Crim 2 Premid Collated Case Digests by EH410

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Crim 2 Case Digests | Justice Yap | PreMidterms | EH 410 SY 2016-2017

Case #1: Made by Jeffrey Fuentes
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO
I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN
DOES, accused-appellants.
Law Applicable: Article 122, 123 and PD no.
532
Topics/Doctrines discussed: Piracy and
conspiracy
Facts:
On March 2, 1991 the M/T Tabangao a cargo
vessel owned by PNOC Shipping Lines with a
cargo containing barrels of kerosene, regular
gasoline and diesel gas was boarded by 7
armed men one of them being Tulin. The crew
changed the name of the boat to "Galilee".
The crew completely took over the vessel and
headed for Singapore where the cargos
were transferred to another ship the "Navi
Pride" under the supervision of Cheong San
Hiong. After the operation the crew members
were brought to shore and given money in
order for them to go back to their homes and
were warned that they were not to speak of
this
to
the
authorities
for
2
days.
A series of arrests were made including Tulin
and Heong. The defense of Tulin and most of
the crew is that they were hired by the captain
as cooks and janitors during the night
Heong's defense was that the crime was not
committed in Philippine waters so he is not
within the jurisdiction of the Phil courts.
Ruling of RTC: Tulin and the other members
are guilty of piracy and are considered as co
conspirators in the crime of piracy and Heong
was branded as an accomplice.
They were ordered to indemnify the price of
the gas plus interest.
Issue: WON the Phil
has jurisdiction over Heong as the crime was
also committed in Singapore which was outside
Phil waters
Ruling: Affirm the RTC decision
Article 122 of RPC includes Philippine
waters and High seas and covers any person
who is not part of the crew and PD 532
includes any person who committed the crime
of piracy. Hence, whether you are a passenger
or not or where the crime was committed
Heong is covered by both laws.
The
court
did
acquire
jurisdiction
over Heong although the transfer was done in
Singapore under the supervision of Heong, the
seizure of the M/T Tabangao was committed in
Philippine waters. PD 532 requires that the

attack and seizure be done in Phil waters but
the disposition by the pirates of the cargo is
still deemed part of the act of piracy hence the
same need not be committed in Phil waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One
of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle
applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy
under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes
piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential
Decree No. 532 should be applied with more
force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine
water. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless
of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.
Case #2: Made by Angelo Tiu
Case Title: People v. Catantan
Law applicable to the case: PD 532
Topics/Doctrines applied in the case:
Piracy in Philippine waters
Facts:
Accused Catantan and Ursal boarded the
pumpboat of the Pilapils off the shore of
Tabogon, Cebu. In order that the Pilapils would
cooperate, Catantan aimed his revolver at
Eugene then struck him and had him hog-tied
while Eugene's younger brother, Juan, was
directed to row the boat towards a different
direction after its engine conked out. As they
passed the shoreline of Nipa, they came across
a "new" pumpboat owned by a certain Juanito.
The group approached Juanito's vessel then
Catantan boarded the same on the pretext of
buying fish but later drew his revolver and
aimed it on Juanito and told him to take him to
Mungaz, Cebu, to which Juanito complied. On
appeal, accused Catantan contends that he
only committed the crime of Grave Coercion
under Art. 286 of the RPC as there was no
attack or seizure of the vessel through force or
intimidation as he and his companion merely
boarded the boat.
Ruling of RTC: GUILTY of Piracy under PD 352
Ruling of CA: AFFIRMED RTC decision
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Issue: WON the acts of the accused merely

constituted Grave Coercion.
It is merely concerned with the incidents of

the speech, or one that merely controls the
time, place or manner, and under well
defined standards. Further, it is not designed
to suppress any particular message, they
are not subject to the strictest form of
judicial scrutiny but an intermediate
approach intermediate approach
somewhere between the mere rationality
that is required of any other law and the
compelling interest standard applied to
content-based restriction.
Ruling of SC:
NO. CA decision affirmed, case falls squarely
within the purview of piracy in PD 532.
Catantan and Ursal seized the Pilapils' vessel
through force or intimidation.
Case #3: Made by Joan Nacorda
Case Title: FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Justice;
and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, respondents. G.R.
No. 168338. February 15, 2008
Doctrines discussed in this case:

Clear and Present Danger Test
(related to Inciting to Sedition, Art.
142, RPC; Discussion by Reyes in pgs.
113-114)
the clear and present danger
rule which rests on the premise
that speech may be restrained
because there is substantial danger
that the speech will likely lead to
an evil the government has a right
to prevent. This rule requires that
the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive,
"extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high."
Content-based Restraint or Censorship
The restriction is based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.
Governmental action that restricts freedom
of speech or of the press based on content
is given the strictest scrutiny in light of
its inherent and invasive impact. Only when
the challenged act has overcome the
clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster, with the
government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Special Penal Law in this case:

Anti-Wiretapping Law (however, this was not
discussed in class)
Content-Neutral Regulation
Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

(related to Inciting to Sedition, Art.
142, RPC; Discussion by Reyes in pgs.
113-114, however, not material in this
case)
the dangerous tendency
doctrine which permits limitations on
speech once a rational connection
has been established between the
speech restrained and the danger
contemplated
Prior Restraint
Facts:
Official governmental restrictions on the

press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or
dissemination. It precludes governmental acts
that required approval of a proposal to
publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the
payment of license taxes for the privilege
to publish; and even injunctions against
publication.
After the 2004 Elections, then Press Secretary

Ignacio Bunye told reporters of the
Oppositions plot to destabilize the Arroyo
administration by releasing an alleged
wiretapped conversation between PGMA and
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano (Hello
Garci Tape). The DOJ Secretary, Raul
Gonzales,warned reporters that the use,
broadcast, or publication of the contents of the
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conversation will make them liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Law.
publication of the Hello Garci Tape does not fall

under these instances.
The NTC also released a warning to all radio

and television owners/operators to observe the
Anti-Wiretapping Law. Moreover, the NTC held a
dialogue and issued a joint statement with the
KBP wherein the NTC denied the issuance of
any memorandum circular or order restricting
press freedom or constituting censorship and
that it does not intend to limit or restrict free
expression of views.
The Court does not condone the alleged

violations of the law. However, the violation of
the law, in this case, cannot trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evil.
Dispositive Portion of the Decision:
In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and
prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the
official statements made by respondents on
June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on
airing the alleged wiretapped conversation
between the President and other
personalities, for constituting
unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press
Issue:
Whether or not the alleged violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law endangers the National
Security of the State warranting regulation or
prior restraint of the press from releasing,
broadcasting, or publishing information about
the Hello Garci Tape.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
No. The respondents have failed to prove that
the alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law and the broadcast or publishing of the
Hello Garci Tape would endanger the National
Security of the State.
Further, the alleged violation failed to satisfy
the Clear and Present Danger Test which
means that speech may be restrained if it
would likely lead to an evil the government has
the right to prevent and that the evil
consequences to be prevented must be
substantive.
SO ORDERED.
It is apparent that the danger sought to be

prevented by the government is the alleged
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, however,
it is not clear as to how the airing of the
wiretapped conversation would lead to such
violation. Moreover, the events leading to the
reveal of the wiretapped conversation are
confusing as to the nature of the danger of
reporting on the contents of the tape.
Governments have the right to be protected
from broadcasts which incite listeners to
violently overthrow it. Similarly, radio and
television may not be used to organize a
rebellion or signal the start of widespread
uprising. However, the broadcast and
Case #4: Made by Psalm Pueblos

Case Title: Soriano v Laguardia, MTRCB
Law applicable to the case:
Sec. 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 4, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
Balancing of Interests
Facts:
Petitioner Eliseo Soriano, as host of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against the petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt
directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the
TV program Ang Tamang Daan. After a
preliminary conference which petitioner
appeared, MTRCB preventively suspended the
showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days.
The following day, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the order, but withdrew his
motion 2 days later, followed by a filing with
the court of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension.
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-
MTRCB then issued decision finding Soriano

liable for his utterance with a penalty of 3
months suspension from his program.
Petitioner then filed petition for prohibition for
certiorari and prayer for injunctive relief,
arguing that Sec. 3(c) of PD 1986 (that created
MTRCB) is patently unconstitutional for
infringing unconstitutional guarantee of
freedom of religion, speech and expression.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during
the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of
Section 5, Art.III.
Whether or not Sorianos statements under his
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed
under Section 4, Art. III
Ruling of SC
- In first issue: No.
-MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986
reveals possession by the agency of the
authority to issue the challenged order of
preventive suspension, and this authority
stems naturally from, and is necessary for the
exercise of its power of regulation and
supervision. Sec. 3(d) empowers MTRCB to
supervise, regulate, deny or cancel permits for
television broadcast.
-There is also nothing in petitioners statements
subject of the complaints expressing any
particular religious belief, nothing furthering his
avowed evangelical mission. Statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of
religious discourse.
- In second issue: No.
- Freedom of expression is not absolute, it may
be regulated to some extent to serve important
public interests. Limits of freedom of
expression are reached with the expression
touches down matters of essentially private
concern.
- Petitioners statement can be treated as
obscene, at least with respect to the average
child, hence, unprotected speech.
- A cursory examination of the utterances
complained of and the circumstances of the
case reveal that to an average adult, the
utterances "Gago ka talaga ...,masahol ka pa
sa putang babae ....Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay
Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!"
may not constitute obscene but merely
indecent utterances. They can be viewed as
figures of speech or merely a play on words. In

the context they were used, they may not
appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The
problem with the challenged statements is that
they were uttered in a TV program that is rated
"G" or for general viewership, and in a time slot
that would likely reach even the eyes and ears
of children
- Without parental guidance, unbridled use of
such language could corrupt young minds
- Balancing of Interests test
- When particular conduct is regulated in the
interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is
to determine which of the two conflicting
interests demands the greater protection under
the particular circumstances presented.
- Court rules that governments interest to
promote and protect interests and welfare of
children buttresses the reasonable curtailment
and restraint on petitioners prayer to continue
as program host
Case #5: Made by Phil Jaramillo
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TITING
ARANAS @ TINGARDS/RONNIE, ANGELO
PARACUELES, JUAN VILLA @ JUANTOY, ELMER
MANALILI, ET AL., accused. ELMER MANALILI
RPC Provision/Law/SPL applicable to the
case: Art. 123 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 532 talking about Qualified
Piracy
Proof Beyond reasonable doubt; Burden
of proof on the prosecution - the
prosecution has the burden of proof in
establishing the guilt of the accused. When
the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an
accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf. In every criminal prosecution, the
identity of the offender or offenders must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
There must be moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind that it was accusedappellant who committed the crime. Absent
this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant.
Defense of Alibi - generally considered a
weak defense. However, it assumes
importance when the identification as an
alleged offender in the crime charged is
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inconclusive or unreliable. Although alibi can
be fabricated, it is not always false and without
merit, and when coupled with the
improbabilities and uncertainties of the
prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi
deserves merit.
December 15, 1992 in the

seawaters of Ubay, Bohol inasmuch
as he was in his residence in Cebu
City at that time. He does not know
the co-accused Titing Aranas,
Angelo Paracueles, Juan Villa,
Gaudencio Tolsidas and Rodrigo
Salas.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
4.
o
Elmer Manalili, along with several other
malefactors, boarded a passenger sea
vessel
and
seized
its
radio.
Subsequently, they demanded and
divested
the
crewmembers
and
passengers of the vessel of their cash
and
valuables,
including
the
equipments of the vessel, in the total
amount of P550,000.00.
On the same occasion, physical injuries
on the person of the vessel's
quartermaster, Ernesto Magalona, were
committed. The other five accused
remained at large, hence, the case of
qualified piracy proceeded only against
accused Manalili. When arraigned,
Manalili pleaded not guilty. He also
waived his right to pre-trial. Thereafter
trial ensued.
Prosecution side presented several
witnesses, namely:
a. Gervacio Ong Uy, 62, operations
manager of the cargo-passenger vessel
M/V J & N Princess
b. Ernesto Magalona, 39,
quartermaster of M/V J & N Princess
since 1991 to the present
c. SPO2 Alex Henson Reyes, a
member of the PNP, a passenger of M/V
J & N Princess to Cebu
d. PO3 Saul Pino Cuyno, 15 a
member of the PNP, a passenger of M/V
J & N Princess to Cebu
Defense presented their witnesses,
namely:
a. Jeffrey Dadula Perandos, 26,
single, third year high school, industrial
painter
b. Reynaldo Cupta Cardona, 21,
single, elementary graduate, painter,
c. Cherry Mae Manalili, appellants
wife
d. Appellant Elmer Manalili, 24,
painter by profession,
o
denied that he was involved in the

piracy committed on board M/V J &
N Princess in the evening of
In the morning and afternoon of

December 15, 1992, he was
working as a painter in the house
of Mr. Chua in La Guardia, Lahug. In
the evening, he was at home with
his wife and child, Reynaldo
Cardona and Jeffrey Perandos who
all corroborated his defense of
alibi.
5. Although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy

testified that one of the pirates who opened
the locker of the quartermaster had a tattoo
with the initials "GV" on his left hand, the court
found no such tattoo mark on appellant's left
hand.
6. From pictures presented by the Central
Intelligence Service (CIS) when Gervacio Ong
Uy was investigated, he identified the two
pirates as Titing Aranas and Paracueles, all at
large. When appellant Elmer Manalili was
presented during the preliminary investigation
before the municipal Judge of Ubay, Gervacio
Ong Uy told Municipal Judge Napuli that his
face was familiar among the eight pirates.
However, quartermaster Magalona and Boiser,
a passenger, identified him as one of the
pirates.
Ruling of RTC:
1.
The trial court found that prosecution

witnesses Gervacio Uy and Ernesto
Magalona identified accused Manalili as
one of the pirates; therefore, the
defense of alibi of the accused could
not
prevail
over
his
positive
identification.
2.
The trial court found Manalili guilty of

qualified piracy and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua. Elmer Manalili
was also ordered to reimburse and pay
each
complaining
witness
the
corresponding amounts of indemnity.
3.
Appellant now contends that the trial

court erred in appreciating the
testimonial evidence of both the
prosecution and defense that led to his
conviction.
He
argues
that
the
prosecution failed to prove beyond
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reasonable doubt that he was one of
the pirates in this case.
Ruling of CA: Didnt go through CA
Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court erred in
in appreciating the testimonial evidence of
both the prosecution and defense that led to
his conviction
Ruling of SC:
Yes. The appeal is
Court held that the
beyond reasonable
one of the pirates
charged. Hence,
acquitted.
meritorious. The Supreme

prosecution failed to prove
doubt that appellant was
who committed the crime
the appellant must be
When Uy was asked whether he could identify

the two armed men who initially pointed a gun
at him, Uy replied in the affirmative, and stated
that he had identified them through pictures
presented by the CIS as Titing Aranas and
Angelo Paracueles.
On the other hand,
prosecution
witness
Ernesto
Magalona,
quartermaster of the same vessel said he could
identify the two armed men who escorted Uy
because he was three to four meters away
from them and the place was well illuminated
with fluorescent lights.
Where eyewitnesses contradict themselves on
a vital question, such as the identity of the
offender, the element of reasonable doubt is
injected and cannot be lightly disregarded.
The identity of the offender, like the crime itself
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In
the case at bench, there is no positive
identification of the appellant inasmuch as
prosecution eyewitnesses Uy and Magalona
contradicted themselves on the identity of the
alleged offender.
Further, witness Uy declared that he saw
appellant for the first time during the
investigation before the municipal judge of
Ubay. He told the municipal judge that
appellant's face was "familiar among the eight
seajackers," but Magalona identified appellant
as one of the pirates. Compared with the
identification
made
by
Magalona,
Uy's
statement that appellant's face was familiar
among the pirates is characterized by
uncertainty. His identification of appellant in
the trial court based on the aforementioned
statement retained its doubtful tenor.
Fallo of the decision:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
appellant Elmer Manalili is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to
cause the immediate release of appellant
unless the latter is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform the Court
accordingly within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Case #6: Made by Yna del Rosario
Case Title: Martinez vs People
RPC Provision/ Law/ SPL applicable:
Art. 124 (Arbitrary Detention) in relation to
Warrantless Arrest
RA 9165 Dangerous Drugs Act
Topics/ Doctrines applied to the case:
Sec. 2 Art. III 1987 Constitution
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
Section 844 (breaches of peace) of the Manila
City Ordinance
Facts:
On December 29, 2007, while PO2
Roberto Soque, et. al, conducting a routine foot
patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila,
they heard a man shouting Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?. For purportedly violating
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the
City of Manila which punishes breaches of the
peace, the man, later identified as Ramon, was
apprehended and asked to empty his pockets.
In the course thereof, the police officers were
able to recover from him a small transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance
suspected
to
be
shabu.
Consequently, Ramon was charged with
possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11(3), Article II of RA 9165.
In defense, Ramon denied the charge
and contented that while walking along
Balingkit Street to borrow a welding machine, a
man in civilian clothing approached and asked
him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his
identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the
man who eventually introduced himself as a
police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle
(sidecar) where the said officer asked him if he
was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial,
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he was still brought to a precinct to be
detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque for P20,
000.00 in exchange for his release, unable to
give the money asked for, Ramon was brought
to the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings.
Ruling of RTC:
The RTC convicted Ramon of the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs; finding all its
elements to have been established through the
testimonies of the prosecutions disinterested
witnesses. It also upheld the legality of Ramons
warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was
disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila
City Ordinance during the time of his
apprehension.
Ruling of CA:
In its June 30, 2011 Decision, the CA
denied Ramon's appeal and thereby affirmed
his conviction. It upheld the factual findings of
the RTC which found that the elements of the
crime of possession of dangerous drugs were
extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in
possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity
of the body search made on Ramon as an
incident of a lawful warrantless arrest for
breach of the peace which he committed in the
presence of the police officers, notwithstanding
its (the case for breach of the peace)
subsequent dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Issues:
The sole issue raised in this petition is
whether or not the CA erred in affirming the
Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the
crime of possession of dangerous drugs.
Ruling of SC:
The petition is meritorious.
contravention of the said provision rendered

inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in
any proceeding in relation to Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution.
Commonly known as the exclusionary rule, the
above-cited proscription is not, however, an
absolute and rigid one. As found in
jurisprudence,
one
of
the
traditional
exceptions,
among
others,
is
searches
incidental to a lawful arrest which is of
particular significance to this case and thus,
necessitates further disquisition.
REMEDIAL LAW: valid warrantless arrest
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a
subsequent search is one that is carried out
under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court which requires that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred
by probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. The term probable cause,
specifically with respect to arrests has been
understood
to
mean
such
facts
and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2
Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating
Section 844 (breaches of peace) of the Manila
City Ordinance. Evidently, the gravamen of
these offenses is the disruption of communal
tranquility. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest
based on the same, it must be established that
the apprehension was effected after a
reasonable assessment by the police officer
that a public disturbance is being committed.
However, PO2 Soques testimony surrounding
circumstances leading to Ramons warrantless
warrant clearly negates the presence of
probable cause when the police officers
conducted their warrantless arrest of Ramon.
POLITICAL LAW: exclusionary rule

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution enshrines a persons right against
unwarranted intrusions by the government.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same
sacrosanct right remains revered, effects
secured
by
government
authorities
in
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of

shouting in a thickly populated place, with
many people conversing with each other on the
street, would constitute any of the acts
punishable under Section 844 of the said
ordinance. The words he allegedly shouted
"Putangina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?" are
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not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and
thus, could not have tended to disturb the
peace or excite a riot considering that at the
time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still
teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, no one present at the place of arrest
ever complained that Ramons shouting
disturbed the public. On the contrary, a
disinterested member of the community (a
certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that
Ramon was merely standing in front of the
store of a certain Mang Romy when a man in
civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque,
approached Ramon, immediately handcuffed
and took him away.
In its totality, the facts and circumstances
could not have engendered a well-founded
belief that any breach of the peace had been
committed by Ramon at the time that his
warrantless arrest was effected. Thus, no
probable cause existed to justify Ramons
warrantless arrest.
POLITICAL LAW: inadmissible evidence
Consequently, since it cannot be said that
Ramon was validly arrested, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was also illegal.
Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized
from Ramon is inadmissible evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
June 30, 2011 Decision and September 20,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 32544 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Petitioner
Ramon
Martinezy
Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Case #7: Made by Katrina Monggaya
Case Title: Galvante v Hon. Casimiro
Law applicable to the case: Art 124, 129,
130
Conducting a search on his vehicle

without being armed with a valid
warrant not penalized by Art 129, 130
of RPC
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against
the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
which dismissed for lack of probable cause the
criminal complaint against against SPO4
Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1

Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1
Federico Balolot for arbitrary detention, illegal
search and grave threat
Facts:
May 14, 2001 Petitioner Galvante was

on his way to visit retired police Plaza.
Upon arriving, he went down of his jeep
and was blocked by four policemen
(private respondents). Galvante was
told to give them his gun, which he
responded that had no gun, showing
his waist that there was no gun tucked
in. SPO4 Conde went to the jeep and
searched the vehicle, to which
Galvante asked for a search warrant
but was not presented any. They saw
Galvantes super .38 pistol under the
floor mat of the jeep and asked him of
the MR of the firearm. Due to the fear
of the firearms being pointed at him,
he
gave
the
document.
They
immediately left taking the firearm. At
the
police
station,
Police
Chief
Rocacorba put Galvante to jail and was
released only at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting
a bailbond.
June 21, 2001 Galvante issued an

affidavit for the purpose of filing cases
of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and
Abuse of Authority against SPO4
Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police
Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1
Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot
and PO1 Eddie Degran
March 20, 2002 SPO4 Conde claims:

(1) he has nothing to do with the
detention; it was the police chief (2)
There was no search warrant, but he
did not search the jeep, only Galvantes
person where the firearm was seen in
plain view
Other private respondents: claimed

that Conde searched the jeep
July 17, 2002 Internal Affairs Service

of DILG decision on admin case: finding
all private respondents guilty of grave
misconduct but penalized them with
suspension only.
RTC granted a Motion for Preliminary

Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance
the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of
Arrest,
but
was
subject
to
reinvestigation, where the prosecution
officer of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution for the approval of the
Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss
because incident stemmed from a valid
9
warrantless arrest - presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty.
Director Blancaflor recommended, and
Deputy
Ombudsman
Casimiro
approved the Resolution.
Ruling of RTC:
Granted the prosecution's motion
to dismiss lack of probable cause
Ombudsman:
Denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on the ground that
the
latter
offered
"no
new
evidence or errors of law which
would warrant the reversal or
modification"
Issue:
Whether or not Deputy Ombudsman

Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and
Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents)
is in grave abuse of discretion when:
(1) they found that the incident upon
which petitioner's criminal complaint
was based stemmed from a valid
warrantless arrest, (2) Notwithstanding
the absence of a valid warrant,
petitioner was arrested and detained
by the private respondents
Whether or not public respondents
denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration
in
a
capricious,
whimsical, despotic and arbitrary
manner
OSG:
Private respondents committed no
crime in searching petitioner and
confiscating his firearm as the
former were merely performing
their duty of enforcing the law
against
illegal
possession
of
firearms and the COMELEC ban
against the carrying of firearms
outside of one's residence.
Ruling of SC:
The
complaint
for warrantless
search charges no criminal offense. The
conduct of a warrantless search is not a
criminal act for it is not penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) or any other special
law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms
of searches:
Art 129 -imposed upon any public

officer or employee who shall procure a
search warrant without just cause, or,
having legally procured the same, shall
exceed his authority or use unnecessary
severity in executing the same.
Art 130 - imposed upon a public officer
or employee who, in cases where a search
is proper, shall search the domicile, papers
or other belongings of any person, in the
absence of the latter, any member of his
family, or in their default, without the
presence of two witnesses residing in the
same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of
the foregoing felonies.
Petitioner accused private respondents of
conducting a search on his vehicle without
being armed with a valid warrant. This
situation, while lamentable, is not covered by
Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
Court need not resolve the issue of whether or
not public respondents erred in their finding on
the validity of the search for that issue is
completely
hypothetical
under
the
circumstance.
Arbitrary detention dismissed
To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary
detention, it must be shown that (a) the
offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the
offender detained the complainant, and (c) the
detention is without legal grounds. The second
element was not alleged by petitioner;
Grave threats when pointed of firearm public officers enjoy a presumption of
regularity in the performance of their official
function. The IAS itself observed that private
respondents may have been carried away by
their "enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest
in line of duty".
On second issue: Grave abuse of discretion is
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but
on caprice, whim and despotism. This does not
obtain in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
10
Case #8: Made by Butch Bito

Case Title: People Of The Philippines vs.
Aaron Flores, et.al.
RPC provision applicable: Art. 124. Arbitrary
Detention
Doctrines applied in the case:
1. Public Official cannot commit the felony of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.
The first element of this said felony (Art
267 of the RPC) is that the
offender is a private individual.
Thus, public officers cannot
commit this crime. In this case,
the proper information that
should have been filed is
Arbitrary Detention since the
accused are all public officials.
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
required quantum of evidence.
Facts: One night, Samson Sayam (victim), was
drinking beer at a certain store. In the
same store the accused Sgt. Wennie
Tampioc
(detachment
commander)
together with his three members,
namely, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao
and Edgar Villeran are also drinking in
the same store.
Sayam joined the four accused at their
table. Sometime later, all the accused
and the victim left the store and walked
towards the direction of the military
detachment headquarters. After the
accused left the store with Sayam,
witnesses heard a single gunshot
followed by rapid firing coming from the
direction
of
the
detachment
headquarters. That was the last time
Sayam was seen, and despite diligent
efforts of Sayams mother and relatives,
he has not been found.
It was the prosecutions contention that
on that night, all four accused hatched a
conspiracy to kidnap the victim and
detain
him
at
the
detachment
headquarters. The trial court held that
the testimonial evidence failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of conspiracy among the four accused.
The prosecution failed to show a common
design. So the trial court proceeded to
determine the individual liabilities of the

four accused based on the degree of
participation in the commission of the
said crime.
Trial Court: The court finds Aron Flores, Edgar
Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY of
Kidnapping and Serious illegal Detention
beyond reasonable doubt and are each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. And since there is no
proof of Sayam being dead, they are also
ordered to pay him solidarily, or his heirs,
the sum of fifty thousand pesos as
damages, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the cost
of the suit.
On the other hand, accused Wennie
Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubts. The trial court found
that he left the store ahead of the three
co-accused. Other circumstances also
show that he is not guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
The accused (except Tampioc since he is
already acquitted) filed an appeal to the
SC. No CA on this case.
Supreme Court: The SC said that the
accused-appellants cannot be charged or
convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, since the first
element of the said crime is that the
offender must be a private individual
(see art 267 sa book for the elements).
The Solicitor General recognized the error
of the charges so he changed the
information and the accused were
charged of the crime of arbitrary
detention.
Issue: Since it is settled that accusedappellants are public officers, the question that
remains to be resolved is whether or not the
evidence adduced before the trial court proved
that Sayam was arbitrarily detained.
SC
ruling:
The
testimonies
of
the
prosecutions main witnesses, namely Carlito
Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit are not
enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Carlito failed to prove that Sayam was
forcibly taken to the detachment headquarters.
11
Neither did he say he was taken at gunpoint.
On the other hand, Jerry did not see any of the
accused apprehend or detain Sayam. He said
that he heard gunshots but in a rural place
which is so silent, the gunshot sound must
have come from any direction. All other pieces
of evidence are circumstantial and are not
enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Therefore, all the accused were acquitted.
Case #9: Made by Khen Aquino
Case Title: Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men,
believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family,
gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt
57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on
November
24
President
Arroyo
issued
Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a
state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and
suppress similar lawless violence in Central
Mindanao. Two days later or on December 6,
2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to
Congress. In her report, President Arroyo said
that she acted based on her finding that
lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao
and
risen
against
the
government. On December 9, 2009 Congress,
in joint session, convened pursuant to Section
18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
review the validity of the President's action.
But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial
law and restoring the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Issue:
*The only issue pointed out in this case is
whether the court may still be compelled to
review the factual basis for the declaration of
martial law in the areas affected, not
necessarily related to our Criminal Law study*
Ruling:
(the ruling in the actual case only revolves
around the Presidents power and the concept
of judicial review; however, with the given
facts, there are particular instances related to
our Criminal Law discussion) In relation to
Criminal Law, although President Arroyo used
her exacting power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, still, it does not necessarily bring forth
the idea that rebellion (or any acts of terrorism

indeed exist). Precisely why within 24 hours
after the proclamation, the Congress should
convene so that the factual basis for the
declaration may be reviewed.
Important note to remember, the
accused (57 armed men) were acquitted in this
case. As ruled out by the RTC of Quezon City,
no probable cause exist that they committed
rebellion in Maguindanao since the prosecution
itself (the State) failed to prove the existence
of rebellion as punished under the Revised
Penal Code. Interestingly, the declaration of
Martial Law is not a convicting power but
rather a regulatory matter for the President to
utilize in cases of threats to our National
security. The President at her discretion may
declare and again at her own discretion lift the
declaration. It is for the regular trial courts to
convict the accused found to have committed
acts against public order.
Case #10: Made by Justin Gular
Case Title: Kapunan Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Law Applicable to the case:
Article 134 Rebellion or Insurrection,
Proclamation No. 347 (Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who
May Have Committed Crimes Against Public
Order, Other Crimes in Furtherance of Political
Ends, and Violations of Articles of War,
Proclamation No. 348 (Granting Amnesty to
Certain AFP/PNP Personnel Who May Have
Committed Certain Acts Defined Herein)
Crimes committed in Furtherance of
Political ends should be committed when there
is an ongoing rebellion.
Facts:
Petitioners in this case are faced with
criminal charges for the murder of KMU
(Kilusang Mayo Uno) Chairman Rolando Olalia
and his driver Leonar Alay-ay.
Felicio Olalia and Perolina Alay-ay filed
before a letter of complaint before the
Department
of
Justice
charging
herein
peritioners who are members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police for the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder for the death of Olalia
and Alay-ay.
Kapunan Jr., in response to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
12
that their criminal liability are totally
extinguished by the amnesty granted to them
under Proclamation No. 347 to which the DOJ
refused to rule of the motions and treated
them as mere counter-affidavits.
Ruling of RTC: ( No case was filed in the
trial courts for this case was investigated
by the Department of Justice)
DOJ Investigation Panel Decision:
The
panel,
after
investigation,
recommended filing two information each for
separate counts of murders against herein
petitioners.
It refused to consider petitioners
defense of amnesty because documents
pertaining to the amnesty failed to show that
the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the
crimes of which the amnesty was applied for.
Furthermore, it was averred that the criminal
acts of petitioners cannot be obliterated by the
amnesty because they cannot be considered to
be committed in furtherance of political beliefs
for at the time of commission there was no
rebellion against the Cory Government. The
murders happened long before the rebellion
took place.
DOJ IP Decision after appeal:
The petitioners still cannot avail of the
benefit of amnesty because Proclamation 348
provides that amnesty may only be given to
AFP/PNP personnel if they have not committed
crimes or acts enumerated in the said order
that will disqualify one from applying. They
ruled that the murder of Olalia-Alay-ay was
considered to be an extra-legal execution
which as a result would disallow them to
benefit from the amnesty.
Ruling of CA:
The CA dismissed the petition for
appeal on the grounds that there is no finding
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary of Justice and that it refused to rule
on the applicability of the amnesty to herein
petitioners as it would involve an evaluation of
evidence which is not within the jurisdiction of
the petition for certiorari.
It further said that questions relating to
which amnesty can apply, assuming they can,
whether it be Proc. 347 or Proc 348 is one that
it cannot rule on and should only be resolved in

the trial courts during hearings.
Issue:
(I) Whether or not the grant of amnesty is
applicable to herein peititoners?
(II) Given such, is it enough to enjoin
prosecution of the petitioners for the
slaying of Olalia-Alay-ay?
Ruling of SC:
(I) Petitioners argue that the Secretary
of Justice should have used article 347 and not
348 which would then mean that they cannot
be disqualified because acts or crimes that
could disqualify under the former proclamation
does not include unlawful executions.
The SC ruled that CA was mistaken in
construing Article 137 not to cover military
personnel as Section 2 thereof would be futile if
such was the case. However, further finding
would show that the crimes enumerated in the
said proclamation are only those which allow
you to apply for a grant of amnesty. The actual
grant of amnesty takes effect only after the
determination of the National Amnesty
Commission which decides that extend to
which amnesty may be provided.
In this particular case, what was
granted to Kapunan was only Rebellion during
the Operation God Save The Queen and
Legaspi for Mutiny and which partake a more
limited scope.
(II) The findings of the Davide
Comission would show that there were previous
acts before the actual rebellion which triggered
military intervention which simulated events
that could provoke tense and unstable
atmosphere for a Coup d'etat. and that the
political assassinations as in this case was a
good example.
Supreme Court however refused to put
credence on these findings as no law or
authority shows that findings of the said
commission are binding to the courts. It was
said that any finding in such commission that
will be used for prosecutorial purposes should
still be evaluated by the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities.
Petitioner admits that the Coup d'etat
plot was preempted and that based on that
admission it was hard for the court to believe
13
that no rebellion happened contemporaneous
with or immediately after the Olalia-Alay-ay
killings and that there was a causal connection
between the two events. The court said that
such matters on whether such killings may be
absorbed in the crime of rebellion may be
better proven and should be addressed in the
trial courts.
The court is therefore persuaded that
there is indeed is a prima facie evidence for
prosecution in the trial courts to prove whether
such murders should have been done in
furtherance of political ends and that it be the
best tribunal to prove its merits.
The arguments of the petitioners that
they be exempt pursuant to the amnesty does
not is without merit taking to account the
specific limitations of the grant of amnesty.
Petition dismissed, CA and DOJ
Resolution Affirmed.
Case #11: Made by Christine Bontuyan
Case Title :Gilbert Zalameda v. People of the
Philippines
(G.R. No. 183656)
RPC PROVISION/LAW/SPL APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE:
Art. 124 (Arbitrary Detention) in relation to
warrantless arrest
R.A. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act of 2002)
Section 11, Article II (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs)
Section 12, Article II (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and
Other
Paraphernalia
for
Dangerous Drugs)
TOPICS/DOCTRINES
APPLIED
CASE:
Rules on Criminal Procedure
TO
THE
Section 5, Rule 113 (Arrest without

warrant; when lawful) in flagrante
delicto
Rules of Court
Section 13, Rule 126 (Search incident
to lawful arrest) plain view doctrine
FACTS:
On September 14, 2003 at 5:15 AM,

SPO4 Mignelito Orbeta, desk officer of Precinct
1, Makati City, received a phone call from a
concerned citizen on an on-going pot session
at 2725, D. Gomez St., Barangay Tejeros,
Makati City. Acting on the information, SPO4
Orbeta dispatched PO2 De Guia, PO2 De
Guzman, PO2 Gonzalo Acnam, PO1 Tidang and
Major Ancheta to verify the report. All
dispatched officers were in uniform.
At 5:25 AM, upon reaching the said
location which was the officers found to be a
house, the door of such was slightly open. PO2
De Guzman peeped inside and saw Gilbert
Zalameda and Albert Villaflor sniffing smoke
while sitting on a bed. PO2 De Guzman gave
his companions a thumbs-up sign and they
all rushed inside the house. The officers
introduced themselves as law enforcers and
frisked both Zalameda and Villaflor in
accordance with police procedure.
The officers were able to obtain a
rectangular plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substances from the right pocket of
Zalameda. Also, on top of the bed, the officers
found aluminum foils (later confirmed to have
traces of shabu), 3 plastic sachets containing
traces of white crystalline substances, a pair of
scissors, a disposable lighter, a bag with a
plastic zipper and an improvised tooter. The
policemen then handcuffed Zalameda and
Villaflor, informed them of their rights and their
violation pursuant to R.A. 9165, and brought
them to the police station.
At the police station, PO2 De Guzman
marked the confiscated item, turned the same
items and the suspects to SPO4 Arsenio
Mangulabnan. SPO4 Mangulabnan prepared a
request for laboratory examination and
immediately after, the seized items were
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
analysis and examination. The Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
conducted an examination on the specimens
submitted and found them to be positive for
the presence of shabu. Urine tests were also
conducted on Zalameda and Villaflor, both
yielded positive results.
14
In
Criminal
Case
No.
03-3559,
petitioner, Gilbert Zalameda was charged with
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
In Criminal Case No. 03-3560, Gilbert
Zalameda and Albert Villaflor were charged
with violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
RULING OF RTC:
In
Criminal
Case
No.
03-3559,
Zalameda is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of possession of dangerous
drugs pursuant to Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.
In
Criminal
Case
No.
03-3560,
Zalameda and Villaflor are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of possession of
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.
The dangerous drug subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 03-3559 consisting of 0.03
grams of shabu and the drug paraphernalia
recovered from the accused and subject matter
of Criminal Case No. 03-3560 are transmitted
to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for appropriate disposition.
RULING OF CA:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC and denied the subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warantless arrest
conducted by the police was illegal, the items
seized from him as a result of the said arrest
were inadmissible
RULING OF SC:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner failed to question the legality of his
warantless arrest
The established rule is that an accused
may be estopped from assailing the legality of
his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing
of information against him before his

arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest
or the procedure in the courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must
be made before he enters his plea; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived.
Warantless arrest conducted by the police was
valid
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure lists down the situations
when a peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(former would refer to peace officer or private
person conducting the warrantless arrest)
A. when in the formers presence, the
person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense
B. when an offense has just been
committed and the former has
probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it
C. when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another
Paragraph a of Section 5 is commonly
known as in flagrante delicto arrest. For a
warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
must occur:
(1) person to be arrested must
execute
an
overt
act
indicating that he has
committed,
is
actually
committing,
or
is
attempting to commit a
crime
(2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer
What led the police to the petitioners
house and to his arrest was the tip from a
15
concerned citizen of an on-going pot session at
the petitioners ouse. Under the circumstances,
the police did not have enough time to secure
a search warrant considering the time element
involved in the process. In view of the urgency,
to verify the report, the responding police
officers went to the given address and caught
petitioner Zalameda and Villaflor sniffing
smoke, a sufficient probably cause for the
police officers to believe that both were
committing a crime.
Evaluating the evidence in its totality,
the prosecution successfully established that
the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto.
Plain view doctrine in relation to seizure of
various drug paraphernalia
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The following requisites
must concur for the doctrine to be applied:
1. the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view the particular area
2. the discover of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent
3. it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may ve
evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure
The police officers had justification to
be at the petitioners place because they were
dispatched by their desk officer. They arrested
petitioner Zalameda and Villaflor because they
had reason to believe they were illegal using
and possessing a prohibited drug and drug
paraphernalia. The search of the petitioner
incident to his arrest yielded the confiscation of
the white crystalline substance identified as
shabu. In the course of the police officers
lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the
drug paraphernalia scattered on the bed
such items plainly visible.
case and as such, the police officers were

justified in seizing them.
Elements of the crime charged: duly
established by the prosecution
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 carries
the following elements:
a. accused possesses an item
or object identified to be a
dangerous drug
b. possession
is
not
authorized by law
c. the accused possesses the
drug freely and consciously
PO2 De Guzman duly and positively
identified petitioner Zalameda as the person he
saw sniffing the shabu with Villaflor, the same
Zalameda from whose pocket he was able to
seize the plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substances.
Illegal
possession
of
equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165 has the following elements:
a. accused possesses or controls any
equipment,
apparatus
or
other
paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering,
injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body
b. such possession is not authorized by
law
The police found the various drug
apparatus and paraphernalia seized because
such items were scattered on top of the
petitioners bed. The evidences, clearly
discovered in plain view.
Thus,
the
petitioner
knowingly
possessed the prohibited drug shabu and had
under his control various drug paraphernalia
without legal authority to do so, all in violation
of Section 11 and 12 of R.A. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
All the foregoing requirements for

lawful search and seizure are present in the
Case #12: Made by Leana Rondez
16
Case Title: Diamante v. People
RPC Provision/Law/SPL applicable: Article
124. Arbitrary Detention, p. 45
Topics/Doctrines Applied:
Arrest Without Warrant When Lawful
Arrest Without Warrant When to Object
Facts:
Petitioners were charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong with robbery
and carnapping in two separate Informations,
both dated July 13, 2000. When arraigned,
petitioners and their co-accused pleaded not
guilty.
At about 2:00 o' clock in the afternoon of July 9,
2000, while Cadorniga was in his clinic inside
his house in Mandaluyong City, Maricar,
accompanied by petitioner Diamante, knocked
on the door seeking a dental check-up.
Cadorniga let them in and entered an inner
room to fix himself. After he emerged from the
inner room, he saw that there were already five
persons inside. Cadorniga went on to conduct
the check-up, after which someone grabbed
him and announced a hold-up. Sta. Teresa
quickly tied him down to a stool and wrapped
his entire body, including his face and eyes,
with a clear scotch tape. Lintag and Dela Rosa
poked guns at him. The assailants soon
ransacked the clinic for around 15 minutes and
left carrying Cadorniga's personal effects.
Cadorniga thereafter heard his car alarm sound
off, putting him on notice that his car, a
Daewoo racer, was likewise taken. One Gerardo
was the driver of the taxi ridden by petitioners
before and after the incident happened. His
testimonies
corroborated
with
that
of
Cadorniga.
SPO4 Alfredo Villarosa of the Pandacan Police
Station testiAed that he and one SPO1 Cenia
apprehended Diamante, Sta. Teresa, Lintag,
Maricar, and Gerardo as accomplice, all without
a warrant, but with the express consent of the
owner of the house where Gerardo had led
them and pointed to the suspects.
Petitioners argue that they were illegally
arrested without a warrant by SPO4 Villarosa,
he having relied solely on Cadorniga's
subjective identification; and that since the
prosecution's evidence emanated from an
illegal arrest, the same cannot produce a
conviction pursuant to the exclusionary rule
under the Constitution.
Ruling of RTC:
Mandaluyong RTC found all the accused guilty
as charged, except Gerardo who had been
discharged to be a state witness, and Loza
whose demurrer to evidence resulted in the

dismissal of the cases as to him by Order of
even date. The trial court credited the version
of the prosecution, primarily the testimony of
Gerardo, to be clear and coherent; and
appreciated the presence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crimes. It deemed the alibi
of the defense inherently weak.
Ruling of CA:
The appellate court affirmed in toto the
Decision of the trial court, upon a Anding that
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
particularly those of Cadorniga and Gerardo,
were not only consistent, reliable and
trustworthy, but also corroborative of and in
harmony with each other. It likewise observed
that, in contrast, the testimonies of the therein
appellants were incongruous.
Issues:
WON the arrest without warrant by SPO4
Villarosa was legal.
Ruling of SC:
The appeal lacks merit.
On the legality of petitioners' arrest, the Court
finds that, indeed, they are barred from
assailing the same for failure to take issue
thereon before their arraignment. Objections to
the legality of an arrest must be made prior to
the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise,
they are considered waived. An accused may
also be estopped from assailing the legality of
his arrest if he fails to move for the quashal of
the Information against him before his
arraignment.
To be sure, the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the accused, hence, any defect therein may be
deemed cured when, as here, the accused
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court. An illegal arrest is thus not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error.
The trial and appellate courts found that
petitioners were among those who committed
robbery and carnapping against Cadorniga as
shown by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses which both courts considered to be
straightforward, clear, and consistent. The
Court finds no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
In fine, petitioners' guilt is indubitable.
Wherefor, the petition is dismissed. For
robbery, the penalty imposed on petitioners is
imprisonment for Four (4) years and Two (2)
17
months of prision correccional as minimum,
and Eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum; and for carnapping, the penalty
imposed on petitioners is imprisonment for an
indeterminate sentence of Seventeen (17)
years and Four (4) months as minimum to
Thirty (30) years as maximum.
7. Petitioner denied the facts and charges

saying that he was approached by civilians
from a white FX forcing him to board the
vehicle. Petitioner says that he was brought to
the Police Station and asked to identify the
drug pusher in their place which he could not.
Case #13: Made by Ralph Gonzales

Case Title: Bonifacio Dolera y Tejada v. People
of the Philippines
RPC Provisions/Law/SPL Applicable:
Art. 124: Arbitrary Detention
R.A. 9165: Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act
Ruling of the RTC: The RTC found petitioner

guilty for violation of RA 9165 and sentenced to
suffer a jail term of 12 years and 1 day as
minimum to 13 years as maximum and to pay
a fine of P300,000.
Topics/Doctrines Applied:
1. The legality of an arrest can no
longer be challenged after the arraignment of
the accused. (see also Sioso et al. v. People of
the Philippines).
2. Importance of the chain of custody
in dangerous drugs cases.
Ruling of the CA: The CA AFFIRMED the ruling

of the RTC
Issues:
Facts:
1. Did the CA err in ruling that the

petitioner waived any objection to his arrest
when he entered a plea upon arraignment and
actively participated in trial?
2. Did the CA err in upholding that the
chain of custody was properly established by
the prosecution?
1. At 3:00pm on August 14, 2003 Police

Officers Reynaldo Labon, Arnold Penalosa and
Victor Aquino conducted surveillance along
Bicol Street, Payatas, Quezon City pursuant to
a report of drug trafficking in the city.
2. Petitioner was spotted by PO2 Labon, who
was in plain clothes, scrutinizing a transparent
plastic sheet.
3. PO2 Labon approached petitioner,
introduced himself as a policeman and inquired
about the transparent plastic sheet.
4. Petitioner did not reply causing PO2 Labon to
suspect that the transparent plastic sheet
contained shabu.
5. PO1 Penalosa then frisked petitioner and
found another transparent plastic sheet.
Respondents proceeded to inform petitioner of
his constitutional rights and brought him to the
police station.
6. At the police station, PO2 Labon and PO1
Penalosa marked the plastic sachets with their
initials before turning them over to the case
investigator who on the same day, the two
sachets were brought to the PNP Crime Lab for
examination. The examination result showed
that the sachets contained 0.10 grams of
shabu.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:

1. No. The Court finds in order the
appellate courts observation that it is too late
for petitioner to question the legality of his
arrest in view of having already entered his
plea upon arraignment and participated in the
trial and having submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, any supposed
defect in his arrest was deemed waived. For
the legality of an arrest affects the jurisdiction
o the court over his person.
2. Yes. The identity of the illegal drugs
must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
While the prosecution for illegal
possession necessitates the elemental act of
possession with moral certainty, it must also be
proven that the illegal substance illegally
possessed is the same substance offered in
court as exhibit must be established with the
same unwavering exactitude.
Section 21, Article II or RA 9165
as well as its Section 21(a) Article II of the IRR
of RA 9165 enumerates the chain of custody.
Furthermore, it mandates the procedure must
be strictly followed.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that
the chain of custody was not followed because:
18
1. There is no showing of how the flow
of the chain of custody of the drugs went from
the time of the arrest of the petitioner and
alleged confiscation of the sachets up to the
turnover at the police station to the
investigator.
2. Neither is there showing that the
items were inventoried or photographed or
marked in the presence of the petitioner in
accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its
IRR.
3. There is also no showing whether
the desk officer and the investigator were one
and the same person and what steps were
undertaken to insure the integrity of the
evidence.
4. There is also no record of who
delivered the items to the crime laboratory and
how they were turned over to the investigator
or desk officer. As such, there is reasonable
likelihood of substitution.
Furthermore, the two sachets were not
even presented in court and identified by
police officer or witnesses. There was also no
explanation as to what happened to the
sachets after laboratory explanation.
CAs reliance on presumption of regularity does
not stand against evidence. As such, the
presumption of innocence of petitioner
accused stands.
Accused was ACQUITTED
Case #14: Made by Rhea Calooy

Case Title: People vs. Kamlon
case: Sedition
Murder, Kidnapping with Murder not absorbed
by Sedition
Facts:
Defendant together with Ulluh and Angkang
set out to look for two men whom they
suspected
were
responsible
for
the
disappearance of two of the followers of the
former seeking to avenge such. They seized
Ajibun and Alling who were detained overnight.
The next day, Alling was shot and killed by
defendant.
Defendant had a different version of the
killing of Alling wherein Alling and Ajibun
attacked and captured two sisters, Habilul and
Muhayla. The uncle of Muhayla shot Alling who
fell on the water while Ajibun escaped.
The two versions were conflicting. SC

determined that the trial court was in a far
more advantageous position of being able to
discriminate
more
competently
the
prevaricators among the witnesses from those
who testified the truth and so concluded that
the findings of the lower court shall not be
disturbed.
Ruling of RTC:
Kamlon was sentenced to death penalty for
kidnapping of Jamalul Alling and Hatib Ajibon
complexed with murder of Jamalul Alling
Ruling of CA:
NONE
Issue: WON physical injuries and murder are

complexed to the crime of sedition
Ruling of SC:
NO, it is not complexed.
Defendant contend that the trial court erred in
convicting accused for rape with murder in
spite the fact that these acts of violence were
committed in furtherance of sedition and
therefore absorbed in the latter crime. He cited
People vs. Hernandez ruling such. But SC found
that the case cannot be invoked as authority
since the case involved the crime of rebellion
and not sedition.
Sedition is a crime against public order;
murder is a crime against persons. (PP vs.
Cabrera)
Sedition in the more general sense is the
raising of commotions or disturbances in the
state; murder at common law is where a
person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully
kills any human being. (PP vs. Cabrera)
SC proceeded to convict the defendants of the
crime of sedition and the common crimes of
murder, frustrated murder, etc. (PP vs. Umali)
The rule obtaining in jurisdiction allows for the
treatment of the common offenses of murder,
etc. as distinct and independent acts separable
from sedition.
Additionally, it was found that defendant
violated conditional pardon by the late
president Quirino.
Case #15: Made by Kara Ventura
Case
Title:
MANUEL
MARTINEZ
Y
FESTIN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS
P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF
MANILA, respondents. [G.R. No. L-34022. March
24, 1972.]
FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Second
19
Judicial District, Branch III, et al.,respondents.
[G.R. Nos. L-34046-7. March 24, 1972]
Law Applicable : Article 145 Violation of
parliamentary immunity, Revised Penal Code
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132,
otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article
VI of the Constitution
FACTS:
Petitioner Martinez y Festin alleged that an
information against him for falsification of a
public document was filed. Its basis was his
stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy
for
delegate
to
the
Constitutional Convention that he was born
on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he
knew that he was born on June 20, 1946.
He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the
afternoon of September 6, 1971, when he was
on his way to attend the plenary session of the
Constitutional
Convention.
During
his
arraignment,
petitioner
asked
for
the
reconsideration of his motion to quash the
warrant for his arrest. Motion was denied
in open court. He then filed a petition for
certiorari on September 11, 1971.
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., it was
alleged that he is a duly elected and
proclaimed
delegate
to
the
1971
Constitutional Convention and assumed the
functions of such office on June 1, 1971.
Two criminal complaints were directly filed by a
certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegateaspirant, and his co-accused for alleged
violation of Section 51 (Penalty to be
imposed upon principals of attempted crime) of
the Revised Penal Code.
An order was issued by the judge for his arrest.
He invoked the privilege of immunity from
arrest and search and filed a motion to
quash. He was unsuccessful as respondent
Judge ordered his immediate arrest. He then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on
September 15, 1971.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrants of arrest
issued against the accused be quashed by
virtue of the parliamentary immunity they
enjoy as delegates pursuant to Section 15

of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as
the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in
relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution
and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING OF SC:
Tthe petition for certiorari and habeas corpus
by Delegate Manuel Martinez y Festin in L34022 and the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr.
in L-34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the
immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and
breach of the peace. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the
Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
Furthermore, history of parliamentary immunity
and its American origin shows that it was never
intended to exempt members of the National
Assembly from criminal arrest (only from civil
action).
Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
that penalizes a public official or employee
who shall while the Congress is in regular or
special session arrest or search any member
thereof except in case he has committed a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code
by a penalty higher than prision mayor come
to their rescue. Such a provision that took
effect in 1932 became inoperative as it is
repugnant to the aforementioned section of the
Constitution that became operative on
November 15, 1935.
Case #16: Made by April Jansen
Case Title: EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial
Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA, Ist Asst.
Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur,
petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in
his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Camarines
Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents. [G.R. No.
L-31839. June 30, 1980.]
Law Applicable : Article 156 (Delivering
prisoners from jail) in relation to Articles 223
(Conniving with or consenting to evasion) and
224 (Evasion through negligence) of the
Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
20
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set
aside the order of the respondent Judge
directing petitioners to amend the information
filed in Criminal Case No. 9414 ofthe CFI of
Camarines Sur entitled, People of the
Philippines versus Eligio Orbita, so as to
include as defendants Governor Armando
Cledera and Assistant Provincial Warden Jose
Esmeralda of Camarines Sur. In said case,
Orbita, a provincial guard, was prosecuted for
infidelity in the custody of a prisoner for the
escape of detention prisoner,Pablo Denaque. In
the course of the trial, the defense alleged that
Esmeralda received a written note from Gov.
Cledera asking him to send in five prisoners
which party included Denaque, who was then
under the custody of Orbita, to his house in
Taculod,Canaman, Camarines Sur to work in
the construction which made Denaques
escape possible, and thus, Esmeralda and Gov.
Cledera should be equally guilty of the offense
with Orbita.
Ruling of RTC:
Eligio Orbita, a provincial guard, is prosecuted
for the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of
Prisoner, defined and punished under Article
224 of the Revised Penal Code.
Defense counsel filed a motion in court seeking
the amendment of the information so as to
include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
defendants therein.
The respondent Judge directed the Fiscal's
office, within 15 days from date, "to cause the
further investigation of the case, taking into
consideration the provisions of Article 156 in
relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised
Penal Code in order to determine once and for
all whether the Governor as jailer of the
Province and his assistant have any criminatory
participation in the circumstances of Pablo
Denaque's escape from judicial custody."
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge erred
in equally incriminating Gov. Cledera and
Esmeralda with Orbita for the escape of Pablo
Denaque
HELD:
YES. Respondent Judge erred in equally
incriminating Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda with
Orbita for the escape of Pablo Denaque.
Decision annulled and set aside. Respondent
Judge directed to proceed with the trial of the
case.
RATIO: The offense of delivering prisoners

from jails as defined in Article 156 is usually
committed by an outsider who: (1) removes
from jail any person therein confined or
(2)helps him escape. If the offender is a public
officer who has custody or charge of the
prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody
of prisoners defined and penalized under Art.
223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov.
Cledera, as governor, is the jailer of the
province and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant
provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted
for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article
156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is
likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their
prosecution for conniving with or consenting to
evasion under Art. 223, and Art. 224 which
punishes evasion through negligence.
Case #17: Made by Hannah Blanco
Case Title: People vs Marcial Ama
Law applicable to the case: Article 160
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi
recidivism cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance such as plea of guilty
but only of a privileged mitigating
circumstance such as minority
Facts:
On October 16, 1958, Marcial Ama, Ernesto de
Jesus and Alejandro Ramos were charged with
murder while serving sentence of impisonment
by final judgment in the New Bilibid Prison. The
accused, armed, conspiring together and with
intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, stabbed Almario Bautista who
died instantaneously. The crime was committed
in the presence of public authorities who were
engaged in the discharge of their duties.
After the accused pleaded not guilty, upon
arraignment, de jesus and Ramos moved for
postponement while Ama, assisted by counsel,
moved to withdraw plea of not guilty and
substitute it to guilty. Counsel for Ama then
moved that minimum penalty be imposed in
view of his plea of guilt to which the
prosecution objected.
Ruling of RTC:
After the fiscal presented evidence for such
aggravating circumstance alleged in the
information, Ama was sentenced to a death
penalty and to indemnifyheirs of the deceases
6000.
21
Issue:
1. Whether or not the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
2. Whether or not RTC erred in allowing
appellant to change his plea without informing
him that such plea cannot offset quasirecidivism
3. Whether or not plea of guilt, as entered in
arraignment, is sufficient to sustain conviction
Ruling of SC:
1. Under Article 160, the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance
of plea of guilt and the imposable penalty
should now be the maximum for murder which
is death.
2. In arraignment, the only duty of the court is
to inform him of its nature, cause, and
attending circumstances. It is the imperative
duty of his counsel, not only to assist him
during reading of information but also to
explain the real import of the charge so he can
fully realize the gravity and consequences of
his plea.
3. When plea of guilt is entered in arraignment,
it is sufficient to sustain conviction for any
offense charged in the information, without the
necessity of requiring additional evidence since
by so doing, he has supplied the necessary
proof.
Decision appealed from is affirmed.
Case #18: Made by Alphonse Belarmino,
Clarlaine Radoc
Case Title: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE VS. ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL
Petitioners:
SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE
ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the
South-South Network (SSN) for Non-State
Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN
M. SANTOS, JR.
Respondent: ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
OF
THE
FACTS:
This case contains 6 petitions. Many groups
and people, on the standing that they are
citizens, or taxpayers, filed a petition of
certiorari on the constitutionality of RA 9372 or
otherwise known as Human Security Act of
2007. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague
and broad, in that terms like widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace and coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
ISSUES:
(1) WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in
defining the crime of terrorism.
(2) WON a penal statute may be assailed
for being vague as applied to
petitioners.
(3) WON there is merit in the claim that RA
9372 regulates speech.
HELD:
(1) The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present
case since these doctrines apply only to free
speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates
conduct, not speech.
(2) Under no case may ordinary penal statutes
be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible.
(3) There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372
regulates speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following
elements of the crime of terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under
RPC and the enumerated special penal laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and
creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to
coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful
demand.
22
b. Petitioners contend that the element of
unlawful demand in the definition of
terrorism must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by
the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What RA
9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
-IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited
authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of
the therein subject penal statute as applied to
the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were
actually charged with the pertinent crimes
challenged on vagueness grounds.
-In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme
Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a
criminal statute, challenged on vagueness
grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a
credible threat of prosecution and should
not be required to await and undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief.
-As earlier reflected, petitioners have
established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
Case #19: Made by Mary Iway
Case Title: LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR (OCA), v
WILMA SALVACION P. HEUSDENS
case: Restriction on Travel with Human
Security Act (But does not dwell much on this,
when Justice mentioned this she merely said
that there were different instances in which
restriction on travel is applicableon in which
is this case, and the other is the restriction on
HSA)
Topics/Doctrines applied in the case: Right
to travel (Constitutional Law) There is no
dispute, therefore, that although respondent
submitted her leave application for foreign
travel, she failed to comply with the clearance
and accountability requirements. As the OCA
Circular specifically cautions that no action
shall be taken on requests for travel authority
with incomplete requirements, it was expected
that her leave application would, as a
consequence, be disapproved by the OCA.
Facts:
This case stemmed from the leave application
for foreign travel sent through mail by Wilma
Salvacion P. Heusdens (respondent), Staff
Clerk. Records disclose that on July 10, 2009,

the Employees Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), received respondents
leave application for foreign travel from
September 11, 2009 to October 11, 2009.
Respondent left for abroad without waiting for
the result of her application. It turned out that
no travel authority was issued in her favor
because she was not cleared of all her
accountabilities as evidenced by the Supreme
Court Certificate of Clearance. Respondent
reported back to work on October 19, 2009.
There is a regulation via OCA Circulr that there
are certain requirements to be met before
personnel may travel and that the same
personnel must be granted the authority to do
so.
Issue: W/N Judge Wilma (yes, first name basis
mi) should be held liable for violation of OCA
Circular 49-2003 for traveling abroad without
the required travel authority.
Ruling of SC (Administrative complaint; SC
shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and personnel):
ADMONISHED + WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense would be dealt with
more severely.
True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the exercise of such
right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones
right to travel provided that such restriction
is in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health as may be
provided by law. This, however, should by no
means be construed as limiting the Courts
inherent power of administrative supervision
over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003
does not restrict but merely regulates, by
providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court personnel, before they can go on
leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to
restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something; to regulate is to govern or direct
according to rule.
Court recognizes a citizens constitutional right
to travel (although not absolute). It is limited
under:
The Human Security Act of 2010 or
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372. The
law restricts the right to travel of
an individual charged with the
crime of terrorism even though
such person is out on bail.
-
The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or

R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law, the
23
Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his
authorized consular officer may refuse
the issuance of, restrict the use of, or
withdraw, a passport of a Filipino
citizen.
-
The Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of

2003 or R.A. No. 9208. Pursuant to the
provisions thereof, the Bureau of
Immigration, in order to manage
migration and curb trafficking in
persons, issued Memorandum Order
Radjr No. 2011-011,[12] allowing its
Travel Control and Enforcement Unit to
offload passengers with fraudulent
travel documents, doubtful purpose of
travel, including possible victims of
human trafficking from our ports.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042,
as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In
enforcement of said law, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration

(POEA) may refuse to issue deployment
permit to a specific country that
effectively
prevents
our
migrant
workers to enter such country.
-
The Act on Violence against Women

and Children or R.A. No. 9262. The law
restricts movement of an individual
against whom the protection order is
intended.
Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or

R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the
Inter-Country Adoption Board may
issue rules restrictive of an adoptees
right to travel to protect the Filipino
child
from
abuse,
exploitation,
trafficking and/or sale or any other
practice in connection with adoption
which is harmful, detrimental, or
prejudicial to the child.

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Crim 2 Case Digests | Justice Yap | PreMidterms | EH 410 SY 2016-2017

Philippine waters. PD 532 requires that the

Ruling of CA: AFFIRMED RTC decision

Issue: WON the acts of the accused merely

It is merely concerned with the incidents of

Doctrines discussed in this case:

Content-based Restraint or Censorship

The restriction is based on the subject

Special Penal Law in this case:

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

Official governmental restrictions on the

After the 2004 Elections, then Press Secretary

publication of the Hello Garci Tape does not fall

The NTC also released a warning to all radio

The Court does not condone the alleged

It is apparent that the danger sought to be

Case #4: Made by Psalm Pueblos

MTRCB then issued decision finding Soriano

figures of speech or merely a play on words. In

December 15, 1992 in the

denied that he was involved in the

In the morning and afternoon of

5. Although prosecution witness Gervacio Uy

The trial court found that prosecution

The trial court found Manalili guilty of

Appellant now contends that the trial

meritorious. The Supreme

When Uy was asked whether he could identify

Fallo of the decision:

contravention of the said provision rendered

POLITICAL LAW: exclusionary rule

To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of

Conducting a search on his vehicle

Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1

May 14, 2001 Petitioner Galvante was

June 21, 2001 Galvante issued an

March 20, 2002 SPO4 Conde claims:

Other private respondents: claimed

July 17, 2002 Internal Affairs Service

RTC granted a Motion for Preliminary

Whether or not Deputy Ombudsman

Art 129 -imposed upon any public

Case #8: Made by Butch Bito

determine the individual liabilities of the

the idea that rebellion (or any acts of terrorism

it cannot rule on and should only be resolved in

R.A. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous

Section 5, Rule 113 (Arrest without

On September 14, 2003 at 5:15 AM,

of information against him before his

case and as such, the police officers were

All the foregoing requirements for

Case #12: Made by Leana Rondez

whose demurrer to evidence resulted in the

7. Petitioner denied the facts and charges

Case #13: Made by Ralph Gonzales

Ruling of the RTC: The RTC found petitioner

Ruling of the CA: The CA AFFIRMED the ruling

1. Did the CA err in ruling that the

1. At 3:00pm on August 14, 2003 Police

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

Case #14: Made by Rhea Calooy

The two versions were conflicting. SC