Difference and value

We began by suggesting that a particular sign doesn't take on its meaning through the apparently direct link of
reference, the relation between sign and object. Then we went on to suggest that even the more abstract link of
signification (the relation between signifier and signified within the sign) is arbitrary. Because of this, the meaning
of a sign cannot be due to some sort of essence of what the sign is in itself. There is no longer any such essence, as
the sign is a sort of historical accident. How then does any sign take on meaning?
We already have the answer: from outside itself. We suggested that the meaning of a sign may depend on a
variety of factors, including the situations and conventions in which it is used. The sign's meaning, that is, depends
on what surrounds it: it is not a content hidden away somewhere 'inside' the sign. Saussurean semiotics develops
this idea in a narrower sense. Out of all the things outside the sign which may contribute to its meaning (everything
we've called 'context', which potentially includes the entire situation and social world in which the sign is being
used), Saussure considers only other signs within the system. That is, in the Saussurean system, a sign gets its
meaning from other signs. The meaning it may get from things that aren't signs is not something Saussurean
semiotics concerns itself with. Keep in mind that this is quite a restricted sense of meaning. We shall follow it for
the moment, because even though it is restricted, the model we can build with it is still immensely suggestive. If a
sign gets its meaning from other signs, it works through a system of differences (from what it isn't), rather than of
identity (with itself). It means something not because it has some fixed identity, but because it is different from
other signs. We could put that in a succinct but paradoxical form by saying that what a sign is due to what it isnt.
Lets make this more specific, by considering the case of our sign cat. Again, we will consider both the
signifier and the signified in turn.
We determined above that the actual sound-sequence cat can vary considerably and yet still be recognised as a
variation on the abstract, general sound-image which is the signifier. For this to occur, we need a system of sounds
which can be distinguished from each other. If cat and pat are going to be different signifiers, we need to be able
to distinguish between the sounds of c and p. What makes the sound-image cat a possible signifier is not the
qualities of the actual sounds themselves, but simply that we can distinguish them from other sounds. We can tell
the difference between cat and pat, mat, bat, and so on, or cat and can, cap, cad, or cat and cot,
coat or cut.
Similarly, our general concept of catness is defined in a network of differences. We can have a concept of
catness because we can distinguish this from other related concepts, like dogness, rabbitness, canaryness,
fishness. The sign big only takes on meaning when it is part of a system which lets it be juxtaposed with little.
A big flea is of a different order of magnitude altogether from a big elephant, or a big (or even a very small)
supernova.
Signification is depicted as a vertical relationship between signifier and signified. What we are suggesting now,
as the source of the signs meaning, is a set of horizontal relationships between signifier and signifier, and between
signified and signified. These horizontal relationships determine a signs value. A signs signification is a function
of its value. The relationship between signifier and signified for any particular sign depends ultimately on the
relationships all the signs in the system have with one another:
signified

signified

signified

value:

signifier

signification:

signifier

signifier

signified
signifier

It may be useful to make a loose analogy with money here. A $10 note, say, buys a certain amount of one
commodity, and a different amount of another. This is not because there is a direct and necessary relationship
between an amount of money and amount of commodity: no law or principle says that $10 is inherently worth
about 3.5 litres of milk. The relationship between the two is due to all sorts of other costs: those of buying, keeping
and feeding cattle, of hiring labour, maintaining machinery, and processing and distributing the product. These in
their turn depend on other costs: the cost of hiring labour, for instance, is determined by factors such as the cost of
living to which of course, the cost of milk makes its own contribution. The cost of milk is rather like the vertical
relationship of signification. The link between the signified commodity and the money which signifies it actually
comes from the horizontal relationship it has with all other costs in the economy.
Indeed, the very term value which we have been using to describe signs comes, of course, from economics.
Semiotics is basically an economic model of sign processes: it sees exchange as their essential feature.
[Tony Thwaites, Lloyd Davis and Warwick Mules, 2002, Introducing Cultural and Media Studies. A Semiotic Approach, New York,
Palgrave, pp. 36-38.]

Paradigm and syntagm

Langue, the code or system of signs, is organised along two axes: selection and combination. On the
first axis, elements are selected. On the second, the elements which have been selected are now
combined according to certain rules. Another set of names for these is the paradigmatic and
syntagmatic axes.
A paradigm is a set of signs, any of which are conceivably interchangeable within a given context.
A syntagm is an ordered array of signs combined according to certain rules.
Paradigms are not fixed; they are determined by the criteria of the context and topic. Elements of
the same paradigm can be broadly substituted for one another in a given syntagmatic context. In the
two statements, The cat sat on the mat and The dog sat on the mat, cat and dog both belong to
the paradigm of domestic mammal. If the cat is mine and the dog belongs to the people next door, I
may decide that they dont belong to the same paradigm at all (which would be my pet), and wonder
what next doors dog is doing on my cats mat.
In general, the less easy it is to substitute a given element for the original term, the more distant it is
from the original paradigm set. If we broaden the paradigm set from domestic mammals to mammals,
we start to get the possibility of less and less likely syntagms (The dugong sat on the mat). The
further away we move, the less likely the syntagms we get. If the paradigm set is simply nouns, we
have possibilities like The generalisation sat on the mat. If we broaden it out even further, to
anything at all, we might just end up with nonsense (The of sat on the mat).
A syntagm, then, is the result of using a conventional rule to combine a series of elements from
various paradigms:
elements of paradigms + rule = syntagm
Here we find the beginnings of a solution to a possible problem which arose earlier on. We said then
that the link of signification between signifier and signified is arbitrary, and that therefore by their
nature signs do not have a single fixed meaning; instead, they have potentially multiple and shifting
meanings. How is it then that in our everyday lives we use signs as if their meanings were stable as
if we know what they mean? Why doesnt every attempted communication break down into a morass
of ambiguities?
The answer is simple enough here. If any individual sign may have several possible meanings, the
actual utterances in which a sign is used tend to narrow somewhat the field of probable meanings. In
isolation, the word cat may equally as well mean a domestic mammal, a whip, a coal scow, a bit of
nautical tackle, a two-hulled boat In fact, however, words never occur in isolation. They always
occur in some context, and generally within some sort of syntagmatic statement, and this tends to
narrow greatly the probable range of meanings. If the word cat occurs in a syntagm such as The cat
is on the mat, it is now much more probable that the cat in question is the domestic mammal rather
than, say, the boat. The context and situation may make one particular meaning or set of meanings
more probable again: it may not be the domestic mammal I mean if I say this sentence while
wondering just where in the dungeon I left the thumbscrews, or while staring at the coal barge which
has just crashed in through the wall. Paradigms provide a plurality of possible meanings; syntagms
tend to narrow these down according to context. Paradigms expand; syntagms contract.
[Tony Thwaites, Lloyd Davis and Warwick Mules, 2002, Introducing Cultural and Media Studies. A
Semiotic Approach, New York: Palgrave, pp. 43-44]