South European Society and Politics

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The 2014 Local Elections in Greece: Looking for

Patterns in a Changing Political System
Yannis Tsirbas
To cite this article: Yannis Tsirbas (2015) The 2014 Local Elections in Greece: Looking for
Patterns in a Changing Political System, South European Society and Politics, 20:1, 133-155,
DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2014.1002555
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Date: 20 November 2016, At: 13:15

South European Society and Politics, 2015

Vol. 20, No. 1, 133155, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2014.1002555

The 2014 Local Elections in Greece:

Looking for Patterns in a Changing
Political System
Yannis Tsirbas

In May 2014, municipal and regional elections were held in Greece, concurrently with
European elections. This was the first electoral test after the 2012 twin earthquake
elections, which marked the beginning of a radical restructuring of the Greek political
system. The fragmentation and inconsistency of voting behaviour across different polls in
2014 indicate that Greek politics remains in a transitional phase whose final outcome is
still contested. Other characteristics of the elections, including the high proportion of
independent candidates, the radical renewal of political personnel and the emergence
of Berlusconism in two major municipalities, underline the continuing lack of legitimacy
of the political system.
Keywords: Local Government Elections; Greece; New Democracy; SYRIZA; PASOK;
Golden Dawn

The 2014 local government elections, held simultaneously with the European
Parliament elections, marked the first electoral contest in Greece after the twin
earthquake parliamentary elections of 2012. In Greece, local elections are never really
locally isolated and always bear importance for the national political scene
(Moschonas 2003, p. 107). Especially after the massive dealignment and restructuring
initiated in 2012, the local elections of 2014 were a test of where significant players in
Greek politics, old and new, stood in terms of electoral influence. The questions this
paper aims to address include who were the winners and losers of the local elections,
the implications of the results for the Greek political system as a whole and how they
linked to the special characteristics of Greek politics which have emerged in relation to
the economic crisis and the elections of 2012. The local elections of 2014 also have
some special features that are worth presenting and analysing.

q 2015 Taylor & Francis

134

Y. Tsirbas

Brief Theoretical Background

It is quite common for local elections studies to employ the well-known concept of
second-order elections (SOE), introduced in the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt
(1980) about the 1979 first European elections. The second-order concepts basic
assumption is that national elections constitute a first-order political arena, which
directly influences behaviour in second-order political arenas, like European or
regional elections. Hence, the latter elections are subordinate to national ones,
where stakes, namely the decision of who will govern, are higher. The main
hypotheses of the less-at-stake model are that the turnout in this kind of election
is lower; small and new political parties have greater chances of receiving a higher
percentage of the votes; there will be more blank/invalid ballots; and the governing
parties will lose strength (Reif & Schmitt 1980, p. 9). Protest parties and radical
populist parties are also expected to be stronger in SOE (Reif 1997, p. 118). The key
explanatory variable for the degree to which the above developments take place
especially those concerning party strength is the position of SOE in the electoral
cycle: the further their distance from national elections, the stronger the secondorder effects are and vice versa (Reif & Schmitt 1980, p. 10). Of course, specific
characteristics of SOE also play a role, as do political circumstances at a national
level. Undoubtedly, there are important issues in second-order political arenas as
well, while party platforms, specific candidates and campaigns are also important
(Reif & Schmitt 1980, p. 10).
Regional and municipal elections are, of course, SOE but at the same time not all of
these contests are merely subordinate to national politics. Schakel and Jeffery, in their
study of 2,933 regional elections in 17 countries, have shown that the second-order
pattern is not entirely followed (Schakel & Jeffery 2013, p. 17) and that regional
elections can be elections in their own terms, thus identifying a nationalising bias of
the classical assumptions for SOE. Also, in Britain in the past, local elections did not
always fully conform to the SOE model, compared with European elections, the
former being more significant than the latter (Heath et al. 1999). Similarly, in Greece,
both turnout and electoral results of prefectural elections, especially after 2002, were
steadily closer to those of national elections than of European ones, resulting in their
characterisation as quasi-parliamentary (Mavris 2003, 2006, p. 133) rather than
second-order.
Therefore, local elections could either be quasi-parliamentary, second-order or
elections in their own terms. Hence, the questions concerning the Greek local
elections of 2014 are as follows: did they ultimately have a national or local character?
Did they serve as a means for the Greek electorate to protest against governmental
policies? Was there a government opposition polarisation? What were the gains and
losses of the government and opposition parties? Did smaller parties indeed perform
better, as the SOE model assumes? Did turnout decrease and blank/invalid ballots
increase compared with parliamentary elections? How did Greek voters deal with three
simultaneous elections?

South European Society and Politics

135

The Context of the Elections

The Political Situation
The 2014 local elections were held within a social and political context largely defined
by the economic crisis. In 2010, the single-party government of PASOK (Panellnio
Sosialistik Knhma [Panhellenic Socialist Movement]), led by Georgios
Papandreou, signed an international bailout agreement, accompanied by a
memorandum of understanding or mnimonio [mnhmnio ]. The first memorandum
and a second one signed in February 2012, prescribed severe austerity measures and
drastic fiscal reforms. At the time of the 2014 elections, Greece was still facing great
economic challenges. Recession continued with a further drop of 0.2 per cent of
output in the second quarter of 2014,1 adding to a total loss of 23.9 per cent of gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2007 13. Globally, this is the third biggest recession after
Canada and the United States (US) in 1929 33.2 Unemployment stood at 26.6 per
cent in the second quarter of 2014, slightly improved compared with 27.5 per cent in
2013 but almost three times the 9.6 per cent of 2009. Frequent strikes, protests and
demonstrations had occurred, especially in the first period of the implementation of
the austerity measures, as well as a fierce public debate concerning the necessity and
scope of the memoranda. The mnimonio division (between political parties that
supported the memoranda, on the one hand, and political parties that opposed them,
on the other), while not having the time to fully take shape and affect the 2010 local
elections (Verney 2012), was the main issue of the 2012 parliamentary elections, acting
as the main voting criterion for around 60 per cent of the electorate (Koustenis 2014,
p. 107). By this time, the centre-right ND (Na Dhmokrata [New Democracy ]),
which had voted against the first memorandum, had joined the pro-mnimonio camp.
In terms of the party system, the 2012 elections marked an abrupt end to a
bipartisanship that had lasted for more than three decades, when PASOK and ND
alternated in power, usually receiving between them around 80 per cent of the votes.
In 2012, both parties hit historical lows. ND received 19 per cent of the votes
(compared with 33 per cent in 2009) and PASOK finished third with 13 per cent

Table 1 Greek Parliamentary Election Results, 2009 12

ND
SYRIZA
PASOK
ANEL
GD
DIMAR
KKE
Other

June 2012 (%)

May 2012 (%)

2009 (%)

29.7
26.9
12.3
7.5
6.9
6.3
4.5
5.9

18.9
16.8
13.2
10.6
7.0
6.1
8.5
18.9

33.5
4.6
43.9

0.3

7.5
10.2

Source: Ministry of the Interior, www.ekloges.ypes.gr

136

Y. Tsirbas

(44 per cent in 2009). Another significant player emerged in second place: SYRIZA
(Synaspism6 th6 Pizospastik6 Arister6 [Coalition of the Radical Left]), with
17 per cent (five per cent in 2009). Electoral volatility quadrupled, while the sum of the
votes of the two first parties was the lowest since 1926 (Stathopoulos 2014, p. 61).
In total, 60 per cent of the Greek electorate switched preferences between the national
elections of October 2009 and May 2012, while more than half a million voters exited
the electorate (Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos 2014, pp. 21 22). Of the four other parties
that won seats in 2012, three entered Parliament for the first time, including neo-nazi
GD (Xrys Ayg [Golden Dawn ])with seven per cent of the vote, its support coming
mostly from alienated PASOK and ND voters, as well as newly enfranchised ones
(Georgiadou 2013, p. 92). The other parliamentary parties were: the antimemorandum populist right-wing ANEL (Anejrthtoi Ellhne6 [Independent
Greeks ]), founded less than three months before the elections, with 10.6 per cent; the
anti-memorandum KKE (Kommoynistik Kmma Ellda6 [Greek Communist
Party]), the oldest Greek political party, with 8.5 per cent; and DIMAR (Dhmokratik
Arister [Democratic Left ]), a left-wing, pro-European party that split from SYRIZA
in 2010, with 6.1 per cent. No government could be formed and new elections were held
in June 2012, with the same seven parties entering parliament and ND and SYRIZA
increasing their vote share by 11 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively (see Table 1). The
second election was followed by the formation of a coalition government between the
one-time adversaries ND and PASOK, including the participation of DIMAR, under
ND leader Antonis Samaras, who remained prime minister during the 2014 elections.
Hence, in 2012 politics became highly contentious and gained the shape of a
triangular polarisation, with pro-bailout governmental forces, anti-bailout forces on
the left and anti-bailout but also xenophobic and isolationist forces on the right
(Teperoglou & Tsatsanis 2014, p. 17). Moreover, the above developments were built
on a deep and long-term loss of trust in political institutions, completely unlike
anything happening in the EU (Verney 2014, p. 33). This loss of trust preceded the
economic crisis, was exacerbated by it and was one of the dominant characteristics of
the Greek political system at the time of the 2014 local elections. In 2014, the
mnimonio division was still present, albeit with some alterations in its content. By this
time, the main argument of the pro-memorandum governmental camp (comprising
ND and PASOK after DIMARs withdrawal from the government in 2013) was that the
end of the crisis was near, when the Greek peoples sacrifices would pay off, and that all
that was needed was patience. The core argument of the anti-memorandum camp,
which included all the parliamentary opposition parties, was that the bailout measures
only deepened the crisis and widened social inequalities, and there was no real
prospect of tackling the countrys debt unless a different economic policy was pursued.
The 2014 local elections fell in the middle of the electoral cycle. However, it could be
argued that the electoral climate and public discourse somewhat resembled that of an
election held towards the end of the electoral cycle. This was due to the widely
discussed possibility of an early national election in the case of a deadlock in the
parliamentary election of the president of the Republic3 due by March 2015. Two other

South European Society and Politics

137

factors also played a part in assigning a national meaning to the local elections: the
simultaneous holding of European elections and the political strategy of SYRIZA.
The Institutional Framework
Local government in Greece is structured at two levels, consisting of 325 municipalities
and 13 regions. This was only the second time that elections had been held at a
regional level since the major Kallikrates reform of 2010 and the local elections of that
year. Kallikrates reduced the number of municipalities from 1,033 while the second tier
of local government moved up from the 50 prefectures to the regions. The decrease in
the number of second-tier local government units and their corresponding
concentration, since each region consisted of two to seven prefectures, could only
enhance their political significance at a national level. In the first regional elections of
2010, under a surface of deceptive stability lay clear signs of the crisis of trust in
political institutions and the future restructuring of the Greek political system that was
to occur in 2012 (Verney 2012, p. 210).
Electoral law prescribes for both municipal and regional elections a majoritarian
system in two rounds: candidates may be elected in the first round with an absolute
majority or in a second round run-off between the two leading candidates. Party
candidacies are not officially allowed and in each local unit, whether a municipality or
a region, a separate list must be formed with its own name and logo. However, the
political leanings of the candidates as well as their party affiliations and endorsements
are widely known in local societies. The winning list receives two-thirds of council
seats in the municipalities and three-fifths in the regions. Traditionally, there has been
no use for post-election agreements in the local councils, and alliances are usually
formed prior to the election. However, between the first and second rounds, it is
common for a lot of bargaining to take place between eliminated and finalist
candidates, while at the central level parties often have an explicit or implicit secondround strategy in cases where their candidates are not in the second round.
As predicted by classic laws of political science (Duverger 1951), the high 50 per cent
threshold leads to candidates contesting the elections, even if they do not have a
realistic chance of winning, in order to influence developments and enter the
aforementioned bargaining process, and it is also easier for party members who do not
get official party support to run as rebel candidates. An outright win in the first round
occurred in only one of the 13 regions in 2014 and two in 2010 and in one-third of
municipalities in both 2014 (114/325) and 2010 (104/325).
Another aspect of the institutional context concerned the timing of the elections.
The Kallikrates reform had decreed that, in future, local elections would be held
simultaneously with the European Parliament elections, for cost-cutting purposes.
This also meant an increase in the local government term in office from four to five
years. However, before the 2014 elections, the governing majority passed a legislative
amendment moving the first round of the local elections one week earlier, so that the
European elections would coincide with the second round. This became a hotly

138

Y. Tsirbas

contested issue, with opposition parties, academics and the mayors of Athens and
Thessaloniki all accusing the governing parties of electoral manipulation. The
argument was that if the predicted victory of SYRIZA occurred in the European
Parliament elections before the second round of the local government elections, voters
would be more likely to opt for anti-government candidates in the latter. However, it
may have worked the other way round: the fact SYRIZA did not do impressively well in
the first round of the local elections may have resulted in the mobilisation of its
electorate for the second round and for the European elections.
Party Strategies
In 2014, the Ministry of the Interior registered some kind of party affiliation, party
origin or endorsement for only 45 out of 325 elected mayors. The respective number
for 2010 was 150, while in previous elections the vast majority of candidates had some
kind of party affiliation either official, in the form of proper endorsement, or
unofficial. Of course, a trend towards independent candidates had started to emerge as
early as 1998 (Lyrintzis 2000, p. 13), but at that time was rather marginal. In 2014, the
phenomenon reached its peak so far. This is a clear reflection of the fluid situation of
the Greek political system, where being associated with a political party, especially a
governing party, has become a perceived disadvantage, in contrast to the practice for
many years, when prospective candidates at the local level strove to get official party
support. This was evident at the party level as well. For instance, PASOK did not offer
any official endorsements, at either regional or municipal level, even though many
candidates were well-known members of the party or incumbents elected with official
PASOK support in 2010.
ND had a modest target of retaining or increasing the number of regions it had won
in 2010 and insisted on downplaying the national character that SYRIZA was trying to
give to the local elections. SYRIZAs strategy was epitomised by its slogan, three polls,
one vote, urging voters to use national political criteria and vote for the partys
candidates across all three elections, regardless of the particularities of different
contests. The party gave a clear anti-governmental and anti-austerity character to its
discourse and another of its central slogans was on the 25th we vote, on the 26th they
leave, suggesting there could be a government change the day after the concurrent
second round of the local elections and European elections. In 2010 it was the then
official opposition, ND, which had given local elections a status of national
referendum. Campaigns with national characteristics also took place in the local
elections of 2006 (Mavris 2006, p. 131), of 2002 (Mavris 2002, p. 44) and before.
PASOK, through the statements of its leader, Evangelos Venizelos, made clear that
its main electoral goal was to win third place in the European elections, downplaying
the importance of the local ones. KKE, running lists in every region and almost every
municipality, pursued the isolationist strategy it followed at the national level, refusing
to form any kind of alliance anywhere. GD followed an opposite strategy, common to
radical right-wing parties (Georgiadou 2013, p. 89): acknowledging that it did not

South European Society and Politics

139

have the organisational strength to support many candidates, it followed the logic of a
few strongholds at the municipal level, contesting only nine of the 100 most
significant municipalities. It also ran candidates in 12 of the 13 regions (the exception
was the Northern Aegean). GDs discourse was clearly anti-political and anti-party and
also dominated by racist, anti-immigrant and anti-EU rhetoric. ANEL supported
candidates, whether from its own ranks or from another party, in only six of the 13
regions and in a handful of municipalities, focusing more on the European elections.
DIMARs declared aim was to combat the polarisation of the political scene between
ND and SYRIZA and to provide solutions at the local level. The party renewed its
support for the successful independent candidates whom it had supported jointly with
PASOK in 2010, adding a few others as well and supporting a candidate in 12 regions.
Except in the Peloponnese region, the governing partners, ND and PASOK, did not
choose to promote joint candidacies in any other region or major municipality in the
first round. Instead, they formed separate lists and ran against each other. This was a key
factor in preventing the local elections from acquiring the character of a government
opposition battle or of the aforementioned triangular shape. The two governing parties
supported each others candidacies only in the second round and especially in cases
where the opposing candidate came from SYRIZA, notably in the municipality of Athens
and the Attica region. In sum, at the regional level, there were two joint candidacies from
SYRIZA and the Ecologists-Greens (Oikolgoi Prsinoi), four from PASOK/DIMAR
and one from DIMAR and Action (Drsh [ Drasi]), a small liberal pro-memorandum
party. In the municipal elections, there were ten joint PASOK/DIMAR candidacies, three
SYRIZA/DIMAR candidacies, one ND/DIMAR and one DIMAR/Greens. DIMARs
participation in almost every joint candidacy is indicative of the partys approach to the
2014 local elections, where it strove to form as many alliances as possible at the local level.

Results
Turnout
In the 2010 local elections, turnout hit historical lows, with 60.9 per cent in the first
round of the regional elections. Some possible explanations offered in that case include
the significant differences between urban and rural areas, with greater turnout in the
latter; an age gap, with younger voters participating less; and declining interest in
politics, as suggested by some survey data (Kafe, Nezi & Pieridis 2011). To these
variables, an analysis of the continuous decline in turnout in Greece between 2000 and
2009 (Vassilopoulos & Vernardakis 2011) adds the decline of party politics; the
weakening of party identification; and a combination of generation replacement and a
cohort effect, with the entry to the electorate of less politicised voters who grew up
after the late 1990s, when political cynicism and erosion of trust started to characterise
the political system. To these factors one should add a classic assumption from the
rational choice tradition (Downs 1957), namely that people do not turn out to vote
unless they can differentiate between the available options before them. In this respect,

140

Y. Tsirbas

there was evidence of a growing process of homogenisation of the political discourse of

the two major parties, PASOK and ND, throughout the 2000s (Tsirbas 2009, p. 86;
Konstantinidis & Tsirbas 2014). Another possible contributor to the gradual decrease
in turnout is the alienation from the political system which was intensified by the
economic crisis. Since the beginning of the latter and particularly the international
bailouts, decisions have increasingly been taken outside the political sphere or at least
outside a political sphere within the reach of a national voter and this is likely to have a
negative effect on turnout, since voters will take more time and resources for
something that matters more (Blais 2000, p. 139).
In 2014, turnout in the local elections remained steady and even demonstrated a slight
increase: in the first round, turnout was 61.6 per cent in the regional elections as opposed
to 60.9 per cent in 2010 and 61.6 per cent compared with 61 per cent at the municipal
level.4 However, the increase in regional first-round turnout between 2010 and 2014 was
mainly due to the increase in Attica. In the second round of the regional elections, the
increase in turnout was far more impressive: 59.9 per cent compared with 46.7 per cent.
This can be attributed to two factors: firstly, to the increased turnout in Attica, the first
regional election to record an increase between the first and second rounds
(62.4 per cent from 61.1 per cent), underlining the importance of this particular contest.
The main explanation, however, was probably the fact that the second round coincided
with the European elections, resulting in a significant restraint of the traditional drop in
turnout between the first and second rounds. Characteristically, in the 2010 regional
elections the average drop in turnout between the first and second round was 13.1 per
cent, while in 2014 it was just four per cent. In the meantime, however, more than
1.2 million voters had left the electorate between 2002 and 2010 (Figure 1). In this case,
absolute numbers of voters are more appropriate for depicting the evolution of turnout
across time, because of various problems of accuracy with the electoral registers.
It is clear from Figure 1 that second-tier local elections have systematically been
more mobilising than European ones and that after a decade with a continuous drop
in the number of voters, resulting in a loss of almost one-fifth of the electorate, turnout
demonstrated a tendency to stabilise at around six million voters in 2012 14. Possibly,
generation replacement is concluded for this decade, as is the toll of voters taken by the
eroding effects of the multilevel crisis. It is also interesting that the Greek local
elections conform to the hypothesis of the SOE model with regard to the increase of
blank and invalid ballots. In the first round of the regional elections, blank/invalid
ballots were 7.1 per cent of the total votes cast, rising to 15.4 per cent in the second
round. The figures for the 2014 municipal elections are similar, as also are both tiers in
2010. In contrast, in the May and June 2012 parliamentary elections, the percentage of
blank/invalid ballots was only 2.4 per cent and one per cent, respectively.
Massive Political Personnel Renewal: A Contagion Effect at the Local Level?
The 2012 parliamentary elections brought an unprecedented renewal of the Greek
political personnel: 50 per cent of MPs (149 out of 300)5 were elected for the first time

South European Society and Politics

141

8,000,000
7,500,000
7,000,000
6,500,000
6,000,000
National Elections
Local Government
European Elections

5,500,000

2014

2012b

2012a

2010

2009

2007

2006

2004

2002

2000

1999

1998

5,000,000

Figure 1 Number of Voters in Parliamentary, Second-Tier Local Government and

European Elections, 1998 2014. Source: Ministry of the Interior.
Note: Data for local government concern the first round of elections for prefectures (1998,
2002, 2006) and regions (2010, 2014). Calculation for local elections 1998 2006 and figure
by the author.

either in May or in June 2012. Many well-known former MPs, even cabinet ministers,
left parliament after serving several consecutive terms. Combined with growing
alienation and the widespread de-legitimisation of the political system, all this suggests
a hypothesis of a contagion effect at the local level, even taking into account the
particularities of the local elections, where candidates personalities, local campaigning
and incumbent performance can influence the outcome. Indeed, as shown in Table 2,
the 2014 elections saw a renewal of local government personnel that reached an
unprecedented6 71 per cent in the 100 most significant municipalities. Moreover, only
40 per cent of incumbent mayors were re-elected, the lowest rate since 1998. In 2010,
this figure was 59 per cent and in 2006 it was 56 per cent (Table 3). In regional
Table 2 Renewal of Political Personnel in the 2014 Local Government Elections (100 most
significant municipalities and 13 regions)
Mayors

2010 14
2006 10
2002 06
1998 2002

Regional secretaries

Renewal rate (%)

Re-election rate (%)

Renewal rate (%)

Re-election rate (%)

71
53
55
63

40
59
56
45

54

50

Source: Ministry of the Interior election site, www.ekloges.ypes.gr, calculation by the author.

142

Y. Tsirbas

Table 3 Party Affiliation and First-Round Vote Share of Regional Election Winners,
2010 14
2014
Region

Winning party

East Macedonia & Thrace

Attica
North Aegean
Western Greece
Western Macedonia
Epirus
Thessaly
Ionian Islands
Central Macedonia
Crete
South Aegean
Peloponnese
Central Greece

ND
SYRIZA
ND
PASOK
Independent
ND
ND
SYRIZA
Independent
PASOK
ND
ND PASOK
ND

2010

1st round (%)

Winning party

1st round (%)

34.7
23.8
31.5
23.1
29.1
50.8
42.9
20.6
32.8
41.1
35.7
43.2
41.4

PASOK
PASOK
PASOK
PASOK
ND
ND LAOS*
ND
ND LAOS
ND
PASOK
PASOK
PASOK LAOS
PASOK

41.8
24.1
36.3
43.3
46.3
44.8
38.6
30.4
43.2
50.3
50.9
41.7
39.0

Source: www.ekloges.ypes.gr
Note: *LAOS Lak6 Orudojo6 Synagerm6 (Popular Orthodox Rally).

elections, in seven out of 13 regions a new regional governor was elected. Of the 12
incumbent regional governors who contested the elections, half were re-elected.
Needless to say, since this was only the second time that regional elections had been
held, caution is required in drawing any definite conclusions. There are, however,
serious indications that the contagion hypothesis is valid and that Greek voters dealt
with their local lords in 2014 by tending to get rid of old faces, similarly to the way they
dealt with their national representatives in 2012.

Regional Election Outcomes

In the regional elections, as second-round turnout was almost the same as in the first
round, with voters of eliminated candidates also turning out to vote (presumably
because of the simultaneous European elections), it is clear that all kinds of
movements took place between first- and second-round preferences. As depicted in
Table 3, in six of the 13 regions, candidates from the ranks of ND were elected with the
support of the party, even if some were labelled independent (as occurred in East
Macedonia & Thrace, Northern Aegean, Epirus, Thessaly, South Aegean and Central
Greece). In the Peloponnese, the joint NDPASOK candidate was also elected, raising
the number of regions controlled by ND to seven, a figure that can be seen as a success,
since the party won two more regions than in 2010. SYRIZA-supported candidates
were elected in only two regions, although one of these, Attica, is the largest in the
country, containing almost one-third of the electorate. For SYRIZA, the Attica victory
somewhat counterbalanced the impact of NDs domination in most regions, especially

South European Society and Politics

143

since Attica is usually a harbinger of which party will dominate at the national level
(Nikolakopoulos 2010). Of the remaining four regions, Crete and Western Greece both
went to independent incumbents elected with PASOK in 2010, while Western
Macedonia was won by an independent candidate supported by ANEL. In the
remaining Central Macedonia region, a rebel ND candidate (the incumbent regional
governor), who had adopted anti-governmental rhetoric, defeated the candidate who
was officially endorsed by the party. Overall, all three main parties had reason to be
satisfied with the regional election results: ND because it increased the number of
regions it controlled, PASOK because it retained its dominance in two regions, with
vote shares that were double or triple its national influence, and SYRIZA because for
the first time it controlled two regions, including the most important of all.
In terms of total electoral influence (shown in Table 4), although the political
situation is not completely suitable for aggregating regional vote shares, a calculation
based on adding the regional election results and adjusting them to reflect the different
size of the regions produces an estimate of national electoral influence of 25.6 per cent
for ND, 17.7 per cent for SYRIZA and 14.7 per cent for PASOK. GD got 8.1 per cent,
with a striking 11.1 per cent in the Attica region, which was, however, the only region
where it got a two-digit vote share. Nevertheless, it was clear that GD solidified its 2012
influence at the regional level. ANEL and DIMAR secured 4.8 per cent and 3.7 per cent,
respectively, if their regional results are projected to the national level. Whether,
however, these results are corrective to the previous parliamentary elections or signal
what will happen in the next ones, as Nikolakopoulos categorises the function of local
government elections (2002, p. 36), remains to be seen.

Municipal Election Outcomes

In the municipal elections candidates that were in some way officially affiliated with
ND won 32 municipalities out of a total of 325, while the respective number for
Table 4 Nationwide Party Strength, 2012 14

ND
SYRIZA
PASOK
ANEL
GD
DIMAR
KKE
Other

May 2014 regional elections* (%)

June 2012 parliamentary elections (%)

25.6
17.7
14.7
4.8
8.1
3.7
8.8
16.6

29.7
26.9
12.3
7.5
6.9
6.3
4.5
5.9

Source: www.ekloges.ypes.gr
Note: *Calculation for regional elections by the author. Percentages were weighted according to
regional electorates sizes, and in cases of joint candidacies vote shares were allocated according to the
respective parties vote shares in June 2012.

144

Y. Tsirbas

SYRIZA was eight. The official KKE candidate won the election in Patras, the thirdbiggest municipality in Greece, in terms of population, and at least two other
municipalities. Some of the candidates that DIMAR supported either with other
political forces (i.e. Athens, Thessaloniki) or alone (smaller municipalities) were
elected, as well as one with the support of the Greens and one with the support of
Drasi. In the remaining almost 270 municipalities, officially independent candidates
were elected, according to the Ministry of the Interior, albeit detailed research at the
local level would reveal more party affiliations than those officially registered,
especially in small municipalities. Two of the most important municipal election
outcomes were the reinforcement of independent candidates and the appearance of a
soccer effect with cases in which candidates associated with local football teams won
significant municipalities.
Athens and Thessaloniki: The Kaminis Boutaris Phenomenon
In Greek local government elections, public attention has traditionally been focused
on three municipalities: Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus. Their results set a great deal
of the tone as to which party has won or lost the local elections overall, especially since
1986, when the then official opposition, ND, ran three high-calibre MPs as candidates
and won all three cities. This was also the first election to overturn a tradition dating
back to the 1950s of a second-round alliance of the left and centre against the
candidates of the right (Nikolakopoulos 2002, p. 37). Thereafter, major parties have
always fielded well-known cadres as candidates in these cities. In Athens and
Thessaloniki, ND maintained its dominance for six consecutive terms, until 2010,
while Piraeus has since 1982 swung between PASOK and ND, with the former electing
five mayors and the latter four including in 2010.
However, in 2010 two independent candidates, from outside traditional party
politics, were elected in Athens and Thessaloniki. Giorgos Kaminis, a university
professor of law and the former Greek Ombudsman, won Athens with the support of
PASOK, DIMAR and the Greens. In Thessaloniki, Yannis Boutaris, a well-known
businessman and eco-activist, was elected with the support of PASOK and DIMAR.
In both cases, these elections had ended a 24-year-long dominance of ND mayors in
the two biggest municipalities. In public discourse, Kaminis and Boutaris are usually
regarded as facets of the same phenomenon: two successful people from outside
politics, bringing a new approach to the handling of public affairs, having a progressive
stance towards issues that can be placed on the social liberalism versus social
conservatism dimension like gay and minority rights and the cremation of the dead
(which is still not practised in Greece) while at the same time pursuing policies that
facilitate free enterprise in their cities.
Despite their differences in approaching certain issues, Kaminis and Boutaris are seen
by many opinion leaders, especially on the centre-left part of the political spectrum, as a
model for conducting politics in the future, the main characteristics of which are
perceived to be prudency and effectiveness. This impression is further enhanced by the

South European Society and Politics

145

fact that the two mayors often make joint public appearances and statements. During
the campaign, they participated in the Initiative of the Five, along with the mayors of
Patras, Volos and Ioannina, also elected in 2010 with the support of PASOK and
DIMAR. The initiative aimed to get rid of party dependencies, offer innovative
solutions for the improvement of the quality of life, rational management of resources
and jurisdictions and redefining of the relations between municipalities and the state
and municipalities and businessmen.7 The mayors therefore adopted an anti-party
rhetoric while accepting the official support of political parties. Of the Five, only
Kaminis and Boutaris were re-elected in 2014. Their re-election in the two most
important municipalities of Greece was interpreted as indicating that a new model of
politician is gaining ground: officials detached from party politics who focus on
pragmatism, common sense and post-materialist issues rather than classic leftright
issues.
Athens and Thessaloniki (along with the Attica region) were the main arenas of
losses for ND, which received a clear message of disapproval here. As shown in Table 5,
in Athens, Kaminis won a low 21 per cent in the first round, while SYRIZAs candidate,
the unknown 34-year-old Gabriel Sakellaridis, came second with a surprising 20 per
cent and NDs candidate was placed third with 17 per cent. After dominating Athens
for several decades, ND did not even manage to get its candidate into the second
round. GDs performance was once again impressive (16 per cent): more than three
times its vote share in the 2010 municipal elections and twice its share in June 2012.
In the second round, Kaminis beat Sakellaridis by less than three per cent (51.4 per
cent versus 48.6 per cent). In Thessaloniki, Boutaris had a much easier victory, leading
NDs candidate by ten per cent in the first round (36 per cent to 26 per cent) and 16 per
cent in the second (58 per cent to 42 per cent) while SYRIZA finished third with 11 per
cent. GDs candidate won almost eight per cent, an increase over the six per cent of
June 2012. As already mentioned, GD chose to support candidates officially in only
nine of the 100 most significant municipalities. Its vote share exceeded that of June
2012 only in three municipalities: Athens, Thessaloniki and the Athenian middle-class
suburb of Kifissia. In the remaining six municipalities that it contested, GDs vote was
on average 30 per cent less than its 2012 parliamentary vote share in the same
municipalities.
Piraeus and Volos: The Soccer Effect or a Greek-Style Berlusconism
Piraeus, on the other hand, was linked to a new phenomenon that made its first
appearance in the 2014 local elections and can be associated with the malaise and
deepening legitimacy crisis of traditional politics. Piraeus is the fifth biggest
municipality in terms of population and the fourth in terms of registered voters.
Politically, however, it is the third-most important city, owing to its central position
adjacent to Athens and literally inseparable from it and its economic importance as
the countrys largest port. It is also home of the very popular Olympiakos Football Club
(FC). No mayor or MP could be elected easily (or at all) in Piraeus if they were not on

146

Y. Tsirbas

Table 5 Municipal Elections Results in Athens, Thessaloniki, Piraeus and Volos, 2010 14
2014
City/Party support

2010

1st round (%)

2nd round (%)

1st round (%)

2nd round (%)

Athens
PASOK/DIMAR (Kaminis)
SYRIZA
ND*
GD
KKE
Others

21.1
20.0
16.9
16.1
7.4
18.5

51.4
48.6

28.3
5.8
35.0
5.3
13.7
11.9

52.0

48.0

Thessaloniki
PASOK/DIMAR (Boutaris)
ND
SYRIZA
GD
KKE
Others

36.0
26.2
10.6
7.7
6.2
13.3

58.1
41.9

33.6
37.9
3.7
1.0
9.5
14.3

50.2
49.8

Piraeus
Independent (Moralis)
ND
SYRIZA
KKE
GD
PASOK
Others

33.3
31.3
17.1
6.7
5.7

5.9

55.2
44.8

23.1
7.6
14.8

29.6
24.9

51.8

48.2

Volos
Independent (Beos)
SYRIZA
PASOK/DIMAR
ND
KKE

38.3
24.8
15.3
13.3
8.4

53.1
46.9

11.0
37.9
35.9
15.2

52.3
47.8

Source: www.ekloges.ypes.gr
Notes: *With LAOS in 2010.

With DIMAR and the Greens in 2010/with the Greens in 2014.

With the Greens in 2014.

With the Greens in 2010.

good terms with the club, its management and its fans. In fact, in 2006 a former
Olympiakos basketball player was elected mayor with the support of PASOK. However,
the club had never before sought openly to gain direct access to public affairs.
In early April 2014, only a few weeks before the 18 May first round, press reports
began to refer to Vangelis Marinakis, a powerful ship-owner and the major stockholder
and leader of Olympiakos FC, as a potential candidate mayor of Piraeus. Besides
Olympiakos fans, the local Orthodox bishop, other ship-owners and local businessmen
also publicly supported a potential Marinakis ticket.8 Finally, Marinakis chose to run
one of his employees, Yannis Moralis, a member of Olympiakos management, as
mayoral candidate while reserving for himself a mere candidacy for the local council,

South European Society and Politics

147

nevertheless leaving no doubt as to who was going to be the strongman of the ticket.
The discourse of Moralis and Marinakis in their pre-election interviews was largely
anti-party and apolitical, based on claims they wanted to introduce something new that
would transcend the traditional left right divide.9 Marinakis was accused both by his
main political opponents and in several news reports of having close relations with
GD10 and was also linked to corruption issues. In 2011 and 2014, he was charged with
complicity in acts of bribery and manipulating football matches but he denied any
wrongdoing and the relevant trials were still pending in 2014.11
Similarly, in Volos, Greeces eighth-biggest municipality, the election was contested by
Achilleas Beos, the strongman of a popular Volos soccer team, who had already served one
year in prison for the same match-fixing case mentioned in relation to Marinakis. Beoss
discourse had anti-system traits. His adventures with the law did not prevent him from
advocating fresh people who are not corrupt and condemning the whole metapolitefsi
(metapolteysh), i.e. the period since the restoration of Greek democracy in 1974,
during which he alleged that politicians stole the money of the people. He was also
openly against people of arts and education.12 It is obvious that Moraliss and Beoss
discourse shared anti-party and anti-political characteristics with that of GD.
Moralis, the son of a PASOK minister of the 1980s, running against an incumbent
ND candidate and an official SYRIZA candidate, finished first with 33 per cent in the
first round, beating the incumbent mayor with 55 per cent in the second round.
SYRIZAs candidate got 17 per cent while KKEs got almost seven per cent (Table 5).
While the accusations about Moraliss and Marinakiss relationship with GD were not
proven, in the first round of the elections GDs candidate won only 5.7 per cent of the
votes, compared with a GD score in Piraeus of 11.9 per cent in the simultaneous
regional elections and 10.7 per cent in the European elections one week later. This
made GD the third-strongest force in the city (after Moralis and ND). In Volos, Beos
was also elected mayor with 38 per cent (well ahead of SYRIZAs 25 per cent) in the
first round and 53 per cent to SYRIZAs 47 per cent in the second. The incumbent
mayor, supported by DIMAR, finished third with 15 per cent.
The cases of Piraeus and Volos demonstrate a new trend in Greek politics, which
may have been implicit for some time but became more salient than ever in 2014: the
soccer effect or a Greek-style Berlusconism. As a political and socio-cultural
phenomenon, Berlusconism, named after the Italian media mogul, football club
owner and prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, involves intense personalisation of
politics, the rise of billionaires in the political sphere and the extensive use of the myth
of the self-made man whose main goal is supposedly getting things done (Cagossi
2010, p. 28). Berlusconism is also deemed to be anti-politics, in that the leader does
not try to lead the people but rather rides the crest of negative public sentiments
(Pasquino 2007, p. 50). The similarities with the Piraeus and Volos cases are striking.
There is, however, an important difference: in Italy, videocracy is another critical
aspect of the phenomenon, meaning the almost total control of mass media messages
by a single political person (Cagossi 2010, p. 33). In the Greek case, although intense
media concentration and lack of diversity are not absent, videocracy is at the local level

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Y. Tsirbas

replaced by soccerocracy, wherein attention and popularity capital accumulated by

activities in the arena of mass professional sports are invested in the realm of politics.
Berlusconism is thought to be erosive of democracy, because it resembles a sultanate
(Sartori 2009) and undermines many of the premises of a democratic regime, like the
separation of powers (Cagossi 2010, p. 30). However, if in Italy Berlusconism is
accused of being one of several causes of the erosion of trust in the political system, in
Greece one could argue for the opposite: it is the generalised erosion of trust in
political institutions that seems to have facilitated this kind of phenomenon.
Three Polls, But How Many Votes?
The 2014 elections were the first occasion when Greek voters had to cast votes in three
different polls at the same time. If both rounds of local elections are taken into
account, a large proportion of the Greek electorate cast a ballot in five polls (two
rounds of municipal and regional, as well as one round of European elections). The
question that arises is how the voters behaved when confronted with so many choices.
Was the dominant trend a party-coherent behaviour that did not differentiate between
elections? Or was there an approach that differed between elections but was consistent
within election type and possibly conformed to the theoretical assumptions of
elections of different order? Or was voting differentiated in terms of both parties and
election type, suggesting a totally fragmented image of voting behaviour in 2014?
To tackle the above questions, the 100 most significant municipalities were analysed.
For representational reasons, all 50 prefecture capitals were included, while the
criterion for the remainder was population size. In each municipality, vote share in the
European elections and in the first round of the municipal and regional elections was
taken into account.13 This allows us to see the relative strength between different polls
for each party, while by correlating vote shares between different polls we can
determine the degree of volatility and national vote coherence for each party.
Figure 2 presents the vote share for each election for the seven parliamentary parties.
NDs electoral strength in the 100 most significant municipalities was greatest in the
municipal elections (27 per cent) and lowest in the European elections (21.7 per cent).
SYRIZAs vote structure was the reverse of NDs, with its weakest performance at the
municipal level (15.2 per cent) and its strongest in the European elections (27.7 per
cent). PASOKs vote pattern is somewhat different: strongest at the regional level (18.3
per cent) with its municipal vote share close behind (17.7 per cent). At both levels of
local government, PASOK demonstrated a greater influence than SYRIZA, emerging as
second party after ND. In comparison, in the European elections PASOKs influence in
the same municipalities fell to 7.5 per cent. The regional elections were also the
strongest arena for both ANEL and DIMAR (11.4 per cent and 7.2 per cent,
respectively). At the municipal level, ANEL got 1.3 per cent, contesting only nine
municipalities and DIMAR 3.9 per cent, contesting 19. GDs vote pattern resembles
that of SYRIZA, becoming stronger as we move from local to national-level polls (1.7
per cent municipal, 8.2 per cent regional and 9.3 per cent European vote). However, in

South European Society and Politics

New Democracy

Golden Dawn

SYRIZA

PASOK

Democratic Left

149

Indep. Greeks

KKE

Figure 2 Vote Share of Major Greek Parties, According to Election Type, in the 100 Most
Significant Municipalities, May 2014

the nine municipalities where GD openly supported a candidate, the party

demonstrated an electoral strength close to its nationwide influence. Finally, the party
with the smallest deviation in electoral performance between the three different polls is
KKE, with 8.2 per cent in the municipal, 9.3 per cent in the regional and 6.4 per cent in
the European elections. KKEs performance in the 2014 municipal elections was on
average 1.69 times greater than in the June 2012 parliamentary elections, signalling a
significant regaining of influence for the Greek communists.
In general, NDs and, especially, PASOKs performance in the municipal and
regional elections indicated that in the local elections of 2014 long-established local
networks continued to play a significant part, as did the personality of specific
candidates and their visibility at the local level, accumulated over the years. SYRIZA, in
contrast, having been a major party only for a couple of years, did not have the time to
capitalise on its national influence in local networks and to recruit the appropriate
political personnel to successfully contest a large number of local elections.
In SYRIZAs case, there was a ratio of almost 1:2 between its municipal and European
election influence, suggesting a complete reversal of the pattern of the past, when the
left in Greece had almost double the influence in municipal elections that it had at the
national level (Nikolakopoulos 2002, p. 37).
The variations between the different polls indicate considerable electoral volatility.
Indeed, if we apply the Pedersen (1979) formula for the differences between the
different kinds of elections, we get a volatility index of 25.2 between the municipal and
regional elections. This means that a quarter of the Greek electorate split their votes

150

Y. Tsirbas

between the two levels of local government elections, voting on the same day for one
partys candidate in the municipal and another partys candidate in the regional
elections. The levels of volatility are similar between regional and European (28.1) and
municipal and European elections (22.4).
In order to determine the level of vote coherence for each party, bivariate
correlations were run for the three different pairs of election types: municipal
regional, municipal European and regional European. In the comparison
between election results in different geographical units, correlation coefficients do
not measure the similarity or proximity of vote shares between different election types,
but to what extent they change in a similar or different linear pattern (Zafiropoulos &
Hatzipantelis 2001, p. 91). Table 6 presents the respective correlation coefficients for
each party.
For ND every correlation is positive, meaning that when its vote share in a
municipal poll rises, so do its vote shares in the regional and European polls. Equally,
when its vote share is lower in a municipal poll, the same is expected for its score the
other two polls within the same municipality. The strongest correlation is between
municipal and European elections (r 0.574). In general, the fact that all three
election type pairs are positively correlated confirms the national character of NDs
electoral influence. The case of SYRIZA is similar. However, its weak penetration at the
local level is confirmed. The strongest correlation concerning SYRIZAs percentages is
between regional and European elections (r 0.720), indicative of a party in the
process of building a national electorate. The third party whose influence has a
national character beyond any doubt is KKE. All of its correlations are positive and
strong, the strongest one being between regional and European elections (r 0.858).
PASOKs political survival has been one of the main questions in Greek electoral
politics since the 2012 elections. The partys rather good performance in the 2014 local
elections might be considered a signifier of its electoral recovery. The local networks
that secured the high percentages of its candidates might be regarded as safeguards of
the partys national influence. However, the non-significant correlation between its
municipal and regional vote shares as well as the two other weak correlations indicate
that PASOKs electoral influence is, rather, undergoing a phase of fragmentation,
suggesting that those hopeful local results were mostly about the persons and not
about the party.
GD seems to going in the opposite direction. The correlations between its municipal
and regional and between its municipal and European vote shares were not statistically
significant in 2014. However, this may be due to the limited number of cases.
Nevertheless, its regional European elections correlation (r 0.654) is the thirdstrongest after KKE and SYRIZA, confirming the existence of a national character to
GDs electoral influence. The electoral influence of the other parties seems to lack a
national character. This is especially the case for DIMAR, whose only significant
correlation is between its regional and European vote share, albeit with the weak figure
of 0.248. ANEL demonstrates the same impression, although its correlation between
the regional and European polls is somewhat stronger (r 0.506).

SYRIZA
r 0.303**
n 88
r 0.410**
n 88
r 0.720**
n 100

ND
r 0.498**
n 79
r 0.611**
n 79
r 0.549**
n 100

r 0.090
n 64
r 0.376**
n 65
r 0.241*
n 95

PASOK
r 0.995
n3
r 2 0.833*
n8
r 0.084
n 53

ANEL

r 20.386
n8
r 20.350
n9
r 0.654**
n 97

GD

Note: Calculation of coefficients by the author.

Pearson product moment correlation: *correlation significant at the 0.05 level; **correlation significant at the 0.01 level.

Regional European

Municipal European

Municipal regional

Correlations between election types

Party vote

Table 6 Correlation Coefficients between Different Election Types in May 2014, by Party

r 2 0.402
n 17
r 2 0.004
n 18
r 0.105
n 98

DIMAR

r 0.824**
n 77
r 0.811**
n 77
r 0.858**
n 100

KKE

South European Society and Politics

151

152

Y. Tsirbas

Conclusions
To sum up, the 2014 local elections in Greece largely conformed to SOE assumptions,
especially at the municipal level. They were characterised by increased volatility,
increased blank/invalid votes and the regaining or confirmation of influence for some
smaller parties like KKE and GD alongside somewhat alarming defeats for the main
governing party, ND, in the biggest city and biggest region. However, the rest of the
election results indicated a rather good performance by ND, a little shy of the partys
June 2012 percentages. Hence, the 2014 local elections did not by themselves constitute a
challenge to government stability. In general, government opposition polarisation was
present but not dominant. SYRIZA, which tried to ignite the aforementioned
polarisation, had the image of a party in the process of acquiring an electoral influence
with national characteristics. However, SYRIZA did not succeed in giving the local
elections a truly national character and failed to translate its national-level influence to
the local level, except in its victory in Attica and its good performance in Athens and a
few other municipalities. PASOK demonstrated resilience at the local level. It is,
nevertheless, questionable whether this means something positive for the party at the
national level or that the decline in its national influence is reversible. Regarding the
other parties, GDs performance confirmed once again that this neo-Nazi formation is
here to stay, having an electoral influence with a national profile, while DIMAR and, to a
lesser extent, ANEL seem to be in crisis. KKEs results could signal the return of the party
to the levels of influence it had prior to the June 2012 parliamentary elections. Finally, it
should be noted that The River (To Potmi [To Potami]), a party recently formed by a
well-known journalist, chose not to contest the local elections at all, but gained 6.6 per
cent in the European elections, emerging as a potential future player at the national level.
The 2014 elections marked a massive renewal of local political personnel,
demonstrated a halt in turnout decrease and confirmed the importance of new forms
of politics. At the same time, phenomena linked to political malaise, like severe antipartisanship, occurred and seem likely to be transferred to the central political scene.
In general, the fact that vote structure, relative electoral strength and inter-election
correlations were so divergent across parties and different types of elections indicates that
the Greek political system has entered a second phase of transition, after the complete
dealignment of 2012. This is probably a phase of shape acquisition, which could lead
either to a system with clear local sub-systems or to one with more coherent national
characteristics, somewhat reminiscent of the bipolarisation that characterised Greek
politics for decades, but surely with weaker poles. Whether the process of electoral retreat
of some parties and advance of others will continue or not, both locally and nationally, is,
of course, of great importance for future developments. Finally, the most appropriate
phrase to summarise the 2014 elections in Greece seems to be as many votes as polls.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Panagiotis Koustenis for providing access to the database of regional
elections results within municipalities and Elthina Angelopoulou for helping with the organisation

South European Society and Politics

153

of this database. The author is also grateful to the journals two anonymous reviewers for their
insightful comments and suggestions.

Notes
1. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-14082014-AP/EN/2-14082014-AP-EN.
PDF (accessed 16 November 2014).
2. http://www.eurobank.gr/Uploads/Reports/7_HMERES_OIKONOMIA_61114.pdf, referred to
by http://www.poleconomix.gr/portal/pages/7587 (both accessed 16 November 2014).
3. If the required majority of 180 out of 300MPs is not achieved for the election of the president of
the Republic, then a general election is held, following which the new parliament can elect a
president with a simple majority of 151MPs.
4. http://ekloges.ypes.gr/
5. Calculation by the author based on data from: http://www.parliament.gr/Vouleftes/StatistikaStoicheia/ (accessed 6 July 2014)
6. Unprecedented for the five rounds of local government elections (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014)
for which there are available official data online.
7. http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid576327
8. http://www.thetoc.gr/eng/the-talk-of-the-toc/article/marinakis-for-piraeus-mayor (accessed 8
July 2014).
9. http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid22767&subid2&pubid63990544
10. NDs candidate in Piraeus, Vassilis Mihaloliakos, stated that GDs support for the Moralis ticket
was centrally orchestrated: http://www.tanea.gr/news/ekloges2014/article/5122428/
mixaloliakos-ayta-poy-symbainoyn-ston-peiraia-den-eixan-symbei-pote/ (accessed 14 November 2014)
11. http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/6699614/greek-league-chief-vangelis-marinakislinked-corruption-scandal
12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v kliXxI1rz28 (accessed 8 July 2014).
13. For the regional and European elections, a weighted mean of vote shares according to the size of
each municipality was calculated. For municipal elections, however, a different strategy had to be
employed, since ANEL and GD supported a candidate only in nine municipalities, while DIMAR
supported a candidate only in 19. If we calculated a weighted average for these few municipalities
and then used some kind of projection (i.e. by projecting these parties vote share in the
municipalities they did not contest according to the municipal 2014/national 2012 ratio), we
would end up overestimating small parties influence. Therefore, for municipal elections, the
sum of votes nationwide was merely taken into account. For regions and municipalities with
joint candidacies (PASOK/DIMAR, SYRIZA/DIMAR, ND/DIMAR, etc.), votes and vote shares
were split according to the percentage the respective parties received in the June 2012
parliamentary elections. For the European elections, the vote for the Olive Trees (Elia) alliance
was counted as a vote for PASOK, which was the only significant party of the formation.
Information about parties support for candidates in the municipal elections was retrieved from
the Ministry of the Interior, as well as from various news sources, both local and national.

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Yannis Tsirbas is a lecturer in electoral behavior at the University of Athens. His

publications include 28 Hmre6: Eklog6, Politik Diawmish kai Eidhseiograwa [28 Days: Elections, Political Advertising and Political News], Athens,
Papazisis, 2007, articles in journals such as South European Society and Politics and
Greek Political Science Review and chapters in edited volumes such as Los principales
narradores y la narrativa dominante de la crisis griega in I. Martin and I. Tirado (eds),
Grecia: aspectos polticos y juridico-economicos de la crisis, Madrid, Centro de Estudios
Politicos and Constitucionales (forthcoming).