the countries of Western Europe as well as Australia and Japan which are
currently expanding their relations with us. Fifth and last there is the United States which is still
regarded as Vietnams long term enemy.184
Despite the policies of engagement between the United States and the Vietnamese
Communists, Hanoi continued to take an anti-American position on foreign conflicts. America
remained the premier imperialist power in the eyes of Hanoi. One source commented that the
the (Vietnamese Communist Party) VCP leaders are always looking for ways to harass
Washington, particularly by supporting the anti-American side in most conflicts that America
involves in one side. Hanoi VCP-controlled media would find every chance to criticize
Washington, often with grudging anti-American rhetoric. The same source noted that In the
1991 Gulf War, Hanoi fiercely supported Saddam Hussein on the front of propaganda and the
mass media. During the years after the Gulf War, Hanoi has taken a friendly position beside
Baghdad, giving Iraq some assistance of food and other deals regarding food and oil and
earning considerable profits in exports to Iraq. A force of labor of thousands of workers was
working in Iraq since 1992 (In 2003) Hanois party-controlled media is publishing news
reports and editorials aimed against the American governments Iraq policy and at anything
unfavorable to the American side. After the war broke out on March 20, 2003, the VCP

183

Sapper Handbook Published by Sapper Command, Hanoi, 1992 Accessed From:

http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113922
184 Tin, Bui. Following Ho Chi Minh (University of Hawaii Press, 1995) page 191.

36

administration has staged many anti-war rallies in dozen major cities in Vietnam protesting the
American governments military actions in Iraq.185
Presently, Vietnam continued its close relations with Russia and rebuilt relations with
Red China by 1990. In December 2012, a ceremony was held to commemorate the Viet Minh
communist victory at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Foreign delegations present included
representatives from the Russian and Chinese Defense Ministries and military attaches of Laos,
Cambodia, Belarus, and North Korea. Vietnamese Communist President Truong Tan Sang stated
that Vietnamese Party, State and people will always be grateful to fraternal socialist countries,
international friends, and peace and justice lovers across the world-including the US people-that
supported and assisted Vietnam during the war. 186 In November 2012, the Vietnamese News
Agency commented that Vietnam always places great value on the neighbourliness, friendship
and comprehensive cooperation with China, and is willing to work with China to continue
deepening and pushing the relations between the two Parties and two countries to a higher
level.187 In October 2011, top Chinese and Vietnamese Communist officials met and pledged
that Both China and Vietnam should...attach the most importance to the overall relationship
and take the common strategic interest as a priority. 188 No doubt, the common strategic
interest of Vietnam and China was the displacement of American power in Asia and then the
world. In April 2010, senior Chinese and Vietnamese military officers vowed to boost friendly
exchange and cooperation between the two military forces. 189 In February 2010, communist
Vietnamese National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong noted in a meeting with a
delegation from the Chinese Peoples Association for Peace and Disarmament that Vietnam will
try its utmost to foster its friendship and cooperation with China on a wider and deeper basis
characterised by mutual trust.190
In 1994, Vietnam and the Russian Federation concluded a major arms sale agreement. In
2003, the Russians and Vietnamese concluded a strategic partnership. During Putins visit to
Vietnam in February/March 2001, the two sides agreed to strengthen their cooperation in
military supplies to meet Vietnams security demands. In September 2008, the Russian Defense
Minister described Vietnam as Russias strategic partner in Southeast Asia. In September
2008, for example, the Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov met with Vietnamese
Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh and declared that Moscow was willing to provide
Vietnamese armed forces with arms and military hardware (and) to upgrade the existing
Vietnamese armaments. Soviet-made equipment was also providedto Vietnam by Ukraine,
Poland, India, and Finland. Between 1994 and 2004, the Russians provided Vietnam with SU-27
Friend or Foe? News Analysis April 7, 2003 Accessed From:
http://www.vietquoc.com/news2003/na040703.htm
186 Vietnam Leaders Attend Ceremony to Mark Victory in 1972 Hanoi Bombing BBC
Monitoring International Reports December 30, 2012
187 Vietnamese, Chinese Party Officials Meet in Beijing BBC Monitoring International Reports
November 18, 2012
188 Top Chinese Political Adviser Discusses Ties with Vietnamese Party Head BBC
Monitoring International Reports October 12, 2011
189 Senior Chinese, Vietnamese Military Officers Vow to Boost Ties BBC Monitoring
International Reports April 23, 2010
190 Vietnam Official Receives Visiting Chinese Peace, Disarmament Delegation BBC
Monitoring International Reports February 5, 2010
185

37

and SU-30 jet fighters. In January 2009, the Vietnamese ordered 8 SU-30 jet fighters from
Russia. In 1997, Vietnam acquired two Yugoclass midget submarines from North Korea. In the
1980s, the Vietnamese acquired SS-1 Scud-B ballistic missiles from the Soviets. In April 1999,
the Vietnamese acquired from North Korea Scud-B missiles. In September 2008, Defense
Minister Phung Quang Thanh traveled to Russia and met with officials of the Federal Service for
MilitaryTechnical Cooperation, Rosoboronexport, and defense enterprises in Moscow (MIG
aircraft manufacturer) and St. Petersburg (Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering
and Admiralty Shipyards).
In 2006, Vietnamese and Chinese officers held discussions about training of military
personnel. In February 2009, it was reported that Vietnam trained 4,000 Royal Cambodian
Armed Forces (RCAF) personnel. In 2009, Laos and Vietnam agreed to extend further
assistance in training to Lao army officers and construct a number of infrastructure facilities
and welfare projects in Laos. In October 2008, Vietnam and China signed an agreement that
formed a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two nations. 191 In September 1990,
the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist leaders held a secret summit in Chengdu, China.
Reportedly, China offered to replace the entire Soviet aid program to Vietnam with one of its
own in return for which Vietnam would agree to co-ordinate its foreign policy and develop
closer political ties with China. 192
In 2012, Russia expressed interest in using the naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. Russia and
Vietnam signed a strategic partnership agreement in since 2001. In 2012, this agreement was
upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. The Vietnamese Defense Minister,
General Phung Quang Thanh, noted cooperation in the military-technical spheres between the
two countries highly contribute towards strengthening the traditional friendship and facilitating
the further development of the strategic partnership. Russia assisted Vietnam in building a
submarine base and repair dockyard. Vietnam imported SU-30MK2 fighter planes and Kilo and
Varshavyanka-class submarines from Russia.193
After the conquest of South Vietnam in April 1975, the North Vietnamese sought to
foment communist revolution in other Indochinese countries. North Vietnam provided massive
assistance to the Pathet Lao in Laos in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Hanoi also provided troops
and arms to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, who conquered that tormented country in April
1975.
In 1960, the Soviets established air connections with Laos at Vientiane Airport. Soviet
copies of C-47 and Convair 240 transports delivered oil and weapons bound for Kong Les
neutralist forces. North Vietnamese artillery troops and 105 mm howitzers were unloaded from
these planes and were destined for Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces. Chinese, Soviet, North
Vietnamese, and Pathet Lao established military missions at Khang Khay and North Vietnam
Thayer, Carlyle A. Vietnamese Peoples Army: Development and Modernization Sultan
Haji Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, Bolkiah Garrison,
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam April 30, 2009 Accessed From:
http://www.american.edu/sis/aseanstudiescenter/upload/17313967-thayer-vietnam-peoples-armymodernization-and-development.pdf
192 Thayer, Carlyle A. The Vietnam Peoples Army Under Doi Moi (Institute of Southeast Asian,
1994) page 68.
193 Blank, Stephen. Russias Growing Ties with Vietnam The Diplomat September 13, 2013
Accessed From: http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/russias-growing-ties-with-vietnam/
191

38

established information offices in Phong Savan. In December 1960 and January 1961, the
USSR airlifted and dropped weapons in Pathet Lao areas 184 times. Chinese armed work crews
constructed roads in northern Laos near the Chinese border and supplied weapons to the Pathet
Lao.194
Once the US commenced its withdrawal of troops from Indochina after the 1973 Paris
Peace Accords, the communist forces redoubled their efforts to conquer Southeast Asia. In Laos,
the anti-communist elements of the Royal Lao government were undermined by both the
Americans and the communist Pathet Lao. Right-wing elements of the Royal Lao Army were
rendered impotent by the US Embassy in Vientiane. Anti-communist opposition by the Royal
Lao Army was quashed by US Embassy orders to cut off rice, oil, and money shipments. Royal
Lao troops were attacked by Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, and Red Chinese troops while
placing cease-fire border markers. Royal Lao government troops were attacked by communist
troops who manned mortars, grenades, and machine guns. Once the US withdrew from Laos in
1973 following the Vientiane Agreement, Soviet planes airlifted 1,000 Pathet Lao soldiers
disguised as policemen. Red China airlifted other Pathet Lao forces to Luang Prabang.
Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma refused to have Royal Lao forces inspect Pathet
Lao materials and personnel. This occurred despite the protocols of the Agreement stipulating
inspections. All US and Thai soldiers withdrew by mid-1974. However, 40,000 North
Vietnamese troops and advisers remained and fought alongside the Pathet Lao. One military
adviser termed Souvanna Phouma nave and his ego got in the way. He truly believed with his
princely status his notion that he was so well liked by so many and his belief that he had the
ability to work out something with his princely half -brother Souphanouvong he had reason to be
confident about the future of Laos. He was wrong. In 1974, a Pathet Lao infantry battalion was
allowed into Vientiane to protect its mission. Instead it engaged in propaganda and agitprop
activities and destabilized the Royal Lao government. They stirred up strikes and demonstrations
by university students who demanded that the government chart a socialist course. Capitalism
and the US were denounced, along with the Royal Lao government. By mid-1974, strikes were
conducted by traffic police and municipal workers in Vientiane. The disorder soon spread to
other towns. By 1975, teachers joined the strikes. The non-communists in the Royal Government
were denounced as incompetent and corrupt. In February 1975, Pathet Lao forces attacked
government positions at Sala Phou Khoun with the aid of North Vietnamese troops. By March
1975, the Royal Lao government lodged 80 protests to the joint commission with no response.
Pathet Lao demonstrators carried signs stating The War is Ended; the Meo Are Dead. In early
1975, demonstrations and strikes by teachers and civil servants continued with people carrying
signs calling for popular uprisings, peoples seizure of power, purification, and the
elimination of reactionaries,foreign consultants, and the National Assembly and the
Constitution. Mobs struck the USIS and USAID offices and threatened US citizens. All Royal
Lao Army commanders other than Gen. Vang Pao retreated under orders from Souvanna
Phouma. On May Day 1975, Pathet Lao and leftist demonstrators in Laotian cities rode US-made
jeeps and Soviet-made PT-76 tanks and denounced the US, demanded the resignation of rightist
cabinet members, and hailed the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam to the communists.
Prominent Pathet Lao communist Phoumi Vongvichit announced on national radio that the
Hmong must be taken out at the roots. A repentant Yang Dao presented a paper in 1981 which

194

Hamilton-Merritt, Jane. Tragic Mountains (Indiana University Press 1993) pages 84-86, 93,
and 99-101.

39

stated At first I did not realize that a plan of extermination carefully set in place in Moscow and
its allies was about to be put into motion against the Hmong of Laos. On May 9, 1975 re turning
from my trip to the communist countries of Asia and Europe I received confirmation through the
Khaosane Pathet Lao, the Pravda of the Laotian Communist Party which wrote We must
eradicate the Meo minority completely. In May 1975, Royal Lao and Pathet Lao troops
collaborated in preventing Hmong civilians and officials from leaving Laos. In June 1975, Radio
Pathet Lao reported that Royal Lao Army requested Pathet Lao advisers. The Vientiane
Domestic Service disseminated Order 904 which confiscated all firearms. All citizens were
required to turn in all firearms to arsenal depots in their respective military regions. One
refugee recounted that the Pathet Lao moved in many soldiers, trucks, and two big tanksThe
PL took over CIA headquarters and ordered everyone over age 9 to attend day long reeducation
classes. Large numbers of Lao and Hmong were placed in so called seminar camps. The
Red Hmong were also used by the regular Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces to conquer
Laos.195
In June and July 1975, many provinces fell to the Pathet Lao and took over the USAID
compound at Kilometer 6. The US Embassy was pressured to reduce their staff to 22. In late July
1975, Souvanna Phouma ordered that all military commanders, provincial chiefs, and other noncommunist officials to go to Vientiane for a meeting. They were all detained. The mixed
Royal/Pathet Lao forces created by the 1973 Agreement were disbanded and the new Minister of
Defense ordered all rightists to turn in their weapons. Soviet helicopters and planes, along with
Royal Lao government planes assisted in the arrests of the rightist and non-communist officials.
In late August 1975, the Laotian border with Thailand was closed. By September 1975, all
professionals, civil servants, and businessmen were arrested and placed in seminar camps. As
a result of a secret meeting at K-6, the former American compound in November 1975, the
Pathet Lao abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Laos Peoples Democratic Republic in
December 1975. Lists of former Laotians who worked for American agencies and trained
military forces were captured by the Pathet Lao and used in the purges that were occurring.
Pathet Lao lecturers stated to the prisoners at the seminar camps assertions such as: Marxism
was very strong and the only country that resisted Marxism was the United States. No longer did
the Marxist worry about England, France, or other European countries; they were no longer a
threat to Marxism and no longer resisted. Only the United States resisted Thus, the Pathet
Lao took over Laos by December 1975 by a combination of foreign troop intervention,
neutralization through propaganda, and false promises of a future Laos rife with peace and
cooperation between the Royal Lao government and the Pathet Lao.196
In 1979, Soviet General V.K. Pikolov visited Laos with a 500 man team to inspect LPLA
chemical weapons warehouses and train LPLA troops in chemical and conventional warfare.
They actually ran the Laotian Air Force. 197 Laos sent troops to aid Vietnam in its 1979 conquest
of Democratic Kampuchea. Over 180 Soviet, Czech, and Hungarian soldiers who posed as
technicians built strategic roads in Laos near Savannakhet. 198 Meanwhile, Pathet Lao atrocities
against the Hmong continued. In 1979, a defecting LPLA pilot defected and revealed that he was
195

Ibid pages 320-337.

Ibid pages 362-376.
197 Ibid page 417.
198 Scott, Joanna. Indochinas Refugees: Oral Histories from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam
(McFarland 1989) page 253.
196

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ordered since 1976 to carry out Extinct Destruction Operations which was intended to wipe
out the reactionary Hmong people. Chemical and conventional weapons were used.
The Pathet Lao also followed a similar strategy of the North Vietnamese in coopting
Western leftists to boost the image of its communist regime in the court of world public opinion.
By 1980, the ruling Pathet Lao government used Westerners to convince world public opinion
that the seminar camps were closed by late 1980. A US professor Dr. MacAlister Brown gave a
lecture in Thailand that indicated he was told by Laotian ministry officials that the seminar
camps were closed. The Mennonite and AFSC were the only private religious groups from the
US allowed to conduct outreach efforts in Laos. One Mennonite official Frederick
Swartzendruber served in Laos from 1979-1981 and was given guided tours of the country
aboard Soviet helicopters. He advanced the theory of the damages and deaths caused by the
yellow rain chemical weapons as simply being bee feces. Swartzendruber also participated in
tours of alleged Hmong markets, where people were allegedly shopping. Anti-Vietnam War
activists in the US denounced Gen. Vang Pao. Laotian agents trained by Vietnam were sent to
the US as refugees and entered because of a sloppy screening process. They threatened former
Royal Lao Army General Vang Pao with untraceable poisoning and other death threats. One
refugee Thao Yia stated in 1985 that Im worried that American Reds and the US will make
relations with Laos so we cant take back Laos. I see Red Lao who come here as refugees. In
Fresno I see Red Lao come here to visit sent by the Lao government to tell the refugees
propaganda. They also collect money from refugees here saying theyll take it to their families in
Laos. They are only here to make money for themselves. There were four Red Hmong in Fresno
last week. These Red Hmong and Red Lao start rumors in California to cause problems for
Hmong living in America. The US Committee on Refugees and the Mennonites blamed the
Hmong resistance for the violence and atrocities in Laos by the Pathet Lao at a human rights
conference with the Laotian charge d affaires to the United States present. A State Department
official and the Laotian charge d affaires traveled to this conference together. This illustrated the
fact that the Bush Administration also helped to collude with American leftists and the Pathet
Lao in covering up communist atrocities. 199
Despite the fall of communism in the period 1989-1991, Laos rebuilt its ties with Red
China and continued to be a satellite of Vietnam. Military relations were reopened with China
and continued with Vietnam. In March 2001, the Seventh Congress of the ruling Lao Peoples
Revolutionary Party hosted delegations from the Communist Party of Vietnam, Cambodian
Peoples Party, FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and
Cooperative Cambodia, Communist Party of China, Communist Party of Cuba, Communist Party
of Russia, Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, and the Korean Workers Party of North
Korea.200 In June 1997, the Defense Ministers of Russia and Laos signed an agreement that
called for the supply of arms to the Laotian Peoples Army and training of their officers in
Russian military academies. 201 In June 1991, Gen Xu Xin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of
the Chinese PLA met with a senior military delegation from Laos. This meeting supported the

199Hamilton-Merritt,

Jane. Tragic Mountains (Indiana University Press 1993) pages 448-449 and
502-503.
200 Lao Party Congress Closes; Committee Pledges Fulfilment of Renovation Tasks Lao
National Radio, Vientiane March 15, 2001
201 Laotian defence minister signs cooperation agreement in Moscow ITAR-TASS news
agency June 20, 1997

41

promotion of friendly contacts between the armed forces of the two countries.202 In July 1992,
a delegation of Lao Peoples Army (LPA) General Staff Department visited Red China and met
with General Chi Haotian. They discussed current situation and army building in their
respective countries and exchanging views on the situation in South-East Asia and in the world
as a whole.203 In May 1993, Chinese Minister of Defense General Chi Haotian led a delegation
of PLA officers to Laos and met with top Laotian armed forces officers. They engaged in
consultations and reached agreements in various issues of mutual interest aimed at enhancing
the gradual strengthening and developing of the long-standing relations and solidarity between
the two ministries.204 In October 1994, Gen Zhang Zhen, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military
Commission met with Lt-Gen Siphon Phalikhan, director of the General Political Department of
the Lao Peoples Army. 205 In June 2004, Xu Caihou, a member of the Central Military
Commission and Director of the General Political Department of the Chinese P LA met with a
delegation of the General Political Department of the Lao Peoples Army, led by its Director
Chansamone Chanyalath. 206 In May 2005, Prime Minister Boungnang Volachit met with Chinese
PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff Xiong Guangkai. 207 As of June 2000, Vietnamese troops
assisted Laotian forces in repressing Hmong rebel forces. 208
The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was also assisted by the Red Chinese, North Vietnamese,
and other communist powers. Chhang Song, Director of the Ministry of Information in the
Khmer Republic and an assistant in the cabinet of Prince Sihanouk reported that the Soviets and
Chinese had lots of intelligence personnel in their embassies in Phnom Penh who were described
as basically KGB types that aided the Khmer Rouge, the North Vietnamese, and the Vietcong.
Khieu Samphan was saved from the authorities by the Chinese Embassy. 209 In October 1973, the
USSR withdrew much of their Embassy staff from Phnom Penh and opened a channel to the
Khmer Rouge based in China. The Khmer Rouge received money from China to maintain its
diplomatic missions and also received weapons from North Korea and Cuba. The North
Vietnamese also provided the Khmer Rouge with AK-47s, 12.7 mm machine guns, 82 mm
mortars, Soviet-made 122 mm rocket launchers, and Chinese-made 107 mm rocket launchers. 210
A US Embassy document noted that Soviet support for the Khmer Rouge focused in on the
recent military successes of the Khmer Rouge forces; the alleged military and economic
weakness of the Phnom Penh regime; and Moscows support for the just cause of the
liberator.211
Lao military delegation in China Xinhua News Agency June 24, 1991
Lao military delegation in China BBC Summary of World Broadcasts July 2, 1992
204 Chinese Defence Minister Holds Meetings in Excellent Atomsphere in Laos Lao National
Radio May 15, 1993
205 Chi Haotian, Zhang Zheng discuss beneficial ties with Lao army general New China
News Agency, Beijing October 29, 1994
206 Chinese military official meets Laotian delegation Xinhua News Agency June 11, 2004
207 Laotian prime minister meets Chinese military official Xinhua News Agency May 28, 2005
208 Diplomats say Vietnamese troops deployed against Laos insurgents Radio Australia June
15, 2000
209 Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press 1999) 222-223.
210Jackson, Karl D. Cambodia 1975-1978 (Princeton University Press 1992) page 32.
211Department of State, Operations Center. Soviet Support for Khmer Insurgents Accessed
From: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975STATE052840_b.html
202
203

42

The North Vietnamese also provided troops and advisers during the Khmer Rouges
battles against the authoritarian pro-US government of President Lon Nol. Frank Snepp noted
that the North Vietnamese provided the Khmer Rouge in 1975 with captured US-made 105mm
howitzers.212 A Red Chinese official in 1977 noted that the North Vietnamese sent two army
divisions to assist the Khmer Rouge in the conquest of Phnom Penh. Vietnam later claimed that
their army provided artillery support to the Khmer Rouge. A State Department official T. Carney
reported that the North Vietnamese developed a shield that protected the Khmer Rouge in eastern
Cambodia from 1970 to 1972. Communist journalist and KGB agent Wilfred Burchett noted
that North Vietnamese artillerymen assisted the Khmer Rouge in the final offensive against
government forces in 1975. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam Vo Dong Giang noted in
1980 that the mortar operators among the Khmer Rouge forces were all North Vietnamese
soldiers.213
The Khmer Rouge itself placed itself on the side of global communist revolution. The
May 1970 program of the Khmer Rouge supported the struggle of the peoples of the world for
peace, independence, democracy and social progress, against the aggressive and warlike
American imperialists, against old and new colonialism in all its forms; it expresses full support
for the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America for independence and freedom,
the struggle of the Chinese people for the recovery of Taiwan, an integral part of the Peoples
Republic of China, the struggle of the Korean people against the American imperialist
aggressors and for the liberation of the southern part of their country and the reunification of
Korea, the struggle of the Arab people, the Palestinian people in particular, for their
fundamental national rights against the Israeli aggressors in the pay of the American
imperialists, the struggle of the American people against the war of aggression, aga inst racial
discrimination and for peace and their genuine interests, etc 214
As of 1977, rightwing Khmer Serei leadership reported that The Khmer Rouge are said
to be divided into four factions: the pro-Chinese; the pro-Soviet; the pro-Vietnamese; and a
group that wants to collaborate with the former head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk. 215
Many of the pro-Hanoi and pro-Soviet Khmer Rouge leaders and activists were purged and
others fled to Vietnam. They returned to Cambodia on the heels of the Vietnamese invasion
forces.
After the Khmer Rouge conquest of Cambodia in April 1975 and renamed the country
Democratic Kampuchea, relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh were relatively inconsistent.
On the one hand, the Khmer Rouge deeply distrusted North Vietnamese intentions for an
Indochina under Hanois sole control. Yet Hanoi and Phnom Penh also maintained party-toparty, trade, and diplomatic relations. Some reports indicated that the war booty captured by the
Khmer Rouge were diverted to North Vietnam either in barter exchanges or to repay the North
Vietnamese for their wartime assistance. You Kim Lanh noted that he had to search all the
212

Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime (Yale University Press 2008) page 102.
Ibid, pages 75 and 99.
214 Political programme of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) : (adopted
unanimously by the Congress held in Peking on Sunday, May 3, 1970) Accessed From:
http://archive.org/stream/PoliticalProgrammeOfTheNationalUnitedFrontOfKampucheanufkadopt
ed/NUFK_djvu.txt
215 Groueff, Stephane. The Nation As Concentration Camp National Review September 2,
1977 pages 988-990.
213

43

houses and collect any rice left in them and stock up the medicine from all the pharmacies. We
loaded everything onto boats run by Vietnamese crews. Yen Savvanarry noted that there was
steady traffic on Highway 1 in late April 1975 to Saigon. The Khmer Rouge transported radios,
motorcycles, and other small vehicles, weapons, bicycles, packaged medicines, 105mm
howitzers, and cars, such as Mercedes and Peugeot 404s to North Vietnamese-occupied South
Vietnam.216 The Khmer Rouge reportedly used American-made jeeps and Red Chinese-built
trucks to transport chairs, refrigerators, air conditioners, fans, TVs, and sacks and bags of
unknown merchandise to North Vietnam. These captured goods were either sold or given to the
North Vietnamese at no charge. 217 The first harvest in Democratic Kampuchea was partially
exported to Vietnam. 218 In July 1976, the civil aviation authorities of Vietnam and Democratic
Kampuchea opened up direct air routes between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea. 219
Vietnamese ships docked at Phnom Penh and unloaded salt, while Democratic Kampuchea
imported 500,000 meters of Vietnamese cloth. 220
The Vietnamese also issued propaganda and diplomatic support on behalf of the Khmer
Rouge (Democratic Kampuchea) until the irreversible hostilities became apparent in 1978. In
April 1977, the Vietnamese denounced the slanderous campaign against the socialist countries
to discredit them and sap their influence. Colluding with the Thai reactionaries the United States
has conducted several armed attacks against Laos and Cambodia. In April 1977, Vietnamese
Communist leader Le Duan noted that under the leadership of the Cambodian Revolutionary
Organization and in the tradition of ardent patriotism and industry the heroic people of
Cambodia over the past two years have upheld the spirit of self reliance and have overcome
many difficultiesThe Vietnamese people warmly hail these fine achievements of the fraternal
Cambodian peopleOn this great occasion the Vietnamese people sincerely thank the fraternal
Cambodian people for your vigorous support and precious assistance to our revolutionary cause
and sincerely wish you many more and still greater successes in building an independent, united,
peaceful and neutral, nonaligned, sovereign, democratic and territorially integral
Cambodia.221
In May 1975, the Khmer Rouge held victory rallies in Phnom Penh to celebrate the North
Vietnamese victory and conquest of South Vietnam. Officials of the Cambodia-Vietnam
Friendship Association were present along with 1,000 Cambodian workers, intellectuals, and
soldiers, who shouted Long Live the Militant Solidarity between Cambodia and Vietnam! 222
In December 1975, a Vietcong ambassador from North Vietnamese-occupied South
Vietnam arrived in Phnom Penh and was warmly received by Democratic Kampuchean Foreign
Ministry officials.223 The Democratic Kampuchean government hailed the elections of the

216

Ponchaud, Francois. Cambodia Year Zero (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978) pages 31-32.
Ngor, Haing. A Cambodian Odyssey (Macmillan, 1987) pages 99-100.
218Paul, Anthony and Barron, John.Murder of a Gentle Land (Readers Digest Press: distributed
by Crowell 1977) page 198.
219 Accord On Air Route Reached With SRV Phnom Penh Domestic Service July 26, 1976
220 Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime (Yale University Press 2008) pages 128 and 123.
221 Shawcross, William The Quality of Mercy (Fontana 1985) page 57.
222 Khieu Samphan Addresses Vietnam Victory Rally in Phnom Penh Phnom Penh Domestic
Service May 17, 1975
223 South Vietnam Envoy Arrives Phnom Penh Domestic Service December 2, 1975
217

44

common National Assembly of unified Vietnam in March 1976.224 In April 1977, the
Vietnamese communist media praised Democratic Kampuchea on its second anniversary. Nhan
Dan wrote a glowing description of a visit of a Vietnamese Womens Delegation to Democratic
Kampuchea by stating: The Cambodian people were enthusiastically embarking on irrigation
workwomen are vigorously surging forward and joining men to become owners of the
country.225
In February 1976, apparently on the eve of the Democratic Kampuchea-Vietnam summit,
a Vietnamese Communist Party high level official named Xuan Thuy, informed the Soviet
ambassador that the relations of Vietnam and Cambodia are slowly improving. In July 1976,
the Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoanh Van Loi informed the Soviet
Ambassador that the Communist leadership deems it necessary to have patience and work
towards gradually strengthening its influence in Cambodia. In 1976, the Deputy DirectorGeneral of the Vietnamese Information Agency, Tran Thanh Xuan led a large delegation of
Vietnamese journalists to Democratic Kampuchea and interviewed Pol Pot. Pol Pot remarked to
Xuan that we consider friendship and solidarity between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese
revolutions, between Kampuchea and Vietnam a strategic question and a sacred feeling. Only
when such friendship and solidarity are strong, can the revolution in our countries develop
adequately. There is no other alternative. That is why, honoring these principles, we consider
that both parties and we personally should aspire to maintain this combat solidarity and
brotherhood in arms and make sure that they grow and strengthen day by day. In March 1977,
Vietnamese Communist Party Politburo member Truong Chinh noted to the Soviet Ambassador
that Democratic Kampuchea is also generally building socialism, but the leaders of
Kampuchea are not clear enough as to forms of socialist construction. There is no unity in the
Kampuchean leadership and much depends on which line will win. 226
The Red Chinese proved to be Democratic Kampucheas strongest economic, political,
and military sponsors. Between 1975 and 1977, Red China exported 200 tanks, 16 F-6C jet
fighters, a number of naval gunboats, 30,000 tons of ammunition, and at least 15,000 Peoples
Liberation Armed Forces (PLA) troops to Democratic Kampuchea. The Chinese PLA trained
Khmer Rouge pilots on leftover US-made T-41 and T-28 training planes based in Battambang.
Chinese propaganda films showed Khmer Rouge pilots flying T-28 combat planes with rocket
pods and T-41 trainers flying from bases in Battambang and Phnom Penh. A delegation from
communist Yugoslav TV observed in 1978 that US-made C-47s operated from Phnom Penh. 227
In mid-1975, 320 Chinese PLA air force troops were stationed in Democratic Kampuchea. The
Chinese PLA also trained Khmer Rouge pilots and crews on US-made UH-1H helicopters based
in Phnom Penh. The AFKLA received from Red China F-6 jets and H-5 bombers. Red Chinese
PLA forces constructed an air base at Kompong Chhnang. 228
Cambodians Apprised of Vietnamese Elections Phnom Penh Domestic Service March 27,
1976
225 Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia (Stanford University Press, 1999) page
98.
226 Yale University Genocide Studies Program Accessed From:
www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/Mosyakov.doc
227 Air War in Cambodia 1953-2003 Accessed From:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_411.shtml
228 Cambodia: Air Force of the Khmer Liberation Army: Air Force History 1975-1979
224

45

The Red Chinese also assisted the Khmer Rouge in setting up front companies in order
for the Phnom Penh regime to trade with the capitalist world (including occasionally the United
States). In 1976, the Khmer Rouge established the Khmer Company for Foreign Trade and the
Ren Fung Corporation.229 The Overseas Commercial Bank (Foreign Trade Bank) of Democratic
Kampuchea was started with 140 million Chinese yuan. 230 Ren Fung was set up by the Khmer
Rouge in Hong Kong in mid-1976 and was housed in a communist Chinese bank. It was staffed
by Khmer Rouge officials and its purchasing was tasked to a Hong Kong Chinese citizen. Ren
Fungs purchases were funded by the PRC firm, China Resources Company. 231 One diplomatic
observer noted Khmers are not yet sure of themselves. They dont know how the capitalist world
will react to their shopping inquiries. They naturally prefer to operate from the shadows and
with the help of those who know the capitalist jungle. 232 Cambodian economic plans were
tailored to the export trade with Red China. After a meeting on the implementation of the state
plan in 1978, Pol Pot noted that In 1978 we must export to China from 100,000 to 150,000 tons
of rice and 20,000 to 25,000 tons of rubber. The contract has been signed and we must carry it
out.233
In addition to the heavy Red Chinese presence, other communist countries provided
scattered assistance to the Khmer Rouge during their period in power from 1975 to 1979. In
September 1977, Kim Jong-il of North Korea congratulated the Khmer Rouge on its 17th
anniversary and for having wiped outcounterrevolutionary group of spies who had committed
subversive activities and sabotage The two top leaders in the Khmer Rouge security apparatus
met with North Korean intelligence and held several working level meetings where they received
material aid and training. North Korea also sent advisers to Democratic Kampuchea to teach the
Khmer Rouge torture and to improve the functioning of Democratic Kampuchean security
cadres.234 In December 1978, North Korean KPA pilots flew a Chinese-made AFKLA H-5 jet
bomber against Vietnamese and their Cambodian puppets. 235 In 1976, Albania shipped tractors to
Democratic Kampuchea in exchange for rubber, coconuts, and wood. Democratic Kampuchea
exported 3,000 tons of rice to Laos for political reasons. In January 1977, the Yugoslav freighter

Accessed From: http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/aa-eastasia/cambodia/cam-af-history3.htm

Chanda, Nayan. Phnom Penhs Undercover Men Far Eastern Economic Review December
10, 1976 pages 49-50.
230 Co-Prosecutors Rule 92 Submission Regarding Indicia of Reliability of the 978 Document
Listed in Connection With Those Witnesses and Experts Who May Be Called During the First
Three Weeks of Trial Accessed From:
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/documents/E158_EN.PDF
231 Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime (Yale University Press, 2002) pages 145-146.
232 Chanda, Nayan. Phnom Penhs Undercover Men Far Eastern Economic Review December
10, 1976 pages 49-50.
233 Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary (University of
Pennsylvania Press, Apr 4, 2000) page 538.
234 Thayer, Nate. Pol Pot Meets Kim il-Sung September 12, 2012 Accessed From
http://www.nate-thayer.com/pol-pot-meets-kim-il-sung/
235 Cambodia: Air Force of the Khmer Liberation Army: Air Force History 1975-1979
Accessed From: http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/aa-eastasia/cambodia/cam-af-history3.htm
229

46

Hrvaska unloaded in Democratic Kampuchea $3 million worth of goods such as tractors and
mechanical equipment. 236
The Soviets and their allies hailed the seizure of the American merchant ship Mayaguez.
An unnamed high official of US intelligence indicated in May 1975 that the Soviet Union and
China were egging on the Khmer Rouge regime. The Soviets and Chinese congratulated the
Phnom Penh regime for its capture of the Mayaguez. This was based on intercepted radio
communications between Moscow, Peking, and Phnom Penh. This unnamed official noted I
can only say that nothing in the messages carried any suggestion that the Cambodians should
back down.237 The propaganda organs of the Warsaw Pact supported the Khmer Rouge in its
seizure of the Mayaguez. In May 1975, the Voice of the GDR noted that the USS Mayaguez
engaged in espionage activities in Cambodian territorial waters 238 In May 1975, the East
German news agency ADN noted that the East German Peace Council opposed US rescue of the
Mayaguez by stating This atrocious arbitrary act against a sovereign country runs counter to
international law and seriously endangers world peace. 239 In May 1975, Voice of the GDR240
commentator Hans-Juergen Wittenburg noted that the Mayaguez was camouflaged as a
freighter and was carrying weapons and was equipped with espionage equipment. He felt
that the Cambodian patrol boats were therefore within their right when they seized the boat. 241
Under the Khmer Rouge administration at Tuol Sleng Prison, their security cadres studied the
works of Lenin and the book created by the East German Stasi, Whos Who in the CIA.242 It is
possible that the Khmer Rouge security cadres had a relationship with the Stasi on the account of
being in receipt of Whos Who in the CIA.
The Soviets and their Eastern European allies provided propaganda and diplomatic
support for the Khmer Rouge (Democratic Kampuchea) even as late as 1978. Throughout 1975,
the Soviets and their allies hailed the fall of Indochina to communist forces. In April 1975, the
Bulgarian communist newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo praised the patriotic forces in Cambodia
and South Vietnam are defeating the anti-peoples regimes created by the US imperialist circles
for the purpose of suppressing the peoples national liberation movement in Indochina.243 In
April 1975, Pravda praised the courage and staunchness of the peoples of this region of Asia
enabled them to repulse imperialist aggression, defeat internal reaction, and defend their
national interestsSoviet people share the joy of the Khmer liberation fighters who have saved
the country from the clique of the imperialist underlings. 244 In April 1975, the Voice of the
GDR noted that What we are now experiencing and let us not forget it, is being shaped jointly
with our solidarity, the victory by nations over their oppressors, the victory of freedom and
morals over oppression and immorality, of revolutionary movements over the
236

Ponchaud, Francois. Cambodia Year Zero (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978) page 84.
Andrew.Mayaguez Story: A Warning Lodi News Sentinel May 20, 1975 page 4.
238 Voice of GDR Reports US Sinking of Cambodian Ships East Berlin Voice of the GDR
Domestic Service May 14, 1975
239 Peace Council Cables Ford About Cambodian Aggression ADN May 16, 1975
240 Acronym for German Democratic Republic or East Germany.
241 Hans-Juergen Wittenburg Commentary East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service
May 15, 1975
242 Shawcross, William The Quality of Mercy (Fontana 1985) page 42.
243 The Disgraceful End Rabotnichesko Delo April 18, 1975
244 New Phase in Cambodian History Has Started Pravda April 23, 1975
237Tully,

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counterrevolution.245 In April 1975, Bulgarian leaders Todor Zhivkov and Stanko Todorov
noted that the Khmer Rouge victory inflicted a grave blow against the imperialist policy of
interference in the domestic affairs of Indochina in favor of the anti-peoples reactionary
forces.246 In April 1975, Neues Deutschland hailed the fact that the Phnom Penh regime has
surrendered to the forces of the peoples liberation. The inhabitants of the Cambodian capital
welcomed their liberators with great joy, and celebrated their victoryThe victory of the people
over the puppets and their wirepullers is the result of a heroic and sacrificial struggle.247 In
May 1975, Neues Deutschland congratulated the Khmer Rouges historic victory of the
Cambodian people over imperialist aggression and domestic reaction. 248 In April 1977,
Izvestia noted that the Cambodian patriots completed their many years of heroic struggle
against the reactionary clique of puppets supported by the aggressive circles of imperialism. 249
A message from Todor Zhivkov and Stanko Todorov dated from April 1977 supported the
Cambodian patriots against the aggression of the imperialists and the bloody anti-popular policy
of the local reactionaries.250
The Soviets also admitted their support for the Khmer Rouge after their victory over the
Lon Nol government in April 1975. Kosygin met with Cambodian Charge DAffairs to the
USSR Nu Pek in April 1975. Nu Pek thanked the Soviet government and the entire Soviet
people for the powerful support the Soviet Union had invariably given to the patriotic forces of
Cambodia in their struggle for national liberation. 251 In April 1975, Radio Moscow noted that
the Soviet Union has learned with deep satisfaction of the liberation of Phnom Penh and of the
restoration of peace on Cambodian soil. It also admitted that various socialist countries
including the Soviet Union and progressive peoples throughout the world have provided all out
aid and support to the just cause of the Cambodian peoples struggle for the freedom and
independence of their fatherland.252
Throughout much of their rule, the Khmer Rouge were the recipients of stentorian praise
from the Soviet bloc. In 1976, when Pol Pot officially became prime minister of Democratic
Kampuchea, Aleksei Kosygin sent a telegram of congratulations, which was published in
Pravda.253 Brezhnev noted at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in
October 1976 that the path of independent development was opened among other countries
before Democratic Kampuchea.254 In April 1976, the East German newspaper Neues

US Failure in Cambodia Seen As End of Era East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic
Service April 14, 1975
246 Leaders Congratulate Cambodians on Victory Sofia BTA Domestic Service April 19, 1975
247 Neues Deutschland Hails Cambodia Peoples Victory Neues Deutschland April 18, 1975
248 Cambodian Leaders Cable Thanks for Victory Congratulations Neues Deutschland May 1,
1975
249 Izvestia Hails Anniversary of Cambodias Liberation Izvestia April 17, 1977
250 Bulgarian Leaders Message Phnom Penh Domestic Service April 17, 1977
251 Kosygin Receives Cambodian Charge DAffairs in Kremlin Moscow TASS April 21, 1975
252 Soviet Official Re-Affirms USSR Support for Cambodia Radio Moscow April 25, 1975
253 Labedz, Leopold. The Use and Abuse of Sovietology (Transaction Publishers, 1989) page
256.
254 Yale University Genocide Studies Program Accessed From:
www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/Mosyakov.doc
245

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Deutschland congratulated Democratic Kampuchea for their elections.255 In April 1977, Pravda
hailed the triumph of the people of Cambodia over the corrupt pro-American regime has made
it possible to carry out profound political and socioeconomic transformations in the country.
The article praised the Democratic Kampuchea constitution, elections, and the collectivization of
the economic sectors. 256 In October 1977, the Soviet foreign affairs weekly New Times praised
Pol Pots progressive social and economic reforms.257 In November 1977, a message from
Khieu Samphan to Brezhnev noted that the great Comrade Leninachieved the historic Great
October Socialist Revolution by founding the glorious proletarian dictatorship state on Soviet
soil, thereby greatly changing the world situation.258 In April 1977, Soviet President Nikolai
Podgorny sent a message to Khmer Rouge president Khieu Samphan, which stated that the
USSR hoped Democratic Kampuchea would succeed in the cause of strengthening
independence and in efforts to strengthen and develop the national economy. 259 As late as
January 1978, Radio Moscow broadcasted a New Years message of support to the Khmer
Rouge which stated In the international arena the Soviet people have constantly supported the
struggle of the heroic Cambodian people and have constantly adhered to the stand of friendship
between Kampuchea and the Soviet Union.260 In January 1978, Moscow Radio conveyed to
the entire Cambodian people the best of health, success in their work and stable peace. 261 In
1978, the USSR Central Committee of the CPSU welcomed the formal announcement of the
existence of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 262
Visiting communist delegations traveled to Democratic Kampuchea to express their
solidarity with the Khmer Rouge. In December 1975, a reception was held with high level
Democratic Kampuchean officials such as Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and officials from the
Foreign Ministry. They hosted diplomats and officials from China, North Korea, North
Vietnamese-occupied South Vietnam, Albania, North Vietnam, and Cuba. Ieng Sary noted that
the international situation had evolved in favor of the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and throughout the world against imperialism and all forms of reaction. 263
Various Maoist communist parties, along with Soviet satellites also issued their greetings
and congratulations to the Khmer Rouge. In May 1976, the state-controlled womens, solidarity,
and labor movements from Laos, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, along with the ChosenSoren (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), and leftwing groups from Finland,
Cambodian Leaders Congratulated on Election Neues Deutschland April 17-18, 1976
USSR Seeks Friendship, Cooperation with Cambodia Moscow Pravda April 17, 1977
257 Labedz, Leopold. The Use and Abuse of Sovietology (Transaction Publishers, 1989) page
256.
258 Khieu Samphan Greets Brezhnev on Revolution Anniversary Phnom Penh Domestic
Service November 6, 1977
259 Foreign Leaders Send Congratulations on National Day Phnom Penh Domestic Service
April 16, 1977
260 Tyson, James L. Target America (Regnery Gateway, 1983) page 129.
261 Moscow Radios New Years Message to Cambodian People Moscow International Service
January 1, 1978
262 Labedz, Leopold. The Use and Abuse of Sovietology (Transaction Publishers, 1989) page
256.
263 Ieng Sary Hosts Reception for Diplomats Phnom Penh Domestic Service December 31,
1975
255
256

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France, Switzerland, and Austria sent their congratulations to the Democratic Kampuchea
regime.264 In April 1977, the deputy foreign ministers and foreign ministers of the following
countries sent their greetings to Democratic Kampuchea: North Korea, Vietnam, Laos,
Yugoslavia, Egypt, Albania, Romania, Algeria, Senegal, Burma, Tunisia, Greece,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Mongolia. 265 In April 1978, Radio Phnom Penh reported
that the communist parties in Malaysia, Mongolia, Bulgaria, the Communist League of
Luxembourg, and the Japan Workers Party sent congratulatory messages to Democratic
Kampuchea.266
Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge also hailed what it viewed as the collapse of the US
economy. In that respect, Phnom Penhs propaganda mirrored that of North Vietnam and other
communist states. In February 1978, Radio Phnom Penh noted this about a coal strike in the US:
The strike was first launched in an effort to resist the cruel oppression and exploitation
committed by the US monopoly capitalists and to demand and protect workers rights which
have been incessantly violated by these monopoly capitalists in their bid to accumulate more
wealth by bleeding the workers white. The Khmer Rouge also noted that the strike increased
the already serious energy crisis that US imperialism is experiencing. 267 In October 1977,
Radio Phnom Penh noted that The oil producing countries have used oil as an effective weapon
with which to strike at the big capitalist countries and especially at US imperialism. The radio
also noted that the US economic crisis has created three difficulties for US imperialism which
the radio listed as loss of confidence in the US dollar, the trade deficit, and unemployment. 268
Democratic Kampuchea also aligned itself with global revolutionary causes supported by
both the Soviet Union and Red China. In October 1978, Ieng Sary noted before the UN General
Assembly that In the Middle East, the struggle of the Palestinian people and all the Arab
peoples to exercise their national rights and to recover their territories has not developed
according to the will of the imperialist and expansionist big powers. This struggle will still
remain long and bitter. The Palestinian and Arab peoples have learned precious lessons thro ugh
their sacrifices. Their will for independence will continue to light the way of their struggleThe
peoples of Zimbabwe, Azania and Namibia, using revolutionary violence in their struggle for
independence and for the right to decide their own destiny against colonialism, racism and
apartheid, are on their way towards victory, despite obstacles created by the rivalries of the
imperialist and expansionist big powers. The struggle of the countries in Latin America to
exercise their national rights has also progressed. The victory won by Panama to recover its
sovereign right to the canal is the result of a stubborn struggle waged by the Panamanian
people. It is also the result of the solidarity among the peoples of Latin America. 269
Friendly Anniversary Greetings Relayed Phnom Penh Domestic Service May 5, 1976
Foreign, Deputy Ministers Greetings Phnom Penh Domestic Service April 28, 1977
266 More Congratulatory Messages on National Day Phnom Penh Domestic Service April 20,
1978
267 US Coal Mines Strike Noted Phnom Penh Domestic Service February 6, 1978
268 Radio Notes US Economic Problems Phnom Penh Domestic Service October 3, 1977
269 Speech by the deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs, Ieng Sary, chairman of the
delegation of Democratic Kampuchea at the 33rd session of the United Nations General
Assembly, delivered on October 12, 1978 Accessed From:
http://archive.org/stream/SpeechByTheDeputyPrimeMinisterInChargeOfForeignAffairsIengSary
/Iensary_djvu.txt
264
265

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The Khmer Rouge also praised the role of the antiwar Left in assisting in their seizure of
power. The peace movement and the New Left played a critical role in pressuring Congress and
the Ford Administration in reducing and eliminating US aid for the Lon Nol government. In
September 1975, Foreign Minister Ieng Sary visited New York City and met with American
leftists and antiwar activists. Sary commented that the Khmer Rouge always remembered that
the American people were supporting us. He stated This victory is not the victory of the
Cambodian people alone, it is the victory of all the people, the American people included especially the American youth and the people that love peace and justice. Sary stated The
Cambodian people know you very well, especially students who are figh ting on our behalf,
especially your students at Jackson state and Kent Statewe always remembered the American
people as friends, and especially the people of New York City. 270 Gunnar Bergstrom of the
Swedish-Cambodian Friendship Association visited Democratic Kampuchea in 1978. He noted
that I was at that time a member of a friendship association which was a remnant of the antiVietnam/Cambodia War movement in Sweden, which was very strong in the Western worldOf
course we didn't want to believe that the liberators had become oppressors. Bergstrom enjoyed
sumptuous meals of rice, chicken, fish, and oysters with high ranking Khmer Rouge officials
such as Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. 271 Historian Sophal Ear noted that the Indochina Resource Center
was the Khmer Rouges most effective apologists in the West. By 1978, the Chinese launched a
propaganda campaign to defend the Democratic Kampuchea regime and distributed films such as
Democratic Kampuchea is Moving Forward and printed glossy magazines. When Foreign
Minister Ieng Sary traveled to New York in 1978, he screened the film mentioned above and
distributed glossy propaganda magazines. 272 In December 1978 Cambodian Radio noted this
about British Labor Party member and underground Maoist Communist Malcolm Caldwell: I
have been trying for years to create more sympathy for your country in Britain. And I know that I
shall be able to carry on this work much more successfully as the result of having the
opportunity to visit your country.273
Between November 1977 and the end of 1978, official delegations from Burma,
Malaysia, Thailand, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Scandinavian countries traveled to
Democratic Kampuchea. Delegations from pro-Chinese communist parties in Australia,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United States also traveled to
Democratic Kampuchea. These delegations were given the usual guided tours of Angkor and
selected agricultural collectives. During this period, Democratic Kampuchea published
propaganda in French, English, and Khmer for foreign consumption.
Khmer Rouge supporters in the US published a booklet titled Long Live the 17th
Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. It was published by the Group of
Kampuchean Residents in America. The book also contained the speeches of Pol Pot. The
Address by Mr. Ieng Sary September 6, 1975 on Indochina Resource Center Letter Head
Accessed From: http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?eKnmuFLMs0BEHzdQSHSWJL9TFpaRTIjB04Ae.apzZ@yApeOvZ1QJRKK
eitDCRTg5ObPAOf4IYbmFJBdPDGKsWpY9UQjFtbJ6it706BGseps/2430803022.pdf
271 Kinetz, Erika. Pol Pots Former Dinner Guest Admits to Lapse in Judgment The Cambodia
Daily November 1, 2007 Accessed From: http://www.cambodiadaily.com/stories-of-themonth/pol-pots-former-dinner-guest-admits-to-lapse-in-judgment-279/
272 Maguire, Peter. Facing Death in Cambodia (Columbia University Press 2013) page 55.
273 Tyson, James L. Target America (Regnery Gateway, 1983)
270

51

Comite des Patriotes du Kampuchea Democratique en France and the British Kampuchea
Support Campaign-Great Britain distributed press releases from the Khmer Rouge. The British
Kampuchea Support Campaign lasted until 1991. Other groups that defended Democratic
Kampuchea proliferated in the 1970s. They existed in Sweden, West Germany, Switzerland,
Denmark, Japan, Hong Kong, and Australia. The Paris Mission of Democratic Kampuchea
issued statements and propaganda that countered statements by Khmer Rouge defectors and
refugees. Hard-line Maoist communists such as Malcolm Caldwell used Government of
Democratic Kampuchea bulletins to back up their positions. Conferences of groups such as the
Swedish-Kampuchea Friendship Association used materials that were published by the
government of Democratic Kampuchea and its officials such as President Khieu Samphan. 274 It
should be noted that the Paris Mission for Democratic Kampuchea was closed by the French in
mid-1976.275 Since that time, the ruling communist regime in Democratic Kampuchea lacked a
diplomatic mission in the West.
The Khmer Rouge also saw itself as the purveyor of communist revolution in the
remaining noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia. In October 1976, a Congress of the highranking personnel of the Democratic Kampuchean Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: we
must strengthen and expand relationships with friends all over the world, especially
revolutionary and peace-loving nations to defeat the American imperialists and the free (world).
Concentrate mainly on the revolutionary forces in Southeast Asia and the progressive forces in
both the Nonaligned Nations and the Third World and secondarily on the forces of justice in the
world. Essentially, we must gather the revolutionary force in Southeast Asia such as in
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia etc. We must pay attention to the close solidarity,
mutual help, and the progressive force in the neutral block and the forces of justice. Pay
attention to close solidarity with the pure Marxist-Leninist forces, especially those with no
conflicts with usContinue to fight to get friends in Southeast Asia and to make friends with the
neutral countries in the world as wellPay attention to solidarity with Marxist parties. 276 In
January 1978, the Thai military admitted that Democratic Kampuchea supported the Thai
Communist Party with weapons and military training. They also admitted that Democratic
Kampuchean troops accompanied Thai Communist Party forces during invasions of Thai
territory. Sometimes Democratic Kampuchean troops directly attacked Thai border villages in
1977 and 1978.277
The Khmer Rouge also followed the Soviet and Chinese pattern in attracting (albeit
cautiously) foreign investment and trade to Democratic Kampuchea. In November 1978, the
Khmer Rouge invited executives from the Thai tourism firm Erawan International to discuss
charter flights of foreign tourists to Angkor. 278 Under the Khmer Rouge and the PRK, foreign
tourist flew from Bangkok to Siem Reap. The Khmer Rouge originally undertook this measure to
Ear, Sophal. The Khmer Rouge Canon 1975-1979 University of California, Berkeley May
1995 Accessed From: http://jim.com/canon.htm
275 France Closes Cambodian Diplomatic Mission Times (London) July 31, 1976 page 5.
276 The B-1 Ministry Congress (10-7-1976) Accessed From:
http://www.yale.edu/cgp/iengsary.htm#BM_E__THE_B_1_MINISTRY_CONGRESS__10_7_1
9
277 Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War
(Stanford University Press 1999)pages 78-81.
278 Bangkok, Thailand Associated Press November 13, 1978
274

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attract hard currency and to gain international respectability from the outside world. 279 It was
reported in September 1978 that Democratic Kampuchea would open Angkor Wat to tourists
traveling from Bangkok. Major General Chatchai of Thailand represented the Erawan
International Company Ltd in a meeting with Kampuchean Foreign Minister Ieng Sary. Erawan
was to set up daily flights from Bangkok to Siem Reap. The Managing Director of Erawan noted
that Bangkok would become the gateway to Angkor Wat. The tours will be 2-3 hours long and
the tourists would then return to Bangkok. 280
Japanese trading companies (a total of 32 firms) banded together in July 1975 to form the
Japan-Cambodia Trade Association. These firms were also members of the Japan-North Vietnam
Trade Association. The Governor of this Association was Koshiro Iwai, secretary general of the
Japan-North Vietnam Trade Association. It was to work for establishment of trade ties between
Japan and Cambodia, people-to-people contacts in the economic field and private level trade
agreements.281 In August 1977, Koshiro Iwai, a Japanese industrialist and President of the
Japan-Cambodia Trade Association announced that he would send a delegation to Democratic
Kampuchea (DK). In the first half of 1977, Japan-DK trade totaled over 1.1 billion yen. The
Association was created in 1976 and had 41 Japanese corporate members. This trade was
conducted through the Hong Kong-based Ren Fung Corporation. Japanese exports to DK
included textiles, bulldozers, dump trucks, other vehicles and spare parts, and chemicals, while
DK exports to Japan consisted of farm products. 282 In early 1977, the Khmer Rouge purchased
from a Japanese firm 10,000 tons of rolled steel. 283
The trickle of foreign capitalist delegations were feted in the best luxuries the Khmer
Rouge had to offer. A Cambodian named Nekuie reported that a banquet was held for a Japanese
delegation in 1978, at which Ieng Sary supposedly treated them with fine bottles of wine that he
described as the spoils of war and where other Khmer Rouge officials attended wearing luxury
Swiss watches and fine American clothes. This delegation reportedly was lodged by the
Khmer Rouge at the biggest hotel in Siem Reap.284
The Vietnamese Communists sought to install a friendly puppet government in Phnom
Penh by 1978 and gathered Khmer Rouge defectors and pro-Vietnamese elements of the
Cambodian Communist movement into a coalition that would form a new regime. The
Vietnamese engaged in meticulous planning for the invasion and occupation of Democratic
Kampuchea. In April 1979, the Red Chinese reportedly captured Vietnamese documents that
dated from January 17, 1979. These hand-written documents were titled On the war along the
south-western border and the victory in smashing the Kampuchean reactionary clique and
originated from the 1st Military District of the Vietnamese army and the commander of the First
Company of the First Battalion of the 567th Regiment under the Cao Bang Provincial Military
Gray, Denis D. Cambodia Bringing Tourism Back To Ancient Angkor Ruins Associated
Press April 10, 1980
280 Post Reports Cambodia to Reopen Angkor Wat to Tourists Bangkok Post September 6,
1978
281 New Body Established To Promote Trade with Cambodia Kyodo July 17, 1975
282 Industrialist Sees Increase in Trade with Cambodia Kyodo News Agency August 10, 1977
283 Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime (Yale University Press, 2002) pages 145-146.
284 A Day of Chaotic Situations: Witness Ny Kan Continues His Testimony
Before The ECCC Accessed From: http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/05-2912_CTM%20Blog%20Entry_Trial%20002.pdf
279

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Command. The document stated: The fourth plenum convened by the Central Committee
passed a resolution which explicitly stated that our basic and long-term enemy was US
imperialism; while our direct enemies and the direct targets of war were Peking and
Kampuchea After the Central Committee adopted this resolution (in June and July 1978), we
were determined to win quick political and military victories along the south-western border. It
was an important task from beginning to endthe plan of the operation was divided into two
phases of attack. The first phase of the operation was to attack Kampuchean combat effectives in
border areas (from 26th December 1978 to 1st January 1979). The second phase was the
liberation of Phnom Penh Another Vietnamese document stated We must establish a front
including six categories of people such as those who sided with Vietnam at the beginning of the
period of resistance against the United States in KampucheaWe have enough conditions to
help friends conduct revolution once againThere is only one such previous example in the
worldthe Soviet assistance to Czechoslovakia in 1968. 285
The Vietnamese and their Cambodian supporters formed a new communist dictatorship
called the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). A new ruling party was formed called the
Kampuchean Peoples Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and it attracted old Vietnamese agents
within the Cambodian Communist movement and elements of the Khmer Rouge. As
communists, the captured and defecting Khmer Rouge soldiers and officers were treated
leniently by the PRK. In 1983, PRK Minister of Justice Ouk Boun Chheoun and Vietnamese
Justice Minister Phan Hien admitted that re-education in the PRK favored the ex-Khmer
Rouge fighters over the noncommunist groups. Elizabeth Becker explained that a former officer
of Pol Pots Khmer Rouge need only accept a different interpretation of Marxist Leninism; a
noncommunist officer who did little more than follow orders in battle is imprisoned indefinitely
because he rejects communism. No other Khmer Rouge figure, whether a commanding officer or
a minor bureaucrat, has been tried or charged. PRK Minister of Justice Ouk Boun Chheoun
noted that The only conditions we place on them is that they return to their native village and
they cease any illegal activities. Becker reported that noncommunists who fought against Pol
Pot while he was in power get harsher treatment. Even though these counterrevolutionaries are
innocent of the Pol Pot massacres the Heng Samrin regime denounces daily, they are the most
likely to be imprisoned indefinitely in reeducation.286 In January 1983, the Kampuchea radio
noted that Khmer Rouge defectors assisted PRK forces in their battles against the antiVietnamese opposition. The radio noted that with correct understanding of the clemency policy
of the Revolution, many defectors left the enemy and joined the people and the Revolution. They
have made every physical and spiritual effort to increase their achievements in response to their
conscience. They have participated in battles against the enemy and have persuaded others to
join the revolution.287
The PRK leadership also hailed the bloody, brutal Khmer Rouge revolution as a blow to
the United States. In April 1982, Heng Samrin described the 1975 Khmer Rouge takeover in this
fashion: The date 17th April 1975 is inscribed in the pages of history as the day when the
Chinese Comment on Vietnamese Documents on Kampuchea New China News Agency
April 2, 1979
286 Becker, Elizabeth. Cambodia Uses Double Standard in Punishing Wartime Enemies
Washington Post March 1, 1983 page A12.
287 Defectors from DK forces aid PRK military operations Phnom Penh home service January
29, 1983
285

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Kampuchean people, closely uniting and co-operating with the Vietnamese and Lao peoples,
seized brilliant victory over the US imperialist aggressors and their la ckeys. The reactionary Lon
Nol clique collapsed and its ringleaders were compelled to flee in shame from Kampuchean
territory. After the country was liberated from the US neo-colonialist yoke, the Kampuchean
people were happy to begin building a new and happy life.288
The PRK regime also sought to use the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge as a propaganda
tool to discredit the entire anti-Vietnamese opposition and attract international legitimacy from
the West and the progressive left. One author noted that what further boosted the Heng Samrin
regimes propaganda war against the Khmer Rouge was the release of the American film The
Killing Fields SPK reported that in 1985 that the Killing Fields was shown in Phnom Penhs
Bassac Theater. The PRK regime used the films release and the presence of foreigners in the
theater to gain a propaganda victory against the Khmer Rouge. Under a North Vietnamese
Colonel named Mai Lam, East German experts turned the Tuol Sleng Prison (S-21) into a
propaganda machine.289
The Khmer Rouge strategic repositioning of its stance on communism was not a sincere
break with Marxism-Leninism or its style of governance. The background of this shift had its
origins in a meeting with the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese Communist Party. Ieng Sary, Deng
Xiaoping, and the Chinese Communist Party leadership under Hua Guofeng held a conference in
January 1979 where Hua stated With regard to the Thai Communist Party as Comrade Deng
Xiaoping has told you its not that we dont support their struggle; its that we must take the
overall situation into account. If Kampuchea is not steady the Thai party will also wobble. We
must pay attention to policy and tactics290
In a conversation between Deng and Pol Pot in January 1979, a joint Sino-Democratic
Kampuchean deception strategy was outlined:
Deng: World public opinion has taken note of several aspects of the purges you are carrying
out purges that are a bit excessive and on a bit too large a scale. I am certain that this
information has reached you as well. I am raising this issue for the sake of the future struggle
Ieng Sary: We all agree and we all understand that we must not abandon the socialist
revolution, but at this time, gather together all our forces.
Deng: During the war against the Japanese, we together with Chiang Kai-Shek turned all the
revolutionary military forces into an army of national revolution, namely the Eighth Route Army
and the Fourth New Army. In doing this, we did away with the distinction between the two sides.
We allied with Chiang Kai-Shek so that he would wage war against the Japanese. We declared
that we agreed with the doctrine of national democracy was a necessity for China. That did not
mean the abandonment of the struggle for socialism and communism. For now, Sihanouk is
taking a good approach. To be sure he has made some poor statements in Peking, but he has his
reasons. He tried to exonerate himself and denounced certain acts that he did not like and people
believed himIt would be a great loss if we did not unite behind him; at worst the date of victory
will be delayed a bit. So that an appropriate time in the near future after an exchange of views
on the matter, I ask you to give the position of head of state to Sihanouk. Comrade Pol Pot will
be prime minister in charge of defense, as well as commander in chiefthe greater the unity, the
more it will result in good consequences for the struggle at this difficult time.For now, dont
Heng Samrins Victory Anniversary Speech Phnom Penh home service April 21, 1982
Maguire, Peter. Facing Death in Cambodia (Columbia University Press, 2012) page 84.
290 Shawcross, William The Quality of Mercy (Fontana 1985) pages 126-127.
288
289

55

talk a lot about the communist party. Talk about patriotism, nationalism, and democracy. The
flag of patriotism, nationalism, and of democracy is more important291
In December 1981, the Voice of Democratic Kampuchea noted that the Communist Party
of Kampuchea dissolved as a strategic maneuver. The broadcast noted that in this new
situation, under these new historic circumstances when the life of the Kampuchean nation,
people and race is in the face of the Vietnamese Le Duan enemy aggressors and race
exterminators, in complicity with Soviet international expansionism; in the situation in which
we are pursuing a new strategic line which does not practice communism and socialism on
behalf of all Party members after thoroughly discussing and evaluating the pros and cons since
February 1979 and, particularly, in accordance with the decision of the joint congress of 3rd,
4th, 5th and 6th September 1981, the CPK Central Committee would like to issue the following
communiquthe CPK is permanently dissolvedOn this occasion of its dissolution, the CPK
calls on all Party members to end all activities as the CPK members, in their capacity as the true
patriots who have profound affection for the people and who are constantly upholding the
banner of national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, peace and neutrality of
Kampuchea, have the full and sacred right to carry on the lofty mission of fighting against the
Vietnamese Le Duan enemy aggressors, expansionists, annexationists and race exterminators in
their glorious life of struggle, in accordance with their normal posts, duties and tasks in the state
organs of Democratic Kampuchea. It was for the sacred cause of the Kampuchean nation and
people that the CPK was founded. It is also for the sacred cause of the Kampuchean nation and
people that the CPK is dissolved under new circumstances. In the process of its work, the CPK
has had both virtues and weaknesses. But, the virtues of the CPK prevailed.292 However, it
appeared that the Khmer Rouge admitted that they were still committed to the ideals of the
extreme Left. The Khmer Rouge Chairman of the Khao Ta-Ngoke camp Chhea Rin noted in
1985 that Before, the policies of Democratic Kampuchea were communistNow they are
socialist.293
A 39-page Khmer Rouge document that was prepared in December 1986 fell into the
hands of the US Embassy in Bangkok. The document was a talk to Khmer Rouge party cadres
that surveyed the history of Democratic Kampuchea and its victories and mistakes. The text
also attacked the others who were the anti-communists who fought the Vietnamese and the
PRK. The document, believed to be authored by Pol Pot, proposed a range of actions was
permitted in line with the political slogan of Nation, Democracy and Livelihood. We use
Livelihood (that is, maintaining decent standards of living) as the means of drawing in people
from the base areas; Democracy to mobilize middle stratum people, like students and
intellectuals; and Nation to mobilize upper level people of the front as widely as possible. The
document noted that in 1975 for the very first time in more than two thousand years of history
people from base areas had taken charge of state power. This empowerment of the poor of the
world never happened, aside from the Paris Commune in 1871, which had been taken over by
capitalists. The document noted that communist dictatorship of Democratic Kampuchea had

291

Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary (University of
Pennsylvania Press, Apr 4, 2000) pages 393-395.
292 Dissolution of Communist Party of Kampuchea Voice of Democratic Kampuchea
December 8, 1981
293 Quinn, Paul. Khmer Rouge; Group that killed a million Cambodians change its tactics
Christian Science Monitor April 4, 1985 page 20.

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been strategically and tactically correctright on target. The document noted that the Khmer
Rouges Four Year Plan was moving along nicely, considering that we had so little
capital(W)e strove to meet our schedule so that the Vietnamese would not catch up with us and
be our master. The document also noted that the United States, France, Britain, and Australia
were land swallowers, race destroyers, megacolonialistsand human rights violators. As of
1985, Khmer Rouge defectors reported that their zones of control were characterized by a
rigidly authoritarian society whose leaders are driven by an almost pathological suspicion of
any other group, including those also fighting the Vietnamese. In the sector under the control of
Khmer Rouge divisional commander Ny Korn punished residents who were just thinking about
something or talking about something, listening to the radio broadcasts of the non -Communist
resistance factions, boys and girls flirting, or demanding pagodas a nd Buddhist ceremonies,
saying things are being done the way Pol Pot used to do things, engaging in political discussions
with relief agency workers, and moving from one sector to another. 294
Even well into the 1990s, the Khmer Rouge spoke in anti-American, leftwing tones. In
January 1995, the Khmer Rouge noted on its radio program that after the 1954 Geneva
conference, French colonialists left Cambodia. The French barely left when the US imperialists
came in with the strategic goal of bringing down independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned
Cambodia. However, they were opposed by the Cambodian nation and people; they were
expelled from Cambodia in 1963-1964From 1960 to 1969 during the US-communist
Vietnamese war, the US imperialists violated Cambodias territorial integrity by most savagely
and brutally bombing and killing the Cambodian peopleAlso in that period, the US
imperialists used chemicals spread from aircraft to destroy thousands of hectares of Cambodia's
forest and rubber plantations and hundreds of villages on the eastern border. Hundreds and
thousands of people, young and old, men and women, children and babies, died at that
timeThe US imperialists ordered the Lon Nol-Sirimatak clique to stage a coup to topple
independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia in blatant violation of international
law on 18th March 1970. Since then the US imperialists fully escalated the war in Cambodia to
kill the Cambodian nation and people.295
In 1988, most of the Khmer Rouge-held camps were inaccessible to international relief
agencies and foreign journalists. The showcase civilian camp of the Khmer Rouge, Site 8 was
used for propaganda purposes. 296
The Chinese and even in the post-Cold War period, the Cubans and Vietnamese backed
the Khmer Rouge. As of February 1991, the Khmer Rouge troops continued to receive Red
Chinese-made weapons via Thailand. 297 In August 1990, the Khmer Rouge reportedly received
24 Type-59 tanks from Red China. 298 In September 2000, the Cambodian newspaper
Cummings-Bruce, Nicholas. Khmer Rouges new image cannot disguise old habits:
Suspicions about contact with Westerners persist The Guardian (London) July 27, 1985
295 Khmer Rouge radio reviews US war crimes Radio of the Provisional Government of
National Union and National Salvation of Cambodia January 31, 1995
296 Richburg, Keith B. Life With the Khmer Rouge Guerrillas; Some Defectors Tell of Forced
Labor, Other Hardships Washington Post November 25, 1988 page A1.
297 Chinese official says Cambodian resistance still receiving Chinese arms Japanese News
Agency News Agency February 28, 1991
298 Phnom Penh radio on supply of Chinese tanks to Khmer Rouge Voice of the People of
Cambodia, Phnom Penh home service October 16, 1990
294

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Moneakseka Khmer noted that a high-ranking Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP) official reported
that the Khmer Rouge leaders used hard currency from the sale of gemstones and logs to Hun
Sen to purchase land and farms in Communist Cuba. The same CPP official reported that the
former Khmer Rouge Foreign Minister Ieng Sary used to visit Cuba once or twice a year. Sary
traveled to Cuba via Red China and Vietnam. 299
Elements of the international communist and terrorist movement supported the Khmer
Rouge in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation. In November 1979, the
International Conference in Solidarity with Kampuchea opened in Stockholm and hosted
delegations from the Swedish-Kampuchean Friendship Association, Swedish communist writer
Jan Myrdal, Democratic Kampuchean officials, Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), Red Chinas
Peoples Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and 250 delegates and observers
from 35 countries.300
Hanois ambitions clearly went beyond the subjugation of Laos and Democratic
Kampuchea. Vietnamese communist National Assembly defector Nguyen Cong Hoan noted
During the first session of the unified National Assembly held in Hanoi in June 1976 we were
given a copy of a document entitled Vietnam-Southeast Asia which was subsequently taken back
because of its sensitive nature. At this same session Mr. Tran Quynh private secretary to Le
Duan told me The liberation of Thailand will be next. It is a historical necessity and a
responsibility of ours.301
As of June 1981, sources reported that Vietnam had a plan to occupy Thailand by 1982 or
1983. These plans were gleaned from conversations between Thai military and police officials
and Laotian soldiers stationed on the border. A report by the Thai newspaper Matichon noted
Vietnam has instructed Vietnamese refugees in Thailand to slip into provinces throughout
Thailand to assist future Vietnamese military actions in Thailand. The refugees were also
instructed to time their sabotage of government buildings and peoples homes to coincide with
and to create confusion, thereby facilitating Vietnamese occupation attemptssince May 1981
Vietnam has moved forces from Danang through Highways 9 and 13 to Saravane, Champassak
and Attopeu. On 2nd May, 21 military trucks were sighted, while six more trucks were sighted on
6th May and 25 others on 8th May. The report says a battalion of Cuban and Soviet soldiers are
located at (Phou Kongtoun) in (Phou Kongtoun) Canton, Saravane Province. These soldiers
advise Lao soldiers in the field and at various Lao military headquarters. A total of 30 medium
and large tanks, two trucks and a total of 37 artillery and anti-aircraft guns were seen at (Phou
Bachiang) camp in Pakse town. A radar station manned by three Vietnamese soldiers and
guarded by a platoon of Vietnamese troops was located at a former ammunition storage building
in Pakse about 150 m west of Highway 13large numbers of Lao have been conscripted for
military service and posted in areas along Laos southern border with Thailand. Laos has also
claimed that it will launch a battle with Thailand sometime in the future.302
A defector from the Vietnamese puppet Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) Pom
Delis noted in June 1980 that: Great interest was aroused over a recent meeting concerned with
Khmer Rouge leaders to seek refuge in Cuba BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
Moneakseka Khmer September 23, 2000
300 International Conference in Solidarity with Kampuchea Opens in Stockholm Xinhua
General News Service November 18, 1979
301Santoli, Al. To Bear Any Burden (Indiana University Press 1999) page 288.
302 Thai Paper Reports Vietnams Plans to Occupy Thailand Bangkok Matichon June 1, 1981
299

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military preparedness including strategy against Thailand as the next target. A map of
Thailand was issued. Presided over by Prime Minister Heng Samrin, the meeting was attended
by Vietnamese, Soviet, Cuban, East German, and Hungarian officials. The Vietnamese said that
they had been fighting for 20 years while Thailand had not had battle experience.It was
significant to note that Pom was the secretary and wife of Ros Samay, the PRK Minister for
Economic Affairs. 303
In September 1979, a captured Vietnamese spy named Phan Vinh Hoi alleged that the
Vietnamese Party leaders and army commanders have frequently made it known that once they
have seized the whole of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese forces will immediately attack
Thailand.304
In July 1983, the Vietnamese and Laotians reportedly created a task force near Vientiane
to organize infiltration and subversion of Thailand in the national salvation style of Hanois
invasion of Democratic Kampuchea. This task force also controlled a group of 100 Thai
Communist Party troops in Laos. According to the Bangkok Post, the first attempt at a
Vietnamese conquest of Thailand occurred from 1976 to 1977 when Hanoi offered to supply
three regiments to the CPT to help liberate the north-east. The forces were supposed to be
volunteers sent to aid the indigenous insurgents. The situation in Thailand at that time was very
critical with students and other youths going into the jungles to join the communists. Several
went to Laos and were formed into a group to act as the Thai nucleus for the Vietnamese arme d
force to make the proposed incursion across the Mekong RiverAmong the designations given
the new party of Thai communists is the name national salvation movement party - almost the
same wording for the Kampuchean group headed by Heng Samrin who became Hanois puppet
in Phnom Penh. The CPTs pro-Peking Politburo, however, turned down the offer. The Thai
governments declaration of amnesty has also drawn many Thais out of the jungles and from
Laos, thus robbing the Vietnamese of the essential Thai core f or the salvation movement.
Intelligence sources described the offer to the CPT as the precursor to the Vietnamese pattern of
organizing and using a local communist organization sympathetic to itself as a front for
turning unstable domestic conditions to their advantage for the purpose of seizing control from
within the target country.305
Richard Gabriel speculated that the present deployment of Vietnamese Army divisions
in Kampuchea could permit a rapid advance from the border to Bangkok, using the unobstructed
approach afforded by the Wattana Corridor, while the remaining PAVN divisions continued
their campaign against Khmer Rouge remnants. The Vietnamese are superior in every combat
element and have substantially more experience than the Thailand Army.306
The Vietnamese continued to flood Southeast Asia with intelligence officers in order to
gain information, goods, and to sow subversion. As of August 1979, a defecting Vietnamese
intelligence official noted that Hanoi dispatched agents to Hong Kong through infiltration on
Vietnamese freighters. These Vietnamese agents posed as refugees. The divisions of the
Disclosures on Heng Samrin Regime by Ros Samays Ex-Wife Bangkok Post June 19,
1980
304 Confession of Vietnamese Spy Captured in Cambodia VODK September 4, 1979
305 Thailand Alleges Vietnam has Set up Task Force in Laos for Infiltration Bangkok Post July
26, 1983
306 Gabriel, Richard A. Fighting Armies: Nonaligned, Third World, and Other Ground Armies, A
Combat Assessment (Greenwood Press, 1983)page 63.
303

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Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security that were responsible for infiltrating Hanois agents were
the Dispatching Bureau and the Political Security Bureau. In the late 1970s, Vietnam sent
intelligence officers to East Germany and the USSR for advanced training. Moscow and East
Berlin also provided sophisticated espionage equipment to the Vietnamese intelligence service.
The Vietnamese agents infiltrated via merchant vessels were dispatched to spy in Hong Kong,
Japan, Singapore, and the Middle East. 307 As of September 1981, Soviet KGB agents in Thailand
collaborated with Eastern European, Laotian, and Vietnamese diplomats that were resident in
Bangkok.308
In September 1980, it was reported that Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime set up a
center that trained special agents in Siem Reap Province to pave the way for Hanois conquest of
Thailand. The centers had 50 trainees, who were Kampucheans of Vietnamese nationality who
spoke Thai fluently. 309 In October 1979, the Vietnamese opened a pacification and espionage
course in Battambang. These agents were to infiltrate Thailand as refugees where they would
collect information, stir up opinion on Thai internal affairs, destroy Thai peasants crops, and
plunder storages and any Thai property they can. The instructors were Soviets who taught
espionage, camouflage, and sabotage techniques. 310
The Vietnamese clearly were ready to use chemical weapons in an effort to attack
Thailand. After all, Hanoi deployed chemical weapons against the South Vietnamese, US forces,
Democratic Kampuchea, Hmong rebels in Laos, and the Red Chinese. A Vietnamese artillery
officer reported to Agence France Presse that the poison gases used to defeat Democratic
Kampuchea originated from the USSR, Red China, and captured stocks leftover from the South
Vietnamese army. During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese used captured stocks of South
Vietnamese and US-made CS and DM nausea gas in tear gas grenades and mortar shells. It was
reported that Red China possibly provided North Vietnam with CS grenades. A July 1981 Soviet
shipment of crates destined to Ho Chi Minh City reportedly contained deadly toxic
chemicals.311
The Vietnamese Communists publically praised and admitted the important role played
by chemical weapons in the battle for Indochina. In April 1980, the chemical armed branch of
the Vietnamese army received the Ho Chi Minh Order, Third Class by Vice-Minister of Defense
Col-Gen Le Trong Tan, who was a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central
Committee and the Central Military Party Committees Standing Committee. Col-Gen Le Trong
Tan noted that the branchs cadres and combatants have actively studied and mastered science
and technology and have been brave, resourceful and creative in combat and combat support.
Together with the whole people and the entire army, they countered enemy acts and, with
chemical weapons, contributed to the great victory in the anti-US national salvation resistance
struggle. Units of the chemical armed branch also used colored smoke successfully to protect
Viet Nams Spying in Hongkong Revealed Xinhua General News Service August 28, 1979
Thai Weekly Exposes KGB Activities in Thailand Xinhua General News Service
September 3, 1981
309 Special Agents Trained in Cambodia to Spy on Thailand BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts September 20, 1980
310 Other Reports on Cambodia; Soviet Instructors Training Spies in Cambodia BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts October 12, 1979
311Burck, Gordon and Flowerree, Charles C. International Handbook on Chemical Weapons
Proliferation (Greenwood Press 1991) pages 378-402.
307
308

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some important work. In the North, during the years of the US imperialists war of destruction,
the branch initially trained a force of command and technical cadres who displayed high combat
spirit and abilityTo fulfill the tasks in the new situation, cadres and combatants of the chemical
armed branch must be thoroughly imbued with the revolutionary line and tasks, the military line
of the Party and the branch's tasks in a war of national defense. They must carry out
satisfactorily scientific and technological research and train themselves actively to manage and
use effectively the weapons and equipment allotted to them. As their immediate goal, the units
must accelerate the campaign to develop the fine traditions and increase the fighting strength of
the peoples armed forces; pay attention to observing discipline; strive to build themselves into
standard units; and actively engage in production in order to improve the soldiers material and
spiritual life.312
Even after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in late 1989, Hanois
advisers controlled the Hun Sen government. Hassan Kasem noted that Hanoi created a perfect
ally in the CPP to defend and protect its substantial interests in Cambodia, ranging from land
border areas, to maritime concessions, to allowances for illegal Vietnamese immigrants to settle
unperturbed throughout the country. Many CPP leaders and high-ranking officials would not
have their prestigious positions and titles without Vietnamese backing: they know it, and Hanoi
knows itUnder Hun Sens CPP-led government, Vietnamese companies have secured large
swathes of Cambodian land in concessions to develop rubber plantations in north and northeast
Cambodia. These Vietnamese companies have engaged in massive logging of luxury timber
across the country, an unsustainable process that has brought little or no benefit to local
KhmerIn the capital of Phnom Penh, more and more Vietnamese immigrants rent or own new
residential buildings, including new luxury apartments and condominiums, with the financial
help of Vietnamese government subsidized bank loans. With those state subsidies, part of
Hanois policy to maintain grassroots control of the local economy, their community and
businesses are growing briskly. Michael Benge noted that Vietnam maintained force of elite
troops and intelligence agents that consisted of 3,000 troops in Cambodia. They were equipped
with tanks and helicopters. Vietnam placed a battalion of troops on alert when Cambodian and
Thai troops engaged in a border clash in 2008. The Vietnamese troops were to assist the
Cambodians if necessary. 313 As of September 1997, the Hun Sen government called in 600 Dac
Cong Vietnamese troops into Cambodia for military assistance. 314 In February 1997, Chea Sim
chairman of the Cambodian Peoples Party noted that CPP expressed sincere admiration for
Deng Xiaoping who led the Communist Party of China and the PRC to great achievements along
the path of a socialist market economy. Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of the Royal
Government of Cambodia, remarked that Deng Xiaoping is a veteran Chinese leader, an
eminent son, and an outstanding and brilliant leader of the Chinese nation, and that his death is

Award Presented to Vietnamese Armys Chemical Branch Hanoi Home Service April 23,
1980
313 Kasen, Hassan A. Vietnams Hidden Hand in Cambodias Impasse Asia Times Online
October 9, 2013 Accessed From: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-02091013.html
314 Daily Says 600 Vietnamese Troops Arrived Through LaosMoneakseka Khmer Phnom Penh
September 18, 1997
312

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a great loss to Chinese history and the world315 In May 1992, Vietnamese soldiers in Phnom
Penh reportedly disguised themselves as Cambodian pedicab operators, bicycle repairers,
motorcycle and car mechanics, sellers of radios, televisions and cars.316 Vietnam continues to
control the Cambodian leftists, even after they lost their dominant political position in Phnom
Penh. In December 2016, the leftist Cambodian Peoples Party and the Vietnamese Communist
Party signed a party-to-party cooperation agreement for 2017-2018 period. The Vietnamese
promised Party building and cadre training for the CPP. 317
In conclusion, the evidence clearly illustrates how the North Vietnamese and their
Indochinese allies utilized the psychological warfare to evict first the French and later the
Americans. These efforts resulted in the eventual communist occupation of almost all of
Indochina. The Soviet-Chinese axis also provided massive military assistance, including troop
support to the North Vietnamese and their Indochinese allies. To this day, Vietnam dominates
Cambodia (through the Cambodian Peoples Party-formerly the Khmer Peoples Revolutionary
Party) and Laos (through the ruling Pathet Lao). Despite tensions with China, Hanoi is still
ideologically aligned with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, communist Vietnam also forged closer
ties with Putins Russian Federation. In all likelihood, if a Third World War broke out between
the United States and the Sino-Russian alliance, Vietnam would assuredly join Americas
enemies. Presently, American big business is also pushing for the passage of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which will provide political legitimacy and economic benefits to Hanoi and quite
possibly Red China. Young patriots, conservatives, and other anti-communists should remember
the true history and circumstances of the Vietnam War and reject any current propaganda
campaigns on behalf of the ruling communists in Hanoi. Meanwhile, much of the American Left
is still in thrall of communist Vietnam. Such support stemmed from a common antiimperialism and adherence to progressive socialist ideals. Many American leftists are still
bitter at US involvement in supporting Indochinese anti-communist governments. However,
Hanois rulers are a gang of corrupt, totalitarian, and anti-worker communists who cooperate
with multinational corporations in outsourcing and the oppression of labor. Disaffected leftists
and conservatives need to forge an anti-communist front in an effort to spread freedom.

Cambodian Peoples Party Sends Condolences China Radio International February 24,
1997
316 Khmer Rouge Radio Reports Growing Number of Vietnamese in Phnom Penh Voice of
the Great National Union Front of Cambodia May 25, 1992
317 Cambodian Party official suggests continuous cooperation with Vietnam December 27,
2016 Accessed From:
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/170204/cambodian-party-official-suggestscontinuous-cooperation-with-vietnam.html
315