Chavez vs.

Public Estates Authority

ISSUES:

FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central

implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the
DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar
as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire

residential land?

PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156
hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

RULING:

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. The transfer (as
embodied in a joint venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain.
Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds
FACTS: Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in
December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945,
he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the
register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire
land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential

lot that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of
this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states

that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions,
aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab
initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No.
2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire
private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the
pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being
practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of
the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land
could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by
the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land."
In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land
merely by way of reciprocity.
Republic vs. CA and Lapina

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of
land, which was approved and issued an original certificate of title.
Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land
shall not be alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date
of the issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon
reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding that
the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low
tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion of
the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition
prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?
HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides thatlands acquired under
free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the
application and for a term of 5 years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grantThe contracts of lease and
mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as
contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because such
contracts impair the use of the property.
2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea moved
towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public
domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the
registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel
subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court
voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said
court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private
person or entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land
should therefor be returned to the public domain.
Malabanan vs. Republic

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application

for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a
parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth
being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of
all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the
RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of
Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as

of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at

any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided
that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in
their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration

Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The
person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription
under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership
of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish
that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax
Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as

property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil

Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this

registration case.

Republic vs. Naguiat

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . .

applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial
Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits.
Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the
Government had no evidence to adduce. 3

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 29,
1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which
affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of
land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly
described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on
29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she
is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same
from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and
their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof
for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of
whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein
petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground
that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of
applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are
part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general
default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office

In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered

judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating
unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the
registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates
the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing
on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters,
appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322
containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant
Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel
Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all
the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees
registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496,
Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject
to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent
laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions
which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And
once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial
court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed
decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that
the CAs decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and

the evidence, since respondent has not established with the

required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect
of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under
(P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner
Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the
length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her
application for registration and for not considering the fact that she
has not established that the lands in question have been
declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.

the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public

domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa,
belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not the
court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with
the applicant.15

Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and

released by positive act of the Government so that they may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are
not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this
postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question
of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the
status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of

the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the
above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle
established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion
of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do
not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse
covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in
Heirs of Amunategui 9A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is
merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies
the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.11 All
lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act,

In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are
already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:

The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a

registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-ininterests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject
property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above
assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude,
citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)16 and
Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion of
the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be
public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are
not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple
reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of
the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not
put in issue. And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from
the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying
the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence
the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the

classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these

documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of
public lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land
registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point
to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and
mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into
alienable and disposable lands need an express and positive act
from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent
and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and

continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of

little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed
decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents
application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case
No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69,
is DENIED.
No costs.