Disability Benefits; entitlement and burden of proof. Petitioner suffered a fractured arm while working on respondents vessel.

He filed a
complaint for permanent disability benefits, among others. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to the higher amount of disability benefits
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement which respondent entered into with a union of which petitioner was a member. The Court of
Appeals denied the petitioners claim. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Court of Appeals, held that the burden of proof rests upon the
party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. And in labor cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Petitioner had the duty to prove by
substantial evidence his own positive assertions. He did not discharge this burden of proof when he submitted photocopied portions of a
different CBA with a different union. Wilfredo Y. Antiquina v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Masterbulk Pte., Ltd., G.R. No.
168922. April 13, 2011.
_____________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199932

July 3, 2013

CAMILO A. ESGUERRA, Petitioner,

vs.
UNITED PHILIPPINES LINES, INC., BELSHIPS MANAGEMENT (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD., and/or FERNANDO T. LISING, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution3 dated
December 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116631 which awarded disability benefits to Camilo Esguerra (petitioner) pursuant
to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers (POEA-SEC) and not under the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) as previously adjudged by the Labor Arbiter (LA) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Facts
On October 26, 2007, United Philippines Lines, Inc. (UPLI), a Philippine-registered manning agency, in behalf of its principal, Belships Management
(Singapore) Pte Ltd., (Belships), hired the petitioner to work as a fitter on board the vessel M/V Jaco Triumph for a period of nine (9) months or until
July 2008, subject to a one (1) month extension upon mutual agreement of the parties. 4
Their contract of employment was approved by the POEA and it contained a clause stating that "the current PSU/ITF TCC Agreement shall be
considered to be incorporated into and to form part of this contract." 5
On August 21, 2008, while the petitioner was welding wedges inside Hatch 5 of the vessel, a manhole cover accidentally fell and hit the petitioner on
the head. The impact of the blow caused him pain on his neck and shoulders despite him wearing a protective helmet. He was given immediate
medical attention and was kept under constant monitoring and observation. 6
On September 11, 2008, the petitioner was medically repatriated to the Philippines where he arrived two (2) days later. 7
On September 15, 2008, he consulted UPLIs accredited physician, Dr. Raymund Sugay of the Physicians Diagnostic Center. After a physical
examination, the petitioner was found to be suffering from tenderness of paravertebral muscles along his back. The x-ray imaging of his spine showed
no fractures but with straightening of the cervical spines. He was advised to undergo physical therapy. 8
Thereafter, the petitioner was referred to UPLIs accredited physicians at the Metropolitan Medical Center where he was placed under the charge of
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan). After series of medical examinations, the petitioner was diagnosed with Coccygodynia
and Thoracolumbar Strain. He was directed to continue his physical therapy sessions. 9
On December 16, 2008, an interim Medical Report was issued by UPLIs accredited physicians, Dr. Mylene Cruz-Balbon (Dr. Cruz-Balbon) and Dr.
Robert Lim (Dr. Lim), who pronounced the petitioners temporary disability as Grade 11 (slight rigidity or 1/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk)
under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC. The doctors recommended that the petitioner continue physical therapy for another six (6) to eight (8) weeks. 10
Alleging that despite undergoing medical treatment and physical therapy sessions, his injuries did not heal and instead, his condition deteriorated, the
petitioner filed before the LA a complaint for permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance with claims for damages and attorneys fees against
UPLI, its President, Fernando T. Lising and Belships (respondents). 11

He claimed that pursuant to the Philippine Seafarers Union/International Transport Workers Federation Total Crew Cost (PSU/ITF TCC) Agreement
incorporated in his employment contract, he is entitled to the maximum permanent disability compensation of US$142,560.00 12 and sick wages
equivalent to 130 days amounting to US$3,063.66. 13
While the complaint was pending or on February 7, 2009, Dr. Chuasuan issued a report maintaining the Grade 11 disability assessment previously
made on the petitioners condition, viz:
Patient has undergone 3 months of rehabilitation and claims only mild improvement of symptoms. Further treatment would probably be of some benefit
but will not guarantee his fitness to work.
Interim disability of grade 11 stands.14
However, Drs. Cruz-Balbon and Lim raised the petitioners assessment to Grade 8 or "moderate rigidity or two-thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting
power" under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC in their medical report. 15 Based thereon, UPLI paid the petitioner sickness allowance of P133,843.47 for the
period September 14, 2008 to January 12, 2009. 16
Unconvinced of the final assessment made by UPLIs physicians, the petitioner consulted independent physician Dr. Raul Sabado (Dr. Sabado) of the
Dagupan Orthopedic Center who, after examination, diagnosed him to be suffering from Compression fracture vertebrae, which is classified as Grade 1
disability. Dr. Sabado pronounced the petitioner permanently unfit for sea-faring duty in a medical certificate dated February 15, 2009. 17 The petitioner
submitted such assessment to bolster his claim. He also submitted a copy of his Seamans Employment Contract. 18 Likewise proffered in evidence was
an alleged copy of ITF Uniform "TCC" Collective Agreement under Sections 22 and 24 19 of which the petitioner is allegedly entitled to maximum
permanent disability compensation of US$142,560.00 and sick wages equivalent to one hundred thirty (130) days or US$3,063.66. The petitioner also
submitted a copy of a CBA between PSU-ALU-TUCP-ITF and Belships covering the M/V Jaco Triumph for the period November 1, 2008 to October 31,
2009.20
For their part, the respondents denied that the petitioners employment was covered by a CBA and pointed out that the selected pages of the alleged
CBA that he attached are misleading. They averred that he is entitled only to the benefits accorded to Grade 11 disability by the POEA-SEC as
determined by the companys designated physicians. 21
Ruling of the LA
On June 10, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision 22 according greater merit to the assessment made by the petitioners independent doctor over the
varying, hence, unreliable, assessments issued by the respondents accredited physicians. The LA also noted that the several amounts for settlement
offered by the respondents to the petitioner are indicative that he is indeed entitled to permanent disability benefits.
The LA rejected the respondents assertion that the petitioners employment was not covered by a CBA since the exact opposite was proven with
certainty by the POEA-approved employment contract submitted by the petitioner. Anent the applicable basis of the award of permanent disability
benefits, the LA found the attached pages of the ITF Uniform "TCC" Collective Agreement applicable and sufficient under which the petitioner is entitled
to disability compensation and balance of the due sickness allowance under Sections 22 and 24 thereof. The LA awarded moral and exemplary
damages in view of the bad faith exhibited by the respondents when they lured the petitioner into settlement by offering various amounts with no
genuine intent to actually settle. The dispositive portion of the decision thus read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents United Philippine Lines, Inc. and Belships Management
(Singapore) PTE Ltd. to jointly and severally pay (the petitioner) the peso equivalent at the time of actual payment of the sums of US$82,500.00 and
US$271.92 as permanent total disability benefits and balance of sickness allowance respectively, pursuant to the mandate of the ITF Uniform "TCC"
Collective Agreement. Respondents are further ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages to the (petitioner) in the amount of P100,000.00 each
plus the amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the judgment award as and by way of attorneys fees.
All claims are ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC agreed with the conclusions of the LA adding that there is actually no disparity between the assessment given by the company doctors and
the petitioners own physician as they uniformly found the petitioner to be permanently unfit for sea duty. Dr. Chuasuan categorically declared in his
February 7, 2009 letter that "further treatment would probably be of some benefit but will not guarantee his fitness to work." 24 The final assessment
made by the respondents doctors also stated that the petitioner has lost 2/3 of his motion lifting power which can only mean that he is already
permanently unfit for sea service. Regardless of the different disability grading given by the doctors, the petitioner is undoubtedly already permanently
incapacitated. As such, the NLRC Decision25 dated May 24, 2010 disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondents is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
The respondents moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the NLRC Resolution 27 dated July 30, 2011.

Ruling of the CA
The respondents sought recourse with the CA which found partial merit in their petition. The CA disagreed with the LA and the NLRC that there is
adequate proof of the provisions of the CBA. The CA ruled that while the petitioners employment contract states that the "current PSU/ITF TCC
Agreement" is incorporated therein, what he attached to his Position Paper and Motion to Dismiss Appeal and/or Opposition is the CBA between PSUALU-TUCP-ITF and Belships which does not contain Sections 22 and 24 cited by him for his claim and relied upon by the LA in awarding the disability
compensation. In fact, under the said agreement, entitlement to the maximum disability compensation of either US$110,000.00 or US$90,000.00 is
accorded only to two classes of officers, i.e., the class of radio officers and chief stewards or the class of electricians and electro technicians - neither of
which does the petitioner belong to. The petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving by substantial evidence his entitlement to superior benefits
under the purported "ITF TCC CBA" as he merely submitted copies of the CBA between PSU-ALU-TUCP-ITF and Belships and not the relevant
PSU/ITF TCC Agreement.
The CA sustained the final assessment of the respondents physicians assigning Grade 8 disability to the petitioner which is compensable under
Section 32 of the POEA-SEC or US$16,795.00 (33.59% of US$50,000.00). The awards for damages and attorneys fees were deleted for lack of bad
faith on the part of the respondents who promptly provided the petitioner with medical assistance and sickness allowance from September 2008 to
January 2009. Thus, the CA Decision28 dated May 26, 2011 disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The May 24, 2010 Decision of public respondent NLRC is SET ASIDE and the June 10,
2009 Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, to read, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering respondents United Philippine Lines, Inc. and Belships Management
(Singapore) PTE Ltd. to jointly and severally pay (the petitioner) the sum of US$16,795.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the prevailing
exchange rate at the time of payment, representing permanent medical unfitness benefits, plus legal interest reckoned from the time it was due. The
claims for moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.29 (Emphasis added)
Aggrieved, the petitioner interposed the present petition ascribing misappreciation of facts on the part of the CA.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partially meritorious.
There is no question that the petitioners injury is work-related and that he is entitled to disability benefits. The dispute lies in the degree of such injury
and the applicable basis for the amount of benefits due for the same.
Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts hence, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.30 In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on this Court and
it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, it is a recognized exception that when the CAs findings are contrary to
those of the NLRC and LA, as in this case, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable
to evidentiary facts.31
The petitioners injury should be
classified as permanent and total
disability.
The findings of the NLRC on the degree of the petitioners disability are most in accord with the evidence on record. As ardently observed by the labor
commission, the orthopedic surgeon designated by the respondents, Dr. Chuasuan, and the petitioners independent specialist, Dr. Sabado, were one
in declaring that the petitioner is permanently unfit for sea duty. Dr. Sabado categorically pronounced the same in his certification dated February 15,
200932 while the import of Dr. Chuasuans report on February 7, 2009 33 conveyed the similar conclusion when he stated: "further treatment would
probably be of some benefit but will not guarantee (the petitioners) fitness to work." The uncertain effect of further treatment intimates nothing more but
that the injury sustained by the petitioner bars him from performing his customary and strenuous work as a seafarer/fitter. As such, he is considered
permanently and totally disabled.
Permanent and total disability means "disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of a similar nature that he was
trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment can do." 34
It is inconsequential whether the petitioner was actually recorded by the respondents to be driving a motorcycle. It does not preclude an award for
disability because, in labor laws, disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough that it
incapacitates to perform his customary work.35
It is not unexpected for Drs. Cruz-Balbon and Lim to downplay the report of Dr. Chuasuan when they issued the Grade 8 final disability assessment.
The Court is not naive of such interplay of force between the seafarer, the company and the latters accredited physicians. As the medical coordinators
of the hospital that represents the company in the conduct of medical evaluations, they are accustomed to do so in order to underrate the
compensation the company must pay to the seafarer-claimant. This is precisely one of the reasons why the seafarer is given the option by the POEASEC to seek a second opinion from his preferred physician.36

The award of permanent disability

benefits shall be governed by the
POEA-SEC.
Settled is the rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. In labor cases, the quantum of proof necessary
is substantial evidence, or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 37 In disability
claims, as in the case at bar, the employee bears the onus to prove by substantial evidence his own positive assertions. 38
To show that he is entitled to superior disability benefits under a CBA, the petitioner submitted copies of pages 9 and 10 of the purported PSU/ITF TCC
Agreement39 and a copy of the complete text of a CBA between PSU-ALU-TUCP-ITF and Belships dated November 3, 2008. 40 Neither of which,
however, substantially establish his claim for the amount of US$142,560.00 permanent disability benefits.
The two-paged evidence reflecting what is supposed to be Sections 22 and 24 of a PSU/ITF TCC Agreement is too trifling to adequately prove that it is
indeed the agreement signed by Belships or that it even covers the petitioner. From the said piecemeal evidence, it is impossible to deduce whether it
is indeed the correct CBA upon which the superior amount of permanent disability benefit claimed by the petitioner can be based. Neither can the
complete text of CBA between PSU-ALU-TUCP-ITF and Belships be considered as satisfactory evidence. As correctly observed by the CA, the said
agreement does not contain Sections 22 and 24 cited by the petitioner for his claim and relied upon by the LA in awarding the disability compensation.
The provision therein that deals with disability compensation is Article 12 which reads:
Article 12
Disability Compensation
If a seafarer due to no fault of his own, suffers an occupational injury as a result of an accident or an occupational disease while serving on board or
while travelling to or from the vessel on Companys business or due to marine peril, and as a result his ability to work is permanently reduced, partially
or totally, and never to be declared fit, the Company shall pay him a disability compensation which including the amounts stipulated by the POEAs
rules and regulations shall be maximum:
Radio Officers, Chief Stewards,
Electricians, Electro Technicians USD 110 000
Ratings USD 90 000
x x x x.41
The CA baselessly concluded that the provision is limited only to radio officers, chief stewards, electricians and electro technicians under which the
petitioner cannot be categorized. As can be gleaned above, ratings are covered by disability compensation. It is not logical to limit the provision only to
the officers as the union, PSU-ALU-TUCP-ITF, represents all Filipino crew members without exception. 42
Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the provision to the petitioner must be sustained in view of the fact that the duration of the submitted copy of PSUALU-TUCP-ITF and Belships CBA is from November 1, 2008 until October 31, 2009 43 or outside the petitioners employment period which expired as
early as July 2008.
In fine, the petitioner failed to proffer credible and competent evidence of his claim for superior disability benefits. What remains as competent basis
for disability award is the POEA-SEC, Section 20(B)(6) thereof provides, to wit:
1wphi1

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with
the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by
the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
Section 32, on the other hand, states that a disability allowance of US$60,000.00 (US$50,000.00 x 120%) is granted for an impediment considered as
total and permanent, such as that adjudged to have befallen the petitioner.
Anent sickness benefits, the Court finds that the respondents have already satisfied the same based on Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC. Under the
said provision, upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period
exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. The receipts on record establish payment of the petitioners sickness allowance from September 14, 2008 to
January 12, 2009 or for a period of 120 days. 44
Damages and Attorneys Fees
The CA correctly denied an award of moral and exemplary damages. The respondents were not negligent in affording the petitioner with medical
treatment neither did they forsake him during his period of disability. However, the Court finds that the petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to
Article 2208(8) of the Civil Code45 which states that the award of attorney's fees is justified in actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
employer's liability laws.46
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution dated December 29, 2011
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA~G.R. SP No. 116631 are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondents United Philippines Lines,
Inc. and Belships Management (Singapore) Pte Ltd. are jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner Camilo Esguerra's permanent disability benefits in
the amount of US$60,000.00 at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment, plus legal interest reckoned from the time it was due. In

addition, they shall also pay attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total award. The dismissal of the claims for moral and exemplary
damages STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
ECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 195832, October 01, 2014

FORMERLY INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED (NOW INC NAVIGATION CO. PHILIPPINES, INC.), REYNALDO M. RAMIREZ AND/OR INTERORIENT
NAVIGATION CO., LTD./LIMASSOL, CYPRUS, Petitioners, v. BENJAMIN I. ROSALES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal of the decision1 dated December 6, 2010 and the resolution dated February 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107271.
The appealed decision reversed the resolution dated November 21, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and reinstated the June 26, 2007 decision
of the Labor Arbiter (LA) finding Benjamin Rosales (Rosales) entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits.
The Antecedent Facts
On October 12, 2005, INC Shipmanagement Incorporated (INC, now known as INC Navigation Co., Philippines, Inc.), in behalf of its foreign principal (Interorient
Shipping Co., Ltd.) hired Rosales for a period of ten (10) months as Chief Cook for the vessel M/V Franklin Strait. Their contract was pursuant to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Rosales was to receive a monthly salary of Five Hundred Fifty United States dollars
(US$550.00). His primary function was to prepare, cook, and process food for the ships officers and crew with the corresponding responsibility of maintaining the
general cleanliness of the working area.2
cralawred

Sometime in February 2006, while on board the vessel, Rosales experienced severe chest pain and breathing difficulties, coupled with numbness on his left arm. On
February 13, 2006, a physician at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami, Florida, USA examined him. He underwent a coronary angiogram and also an angioplasty in the
left anterior artery of his heart. All these were provided by the company at its own expense. Rosales was thereafter declared unfit to work and was advised to
continue treatment in his home country.3
cralawre d

On February 20, 2006, after repatriation to the Philippines, Rosales was confined at the Manila Medical Center where the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes
G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz) examined him. Rosales was diagnosed to be suffering from acute myocardial infarction secondary to coronary artery disease, hypertension and
diabetes mellitus.4
cralawre d

On April 7, 2006, Rosales consulted Dr. Paterno Dizon, Jr. (Dr. Dizon), an interventional cardiologist at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center, who certified that he was
suffering from coronary artery disease and severe stenosis in his heart. Consequently, he underwent a Coronary Artery By-Pass Graft Surgery at the Philippine Heart
Center.5
cralawred

On October 10, 2006, Dr. Cruz gave Rosales a partial permanent disability assessment equivalent to Grade 7 (moderate residuals of disorder) under the POEASEC. The assessment took into account the marked improvement of his condition. 6
cralawred

On November 9, 2006, Rosales sought the medical advice of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), a cardiologist at the Philippine Heart Center for a second opinion. Dr.
Vicaldo found him still suffering from hypertensive cardiovascular and coronary artery diseases in his heart. He assessed Rosales to be unfit to work as a seaman in
any capacity and considered his illness to be work-related. He thus gave Rosales a permanent total disability rating of Grade 1 under the POEA-SEC. 7
cralawre d

On the strength of Dr. Vicaldos more favorable finding, Rosales claimed permanent total disability benefits from INC. The company denied the claim. Following the
denial, Rosales filed a complaint8 on December 7, 2006 for disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorneys fees
against INC before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. 9
cralawre d

Rosales asserted that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the POEA-SEC based on Dr. Vicaldos Grade 1 disability rating; that this assessment is
based on the finding that his illness was acquired in the performance of his duties, and that his illness rendered him unfit for sea duties. Rosales further stated that he
was incapacitated to work for more than one hundred twenty (120) days. He also questioned Dr. Cruzs competency since Dr. Cruz did not actually perform the
medical procedures, but based it only on the report of Dr. Dizon. Moreover, Rosales argued that Dr. Cruz is not a cardiologist but a general and cancer surgeon and who
could not render an impartial assessment since he was a company-designated physician. 10
cralawred

For its part, INC emphasized that Dr. Cruz only gave a Grade 7 disability rating based on his post-treatment evaluation of Rosales; that under the POEA-SEC, it is the
company-designated physician who is tasked to assess the fitness of a seafarer and to give the corresponding disability benefits rating. INC also pointed out that the
award of disability benefits is not dependent on the impairment of the seafarers earning capacity but on the gravity of the injury he had sustained.
The Compulsory Arbitration Decisions
In his decision of June 26, 2007,11 the LA found the complaint meritorious and ordered INC to pay Rosales Sixty Thousand United Stated dollars (US$60,000.00)
as permanent total disability benefits, plus three percent (3%) of this amount as attorneys fees.
The LA noted that Rosales is entitled to Grade 1 disability benefits because his illness prevented him from working for more than one hundred twenty (120) days
reckoned from the time he was repatriated in February 2006 until his disability rating was issued in October 2006.
INC appealed the ruling to the NLRC. The latter, in its resolution of January 4, 2008, affirmed the LAs decision. The NLRC, however, subsequently reversed its ruling. 12
It opined in this reversal that Rosales should only be entitled to a partial disability benefit amounting to Twenty Thousand United States dollars (US$20,900.00) in
accordance with Dr. Cruz assessment.
The NLRC reasoned out that Dr. Cruz assessment should prevail over Dr. Vicaldos finding because Dr. Cruz, as the company-designated doctor, had thoroughly
examined and had overseen the treatment of Rosales from the time of repatriation until the date of the issuance of his disability grading, while Dr. Vicaldo only
attended to Rosales once on November 9, 2006.
Rosales challenged the NLRC ruling by filing with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He contended that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the assessment of the company-designated physician and in finding that he is not entitled to full disability benefits.
The Assailed CA Decision

The CA granted the petition in its decision of December 6, 2010, 13 thereby reinstating the LAs decision finding Rosales entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
The appellate court found that from the time Rosales was repatriated until the disability grading was issued, a period of eight (8) months or more than one hundred
twenty (120) days, had lapsed and Rosales had not been able to work during this period. The CA also considered that despite medical treatment, Dr. Cruz still found
that Rosales illness persisted; that this declaration, coupled with Rosales two (2) major heart operations, should be more than sufficient to conclude that he could no
longer perform his duties as Chief Cook. For this reason, Rosales earning capacity was grossly impaired, warranting the award of Grade 1 permanent total disability
benefits.
INC moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution of February 24, 2011; 14

hence, the petition.

The Issues
INC raises the following assignment of errors:

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

I.
WHETHER OR NOT ROSALES IS ENTITLED TO FULL DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS BECAUSE HE WAS UNABLE TO WORK FOR ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120)
DAYS.
II.
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN FINDING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE NLRC IN FAVORING THE FINDINGS OF ROSALES PHYSICIANS OVER THAT
OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN.
INC primarily argues that the CA erred in finding that there had been grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the NLRC; that (1) the disability is measured in terms of
gradings, not by the number of days of actual inability to work; and (2) in a conflict of findings between the company-designated physician and the private physician, it
is the company-designated physicians findings that should prevail.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition meritorious. The CA gravely abused its discretion when it totally disregarded the governing contract between the parties a situation that
this Court cannot disregard without risking instability in maritime labor relations involving Filipino seamen.
It is the doctors findings which
should prevail over the simple
lapse of the 120-day period
Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:

chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

xxxx
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules[.] [Emphasis ours]
This provision should be read in relation with Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code [Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation Commission],15 and with Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC. 16 We had the occasion to explain the interplay of these provisions in Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc., et al.,17 under these terms:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for
diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period
is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to
a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may
of course also be declared fit to work at any time if such declaration is justified by his medical condition. [Emphasis supplied]
The law and this pronouncement make it clear that INC is obligated to pay for the treatment of Rosales, plus his basic wage, during the 120-day period from
repatriation while he is undergoing treatment; he could not work during this period and hence was on temporary total disability.
Permanent disability transpires when the inability to work continues beyond one hundred twenty (120) days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of
any part of his body. In comparison with the concept of permanent disability, total disability means the incapacity of an employee to earn wages in the same or
similar kind of work that he was trained for, or is accustomed to perform, or in any kind of work that a person of his mentality and attainments can do.
It does not mean absolute helplessness.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury that is compensated; it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning
capacity.18
cralawre d

Thus, while Rosales was entitled to temporary total disability benefits during his treatment period (because he could not totally work during this whole period), it
does not follow that he should likewise be entitled to permanent total disability benefits when his disability was assessed by the company-designated physician after
his treatment. He may be recognized to be have permanent disability because of the period he was out of work and could not work [in this case, more than one
hundred twenty (120) days], but the extent of his disability (whether total or partial) is determined, not by the number of days that he could not work, but by
the disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his resulting incapacity to work and earn his wages.
It is the doctors findings that should prevail as he/she is equipped with the proper discernment, knowledge, experience and expertise on what constitutes total or
partial disability. His declaration serves as the basis for the degree of disability that can range anywhere from Grade 1 to Grade 14. 19 Notably, this is a serious
consideration that cannot be determined by simply counting the number of treatment lapsed days.
In light of these distinctions, to confuse the concepts of permanent and total disability is to trigger a situation where disability would be determined by simply
counting the duration of the seafarers illness. This system would inevitably induce the unscrupulous to delay treatment for more than one hundred twenty (120) days
to avail of the more favorable award of permanent total disability benefits.
Non-referral to a third physician,
whose decision shall be considered as final
and binding, constitutes a breach of the
POEA-SEC
After establishing the importance of the physicians assessment of disability claims, the present case should have already been resolved had it not been for the
conflicting findings of Dr. Cruz and Dr. Vicaldo.
In the settlement of this conflict, we need not provide a lengthy discussion as we have resolved this matter in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v.
Dumadag,20 citing Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the [e]mployer and the seafarer. The third
doctors decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphasis ours)
This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor
whose assessment should prevail. In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer
expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose decision is final and binding on the parties.
We have followed this rule in a string of cases, among them, Philippine Hammonia,21Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corp.,22Santiago v. Pacbasin
Shipmanagement, Inc.,23Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency,24 and Masangkay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc.25 Thus, at this point, the matter of referral
pursuant to the provision of the POEA-SEC is a settled ruling.
Since Rosales signed the POEA-SEC, he bound himself to abide by its conditions throughout his employment. The records show that after obtaining a medical
certificate from Dr. Vicaldo classifying his illness as Grade 1 (contrary to Dr. Cruz Grade 7 assessment that the company insisted on), Rosales immediately proceeded to
secure the services of a counsel and forthwith filed a complaint for disability benefits. 26
cralawre d

By so acting, Rosales proceeded in a manner contrary to the terms of his contract with INC in challenging the company doctors assessment; he failed to signify his
intent to submit the disputed assessment to a third doctor and to wait for arrangements for the referral of the conflicting assessments of his disability to a third doctor.
Significantly, no explanation or reason was ever given for the omission to comply with this mandatory requirement; no indication whatsoever is on record that an
earnest effort to secure compliance with the law was made; Rosales immediately filed his complaint with the LA. As we recently ruled in Bahia Shipping Services, Inc.,
et al. v. Crisante C. Constantino,27 when the seafarer challenges the company doctors assessment through the assessment made by his own doctor, the seafarer shall
so signify and the company thereafter carries the burden of activating the third doctor provision.
To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctors assessment based on
the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarers own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve the conflict by the referral of the
conflicting assessments to a third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties. Upon notification, the company carries the
burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties. In Bahia, we said:
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

In the absence of any request from him (as shown by the records of the case), the employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As the party seeking to impugn
the certification that the law itself recognizes as prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctors findings are correct, as well as the
burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been made by his own physician. Upon such notification, the company must itself respond by setting into
motion the process of choosing a third doctor who, as the POEA-SEC provides, can rule with finality on the disputed medical situation.
In the absence of a third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between Dr. Lim and Dr. Almeda, Dr. Lims assessment of Constantinos health should
stand.28 Thus, the CAs conclusion that Constantinos inability to work for more than 120 days rendered him permanently disabled cannot be sustained.
Thus, as matters stand in the present case, the complaint was premature; it should have been dismissed as early as the LAs level since the fit-to-work certification and
grading by the company-designated physician prevails unless a third party doctor, sought by the parties, declares otherwise.
Significantly, no reason was ever given why the LA and the NLRC both disregarded the third-doctor provision under the POEA-SEC. For similarly ruling, the CA fell into
the same error. 29
cralawred

Once again, it appears to us, that the third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate
considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims at the parties level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were to be brought
to court.30
cralawre d

Even granting that the complaint should be given due course, we hold that the company-designated physicians assessment should prevail over that of the private
physician. The company-designated physician had thoroughly examined and treated Rosales from the time of his repatriation until his disability
grading was issued, which was from February 20, 2006 until October 10, 2006. In contrast, the private physician only attended to Rosales once, on
November 9, 2006.31This is not the first time that this Court met this situation. Under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated
physician is more credible for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in
one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records.
We are thus compelled to dismiss the present complaint, as we had similarly done in Philippine Hammonia,32 to impress upon the public the significance of a binding
obligation. This pronouncement shall not only speed up the processing of maritime disability claims and decongest court dockets; more importantly, our ruling would
restore faith and confidence in obligations that have voluntarily been entered upon. As an institution tasked to uphold and respect the law, it is our primary duty to
ensure faithful compliance with the law whether the dispute affects strictly private interests or one imbued with public interest. We shall not hesitate to dismiss a
petition wrongfully filed, or to hold any persons liable for its malicious initiation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The complaint is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

___________________________________________________
G.R. No. 191034

October 1, 2014

AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES INC., ATTY. IMELDA LIM BARCELONA and PRONA V SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
APOLINARIO N. SIADOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari challenging the decision dated September 25, 2009 and resolution dated January 21, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101211.
1

The Antecedents

On December 18, 2000, Dennis Siador (Dennis), son of respondent Apolinario Siador (Apolinario), entered into a seven-month contract of employment,
as Ordinary Seaman on board the vessel LNG ARIES, with petitioner Agile Maritime Resources, Inc. (Agile) - the local manning agent of petitioner
Pronav Ship Management, Inc.
4

On December 12, 2001, Apolinario filed a complaint for death benefits, damages and attorneys fees against the petitioners, including Agiles President,
Imelda Lim Barcelona (Barcelona), for the death of Dennis "who fell from the vessel [on June 28, 2001] and who died in the high seas x x x," while the
vessel was cruising towards Sodegaura, Japan. Dennis body was never recovered.
5

Apolinario claimed that Dennis employment was governed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) and supplemented by the International Transport Workers Federation-Total Crew Cost (ITF-TCC) Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
Under the POEA-SEC, in case of death of a seafarer, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to Fifty Thousand
United States dollars (US$50,000,00). The ITF-TCC CBA, on the other hand, grants Sixty Thousand United States dollars (US$60,000.00) to the
immediate next of kin of the seafarer who lost his life. As the sole heir of Dennis, Apolinario prayed for the upgraded death benefits under the ITF-TCC
CBA.
6

The petitioners did not deny that the incident happened. Based on the "Masters Statement on S.A.R. Operation for Mr. Dennis Siador" (Masters
Statement), they contended that atabout 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of June 28, 2001, Able Seaman Gil Tamayo (AB Tamayo) saw Dennis jump
overboard. Tamayo immediately informed Third Officer Milan Crnogorac who sounded the man-overboard alarm seven short blasts, followed by one
long blast.
10

The Master of the vessel immediately ordered a life ring thrown into the water and put into motion the vessels man-overboard maneuver by turning the
vessel to a reciprocal course on her starboard side. Fitter Rolando Moreno (Moreno) was ordered to keep an eye on Dennis with the use of binoculars.
Allegedly, Moreno saw Dennis floating on his back, making no effort to swim towards the life ring. He then saw Dennis sink in the water and disappear
from sight despite the effort to rescue him by a team led by the Chief Officer. At 5:15 p.m., with the horizon darkening and the temperature remarkably
dropping, the search and rescue effort was called off.
Agile notified Apolinario of Dennis death through a letter dated July 30, 2001. With the assistance of a counsel and the ITF, Apolinario demanded
death and burial benefits, Dennis accrued salary and leave pay from the petitionerswho turned down the claim, particularly for death benefits under the
CBA. This refusal led to the filing of the complaint.
11

12

The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings

In his decision of January 12, 2004, Labor Arbiter (LA) Edgardo M. Madriaga (Madriaga) dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. LA
Madriaga found that Dennis saddled by heavy personal and psychological problems took his own life by jumping overboard.
13

On Apolinarios appeal, the National Labor Relations (NLRC) affirmed LA Madriagas ruling inits resolution dated January 24, 2007. It found no
sufficient justification to disturb the appealed decision. Apolinario moved for reconsideration, butthe NLRC denied the motion. The denial prompted
Apolinario to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
14

The CA Proceedings
Apolinario charged that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed LA Madriagas finding that Dennis took his own life and thus is not
entitled to death benefits. He decried the NLRCs "narrow-minded view of the incident;"it failed to consider that "days prior to his death, Dennis was
already afflicted with mental disability and could not be blamed for jumping overboard." Apolinario also assailed the NLRCs failure to apply the
jurisprudential principle that self-destruction is not presumed.
15

The CA Decision
The CA partially granted the petition. It reversed the labor tribunals dismissal of the complaint and awarded Apolinario Sixty Thousand United States
dollars (US$60,000.00) as death benefits, but denied his claim for damages. It sustained Apolinarios position that prior to his death, Dennis had been
suffering from mental instability, and therefore could not be considered to have intentionally taken his life. It cited the personal accounts of the Filipino
crew members on Dennis
unusual behavior days before the incident, which narrated that Dennis appeared to be very disturbed, anxious, depressed and restless. These personal
accounts are contained inthe "Statement on Mr. Dennis Siador" (Crewmembers Statement) that Master Capt. Dragan Tataj, the Master of the vessel,
prepared on the very day the incident happened; the Filipino crewmembers affirmed the statement through their signatures.
16

17

The CA opined that without the report of Dennis previous unusual behavior, it would have been safe to presume that he willfully took his life, but the
report on record cannot be disregarded.
18

The Petition
The petitioners ask the Court to set aside the CA ruling on the ground that the CA gravely erred in reversing the decision and the resolution of the LA
and the NLRC, respectively, as they committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case. They insist that there is "ample and convincing
evidence" showing that Dennis took his own life and that his death was not caused by his mental problems.

The evidence, they point out, is found in the Crewmembers Statement, where the crewmembers in contact with Dennis narrated that on the day of the
incident"he was just depressed, that he was not ill and that he just wanted to be alone." According to the petitioners, Dennis statement negates the
CAs finding that Dennis was mentally ill.
19

The Case for Apolinario

In his Comment, Apolinario prays for the dismissal of the petition. The CAs finding that Dennis was suffering from unsound mind days before the
incident is fully supported by the records of the case, particularly by the petitioners own evidence. Apolinario submits, too, that the CA ruling coincides
with legal principle in labor compensation cases that self-destruction is not presumed.
20

21

The Courts Ruling

We grant the petition.
Preliminary considerations
a. Certiorari under Rule 65 and appeal under Rule 45
In a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling rendered pursuant to Rule 65, the Court determines the legal correctness of the CA decision based on its
determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision that the CA reviewed, not on the basis of whether the
NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, in testing for legal correctness, the Court views the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it.
We draw attention at this point to the basic postulate that in the judicial review of labor tribunals rulings, their factual findings and the conclusions from
these findings are generally accorded respect by the courts because of the tribunals expertise in their field. There is also the reality that the ruling
brought under Rule 65 to the CA is already a final and executory ruling and can only be disturbed if it is void because the NLRC acted without
jurisdiction.
This postulate should be related to the intrinsic limitations of a certiorariproceeding: it is a limited remedy aimed solely at the correction of acts rendered
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; it does not, and cannot, address mere errors of judgment.
Of course, the rule that a certiorariproceeding normally precludes an inquiry into the correctness of the labor tribunals evaluation of the evidence on
which its decision is based, is not absolute; circumstances may exist that would allow the courts review of the tribunals factual findings and the
supporting evidence. One instance is when there is a showing that the NLRCs factual findings and conclusions were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record. Another instance is when the tribunal, such as the NLRC in this case, made factual findings that are not supported
by substantial evidence. By established jurisprudence, these kinds of rulings are tainted by grave abuse of discretion.
In the present case, the labor tribunals agree that Dennis committed suicide by jumping from the ship because of his heavy "personal and
psychological problems," as shown by the unusual behavior he exhibited days before the incident. The CA disagreed with the labor tribunals and ruled
that even with Dennis unusual behavior, the "willfulness to take his own life could not be presumed when he jumped overboard" and in fact "cast
serious doubt" on the petitioners claim of willfulness. It added that AB Tamayos statements that he saw Dennis jump overboard and thereafter make
no effort to reach the life ring "are not conclusive proof" of suicide.
22

As matters stand, the Court needs only to determine whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that
substantial evidence exists to support its conclusion that Dennis willfully took his own life.
b. Burden of proof in death benefits cases; burden of evidence
In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the NLRCs finding that Dennis committed suicide, we find it necessary to discuss the
burden of proof and the corresponding shift in the burden of evidence in death benefits casesunder the POEA-SEC. The relevant provision of the
POEA-SEC pertinently reads:
D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or
intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the employer can provethat such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to
the seafarer.
23

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. As a claimant for death benefits, Apolinario has the burden of proving that the seafarers death (1) is work-related; and (2) happened
during the term of the employment contract. Unarguably, Apolinario has discharged this burden of proof.
24

25

In the usual course, such proof would haverendered the petitioners automatically liable, except that the same provision of the POEA-SEC allows an
exemption from liability for death benefits if the employer can successfully prove that the seafarer's death was caused by an injury directly attributable
to his deliberate or willful act. That the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act is a matter of defense that the employer has to prove. In legal
parlance, the employer carries the burden of proof to establish its claim that it should not be held liable.

Whether it is the employer or the seafarer, the quantum of proof necessary to discharge their respective burdens is substantial evidence, i.e., such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise.
26

Since Apolinario has initially discharged his burden of proof, the petitioners, in order to avoid liability, must similarly establish their defense. If the
petitioners are able to establish their defense by substantial evidence, the burden nowrests on Apolinario to overcome the employers defense. In other
words, the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarers heirs.
While the rules of evidence are notcontrolling in the proceedings of the labor tribunals, a structured approach as described above is necessary if the
courts were to observe the limitations to their own power of review. Otherwise, as wehinted at in our preliminary consideration, resort to the courts will
amount to the review of the intrinsic merits of the NLRCs ruling,in effect a review on appeal that statutory law does not (and, hence, the courts cannot)
provide.
27

We shall proceed to determine whether the CA correctly determined if the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion based on the above
considerations.
Substantive considerations
a. There was substantial evidence to prove that Dennis death was directly attributable to his own action
In the present case, the LA, NLRC and the CA uniformly found that Dennis jumped from the ship. Additionally, the petitioners cited the following
personal circumstances that may have driven Dennis to do what he did: his dysfunctional family; the death of his mother after a lingering illness; the
bitter parting withhis father whom he had not seen for three (3) after he and his two (2) brothers were thrown out from their home in Talisay, Cebu; and
his disappointment with his sister whose medical education he supported, only to learn that she got married and did not even invite him to the
wedding.
28

29

30

Based on these facts and the legal presumption of sanity, we conclude that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it affirmed the LAs
dismissal of the complaint; we hold that the seafarers death was due to his willful act, asthe employer posited and proved.
Two analogous cases may be cited insupport of this conclusion. In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Leonila Surigao, the seafarer was found
dead inside the bathroom of his hospital room with a belt tied around his neck. In denying the claim for death benefits, the Court ruled that substantial
evidence suffices for the employer to show that the seafarer committed suicide even if there was no eyewitness to its commission and the possibility of
a contrary conclusion existed. In Crewlink, Inc. v. Teringtering, the seafarer, who had already previously jumped in the open sea, jumped again,
resulting in his death due to drowning. In holding that it was a caseof suicide, the Court ruled that the employer "was able to substantially prove that
[the seafarers] death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea."
31

32

With the companys discharge of the burden to prove its defense, the burden of evidence shifted to Apolinario to rebut the petitioners case. In other
words, Apolinario has to prove by substantial evidence that Dennis may be insane atthe time he took his life.
By holding that willfulness "could not be presumed" from Dennis act of jumping overboard, we observe that the CA cluttered its appreciation of the
evidence, contrary to the rules on the burden of proof and the burden of evidence that must be observed since the issue before the CA was not the
intrinsic correctness of the NLRCs ruling but the existence of grave abuse of discretion. As the LA and the NLRC found, the petitioners have
discharged by substantial evidence the burden ofproving willfulness through the cumulative consideration of the following circumstances: 1. Just a few
hours before the incident, Filipino crew members spoke with Dennis in his cabin and asked him if there was anything wrong with his state of health;
Dennis replied that everything was in order.
2. After Dennis jumped from the ship, he was seen calmly floating on his back and was not swimming towards the life ring or the lifeboat
while floating on the ocean.
3. Even the labor federation to which Dennis belonged, agreed that Dennis committed suicide.
Since the burden of evidence was shifted to Apolinario, the reversal of the NLRCs ruling could only be premised on Apolinarios successful proof by
substantial evidence of Dennis insanity or mental illness. The CA, however, instead of proceeding in this manner, imposed the burden of evidence on
the petitioners on the ground that "willfulness x x x could not be presumed when[Dennis] jumped overboard."
By doing so, the CA acted as if the petition before it was part of an appellate process rather than an independent civil action of certiorari that is limited
to questions of grave abuse of discretion. Properly, the question for the CA to answer was whether Apolinario established by substantial evidence his
claim of insanity.
b. Apolinario did not sufficiently meet the burden of evidence
i. inapplicability of Lapid and Naess
In an attempt to establish Dennis mental illness, Apolinario relied on portions of the Crewmembers Statementdescribing through the narration of
several crewmembers, Dennis demeanor and actuations a few days and moments beforethe incident. It reads:
According to all present, the behavior of Mr. Siador in the last few days was different from his previous one.

- On June 24th [,] Mr. Siador was togetherwith Mr. Canones at the swimming pool and he was telling him some strange things about the
future, Jesus, Angels, some visions/predictions that he have. He stated that he will write with his finger something on Mr. [Canones] back
and on the swimming pool bulkhead. His writing will be guided by Jesus. On June 25th , Mr. Siador wrote and draw some unclear
messages on two paper napkins and handed them to Mr. Canones. Again he stated his hand is guided by Jesus. These napkins are
available for closer look.
- He confided with Mr. Nobleza that there is a gap between him and his father. Yesterday[,] he predicted the future of Mr. Nobleza.
- Today[, at] around 1340 LT[,] Mr. Dela Cruz spotted from the main deck Mr. Siador on the swimming pool deck. Mr. Siador was half naked
and holding something in his hands. Mr. Dela Cruz called him but he just [retreated] out of sight. Together with Mr. Tamayo, Mr. Dela Cruz
went to swimming pool tolocate Mr. Siador but with no avail. He disappeared. After thatthey went forward to see the Bosun and report this
unusual behavior. Bosun decided to go to Engine room and find Mr. Moreno who is [a] good friend of Mr. Siador and try to [find] him and
eventually find out the reason for such unusual behaviour.
- Today[, at] around 0500 LT, Mr. Siador called on the phone Mr. Moreno and asked to join him in his cabin. Mr. Moreno went and Mr. Siador
said to him "Jesus win, Evil[lose], Bosun [lose]. Mr. Moreno replied OK and returned to his cabin.
- Mr. Alcantara noticed that Mr. Siador in last few days is taking less food than before and that he declined in his personal
appearance/hygiene. Furthermore[,] Mr. Siador started to take his food later than the rest of the crew, apparently avoiding other persons.
On [Mr. Alcantaras] enquiry about these changes, Mr. Siador said that he [had] one problem but he didnt specify anything.
- Mr. Ave, Mr. Moreno and Mr. Santos, today after lunch [at] around 1245 LT[,] spoke with Mr. Siador in his cabin and asked him if there is
anything wrong with his state of health but [Mr. Siadors] reply was everything is in order.
According to Apolinario, the statements describing Dennis actuations can only point to the conclusion that Dennis was already mentally disturbed a few
days before he plunged into the ocean and drowned. Since Dennis was no longerin his right mind, his act of jumping into the open sea cannot
beconsidered willful on his part.
The CA recognized merit in this argument, adding that Dennis assignment to the Gas Cargo Engineerto perform work outside of his regular duties
"obviously took a toll on his mental condition." The CA cited the cases of Lapid v. NLRC and Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC in upholding
the presumption of self-preservation over the employers claim of suicide.
33

34

35

We find the cited cases inapplicable to the present case.

In Naess, the Court affirmed the award of death benefits to a seafarer who "jumped or fell overboard" as he ran towards the deck after fatally stabbing
a co-worker. The Court reasoned out that the parties contract makes Naess "unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for [the seafarers] death
while in itsservice." Given this conclusion, the Court only "parenthetically" observed that the "events surrounding the death of [the seafarer] have not
been established with any degree of certitude." In short, the employer was liable without qualifications for death benefits because the employers
liability arises solely from the fact of the seafarers death.
36

The contract in Lapid is different from Naess. It provides, as in the present case, that if the death of the seafarer is due to his own willful act, then the
employer is not liable for death benefits.
The seafarer in thiscase was found dead while hanging in an abandoned warehouse. While the employer presented a report, stating that the cause of
death was asphyxia by hanging, the employer failed to investigate and, consequently, to present evidence on the circumstances surrounding the
seafarers death to indicate that it was a suicide rather than a crime.
The employer tried to bolster its theory of suicide by relying on the seafarers co-employees assertion that the deceased had an unidentified family
problem. But this claim ran counter tothe seafarers own letters to his family showing his excitement to go home. Under this evidentiary situation, the
Court ruled:
On these equivocal avowals, this Court is not prepared to rule that Ariel took his own life. The records are bereft of any substantial evidence showing
that [the] respondent employer successfully discharged its burden of proving that Ariel committed suicide, so as to evade its liability for death benefits
under POEA's Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seaman.
Unlike these cases, the circumstances surrounding Dennis were duly proven by the employer. That Dennis jumped, instead of fell, from the ship is a
uniform finding of the labor tribunals and the CA. The employer also showed by substantial evidence what prompted Dennis to act as he did, without
any contrary evidence submitted by Apolinario to dispute the employers evidence. ii. Shift in the burden of evidence; proof of insanity
Since the POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also that the seafarer
willfully caused his death,evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counterdefense. Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the seafarer(his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness
required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof to negate
voluntariness.
In this regard, selected circumstances prior to and surrounding his death might have provided substantial evidence of the existence of such insanity or
mental sickness. In Crewlink, we observed:
37

38

xxx Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to mental disorder. The issue of
insanity is a question of fact; for insanity isa condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in
the mind of another, the state or condition of a persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an
accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or who has
rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support the respondent's claim.
1wphi1

But his strange behavior cannot be the basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion because portions of the Crewmembers Statement itself
rendered the basis for a finding of insanity insufficient. To recall, a few hours beforethe accident, Filipino crew members approached Dennis to ask him
if anything was wrong with him and Dennis simply replied that everything was in order. No proof was ever adduced as well showing that whatever
personal problems Dennis had were enough to negate the voluntariness he showed in stepping overboard.
The Court observes that, more often than not, the question of willfulness in causing ones death isexplained away as arising from insanity because the
very nature ofthe defense that the employer is allowed to put up is mentally tough tograsp. Differences of opinion can arise and have arisen, as in this
case; hence, it becomes imperative for the courts to proceed on the basis ofa correct framework of review if stability and consistency in rulings can be
approximated.
In the present case, as the petitioners correctly argued, the CA did not expressly find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. What is
clearis that the CA simply disagreedwith the NLRCs conclusion of willfulness. Unless the CAs basis for its disagreement, however, amounted to grave
abuse of discretion, it is inlegal error in reversing the final and executory ruling of the NLRC on certiorari.
By erroneously proceeding in itsappreciation of the parties respective burdens of proof and burden of evidence, the CA erroneously, too, required the
petitioners toshow "conclusive proofs" of willfulness or establish it "with absolute certainty." As a result, the CA itself had to engage in speculation to
debunk the required willfulness that the petitioners already established. The CA held:
39

40

The Master's Statement that Able Seaman Tamayo saw Siador jump overboard and thereafter made no effort to reach the life ring after it was thrown to
him are not conclusive proofs that Siador took his own life.
His alleged jumping overboard from a height equivalent to a five storey building might have caused undue pressure for him to temporary lose his
composure which prevented him from seeking the life ring. A life ring may likewise be not that visible at a distance of 25 meters from Siador' s position
considering the waves at the sea. [Emphasis ours]
While the NLRC may have erred in declaring that there is "no doubt" that Dennis committed suicide by jumping overboard, this error does not amount
to grave abuse of discretion since conclusive proof is not necessary to establish willfulness.
41

Lastly, we must point out that this case is not one of doubt reasonably arising from the evidence. In that case, we would have resolved the case in favor
of the seafarer. From the prism of the initial Rule 65 petition that the CA faced, and eventually the Rule 45 petition now before this Court, we find that
the petitioners sufficiently established that Dennis willfully caused his death while Apolinario' s evidence fell short of substantial evidence to establish its
counterdefense of insanity. In other words, Apolinario's complaint must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his
evidence to support his claim of insanity. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

______________________________________________________

As in Dumadag, Gepanaga failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the

conflicting assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding
opinion. Consequently, the Court applies the following pronouncements laid down in
Vergara: The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that
when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel,
his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated
physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the companydesignated physicians assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding
on them. Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third
opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in
accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of
this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the companydesignated doctors certification is the final determination that must prevail.
VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR ERICKSON MARQUEZ vs. RAMON A.
GEPANAGA JR., G.R. No. 206285, February 04, 2015, J. Mendoza
_________________________________________
IS THE injury suffered by the seafarer the result of an accident thereby entitling him to higher disability benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA)?
This is the question posed in the April 23, 2014 case of Carlo F. Sunga vs Virjen Shipping Corp., Nissho Odyssey Ship Management Pte. Ltd., and Capt. Angel
Zambrano which was decided by the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 198640.
The seafarer in this case, a member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), entered into a contract of employment
as Fitter on board an ocean-going vessel for nine months. His employment was covered by a CBA executed between AMOSUP and his employers.
One time, while on board, the seafarer had to lift a 200-kilogram globe valve from the lower floor of the engine room to its installing position. As it was being
positioned, one of the oilers lost his grip of the valve, thus, causing its whole weight to crash on the seafarer. At that point, he felt his back snap. Since then, he
started to experience pain which led him to request for repatriation which was accordingly granted.
Reporting to the company-designated doctor, the seafarer underwent medical examination and was issued medical certificates: the first, recommending a Grade 8
disability based on the POEA-Standard Employment Contract (SEC), and the second, a disability grading of 25 percent in accordance with the CBA.
His employers offered the amount of US$16,795 as full settlement for his disability benefits based on the POEA-SEC but he rejected it and demanded that his
benefits be based on the disability grading of 25 percent based on the CBA. His employers claimed that he failed to present any proof that his disability was the
result of an accident and it was simply an illness or an anatomical defect.
The arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the seafarer, basing his disability benefits on the CBA. The Court of Appeals
ruled otherwise and applied only the POEA-SEC, noting that the back injury which the seafarer suffered was reasonably anticipated since carrying heavy objects
can cause injury and that lifting and carrying heavy objects are part of his duties as Fitter. There was no mishap, occurrence or fortuitous event when the injury
was incurred.
The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the arbiter and the NLRC and found that the seafarers injury was the result of the accidental slippage in the handling of
the 200-kilogram valve based on circumstantial evidence.
The high court observed that the seafarer did not incur the injury while solely performing his regular duties but an intervening event transpired, i.e., when the oiler
lost his grip of the valve, which brought upon the injury on the seafarer. Such an incident cannot be considered foreseeable nor can it be reasonably anticipated.

The duty of the seafarer here was not to routinely carry a 200-kilogram valve singlehandedly, but only to change the valve. An accident therefore pertains to an
unforeseen event in which no fault of negligence attaches to the defendant.
As defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, accident is an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of
events or that could not be reasonably anticipated.
As such, the seafarers disability benefits fall within the CBA coverage, which provides that: A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident
whilst in the employment of the Company shall be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this Agreement.

_______________________________________________

Can the receipt by a seafarer of an amount less than the sickness wages and reimbursement of medical expenses he is entitled to be valid? The
Honorable Supreme Court categorically answered this question in the negative in the case of Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. and Asia Maritime Co.,
Ltd. vs. Gil A. Flores (646 Phil. 570).
In the cited case, the seafarer was hired by his employers in April 1997 as Chief Officer to work onboard a foreign vessel.
Just two months from the time he boarded his ship, he experienced a shooting pain on his right foot. After being declared not fit to work by
the doctor who attended to him abroad, he was repatriated to the Philippines in June 1997.
His employers company-designated physician found him to be suffering from large disc herniation with nerve root compression and edema,
and thus, was recommended for confinement for two weeks for physical therapy and medications.
If unresolved, surgical decompression was suggested. Unfortunately, his employers refused to grant him continued medical assistance. He
then sued, demanding medical treatment and seeking reimbursement of his medical and hospital expenses as well as payment of sickness wages,
disability compensation, and damages.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint, noting among others, that he was declared fit to work not only by the Philippine General Hospital
which he chose, but also by the Employees Compensation Commission to which his condition was endorsed by the Arbiter.
The Receipt and Quitclaim he executed in favor of his employers wherein he considered the sum of US$1,010.00 as full payment of his salaries
and benefits was also held to be valid by the Arbiter.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the Arbiter, except for the issued of disability compensation, and found the seafarer to be entitled to
sickness wages equivalent to 120 days (US$4,800.00 less the US$1,010.00 he already received) and free medical and hospital treatment in
accordance with the Standard Employment Contract.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC decision with minor modification.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and ruled that the employers were remiss in giving continuous treatment for
the seafarer. The High Court clarified that the seafarer should be reimbursed the cost of the prescribed medicines he purchased and the surgical
expenses he incurred.
As for the Receipt and Quitclaim signed by the seafarer, the High Court explained that the elements of voluntariness and free will are lacking
and do not absolve the employers from the liability of paying him the sickness wages and other monetary claims.
Citing More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC (366 Phil 646 (1999), the Court said that the law does not consider as valid any agreement to
receive less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled.
It is never enough to assert that the parties have voluntarily entered into such a quitclaim. The following must likewise exist: (a) there was no
fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties, (b) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (c) that the contract is not contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

The Court recognized that the Receipt and Quitclaim show that the seafarer would be releasing his employers from all claims in an allencompassing manner, including the fact that he had not contracted or suffered any illness or injury in the course of his employment and that he was
discharged in good health, which stipulations placed the seafarer in a disadvantageous position vis--vis his employers.
__________________________________________

Three separate and distinct benefits of a medically repatriated seafarer.

The Filipino seafarer is entitled to medical treatment at cost to the employer apart from disability benefits and
sickness allowance.

Away from his family and working on board vessels sailing non-stop for weeks or months the worlds oceans, the Filpino seafarer is physically, mentally
and emotionally stressed. Constantly exposed to fluctuating temperatures caused by variant weather changes of extreme hot and cold as the ships
cross ocean boundaries, not to mention harsh weather conditions, the risks of his getting killed, injured or ill are high.

The employer is liable for three separate and distinct kinds of liabilities under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) for any work-related illness or injury that the seafarer may have suffered during the term of the contract. In other
words, employers must: (1) provide medical treatment to the seafarer at their cost; (b) pay the seafarer sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage and (2) compensate the seafarer for his permanent total or partial disability as finally determined by the company-designated physician.

Section 20-B (2), paragraph 2, of the POEA-SEC entitles the seafarer medical treatment that is aimed at the speedy recovery of the seafarer and the
restoration of his previous healthy working condition. The contract imposes on the employer the liability to provide, at its cost, for the medical treatment
of the repatriated seafarer for the illness or injury that he suffered on board the vessel until the seafarer is declared fit to work or the degree of his
disability is finally determined by the company-designated physician. This liability for medical expenses is conditioned upon the seafarer's compliance
with his own obligation to report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from his arrival in the country for diagnosis and treatment.

Since the seafarer is repatriated to the country to undergo treatment, his inability to perform his sea duties would normally result in depriving him of
compensation income. To address this contingency, Section 20-B (3), paragraph 1, of the POEA-SEC imposes on the employer the obligation to
provide the seafarer with sickness allowance that is equivalent to his basic wage until the seafarer is declared fit to work or the degree of his
permanent disability is determined by the company-designated physician. The period for the declaration should be made within the period of 120 days
or 240 days, as the case may be.

Once a finding of permanent (total or partial) disability is made either within the 120-day period or the 240-day period, Section 20-B (6) of the POEASEC requires the employer to pay the seafarer disability benefits for his permanent total or partial disability caused by the work-related illness or injury.
In practical terms, a finding of permanent disability means a permanent reduction of the earning power of a seafarer to perform future sea or on board
duties; permanent disability benefits look to the future as a means to alleviate the seafarer's financial condition based on the level of injury or illness he
incurred or contracted.

The Supreme Court emphasized the separate treatment of, and the distinct considerations in, these three kinds of liabilities in the case of Javier v.
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.. (G.R. No. 2014101 July 2, 2014). The evident intent of the POEA-SEC is to treat these liabilities of the
employer separately and distinctly from one another by treating the different items of liability under separate paragraphs. These individual paragraphs,
in turn, show the bases of each liability that are unique from the others.

Significantly, too, while Section 20 of the POEA-SEC did not expressly state that the employer's liabilities are cumulative in nature so as to hold the
employer liable for the sickness allowance, medical expenses and disability benefits it does not also state that the compensation and benefits are
alternative or that the grant of one bars the grant of the others.

It is clear from the above that while a seafarer is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits, this does not rule out his right to the other
benefits provided for under the POEA-SEC such as reimbursement for medical expenses, sickness allowance and benefit for partial disability caused
by a work-related injury.

This formulation is in keeping with the POEA's mandate under Executive Order No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of
Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas. As a labor
contract, the POEA-SEC is imbued with public interest. Accordingly, its provisions must be construed fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the
seafarer in the pursuit of his employment on board ocean-going vessels. After all, the constitutional policy accords and guarantees full protection to
labor, both local and overseas.
_________________________________________________

In most seafarer cases for disability or death benefits claims, one of the
arguments often raised by the companies or the insurance correspondents is that
they are not liable to pay benefits by pointing to the medical reports of the companydesignated physician that the seafarers illness is not work-connected, that he is fit to
work or that the compensation is limited to a lower amount based on a low disability
grading. They point out that the POEA mandated that the seafarers disability can
only be assessed by the company-designated physician considering that the latter had
the time and the opportunity to constantly monitor the health and physical condition of
the seafarer.
This issue was discussed by the Supreme Court in the recent 2015 case ofPhilippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. and Northern
Marine Management Vs. Joselito A. Cristino (G.R. No. 188638. December 9, 2015) wherein the Court said that the medical opinion of the
seafarers personal specialist doctor deserves greater evidentiary weight as the company offered no other convincing proof to substantiate
their arguments. The company doctor and the seafarers personal doctor differed on their opinion on the work-relatedness of the seafarers
illness, melanocytes or malignant melanoma. The Court said that the seafarers own oncologist was actively involved in his treatment and
even performed surgical procedure on him as opposed to the more basic medical management provided by the companys designated
physician which were initially limited to the giving of oral medication and wound dressing.

In various decisions, the Supreme Court clearly pointed out that the findings and
the disability grading of a company-designated physician could be set aside by the
Court in its determination of disability compensation (Philippine Transmarine Carriers,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47). The Court noted that their findings cannot be taken as
gospel truth due to the proliferation of obviously biased company doctors whose loyalty
rests completely upon the company they serve and these are palpably self-serving and
biased in favor of petitioners and certainly could not be considered
independent(Wallem vs.NLRC 318 SCRA 623, United Philippine Lines, Inc. and/or
Holland America Line, Inc., vs. Francisco D. Beseril, 487 SCRA 249). The Court also
considered the glaring apparent inconsistency in the company doctor's medical report
between the classification of claimant's disability and the fact stated that said claimant
had been unable to work for long period of time, which condition makes his disability
permanent and total (Crystal Shipping, Inc. vs. Natividad, 473 SCRA 559.)
In Seagull Maritime Corp. vs. Jaycee Dee et al (520 SCRA 109) the highest
tribunal explained that courts are called upon to be vigilant in their time-honored duty to
protect labor, especially in cases of disability or ailment. When applied to Filipino
seamen, the perilous nature of their work is considered in determining the proper
benefits to be awarded. These benefits, at the very least, should approximate the risks
they brave on board the vessel every single day. Accordingly, if serious doubt exists
on the company-designated physician's declaration of the nature of a seafarer's injury
and its corresponding impediment grade, resort to prognosis of other competent
medical professionals should be made. In doing so, a seaman should be given the
opportunity to assert his claim after proving the nature of his injury. These evidences will

in turn be used to determine the benefits rightfully accruing to him. Nowhere in that
case (German Marine Agencies, Inc. did we hold that the company-designated
physician's assessment of the nature and extent of a seaman's disability is final and
conclusive on the employer company and the seafarer-claimant. While it is the
company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered a
permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to
seek a second opinion.
In HFS Philippines vs. Pilar (585 SCRA 315), the findings of the independent
physicians were given more credence than those of the company-designated
physicians, the Supreme Court held that the bottomline is this: the certification of the
company-designated physician would defeat respondent's claim while the opinion of the
independent physicians would uphold such claim. In such a situation, we adopt the
findings favorable to respondent. The law looks tenderly on the laborer. Where the
evidence may be reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways, one prejudicial and the
other favorable to him, the balance must be tilted in his favor consistent with the
principle of social justice.
The POEA contract does not preclude the seafarer from getting a second opinion
as to his condition for purposes of claiming disability benefits. The Supreme Court
reiterated in the case of Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. vs. Mesina (697 SCRA 601)
that "[w]hile it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman
suffers a permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his
right to seek a second opinion," hence, the Contract "recognizes the prerogative of the
seafarer to request a second opinion and, for this purpose, to consult a physician of his
choice (NYK-Fil Ship Management vs. Talavera, 571 SCRA 183; Abante vs. KJGS
Fleet Management Manila, et al, 607 SCRA 734). The Court stressed that the company
physician's assessment does not evince irrefutable and conclusive weight in assessing
the compensability of an illness as the seafarer has the right to seek a second opinion
from his preferred physician. (Maunlad Transport, Inc. vs. Manigo Jr., G.R. No. 161416,
June 13, 2008, citing Crystal Shipping, Inc. vs. Natividad, Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc. vs.NLRC, 525 SCRA 42, Cadornigara vs. NLRC, 538 SCRA 363.)
In the case of Magsaysay vs. Laurel (694 SCRA 225) the disability provisions of the POEA-SEC recognize the right of a seafarer to
seek a second medical opinion and the prerogative to consult a physician of his choice. Therefore, the provision should not be construed that
it is only the company-designated physician who could assess the condition and declare the disability of seafarers. The provision does not
serve as a limitation but rather a guarantee of protection to overseas workers.

This principle is in line with the Supreme Court rulings that strict rules of
evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation considering the probability and
not the ultimate degree of certainty is the ultimate test of proof in compensation
proceedings (Barcenas vs. WCC 158 SCRA 314; NFD International Manning Agents,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486; Heirs of the late R/O Reynaldo Aniban vs. NLRC, 282
SCRA 377).
______________________________________________________________

Seafarers incapacity to work: Defocusing the injury/illness

IS Grade 1 disability assessment always necessary for a seafarer to be considered totally and permanently disabled?
If a seafarer suffers a work-related illness/ injury and is declared unfit to work and assessed with Grade 1 disability, the seafarer is evidently suffering from a total
and permanent disability, thus, entitled to corresponding benefits under the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA Standard Terms and Conditions) or applicable collective bargaining agreement.
In case like the one above, the rules regarding the benefits of the seafarer are clear cut and unquestionable. However, there are number of cases when the
disabled seafarer is assessed with disability lower than Grade 1, or temporary partial disability i.e., Grade 2 to14 under Section 32 of POEA Standard Terms and
Conditions.
Notwithstanding the fact that the seafarer remains unfit to perform similar work, the principal and manning agency deny to grant the seafarer with total and
permanent disability benefits on the defense that the benefits must be those that corresponds to the given disability grading. What happened, then, to the seafarer
who cannot anymore be gainfully employed in the same way that he was accustomed before the occurrence of his disability?
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court had emphasized that in disability compensation, what is compensated is the incapacity to work, not the injury or illness.
In one case, the seafarer was diagnosed with lumbar spine illness and assessed by the company-designated physician with disability Grade 8, but remains unfit to
work as a seafarer (pump man). The Supreme Court ruled that, under the legal contemplation, the seafarer is totally and permanently disabled stressing that if the
injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a
period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently
disabled (Krestel Shipping Co., Inc., et al. vs. Munar, G.R. No. 198501; January 30, 2013).
The same principle was applied in the case of Alpha Ship Management Corporation, et al. vs. Calo (G.R. No. 192034, January 13, 2014), under which the
Supreme Court deemed the seafarer totally and permanently disabled due to the fact that he was under medical treatment and unable to engage in gainful
employment for more than 240 days.
In sum, regardless of the disability grading assessment, so long as the seafarers injury or illness prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than
120 or 240 days, the seafarer becomes entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. As the Supreme Court consistently emphasized, disability should be
analyzed more on the loss or impairment of the earning capacity, and not much on its medical significance.

___________________________________________________________
G.R. No. 198640

April 23, 2014

CARLO F. SUNGA, Petitioner,

vs.
VIRJEN SHIPPING CORPORATION, NISSHO ODYSSEY SHIP MANAGEMENT PTE. LTD., and/or CAPT. ANGEL ZAMBRANO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision dated February 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 113661. The appealed decision reversed and set aside the Decision dated December 21, 2009 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Second Division, finding Carlo F. Sunga (Sunga) not entitled to disability benefits.
1

The Antecedent Facts

On July 14 2006, Virjen Shipping Corporation (Virjen), acting in behalf of its foreign principal, Nissho Odyssey Ship Management Pte. Ltd., entered into
a contract of employment with Sunga. Under the contract, Sunga would be working as a fitter on board the ocean-going vessel MT Sunway for nine (9)
months on a monthly salary of US$ 566.00.
2

As a registered member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamens union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), Sungas employment was covered by
the IBF JUS/AMOSUP-IMMAJ Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) executed between Virjen and Nissho Odyssey, All Japan Seamens Union and
AMOSUP.
3

Prior to Sungas deployment, or before August 11, 2006, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination that found him fit for work. But,
sometime in 2007, while already on board the MT Sunway vessel, Sunga started to experience an on-and-off right flank pain, making it difficult for him
to work. The pain became more intense as the days progressed, thereby prompting him to request for repatriation. The request was granted on April
25, 2007.
4

On April 27, 2007, Sunga reported to Virjens company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), for medical examination. The doctor
instructed him to undergo Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of his lumbosacral spine. The MRIs results merited the medical advice that Sunga
undergo physical therapy for a period of four (4) months under the supervision of Dr. Cruz. Despite the therapy, Sunga still experienced episodes of
moderate to severe pain on his right lower extremity and back. He also manifested limited trunk mobility and was unable to undertake lifting activities.

On September 7, 2007, Dr. Cruz issued a medical certificate recommending a Grade 8 disability (Moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power
of the trunk) based on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. Dr. Cruz also issued
another medical certificate recommending a disability grading of 25% (Back pains with considerable reduction of mobility) in accordance with the
parties CBA.
6

On the strength of these two certificates, Virjen immediately offered Sunga the amount of US$ 16,795.00, in accordance with the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers, as full settlement for the latters disability benefits. However, Sunga rejected the offer; he demanded instead that
his disability benefits be based on the disability grading of 25%, pursuant to the provisions of the parties CBA.
7

Virjen denied Sungas demand. Hence, on October 23, 2007, Sunga filed a complaint before the NLRC against Virjen for disability benefits as stated in
the parties CBA (not under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers) in the amount of US$ 110,000.00. The complaint likewise prayed
for attorneys fees, plus moral and exemplary damages.
8

In his position paper, Sunga claimed that the nature of his work involved manual repairs, which required the lifting and carrying of heavy equipment and
materials. On January 5, 2007, while MT Sunway was docked at Singapore, he alleged that he, together with two other oilers, was assigned to change
MT Sunways globe valves. Aside from lifting the 200-kilogram globe valve from the lower floor of the engine room to its installing position, Sunga also
has to bear its entire weight while it was being positioned by the other oilers. Unfortunately, one of the oilers lost his grip, causing the whole weight of
the globe valve to crash on Sunga. At that instant, he felt his back snap, causing intense pain at his lower back which persisted for several days.
Unable to even stand up just to go to the bathroom, Sunga was forced to request for repatriation.
9

Virjen replied that it had no liability to pay Sunga any disability benefits under the CBA. Virjen claimed that the CBA requires that for permanent
disability to be compensable, the disability should be the result of an accident incurred during the course of the seafarers employment. Virjen argued
that Sunga failed to present any proof that his disability was indeed the result of an accident. It was simply an illness or an anatomical defect. He had
also failed to mention any details regarding the unfortunate event in his request for repatriation.
10

Ruling of the Labor Tribunals

On May 30, 2008, the Labor Arbiter ruled in Sungas favour. It ordered Virjen to pay Sunga his disability compensation benefits in the amount of US$
110,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of the parties CBA. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Sungas injury is not merely an anatomical defect but a bodily
harm brought upon by the performance of his duties and functions as fitter of the vessel. The result of the MRI revealing that Sunga had herniated disc
is already a manifestation that the injury resulted from an accident, commonly incurred through falling or by lifting heavy objects. The pertinent portion
of the Labor Arbiters decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to jointly and severally liable:
1) To pay complaint the amount of US$ 110,000.00, or its Philippine peso equivalent prevailing at the exchange rate at the time of payment,
representing his disability benefits under the IBF-JUS-IMMF-AMOSUP Collective Bargaining Agreement;
2) To pay complainant an amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total judgment award, as and for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.

11

Virjen filed its appeal with the NLRC. In a Decision dated December 21, 2009, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC however
reduced the awards of disability benefits and attorneys fees to US$ 105,000.00 and US$ 10,500.00, respectively. Virjen filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of February 26, 2010.
12

13

Ruling of the CA
Virjen filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. On February 25, 2009, the CA granted the
petition. The CA reasoned that accident is an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence, something that does not occur in the usual course of
events or could not be reasonably anticipated. According to the appellate court, the injury was not accidental; it is common knowledge that carrying
heavy objects can cause injury and that lifting and carrying heavy objects are part of his duties as fitter. Thus, a back injury is reasonably anticipated. It
cannot serve as basis, therefore, for Sunga to be entitled to disability benefits. There was no mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event when the injury
was incurred. Hence, the CA reversed the findings of the labor tribunals and applied the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers disability benefits
(which only requires that the seafarers disability must be caused by an injury or illness that is work-related), instead of enforcing the parties CBA.
Sungas motion for reconsideration having been denied, it now come before us for a final review.
The Issues
Sunga raises the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE CA ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION DESPITE THE WELL-ESTABLISHED RULE THAT FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF LABOR OFFICIALS ARE ACCORDED NOT ONLY RESPECT BUT EVEN FINALITY.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT SUNGAS INJURY WAS NOT A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT.
Sunga primarily argues that factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction
are generally accorded not only respect but even finality and bind even the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence; that there was no
reason for the CA to reverse the findings of the labor tribunals. More importantly, granting that the CA indeed has the power to annul judgments handed
by the labor courts, the CA erred in finding that Sunga is not eligible for disability benefits under the parties CBA since he had incurred injury, by
accident, in the performance of his duties.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
The assailed CA decision before us is challenged through a Rule 45 petition, a remedy limited to pure questions of law. In this mode of review, we
have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC
decision before it, not necessarily on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct.
14

15

Grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to or equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. There is grave abuse of discretion when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
16

Applying the doctrine in the present case, we fail to see any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC which would authorize the appellate
court to substitute its own ruling over that of the NLRC. There was ample evidence to support the findings of the NLRC. The CA, in a Rule 65 petition,
is limited to a simple review of whether there existed grave abuse of discretion; the CA should not concern itself with the determination of whether the
NLRC, after evaluation of the evidence presented before it, had correctly ruled on the merits of the case. The question of intrinsic merits is an issue
best left to the labor tribunals which are deemed to have mastery over the subject matter.
17

As found by both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, Sungas injury was the result of the accidental slippage in the handling of the 200-kilogram globe
valve which triggered Sungas back pain; the weight of the globe valve, coupled with the abruptness of the fall, explain why the injury was so severe
as to render Sunga immobile. While indeed Sunga had not explained in the request for repatriation the proximate cause of the injury, there was
enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate the claim. We have held that circumstantial evidence is founded on experience, observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.
18

19

20

At any rate, this issue had already been resolved in the proceedings before the labor tribunals. Virjen failed to deny the facts as narrated by Sunga in
his pleadings. The CA, too, was conclusive in its ruling regarding the incident and merely discussed what matters shall constitute as an accident.
21

22

Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, particularly where it is in absolute agreement with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, are accorded not
only respect but even finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the basic issue left
for us to resolve is the determination of whether the CA found grave abuse of discretion whose correction called for the consideration of the incident at
the MT Sunway vessel as an accident.
23

As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, "accident," is "[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual
course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated, x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence,
neglect or misconduct." Similarly, the Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word "accident" as "[t]hat which happens by chance or fortuitously, without
intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."
24

25

In deciding this case, we are not unaware of the doctrine discussed in the case of NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. v. Illescas, where the
employee, Esmeraldo Illescas (Illescas), also a seafarer, was ordered to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to
the deck to refit the caps. While carrying a heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, Illescas felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain that radiated down to
the left side of his hips. He immediately informed the ship captain about his condition, and was advised to take pain relievers. As the pain was initially
tolerable, he continued with his work. After a few days, the pain became severe, and Illescas suffered difficulty in walking.
26

Illescas also claimed for the more favorable disability benefits stated in the CBA, as opposed to the benefits being offered by the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers. But the Court denied his claim, ruling that the snap on the back of Illescas was not an accident but an injury
sustained from carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The Court reasoned out that the injury cannot be
said to be the result of an accident, i.e., an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the performance of a
duty. Although Illescas may not have expected the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury. Hence, the
injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term "accident."
27

While on its face, the facts seemed similar, they are in fact different, thus leading us to decide the present case differently. In Illescas, no unusual,
fortuitous, unexpected or unforeseen event took place or was reported. Illescas merely went about his normal duties; he transported fire hydrant caps
from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps. The sudden snap Illescas felt on his back while carrying the fire hydrant
caps thus could not, by itself, qualify as an accident.
28

In the present case, Sunga did not incur the injury while solely performing his regular duties; an intervening event transpired which brought upon the
injury. To repeat, the two other oilers who were supposed to help carry the weight of the 200-kilogram globe valve lost their grasp of the globe valve. As

a result, Sungas back snapped when the entire weight of the item fell upon him. The sheer weight of the item is designed not to be carried by just one
person, but as was observed, meant to be undertaken by several men and expectedly greatly overwhelmed the physical limits of an average person.
Notably, this incident cannot be considered as foreseeable, nor can it be reasonably anticipated. Sungas duty as a fitter involved changing the valve,
not to routinely carry a 200-kilogram globe valve singlehandedly. The loss of his fellow workers group was also unforeseen in so far as Sunga was
concerned.
1wphi1

In Jarco Marketing Corporation, et al., v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that an accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly
or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens."
29

Since Sunga encountered an accident on board MT Sunway, the CA thus grossly misappreciated and misread the ruling of the NLRC, leading the
appellate court to find a grave abuse of discretion sufficient for a reversal of the NLRC ruling. In other words, as the NLRC found, Sunga's disability
benefits should fall within the coverage of the parties' CBA, which provides:
Article 28: Disability
28.1 A seafarer who sutlers permanent disabilitv as a result of an accident whilst in the employment of the Company regardless of fault, including
accidents occurring while traveling to or from the ship, and whose ability to work as a seafarer is reduced as a result thereof, but excluding permanent
disability due to willful acts, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this Agreement. (emphasis ours)
30

xxxx
In sum, we find that the NLRC did not abuse its discretion. It arrived at a proper decision after fully appreciated of the parties' arguments and carefully
considering the presented evidence. Thus, there was no basis for the CA' s conclusion that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 25, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 113661, and its Resolution
dated September 14, 2011 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the December 21, 2009 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________________________
G.R. No. 211454, February 11, 2015

MAUNLAD TRANS., INC./CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC., AND MR. AMADO L. CASTRO, JR., Petitioners, v. RODOLFO M. CAMORAL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On petition for review1 is the Decision2 dated November 13, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122396 affirming the Decision dated July 27, 2011 and
Resolution dated October 14, 2011 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR-OFW-02-01759-10. The NLRC sustained the Decision dated
November 10, 2010 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) awarding to Rodolfo M. Camoral (Camoral) total disability benefits and attorneys fees.
Antecedent Facts
For 18 years since 1991, Camoral was continuously deployed overseas by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., a foreign shipping company, through its local agent, Maunlad
Trans., Inc. (petitioners). In April 2009, they took him on board M/S Carnival Sensation as ice carver for a period of eight months, the company doctors having declared
him Fit for Sea Duty (Without Restriction) after the requisite physical evaluations. As ice carver, Camorals job required lifting and carrying heavy blocks of ice and
using heavy equipment and tools, working for hours inside the freezer in sub-zero temperature. One day in September 2009 while at work, he suddenly felt
excruciating pain in his neck. The pain quickly radiated to his shoulder, chest and hands. It became so intense that he dropped to the floor. Pain relievers could not
relieve the pain, and the ships doctor advised the Chief Chef that Camoral was unfit for further duty on board. On advice of the company doctor in Florida, United
States of America, Dr. James E. Carter (Dr. Carter), a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan was performed on Camorals cervical spine on September 25, 2009, revealing
the following:3
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IMPRESSION:
1. At C5-6, there is a moderately large, broad-based posterior disc herniation of the protrusion type with resultant obliteration of the subarachnoid space ventrally and
severe right greater than left bilateral neural foraminal stenosis. There is probable compression of the exiting right greater than left C6 nerves bilaterally.
2. At C4-5, there is a small-to-moderate sized, diffuse, posterior broad-based disc herniation of the protrusion type. There is resultant effacement of the subarachnoid
space ventrally and a mild amount of right-sided neural foraminal stenosis.
3. There is slight reversal of the normal lordotic curvature of cervical spine consistent with muscle spasm. 4

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In his medical report dated September 28, 2009, Dr. Carter found Camoral with Cervical Disc Herniation and Radiculopathy and declared him unfit for duty. Camoral
was repatriated on October 4, 2009, and on arrival in Manila he was referred to company doctors at the Marine Medical Services of the Metropolitan Medical Center. On
October 26, 2009, he underwent a surgical procedure known as Anterior C5 Discectomy Fusion with Pyramidal Cage and Mastergraft Putting, Plating. In the Operation
Sheet, his pre-operative and post-operative diagnosis showed Cervical Spondylotic Radiculopathy secondary to C4-C5, C5-C6 Disc Protrusion, while the portion on
Description of Organs stated that he had a compressed end at C4-5 to C5-6 level and thickened posterior ligaments. He underwent rigorous physical therapy, but
after more than five months his condition barely improved, and the pain in his neck, chest and shoulder persisted. He then consulted Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang, Jr. (Dr.
Catapang), a renowned Orthopaedic and Traumatology Surgeon, who after a thorough clinical and physical examination of Camoral issued a report on February 22,
2010.5The report stated that:
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Present physical examination revealed neck pain more on flexion; presence of a post operative scar anterior neck; neck movement is limited, sudden and strenuous
activities may aggravate the condition. Mr. Camoral continues to complain and suffer from neck pain despite continuous therapy. The pain is made worse by neck
rotation. He has lost his pre-injury capacity and is UNFIT to work back at his previous occupation as a seafarer.
cralawre d

x x x If a long term and more permanent result are [sic] desired however, he should refrain from activities producing torsional stress on the neck and those that require
repetitive bending and lifting, things Mr. Camoral is expected to do as a Seafarer.
Some restriction must be placed on Mr. Camorals work activities. This is in order to prevent the impending late sequelae of his current condition. He presently does not
have the physical capacity to return to the type of work he was performing at the time of his injury. He is therefore UNFIT in any capacity for further sea duties. 6
Camoral failed to get further financial assistance from the petitioners for his subsequent treatment and medications, as well as total disability benefits. He was instead
offered $10,075.00 corresponding to Grade 10 disability the company gave him. With no income for more than 120 days and having been declared unfit to return to his
previous job due to loss of his pre-injury capacity, he sued the petitioners before the LA for total disability benefits of US$60,000.00, citing Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on board Ocean-going Vessels (POEA SEC for brevity). 7
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In their answer, the petitioners argued that Camoral was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits since he was not assessed by the company doctors with
a Grade 1 disability; that Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim), one of the company doctors, noted in his medical report dated December 11, 2009 that after surgery and
rehabilitation Camoral was recovering well, and that in his follow-up report dated January 8, 2010, X-Ray examination showed good alignment and fusion, and he
advised Camoral to continue medications and rehabilitation; that on January 29, 2010, Dr. Lim noted that Camorals muscle strength in both upper extremities were
graded 5/5, indicating improvement, and on March 5, 2010, Dr. Lim noted that he had reached maximum medical cure; that Dr. Ibet Marie Y. Sih (Dr. Sih), a company
neuro and spine surgeon, assessed him with Grade 10 disability with moderate stiffness or one-third limitation of motion of the neck, not Grade 1 disability; that
petitioners paid all of his sickness allowance and medical expenses. 8
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Rulings of the LA and the NLRC

On November 10, 2010, the LA rendered judgment, the pertinent portion of which reads:

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Section 20 B of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Seafarers On-Board Ocean Going Vessels, provides:
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical
and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires
medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has
been established by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
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xxxx
Under the Section 20B of Standard Contract, an injury or illness to be compensate [sic] must be work-related and has occurred during the effectivity of the contract.
These conditions are met in the instant case x x x.

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xxxx
This Office rules in favor of the complainant [finding him] entitled to total disability. This finds support in the [string] of Supreme Court decisions that the inability of the
seafarer to return to the same kind of work he was trained to render him permanently disabled.
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xxxx
There is no disagreement between the findings of the company- designated physician and complainants private doctor because both declared that complainant is not fit
to go back to work. x x x.
Considering that complainants position is (sic) an Ice Carver, it is required that he should have full movement of his neck in the performance of his function and the
pain and the limitation of his neck movement effectively prevents him from engaging in the same kind of work he was trained for.
The Grade 10 disability made by the company physician is not binding to this Office as it is clear that complainant can no longer return to work.

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xxxx
Complainants claim for damages cannot be granted for lack of basis. But as complainant availed of the services of a lawyer, he is entitled to an award of attorneys
fees.
WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered ordering Respondents jointly and solidarily to pay complainant US$60,000.00 plus ten (10%) percent thereof as and by
way of attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.9
The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, which however denied the same in its Decision dated July 27, 2011, the pertinent portion of which reads:

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Indeed, it is not disputed that the conditions for compensability of an incapacity resulting from work-connected illness/injury during the term of the contract, have been
met in this case.
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xxxx
Perusal of the respondents submitted medical report and disability assessment fails to show how the partial permanent disability assessment was arrived at, as it
simply states that complainant is suffering from impediment Grade 10 disability, without any evidence that indeed only 1/3 limitation of motion of the neck or moderate
stiffness had affected the complainant.

On the other hand, as shown by the certification issued by Dr. Catapang on February 22, 2010 complainants disability is permanent and prevents him from further sea
duties. The medical opinion also categorically declares that complainant continues to suffer from neck pain despite continuous therapy and that he should refrain
from activities producing torsional stress on the neck and those that require repetitive bending and lifting; things that Mr. Camoral is expected to do as a Seafarer.
xxxx
x x x The test to determine its gravity is the impairment or loss of ones capacity to earn and not its mere significance. Permanent total disability means disablement of
the employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform or any kind of work which a person of
his mentality and attainment can do.
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xxxx
Accordingly, We find the medical opinion of complainants own doctor to be more credible, and sustain the assessment as to complainants permanent incapacity that
has rendered him unfit to work as seafarer, thus entitling him to [sic] awarded disability compensation.
We sustain the award of attorneys fees of ten (10%) percent as the complainant had sought legal representation pursuing his valid contractual claims.
WHEREFORE, respondents appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 10, 2010 stands AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated October 14, 2011 of the NLRC.
Ruling of the CA
On petition for certiorari to the CA, citing Section 20B(6) of the POEA SEC, the petitioners insisted that regardless of whether the disability is total or partial, any
compensation should be based on the grading provided in the POEA SEC, which in this case is Grade 10 disability as assessed by the company doctors. 11
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But the appellate court upheld the NLRC, ruling that firstly, Section 20 of POEA SEC, which is deemed written into the seafarers contract, provides for the minimum
requirements acceptable to the government before it approves the deployment of Filipino seafarers on foreign ocean-going vessels, and that secondly, the two elements
required for an injury or illness to be compensable concurred in the case: a) the injury or illness is work related, and b) and it occurred during the term of the seafarers
contract.12 The pertinent portion of Section 20 reads:
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SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.

(B) COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
xxxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his
return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the
seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctors
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.
5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit
for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite
earnest efforts.
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of
benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted. 13
The CA cited Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc./Maersk Services Ltd. v. Mesina 14 on what constitutes permanent as well as total disability, thus:
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Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Total
disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled,
or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total disability is
considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.15 (Italics ours)
In concluding that Camorals disability is permanent and total, the CA noted that he became unfit to continue the same kind of work he was hired for by the
[p]etitioners for more than 120 days as also established by the findings and recommendations made by the company doctors and by Dr. Catapang, the private
physician whom private respondent hired.16 The CA also held that while under Section 32 of the POEA SEC, only injuries or disabilities classified as Grade 1 may be
considered as total and permanent, if, however, even with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, the seafarer is incapacitated to perform his
usual sea duties for more than 120 days or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, under legal contemplation he is totally and permanently
disabled. The CA further said that an impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of
the [POEA SEC] but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II,
Book IV of the Labor Code.17
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In contrast, the CA cited Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code expressly granting to Camoral total permanent disability:

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Art. 192 (c). The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules[.]
xxxx
The CA also invoked Section 2(b), Rule VII of the AREC which provides, to wit:

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Sec. 2. Disability
xxxx
b. A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding
120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
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The CA also concurred in the award of attorneys fees to Camoral on the basis of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, since he was compelled to hire a lawyer due to the
petitioners unreasonable refusal to pay his benefits.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
In the instant petition, insisting that the factual conclusion of the appellate court as to Camorals disability was based on speculation and manifestly mistaken
inferences, the petitioners point out that Camoral was assessed with a Grade 10 disability within the 240-day period allowed to the employer by law; that Camoral was
seen by his private doctor only on one single consultation, whereas the company-designated doctors treated him over an appreciable length of time; and the award of
attorneys fees was erroneous since they complied with all their obligations under the POEA SEC, and the denial of Camorals claim for total disability benefits was based
on just, legal, and valid grounds.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
The petitioners admit in their petition that on the 150th day of Camorals treatment, March 5, 2010, his maximum medical cure or recovery was reached, at which time
he was finally assessed with a Grade 10 disability, with moderate stiffness, or one-third limitation of motion of the neck. Thereafter, the petitioners refused further
medical assistance and offered him $10,075.00 as partial permanent disability benefit, which Camoral however declined, insisting that his disability is total and
permanent.18
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Camorals treatment extended beyond 120 days and although the maximum cure was attained, both the company doctor and Camorals private doctor agreed that in
his condition he could no longer return to his job as ice carver. Significantly, the companys neuro-spine surgeon, Dr. Sih, in her letter-bulletin 19 particularly noted that
considering the patients nature of work (entailing heavy weight lifting), he is assessed to be disabled/not fit to go back to work. Camorals own physician, Dr.
Catapang, found that he continued to complain and suffer from neck pain despite continuous therapy, and the pain is made worse by neck rotation, something that
obviously cannot be prevented in a manual occupation, and he concluded that Camoral has lost his pre-injury capacity and is UNFIT to work back at his previous
occupation as a seafarer.
The issue now before the Court is whether the disability grading provided by the petitioners for Camorals impediment must control. The Court says no.
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., et al.,20 the Court harmonized the POEA SEC with the Labor Code and the AREC in holding that: (a) the 120 days
provided in Section 20-B(3) of the POEA SEC is the period given to the employer to determine the fitness of the seafarer to work, during which the seafarer is deemed
to be in a state of total and temporary disability; (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be extended by a maximum of 120 days, or up to 240 days,
should the seafarer require further medical treatment; and (c) a total and temporary disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated
physician within 120 days or 240 days, as the case may be, or upon the expiration of the said periods without a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent
disability and the seafarer is still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties. 21
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As noted in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, the POEA SEC provides merely the minimum acceptable terms in a seafarers employment contract, and that in the
assessment of whether a seafarers injury is partial and permanent, the same must be so characterized not only under the Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32
of the POEA SEC, but also under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the AREC implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. 23 Article 192(c) of the Labor
Code provides that temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the AREC, shall be deemed total and
permanent; Section 2(b) of Rule VII of the AREC also provides that:
22

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[D]isability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding
120 days, except as otherwise provided under Rule X of these Rules. (Italics ours)
Thus, according to Kestrel, while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he must not be precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or
disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 days or 240
days, as is the case here, then he shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. 24 In Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad,25 the Court specifically ruled that it is of no
consequence that he recovered, for what is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days, and this constitutes permanent
total disability:
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Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not
alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured
after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more
than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which
is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work. 26 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
In Alpha Ship Management Corporation v. Calo, 27 the Court said:
An employees disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a declaration either of
fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment period, while the employees disability continues and he is unable to engage in
gainful employment during such period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employees fitness or disability.28
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Significantly, the NLRC noted that the medical report and disability assessment submitted by the petitioners after more than 120 days of treatment and rehabilitation
did not show how the partial permanent disability assessment of Camoral was arrived at. It simply stated that he was suffering from impediment Grade 10 disability,
but without any evidence that in fact only one-third limitation of motion of the neck or moderate stiffness had affected Camoral. But even without this observation, it is
not disputed that Camoral has been declared unfit by both the petitioners and Camorals doctors to return to his previous occupation. This, to the Court, is akin to a
declaration of permanent and total disability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

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_________________________________________
G.R. No. 203804

April 15, 2015

DARIO A. CARCEDO (substituted by his wife PRISCILLA DELA CRUZ-CARCEDO), Petitioner,

vs.
MAINE MARINE PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or MISUGA KAJUN CO., LTD., and/or MA. CORAZON GEUSE-SONGCUYA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the Decision dated 29 June 2012 and Resolution dated 5 October 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 120706, nullifying the Decision dated 8 March 2011 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case No. 01000007-11 (OFW), and reinstating the Decision dated 30 November 2010 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR-OFW [M]-00-09-13527-09.
1

The Facts
On 6 August 2008, Dario A. Carcedo (Carcedo) was hired by respondent Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. for its foreign principal Misuga Kajun Co., Ltd.
(collectively, respondents). He was engaged as Chief Officer on board M/V Speedwell under contract for nine months, with a basic monthly salary of
US$1,350.00.
6

Carcedo underwent the Pre-Employment Medical Examination on 8 August 2008, where he was declared fit for work. He boarded the vessel on 10
August 2008.
In November 2008, Carcedos foot was wounded because of his safety shoes. Upon examination, the ship doctor gave him antibiotics and allowed him
to resume work. His foots condition worsened when he slid down the deck and bumped his right foot. In January 2009, he felt pain in the back of his
swollen leg and developed fever and headache.
7

On 19 January 2009, he was treated at the Yoshino Hospital in Japan. The doctor diagnosed Carcedo with an open fracture of the right major toe bone
with a suspicion of sepsis.
8

Carcedo was repatriated on 20 January 2009. He was immediately referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedez Cruz of the Manila
Doctors Hospital, for medical treatment. In Dr. Cruzs report dated 26 January 2009, he stated:
9

The patient underwent debridement of the wound of the right big toe today at Manila Doctors Hospital. Operative findings showed infected open wound
in the medial aspect of the right big toe. There is foul smelling purulent discharge. Vascularity of the toe is compromised with beginning gangrene
formation. He tolerated the procedure well. Fasting blood sugar is elevated at 14 (normal value = 4.2-6.1). He was referred to our endocrinologist for
co-management.
Diagnosis:
Infected wound with gangrene, right big toe
S/P Debridement
Diabetes mellitus

10

Carcedo also underwent disarticulation of the right big toe on 26 January 2009. He was discharged from the hospital on 12 February 2009.
11

12

On 24 March 2009, Dr. Cruz recommended "an impediment disability grading of 8% Loss of first toe (big toe) and some of its metatarsal bone."

13

Due to infection of the amputated stump, Carcedo was again admitted to the hospital on 20 April 2009 for intravenous antibiotics. While confined in the
hospital, Carcedo underwent sequestrectomy of the right first metatarsal bone. He also underwent curettage and serial debridements of the
wound. On 27 May 2009, Carcedos right first metatarsal bone was removed. He was discharged on 6 June 2009, with the following report from Dr.
Cruz:
14

15

16

17

The patient was discharged today from the hospital. The wound of the right foot is still open with good granulation tissues. There is a minimal
suppuration and serous discharge. He is advised to continue daily wound care.
18

On his follow-up consultation on 15 June 2009, Dr. Cruz noted that:

There is x x x good granulation tissue on the stump of amputated right big toe. The wound is open but with slight yellowish discharge. Cleaning and
dressing were done. He was advised to continue his medications.
19

On 21 October 2009, Carcedo filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$148,500.00, sickness allowance and
other consequential damages. Meanwhile, Carcedo consulted orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo, who amputated Carcedos second
toe on 30 November 2009. Dr. Raymundos Medical Report dated 16 March 2010 reads:
20

21

The patient saw me last October 29 and was advised that his condition was still in the healing process. However, in November 30 of the same year, the
patient again developed chills and was admitted at the UP-PGH where he underwent an amputation of the 2nd ray of the left foot and was diagnosed
with chronic osteomyelitis with a non-healing wound in the said area. On follow-up today, the wound has already completely healed and closed well
with no draining sinus noted. He now has absence of the first and second toe which is prompting him to walk on the lateral aspect of his left foot with a
cane. He still has some pain on weight bearing but the wound is already completely healed.

RECOMMENDATION:
I told him that with his present condition right now, he is not fit to return to his previous work duties as a chief mate on board.

22

The Court of Appeals summarized the positions of the parties, thus:

In his position paper, Carcedo averred: (1) his injury was work related because he sustained the wound from his safety shoes at work, hence, his injury
was compensable under Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract; (2) his disability was total and permanent; the injury on his leg
was so severe that despite medication, there was no certainty that his former physical condition would get restored and he could resume his customary
work; he walked with difficulty and not without a cane; his Orthopedic Surgeon, Dr. Alan Leonardo R. Raymundo recommended, viz: "x x x with his
present condition right now, he is not fit to return to his previous work duties as a chief mate on board"; (3) he suffered severe depression and anxiety,
for which, he was entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees; his employers refusal to pay his disability benefits showed evident
bad faith; and, he was denied a better medical treatment because he had to make do with what his depleted resources could afford.
Maine posited: there were valid reasons to deny Carcedos claims, viz: (1) they were bound by the provisions on disability compensation under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract and CBA; the disability compensation schedule under the IBF-JSU/AMOSUP IMMAJ CBA Schedule of Disability
and Impediment (Annex 3 of the CBA), provided:

Degree of
Disability

Rate of
Compensation
Senior Officers

US$

100

148,500

75

111,375

60

89,100

50

74,250

40

59,400

30

44,550

20

29,700

10

14,850

the CBA further stated:

28.4 The Company shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with APPENDIX 3, with any differences, including less than ten
percent (10%) disability, to be pro rata; since Carcedos injury fell under Loss of 1st toe (big toe) and some of its metatarsal bone,[] his rate of
compensation was equivalent to 8% computed, as follows:
US$148,500 x 0.08 = US$11,880.00
(2) the disability assessment of the company-designated physician who attended to the seafarer throughout his illness and who had authority to assess
his medical condition, should be given utmost credence, instead of a doctor who had only examined the seafarer later; (3) it had not acted in bad faith
and had dealt fairly with Carcedo; it complied with its duties under the POEA contract; it paid for all of Carcedos medical bills and even offered to pay
disability benefit of US$11,880.00; and Carcedo was, thus, not entitled to attorneys fees and exemplary damages.
23

In Respondents Reply to Complainants Position Paper, they submitted the opinions of more doctors to refute Carcedos claim that he was unfit for
sea duty.
24

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On 30 November 2010, Labor Arbiter Patricio Libo-on denied Carcedos claim for full disability and awarded him only partial disability in the amount of
US$11,800.00 in accordance with the contract between the parties. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for the payment of full disability is dismissed and respondent is ordered to pay the complainant
partial disability in the amount of US$11,800.00.
SO ORDERED.

25

The Labor Arbiter held that the contract between the parties is the law between them. Hence, the partial and permanent disability assessment made by
the company-designated physician in accordance with the CBA prevails over the inability of Carcedo to return to his usual work.

The Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters decision and awarded Carcedo full disability benefits and attorneys fees. The dispositive portion of
the NLRC Decision dated 8 March 2011 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one issued ordering MAINE MARINE PHILIPPINES, INC., to pay DARIO A. CARCEDO, or his surviving spouse, PRISCILLA V. DELA CRUZCARCEDO, the amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED US DOLLARS ($148,500.00), plus attorneys fees not
exceeding US$14,850.00.
SO ORDERED.

26

The NLRC gave credence to the findings of Dr. Raymundo, and held that Carcedos death was confirmation of his unfitness to do work as a
seaman. The NLRC applied the definition of permanent disability enunciated by the Court in the case of Crystal Shipping Inc. v. Natividad, which was
"the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body."
27

28

29

In its Resolution dated 27 May 2011, the NLRC denied respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, herein respondents filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
30

31

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals upheld the 8% disability grading made by the company-designated physician in accordance with the CBA. However, the Court of
Appeals also declared Carcedo to be suffering from total and permanent disability because (1) he was unable to perform his job for more than 120
days; and (2) the declarations by the company-designated physician that Carcedo was fit for sea duty were made more than 400 days from
repatriation. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 June 2012 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated March 8, 2011 is NULLIFIED and the Labor Arbiters Decision dated November 30, 2010, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

32

Hence, this petition.

The Issues
Carcedo assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN NOT AWARDING TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY
BENEFITS TO THE PETITIONER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.
33

The Courts Ruling

We grant the petition in part.
Entitlement to Disability Benefits
A contract is the law between the parties, which in this case are the CBA and the POEA-SEC. The CBA contains the following pertinent medical and
disability provisions:
Article 25: Medical
xxxx
25.3 A seafarer repatriated to their port of engagement, unfit as a result of sickness or injury, shall be entitled to medical attention (including
hospitalization) at the Companys expense:

xxxx
(b) in the case of injury, for so long as medical attention is required or until a medical determination in accordance with clause 28.2 concerning
permanent disability.
xxxx
Article 28: Disability
28.1. A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident whilst in the employment of the Company regardless of fault,
including accidents occurring while traveling to or from the ship, and whose ability to do work as a seafarer is reduced as a result thereof,
but excluding permanent disability due to willful acts, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of
this Agreement.
28.2. The disability suffered by the seafarer shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the Company. If a doctor appointed by or on
behalf of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be nominated jointly between the Company and the Union and the
decision of this doctor shall be final and binding on both parties.
28.3 The Company shall provide disability compensation to the seafarer in accordance with APPENDIX 3, with any differences, including
less than ten percent (10%) disability, to be pro rata. 28.4. A seafarer whose disability, in accordance with 28.2 above is assessed at fifty
percent (50%) or more under the attached APPENDIX 3 shall, for the purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as permanently unfit for
further sea service in any capacity and be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) compensation. Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at
less than fifty percent (50%) disability but certified as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the Company-nominated
doctor, shall also be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) compensation. Any disagreement as to the assessment or entitlement shall be
resolved in accordance with clause 28.2 above.
34

Based on the above-quoted provisions of the CBA, there are three instances when a seafarer may be entitled to 100% disability compensation. These
are: (1) when the seafarer is declared to have suffered 100% disability; (2) when the seafarer is assessed with disability of at least 50%; and (3) when
the seafarer, while assessed at below 50% disability, is certified as permanently unfit for sea service.
According to the CBA, both the disability assessment and the certification as permanently unfit for sea service are to be given by the companydesignated physician. These can be overruled by a third doctor jointly appointed by the company and the union, in the event that the seafarers
personal physician disagrees with the evaluations of the company designated physician. Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides a similar
mechanism for determining the disability assessment.
35

However, it is not only the contract between the parties that governs the determination of the disability compensation due the seafarer. The Court has
ruled that the provisions on disability of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of
the Labor Code are applicable to the case of seafarers. In Remigio v. NLRC, the Court held:
36

The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under E.O. No. 247 to "secure the best terms
and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino
workers overseas." Section 29 of the 1996 POEA SEC itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the] Contract, including the
annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where the
Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the New Civil Code expressly
subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and
similar subjects."
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC,
seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by the companyaccredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC that
"disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement
of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of
work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness." It likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a
disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning
capacity.
37

The pertinent Labor Code provision is found in Article 192(c)(1), Chapter VI, Title II, Book IV:
Art. 192. Permanent and total disability.
xxxx
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules[.] (Emphasis
supplied)

The corresponding provision in the AREC is Section 2(b) of Rule VII which reads:
SECTION 2. Disability. x x x
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The above rule pertains to Section 2, Rule X of the AREC:
SECTION 2. Period of entitlement. (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it
shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to
exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total
and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or
impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions, in conjunction with Section 20(B)(3) of the POEASEC, were interpreted in the case of Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services,
Inc. thus:
38

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from
arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as
he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by
the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable
Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then
the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period
that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified
by his medical condition. (Emphasis supplied)
39

Hence, a partial and permanent disability could, by legal contemplation, become total and permanent. The Court in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v.
Munar held that the declaration by the company-designated physician is an obligation, the abdication of which transforms the temporary total disability
to permanent total disability, regardless of the disability grade, viz:
1wphi1

40

Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent.
However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from
performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal
contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. In other words, an impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the
Schedule of Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended
Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. That while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he
is not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his
illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.
Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarers fitness to work or permanent disability
within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarers medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be
deemed totally and permanently disabled. (Emphasis supplied)
41

Assessment of Disability Grading

We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter that the 24 March 2009 disability assessment made by Dr. Cruz was definitive. To our
mind, the said disability assessment was an interim one because Carcedo continued to require medical treatments even after 24 March 2009. He was
confined in the hospital from 20 April 2009 to 6 June 2009, where he underwent serial debridements, curettage, sequestrectomy and even amputation
of the right first metatarsal bone. He was certainly still under total disability, albeit temporary at that time.
His discharge from the hospital was 137 days from repatriation. Following the Courts rulings in Vergaraand Kestrel, since Carcedo required further
medical treatments beyond the 120 day period, his total and temporary disability was extended. The company-designated physician then had until 240
days from repatriation to give the final assessment.
During the follow-up consultation on 15 June 2009, Dr. Cruz noted that Carcedos wound was still open and that he was to continue his
medications. Carcedos injury required tending. This was 146 days from repatriation, and Dr. Cruz still had nearly 100 days within which to give
42

Carcedos final disability assessment, yet he gave none.

Indeed, the schedule of disabilities in the CBA, if there is one, or the POEA-SEC, should be the primary basis for the determination of a seafarers
degree of disability. However, the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot be read in isolation from the Labor Code and the AREC. Otherwise, the disability
rating of the seafarer will be completely at the mercy of the company designated physician, without redress, should the latter fail or refuse to give one.
Here, the company-designated physician failed to give a definitive impediment rating of Carcedos disability beyond the extended temporary disability
period, after the 120-day period but less than 240 days. By operation of law, therefore, Carcedos total and temporary disability lapsed into a total and
permanent disability.
43

Even assuming that Dr. Cruzs 24 March 2009 disability rating were definitive, Carcedo would still have a cause of action for total and permanent
disability compensation. Dr. Cruzs declaration of 8% impediment rating was made 63 days from repatriation, within the 120-day period. However,
beyond this period, Carcedo was still incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties as he was still undergoing medical treatments and was confined in
the hospital. In C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok, the Court held:
44

Based on this Courts pronouncements in Vergara, it is easily discernible that the 120-day or 240-day period and the obligations the law imposed on the
employer are determinative of when a seafarers cause of action for total and permanent disability may be considered to have arisen. Thus, a seafarer
may pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits if: (a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness
to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his
temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the
company-designated physician; (c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the
case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion; (d) the companydesignated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his
employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and
permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not
compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC
found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer
refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and(h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the
120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods. (Emphasis supplied)
45

Certification of Fitness for Sea Service

Neither was there a certification from the company-designated physician as to Carcedos fitness for sea service.
Dr. Cruzs 24 March 2009 report on the disability grading of Carcedo did not include a certification that he was already fit for sea duty. And even if it
had, it would be belied by his subsequent reports on, and the fact of, the continuation of medical treatments and hospitalization of Carcedo after the
issuance of the 24 March 2009 report. However, in Respondents Reply to Complainants Position Paper, they wrote:
xxxx
b. Medical Director and PEME doctor Dr. Fe Bacungan clearly opined that complainants amputated right big toe will not in any way
interfere with his current position as Chief Officer on board.
c. Another PEME doctor Dr. Pascualito Gutay likewise opined that complainants current condition will not render him unfit for further sea
duties as Chief Officer onboard.
xxxx

46

The Court of Appeals considered the opinions of Dr. Bacungan and Dr. Gutay as fit for sea duty declarations of respondents designated physicians.
We disagree. These opinions are not the certifications of fitness for sea duty contemplated by the CBA and the POEA-SEC. First, Dr. Bacungan and Dr.
Gutay were not the company-designated physicians assigned to the care of Carcedo. Second, they were given in response to a hypothetical inquiry by
respondents counsel. Third, neither doctor examined Carcedo in coming up with their opinions.
47

As discussed above, the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is the province of the company-designated physician, subject to the
periods prescribed by law. Hence, we also disagree with the NLRCs giving credence to the declaration of Dr. Raymundo that Carcedo was unfit to
work as a seaman.
Carcedo consulted Dr. Raymundo more than nine months since repatriation, and four months since he last consulted the company-designated
physician. During the latter period, Carcedo could have developed any number of conditions that may or may not be related to the injury suffered while
on board the ship. Notably, Dr. Raymundos medical report does not specify what "condition" of Carcedo was "still in the healing process."
48

In addition, Dr. Raymundo was only consulted after Carcedo was treated by the company-designated physician. Dr. Raymundo did not have a chance
to observe Carcedo from the time of his repatriation, and was not able to monitor his condition throughout the treatments.
Besides, Dr. Raymundos disability assessment includes a second ray amputation which he performed on Carcedo. This, and the amputation of the first
toe and its metatarsal bone performed by the company-designated physician, formed the basis of Dr. Raymundos unfit for sea duty declaration. In
contrast, the injury diagnosed by the doctor at the Yoshino Hospital in Japan and the initial findings of Dr. Cruz immediately upon repatriation only
pertain to the first toe. Apart from the vague mention of a condition that was still in the healing process, there was no indication that the second ray
amputation was a consequence of the injury sustained while on board.
Nevertheless, Carcedos disability is deemed total and permanent due to the lack of a final disability assessment and of a certification of fitness for sea
service from Dr. Cruz.
Disability Compensation Due
Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that Carcedo is entitled to full disability compensation. As a senior officer at the time he was injured, at
100% degree of disability, Carcedo is entitled to US$148,500.00.
49

Moral and Exemplary Damages

and Attorneys Fees
The Labor Arbiter found no basis to award damages and attorneys fees. The NLRC likewise did not award damages but awarded attorneys fees. The
Court of Appeals did not award moral and exemplary damages but deleted the award of attorneys fees.
We find no ground to disturb the following findings of the Court of Appeals:
As for attorneys fees, the same may be awarded if petitioner acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim.
Here [respondents] did not act in bad faith because they in fact paid all expenses relative to Carcedos treatment and hospitalization. They even offered
to pay disability benefits, albeit, Carcedo refused it because he wanted Grade 1, no less. Too, the assailed decision did not explain the basis for the
award of attorneys fees.
50

Indeed, the NLRC only included the award of attorneys fees in the dispositive portion of the Decision dated 8 March 2011 without a discussion as to
the basis therefor.
A Final Note
In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency v. Dumadag, the Court lamented:
51

The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate
considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than
if they were brought to court.
52

In this case, the third-doctor-referral provision did not find application because of the lack of a definitive disability assessment by the companydesignated physician. However, the respondents believed, nay, insisted, that the 24 March 2009 disability rating of 8% was the final assessment of
their designated physician. When Carcedo submitted the contrary findings of his personal physician, respondents presented the opinions of five more
doctors, in rebuttal, just to say that Carcedo could have been declared fit for sea duty if he were to re-apply for the same position of chief mate.
At that point in time, the parties were yet before the Labor Arbiter, who could have facilitated the election of the third doctor. We would like to remind
ship owners, manning companies and seafarers of their respective obligations as regards the third doctor provision. In INC Shipmanagement,
Incorporated v. Rosales, we held:
To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled, upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctors assessment
based on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment from the seafarers own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention to resolve the
conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding on the parties.
Upon notification, the company carries the burden of initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed between the parties. In
Bahia, we said:
In the absence of any request from him (as shown by the records of the case), the employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As the party
seeking to impugn the certification that the law itself recognizes as prevailing, Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctors
findings are correct, as well as the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been made by his own physician. Upon such notification,
the company must itself respond by setting into motion the process of choosing a third doctor who, as the POEA-SEC provides, can rule with finality on
the disputed medical situation.
53

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. We REVERSE the Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 June 2012 and Resolution dated 5 October
2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120706. We REINSTATE with MODIFICATION the Decision dated 8 March 2011 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC LAC Case No. 01-000007-11 (OFW).
We order Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. to pay Dario A. Carcedo, or his surviving spouse, Priscilla Dela Cruz-Carcedo, the amount of US$148,500.00
only, without attorney's fees. The award shall be paid in Philippine pesos, computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATTE S TATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
______________________________________________
Supreme Court rules that seafarer who is unable to work for more than 120 days is entitled to US$60,000
Introduction: The Philippine Labor Code states that a disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days is considered
total and permanent disability. Is this labor law principle of 120 days applicable to seafarers?
In the Crystal Shipping case decided on October 20, 2005 and reiterated in the Remigio case of April 12, 2006, the Philippine Supreme Court
has ruled that seafarers are subject to the Labor Code concept of permanent disability. Thus, those who are unable to perform their
customary work for more than 120 days are deemed totally and permanently disabled. The seafarers in these two cases were awarded
US$60,000 in permanent disability benefits.
Author's Note: Vessel interests have always argued that this labor law principle of 120 days is not applicable to seafarers' claims as
seafarers' claims are based on the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The principle of 120 days refers to employee benefits provided
by the Philippine Social Security System (SSS) which has different rules than that of the POEA Contract. SSS pays a monthly pension of
five years provided the employee is not gainfully employed and is unable to recover from his permanent disability. Further, said employee
must be examined by a doctor at least once a year. The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides for treatment until "maximum cure"
which may take more than 120 days and it is the company doctor that declares the disability grading depending on a schedule of disability.
In fact, Section 20(3) of the POEA contract states that the benefits under said contract are separate and distinct from the Social Security
System.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days
Seafarer was employed under the old POEA Standard Employment Contract. He was diagnosed with "swelling neck and lymphatic glands
right side in neck" and was repatriated on August 18, 1998. He underwent a total tyroidectomy with radial neck dissection and also
radioactive iodine therapy. The company doctor gave him a disability grading of Grade 9. He sought the opinion of his own doctor who
declared him totally and permanently disabled with a grading of Grade 1.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC awarded total disability benefits of US$60,000.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Quisumbing, affirmed the ruling thus:
"Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of
any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least,
or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows his disability was permanent."
"Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he
was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean
absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is the not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work
resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity."
"Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001.
Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost
three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be
incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total
disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the
employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work."
Crystal Shipping, Inc. and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen vs. Deo P. Natividad, G.R. No. 154798, October 20, 2005, First Division, Justice Leonardo
A. Quisumbing, Ponente

A total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days
Seafarer was employed as a musician (drummer) under the old POEA contract. On March 16, 1998, seafarer suffered chest pains and
eventually had a triple coronary artery bypass in New Orleans. After repatriation, he filed a claim for permanent total disability benefits.
Manning agent referred seafarer to their company doctor who wrote "he may go back to sea duty as a piano player or guitar player after 8-10
more months".
The Labor Arbiter did not award disability benefits as no medical report showing a Grade 1 disability was submitted and the fact that
seafarer can go back to work after 8-10 months showed he was not disabled. The NLRC affirmed the decision adding that seafarer's habit of
smoking two packs a day is a willful act that contributed to his disability. The Court of Appeals likewise did not award disability benefits as
there was not enough evidence submitted to show that seafarer was actually unable to work as a musician.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision.
The Court said that the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability must be applied to the facts of the case. In the recent case of
Crystal Shipping Inc. vs. Natividad, "permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body." Seafarer was declared unfit to work as a drummer for at least 8-10 months. This in
itself already constitutes permanent total disability.
The Court further ruled:
"Indeed, playing drums per se requires physical exertion, speed and endurance. It demands the performance of hitting strokes and
repetitive movements that petitioner, having undergone a triple coronary bypass, has become incapacitated to do. The possibility that
petitioner could work as a drummer at sea again does not negate the claim for permanent total disability benefits. ...what is important is that
he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability."
"We do not agree that petitioner's admission that he was a heavy smoker is enough ground to disqualify him from entitlement to disability
compensation...we have held that a worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course of his employment and while the employer is
not the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and assumes the risk of liability..."
Bernardo Remigio vs. National Labor Relations Commission, C.F. Sharp Crew Mgt., Inc. & New Commodore Cruise Line, Inc., G.R. No.
159887, April 12, 2006, Second Division, Justice Reynato Puno, Ponente
______________________________________________

Law Labor Digest: PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al (G.R. No. 123891, Feb. 28, 2001)
Law Labor Digest: PHILIPPINES TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al
(G.R. No. 123891, Feb. 28, 2001)
FACTS:
Private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against Philippine Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC) for payment of disability benefit,
sickness wages, refund of medical expenses and attorneys fees. POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the private
respondent awarding disability benefit.
Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which rendered him unfit for work. However, it points out that private respondent did
not submit proof of the extent of his disability as required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen. Without
this proof, petitioner argues that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the findings of the POEA Adjudication Office.
ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with modification, the judgment of the POEA Adjudication Office.
HELD:
NO. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.
In NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486, 494 (1997), we said:
Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Private respondent
having substantially established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to have transpired during his
employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to private
respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.
The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of
their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in
their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.
Petition is DISMISSED.
_____________________________

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123891. February 28, 2001]

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION,
and
CARLOS
NIETES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated September 25, 1995 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No. 009101-95. Said
decision affirmed with modification the judgment dated March 16, 1995 of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), ordering the herein petitioner and Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation to pay private respondent jointly and severally the sum of
US$21,000 or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment and P34,114.00 as reimbursement
for medical expenses plus 10% of the total award as attorneys fees in favor of the private
respondent. In its Resolution dated December 29, 1995, the NLRC also denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The facts in this case are as follows:
On January 23, 1993, private respondent, Carlos Nietes filed a complaint against Philippine
Transmarine Carriers Inc. (PTC) for payment of disability benefit, sickness wages, refund of
medical expenses and attorneys fees. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. was impleaded as
surety of respondent PTC.
Private respondent alleged that he was a licensed Captain and/or Master Mariner. For the
period March 1985 to May 17, 1990, he was employed by PTC. He last boarded M/V MA.
ROSARIO where he served as Master from April 11, 1990 to May 17, 1990. At that time he was
a member of good standing of the Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP), an affiliate of the International Transport Federation (ITF) of
London. He paid his union dues, insurance premiums, etc., which were checked-off from his
salaries.
As Master on board, he received US$1,500.00 per month. From May 10, 1990 up to May
17, 1990, the date he was repatriated, he was hospitalized at the Moji Hospital in Moji, Japan, at
the instance of the vessels owners. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he was instructed by PTC
and AMOSUP to report to the Seamens Hospital, a hospital owned and operated by
AMOSUP. On May 19, 1990, Dr. George Matti of the Seamens Hospital issued a medical
certification that he was unfit for work and was instructed to continue treatment/medication.

When he was refused admission at the Seamens Hospital, he was forced to secure medical
treatment at the Sto. Nio Medical Specialist and Emergency Clinic as an out-patient. His
attending physician was Dra. Geraldine B. Emperador. Her diagnosis showed he was unfit to
work as Master of the vessel.
On May 25, 1992, he referred his claims to Atty. Oscar Torres who repeatedly informed PTC
of the claim for benefits and refund. Sometime in July 1992, he was informed by Atty. Torres
that his claim was being handled by Atty. Augusto Arreza, Jr., PTCs legal consultant and that
they had submitted all the required documents to Atty. Arreza, including the carbon original of
the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Matti of the Seamens Hospital which certificate states that
he was not fit to work.
From November 1992 up to the filing of this petition, Atty. Torres allegedly had not talked to
Atty. Arreza. Being a member of AMOSUP from 1985 to 1990, until he was declared unfit to
work, petitioner claimed he was entitled to permanent total disability benefit in the amount
equivalent to 86% of the US$18,000.00, sickness wage benefit in the sum of US$6,000.00 as per
Section C, Subsection (c) of the POEA Standard Format, plus ten percent (10%) of the total
judgment award and attorneys fee.
In his supplemental complaint, private respondent further asked for refund of medical
expenses incurred in the amount of P30,411.00 plus professional fee of P4,000.00 or a total of
P34,411.00. Receipts covering these payments were submitted as Annexes I and II.
On March 16, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office issued its decision in favor of the private
respondent. It held that

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering respondents Philippine

Transmarine Carriers Inc. and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. to pay complainant
jointly and severally the sum of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND US DOLLARS
(US$21,000.00) or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment and P34,114.00
representing reimbursement of medical expenses plus ten percent (10%) thereof of the
total award by way of and/as attorneys fees.
All other causes or actions are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed said decision to the NLRC which affirmed it except for the award of
attorneys fees which is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. NLRC later denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now contends that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in:

AWARDING DISABILITY BENEFIT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT DESPITE

THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF HIS PERMANENT DISABILITY AND THE
DEGREE THEREOF.
B

ARBITRARILY DISREGARDING THE WELL-ESTABLISHED FACT THAT

THE ABSENCE OF A DETERMINATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PERMANENT DISABILITY AND THE DEGREE THEREOF WAS DUE
SOLELY TO HIS FAULT.
C

AWARDING SICK WAGES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE FULL

PERIOD OF 120 DAYS NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF A
DECLARATION OF HIS UNFITNESS TO WORK OR A DETERMINATION
OF THE DEGREE OF HIS PERMANENT DISABILITY.
D

GRANTING THE REIMBURSEMENTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS

MEDICAL EXPENSES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTERS
TREATMENT WAS DONE BY A PHYSICIAN NOT DESIGNATED OR
ACCREDITED BY PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF THE POEA
STANDARD CONTRACT.
The main issue is whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming with
modification, the judgment of the POEA Adjudication Office.
Petitioner admits that private respondent suffered illness which rendered him unfit for
work. However, it points out that private respondent did not submit proof of the extent of his
disability as required by Section C (4) [b] and [c] of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen.
[1]
Without this proof, petitioner argues that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it
affirmed the findings of the POEA.
Petitioner also contends that public respondents erred in awarding sick wages for 120 days
in favor of the private respondent without evidence on record establishing the extent of his
disability, which is essential in determining the correct amount of disability benefit. Further,
petitioner avers private respondents claim for refund of the medical expenses should have not

been granted by the public respondents on the ground that the physician who treated private
respondent was not accredited in violation of the POEA Standard Contract for Seamen.
Public respondents held that in effect, the complainant has substantially complied with the
POEA Standard of Employment Contract for Seamen when he submitted himself to the Seamens
Hospital three days after his repatriation from Japan. [2] They also found that private respondent
had in fact substantially complied with the post-employment requirements under paragraph 4 [b]
and [c] of Section c,[3] of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen. We note that
private respondent submitted himself, upon the instructions of the petitioner and AMOSUP, to
the Seamens Hospital, which is owned and operated by AMOSUP, for medical assistance under
the care of Dr. George Matti, a company accredited physician, three days after his May 17, 1990
repatriation from Japan.
On record, private respondent was examined and diagnosed at the Seamens Hospital and
was found to be suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy, so that he was
declared unfit to work by no less than a company accredited physician in the person of Dr.
George Matti.[4]
Petitioner was well aware of the private respondents hospitalization at Moji, Japan, as well
as his repatriation on May 17, 1990. It was upon the advice of petitioner that he was examined
and diagnosed at the Seamens Hospital. There Dr. George Matti, petitioners own accredited
physician, declared him unfit to work. Petitioner could not now feign ignorance of this
information. Two licensed physicians examined and diagnosed private respondent and both of
them had issued similar findings, that private respondent was afflicted with congestive heart
failure and cardiomyopathy making him unfit to work.
Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. In NFD International
Manning Agents, Inc. vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 486, 494 (1997), we said:

Strict rules of evidence, it must be remembered, are not applicable in claims for
compensation and disability benefits. Private respondent having substantially
established the causative circumstances leading to his permanent total disability to
have transpired during his employment, we find the NLRC to have acted in the
exercise of its sound discretion in awarding permanent total disability benefits to
private respondent. Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of
proof in compensation proceedings.
Consistently the Court has ruled that disability should not be understood more on its medical
significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of
an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that [he] was
trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and
attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.[5] In disability compensation, we

likewise held, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work
resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.[6]
Finally, petitioner faults public respondent for allowing the reimbursements of private
respondents medical expenses despite the fact that the latters treatment was done by a physician
not designated or accredited by the petitioner in violation of the POEA Standard Contract for
Seamen.However, records of the case show that private respondent had initially sought treatment
at Seamens Hospital under the care of Dr. George Matti, a company accredited physician. Only
after he was refused admission thereat was he compelled to seek medical assistance
elsewhere. His life and health being at stake, private respondent did not have the luxury to scout
for a company-accredited physician nor was it fair at this late stage for his employer to deny him
such refund for medical services that previously he was admittedly entitled to.
The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the
protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board oceangoing vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and
liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.[7]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated September 25, 1995 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner and
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation are ordered to pay jointly and severally the following
amounts to private respondent Carlos Nietes: Twenty One Thousand US Dollars (US$21,000.00)
or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment, as disability benefits and P34,114.00
representing reimbursement of medical expenses, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
______________________________________

[G.R. No. 134028. December 17, 1999]

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM), petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANICO, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Through this petition for review, the Employees Compensation Commission seeks
to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 47804, dated
28 May 1998, reversing petitioners decision, dated 20 March 1997, in ECC Case No.
8342 and granting Edmund Sanicos (private respondents) claim for compensation

benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (Book IV, Title II of the
Labor Code).
Private respondent was a former employee of John Gotamco and Sons. He worked
in said company as wood filer from 1986 until he was separated from employment on
31 December 1991 due to his illness. His medical evaluation report, dated 31
September 1991, showed that he was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis
(PTB). Subsequent chest x-rays taken on 9 October 1994 and 3 May 1995
diagnostically confirmed his illness.
On 9 November 1994, private respondent filed with the Social Security System
(SSS) a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. On 23 April
1996, the SSS denied private respondents claim on the ground of prescription. The
SSS ruled that under Article 201 of the Labor Code, a claim for compensation shall be
given due course only when the same is filed with the System three (3) years for the
time the cause of action accrued. In private respondents case, the SSS reckoned the
three-year prescriptive period on 21 September 1991 when his PTB first became
manifest. When he filed his claim on 9 November 1994, the claim had allegedly
already prescribed.
On appeal, petitioner affirmed the decision of the SSS. Private respondent then
elevated the case to the CA, which reversed petitioners decision and granted private
respondents claim for compensation benefits. In ruling that private respondents claim
was filed well within the prescriptive period under the law, the CA reconciled Article
201 of the Labor Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Under the latter
provision of law, an action upon an obligation created by law must be filed within ten
(10) years from the time the cause of action accrues. Thus, while private respondents
illness became manifest in September 1991, the filing of his compensation claim on 9
November 1994 was within, even long before, the prescriptive period.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondents
claim for compensation benefit had already prescribed when he filed his claim on 9
November 1994.
We rule in favor of private respondent.
This Court has consistently ruled that disability should not be understood more
on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work,

or work of similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any
kind of work which a person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not
mean absolute helplessness.[1] This Court has also held that:
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.[2]

Petitioner thus seriously erred when it affirmed the decision of the SSS denying
private respondents claim on the ground of prescription. In determining whether or
not private respondents claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under
Article 201 of the Labor Code, petitioner and the SSS reckoned the accrual of private
respondents cause of action on 31 September 1991, when his PTB became
known. This is erroneous.
Following the foregoing rulings, the prescriptive period for filing compensation
claims should be reckoned from the time the employee lost his earning
capacity, i.e., terminated from employment, due to his illness and not when the same
first became manifest. Indeed, a persons disability might not emerge at one precise
moment in time but rather over a period of time. [3] In this case, private respondents
employment was terminated on 31 December 1991 due to his illness, he filed his
claim for compensation benefits on 9 November 1994. Accordingly, private
respondents claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article
201 of the Labor Code.
In this light, the Court finds no need at this time to rule on the seeming conflict
between the prescriptive period for filing claims for compensation benefits under
Article 201 of the Labor Code and Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code.
In conclusion, the Court takes this opportunity to once again remind petitioner
that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to
provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability,
illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Thus:
As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the
Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work
connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the
compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states
that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.[4]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
_______________________________________

Maritime Corp et al. vs. Jaime M. Velasquez, et al.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 179802

November 14, 2008

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP. and/or CONRADO N. DELA CRUZ and ODF

vs.
JAIME M. VELASQUEZ and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

JELL

ASA, petitioners,

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97098, which reversed and
set aside the June 23, 2006 decision 2 and September 21, 2006 resolution3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NCR Case No. 044854-05.
The facts, as culled from the record, are as follows.
Respondent Jaime M. Velasquez was hired by petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation as second cook for its foreign principal,
co-petitioner ODF Jell ASA. The parties had a considerably long employment history covered by about ten (10) employment
contracts wherein petitioners engaged respondent's services on board vessels owned by ODF Jell ASA. On July 28, 2003, while on
duty as second cook on board the vessel M/T Bow Favour, respondent suffered high fever and was unable to work. He took fever
relieving medicine but his condition worsened. By the fourth day, his body temperature reached 40.9C. His extremities were
swollen and he could not walk. He also had edema in the abdominal area. Respondent was brought to a hospital in Singapore where
he was confined from August 12 to October 13, 2003. Thereafter, he was repatriated to the Philippines.
It is from this point onwards that the allegations of the parties differ.
In his pleadings, respondent alleged that upon his repatriation, he was not confined to St. Luke's Medical Center as he expected. He
claimed that he was compelled to seek medical treatment from an independent doctor. On November 13, 2003, he consulted a
certain Dr. Efren Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) who diagnosed him to be suffering from staphylococcal bacteremia, multiple metastatic
abcesses, pleural effusion and hypertension and declared his disability as Impediment Grade 1 (120%). Dr. Vicaldo further
concluded that respondent was "unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity." Hence, respondent filed a claim for disability
benefits, illness allowance/ reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees but petitioners refused to pay.
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintained that upon respondent's repatriation on October 13, 2003, he was immediately referred to
a company designated physician for further medical care and treatment; that the initial impression was Systemic Staphylococcal
Infections; Resolving; that he was under the care of said physician for three (3) months during which he underwent extensive
medications and treatment; that he was admitted and confined at St. Luke's Medical Center from October 13, 2003 to November 11,
2003; that progress reports on his recovery have been issued; that by January 5, 2004, respondent was declared as "cleared to work
resumption as seafarer"; and that petitioners were the ones who shouldered respondent's hospitalization expenses.
On March 29, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Dispositively, the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation and/or Conrado N. Dela Cruz and ODF Jell ASA to pay complainant Jaime M. Velasquez the amount of
SIXTY TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY US DOLLARS (US$62,260.00) or its equivalent in Philippine Peso at
the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his disability benefits and sickness allowance
and 10% of the total monetary award by way of attorney's fees.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing decision, petitioners filed an appeal with the NLRC, alleging serious errors in the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter.
Upon review of the records, the NLRC made the following findings:
A careful review of the records shows that, in not one instance did complainant, by way of a contrary medical finding,
assail the diagnosis arrived at by the company designated physician, Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II. As noted, the findings of Dr.
Efren Vicaldo, complainant's private physician, and those of Dr. Alegre, bear consistency with each other save for his
hypertensive condition. Above all these, complainant's credibility suffered a serious setback when he declared that he was
seen by Dr. Alegre only twice and that there was no treatment given to him since repatriation (Records, pp. 88-89).
Records belie such assertion. Copies of the medical reports accomplished by the company accredited physician would
show that he was examined and treated by the latter for no less than eight (8) times (Records, pp. 128-135). As gleaned
therefrom, complainant was placed under the care and supervision of Dr. Alegre for about ninety (90) days, his admission
at St. Luke's Medical Center being on 13 October 2003 and with his discharge being had only on 11 November 2003. This
negates anew complainant's claim that he was not treated at St. Luke's Medical Center. Further, on dates of 18 November
2003, 21 November 2003, December 1, 2003, December 4, 2003 and December 15, 2003, medical certificates of even
dates bore results of complainant's physical examination. Finally, on 5 January 2004, complainant was cleared for sea
duties, on the basis of the following findings:
"His infection has already subsided and resolved.
He has been off his anti-hypertensive medication for 1 week and his blood pressure is still acceptable at 140/90.
Regular intake of anti-hypertensive medications is advised for strict compliance so that hypertension is
controlled to prevent complications."
Given the earlier adverted consideration on such want of credence on complainant's part as gleaned from his assertions
which were easily controverted by evidence on record, such notable conjectural tenor on the part of complainant's private
physician as to the possible effects of his alleged hypertensive condition cannot be taken as sufficient basis to overcome
the correctness of the medical findings arrived at by Dr. Alegre, not to mention that complainant was examined by his
chosen physician only once. Aside from his alleged hypertensive condition which could be addressed to by oral
medication, there exists no evidence that there is a direct causal connection between said alleged hypertensive condition
and a condition of permanent and total disability being claimed by the complainant. Accordingly, the claim must be
denied.
On June 23, 2006, the NLRC rendered a decision reversing that of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent's complaint for lack
of merit. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
entered, DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at such a disposition, the NLRC held:
Weighty considerations anchored on principles governing contracts and jurisprudence in support thereof find the
complainant to observe its commitments under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (Article 1159, Civil Code of the
Philippines). Said contract of employment specifically mentions that fitness to work or the degree of disability of a seafarer
is within the competence of a company designated physician to establish (Section 20 (b), No. 2, paragraph 2 of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract). Stated otherwise, the seaman is bound by the declaration of the company designated

physician concerning his physical condition in relation to his work. Given this situation, the burden of proof rests upon
him in order to establish the disability alleged in such findings. Whether complainant was successful in countering the
declaration of fitness to work by the company designated physician, is a matter that merits serious concern.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari.
On April 25, 2007, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision setting aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstating that of the
labor arbiter. The CA ratiocinated thus:
That the company-designated physician did declare that petitioner is fit to sea duty should not prejudice petitioner's claim
for disability benefits. In the first instance, it is well to note that there is doubt and question as to the accuracy of the
declaration of the Dr. Alegre's "cleared to work resumption as seafarer." Such certification should not be taken as the only
primary consideration, especially when there is contra finding by another doctor giving doubt to the findings of the
company-designated physician. As held in the case of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, "opinions of petitioner's
doctor to this effect should not be given evidentiary weight as they are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of
petitioners, and certainly could not be considered independent." The medical findings of Dr. Alegre, unsubstantiated by
any other evidence, are suspect for being biased in favor of the private respondent. In the present case, petitioner has been
rendered incapable of further pursuing his usual work because of his weakened bodily condition due to illness contracted
during his employment. It is undisputed that petitioner had been under the employ of respondents since 1992 and had
finished ten (10) contracts with them on board as second cook. While considering this long stint with the respondent, his
non-redeployment more so puts in doubt the claim of respondent that petitioner was indeed fit to work. Moreover, it is
well settled that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Petitioner
having substantially established that he could not able to perform the same work as he used to before his repatriation, and
was found both by his independent physician and Gleneagles Hospital in Singapore suffering from severe hypertension as
well as other diagnosed illnesses which were contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks involved in the performance
of his job, we find the NLRC to have acted in grave abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Labor Arbiter awarding disability claims to petitioner.
Petitioners are now before the Court principally contending that the CA committed reversible error when it upheld the findings of
respondent's private physician rather than the findings of the company-designated physician.
We grant the petition.
The standard employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) pursuant
to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247 to "secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers
and ensure compliance therewith" and to "promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas." 4 Section 29 of the 1996
POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA Contract) itself provides that "[a]ll rights and obligations of the parties to [the]
Contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions,
treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory." Even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with
public interest that the New Civil Code expressly subjects it to "the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects." 5
The POEA Contract is clear in its provisions when it provided who should determine the disability grading or fitness to work of
seafarers. The POEA contract recognizes only the disability grading provided by the company-designated physicians. Section 20 B.3
of the POEA contract provides:
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician but in no case shall exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
xxx
For this purpose the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall resort in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
Moreover, Section 20 (B), no. 2, paragraph 2 of the POEA Contract provides:

However, if after the repatriation the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be
so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by
the company-designated physician.
These provisions clearly illustrate that respondent's disability can only be assessed by the company-designated physician. If the
company-designated physician declares him fit to work, then the seaman is bound by such declaration.
Further, it should be noted that the claim for sickness and permanent disability benefits arose from the stipulations in the standard
format contract of employment pursuant to a circular of the POEA. Such circular was intended for all parties involved in the
employment of Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. 6 The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is
the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them. 7 Thus, the parties are both bound by the provisions of the POEA
Contract which declares that the degree of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer should be assessed by the company-designated
physician.
In German Marine Agencies v. NLRC, 8 the Court explicitly laid that it is the company-designated physician who should determine
the degree of disability of the seaman or his fitness to work, thus:
x x x In order to claim disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, it is the "company-designated"
physician who must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either
injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. x x x It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that
if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulation shall control. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard Employment Contract - the only
qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability is that he be
"company-designated.
Again, in Benjamin L. Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc., and Demaco United Ltd, 9 the Court ruled that the opinion of the
company-designated physician should be upheld over that of the doctors appointed by the seafarer considering that the basis of the
findings of the seafarer's doctor are the medical findings of the company physician.
Undoubtedly, jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician's findings which should
form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer. In this particular case, respondent refused to accept the assessment made by
the company-designated physician that he is fit to work.
Under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessel or the
POEA Contract issued pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 4 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, both Series of 2000,
respondent could not disregard the findings of the company-designated physician. Section 20-B, paragraph 3 of the POEA Contract
provides:
3. xxx
xxx
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
It is beyond cavil that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability. But
under the aforecited provision, when the seaman's private physician disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated
physician, as here, a third doctor's opinion may be availed of in determining his disability. This however was not resorted to by the
parties. As such, the credibility of the findings of their respective doctors was properly evaluated by the NLRC.
The Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of seafarers. In a catena of cases, 10 the Court
declared that disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent
total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was
trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. In addition, the
Court in GSIS v. Cadiz11 and Ijares v. CA12 held that permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than
120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
Here, petitioner suffered from Staphylococcal bacteremia, a type of bacteria which usually infects the skin entering the
bloodstream. Staphylococci normally grow in the nose and on the skin of 20% to 30% of healthy adults (and less commonly in the
mouth; mammary glands; and urinary, intestinal, and upper respiratory tracts). These bacteria do not harm most of the time.

However, a break in the skin, burn, or other injury may allow the bacteria to penetrate the body's defenses and cause infection.
Commonly, staphylococcal infections produce collections of pus (abscesses), which can appear not only on the skin but also in
internal organs. If properly treated with antibiotics, most healthy people who develop staphylococcal infections recover fully within a
short time.13
The company-designated physician cleared respondent for work resumption upon finding that his infection has subsided after
successful medication. We agree with the NLRC that the doctor more qualified to assess the disability grade of the respondent
seaman is the doctor who regularly monitored and treated him. The company-designated physician possessed personal knowledge of
the actual condition of respondent. Since the company-designated physician in this case deemed the respondent as fit to work, then
such declaration should be given credence, considering the amount of time and effort the company doctor gave to monitoring and
treating respondent's condition. It is undisputed that the recommendation of Dr. Vicaldo was based on a single medical report which
outlined the alleged findings and medical history of respondent despite the fact that Dr. Vicaldo treated or examined respondent
only once. On the other hand, the company-designated physician outlined the progress of respondent's successful treatment over a
period of several months in several reports, as can be gleaned from the record. As between the findings of the company-designated
physician (Dr. Alegre) and the physician appointed by respondent (Dr. Vicaldo), the former deserves to be given greater evidentiary
weight.
All told, the Court finds and so rules that the CA committed reversible error in ignoring the medical assessment of the companydesignated physician that respondent was cleared for work resumption as a seafarer and granting respondent's claim for disability
on the basis of a single medical examination report of respondent's appointed physician contrary to the clear, unambiguous
provisions regarding disability benefit claims contained in the POEA Contract between the parties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97098
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the NLRC, 2nd Division, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84777. January 30, 1992.]
JOSE A. BEJERANO, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Respondent.
Public Attorneys Office for Petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION; DISABILITY, CONSTRUED. Respondent EECs contention that "disability should be understood
more on its medical significance rather than loss of earning capacity" is without basis in jurisprudence. Precedents in earlier cases show that disability is intimately
related to ones earning capacity.
2. ID.; ID.; PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY; DEFINED. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that "permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of
her mentality and attainment could do."
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3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN COMPENSABLE. It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of
an occupation for renumeration or profit in substantially customary and usual manner. Permanent total disability is the lack of ability to follow continuously some
substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material injury or danger to life. It is therefore clear from the aforementioned rulings
that the loss of ones earning capacity determines the disability compensation one is entitled to. Thus, this court ruled: "In disability compensation, it is not the injury
which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity (Ulibas v. Republic, 83 SCRA 819; Roma v. WCC, 80
SCRA 1270)."
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4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTORS CERTIFICATION AS TO THE NATURE OF CLAIMANTS DISABILITY; MAY BE GIVEN CREDENCE; REASON THEREFOR. In the earlier cases,
this Court ruled that the physicians report of sickness or accident substantiates the disability claim. In one case, this Court ruled, that a doctors certification as to the
nature of claimants disability may be given credence as he would not normally make a false certification for the sake of a lowly school teacher. According to this Court:
". . . No physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government
agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection. In fact, if he were not sure of what he was certifying to, then
he would not have issued the second certification on July 12, 1979, knowing fully well that he would be perpetuating an erroneous or false report. Under normal
circumstances, he would not sacrifice his medical career for the sake of a lowly public school teacher."

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for renew on certiorari is the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirming the award of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) to petitioner Jose Bejerano of temporary total disability benefits for the period of 6-9 December 1985 and permanent partial disability

benefits for nineteen (19) months corresponding to the period from January 1986 to July 1987. **
Petitioner Jose Bejerano was a cash supervisor of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Zamboanga City Branch Office. He retired at the age of sixty-two (62), after
having served the bank for almost twenty-nine (29) years. 1 Medical records disclose that sometime in 1985, petitioner complained of dyspnea or shortness of breath
accompanied by productive cough. He was admitted to the Brent Hospital, where he was attended to by Dr. Arcadio Salazar, who medically diagnosed his illness as
Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease Emphysema with severe asthmatic component. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Salazar states that petitioner was admitted three
(3) times to Brent Hospital in the year 1985, not including the petitioners confinement at Brent Hospital on 6-9 December 1985, for treatment of chronic obstructive
lung disease. Dr. Salazar, in the same medical certificate, classified petitioners disability as permanent total. 2
Due to his disability, petitioner was forced to retire at the age of sixty-two (62) on 31 December 1985 and received the sum of P60,890.57 corresponding to five (5)
years lump sum of his annuity. 3
In the year 1987, petitioner was again confined at the Zamboanga Regional Hospital on the following dates:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. 27 February 1987 up to 2 March 1987;

2. 23 April 1987 up to 26 April 1987;
3. 5 May 1987 up to 18 May 1987; 4
Subsequently, petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which was favorably acted upon. The GSIS
awarded petitioner Bejerano benefits for temporary total disability for the period of 6-9 December 1985 and permanent partial disability from January 1986 to July
1987. 5
Not satisfied with the award, petitioner in a letter dated 17 March 1987 requested the GSIS for a change of the classification of his disability benefits from permanent
partial to permanent total. Such request was denied by the GSIS, which prompted petitioner to file, on 13 July 1987, a request for reconsideration of the earlier denial
of his request for the conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. 6
On 29 September 1987, the GSIS again denied petitioners request. 7 This denial was appealed by the petitioner to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in
a letter dated 8 October 1987. On 5 July 1988, the ECC ruled that the disability benefits previously awarded to the petitioner were already commensurate to the degree
of the petitioners disability. In affirming the GSIS decision, the ECC declared, in part, that:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

". . . Appellants disability could not be considered permanent total disability in the sense that he is not completely incapable of engaging in gainful occupation . . . 8
Hence, this petition.
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioners disability would entitle him to compensation benefits corresponding to permanent total disability.
Petitioner contends that there is substantial evidence showing that his disability is permanent and total. On the other hand, respondent ECC argues that the petitioners
disability was classified by respondent as permanent partial because the criteria for permanent total disability, as laid down by the medical guidelines of the
Commission, were not satisfied. Respondent maintains that "disability should be understood more on its medical significance rather than loss of earning capacity." 9
We find for Petitioner.
Respondent ECCs contention that "disability should be understood more on its medical significance rather than loss of earning capacity" is without basis in
jurisprudence. Precedents in earlier cases show that disability is intimately related to ones earning capacity.
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that "permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a
similar nature that she was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of her mentality and attainment could do." 10
It does not mean state of absolute helplessness, but inability to do substantially all material acts necessary to prosecution of an occupation for remuneration or profit in
substantially customary and usual manner. 11
Permanent total disability is the lack of ability to follow continuously some substantially gainful occupation without serious discomfort or pain and without material
injury or danger to life. 12
It is therefore clear from the aforecited rulings that the loss of ones earning capacity determines the disability compensation one is entitled to. Thus, this Court
ruled:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity (Ulibas
v. Republic, 83 SCRA 819 Roma v. WCC, 80 SCRA 1270)." 13
A thorough examination of the records convinces us that petitioners claim is substantiated with enough evidence to show that his disability is permanent and total.
First, the attending physician during the petitioners treatment on 6-9 December 1985 at Brent Hospital, Zamboanga Branch, Dr. Arcadio Salazar, diagnosed petitioners
condition as Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease and classified petitioner s disability as permanent and total. 14 Second, the Medical Examiners report on Claim for
Disability Benefits dated 26 August 1987 prepared by Medical Examiner Silvester L. Martinez also classified petitioners disability as total and permanent and described
the symptoms of petitioners illness as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

"Shortness of breath, difficulty of walking distances longer than ten (10) meters without having respiratory problems; inability to walk a flight of stairs without intervals
of rest." 15
Again, in another medical certificate dated 8 June 1988 issued by Dr. Arcadio Salazar, the petitioners disability was classified as total and permanent for the following
reasons:
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1. The patient has a tendency to develop acute exacerbation of his ailment resulting in frequent hospitalizations (1985 to 1987);
2. The patients condition stabilizes only on strict confinement at home;
3. The physical capacity of the patient has deteriorated markedly. He could walk a distance of only 10 meters before dyspnea develops;
4. The patient is confined at home and under continuous medication. 16
It is evident from the foregoing that, as per his physicians opinion, petitioner is totally incapacitated from engaging in any gainful occupation, and that therefore his
disability is permanent and total.
In earlier cases, this Court ruled that the physicians report of sickness or accident substantiates the disability claim. 17
In one case, this Court ruled, that a doctors certification as to the nature of claimants disability may be given credence as he would not normally make a false
certification for the sake of a lowly school teacher. 18 According to this Court:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

". . . No physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government
agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection. In fact, if he were not sure of what he was certifying to then
he would not have issued the second certification on July 12, 1979, knowing fully well that he would be perpetuating an erroneous or false report. Under normal
circumstances, he would not sacrifice his medical career for the sake of a lowly public school teacher." 19

It is also of importance to note that petitioner was forced to retire at the age of 62 because of his physical condition. This, again, is another indication that petitioners
disability is permanent and total. As held by this Court, "the fact of an employees disability is placed beyond question with the approval of the employees optional
retirement, for such is authorized only when the employee is physically incapable to render sound and efficient service . . ." 20
"Finally, denying petitioners permanent total disability benefit, who for more than twenty (20) years had rendered his best service unblemished and only because his
ailments forced him to retire, would subvert the very essence of the Workmens Compensation Act to implement the social justice provision of the Constitution."
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WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is MODIFIED and the GSIS is hereby ordered to pay petitioner compensation benefits for
permanent total disability effective January 1986, which is the start of the period when his earning capacity was impaired due to his disability.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

______________________________

FIRST DIVISION
CRYSTAL SHIPPING,
and/or
A/S
STEIN
BERGEN,
Petitioners,

- versus DEO P. NATIVIDAD,

Respondent.

INC., G.R. No. 154798

LINE
Present:
Davide Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 20, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Resolutions[1] dated July 2, 2002 and August 15,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71293 which denied petitioners
motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari and their motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner A/S Stein Line Bergen, through its local manning agent, petitioner
Crystal Shipping, Inc., employed respondent Deo P. Natividad as Chief Mate of
M/V Steinfighter for a period of ten months. [2] Within the contract period,
respondent complained of coughing and hoarseness and was brought to shore for
examination. He was diagnosed with swelling neck and lymphatic glands right side
in neck, declared unfit for duty, and advised to see an ear-nose-throat specialist.
[3]
He was repatriated to Manila on August 18, 1998.

Shortly after his arrival, respondent was referred to ClinicoMed Inc., the companydesignated clinic, for check-up and later thoroughly examined at the Manila
Doctors Hospital. He was diagnosed with papillary carcinoma, metastatic to
lymphoid tissue consistent with thyroid primary and reactive hyperplasis, lymph
node. On September 11, 1998, he underwent a total thyroidectomy with radial neck
dissection. After the operation, respondent developed chest complications and
pleural effusion, and had to undergo a thoracenthesis operation. On the basis of all
these, his attending physician diagnosed him permanently disabled with a grade 9
impediment, with grade 1 as the most serious.[4]
A second opinion by Marine Medical Services and Metropolitan Hospital attending
physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim, likewise concurred that respondent was disabled
with a grade 9 impediment.[5] Under the care of Dr. Lim, respondent underwent
various treatments, one of which was the radioactive iodine therapy at the
Philippine General Hospital. While his treatment with Dr. Lim was ongoing,
respondent sought the opinion of Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, who opined that he was
totally and permanently disabled for labor with a grade 1 impediment. [6] On
February 22, 1999, respondent underwent a whole body scan which revealed no
trace of radio iodine on his body to indicate metastasis or residual thyroid tissue.
The attending physician, Dr. Wilson D. Lim, confirmed the earlier assessments of
disability with a grade 9 impediment.[7]
All expenses incurred in respondents examination and treatments were shouldered
by the petitioners. Respondent was also paid the allowable illness allowances,
commensurate to a grade 9 impediment.
On June 25, 1999, petitioners offered US$13,060 as disability benefits which
respondent rejected. Respondent claimed that he deserves to be paid US$60,000
for a grade 1 impediment. Failing to reach an agreement, respondent filed, with the
Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB), a complaint for disability benefits, illness
allowance, damages and attorneys fees.
The Labor Arbiter ruled for respondent and ordered petitioners to pay respondent
US$60,000 as disability benefits, P100,000 as moral damages, and ten percent of
the total monetary award as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) initially reversed
the ruling of the RAB on the ground that findings of the company-designated
doctors were binding, as stipulated in the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) Standard Employment Contract.[8] However, upon respondents motion for
reconsideration, citing jurisprudence that findings of company-designated doctors

are self-serving, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the RAB with respect only to the
award of disability benefits.
Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for extension of time to file their petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On July 2, 2002, the appellate court denied the
motion on the ground that pressure of work is not a compelling reason for the grant
of an extension.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners motion for extension is DENIED
and the instant case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Prior to the receipt of the appellate courts denial, petitioners filed the
petition. It was noted without action in view of the July 2, 2002 Resolution.
[10]
Subsequently, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution, but it was
denied.[11]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari ascribing error to the Court of Appeals,
I. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE THEIR PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65, FAILING TO GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS THEREIN;
II. WHEN IT MERELY NOTED PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WITHOUT PERUSING THE
ALLEGATIONS THEREIN AND THE ARGUMENTS IN
SUPPORT THEREOF WHICH, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
IS CLEARLY INIQUITOUS AND UNJUST.[12]

Here, we are asked to resolve the procedural issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a
petition; and the substantive issue of the proper disability benefits that respondent
is entitled to.
Anent the procedural issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court
erroneously applied the ruling in Velasco v. Ortiz,[13] because the factual
circumstances therein were different from the present case. In Velasco, the parties
sought for the admission of their appeal that was filed beyond the reglementary
period. In the present case, however, petitioners filed their motion for extension of
time within the reglementary period. They maintain that they have a valid and
compelling reason in asking the appellate court for extension. Moreover,

petitioners posit that technical rules of procedure should give way to substantive
justice.
On the other hand, respondent argues that there should be more than a mere claim
of extreme pressure of work to justify an extension of time to file a petition for
certiorari. He calls attention to the fact that petitioners never moved for the
reconsideration of the NLRC decision, which is a prerequisite for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Likewise, respondent counters petitioners plea for liberality
by indicating their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
decision.
Jurisprudence abounds on the subject that a motion for reconsideration is a
prerequisite for the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. [14] A literal
interpretation of this prerequisite would require a motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC decision, which granted a previous motion for reconsideration and reversed
a prior decision. After all, the second decision is considered as entirely new.
We cannot fault the appellate court for faithfully complying with the rules of
procedure which it has been mandated to observe. [15] Save for the most persuasive
of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of
justice.[16]
Indeed, on several occasions, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their
cases. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided
only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.
Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as basis of
decisions.[17]
The reason for requiring a motion for reconsideration is to make sure that
administrative remedies have been exhausted before a case is appealed to a higher
court. It allows the adjudicator a second opportunity to review the case, to grapple
with the issues therein, and to decide anew a question previously raised. [18] It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a
matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in
its forum.[19]
With the first motion for reconsideration which the NLRC granted, there is
no need for the parties to file another motion for reconsideration before bringing up
the matter to the Court of Appeals. The NLRC was already given the opportunity

to pass upon and correct its mistakes. Moreover, it would be absurd to ask the
NLRC to keep on reversing itself.
Considering that property rights of both parties are involved here, we will
give due course to the instant petition. Remanding the case to the court a quo will
only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all
probability the case would end up with this Court. [20] Thus, we shall bring the
present controversy to rest by deciding on the appropriate disability benefits that
respondent is entitled to.
On the substantive issue, petitioners assert that the NLRC erred when it said that
findings of company-designated doctors are self-serving. They point out that there
were three doctors who came up with the same findings. They argue that these
findings were more credible than the findings of respondents doctor. In addition,
petitioners claim that the award of a grade 1 impediment/disability benefit was
wrong considering that respondent subsequently gained employment as chief mate
of another vessel.
In resolving the merits of the case, we find pertinent Section 30 of the POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996,[21] which provides the schedule of
disability or impediment for injuries suffered and illness contracted. The particular
illness of the respondent is not within those enumerated. But, the same provision
supplies us with the guideline that any item in the schedule classified under grade 1
constitutes total and permanent disability.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more
than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
[22]
As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18,
1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical
treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to
earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainments could do.[23] It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability
compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.[24]
Although the company-designated doctors and respondents physician differ
in their assessments of the degree of respondents disability, both found that
respondent was unfit for sea-duty due to respondents need for regular medical

check-ups and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea. There is
no question in our mind that respondents disability was total.
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent
was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. [25] Nonetheless, this
information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was
unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that
respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the
illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total
disability.[26] An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be
germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making
ends meet at the time when he is unable to work.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated
July 2, 2002 and August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
71293, as well as the Resolution dated April 9, 2002 of the National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 23333-2000 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________

G.R. No. 177578 : January 25, 2012

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and/or WASTFEL-LARSEN MANAGEMENT A/S, Petitioners, v. OBERTO S.
LOBUSTA, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Oberto S. Lobusta is a seaman who has worked for Magsaysay Maritime Corporation since 1994. In March
1998, he was hired again as Able Seaman by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. Lobusta boarded MV "Fossanger" on March
16, 1998. After two months, he complained of breathing difficulty and back pain.
On May 12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore, Lobusta was admitted at Gleneagles Maritime Medical Center and

was diagnosed to be suffering from severe acute bronchial asthma with secondary infection and lumbosacral muscle strain.
Dr. C K Lee certified that Lobusta was fit for discharge on May 21, 1998, for repatriation for further treatment.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was referred to Metropolitan Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr. Robert Lim, issued numerous
medical reports regarding Lobustas condition. Upon reexamination by the Orthopedic Surgeon on August 11, 1998, he
opined that Lobusta needs surgery, called decompression laminectomy, which was done on August 30, 1998.
As the parties failed to reach a settlement as to the amount to which Lobusta is entitled, Lobusta filed on October 2, 2000, a
complaint for disability/medical benefits against petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay Lobusta (a) US$2,060 as medical allowance, (b)
US$20,154 as disability benefits, and (c) 5% of the awards as attorneys fees. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA
decision. Unsatisfied, Lobusta brought the case to the CA. The CA granted the petition for certiorari of Lobusta and modified
the findings of the NLRC. As aforesaid, the CA declared that Lobusta is suffering from permanent total disability and
increased the award of disability benefits in his favor to US$60,000. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Labor Code instead of the provisions of the POEA
contract in determining Lobustas disability, and in ruling that the mere lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta to total and
permanent disability benefits. The CA allegedly erred also in holding them liable for attorneys fees, despite the absence of
legal and factual bases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in in applying the provisions of the Labor Code instead of the provisions of the POEA
contract in determining Lobustas disability, and in ruling that the mere lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta to total and
permanent disability benefits.
HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed.
Labor Law
Standard terms of the POEA Standard Employment Contract agreed upon are intended to be read and understood in
accordance with Philippine laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, as amended, and the applicable
implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance.
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard Employment Contract that must be considered in determining
Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc., we said that whether the Labor Codes provision on permanent total
disability applies to seafarers is already a settled matter.
In Palisoc, we cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission where we said (1) that the standard
employment contract for seafarers was formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 247 "to
secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance therewith," and "to
promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas"; (2) that Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard
Employment Contract itself provides that all rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, including the annexes
thereof, shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants
where the Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that even without this provision, a contract of labor is so impressed with public
interest that the Civil Code expressly subjects it to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is
allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either
fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
To be sure, there is one Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, as stated in Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, as
amended, and the ECC Rules. We also note that the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA Standard
Employment Contract was lifted verbatim from the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 1996 POEA Standard
Employment Contract, to wit:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
Applying the foregoing considerations, we agree with the CA that Lobusta suffered permanent total disability. On this point,
the NLRC ruling was not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was first examined by the Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22, 1998. The
maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-treatment period expired, but no declaration was made that Lobusta is fit to work. Nor
was there a declaration of the existence of Lobustas permanent disability. On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was still

prescribed medications for his lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for reevaluation. May 22, 1998 to February 16,
1999 is 264 days or 6 days short of 9 months.
In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work again as a seaman and that his disability is permanent "as he
has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the present or for more than 120 days." This period is more than eight years,
counted until the CA decided the case in August 2006. On the CA ruling that Lobustas disability is permanent since he was
unable to work "for more than 120 days," we have clarified in Vergara that this "temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days."
Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as permanent total disability benefits, the maximum award under
Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract. We also affirm the award of US$2,060 as sickness
allowance which is not contested and appears to have been accepted by the parties.
DENIED
_______________________________________

DISABILITY BENEFIT OF SEAFARERS

Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. And
probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least, be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere
possibility will
disease.

not

suffice;

a claimwill fail if

there

is

only a possibility that

the

employment

caused

the

(ARNALDO G. GABUNAS, SR.v. SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., MR.

VICENTE BRILLANTES AND IUM SHIP MANAGEMENT, G.R. No. 188637, 15 December
2010)

That the exact and definite cause of petitioners illness is unknown cannot be used to justify grant of
disability benefits, absent proof that there is any reasonable connection between work actually performed by
petitioner

and

his

illness.

(JERRY M. FRANCISCO v. BAHIASHIPPING SERVICES, INC.

and/or CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA, and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES, LTD, G.R. No.
190545, 22 November 2010)

Respondent was thus required to undergo post-employment medical examination by a company-designated

physician within three working days from arrival. He failed to comply with the requirement, however, without
explanation or justification therefor. Hence, he forfeited his right to claim disability benefits.

(PHILIPPINE

TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., GLOBAL NAVIGATION, LTD. v. SILVINO A. NAZAM,

G.R. No. 190804, 11 October 2010)

In addition, the Supreme Court (SC) explained that specifically with respect to mental diseases, for the
same to be compensable, the POEA-SEC requires that it must be due to traumatic injury to the head which did not
occur in this case.

(PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., GLOBAL NAVIGATION,

LTD. v. SILVINO A. NAZAM, G.R. No. 190804, 11 October 2010)

In the absence of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be accepted to have caused or at least
increased the risk of contracting the disease, in this case, brief psychotic disorder. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove
work-causation

or

work-aggravation

imposed

by

law

is

real

and

not

merely

apparent.

(EDGARDO M.

PANGANIBAN v. TARA TRADING SHIPMANAGEMENT INC. AND SHINLINE SDN BHD,

G.R. No. 187032, 18 October 2010)

It appears premature at this time to consider petitioners disability as permanent and total because the severity of
his ailment has not been established with finality to render him already incapable of performing the work of a
seafarer. In fact, the medical expert termed his condition as brief psychotic disorder. The SC also takes note, as the
CAcorrectly did, that petitioner did not finish his treatment with the company-designated physician, hence, there is
no

final

evaluation yet on

petitioner.

(EDGARDO

M.

PANGANIBAN

v.

TARA

TRADING

SHIPMANAGEMENT INC. AND SHINLINE SDN BHD, G.R. No. 187032, 18 October
2010)

The snap on the back of Illescas was not an accident, but an injury sustained by Illescas from carrying the
heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the
result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted
from

the

performance

INC./BARBER SHIP

of

duty.

MANAGEMENT

183054, 29 September 2010)

(NFD
LTD.v.

INTERNATIONAL
ESMERALDO

C.

MANNING
ILLESCAS,

AGENTS,
G.R.

No.

The Supreme Court (SC) sustained the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in granting total and permanent
disability benefits in favor of Villamater, as it was sufficiently shown that his having contracted colon cancer was, at
the very least, aggravated by his working conditions, taking into consideration his dietary provisions on board, his
age, and his job as Chief Engineer, who was primarily in charge of the technical and mechanical operations of the
vessels

to

ensure

voyage

safety.

(LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. and WORLD MARINE

PANAMA, S.A. v. CATALINO U. VILLAMATER, et al., G.R. No. 179169, 3 March 2010)

Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of

work-connection and not direct causal relation is required. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the
test

of

proof

in

compensation

proceedings.

(LEONIS NAVIGATION CO., INC. and WORLD

MARINE PANAMA, S.A. v. CATALINO U. VILLAMATER, et al., G.R. No. 179169, 3

March 2010)

It is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from
his

repatriation. The

benefits.

unexplained

omission

of

this

requirement

will

bar

the

filing

of

a claim for

disability

(ALEX C. COOTAUCO v. MMS PHIL. MARITIME SERVICES, INC., MS. MARY C.

MAQUILAN AND/OR MMS CO. LTD., G.R. No. 184722, 15 March 2010)

Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement
of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

It does not mean absolute

helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to
work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity.

(RIZALDY M. QUITORIANO v. JEBSENS

MARITIME, INC./ MA. THERESA GUTAY and/or ATLE JEBSENS MANAGEMENT A/S ,
G.R. No. 179868, 21 January 2010)

Since cholecystolithiasis or gallstone has been excluded as a compensable illness under the applicable
standard contract for Filipino seafarers that binds both respondent Abalos and the vessels foreign owner, it was an
error for the CA to treat Abalos illness as "work-related" and, therefore, compensable. The standard contract
precisely did not consider gallstone as compensable illness because the parties agreed, presumably based on
medical science, that such affliction is not caused by working on board ocean-going vessels. Nor has respondent
Abalos proved by some evidence that the nature of his work on board a ship aggravated his illness.

(BANDILA

SHIPPING, INC., MR. REGINALDO A. OBEN, BANDILA SHIPPING, INC. and FUYOH
SHIPPING, INC., v. MARCOS C. ABALOS, G.R. No. 177100, 22 February 2010)

Considering the circumstances prevailing in the instant case, the SC ruled that it did not matter that the
company-designated physician assessed petitioner as fit to work. It is undisputed that from the time petitioner was
repatriated, he was unable to work for more than 120 days as he was only certified fit to work 199 days thereafter.
Consequently, petitioner's disability is considered permanent and total. In fact, from his repatriation until the filing
of his petition before the SC, or for more than five years, petitioner claims that he was unable to resume his job as
a

seaman which

thus

strongly

indicates

that

his

disability

is

permanent

and

total.

(CARMELITO N.

VALENZONA v. FAIR SHIPPING CORPORATION and/or SEJIN LINES COMPANY

LIMITED, G.R. No. 176884, 19 October 2011)

For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000

POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be
work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed
during the term of the seafarers employment contract. In other words, to be
entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient
to

establish

that

the

seafarers

illness

or

injury

has

rendered

him

permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a

causal connection between the seafarers illness or injury and the work for
which

he

had

been

contracted. (GILBERT

QUIZORA

v.

DENHOLM

MANAGEMENT (PHILIPPINES), INC., G.R. No. 185412, November 16, 2011)

CREW

Lastly, there is also no proof that petitioners varicose veins caused

him to suffer total and permanent disability. The Pre-Employment Medical
Examination(PEME) he underwent cannot serve as enough basis to justify a
finding of a total and permanent disability because of its non-exploratory
nature. The fact that respondent passed the companys PEME is of no
moment. We have ruled that in the past the PEME is not exploratory in
nature.

It

was

examination

of

not
an

intended
applicants

to

be

medical

totally

in-depth

and

condition. (GILBERT

thorough

QUIZORA

v.

DENHOLM CREW MANAGEMENT (PHILIPPINES), INC., G.R. No. 185412, November

16, 2011)

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind
of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of
his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is
not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's
earning capacity.

(FIL-STAR MARITIME CORPORATION, CAPTAIN VICTORIO S. MIGALLOS

and GRANDSLAM ENTERPRISE CORPORATION v. HANZIEL O. ROSETE, G.R. No.

192686, November 23, 2011)

A total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is
necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom
(Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146636, Aug. 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221). On the other hand, a total
disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.

(FIL-STAR MARITIME

CORPORATION, CAPTAIN VICTORIO S. MIGALLOS and GRANDSLAM ENTERPRISE

CORPORATION v. HANZIEL O. ROSETE, G.R. No. 192686, November 23, 2011)

A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the
240

day

period,

declares

it

to

be

so,

or

when

after

the

lapse

of

the

same,

he

fails

to

make

such

declaration.

(ALEN

H.

SANTIAGO

v.

PACBASIN

SHIPMANAGEMENT,

INC.

and/or

MAJESTIC CARRIERS, INC., G.R. No. 194677, 18 April 2012)

For purposes of determining the seafarers degree of disability, it is the company-designated physician who
must proclaim that he sustained a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness,
during the term of his employment.

(DANIEL M. ISON, v. CREWSERVE, INC., et al., G.R. No.

173951, 16 April 2012)

Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for

more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he losses the use of any
part of his body.(MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and/or WASTFEL-LARSEN
MANAGEMENT A/S + vs. OBERTO S. LOBUSTA, G.R. No. 177578, January 25, 2012)

The 120-day period is when the seafarer is considered to be totally yet

temporarily disabled, thus, entitling him to sickness wages. This is also the
period given to the employer to determine whether the seafarer is fit for sea
duty or permanently disabled and the degree of such disability. (C.F. SHARP
CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., et al. v. JOEL D. TAOK, G.R. No. 193679, July 18, 2012)

When the company-designated physician made a declaration that Tomacruz was already fit to work, 249
days had already lapsed from the time he was repatriated. As such, his temporary total disability should be deemed
total and permanent, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and its implementing rule.

(PHILASIA

SHIPPING AGENCY CORPORATION, et al. vs. ANDRES G. TOMACRUZ, G.R. No.

181180, 15 August 2012)

A seafarer, to be entitled to disability benefits, must prove that the injury was suffered during the term of
the employment, and must submit himself to the company-designated physician for evaluation within three days

from

his

repatriation.

(WALLEM

MARITIME

SERVICES,

INC.

VS.

ERNESTO

C.

TANAWAN, G.R. No. 160444, August 29, 2012)

It is evident that the maximum 240-day medical treatment period

expired in this case without a declaration of Medels fitness to work or the
existence

of

his

permanent

disability

determined.

Accordingly, Medels

temporary total disability should be deemed permanent and thus, he is

entitled to permanent total disability benefits. (FAIR SHIPPING CORP., and/or
KOHYU MARINE CO., LTD. v. JOSELITO T. MEDEL, G.R. No. 177907, 29 August
2012)

Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or
work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.

(PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING,

INC. et al. v. BENJAMIN D. PENALES, G.R. No. 162809, 5 September 2012)

It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered
by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and
his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very
least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.

(ESSIE V. DAVID, represented by

his wife, MA. THERESA S. DAVID, and children, KATHERINE and KRISTINA DAVID v.
OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., and/or MICHAELMAR SHIPPING SERVICES,
G.R. No. 197205, 26 September 2012)

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the companydesignated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the
seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness,
during the term of the latter's employment. It is his findings and evaluations

which

should

form

the

basis

of

the

seafarer's

disability

claim.

His

assessment, however, is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on the

claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts, as its inherent merits would still
have to be weighed and duly considered. The seafarer may dispute such
assessment by seasonably exercising his prerogative to seek a second
opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. In case of disagreement between
the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor
of choice, the employer and the seaman may agree jointly to refer the latter
to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them. (RUBEN
D. ANDRADA v. AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC., and/or SONNET SHIPPING
LTD./MALTA, G.R. No. 194758, 24 October 2012)

A seafarers inability to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered
an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability
benefits in his favor. The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the companydesignated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same, he fails
to make such declaration.

(BENJAMIN C. MILLAN vs. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC.,

et al., G.R. No. 195168, 12 November 2012)

Illnesses need not be shown to be work-related to be compensable under the 1996 POEA-SEC, which
covers all injuries or illnesses occurring in the lifetime of the employment contract. It is enough that the seafarer
proves that his or her injury or illness was acquired during the term of employment to support a claim for disability
benefits. (CAREER

PHILIPPINES

SHIPMANAGEMENT,

INC.

et al.

v.

SALVADOR

T.

SERNA, G.R. No. 172086, 3 December 2012)

The obligation imposed by the mandatory reporting requirement under the 1996 POEA-SEC is not solely on
the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act on the report, and in this sense partakes of the nature of a
reciprocal obligation. While the mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer to be present for the postemployment medical examination, which must be conducted within three (3) working days upon the seafarers

return, it also poses the employer the implied obligation to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the
seafarer.

(CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. et al. v. SALVADOR T.

SERNA, G.R. No. 172086, 3 December 2012)

It would be fairly easy for a physician to determine whether the injury or ailment is work-related within
three-days from repatriation, to ignore the requirement would set a precedent with negative repercussions which
would

open

the

floodgates

INTERNATIONAL

to

limitless

SHIPPING,

number

INC.

VS.

of

seafarers

THE

claiming

HEIRS

OF

disability

THE

benefits.

LATE

(LOADSTAR

ENRIQUE

C.

CALAWIGAN REPRESENTED BY THE LEGAL SPOUSE MARITESS C. CALAWIGAN, G.R.

No. 187337, 5 December 2012)

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability to be compensable, all of the following conditions
must be satisfied under the POEA-SEC: (1) the seafarers work must involve the risks described in the contract; (2)
the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was
contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no
notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

(LOADSTAR INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC.

VS. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ENRIQUE C. CALAWIGAN REPRESENTED BY THE LEGAL
SPOUSE MARITESS C. CALAWIGAN,G.R. No. 187337, 5 December 2012)

While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the

seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC, it cannot allow claims for compensation
based on conjectures and probabilities. When there is no evidence on record
to permit compensability, the Court has no choice but to deny the claim, lest
injustice

is

caused

to

the

employer. (CREW

AND

SHIP

MANAGEMENT

INTERNATIONAL INC. and SALENA INC. v. JINA T. SORIA, G.R. No. 175491, 10
December 2012)

The company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarers fitness to work or
permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarers medical
condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

(KESTREL

SHIPPING CO., INC./ CAPT. AMADOR P. SERVILLON and ATLANTIC MANNING LTD. v.
FRANCISCO D. MUNAR, G.R. No. 198501, 30 January 2013)

A seafarers compliance with the under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC presupposes that the companydesignated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the
120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the
seafarer had nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and
permanent.

(KESTREL

SHIPPING

CO.,

INC./

CAPT.

AMADOR

P.

SERVILLON

and

ATLANTIC MANNING LTD. v. FRANCISCO D. MUNAR, G.R. No. 198501, 30 January

2013)

While it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered a permanent
disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a second opinion. Accordingly, if
serious doubt exists on the company-designated physician's declaration of the nature of a seaman's injury and its
corresponding
made.

impediment

grade,

resort

to

prognosis

of

other

competent

medical

professionals

should

be

(RAMON G. NAZARENO v. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC., AND ELITE

SHIPPING A/S, G.R. No. 168703, 26 February 2013)

__________________________________

The beneficiaries of a deceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as they are able to establish that (a) the
seafarers death is work-related, and (b) such death had occurred during the term of his employment contract.
G.R. No. 198408, 12 November 2014
Complainant Conchita J. Racelis, as the surviving spouse of Rodolfo L. Racelis, initiated a claim for death benefits pursuant to the
International Transport Workers Federation-Collective Bargaining Agreement (ITWF-CBA), of which her husband was a member.
However, her claim was denied by the employer on the ground that the death was not work-related as it was due to Brainstem
(pontine) Cavernous Malformation, which was congenital and it had familiar strains according to a doctor. Thus, complainant
instituted a labor case against them.
Previously, Rodolfo L. Racelis was recruited and hired by respondent United Philippine Lines, Inc. (UPL) for its principal,
respondent Holland America Lines, Inc. (HAL) to serve as Demi Chef De Partie on board the vessel MS Prinsendam, with a basic

monthly salary of US$799.55.5 The Contract of Employment was for a term of four (4) months, extendible for another two (2)
months upon mutual consent. After complying with the required pre-employment medical examination where he was declared fit to
work, Rodolfo joined the vessel on January 25, 2008. Prior thereto, Rodolfo was repeatedly contracted by said respondents and was
deployed under various contracts since December 17, 1985.
On his last employment, Rodolfo experienced severe pain in his ears and high blood pressure causing him to collapse while in the
performance of his duties. He consulted a doctor in Argentina and was medically repatriated on February 20, 2008 for further
medical treatment. Upon arrival in Manila, he was immediately brought to Medical City, Pasig City, where he was seen by a
company-designated physician, Dr. Gerardo Legaspi, M.D. (Dr. Legaspi), and was diagnosed to be suffering from Brainstem
(pontine) Cavernous Malformation. He underwent surgery twice for the said ailment but developed complications and died on
March 2, 2008.
HELD: The employer was held liable. Deemed incorporated in every seafarers employment contract, denominated as the POEASEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract, is a set of standard provisions
determined and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for
the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.
In the 2000 POEA-SEC, it stipulates that the beneficiaries of a deceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as
they are able to establish that (a) the seafarers death is work-related, and (b) such death had occurred during the term
of his employment contract.
Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, work-related injury is defined as injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the
course of employment. On the other hand, work-related illness is defined as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a
result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.
Jurisprudence provides that [t]he words arising out of refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words in the course of refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a
matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise in the course of employment when it takes place within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.
Here, the death of the seafarer is evidently work-related. While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not
listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that
[t[he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as
follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are dispuatbly presumed as work related. In other
words, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed
in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the
POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer
to overcome the presumption. This presumption should be overturned only when the employers refutation is found to be supported
by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion.
Further, the seafarers death occurred during the term of employment. While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of
terminating the seafarers contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes
the proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.
The 1987 Constitution affords full protection to labor. Consistent with the States avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as
enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of
Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. As such, it is a standing principle that its
provisions are to be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in their favor.
Guided by these principles, it has been held that a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception to the second requirement
under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that the seafarers death had occurred during the term of his employment, in
view of the terminative consequences of a medical repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same. In essence, the Court held that
under such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it is enough that the
seafarers work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment.
As for the award, respondents never died and therefore admitted that the late Rodolfos membership in the AMOSUP that had
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with HAL, or the ITWF-CBA is applicable. Its provisions therefore must prevail over
the standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment Contract. Hence, the NLRCs award of

US$60,000.00 as compensation for the death of Rodolfo in accordance with Article 21.2.1 of the ITWF-CBA was in order. The same
holds true for the award of burial assistance in the amount of US$1,000.00 which is provided under Section 20 (A) (4) (c) of the
2000 POEA-SEC. Moreover, conformably with existing case law, the NLRCs grant of attorneys fees in the amount of US$6,100.00
was called for since petitioner was forced to litigate to protect her valid claim. Where an employee is forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the award.