Assignment #1

1.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court. A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. To initiate a special proceeding, a
petition and not a complaint should be filed. Ching vs. Rodriguez, 661 SCRA 449,
G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011
2.
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding
before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased
person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a
quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Sharia
District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants
and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the
proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding
as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized
as among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and,
subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized
as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. Montaner vs. Shairi'a District Court,
576 SCRA 746, G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009.
In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent
is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. The
court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of the decedent. In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District
Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent. Montaner vs. Shairi'a District
Court, 576 SCRA 746, G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
3.
The petition is imbued with merit. However, it must be emphasized that petitioners
contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings is not entirely correct. Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of
Court provides: Sec. 2. Applicability of Rules of Civil Actions.In the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings. Stated differently, special provisions
under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary
civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. Sheker
vs. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, 540 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of
being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of
special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings
as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service
and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would
not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special
proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the
present case Sheker vs. Estate of Alice O. Sheker, 540 SCRA 111, G.R. No. 157912
December 13, 2007
4.
In an appeal from an order of probate court appointing a special co-administrator,
such issue being merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the
deceased spouse, the amount in controversy is not merely the value of the portion
of the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased spouse but of the entire conjugal
estate, and it is this latter amount that determines what court will have jurisdiction
over said appeal. Fernandez vs. Maravilla, 10 SCRA 589, No. L-18799 March 31,
1964
5.
The provision of Rule 83 that if "there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person," cannot be used to justify
the institution of Jose S. Matute even without a hearing, because such institution
has no factual basis considering that there was a general administrator (Carlos V.
Matute) who remained in charge of the affairs of the Matute estate after the
removal of Matias S. Matute. The abovecited provision evidently envisions a
situation when after the removal of the incumbent administrator no one is left to
administer the estate, thus empowering the probate court, as a matter of necessity,
to name a temporary administrator (or caretaker), pending the appointment of a
new administrator after due hearing. Such circumstance does not obtain in the case
at bar.
6.
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana
Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and
Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper vs.
Cooper, 43 Ind. A. 620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin,
whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is
the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin
is to be preferred." (Cabanas, et al. vs. Enage et al., 40 Off. Gaz. 12 Suppl. 227;
citing 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 77, p. 416, cited in Francisco Vicente J., The Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-B 1970 Ed., p. 23).
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the
late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they
are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely:
Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in
Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana
Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of
kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the
Court, in order to represent both interests.
7.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of
the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio
Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It
must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and
special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues
which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the
rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint
and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not
be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement
of estate. Vda. de Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 135, G.R. No. 129242
January 16, 2001
8.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to
accomplish through his allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution
of Anastacias shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estatean objective
that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be done. The RTC of Makati,
acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and
distribute the estate of a deceased. A relevant provisionSection 2 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Courtthat contemplates properties of the decedent held by one
of the heirs declares: Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
[Emphasis supplied.] Worth noting are this Courts statements in the case of
Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 (2001): Matters which involve settlement
and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of
the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Reyes vs. Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Br. 142, 561 SCRA 593, G.R. No. 165744 August 11, 2008
9.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the
deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to
the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in
the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no
transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded
in the books of the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the
equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the
court being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of
the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or
executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is
entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if
petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of
Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be
entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer
book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This
would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has
participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming
proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased
must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be
an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as
in a case for the recovery of property. The doctrine applies to the instant case,
which is one for specific performanceto direct respondent corporation to allow
petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his
representatives. Puno vs. Puno Enterprises, Inc., 599 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 177066
September 11, 2009
10.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete
determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioners
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives
him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by
respondents.
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are
perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only
to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to
continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement
would not, in any way, support petitioners contention that it was his and his
siblings intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they
believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of
contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial
consideration.16 It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic
construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.17 Such intention is
determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical interpretations
should also be avoided.19
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between
him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of the
subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching
the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their
deceased father.
Moreover, petitioners asseveration of his and respondents intention of continuing
with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the
present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the
subject property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank
acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such
offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase
the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Banks
offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the
time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject
property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of
knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage was already
foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the Bank does not
give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners
of the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to
depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence
adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioners contention that he and his siblings intended to continue
their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of
the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in
common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting
in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.20 In other
words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership,21 an objective
which negates petitioners claims in the present case. Balus vs. Balus, 610 SCRA
178, G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
11.
The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate
depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent Lim vs. Court of
Appeals, 323 SCRA 102, G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000
12.
For purposes of determining what court has jurisdiction in the settlement of a
deceaseds estate, the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not
an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360, No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
A fair reading of the Rulesince it deals with venue and comity between courts of
equal and co-ordinate jurisdictionindicates that the court with whom the petition
is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order
to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely such
court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedents last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal
domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the
allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may actually be false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the
petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has
before it the petition for probate of the decedents alleged last will. Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360, No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
13.
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294, G.R.
No. 133743, G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
14.
In the application of venue statutes and rulesSection 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such natureresidence rather than domicile is the significant
factor, x x x In other words, resides, should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189, No. L-40502, No. L-42670
November 29, 1976
15.
In said issue, herein petitioner maintains that to proceed to execute the deed of
absolute sale without the go-signal of the Probate Court is to be recreant to his
sworn duty as administrator, as well as to render void his actuations done without
the permission of the Probate Court. This contention is correct and is impressed with
merit. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of he property was already deceased and there
were proceedings in the Probate Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to
first give authorization to the administrator of the estate to deliver titles of lots
which had previously been sold. Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 106, G.R.
No. 75579 September 30, 1991

Indeed, questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the
deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the parties,
without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private complainant. Trinidad
vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 106, G.R. No. 75579 September 30, 1991
16.
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the
estate. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibaez, 452 SCRA 228, G.R. No.
149926 February 23, 2005

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory. As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera: . . . This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed.
The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedents estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. Union Bank of the Philippines
vs. Santibaez, 452 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
17.
Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does
not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim.
The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims. Hilado vs. Court of Appeals, 587 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 164108 May
8, 2009
While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may
be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect
their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected. Hilado vs. Court of Appeals, 587 SCRA 464, G.R. No.
164108 May 8, 2009
There are reliefs available to compel an administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within
three (3) months from appointment and to render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration, but
a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled
to do s Hilado vs. Court of Appeals, 587 SCRA 464, G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009
18.
The determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the
proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 700
SCRA 778, G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the
proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that
the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate
could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for
the recovery of property. Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778, G.R.
No. 198680 July 8, 2013
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding
had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot
be re-opened. Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778, G.R. No.
198680 July 8, 2013
19.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. Garcia-Quiazon
vs. Belen, 702 SCRA 707, G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
residence, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen, 702 SCRA 707, G.R. No.
189121 July 31, 2013
20.
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. Sabidong vs. Solas, 699 SCRA 303, A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25,
2013
21.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate
action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency
and convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a
separate action. Although generally, a probate court may net decide a question of
title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership. Coca vs. Borromeo, 81
SCRA 278, No. L-27082, No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
22.
The Court stresses, however, that its determination of ownership in the instant case
is not final. It is only a provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving
the issue of possession. It would not bar or prejudice a separate action between the
same parties involving the quieting of title to the subject property. Bunyi vs. Factor,
591 SCRA 350, G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009
23.
Trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of
properties belonging to the estate of a deceased person, while the probate
proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of
the same court. Solivio vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 119, G.R. No. 83484
February 12, 1990
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself
alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271,
1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as
the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong v. Tecson, supra);
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). Solivio vs. Court of Appeals,
182 SCRA 119, G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990