ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
[G.R. No. 137431. September 7, 2000.]
EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his
attorney-in-fact ROMEO L.
SANTOS, petitioner, vs. LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ,
ROBERTO ONG and AUGUSTO
AQUINO, respondents.
Fernando A. Santiago for petitioner.
Gonzales Aquino and Associates for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Questioned in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari is the propriety of the Order of the
Regional Trial Court requiring payment of
compensation for petitioner's land taken under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, to be
made in cash and bonds. According to petitioner
Edgardo Santos, owner of the land so taken, said
order illegally amended the judgment rendered
August 12, 1997 which directs payment of
compensation to be made "in the manner provided
in RA 6657." DEHaAS
The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated
compensation to the petitioner "in the manner
provided by RA 6657." There is certitude with
regards to this assertion. Pursuant to section 18 of the
same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds. The
confusion in the present case, which required the
issuance of the assailed order, arose from petitioner's
belief that the Land Bank had obligated itself to pay
in cash the compensation due him. This fact can
allegedly be gleaned from its compliance with the
December 4, 1997 Writ of Execution and December
19, 1997 Notice of Garnishment. However, the Land
Bank's compliance with the Writ of Execution and
the Notice of Garnishment should be construed as an
agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth
in RA No. 6657. Its compliance was not an
undertaking to pay in cash because such act would
have been a deviation from the dictum of the final
judgment, to which execution must conform.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION;
AGRARIAN REFORM; RA 6657
(COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
LAW); PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION IN
CASH AND BONDS; CASE AT BAR. The
argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998 Order
was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997
judgment which had become final and executory. The
reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or
alter the Decision. Rather, the
Order iterated and made clear the essence of the
final judgment. The August 12, 1997 judgment
mandated compensation to the petitioner "in the
manner provided by R.A. 6657." Pursuant to Section
18 of the same law, payment was to be in
cash and bond. Respondent bank was obliged to
follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment.
Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and
the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been
construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the
manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash
because such act would have been a deviation from
the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution
must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands,
is not compatible with such judgment.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; COMPLIANCE
WITH WRIT OF EXECUTION CANNOT VARY
THE TENOR OF THE JUDGMENT; CASE AT
BAR. Petitioner contends that the bank is
estopped from questioning its alleged undertaking to
pay him in cash. This contention was purportedly
manifested in its letter-compliance with the Writ of
Execution and the Notice of Garnishment. In the
letter, respondent said that it was segregating a
specified amount from the Agrarian Reform Fund, in
order to pay him. He insists that such amount was
garnished in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, and should have been delivered to
him pursuant to Section 9 of the same Rule. We
disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to follow the
mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its
compliance with the Writ of Execution and the
Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed
as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set
forth inRepublic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was
not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act
would have been a deviation from the dictum of the
final judgment, to which execution must conform.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT WHICH
RENDERED A JUDGMENT HAS SUPERVISORY
CONTROL OVER THE PROCESS OF ITS
EXECUTION AND HENCE MAY ISSUE AN
ORDER CLARIFYING THE TERMS THEREOF.
The appellate court was correct in sustaining the
propriety and the efficacy of the April 24, 1998 Order
of Judge Llaguno. In the exercise of her supervisory
powers over the execution of a final and executory
judgment, such as her August 12, 1997 Decision,
special circumstances attending its execution
impelled her to issue the Order clarifying the terms
thereof. CASIEa
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA
6657) provides that just compensation to landowners
shall be paid in cash and bonds. Hence, a trial court
decision directing the payment of such compensation
"in the manner provided by R.A. 6657" is not
illegally amended but is merely clarified by an order,
issued during the execution proceedings, that such
amount shall be paid in cash and bonds.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the December 8, 1998
Decision 1 and the February 2, 1999 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) 3 in CA-GR SP No.
48517, which had respectively dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus, filed by petitioner, and
denied reconsideration.
The decretal part of the assailed Decision reads:
1
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
"WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED. The Order of April 24, 1998 is
AFFIRMED." 4
The Facts
The antecedents of the case are adequately
summarized in the assailed Decision, as follows:
"It appears that petitioner Edgardo Santos is
the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-
3206 for the determination of just
compensation regarding properties which
were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in
1972. On August 12, 1997, the Regional Trial
Court, sitting as an Agrarian Court rendered
judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered (1) fixing the amount of
P49,241,876.00 to be the just compensation
for the irrigated and unirrigated ricelands with
areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares,
respectively, and situated at Pinit, Ocampo,
Camarines Sur which are portions of the
agricultural lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 2883 and 2884 in
the name of the [plaintiff] and which were
taken by the government pursuant to Land
Reform Program as provided in Presidential
Decree No. 27; and (2) ordering Defendant
Land Bank of the Philippines to pay
[p]laintiff the amount of FORTY-FIVE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
AND 34/100 (P45,698,805.34) PESOS,
Philippine [c]urrency, in the manner provided
by R.A. 6657, by way of full payment of the
said just compensation. No pronouncement as
to costs. " CAHTIS
"A preliminary valuation in the amount of
P3,543,070.66 had in fact been previously
released by the Land Bank in cash and bond;
thus deducting it from the total amount
adjudged, the balance unpaid amount[ed] to
P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the
Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance
with RA 6657.
"The Land Bank elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court, which eventually dismissed
the appeal in its Resolution dated December
17, 1997. Accordingly, a writ of execution
was issued by the Regional Trial Court on
December 4, 1997 and a notice of
garnishment was served on the Land Bank on
December 17, 1997.
"On December 22, 1997, the Regional Trial
Court issued an Order declaring that the Land
Bank had complied with the writ of execution
and ordered the same to release the amount of
P44,749,947.82 to petitioner and the amount
of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court as
commission fees for execution of judgment.
"The Land Bank remitted the amount of
P948,857.52 to the Clerk of Court on
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
December 24, 1997 and released the amount
of P3,621,023.01 in cash and Land Bank
Bond No. AR-0002206 in the amount of
P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner.
"Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution before the
Regional Trial Court, praying that the
payment of the compensation be in proportion
of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,745
in cash, alleging that the cash portion should
include the amounts in the Decision
representing the interest payments.
"Before the motion could be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court, petitioner moved to
withdraw the same and instead filed a motion
for release of the balance of the garnished
amount. He claimed that the payment of
P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank Bonds was not
acceptable to him and that the said amount
should be paid in cash or certified check. The
respondent Land Bank, on the other hand,
opposed the motion, contending that the
judgment amount had already been satisfied
on December 24, 1997.
"The Regional Trial Court issued an Order
on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to
release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from
the garnished amount in cash or certified
check.
"The Land Bank moved for a
reconsideration of the said Order, maintaining
that the payment was properly made in Land
Bank Bonds.
"On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a
motion to hold the Land Bank in contempt for
its refusal to release the balance of the
garnished amount in cash or certified check.
"Respondent Regional Trial Court presided
over by a new judge, resolved the two
motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the
payment of just compensation must be
computed in the manner provided for in
Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. Thus, it
ruled that:
"To summarize, the very issue to be
resolved in the instant case is to determine
how much should be paid in cash and how
much also should be paid in bonds, to fully
satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the
amount of P49,241,876.00, the computation
of which is as follows:
Total land value per judgment P49,241,876.00
Amount payable in bonds:
70% (50 has) P22,323,932.75
75% (excess) P13,012,907.41 35,336,840.16
Amount payable In cash:
30% (50 has) P9,567,399.75
35% (excess) 4,337,635.81 13,905,035.56
Less:
Preliminary valuation: P3,543,070.66
Commissioner's Fee: 948,857.52
2
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Payment to plaintiff on
12-24-97 3,621,023.01 P8,112,951.19
payment of just compensation. The provision
P5,792,084.37
"Consequently, not only must the Order of
March 20, 1997 be reconsidered, but by
implication, the Order of this Court dated
December 22, 1997 is likewise deemed
reconsidered. It goes without saying that the
payment of just compensation must be made
in accordance with Sec. 18, Republic Act No.
6657 in relation to Section 9, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as it
does not contravene . . . the former.
"On the basis of the foregoing discussion,
this Court finds no merit [i]n the motion to
cite in contempt of court the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
"Be it also noted that Defendant Land
Bank, through counsel, has submitted a re-
computation of the compensation in
accordance with her manifestation on oral
argument [with] which this court begs to
disagree.
"WHEREFORE, Defendant Land Bank of
the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the
[p]laintiff the [c]ash [b]alance of FIVE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO
THOUSAND EIGHTY-FOUR and 37/100
(P5,792,084.37), Philippine [c]urrency and
the amount of THIRTY FIVE MILLION,
THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
and 16/100 (P35,336,840.16) PESOS in
government instruments or bonds to fully
satisfy the Judgment herein in the amount of
forty-nine million two hundred forty one
thousand eight hundred seventy six
(P49,241,876.00) pesos, Philippine
[c]urrency as just compensation due the
[p]laintiff.
"Thus, the Order of this Court dated March
20, 1998 is hereby reconsidered and SET
ASIDE and by implication, the Order dated
December 22, 1997 is hereby deemed
reconsidered and MODIFIED accordingly.
"The Motion to Cite in Contempt of Court
the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby
DENIED.
"SO ORDERED."
"Petitioner's motion to reconsider the above-
mentioned Order was denied on June 17, 1998[;]
hence, this petition." 5
The CA Ruling
The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998
Order of the trial court. The appellate court opined
that the Order merely ascertained the mode of
compensation for petitioner's expropriated properties,
as decreed in the final judgment, and was issued
pursuant to the court a quo's general supervisory
control over the process of execution. Said the CA:
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
"RA 6657 is clear and leaves no doubt as to
its interpretation regarding the manner of
allows the landowner to choose the manner of
payment from the list provided therein, but
since plaintiff had obviously wanted payment
to be made in cash, then the trial court,
through the new presiding judge, Judge
Villegas-Llaguno, had only to apply Section
18 of R.A. 6657 which provides for the
payment of a percentage thereon in cash and
the balance in bond, in the exercise of her
ministerial duty to execute the decision which
ha[d] become final and executory.
Nevertheless, in the exercise of her
supervisory powers over the execution of a
final and executory judgment, Judge Villegas-
Llaguno found it necessary to modify the
order of Judge Naval dated December 22,
1997 as regards the order of execution since it
had erroneously applied Section 9, Article 39
of the Rules of Court regarding satisfaction of
money judgments in the manner of payment
even as to the portion required to be paid in
bonds, and thus, had completely disregarded
the portion in the final and executory decision
of August 12, 1997 which makes direct
reference to RA 6657.
"The garnishment, on the other hand, of the
amount of P45,698,805.34 from the Land
Bank of the Philippines does not affect the
execution of the judgment in the case. As
above-expounded, the judgment was to be
fully executed in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. 6657 which allows the
landowner to have the compensation be paid
in cash and in bond, but not fully in cash, as
herein petitioner would like to maintain.
Technically, the garnishment which was made
in this case pursuant to the order of execution
by Judge Naval shall extend only to the cash
portion of the judgment amount. On the other
hand, with respect to the amount to be issued
in bonds, the only jurisdiction of the trial
court is to order the Land Bank of the
Philippines to issue the corresponding bonds
and deliver the same to herein petitioners.
Hence, this Petition. 6
Issues
In his Memorandum, 7 petitioner submits the
following issues for resolution:
"1. Did respondent judge act without
jurisdiction when she issued the Order dated
24 April 1998 amending the final Judgment
dated 12 August 1997?
"2. Is it a ministerial duty of the respondent
judge to order the release and of the Land
Bank to release the garnished amount under
Section 9 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court?
3
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
"3. May respondent Land Bank question the
legality of its own compliance with the Writ
of Execution?
"4. Are the respondent judge and the
respondent Land Bank and its officials liable
for damages under Section 3 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court?" 8
In short, the main issue is whether the April 24,
1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was proper.
The Court's Ruling
We find no merit in this Petition.
Main Issue
Propriety and Efficacy of the
April 24, 1998 RTC Order
Petitioner insists that the April 24, 1998 Order of
Judge Llaguno was issued without jurisdiction. That
is, it allegedly amended the August 12, 1997
judgment of the Special Agrarian Court by requiring
the payment of compensation in cash and bonds.
Assailed Order Not an
Amendment, But an Iteration
of Final Judgment
The argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998
Order was not an illegal amendment of the August
12, 1997 judgment which had become final and
executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise,
correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the
Order iterated and made clear the essence of the
final judgment.
The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated
compensation to the petitioner in the manner
provided by R.A. 6657." 9 There is certitude with
regard to this assertion. The confusion in the present
case, which required the issuance of the assailed
Order, arose from petitioner's belief that the Land
Bank had obligated itself to pay in cash the
compensation due him. This fact can allegedly be
gleaned from its compliance with the December 4,
1997 Writ of Execution and December 19, 1997
Notice of Garnishment.
Compensation Due Petitioner
to Be Paid Pursuant to RA 6657
However, it is clear from the August 12, 1997
judgment that the compensation was to be paid "in
the manner provided by RA 6657." 10 Pursuant to
Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in
cash and bonds, as indicated below:
"Section 18. Valuation and Mode of
Compensation. The LBP shall compensate
the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR
and LBP, in accordance with the criteria
provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be
finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
"The compensation shall be paid in one of
the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following
terms and conditions
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
(a) For lands above fifty (50) Twenty-five percent
(25%)
hectares, insofar as the cash, the balance to be paid
excess hectarage is concerned. in government
financial
instruments negotiable
at any time
(b) For lands above twenty- Thirty-percent (30%)
cash,
four (24) hectares and up to the balance to be paid
in
fifty (50) hectares government financial
instruments negotiable at
anytime."
Be that as it may, petitioner contends that the bank
is estopped from questioning its alleged undertaking
to pay him in cash. This contention was purportedly
manifested in its letter-compliance with the Writ of
Execution and the Notice of Garnishment. In the
letter, respondent said that it was segregating a
specified amount from the Agrarian Reform Fund, in
order to pay him. He insists that such amount was
garnished in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, and should have been delivered to
him pursuant to Section 9 of the same Rule.
We disagree. Respondent bank was obliged to
follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment.
Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and
the Notice of Garnishment 11 ought to have been
construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the
manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its
compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash
because such act would have been a deviation from
the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution
must conform. 12 Paying in cash, as petitioner
demands, is not compatible with such judgment.
Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final
judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds.
Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction
with RA 6657. Since respondent bank had already
given petitioner the entire adjudged amount in the
required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be
deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule
39. CSaITD
We understand petitioner's desire to be paid in
cash; after all, his compensation was long overdue.
However, we cannot grant his Petition because it is
not sustained by the law. In this regard, we recall the
Court's explanation in Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform: 13
"It cannot be denied from these cases that
the traditional method for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid
in the past solely in that medium. However,
we do not deal here with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
This is not an ordinary expropriation where
only a specific property of relatively limited
area is sought to be taken by the State from its
4
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What we deal with here is
a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
xxx xxx xxx
"With these assumptions, the Court hereby
declares that the content and manner of the
just compensation provided for in the afore-
quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism
has influenced our decision on this issue, but
after all this Court is not a cloistered
institution removed from the realities and
demands of society or oblivious to the need
for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely
anxious as the rest our people to see the goal
of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant
masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the
said section will result in the nullification of
the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes
even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the specter of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not
in our view the intention of the Constitution,
and that is not what we shall decree today.
"Accepting the theory that payment of the
just compensation is not always required to
be made fully in money, we find further that
the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment,
as determined on the basis of the areas of the
lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive
upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in
money, primarily because the small
landowner will be needing it more than the
big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value.
No less importantly, the government financial
instruments making up the balance of the
payment are 'negotiable at any time.' The
other modes, which are likewise available to
be landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because the payment is made in
shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties
or assets, tax credits, and other things of value
equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
"Admittedly, the compensation
contemplated in the law will cause the
landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this
cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is
devoutly hoped that these countrymen of
ours, conscious as we know they are of the
need for their forbearance and even sacrifice,
will not begrudge us their indispensable share
in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive
goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail."
All told, we hold that the appellate court was
correct in sustaining the propriety and the efficacy of
the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno. In the
exercise of her supervisory powers over the
execution of a final and executory judgment, 14 such
as her August 12, 1997 Decision, special
circumstances attending its execution impelled her to
issue the Order clarifying the terms thereof.
Petitioner's claim for damages against the bank
must likewise be denied because, as already
explained, it was well within its rights in resisting the
former's claim.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 168631. April 7, 2009.]
LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA
B. VDA. DE ABELLO and HEIRS OF
ELISEO ABELLO, NAMELY: NENITA,
SULITA, ROLANDO, IMELDA and
ELISEO, JR., all surnamed
ABELLO, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision 1 dated February 28, 2005, and
Resolution 2dated June 27, 2005, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85091. CHDAEc
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Carolina Vda. de Abello (Carolina) is
the widow of the late Eliseo Abello, while the rest of
the respondents are their children. Respondents are
the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-55863, containing
an area of 12.1924 hectares, situated at Brgy. Sto.
Nio 3rd, San Jose City. 3
In a letter 4 dated March 6, 2000 addressed to a
certain Dalmacio Regino, thru Eliseo Abello, the
Land Valuation and Landowner's Compensation
Office III of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
informed the respondents that 10.3476 hectares of
their property have been placed under the
government's Operation Land Transfer 5and that the
assessed compensation for the land's expropriation
was P146,938.54.
Using the guidelines for just compensation
embodied in Presidential Decree No. 27 6 (PD 27)
and implemented in Executive Order No. 228 7 (EO
228), and taking into consideration the Government
Support Price (GSP) for one cavan of 50
kilos palay in October 21, 1972 which was
P35.00, 8 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
and the LBP computed the value of the 10.3476
hectare land at P40,743.66. 9 Based on
DAR Administrative Order No. 13 (DAR AO
13), 10 series of 1994, a 6% increment in the amount
of P106,194.88 was added to the original
5
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
valuation. 11 Thus, the formula they used to compute
the value of the property was:
Land value = Average Gross
Production (AGP) x 2.5 x Government
Support Price (GSP)
Or = 45 x 2.5 x 35
= P3,937.5 x 10.3476 hectare
= P40,743.66 + P106,198.88 Increment
per CAR AO 13, S. 1994
= P146,938.54
Claim No. 03-EO-94-0573 reflects that the
proceeds of the claim amounts as follows:
Original Increment per Total
DAR AO 13, S. 1994
Cash P4,074.37 10,619.48 14,693.85
Bond 36,669.29 95,575.40 132,244.69
Total 40,743.66 106,194.88 146,938.54 12
In a letter 13 dated June 6, 2000, Carolina
informed LBP that she is the owner of the said parcel
of land and not Dalmacio Regino. Further, she stated
that the prevailing market value of an agricultural
land at Sto. Nio 3rd, San Jose City at that time was
P300,000.00 to P400,000.00 per hectare. She pegged
the value of the subject property at P350,000.00 per
hectare or a total of P4,267,340.00, which should be
paid to her and the other heirs of Eliseo Abello. 14
Subsequently, respondents filed a Petition for Just
Compensation 15 before the Special Agrarian Court
(SAC), Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, which petition was later docketed as
Special Agrarian Case No. 1193-G.
Respondents alleged that they are the owners of an
agricultural land covered by TCT No. NT-55863
consisting of 12.1924 hectares situated at Barangay
Sto. Nio 3rd, San Jose City, their ownership being
evidenced by a deed of absolute sale executed in
favor of the spouses Eliseo Abello and Carolina
Abello by the registered owner, Eleuteria Vda. de
Ignacio; that 10.3476 hectares of the aforesaid land
was placed under Operation Land Transfer by the
government; that the defendant LBP fixed the value
of their land at P145,938.54; that their land yields an
average harvest of 120 cavans of palay per hectare
per cropping; that the prevailing purchase price per
hectare in the area ranges from P300,000.00 to
P400,000.00 per hectare; and that the petitioners are
willing to sell aforesaid landholding for P350,000.00
per hectare. 16Ultimately, they prayed, among other
things, that the just compensation for the subject
property be fixed in the amount of not less than
P4,267,340.00.
On July 26, 2002, LBP filed its Answer. 17 Among
other things, LBP alleged that the said landholding
was under Operation Land Transfer by the DAR, and
was valued in accordance with PD 27 and EO 228;
that it was endorsed to the LBP for payment in
November 1994; that LBP reviewed the claim and
found the same in order; that the subject landholding
was valued at P40,743.66 for the 10.3426 hectares
covered; that the average gross production (AGP)
was determined to be 45 cavans per hectare; that the
government support price in 1972
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
per cavan of palay was P35.00, the price obtaining at
that time; that in addition to the amount of
P40,743.66, DAR AO 13 provides for an incremental
increase of 6% compounded annually, hence, the
total compensation due the landowner is
P146,938.54. 18 LBP prayed that the said valuation
be adopted by the SAC or that it be judicially
determined in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
Thereafter, the SAC appointed commissioners to
assist it in examining, investigating, and ascertaining
the facts relevant to the dispute, including the
valuation of the subject landholding. The team was
headed by Officer-in-Charge, Branch Clerk of Court,
Mr. Arsenio S. Esguerra, Jr. (Esguerra), with Mr. Gil
Alvarez and Mr. Willy Wong as members. ACETID
On January 30, 2003, Commissioner Esguerra
submitted a Consolidated Commissioner's
Report 19 detailing their findings. Based on their
ocular inspection, the land is situated four kilometers
from the town proper and accessible by a feeder road.
The topography is generally flat and there are water
pumps installed. He recommended that the
compensation for the subject land should be pegged
at P200,000.00 per hectare. It reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The landholdings of the plaintiff has an
aggregate area of 10.3476 hectares situated at
Barangay Sto. Nio 3rd, San Jose City.
The landholding is classified as riceland. It
is four (4) kilometers away from the city
proper of San Jose City and traversed by a
feeder road. It is accessible to all kinds of
transportation. It is along the San Jose City-
Lupao, Nueva Ecija provincial highway. The
topography is generally flat and there is a
creek (Linamuyak Creek) near the
landholdings where farmer-beneficiaries can
derive water. There are also water pumps
installed, hence, the landholding is artificially
irrigated. There is electricity in the site. The
average gross harvest ranges from 100 to 110
cavans per hectare.
Based from the foregoing considerations,
the undersigned believes that the
compensation of plaintiff's landholdings with
an aggregate area of 10.3476 hectares is
P200,000.00 per hectare.
On April 12, 2004, the SAC rendered a
Decision 20 adopting the recommendation of its
appointed commissioners which fixed the just
compensation for the subject property at P200,000.00
per hectare. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Fixing the just compensation for
plaintiffs' 10.342 hectare land at P200,000 per
hectare or a total of P2,068,520.00.
2. Ordering the defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines to pay the above amount to the
plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. 21
6
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Both the LBP and the DAR filed separate motions
for reconsideration which was denied in the
Order 22 dated July 5, 2004.
Pursuant to Section 60 of RA 6657, LBP sought
recourse before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 85091,
arguing that:
A. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF
THE COVERED AREA OF 10.3476
HECTARES AT P200,000.00 PER
HECTARE BY NOTFOLLOWING THE
APPROPRIATE LAND VALUATION
FORMULA PRESCRIBED UNDER PD
27 AND EO NO. 288.
B. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
APPLYING THE VALUATION FACTORS
UNDER R.A. 6657 TO SUBJECT
LANDHOLDING ACQUIRED UNDER P.D.
27. 23
On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a
Decision 24 denying the petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error
from the order abovementioned, the petition
is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court[,] Branch No. 33 of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in Agrarian Case No.
1193-G is AFFIRMED in all respect.
SO ORDERED. 25
The CA opined that the SAC made no mistake
when it ruled that the provisions of RA 6657 is
controlling and that the provisions of PD 27 and EO
228 shall apply only in suppletory character to RA
6657. 26
LBC filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied in the Resolution 27 dated June 27, 2005.
Hence, this present petition.
The core issue submitted by LBP to be resolved in
the present case is:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURT CAN DISREGARD
THE FORMULA PRESCRIBED
UNDER P.D. NO. 27 AND E.O. 228 IN
FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION
OF P.D. 27-COVERED LAND. 28 cHDaEI
LBP maintains that the formula under PD
27 and EO 228, coupled with the grant of
compounded interest pursuant to DAR AO 13, is
sufficient to arrive at a just compensation for the
subject property. Moreover, LBP insists that it is the
value of the property at the time of taking not at
the time of payment that is controlling.29
To buttress its claim, LBP argues that the property
was legally taken by the government upon the
effectivity of PD 27 or on October 21, 1972, and it is
such date that ownership over the subject land was
deemed transferred from the landowner to the
farmer-beneficiaries. When EO 228 fixed the basis in
determining the value of the land using the
government support price (GSP) for one cavan of 50
kilos of palay on October 21, 1972 at P35.00, it was
in cognizance of the rule that just compensation is
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
the value of the property at the time of the taking. As
such, PD 27 and EO 228 should be the basis in
computing the value of the land because respondents
were effectively deprived not only of possession, but
also of dominion over the subject property on
October 21, 1972. 30
The petition is bereft of merit.
As the opening paragraph of PD 27 explains, the
statute was issued in order to address the then
prevailing violent conflict and social tension brought
about by the iniquitous landownership by a few. It is
within this context that former President Ferdinand
Marcos deemed it proper to declare the emancipation
of all tenant-farmers effective October 21,
1972. 31 Thereafter, EO 228 declared full land
ownership to all qualified farmer-beneficiaries as of
October 21, 1972 and gave the formula for land
valuation.
On June 15, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL), or RA 6657, was enacted to
promote social justice to the landless farmers and
provide "a more equitable distribution and ownership
of land with due regard to the rights of landowners to
just compensation and to the ecological needs of the
nation." 32
Section 4 of RA 6657 provides that the CARL shall
cover all public and private agricultural lands,
including other lands of the public domain suitable
for agriculture. Section 7 33 provides that rice and
corn lands under PD 27, among other lands, will
comprise phase one of the acquisition plan and
distribution program. Section 75 34 ofRA
6657 expressly states that the provisions of PD
27 and EO 228 and 229, and other laws not
inconsistent with RA 6657, shall have suppletory
effect.
In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v.
Court of Appeals, 35 this Court ruled that the seizure
of the landholding did not take place on the date of
effectivity ofPD 27 but would take effect on the
payment of just compensation. LBP's contention that
the subject property was acquired for purposes of
agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the
effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should
be based on the value of the property as of that time,
is consequently flawed.
In Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 36 the Court held that it is a recognized rule
that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment
of just compensation. The Court further held that:
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered
the emancipation of tenant-farmer as [of]
October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall
"be deemed the owner" of a portion of land
consisting of a family-sized farm except that
"no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmer's cooperative." It was
7
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
understood, however, that full payment of just
compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional
requirement.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad, 37 the Court held that the determination
of just compensation should be in accordance
with RA 6657, and not PD 27 and EO 228, thus:
It would certainly be inequitable to
determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO
228 considering the DAR's failure to
determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD
27 or EO 228, is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full and
ample."
Under the factual circumstances of the case, the
agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just
compensation to be paid respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage RA 6657 * before
the completion of this process, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded
under the said law.38 Indeed, this Court has time and
again upheld the applicability of RA 6657, with PD
27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling in Paris v.
Alfeche. 39 AEIcSa
Section 17 of RA 6657, which is particularly
relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the
determination of just compensation, reads as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just
Compensation. In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the non-payment of
taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine
its valuation.
To be sure, just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD
27 or EO 228. This is especially imperative
considering that just compensation should be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample. 40
The determination of the proper valuation of the
land upon any other basis would not only be unjust, it
is bordering on absurdity. For years, respondents
have been deprived of the use and enjoyment of their
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
landholding, yet to date, they have not received just
compensation therefor. Although the purpose of PD
27 was the emancipation of tenants from the bondage
of the soil and transferring to them the ownership of
the land they till, such noble purpose should not
trample on the landowners' right to be fairly and
justly compensated for the value of their property.
In sum, the SAC and the CA committed no
reversible error when it ruled that it is the provisions
of RA 6657 that is applicable to the present case. The
SAC arrived at the just compensation for
respondents' property after taking into consideration
the commissioners' report on the nature of the subject
landholding, its proximity from the city proper, its
use, average gross production, and the prevailing
value of the lands in the vicinity. This Court is
convinced that the SAC correctly determined the
amount of just compensation due to respondents in
accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and
existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 28, 2005 and Resolution
dated June 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85091, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| [G.R. No. 173923. October 12, 2009.]
PEDRO MAGO (deceased), represented
by his spouse SOLEDAD MAGO,
AUGUSTO MAGO (deceased),
represented by his spouse NATIVIDAD
MAGO, and ERNESTO MAGO,
represented by LEVI
MAGO, petitioners, vs. JUANA Z.
BARBIN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 of the
Decision 2 dated 20 October 2005 and the Resolution
dated 13 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87370.
The Facts
On 11 November 1994, respondent Juana Z. Barbin
filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Norte an action
for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents,
Disqualification of Tenant-Beneficiary, Repossession
and Damages. Respondent alleged that she is the
owner in fee simple of an irrigated riceland located in
Barangay Guinacutan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte,
with an area of 4.7823 hectares, and that Augusto
Mago, Crispin Mago, Ernesto Mago, and Pedro
Mago were tenants of the subject landholding.
Respondent further alleged that petitioners violated
the terms of their leasehold contracts when they
failed to pay lease rentals for more than two years,
which is a ground for their dispossession of the
landholding.
On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the
subject landholding was placed under the Operation
Land Transfer program of the government pursuant
8
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD
27). 3 Respondent's title, OCT No. P-4672, was then
cancelled and the subject landholding was transferred
to Augusto Mago, 4 Crispin Mago, 5 Ernesto
Mago, 6 and Pedro Mago, 7 who were issued
Emancipation Patents on 20 February 1987 by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Transfer
Certificates of Title issued to petitioners 8 emanating
from the Emancipation Patents were registered with
the Registry of Deeds on 9 February 1989.
Petitioners averred that prior to the issuance of the
Emancipation Patents, they already delivered their
lease rentals to respondent. They further alleged that
after the issuance of the Emancipation patents, the
subject landholding ceased to be covered by any
leasehold contract.
In a Decision 9 dated 30 January 1997, the PARAD
denied the petition for lack of merit. The PARAD
found that in her petition for retention and exemption
from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer,
and cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer,
filed before the DAR, respondent admitted that aside
from the 6.7434 hectares of riceland, she also owns
other agricultural lands with an aggregate of 16.8826
hectares consisting of "cocolands". The PARAD held
that the subject landholding is clearly covered by the
Operation Land Transfer under Letter of Instruction
No. 474 (LOI 474). 10 Under LOI 474, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos directed the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform to place under the Land Transfer
Program of the government pursuant to PD 27 all
tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares
or less belonging to landowners who own other
agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in
aggregate areas or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from
which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families. HDATCc
The PARAD further held that pursuant to
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978,
payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by
the Operation Land Transfer shall terminate on the
date the value of the land is established. Thus, the
PARAD held that the proper recourse of respondent
is to file a claim for just compensation.
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed and set aside
the PARAD Decision. The dispositive portion of the
DARAB Decision dated 18 June 2004 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated 30 January 1997 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby entered:
1. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte to cancel EP Nos. 745, 747,
and 749 issued in the name of Augusto Mago,
Ernesto Mago, and Pedro Mago respectively,
and
2. DIRECTING the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Vinzons, Camarines Norte,
to reallocate the subject lands to qualified
beneficiaries.
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
SO ORDERED. 11
The DARAB held that when the subject
landholding was placed under the Operation Land
Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties
ceased and the tenant-beneficiaries were no longer
required to pay lease rentals to the landowner.
However, when petitioners entered into an agreement
with respondent for a direct payment scheme
embodied in the Deeds of Transfer, petitioners
obligated themselves to pay their amortizations to
respondent who is the landowner. The DARAB found
that except for Crispin Mago, who had fully paid his
tillage, petitioners defaulted in their obligation to pay
their amortization for more than three consecutive
years from the execution of the Deeds of Transfer in
July 1991. Under DAR Administrative Order No. 2,
series of 1994, one of the grounds for cancellation of
registered Emancipation Patents is when there is
default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three
consecutive amortizations in case of direct payment
schemes. Thus, the DARAB ruled that the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to
petitioners is warranted in this case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the DARAB denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the DARAB Decision and thereafter
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance
of an Emancipation Patent to a qualified farmer-
beneficiary is not absolute and can be attacked
anytime upon showing of any irregularity in its
issuance or non-compliance with the conditions
attached to it. The Emancipation Patent is subject to
the condition that amortization payments be remitted
promptly to the landowner and that failure to comply
with this condition is a ground for cancellation under
DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to
comply with this condition since petitioners failed to
prove that they have remitted the amortizations due
to the landowner in accordance with their agreed
direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of
Transfer. cHaADC
The Issues
Petitioners contend that:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE
PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR VIOLATING
DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02,
SERIES OF 1994;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE DAR
ADJUDICATOR IN ORDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE
EMANCIPATION TITLES ISSUED TO THE
PETITIONERS-FARMER BENEFICIARIES
DESPITE THE LAPSE OF ONE (1) YEAR
WHICH RENDERS THE SAID TITLES
9
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
INDEFEASIBLE PURSUANT TO THE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE RECEIPTS EVIDENCING
PAYMENTS OF THE DISPUTED
AMORTIZATION WHICH WERE
FORMALLY OFFERED AND
CONSIDERED BY THE HONORABLE
DAR PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF
CAMARINES NORTE (PARAD) IN
DECIDING THE CASE AS SHOWN IN
THE DECISION DATED JANUARY 30,
1997. 12
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners argue that the Emancipation Patents and
Transfer Certificates of Title issued to them which
were already registered with the Register of Deeds
have already become indefeasible and can no longer
be cancelled.
We do not adhere to petitioners' view. This Court
has already ruled that the mere issuance of an
emancipation patent does not put the ownership of
the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. 13 Emancipation patents issued to agrarian
reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled
for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations.
In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of
1994, which was issued in March 1994, enumerates
the grounds for cancellation of registered
Emancipation Patents or Certificates of
Landownership Award:
Grounds for the cancellation of registered
EPs [Emancipation Patents] or CLOAs
[Certificates of Landownership Award] may
include but not be limited to the following:
1. Misuse or diversion of financial and
support services extended to the ARB
[Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries]; (Section 37
of R.A. No. 6657) HDIATS
2. Misuse of the land; (Section 22 of R.A.
No. 6657)
3. Material misrepresentation of the ARB's
basic qualifications as provided under Section
22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other
agrarian laws;
4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf.
Section 73, Paragraphs C and E of R.A. No.
6657)
5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of
conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to
use or any other usufructuary right over the
land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary,
in order to circumvent the provisions of
Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27,
and other agrarian laws. However, if the land
has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228, ownership may be transferred after full
payment of amortization by the beneficiary;
(Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228)
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
6. Default in the obligation to pay an
aggregate of three (3) consecutive
amortizations in case of voluntary land
transfer/direct payment scheme, except in
cases of fortuitous events and force
majeure;
7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least
three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP,
except in cases of fortuitous events and force
majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657)
8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded
land continuously for a period of two (2)
calendar years as determined by the Secretary
or his authorized representative; (Section 22
of RA 6657)
9. The land is found to be exempt/excluded
from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No.
228 or CARP coverage or to be part of the
landowner's retained area as determined by
the Secretary or his authorized representative;
and
10. Other grounds that will circumvent laws
related to the implementation of agrarian
reform program. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 228 (EO
228), 14 one of the modes of paying compensation to
the landowner is by direct payment in cash or kind by
the farmer-beneficiaries. In this case, petitioners
entered into an agreement with respondent for a
direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of
Transfer. However, petitioners failed to pay the
amortizations to respondent landowner in accordance
with their agreed direct payment scheme. As found
by the Court of Appeals: cDTACE
There is no substantial evidence on record
that the petitioners had remitted the
amortizations due to the landowner in
accordance with their agreed direct payment
scheme embodied in their deeds of transfer. In
view thereof, We have no recourse but to
sustain the findings of fact of the agency
below. . . .
Indeed, We have scrutinized the evidentiary
records but found no valid reason to depart
from the challenged decision. Petitioner Pedro
Mago's supposed receipts of payment to
prove that he paid the amortizations due were
not even attached to the records of this case.
In the case of Augusto Mago, his payment of
P3,500.00 does not clearly show that the
payment was intended for the subject land.
Granting that it was so, it appeared to be for
initial payment only. In Ernesto Mago's case,
his heirs relied on a MARO Certification
stating that Juana Barbin had refused to
accept their payment. It was, however, issued
only on October 1, 2003 long after the filing
of the complaint. While P.D. 27 aims to
emancipate landless farmers, it does not also
allow unjust treatment of landowners by
10
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
depriving the latter of the just compensation
due. 15
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred
in finding them liable for violating DAR
Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994. Well-
settled is the rule that only questions of law can be
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 The factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal, provided they are based on
substantial evidence. 17 More so in this case where
the findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with
those of the DARAB, an administrative body with
expertise on matters within its specific and
specialized jurisdiction. 18
In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the
Transfer Certificates of Title should not have been
issued to petitioners without full payment of the just
compensation. 19 Under Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 266, 20 the
DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only
after the tenant-farmers have fully complied with the
requirements for a grant of title under PD 27.
Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are
already deemed owners of the land they till, it is
understood that full payment of the just
compensation has to be made first before title is
transferred to them. 21 Thus, Section 6 of EO
228 provides that ownership of lands acquired
under PD 27 may be transferred only after the
agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the
amortizations. In Corua v. Cinamin, 22 the Court
held:
As discussed above, the laws mandate the
full compensation for the lands acquired
under Pres. Decree No. 27 prior to the
issuance of emancipation patents. This is
understandable particularly since the
emancipation patent presupposes that the
grantee thereof has already complied with all
the requirements prescribed by Pres. Decree
No. 27. . . . DAHSaT
While this Court commiserates with
respondents in their plight, we are constrained
by the explicit requirements of the laws and
jurisprudence on the matter to annul the
emancipation patents issued to respondents in
the absence of any proof that they or the LBP
has already fully paid the value of the lands
put under the coverage ofPres. Decree No.
27. The requirement is unequivocal in that
the values of the lands awarded to
respondents must, prior to the issuance of
emancipation patents be paid in
full. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the
DARAB found that petitioners have not fully paid
the amortizations for the land granted to them. The
PARAD had a similar finding when it recommended
that the proper recourse of respondent is to file a
claim for just compensation. Clearly, the cancellation
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
of the Emancipation Patents issued to petitioners is
proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision dated 20 October 2005
and the Resolution dated 13 July 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87370. IHCSTE
SO ORDERED.
|||[G.R. No. 153456. March 2, 2007.]
ROBERTO PADUA, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY.
DELFIN B. SAMSON, DEPARTMENT
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, and MR.
TEOFILO INOCENCIO, * respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Herein Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the December
18, 2001 Decision and May 7, 2002 Resolution 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the
Petition for Annulment of a Final and Executory
Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 59366. 2
The CA summarized the facts as follows:
Private respondents Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. (Dela
Cruz, et al.) were tenants of Lot Nos. 68 and 90 of
the Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac. In
1966, upon the request of Anao Mayor Catalino Cruz
(Mayor Cruz), Dela Cruz, et al. agreed to donate said
properties to the municipality on the condition that
these be used as school sites. The project did not
materialize and, in 1977, Dela Cruz, et al. asked that
the properties be returned to them. However, they
found out that Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68
to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No. 90 to
Edwin Cruz (Cruz) who were each issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). 3
Upon Petition for Cancellation of CLT filed by
Dela Cruz, et al., Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Secretary Condrado Estrella issued an Order
dated April 19, 1982 (Estrella Order), cancelling the
CLT issued to Labagnoy and Cruz. The latter filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment for lack of due
process but the same was denied by Secretary
Estrella in his Order dated September 19, 1984.
Labagnoy and Cruz appealed to the Office of the
President (OP) which dismissed the same in an Order
dated May 9, 1990. Said May 9, 1990 OP Order
became final and the same was partially executed
with the restoration of Lot No. 68 in the possession
of Dela Cruz, et al.. 4
However, during the pendency of the appeal before
the OP, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Waiver over his
interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of which DAR
Regional Office III issued an Order dated December
7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring Lot
No. 90 open for disposition. 5 On November 7, 1989,
then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago
issued an Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein
petitioner Roberto Padua (Padua) who had been
occupying said property and paying the amortization
thereon to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
11
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
Aggrieved, Dela Cruz, et al., acting thru Anao
Mayor Clemente Apuan, filed with the DAR
Secretary a Letter-Petition for Cancellation (Letter-
Petition) of the December 7, 1987 DAR Regional
Office III Order and the November 7, 1989 DAR
Order. 6
DAR Secretary Garilao granted the Letter-Petition
in an Order dated July 2, 1995 (Garilao Order), to
wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order
is hereby issued granting the petition, thereby
cancelling the Order of Award dated
November 7, 1989 issued in favor of Roberto
Padua involving Lot No. 90, Psd-185539,
Ongsiako Estate and directing the Regional
Director to cause the restoration of possession
of said lot in favor of the petitioners. All
payments made by Roberto Padua on account
of said lot as rentals for the use thereof are
forfeited in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED. 7
Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Nestor
Acosta (Director Acosta) issued a
Memorandum 8 dated May 9, 2000, directing herein
public respondent Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer Teofilo Inocencio (PARO Inocencio) to
implement the Garilao Order. In turn, PARO
Inocencio instructed Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer Lino Mabborang (MARO Mabborang) to
issue the necessary documents to award Lot No. 90
to Dela Cruz, et al.. 9
Upon being informed by MARO Mabborang of the
implementation of the Garilao Order, Padua filed
with the CA a Petition for Annulment of a Final and
Executory Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction. 10 In justifying his recourse
to a Petition for Annulment, Padua claims that the
DAR under Sec. 50 of Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL)cannot take cognizance of the
petition for cancellation because the matter involved
is a civil law issue relating to the validity of a
contract of sale executed by LBP and petitioner, not
an agrarian reform matter; that cancellation can only
be ordered by a court of justice, not by an
administrative agency exercising only quasi-judicial
powers, more so if it is considered that plaintiff was a
purchaser for value and was not a party to the
controversy between farmers/tenants and the grantees
of the certificate of land transfer; that Sec. 50
of CARL falls under the heading of Administrative
Adjudication under Chapter XII, hence, this
administrative adjudication cannot be the mechanism
for resolutions of a contract; and, that this was in fact
the stand of PARO Inocencio in his 2nd Indorsement
dated February 15, 1994. 11
Padua also claimed lack of due process in that he
was allegedly never impleaded as a party to the
Petition for Cancellation of CLT nor furnished a copy
of the Letter-Petition but that he became aware of the
Garilao Order only when it was about to be
implemented. 12
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
On December 18, 2001, the CA issued the herein
assailed Decision, dismissing the Petition for
Annulment for being the wrong mode of questioning
the Garilao Order. It held that Rule 47 applies only to
final judgments and orders of Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs) in civil cases and not to orders issued by the
DAR Secretary. 13 The CA also affirmed the Garilao
Order, holding that then DAR Secretary Garilao had
authority to resolve the Letter-Petition as it involved
an agrarian dispute. 14 The CA also rejected the
contention of Padua that he was not accorded due
process in view of evidence on record that he was
notified of the proceedings on the Letter-Petition but
he chose not to participate therein. 15
Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 which
the CA denied in its May 7, 2002 Resolution. 17
Hence, the present Petition on the following
grounds:
The Court of Appeals committed a grave and
reversible error when it held that Rule 47 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure may not be availed of for assailing
an Order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 18
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
not holding that the Department of Agrarian Reform
acted without jurisdiction. 19
We find that the CA correctly dismissed the
Petition for Annulment and affirmed the
Garilao Order.
We reiterate that a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court may be
availed of against final judgments and orders
rendered by either RTCs in civil actions 20 or
Municipal Trial Courts 21 (MTCs). 22 Final
judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals such
as the National Labor Relations Commission, 23 the
Ombudsman, 24 the Civil Service
Commission, 25 and the OP 26 are beyond the reach
of a petition for annulment under Rule 47. An order
of the DAR Secretary issued in the exercise of his
quasi-judicial powers is also outside its scope. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, in Macalalag v.
Ombudsman, 27 explained the rationale behind the
limited application of Rule 47, to wit:
The right to appeal is a mere statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of law. There must then
be a law expressly granting such right. This
legal axiom is also applicable and even more
true in actions for annulment of judgments
which is an exception to the rule on finality of
judgments. 28
In the present case, neither Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657 29 nor R.A. No.
7902 30 allows a petition for annulment of a
final DAR decision or order. Section
61 31 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that a DAR
decision or order be reviewable by the CA in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In turn,
the Rules of Court, consistent with Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95
and R.A. No. 7902, prescribes under Rule
12
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
43 32 that the mode of appeal from decisions
or orders of DAR as a quasi-judicial agency is
by petition for review to the CA. 33 Padua's
recourse to a Petition for Annulment of the
Garilao Order, rather than a petition for
review, was therefore fatally infirm. CIcTAE
Even if Padua's Petition for Annulment had
been treated by the CA as a petition for
review, it would still have failed.
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 vests in DAR the
following quasi-judicial power:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the
DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with the
primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
It shall not be bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence but shall proceed to
hear and decide all cases, disputes, or
controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts of every case in accordance with
justice and equity and the merits of the case.
Towards this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule
of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination for every
action or proceeding before it.
On August 30, 2000, DAR adopted Administrative
Order No. 06-00 34 or the Rules of Procedure for
Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. Section 2
thereof states:
Section 2. Cases Covered. These Rules
shall govern cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall
include the following:
(a) Classification and identification of
landholdings for coverage under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP), including protests or
opposition thereto and petitions for lifting of
coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or
disqualification of potential farmer-
beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under
CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and
CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in
cases outside the purview ofPresidential
Decree No. 816, including the issuance,
recall or cancellation of Emancipation
Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet
registered with the Register of Deeds;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
In the disputed July 2, 1995 Order, then DAR
Secretary Garilao cancelled the award to Padua of
Lot No. 90, thereby declaring the latter not qualified
to acquire the property as an agrarian reform
beneficiary. 35 Said Order was therefore issued by
Sec. Garilao in the exercise of his power under
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 2 (b) of
Administrative Order No. 06-00.
Padua insists, however, that his status in relation to
Lot No. 90 was no longer that of a mere potential
agrarian reform farmer-beneficiary but a civil law
vendor dealing directly with the LBP in the payment
of amortizations on the property. 36 That view is
incorrect. The statutory mechanism for the
acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires
full payment of amortization before a farmer-
beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in
turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name
of an original or a transfer certificate of title. 37 As
Padua himself admitted that he is still paying
amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in
relation to said property remains that of a mere
potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities DAR
may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2
(d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00, DAR has
authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP,
or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but
not yet registered with the Register of Deeds. 38
As to the claim of Padua that he was not accorded
due process in the cancellation of the Santiago Order
which awarded Lot No. 90 in his favor, this is belied
by his own Annex "A" in support of his Urgent
Reiteration of Application for Restraining Order or
for Observance of Judicial Courtesy as Mandated
by Eternal Gardens versus Court of
Appeals. 39 Annex "A" 40 is the letter of MARO
Mabborang informing Padua of the implementation
of the Garilao Order. Attached to Annex "A" is the
May 9, 2000 Memorandum of Director Acosta,
which reads:
We are transmitting herewith the Order
dated July 2, 1995 issued by the Office of the
DAR Secretary, in the above entitled case.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed
but it was denied on August 12, 1996. [The]
appeal taken to the Office of the President
was dismissed May 25, 1998, and the motion
for reconsideration thereof was denied on
January 22, 1999.
Considering per available records, that no
further action was taken, hence, it has already
become final and executory and may be [sic]
now be implemented. CIETDc
xxx xxx xxx 41 (Emphasis added)
Thus, any defect in due process was cured by the
fact that Padua had filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and an Appeal to the OP from the
Garilao Order. 42
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated December 18, 2001 and
Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
13
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|||[G.R. No. 165501. March 28, 2006.]
SPOUSES JESUS and EVANGELINE
PASCO, petitioners, vs. PISON-ARCEO
AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
From the Court of Appeals August 27,
2003 1 decision which denied their petition for
review of the decision of the Bacolod City Regional
Trial Court (RTC) affirming with modification that of
the June 30, 2000 of the Talisay City Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Spouses Jesus and
Evangeline Pasco (petitioners) brought the case to
this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent, Pison-Arceo Agricultural and
Development Corporation, is the registered owner of
a parcel of land containing more than 100 hectares
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
88078 of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental.
Constructed on respondent's parcel of land are
houses which are occupied by its workers.
Petitioners, among other workers, used to work for
respondent until 1987. They having ceased to be
employed by respondent, petitioners were asked to
vacate the house they were occupying but they
refused, hence, respondent filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against them before the MTCC in
Talisay City.
In their Answer to the Complaint, 2 petitioners
claimed that, inter alia, they built the house occupied
by them at their own expense and their stay on the
land was upon the tolerance of respondent.
In their Position Paper, 3 petitioners claimed that
respondent constructed houses for its workers but the
house they were occupying was destroyed by a
typhoon, forcing them to build their house;
respondent's demand was merely for them to vacate
the house, as they had paid rentals thru salary/wage
deductions; and their refusal to vacate the house is
justified, they being the owners and actual possessors
thereof.
By Decision of June 30, 2000, 4 the MTCC of
Talisay rendered judgment in favor of respondent
upon the following findings:
As adduced, it is explicitly clear
that [respondent] provided housing facilities
to every worker in its hacienda without a
requiring payment of rentals, however, with
an implied promise that the same be vacated
upon their cessation from work. . . .
On the issue that [petitioners] were
responsible in building their own houses is
devoid of merit. . . . However, [petitioners]
made repairs on their houses when [the] same
were destroyed by typhoon sometime in
1975. These are repairs badly needed at that
time there being no however express
authority from [respondent]. DCaSHI
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
xxx xxx xxx
As to the contention of [petitioners] in Civil
Case No. 677, [respondent] is amenable to
remove whatever improvements they have
introduced thereto including the trees they
planted. . . .
xxx xxx xxx (Underscoring supplied) 5
Accordingly, the MTCC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered for [respondent] and herein
[petitioners in Civil Case No. 677], spouses
Jesus Pasco and Evangeline Pasco . . . and
those persons claiming under their names are
hereby ordered:
1. To vacate the premises of [respondent's]
Lot 707, Talisay Cadastre covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-88078 and
to remove whatever improvements they
introduced thereon;
2. To pay [respondent] the sum of P50.00 a
month as rental payment from the time of the
filing of the herein complaint until they have
vacated the premises; and
3. To pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED. 6 (Underscoring supplied)
After the promulgation on June 30, 2000 of the
MTCC decision or on August 23, 2000, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Talisay City sent a Notice of Coverage and Field
Investigation 7 (Notice of Coverage) advising
respondent that its parcel of land is now covered
under Republic Act 6657 otherwise known as
theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
and inviting the presence of a representative to a field
investigation to be conducted on September 12, 2000
during which it (respondent) may pinpoint its
retained area in accordance with Section 6 of
the CARL.
In the meantime, as petitioners appealed the MTCC
decision in the Unlawful Detainer Case to the RTC,
they, on August 24, 2000, filed a Memorandum of
Appeal 8contending that the MTCC:
I. . . . . ERRED IN FINDING THE
[PETITIONERS] TO BE BUILDERS,
PLANTERS OR SOWERS IN BAD FAITH.
II. . . . . ERRED IN NOT FINDING
[RESPONDENT] TO BE OWNERS IN BAD
FAITH.
III. . . . . ERRED IN APPLYING
ARTICLES 449 TO 451 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.
IV. . . . . HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE COMPLAINT UNTIL [PETITIONERS]
RIGHT OF RETENTION UNTIL ARTICLE
546 OF THE CIVIL CODE HAS EXPIRED.
xxx xxx xxx 9
In their Memorandum, petitioners argued that
respondent's hacienda is covered by the CARL and
they are qualified beneficiaries thereunder; whether
they are qualified beneficiaries is material to the
determination of whether they are planters or builders
14
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
or sowers in bad faith; "upon knowledge that the land
subject of the unlawful detainer case is a[n] hacienda,
it is within the sound discretion of the judge to clarify
from the parties whether or not the subject land is
covered by [CARL] and whether or not the
defendants are qualified agrarian reform
beneficiaries"; "it is mandatory on the part of the
courts to take judicial notice of agrarian laws"; and
the unlawful detainer case, at all events, was
prematurely filed as respondent's right to eject them
would arise only after they are reimbursed of their
expenses in repairing the house and, therefore, the
MTCC has no jurisdiction yet to order their
ejectment.
By Decision of December 5, 2000, 10 the RTC of
Bacolod City affirmed the June 30, 2000 decision of
MTCC Talisay, with modification, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, dated
June 30, 2000 is hereby modified as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered for [respondent] . . . . against
spouses Jesus Pasco and Evangeline Pasco
and the persons claiming under their names
are hereby ordered:
1. To vacate the premises of [respondent's]
Lot 707, Talisay Cadastre covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-88078 and
to remove the house they constructed thereon;
2. To pay [respondent] the sum of P50.00 a
month as rental payment from the time of the
filing of the herein complaint until they have
vacated the premises; and
3. To pay the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
With costs against the
[petitioners]. 11 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners moved to reconsider 12 the RTC
decision, they contending that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer
in view of the agrarian dispute between them and
respondent; and by Order 13 of June 8, 2001,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, they elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals 14 before which they raised, in the main, the
issues of:
I. . . .
A. Whether or not the Notice of
Coverage issued by DAR and which was
ADMITTED by [respondent's] sufficient
evidence to prove that [respondent's] land is
covered by CARP.
B. Whether or not [petitioners'] evidence to
prove that they are potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries has been existing at the time of
the filing of the complaint for ejectment
against them.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS AN
AGRARIAN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IN CIVIL CASE NO. 677 SO AS
TO NULLIFY THE PROCEEDINGS IN
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT FOR
EJECTMENT, HAVING BEEN BROUGHT
BY A PARTY WHO IS NOT THE REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST. 15 (Underscoring
supplied)
To their petition before the appellate court,
petitioners attached a copy of the Notice of Coverage
and Field Investigation sent by the MARO, Talisay
City to respondent.
In the meantime, the MARO of Talisay City issued
on August 24, 2004 a Certification 16 that herein
petitioner Jesus Pasco is registered as
potential Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) beneficiary in the land owned by
respondent.
By the assailed Decision of August 27,
2003, 17 the appellate court denied petitioners'
petition, ratiocinating as follows:
Well settled is the rule that the only issue in
ejectment cases is the physical possession of
the premises, independent of any claim of
ownership by the parties, and this must be so
because the issue of ownership cannot be
definitely decided in an ejectment case.
Considering that the petitioners were in
possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated
any time. Persons who occupy the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that
they will vacate the same upon demand,
failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
In the instant case, the petitioners admitted in
their Answer almost all the allegations in the
complaint. Since the petitioners occupy the
subject land at the owner's tolerance, they are
bound to vacate the same, failing which, an
ejectment suit is the proper remedy against
them.
We agree with the allegations of the
respondent corporation that the petitioners'
defenses: (1) that the subject land is covered
by CARP; (2) that there is an agrarian
dispute; and (3) that the case is not brought by
a real party-in-interest are mere afterthoughts
to muddle the case and win at all costs. These
issues were not raised before the trial
court. The fact is that the petitioners had
admitted from the very start that the
respondent is the owner of the lot in question.
They are therefore in estoppel if they deny the
fact the complaint was brought by the real
party-in-interest. In the same manner, the
15
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
defense that the court has no jurisdiction over
the ejectment case because of an agrarian
dispute or the land is covered by CARP is
likewise untenable. Basic is the rule that the
material averments in the complaint,
which in this case is for ejectment,
determine the jurisdiction of the court.
And, jurisprudence dictates that the court
does not lose its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case by the simple expedient of a
party raising as a defense therein the
alleged existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. Moreover,
it is a settled rule that no question will be
raised on appeal unless it has been raised in
the court below.
Anent the allegation that the respondent is
not the real party in interest, the same
deserves scant consideration. Even granting
that there is indeed a co-ownership over a
portion of the subject land, the law says that
anyone of the co-owners may bring an action
in ejectment. Thus, the respondent (plaintiff)
is unquestionable a real party in
interest. 18 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar 19 assailing the appellate
court's decision upon the following issues:
1. Whether or not one who has been
identified by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) as potential agrarian reform
beneficiary may be ejected from the land
where he is identified as such, by the
landowner, who has already been notified by
the DAR of the coverage of his land by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program of the government.
2. Whether or not the foregoing issue
involves an issue affecting the jurisdiction of
the court over the nature of the action or it
involves primary jurisdiction.
3. Whether or not the matters involving
jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the
action could be raised for the first time on
appeal. 20 (Underscoring supplied)
As reflected above, the theory of petitioner before
the MTCC is different from that proffered before the
RTC. Thus, before the MTCC, they claimed that the
house they are occupying was built at their own
expense.
Before the RTC, they raised for the first time that,
they being qualified beneficiaries of the CARP, the
same should be considered in determining whether
they are builders, planters, or sowers in good faith.
And, for the first time too, they assailed the MTCC's
lack of jurisdiction over the action due to
prematurity, they contending that respondent's right
to eject them would accrue only after they are
reimbursed of their expenses in the repair of the
house.
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24
In their motion for reconsideration of the RTC
decision, petitioners this time argued that the MTCC
had no jurisdiction over the case in view of the
agrarian dispute between them and respondent.
As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain
theory upon which the case is tried and decided by
the lower court will not be permitted to change
theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic
considerations of due process underlie this rule. 21
The aforecited rule is not without exception,
however. As correctly argued by petitioners, though
not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter may be considered by the
reviewing court as it may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. 22
The issuance during the pendency of the case of a
Notice of Coverage to respondent does not, however,
automatically make the ejectment case an agrarian
dispute over which the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
jurisdiction. 23 The issuance of a Notice of Coverage
is merely a preliminary step for the State's acquisition
of the land for agrarian reform purposes and it does
not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership
of the land to the government. The purpose of a
Notice of Coverage is explained by this Court, thus:
. . . The Notice of Coverage shall also invite
the landowner to attend the field investigation
to be scheduled at least two weeks from
notice. The field investigation is for the
purpose of identifying the landholding and
determining its suitability for agriculture and
its productivity. . . . The date of the field
investigation shall also be sent by the DAR
Municipal Office to representatives of the
L[and] B[ank] [of the] P[hilippines], BARC,
DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries.
The field investigation shall be conducted on
the date set with the participation of the
landowner and the various
representatives. . . . Should there be a
variance between the findings of the DAR
and the LBP as to whether the land be placed
under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to
agriculture, the degree or development of the
slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a
composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and
DA which shall jointly conduct further
investigation. . . .
Clearly then, the notice requirements under
the CARL are not confined to the Notice of
Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law.
They also include the Notice of Coverage first
laid down in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of
1989 and subsequently amended in
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR
A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. This Notice of
Coverage does not merely notify the
16
ENGR ARIEL MARK PILOTIN
landowner that his property shall be placed No pronouncement as to costs.
under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise SO ORDERED.
his retention right; it also notifies him, |||
pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990,
that a public hearing shall be conducted
where he and representatives of the concerned
sectors of society may attend to discuss the
results of the field investigation, the land
valuation and other pertinent matters. Under
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice
of Coverage also informs the landowner that
a field investigation of his landholding shall
be conducted where he and the other
representatives may be present.
xxx xxx xxx x 24 (Underscoring supplied)
Since during a field investigation the DAR and
Land Bank of the Philippines would make a
determination as to whether, among other things, "the
land will be placed under agrarian reform, the land's
suitability to agriculture," a Notice of Coverage does
not ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land
reform area. The owner retains its right to eject
unlawful possessors of his land, as what respondent
did in the present case.
As for the registration of petitioners as potential
CARP beneficiaries, the same does not help their
cause. As "potential" CARP beneficiaries, they are
included in the list of those who may be awarded
land under the CARP. Nothing in the records of the
case shows that the DAR has made an award in favor
of petitioners, hence, no rights over the land they
occupy can be considered to have vested in their
favor in accordance with Section 24 of
the CARL which reads:
Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The
rights and responsibilities of the
beneficiary shall commence from the time
the DAR makes an award of the land to
him, which award shall be completed within
one hundred eighty (180) days from the time
the DAR takes actual possession of the land.
Ownership of the beneficiary shall be
evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award, which shall contain the restrictions
and conditions provided for in this Act, and
shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds
concerned and annotated on the Certificate of
Title. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, to allow petitioners to continue to stay
in respondent's land on the ground that they are
potential CARP beneficiaries would give them
preferential treatment over other potential CARP
reform beneficiaries who are not occupying the
premises and still awaiting the award to be made by
the DAR in their favor. Worse, to further tolerate
petitioners' occupancy of respondent's land might
give other potential CARP beneficiaries the wrong
signal that they too can occupy the land which may
be awarded to them even before they are chosen or
before an award is made in their favor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
Atty UNGOS III | Agra Sec 18-24 17