LEGAL RESEARCH

TITLE: De Leon vs. Third Division of the Supreme Court

G.R. No. 164046
July 20, 2004
FACTS: On March 3, 1995, private respondent Ernest Cuna (Cuna) filed a
complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance with damages against
petitioners Cesar and Agnes de Leon (petitioners) with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. Cuna claimed that his deceased wife, Ellen AlcantaraCuna,- fraudulently sold two parcels of land (the "lots") in Payatas, Quezon
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 280780 and 280781.
Cuna averred that the lots formed part of their conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that the lots were the paraphernal
property of Ellen Alcantara-Cuna and could thus be alienated by her without
Cuna's consent. After the lots were sold to petitioners, they proceeded to
subdivide them into four lots. Subsequently, new TCTs for each of the
resulting eight lots were issued in their name. the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in their decision nullified the sale of the lots to petitioners and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue new titles in Cuna's
name over the lots covered by four TCTs and to retain the remaining 4 TCTs
in the name of the petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the decision of the
Court of Appeals which was later on denied by this Court. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof and prayed for the cancellation of the
notice of Lis Pendens and Adverse Claims on the 8 TCTs. This motion was
again denied by the appellate court. Almost 5months after, filed a Petition for
Review with the Supreme Court, however, the 3 rd Division of the SC denied
their petition for Review on the Ground of: (1) lack of proper verification; and
(2) no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in issuing the
assailed Decision.Once again, petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens and Adverse
Claim, but the motion was denied for lack of merit in its Resolution. The
petitioner then filed for an instant for Certiorari and argued that the
Resolution of the Courts 3rd Division violates due process because it does not
state the facts and the law on which it is based also it assert that the Court's
Third Division acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
Petition for Review for failure to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the Court of Appeals in promulgating the Decision and the
Resolution assailed therein. They pray that the Court En Banc resolve their
Petition for Review and cancel the notices of Lis Pendens and Adverse Claims
on TCTs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court sitting en banc may render decision upon
the instant petition of Certiorari considering the Resolution of the 3rd
Division of this Court on the said case?

HELD: No. The Court en banc will not accept the petitioners attempt to
obtain another appeal of the Court of Appeals decision in the guise for a
petition for certiorari. According to the Court, a second appeal is not allowed
under the rules of procedure. Neither is a petition for certiorari available as a
remedy under the Rules for assailing the decision of the Court itself. The
direct filing of the present petition with the Court En Banc by itself
constitutes forum-shopping.The Court also mentioned that petitioner's
counsel should have known that the filing of the present petition constitutes
forum-shopping which is prohibited because it is an abuse
of judicial processes and effectively degrades the administration of justice.
Further, the Court ruled in accordance with The second paragraph of Section
5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that the acts
of a party or his counsel clearly constituting willful and deliberate forumshopping shall be ground for summary dismissal of the case with prejudice
and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions. The petition had been dismissed.
My Opinion:
The decision made by the Supreme Court in this case had been anchored by
the Doctrine of Heirarchy of laws, where judicial decisions of the 3 rd Division
of the Court since part of the law of the land, tends to be respected by the
other courts even sitting en banc, for which the Resolution made became
final and executory for the said case. If a second appeal will be entertained
by the Court en banc, it will be a violation of their judicial processes and may
either reverse or retain such divisions decision which might render confusion
on the part of the people and may clog the court for multiple appeals filed
before them.

TITLE: Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et.al vs Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
et.al
G.R. No. 134577
November 18, 1998
FACTS: On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first
regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day was the
election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan
were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2,
Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the
discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators
belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a
minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No
consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a
letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minorit
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator
Tatad.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising

the position of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that Section 16 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Courts judicial power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within
the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused
their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the
Senate President recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter
says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the
positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating
them or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis
upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the

office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,

petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to
the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that
may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position
has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself
in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no
way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown
to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his
discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the
Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of
this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally
allowed
to
articulate
their
standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President
cannot be accused of capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or of
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where
no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has
been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within
their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
Note: (CaseDigestforSantiagonotmine)

CRIMINAL LAW
TITLE: The People of the Philippines vs Antonio Z. Oanis, et.al
G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943
FACTS: Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the
following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Defendant
corporal Galanta, and privates Oralo, Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they
were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping
containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and,
if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The
same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector. Oanis volunteerd to join the party since he
failed to locate some of his men to guide the troop in finding Irene. When this
group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida, and asked her
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry
also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with
his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively
fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door
where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. It turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. The Provincial Inspector had been informed with the killing.
Galanta and Oanis claimed that they killed the deceased. These facts had
been supported by the testimony of Irene, different from story given by the
two appellants. The testimonies of the two appellants were not favored by
the trial court because they find it contradictory with each other so the lower
court ruled that the appellants are both guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the appellants may be held responsible for the
death caused to
Tecson?
2. Whether ornot the appellants be charged of the crime of homicide
through reckless
imprudence?
HELD:
1. Yes. The respondents are held liable for the death of Tucson. The Court
held in accordance with the doctrine restated in the new Rules of Court thus:
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest,
and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is
necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer
cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or
violence in making an arrest. It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a
notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the
peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for
killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no
resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. In addition the Court also
ruled that The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
2. No. The appellants should not be charged of homicide through reckless
imprudence but of murder alone with mitigating circumstance. The Court
ruled through citing the same case in People vs. Gona that where such
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim
cannot be considered as reckless imprudence to support a plea of mitigated
liability . As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in Article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when
he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Out of the two requisites presented in such provision only one requisite was
present in this case-appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. Their
duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered
by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or
in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of
such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without
any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his
identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be

imposed. Therefore, the appellants had been guilty of murder with mitigating
circumstance.