LIBEL LAWS IN THE PHILIPPINES
virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to
Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines,
libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause
the dishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of
libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to
another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice. [Daez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, 31 October 1990, 191 SCRA 61,
67]
In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged
libel means, but what the words used by him mean.
Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine the defamatory
character of words used in the following manner, viz:
Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more
effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made.
Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for
slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to
induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person
or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty,
public ridicule. . . . [Lacsa v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
161 SCRA 427 (1988) citing U.S. v. OConnell, 37 Phil. 767
(1918)]
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person
the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him
in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third
person. It is not required that the person defamed has read or
heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a
third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a
mans reputation is the estimate in which others hold him in,
not the good opinion which he has of himself. [Alonzo v. Court
of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51 (1995)]
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it
must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was
able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) the
Supreme Court ruled that in order to maintain a libel suit, it is
essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-
16772, November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that
he be named (19 A.L.R. 116). In an earlier case, the high court
also declared that defamatory matter which does not reveal
the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast,
affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers
of the libel could have identified the personality of the individual
defamed. (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42
Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance,
especially where a group or class of persons, as in the case at
bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger
the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member
to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR
2d. 1384).
PRESUMPTION OF MALICE:
The law also presumes that malice is present in every
defamatory imputation. Thus, Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged
communication, the character of which is a matter of defense
that may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part
of the accused. Once it is established that the article is of a
privileged character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on
the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender
was prompted by malice or ill will. When this is accomplished
the defense of privilege becomes unavailing. [Santos v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-45031, 21 October 1991, 203 SCRA 110,
114]
Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is
defamatory, as in this case, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law
already presumes that the defendants imputation is malicious
(malice in law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to
show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome
the legal inference of malice.
In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. So if the
ill will is engendered by ones sense of justice or other legitimate
or plausible motive, such feeling negatives actual
malice. [Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. III,
radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means.
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE:
Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means,
shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book
or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible
for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if
he were the author thereof.

Bk. II, 1997 Ed., citing People v. de los Reyes, Jr., 47 OG

DEFENSES:
3569]
In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
It is established doctrine that the malice that attends the
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged
dissemination of the article alleged to be libelous must attend
as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with
the distribution itself. It cannot be merely a resentment against
good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be
a person, manifested unconnectedly several months earlier or
acquitted.
one displayed at a much later date.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not
HOW COMMITTED:
constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the
imputation shall have been made against Government
Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, libel may be
employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving,
official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
It is important to remember that any of the imputations covered
by Article 353 is defamatory and, under the general rule laid
down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if it be true; if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when
the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or
spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.
Truth then is not a defense, unless it is shown that the matter
charged as libelous was made with good motives and for
justifiable ends.