G.R. No.

L-65935 September 30, 1988

FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUGA JR.,
respondents.
FACTS
This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of
the NBS Machineries Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit. Sunga purchased a
passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on
March 21, 1978 and for which he executed a promissory note payable in instalments
for 24 months. On the same date, a chattel mortgage was executed by him in favor of
the Motor center, Inc., and was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation. On
October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) employees of the defendant
Filinvest Credit Corporation without any receipt, claiming that he was delinquent in the
payments of his vehicle. After verification that Sungas accounts are all in order,
Filinvest admitted it was their fault.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision ordering Filinvest to pay Sunga (a)
Moral Damages P30,000.00; (b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00;
(c) Actual damages 500.00; (d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00; (e) Attorney's Fees
10,000.00; and to pay the costs. Filinvest appealed. IAC affirmed the lower courts
decision in toto "except with regard to the moral damages which, under the
circumstances of the accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00."
ISSUE
Whether the increase in the award for moral damages by the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
RULING

The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in increasing

extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation expenses.
"Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a
civil case an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision
of the court below.Sunga did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo
which awarded him the sum of P30,000.00 by way of moral damages.
However, even if Sunga is entitled to moral damages due to the unwarranted
seizure of the minibus Mazda, which tainted his reputation in the business
community, thus causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation, the award of
moral damages even in the sum of P30,000.00 is excessive for it must be
emphasized that "damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the
expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral

sufferings the injured parties have undergone by reason of defendant's culpable

action.
Considering that he was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three days,
and possession of which was restored to him soon after the accounting errors
were ironed out, it is reduced to P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation expenses
is eliminated there being no price for litigation.

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC,
Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
FACTS
Laguna Lake Development Authority received a complaint seeking to stop the
operation of the open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area. LLDA
conducted an on-site investigation, after which, it was found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No.
1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850.
Further, the water collected from the leachate and the receiving streams
indicates the presence of bacteria which could considerably affect the quality of
the receiving waters. This prompted LLDA to issue a Cease and Desist Order
ordering the City Government of Caloocan to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite.
City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer
for the issuance of writ of injunction. It sought to be declared as the sole
authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of
the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.
ISSUE
1. Does the LLDA, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority
to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite
in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan ?

2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws ?
RULING
1 Yes, LLDA has authority.
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment
that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business
establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which is a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under
the Office of the DENR Secretary. As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution
cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in
cases where the special law provides for another forum.
In the instant case, LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out
and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila,
Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. Thus, it obviously has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
2 Yes, LLDA has the power to issue a cease and dessist order. The cease and
desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to
stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to
have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850 cannot be stamped as an
unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. Republic Act No. 4850
expressly authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not
expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule
that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as
are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. The authority of the LLDA
to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be
reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like
that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive
and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot
be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of
such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as
those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.(Pollution
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.)

G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985

AGAPITO MAGBANUA, INENIAS MARTIZANO, CARLITO HERRERA, SR., PAQUITO
LOPEZ, AND FRANCISCO HERRERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND SPECIAL CASES DIVISION),
EDUARDO, BUTCH, DIEGO AND NENA All Surnamed PEREZ, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioners at bar all alleged that they are share tenants of the defendants; that the
defendants diverted the free flow of water from their farm lots which caused portions of
their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and prejudice: and that they were
told by the defendants' overseer to vacate their respective areas for they could not
plant palay any longer due to lack of water. They prayed that they be declared as
leasehold tenants and that the defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees and
different kinds of damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners granting them individually
moral and exemplary damages in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS,
each and orders the defendants to pay the attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
The defendants appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which in turn deleted the
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
eliminating the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

RULING

The petitioners are entitled to a measure of moral damages. Article 2219 of the
Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21
of the same code and the latter stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make
them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights and
caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion of the water.
The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants
acted in an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232. Civil Code.)
It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to attorney's
fees but the size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to the sound
discretion of the court.
Moral damages P1,000.00
Exemplarly damages 500.00
Attorney's fees 1,000.00

P2,500.00
The costs shall be assessed against the private respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA
OPOSA, et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.
FACTS
The petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
An imploded additional petitioner is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
They allege that they "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical forests and that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn.
They mainly pray for the Secretary of DENR to (1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements(TLA) in the country; and to (2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
ISSUE
1 Whether petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
2 Whether the granting of the TLAs was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
the petitioners right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

RULING
(1)The petitioners can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the

succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment

constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
(2) Not yet settled.
The court a quo dismissed the case on the ground of the non-impairment
clause, stating that no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case.(Tan vs. Director of Forestry)
Into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code
(P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require.
It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

ERNESTO R. RODRIGUEZ, JR., ERNESTO LL. RODRIGUEZ III, SACHA DEL
ROSARIO, JOSE P. GENITO, ZENAIDA Z. RODRIGUEZ, and ENECERIO
MONDIA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DAYTONA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Daytona Construction is a domestic corporation with a business permit for
the manufacture of road and building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates,
with cement batching plant. Petitioners resides adjacent to the Daytona compound in
Quezon City. Their houses and lands has been over-run by effluence from the cement
batching plant of the defendant. The sediment affected all forms of vegetation which
died as a result, and even contaminated their source of drinking water. It also caused
health complications to the residents.

Hence, they filed on December 16, 1980, an action for abatement of a public nuisance
with damages against Daytona. The court declared the defendant in default after it
failed to file an answer and authorised the petitioners to file evidence ex parte.
On June 30, 1982, the court a quo rendered its decision declaring the operation of the
cement hatching plant of the defendant corporation as a nuisance and ordering its
permanent closure and awarding damages to the petitioners. In an order dated July 9,
1982, the trial court upon motion of plaintiffs granted execution pending appeal it
indeed appearing as alleged in the motion that the continued operation of the cement
batching plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the neighborhood, both in
point of health and property. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, Daytona
appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in issuing a writ of execution pending appeal without
appropriate prior notice to the appellant.
RULING

There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue the
order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically stated that there was
a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of defendant's (Daytona
Construction) cement batching plant because it posed "a great menace to the
neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial court thus stated:
From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly any
question that the cement dust coming from the batching plant of the defendant
corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the
area. The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated by the day and
night operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious discomfort and
untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and
causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement justified.
The decision of IAC is set aside and the court a quos decision is reinstated.

G.R. No. 94759

January 21, 1991
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge,
Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.
FACTS
Technology Developers is a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture
and export of charcoal briquette. Complaints regarding the smoke coming out of the
chimney of the company while in operation reached the acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz.
An investigation was made by one Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8,

1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the
surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.
The acting mayor then sent a letter to the company ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the its plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c)
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and
of other document. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality
of Sta. Maria and also a mayors permit. While petitioner was able to present a
temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission on
December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner, respondent
acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander to padlock the premises of
petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Petitioner then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with
preliminary injunction against private respondent with the court a quo which is
presided by the respondent judge. The decision denied the preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
Whether the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
RULING

The petition is devoid of merit.

While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business
is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized that
the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the application for a
permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate
measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of
the community from the emissions in the operation of the business.
This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents
of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan and the closure order of the Acting
Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in
her report of December 8, 1988.
Concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth
of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay
the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the
environment.

G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006

EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, MA. ENCARBACION R. LEGASPI, JAIME
BLANCO, JR., ENRIQUE BELO, CARLOS VIAPLANA, CARL FURER,

VIVENCIO TINIO, MICHAEL BRIGGS, ROSA CARAM, FAUSTO PREYSLER,

ROBERT KUA, GEORGE LEE, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, PETER DEE,
LUISA MARQUEZ, ANGELITA LILLES, JUAN CARLOS, HOMER GO, AMADEO
VALENZUELA, EMILIO CHING, ANTONIO CHAN, MURLI SABNANI, MARCOS
ROCES, RAYMUNDO FELICIANO, NORMA GAFFUD, ALF HOLST, LOURDES
P. ROQUE, MANUEL DY, RAUL FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA TENGCO, CHI MO
CHENG, BARANGAY DASMARIAS, and HON. FRANCISCO B. IBAY,
petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondent
FACTS
Petitioners are all residents of Dasmarias Village. Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR
began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of
53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt
Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes
through the Sergio Osmea, Sr. Highway (South Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort
Bonifacio, and Dasmarias Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where petitioners
homes are. Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the
internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could cause to their
health and well-being. They got hold of published articles and studies linking the
incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields ranging from
cancer to leukemia. Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an
impass. Thus, they filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
NAPOCOR. The trial court ordered the writ and the CA reversed the decision.
DEFENSE: Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing
Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and
Natural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the
Government,"
ISSUE
Whether the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel
poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree No. 1818.
RULING

Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held to prohibit courts from issuing an
injunction against any infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the
pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the economic development
effort of the nation.
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only
to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On

issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court
declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally
protected right to health and whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed
violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the
affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court
with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As
such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective mantle of
Presidential Decree No. 1818. There is adequate evidence on record to justify
the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and
safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be located within safe
distances from residences. Also, the area alluded to as location of the
NAPOCOR project is a fragile zone being proximate to local earthquake faults,
particularly the Marikina fault, among other zones. This is not to mention the
risks of falling structures caused by killer tornadoes and super typhoons, the
Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated along the typhoon belt. The
Local Government Code then requires conference with the affected communities
of a government project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this
requirement.
This decision does not undermine the purpose of the NAPOCOR project which
is aimed towards the common good of the people.But for what use will
modernization serve if it proves to be a scourge on an individuals fundamental
right, not just to health and safety, but, ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all
of its desired quality?

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987

VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FACTS
Valentin L. Legaspi requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Civil
Service Commission denied his request. Thus, he instituted a special civil action for
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information which
is a matter of public concern.
DEFENSE: Legaspi is bereft of actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of the CSC
employees.

ISSUE
Whether the information sought is a matter of public concern.
RULING

The information is a matter of public concern.

Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate
concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at
all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. There is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil
service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
In the question of Legaspis actual interest, when a mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general "public" which possesses the right.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed,the law expressly mandate the
duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents,
papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy
development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Except,
perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or
sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the
person seeking access to the records.
However, the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The
law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such
as those affecting national security. It is for the courts to determine in a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates
to or affects the public.
The Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of its
employees, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.