Jose Bengzon, Jr.

vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the
Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa Corys brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines
and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that
Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations
and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and
Bengzons plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of
their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and
injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained
no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the
relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr.
Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

SCB PHILIPPINES VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL

INSTITUTION AND CURRENCIES EN BANC

FACTS:

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in
Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities
Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to
immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a
similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial
hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were
cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting
a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would

encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance
of the foregoing cases.

RULING: Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the
resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was
simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling
unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-

judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or

may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for
contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot
penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability.
Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent
Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in
its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear
liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such
Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and
the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

Arnault v. Nazareno

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land,
known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the
Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the governments
payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of
Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In
the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the
name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he
withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the
custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the
questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing
to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?

2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session?

3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not
and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not
challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things,
to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the
P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the
very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is
impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to
any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to
any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to
the matter under inquiry.

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that
subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may
be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to
any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power
is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate,
which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as
in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave
the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal
instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name
of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the
applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of

the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of
the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the
court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . .
The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the
law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to
prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary
danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances
of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not
relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might
incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.

Senate vs. Ermita

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive

departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and
duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity
of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22
of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary
in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to
elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot

frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then
to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances
in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.