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EDU v ERICTA

Assailed is the validity of the Reflector Law and


Admin Order No. 2 which implements it. Under
the law, a vehicle has to comply with the
requirements of having reflective device prior
to being registered at the LTO.
The respondent Galo on his behalf and that of
other motorists, filed a suit for certiorari and
prohibition
with
preliminary
injunction
assailing the validity of the challenged Act as
an invalid exercise of the police power for
being violative of the due process clause. This
he followed on May 28, 1970 with a
manifestation wherein he sought as an
alternative remedy that, in the event that
respondent Judge would hold said statute
constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of
the Land Transportation Commissioner, now
petitioner, implementing such legislation be
nullified as an undue exercise of legislative
power.
Issue: W/N Reflector Law is unconstitutional,
and w/n AO2 is valid
HELD:
YES, both the law and AO 2 are valid.
It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is
a legislation enacted under the police power to

promote public safety. What is delegated is


authority which is non-legislative in character,
the completeness of the statute when it leaves
the hands of Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power
It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. "the most
essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of
powers," (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out "to
all the great public needs."
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial
in the past may be interwoven in the present
with the well-being of the nation.
2. Delegation of Legislative Power
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the
doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
may not delegate its legislative power to the
two other branches of the government, subject
to the exception that local governments may
over local affairs participate in its exercise.
What cannot be delegated is the authority
under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the

completeness of the statute in all its term and


provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature. To determine whether or not there
is an undue delegation of legislative power the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when
it describes what job must be done, who is to
do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For
a complex economy, that may indeed be the
only way in which the legislative process can
go forward. A distinction has rightfully been
made between delegation of power to make the
laws which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, which constitutionally may
not be done, and delegation of authority or
discretion as to its execution to exercised under
and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
objection call be made. The Constitution is thus
not to be regarded as denying the legislature
the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lay down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
its maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative

command is to be effected. It is the criterion by


which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental
rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have
to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

ERMITA-MALATE v CITY OF MANILA


Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of
Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond


the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate
due to the fact that hotels were not part of its
regulatory powers. They also asserted that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional
and
void
for
being
unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was
also the requirement that the guests would fill
up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises
and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging
houses would be open for inspection from city
authorities. They claimed this to be violative of
due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes
and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as
a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also
invoked the lack of due process on this for
being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any
room or portion thereof more than twice every
24 hours. There was also a prohibition for
persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the


automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court
unconstitutional.

declared

the

ordinance

Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.


Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
"The presumption is towards the validity of a
law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the resumption of constitutionality must prevail
in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present
case, the lower court deciding the matter on
the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.

There is no question but that the challenged


ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals,
particularly
fornication
and
prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was
intended to discourage "establishments of the
kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. In view of the requirements of
due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties, however,
the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is
the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances," decisions

based on such a clause requiring a "close and


perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in
slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful
occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate,
but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much
wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the wellknown
legal
principle
that
municipal
ordinances
must
not
be
unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to
supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of
a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by
limiting duration of use to twice every 24

hours- It was not violative of due process.


'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied
in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general
well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required
balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so
that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its
virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez
faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the
liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal
information,
the
maintenance
of
establishments, and the full rate of paymentHolmes- We agree to all the generalities about
not supplying criminal laws with what they

omit but there is no canon against using


common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."

ERMITA-MALATE v CITY OF MANILA ,


supra

On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of


Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the
following provisions questioned for its violation
of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and
6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue
also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice
every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction
and petitioners raised the case to SC on
certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due
process requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. There is no violation o
constitutional due process for being reasonable
and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its
face. Taxation may be made to implement a
police power and the amount, object, and
instance of taxation is dependent upon the local
legislative body. Judgment of lower court
reversed and injunction lifted.

ERMITA-MALATE v CITY OF MANILA v3


On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board
enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought
to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them
into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class
(taxed
at
4.5k/yr).
It
also
compelled
hotels/motels to get the demographics of
anyone who checks in to their rooms. It
compelled hotels/motels to have wide open
spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their
patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity
of the law averring that such is oppressive,
arbitrary and against due process. The lower
court as well as the appellate court ruled in
favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the
due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There
is a presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o
a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity,
the presumption stays. As in this case, there
was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot
prevail over the presumption. Further, the

ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.


There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. This
is to minimize prostitution. The increase in
taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned.
And taxation is a valid exercise of police power
as well. The due process contention is likewise
untenable, due process has no exact definition
but has reason as a standard. In this case, the
precise reason why the ordinance was enacted
was to curb down prostitution in the city which
is reason enough and cannot be defeated by
mere singling out of the provisions of the said
ordinance alleged to be vague.

Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc.


vs. Torres
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a
result of the department order DOLE, through
the POEA took over the business of deploying
Hong Kong bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization
of private employment and recruitment
agencies duly licensed and authorized by the
POEA to engage in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino land-based

workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul


the aforementioned order and to prohibit
implementation.
ISSUES:
whether or not respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA
circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
whether or not the requirements of publication
and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied
with.
HELD: FIRST, the respondents
within in their authority and did
grave abuse of discretion. This
Article 36 (LC) clearly grants
Secretary to restrict and regulate
and placement activities, to wit:

acted well
not commit
is because
the Labor
recruitment

Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of


Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of
this title [Regulation of Recruitment and
Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized
to issue orders and promulgate rules and

regulations to carry out the objectives and


implement the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies
is constitutional. It is necessitated by the
growing complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are
however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason
is the lack of proper publication and filing in
the Office of the National Administrative
Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil
Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The
Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts
shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15)
days after announcement of their adoption in
newspapers of general circulation;

and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of


the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with
the University of the Philippines Law Center,
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted
by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rulemaking requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in
cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the
rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987).
Prohibition granted.

JMM PROMOTIONS v CA
The Federation of Entertainment Talent
Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for
brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995
assailing that the Department Order No. 3
which establishes various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists
under a new system of training, testing,
certification and deployment of the former and
other related issuance, principally contending
that
the
said
orders,
1.)violated
the
constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged
existing contracts for employment; and 3.)
deprived individual artists of their licenses
without due process of law. FETMOP also
averred that the issuance of the Artist Record
Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and
in gross violation of the constitutional right to
life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for
the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM
for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary
for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in

the civil case which was granted by the trial


court on February 15, 1995. However, on
February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an
order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and dismissed the
compliant. An appeal was made to the trial
court regarding its decision but it was also
however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB
requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's decision and concluded
that the said issuance constituted a valid
exercise of Police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the said issuance is
a valid exercise of Police Power.
HELD: Yes, the ARB requirement and
questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by
the State. The proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a
valid exercise of police power by the state
particularly when their conduct afffects either
the execution of a legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, the
public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (use your property in such
a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of
course be within the legitimate range of
legislative action to define the mode and

manner in which every one may so use his own


property so as not to pose injury to himself or
others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects
at most the right of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is certainly much
wider.
To
pretend
that
licensing
or
accreditation
requirements
violates
due
process clause is to ignore the settled practice,
under the mantle of the police power, of
regulating entry to the practice of various
trades or profession. Professional leaving for
abroad are required to pass rigid written and
practical exams before they are deemed fit to
practice their trade. It is not claimed that these
requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation
of a property right under the due process
clause. So long as professionals and other
workers meet reasonable regulatory standards
no such deprivation exists.

JMM PROMOTIONS v CA , supra


Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in
1991, Cory banned the deployment of
performing artists to Japan and other
destinations. This was relaxed however with
the introduction of the Entertainment Industry

Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to


POEA to screen and train performing artists
seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the
proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE
sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artists Record Book which a
performing artist must acquire prior to being
deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent
Managers of the Philippines assailed the
validity of the said regulation as it violated the
right to travel, abridge existing contracts and
rights and deprives artists of their individual
rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of
FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of
EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC
is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower
court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
police
power.
Police
power
concerns
government
enactments
which
precisely
interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare or the
common good. As the assailed Department
Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that
the
burden
rests
upon
petitioners
to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly,
its ARB requirement, does not enhance the
public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably.
The
welfare
of
Filipino
performing artists, particularly the women was

paramount in the issuance of Department


Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban
against the deployment of performing artists to
high risk destinations, a measure which
would
only
drive
recruitment
further
underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes
the
method
of
screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least
lessens
the
room
for
exploitation
by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose,


and one of the statutory conditions of this
license is that it might be revoked. Revocation
of it does not deprive the defendant of any
property, immunity, or privilege.

CHAVEZ v ROMULO
GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP
Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the
issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines
banning carrying firearms outside of residence.
Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to
reconsider the implementation. The request
was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition
and injunction against Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is
a violation of right to property? Whether or not
the banning of carrying firearms outside the
residence is a valid exercise of police power?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may
be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to
be exercised under existing restrictions. A
licensee takes his license subject to such

The basis for its issuance was the need for


peace and order in the society. the assailed
Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession
of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence.
However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may reapply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is
regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be
curtailed.
CHAVEZ v ROMULO , supra
This case is about the ban on the carrying of
firearms outside of residence in order to deter
the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the
ban as a violation of his right to property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of permit to
carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a
vested property right
HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the
above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and


foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of
jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a
person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs. The
Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create
a vested right. In a more emphatic
pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran,
Jr. that:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted
broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR.
This is evident from the tenor of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No.
1866 which state that the Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions
as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of
firearms to carry them outside of residence.

Following the American doctrine, it is indeed


logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to
be exercised under existing restrictions, and
such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.
A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose,
and one of the statutory conditions of this
license is that it might be revoked by the
selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is
not a contract, and a revocation of it does not
deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of
these words in the Declaration of Rights. The
US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental
Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke
or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license
by the State is always revocable.

NDC v PHIL VETERANS BANK


Pres. Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies
to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company, outlined the procedure
for filing claims against the Agrix companies
and created a Claims Committee to process
these claims.
Especially relevant to this case is Sec. 4(1)
thereof providing that "all mortgages and other
liens presently attaching to any of the assets of
the
dissolved
corporations
are
hereby
extinguished."
Before this, the Agrix Marketing had executed
in favor of petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank
a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over
three (3) parcels of land situated in Los Baos,
Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage,
AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed
purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
companies that the aforementioned decree was
issued by President Marcos.
Petitioner filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims
Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In
the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the
National Development Company, invoking Sec.
4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the

Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for


the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of
Philippine Veterans.
For its part, the Philippine Veterans took steps
to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage,
prompting Agrix to file a second case with the
same court to stop the foreclosure.
In the trial court, the judge annulled not only
the challenged provision of Sec. 4 (1), but the
entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds
that: (1) the presidential exercise of legislative
power was a violation of the principle of
separation of powers; (2) the law impaired the
obligation of contracts; and (3) the decree
violated the equal protection clause.
The motion for reconsideration of this decision
having been denied, the present petition was
filed in the Supreme Court.
The petitioners contend that the private
respondent is now estopped from contesting
the validity of the decree. They cited Mendoza
v.
Agrix
Marketing,
Inc.,1
where
the
constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1717 was
also raised but not resolved.
Moreover the claims committee dismissed the
filing of the petition by Philippine Veterans on
the ground of the aforementioned estoppel.

The petitioners stress that in that the private


respondent also invoked the provisions of Pres.
Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the
AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get
results, it sought to foreclose the real estate
mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor, which
had been extinguished by the decree. It was
only when the petitioners challenged the
foreclosure on the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the
decree, that the private respondent attacked
the validity of the provision. At that stage,
however, consistent with Mendoza, the
petitioners alleged that private respondent was
already
estopped
from
questioning
the
constitutionality of the decree.
Issues:
1. Is estoppel applicable?
2. Is PD 1717 constitutional?
Held: No. Yes. petition dismissed
Ratio:
1. To rule now that the private respondent is
estopped for having abided with the decree
instead of boldly assailing it is to close our eyes
to a cynical fact of life during the Marcos time.
This case must be distinguished from Mendoza,
where the petitioners, after filing their claims
with the AGRIX Claims Committee, received in
settlement shares of stock valued at P40,000.00
without protest or reservation.

The private respondent has not been paid a


single centavo on its claim, which was kept
pending for more than seven years for alleged
lack of supporting papers. Significantly, the
validity of that claim was not questioned by the
petitioner when it sought to restrain the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by the
private respondent. The petitioner limited itself
to the argument that the private respondent
was estopped from questioning the decree
because of its earlier compliance with its
provisions.
2. The Court is especially disturbed by Section
4(1) of the decree, quoted above, extinguishing
all mortgages and other liens attaching to the
assets of AGRIX. It also notes, the restriction in
Subsection (ii) thereof that all "unsecured
obligations shall not bear interest" and in
Subsection (iii) that "all accrued interests,
penalties or charges as of date hereof
pertaining to the obligations, whether secured
or unsecured, shall not be recognized."
These provisions must be read with the Bill of
Rights, where it is clearly provided in Section 1
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due course of law nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of
the law" and in Section 10 that "no law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.

Petitioners argue that property rights, like all


rights, are subject to regulation under the
police power for the promotion of the common
welfare. Hence justification of the provision.
Court- The police power is not a panacea for all
constitutional maladies. Neither does its mere
invocation conjure an instant and automatic
justification for every act of the government
depriving a person of his life, liberty or
property.
A legislative act based on the police power
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. In more familiar words, a)
the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
should justify the interference of the state; and
b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals
The case is not applicable to these
requirements because the interests of the
public are not sufficiently involved to warrant
the interference of the government with the
private contracts of AGRIX. The decree speaks
vaguely of the "public, particularly the small
investors," who would be prejudiced if the
corporation were not to be assisted. There was
no record of these investors. Also, there was no
public interest to be protected. The decree was
to the benefit of an exclusive set of investors.

The oppressiveness is patent on the face of the


decree to rehabilitate Agrix. No consideration
is paid for the extinction of the mortgage
rights. The accrued interests and other charges
are simply rejected by the decree.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived
from contract and so comes under the
protection of the Bill of Rights. Private property
cannot simply be taken by law from one person
and given to another without compensation and
any known public purpose. This is plain
arbitrariness and is not permitted under the
Constitution.
And not only is there arbitrary taking, there is
discrimination as well. In extinguishing the
mortgage and other liens, the decree lumps the
secured creditors with the unsecured creditors
and places them on the same level in the
prosecution of their respective claims.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons
or things similarly situated must be treated
alike, both in the privileges conferred and the
obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or
things differently situated should be treated
differently. In the case at bar, persons
differently situated are similarly treated, in
disregard of the principle that there should be
equality only among equals.
One may also well wonder why AGRIX was
singled out for government help, among other
corporations where the stockholders or

investors were also swindled. It is not clear


why other companies entitled to similar
concern were not similarly treated.
On top of all this, New Agrix, Inc. was created
by special decree notwithstanding the provision
of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, that:
SEC. 4. The Batasang Pambansa shall not,
except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such corporations
are owned or controlled by the Government or
any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
The new corporation is neither owned nor
controlled by the government.
The Court also feels that the decree impairs the
obligation of the contract between AGRIX and
the private respondent without justification.
While it is true that the police power is superior
to the impairment clause, the principle will
apply only where the contract is so related to
the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the
legislature in the interest of the greater
number.
It can be seen that the contracts of loan and
mortgage executed by AGRIX are purely
private transactions and have not been shown
to be affected with public interest.

NDC v PHIL VETERANS BANK , supra


The particular enactment in question is
Presidential Decree No. 1717, which ordered
the rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of
Companies to be administered mainly by the
National Development Company. The law
outlined the procedure for filling claims against
the Agrix Companies and created a claims
committee to process these claims. Especially
relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is
section 4(1) thereof providing that all
mortgages and other liens presently attaching

to any of the assets of the dissolved


corporations are hereby extinguished. Earlier,
the Agrix Marketing Inc. had executed in favor
of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank
a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978 over
three parcels of land situated in Los Baos,
Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage,
Agrix went bankrupt. It was the expressed
purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
companies that the aforementioned decree was
issued by President Marcos. A claim for the
payment of its loan credit was filed by PNB
against herein petitioner, however the latter
alleged and invoked that the same was
extinguished by PD 1717.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Veterans
Bank as creditor of Agrix is still entitled for
payment without prejudice to PD 1717.
Held: Yes. A mortgage lien is a property right
derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of Bill of rights so do interests on
loans, as well s penalties and charges, which
are also vested rights once they accrue. Private
property cannot simply be taken by law from
one person and given to another without just
compensation and any known public purpose.
This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted
under the constitution.
The court also feels that the decree impairs the
obligation of the contract between Agrix and
the private respondent without justification.

While it is true that the police power is superior


to the impairment clause, the principle will
apply only where the contract is so related to
the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the
legislature in the interest of greater number.
Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an
invalid exercise of the police power, not being
in conformity with the traditional requirements
of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The
extinction of the mortgage and other liens and
of the interest and other charges pertaining to
the legitimate creditors of Agrix constitutes
taking without due process of law, and this is
compounded by the reduction of the secured
creditors to the category of unsecured
creditors in violation of the equal protection
clause. Moreover, the new corporation being
neither
owned
nor
controlled
by
the
government, should have been created only by
general and not special law. And in so far as the
decree also interferes with purely private
agreements
without
any
demonstrated
connection with the public interest, there is
likewise an impairment of the obligation of the
contract.

MMDA v GARIN
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation
receipt and his drivers license was confiscated
for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return
of his license and expressed his preference for
case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate
reply from the reply from the Chairman, Garin
filed a complaint for preliminary injunction
assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of
RA 7942 violates the constitutional prohibition
against
undue
delegation
of
legislative
authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties.
RTC rules in his favor directing MMDA to
return Garins drivers license and for MMDA
to desist from confiscating drivers license
without first giving the driver to opportunity to
be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 which
authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers license in the enforcement of
traffic constitutional.
RULING:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It


was concluded that MMDA is not a local
government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community.
Police power as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty is the power vested in the
legislative to make, ordain and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the
same.
There is no provision in RA 7942 that
empowers MMDA or its council to enact
ordinances,
approve
resolutions
and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions
are administrative in nature. It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, P.O., NGOs and private
sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery
of services.

and expressing his preference for his case to be


filed in court

MMDA v GARIN , supra


Respondent, Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was
issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his
drivers license was confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo,
Manila, on 05 August 1995.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs
validity (which is 48 hours from date of
apprehension), the respondent addressed a
letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his drivers license,

Since there was no reply, Garin filed the


original
complaint
with
application
for
preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on 12
September 1995, contending that, in the
absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924
grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, preempting a judicial determination of the validity
of the deprivation, thereby violating the due
process clause of the Constitution.
The
respondent
further
contended
that
the
provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against
undue
delegation
of
legislative
authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix
and impose unspecified and therefore
unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring
motorists.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that
the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act
No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection
and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic
violations, which powers are legislative and
executive in nature; the judiciary retains the
right to determine the validity of the penalty
imposed. The MMDA also refuted Garins
allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the

governing board and policy making body of the


petitioner, has as yet to formulate the
implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 and directed the courts attention to
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001
dated 15 April 1995 which authorizes
confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance
of a TVR.
Respondent Garin, however, questioned the
validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No.
TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by
the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a
quorum.
On 23 October 1995, the RTC granted the
preliminary
mandatory
injunction
which
ordered the MMDA to return the respondents
drivers license. On 14 August 1997, the RTC
rendered the decision in favor of the
respondent.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA,
through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04,
Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the
use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT)
scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists
are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any
Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no
longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter
of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given
seven days from the date of implementation of

the new system to pay their fines and redeem


their license or vehicle plates
Although this case was considered as moot and
academic
by
the
implementation
of
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004,
the Supreme Court believed that it was but
proper to address the current issue for the
proper implementation of the petitioners
future programs.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5(f) of Republic Act No.
7924, which created the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), authorizes the
MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic
laws and regulations
Ruling:
By virtue of the doctrine promulgated in the
case of Metro Manila Development Authority v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Rep. Act No.
7924 does not grant the MMDA with police
power, let alone legislative power, and that all
its functions are administrative in nature.
Police power, having been lodged primarily in
the National Legislature, cannot be exercised
by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the president and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs).

Once delegated, the agents can exercise only


such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.
Thus, as held in the aforementioned case, . . .
[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the
following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation,
implementation,
preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council
to
"enact
ordinances,
approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental
organizations
and
the
private sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
All its functions are
administrative in nature and these are actually
summed up in the charter itself, viz:..

Although petitioner is not precluded and in


fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend
or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management,
as
well
as
the
administration
and
implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, it still needs a valid
law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source. This is consistent with the
ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a
development authority created for the purpose
of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies,
peoples
organizations,
non-governmental
organizations and the private sector, which may
enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
Hence, the power of MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses without
need of any other legislative enactment, is an
unauthorized exercise of police power.

BELTRAN v SECRETARY OF HEALTH


Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board
of Directors of the Philippine Association of
Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and
non-profit association composed of free

standing blood banks. Public respondent


Secretary of Health is being sued in his
capacity as the public official directly involved
and charged with the enforcement and
implementation of RA 7719 or the National
Blood Service Act. Section 7 of RA 7719
provides phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the
said provision on the ground, among others,
that such represents undue delegation if not
outright abdication of the police power of the
state.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid
exercise of police power
Held: Petitions dismissed. The court upholds
the validity of RA 7719.
The promotion of public health is a
fundamental obligation of the State. The health
of the people is a primordial governmental
concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise
of the States police power in order to promote
and preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if
(a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires the interference of the State; and (b)
the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the attainment of the objective sought to be

accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon


individuals
Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.
Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds
of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general welfare of the State and to its
fundamental aim of government, the rights of
the individual may be subordinated.

BELTRAN v SECRETARY OF HEALTH ,


supra
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine
Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)
released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system entitled
Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine
Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of
the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were
supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by
the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based
blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospitalbased blood banks ; showing that the
Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. It was further found, among
other things, that blood sold by persons to
blood commercial banks are three times more
likely to have any of the four (4) tested
infections or blood transfusion transmissible
diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B
and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law

on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an


adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. One of the
provisions of the said act was the phasing out
of commercial blood banks within 2 years from
its effectivity.
Petitioners, comprising the majority of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Association
of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of RA
7719 on the ground among others that it is an
improper and unwarranted delegation of
legislative power. According to petitioners, the
Act was incomplete when it was passed by the
Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a
standard to which the Secretary of Health must
conform in the performance of his functions.
Petitioners also contend that the two-year
extension period that may be granted by the
Secretary of Health for the phasing out of
commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7
of the Act constrained the Secretary to
legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of
legislative power.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A.
7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER
Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power or not,
it is usual to inquire whether the statute was

complete in all its terms and provisions when it


left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of the administrative
body or any other appointee or delegate of the
Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that
may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards,
an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated
to it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is
clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the
health of the people and has mandated several
measures to attain this objective. One of these
is the phase out of commercial blood banks in
the country. The law has sufficiently provided a
definite standard for the guidance of the
Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public
health by providing a safe and adequate supply
of blood through voluntary blood donation. By
its provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under


Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to
execute the provisions of said Act. Specifically,
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9
provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for
another two years until May 28, 1998 based
on the result of a careful study and review of
the blood supply and demand and public
safety. This power to ascertain the existence of
facts and conditions upon which the Secretary
may effect a period of extension for said phaseout can be delegated by Congress. The true
distinction between the power to make laws
and discretion as to its execution is illustrated
by the fact that the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.

WHITE LIGHT CORP v CITY OF MANILA


On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S.
Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting ShortTime Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels,
Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila
(the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less
than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more
than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa
Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC),
who own and operate several hotels and motels
in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention
on the ground that the ordinance will affect
their business interests as operators. The
respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance
is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void
as it strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution. Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging
private enterprises and the incentive to needed

investment, as well as the right to operate


economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance
sought
to
dissuade
could
nonetheless be consummated by simply paying
for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted
that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities
the power to regulate the establishment,
operation
and
maintenance
of
cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. Also, they contended that under
Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they
have the power to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is
an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive interference in
their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.

First, it held that the ordinance did not violate


the right to privacy or the freedom of
movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit
individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained
through a lawful method. The lawful objective
of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to
curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still
allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on
the establishments is justified by the well-being
of its constituents in general.

that runs through those decisions and the case


at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted
with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging
establishments.
This
could
be
described as the middle case, wherein there is
no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have
been severely restricted. At its core, this is
another case about the extent to which the
State can intrude into and regulate the lives of
its citizens

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

The test of a valid ordinance is well


established. A long line of decisions including
City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to
be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit
to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise
of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered
as a valid exercise of police power, and as such,
it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not
only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr
ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v.
Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread

The ordinance in this case prohibits two


specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room

more than twice a day. The ban is evidently


sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the
Local
Government
Code
through
such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding
right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug
use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the
myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law that they
were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they
also recognized the capacity of the petitioners
to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-

up rates to the lodging establishments in


question. The rights at stake herein fell within
the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty
as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined
by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint
or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace
the right of man to enjoy the facilities with
which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary
for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional
right must be recognized and the invasion of it
should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to
the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
deserving
of
constitutional
protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of
a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require an

interference with private rights and the means


must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the
police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to
curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing
the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the
strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug
use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners
and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in

illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and


prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from
their clientele by charging their customers a
portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its
citizens.
However
well-intentioned
the
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary
and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The
ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
the businesses of the petitioners as well as
restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly
equates wash rates and renting out a room
more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance
No.
7774
is
hereby
declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as
to costs.

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Davao
City enacted Ordinance No. 0309 series of
2007. It was approved by city mayor Duterte
and took effect on March 23, 2007 after its
publication in Mindanao Power. Section 5 of the
Ordinance enforces a ban on aerial spraying 3
months thereafter (transition period).
The
Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association
(PBGEA)
challenged
its
constitutionality before the RTC, alleging that
the ordinance is an unreasonable exercise of
police power, violated the equal protection
clause, amounted to the confiscation of
property without due process, and lacked
publication pursuant to S511 of the Local
Government Code (LGC).

Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and


Exporter Association Inc.

On May 8, 2007, the residents around the


plantation led by Wilfredo Mosqueda submitted
a motion to intervene and opposition to
issuance of preliminary injunction. The RTC
granted their petition and thereafter declared
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional.
They cited that the City of Davao validly
exercised police power under the General
Welfare Clause of the LGC, and consistent with
the equal protection clause since aerial
spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticide application due to the higher degree
of health risk caused by the aerial drift. There

is also no clear showing that it violated the


Constitution.
PBGEA appealed and the CA reversed the
RTCs decision. Section 5 of the assailed
ordinance is void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive, found the 3
month transition period impractical, and
violated the equal protection clause since the
term aerial spraying made no distinction to the
other classes of pesticides or fungicide. The
maintenance of the 30m buffer zone around the
plantations under Section 6 of the ordinance
also constituted taking of property without due
process as the landowners are compelled to
cede portions of their property. The City of
Davao filed a petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: W/n Ordinance
unconstitutional (YES)

No.

0309-07

is

HELD:
1. The Ordinance is a valid act of the
Sangguniang Bayan. To be considered as a
valid police power measure, an ordinance must
pass a two pronged test: It must be formal and
enacted within the powers of the LGU, and it
must be substantive and conforms with the
limitations under the constitution. The General
Welfare Clause of the LGC comprehends 2
branches of delegated powers: general
legislative power and police power proper.

General legislative power refers to power


delegate by congress to the local legislative
body, while police power proper authorizes the
LGU to enact ordinance necessary for public
order. The city of Davao has authority to enact
measures promoting public welfare namely
advancing the interest of residents vulnerable
to alleged health risks due to pesticide drift.
2. The Ordinance violates the Due Process
Clause. Section 5 of the Ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive since it sets the
effectivity of the ban at three months after
publication. The three month period is
inadequate the facilitate the shift from aerial to
truck mounted spraying given the vast area of
the affected plantations, and it effectively
deprives respondents from efficient means to
combat the Black Sigatoka disease. However,
the requirement of a 30m buffer zone is
reasonable. Section 3e of the ordinance
requires planting diversified trees in the areas
within the buffer zone. Respondents do not
permanently
and
completely
lose
their
landholdings in the affected area since they can
still cultivate or make other productive uses
thereof.
3. The Ordinance violates the Equal Protection
Clause. For a classification to be valid, it must
be: based on substantial distinctions; germane
to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions; and equally applicable to

all members of the same class. The City of


Davao claims that the ordinance aims to
eliminate pesticide drift from aerial spraying.
However, pesticide drift can also result from
manual spraying. The ban against aerial
spraying alone does not achieve the goal of the
ordinance. The imposition of the ban is also too
broad since it applies to all forms of aerial
spraying regardless of the substance being
used. It should be noted that aside from
pesticide, vitamins and other beneficial
substances are also used in aerial spraying.
Section 6 which created the 30m buffer zone
also includes entities engaged in organic
farming who do not contribute to pesticide
drift. The prohibition against aerial spraying
also denies individuals the technology aimed at
efficient and cost-effective operations and
cultivation of banana and other crops.
4. Petitioners rely on the Precautionary
Principle, which lacks sufficient scientific basis.
The precautionary principle is a German social
planning
principle
that
justifies
the
implementation of vigorous policies to tackle
global warming and pollution. However, it is
only relevant if there is a concurrence of three
elements: uncertainty, threat of environmental
damage, and irreversible harm. Thus, it is only
relevant in situations where the threat is
certain or that a causal link between an action
and environmental damage can be established.
In the case at bar, there is no scientific study

that sufficiently validates the effects of aerial


spraying.
5. The Ordinance is an ultra vires act. Davao
City disregarded the regulations implemented
by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA)
in enacting said ordinance. Although the LGC
vests municipal corporations with sufficient
power to govern themselves, they have no right
to enact ordinances that are dissonant with the
States policy. The function of pesticides
control, regulation, and development is the
jurisdiction of PD 1144. Such functions are not
granted to LGUs. In enacting the Ordinance,
the city of Davao performed an ultra vires act.
Moreover, the ordinance prohibits an activity
already covered by the jurisdiction of the FPA
which has issued its own regulations under
Memorandum circular no. 2, series of 2009.
The City of Davao exceeded its delegated
authority in enacting Ordinance 0309-07.
CONCLUSION:
The Court denies the consolidated petitions and
affirms the CA decision promulgated on
January 9, 2009, declaring Ordinance No 030907 unconstitutional.

Drugstores Association of the Philippines,


Inc. v NCDA
Facts:
On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7277, the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,"
was passed into law. The law defines "disabled
persons", "impairment" and "disability."
On
April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 94427
("Magna Carta for Persons with Disability") was
enacted amending RA 7277. Specifically, Sec.
32 of RA 9442 granted the PWDs a 20%
discount on the purchase of medicine (upon
submission as proof of his/her entitlement
thereto: ID issued by mayor or brgy. captain,
passport, or transportation discount fare ID
from the National Council for the Welfare of
Disabled persons) and a tax deduction scheme
was adopted wherein covered establishments
may deduct the discount granted from gross
income based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9442 (Sec. 6 Rule IV
pertains to Other Privileges and Incentives,
including the purchase of medicine) was jointly
promulgated by several government agencies.

On April 23, 2008, the NCDA issued


Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of
2008, prescribing guidelines which should
serve as a mechanism for the issuance of a
PWD Identification Card (IDC) which shall be
the basis for providing privileges and discounts
to bonafide PWDs. On December 9, 2008, the
DOF issued Revenue Regulations No. 1- 2009
prescribing rules and regulations to implement
R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of PWDs
and tax incentives for establishments granting
the discount. On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued
A.O. No. 2009-0011 specifically stating that the
grant of 20% discount shall be provided in the
purchase of branded medicines and unbranded
generic medicines from all establishments
dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of
the PWDs.
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for
Prohibition with application for a TRO/WPI
before the CA to annul and enjoin the
implementation of the 5 laws abovementioned
(in bold). On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a
Decision upholding the constitutionality of RA
7277 as amended, as well as the assailed
administrative issuances.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in ruling the PWD
discount as a valid exercise of police power
instead of an invalid exercise of the power of

eminent domain (because it fails to provide just


compensation to petitioners)
2. WON the assailed laws violate the due
process clause
3. WON the definition of disabilities under
the assailed laws are vague, ambiguous, and
unconstitutional
4. WON the PWD discount violates the equal
protection clause
Ratio:
We deny the petition.
1. The CA is correct when it applied by analogy
the case of Carlos Superdrug Corporation et al.
v. DSWD, et al. wherein We pronounced that
Sec. 4 of RA 9257 which grants 20% discount
on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens
is a legitimate exercise of police power. Police
power is the power of the state to promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. On the other
hand, the power of eminent domain is the
inherent right of the state (and of those entities
to which the power has been lawfully
delegated) to condemn private property to
public use upon payment of just compensation.
In the exercise of police power, property rights
of private individuals are subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state. A legislative act based on the police

power requires the concurrence of a lawful


subject and a lawful method.
The priority given to PWDs finds its basis in the
Constitution (Sec. 6 Art XII and Sec. 11 Art
XIII). Thus, the Declaration of Policy (Sec. 2) of
RA 7277 recognizes that disabled persons are
part of the Philippine society, to whom the
Senate shall give full support for the
improvement of their total well-being and their
integration into the mainstream of society. The
State shall adopt policies ensuring the
rehabilitation,
self-development
and
selfreliance of disabled persons. Hence, the PWD
mandatory discount on the purchase of
medicine is supported by a valid objective or
purpose. As in the case of senior citizens, the
discount privilege to which the PWDs are
entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the
general public to which these citizens belong.
The means employed in invoking the active
participation of the private sector, in order to
achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related. Also, the
means employed to provide a fair, just and
quality health care to PWDs are reasonably
related to its accomplishment, and are not
oppressive, considering that as a form of
reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs
in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by
the establishments as allowable tax deductions.

2. The three documents (see above) mentioned


in Sec. 32 of RA 7277 as amended by RA 9442
to entitle one to the discount must be read with
its IRR. NCDA A.O. No. 1 provides the
reasonable guidelines in the issuance of IDCs
to PWDs as proof of their entitlement to the
privileges and incentives and fills the details in
the implementation of the law. Petitioners'
insistence that Part IV (D) of said AO is void
because it allows allegedly non-competent
persons like teachers, heads of establishments
and heads of NGOs to confirm the medical
condition of the applicant is misplaced. It must
be stressed that only for apparent disabilities
can the teacher (a school assessment for
students) or head of a business establishment
(a certificate of disability for employees)
validly issue the mentioned required document
because, obviously, the disability is easily seen
or clearly visible. It is, therefore, not an
unqualified grant of authority for the said
nonmedical persons as it is simply limited to
apparent disabilities. On the other hand,
nonapparent disabilities can only be validated
by a licensed private or government physician,
and a medical certificate has to be presented in
the procurement of an IDC. Therefore, the
provision complies with the standards of
substantive due process.
3. Aside from the definitions of a "person with
disability" or "disabled persons" under RA 7277
as amended by RA 9442 and its IRR, NCDA

A.O. No. 1 specifies that IDs shall be issued to


those
with
the
following
conditions:
psychosocial, chronic illness, learning, mental,
visual,
orthopedic,
speech
and
hearing
conditions. This includes persons suffering
from disabling diseases resulting to the
person's limitations to do day to day activities
as normally as possible such as but not limited
to those undergoing dialysis, heart disorders,
severe cancer cases and such other similar
cases resulting to temporary or permanent
disability. Similarly, DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011
defines the different categories of disability. In
the instant case, We do not find the aforestated
definition of terms as vague and ambiguous.
Settled is the rule that courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under
the special and technical training and
knowledge of such agency.
4. With respect to RA 9442, its expressed
public policy is the rehabilitation, selfdevelopment and self-reliance of PWDs.
Persons with disability form a class separate
and distinct from the other citizens of the
country.
Indubitably,
such
substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to
the purpose of the law. Thus, Congress may
pass a law providing for a different treatment
to persons with disability apart from the other
citizens of the country.

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26,

2010, and the Resolution dated November 19,


2010, in CA-GR. SP No. 109903 are
AFFIRMED. All concur.

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