Feria vs CA, GR No.

122954, February 15, 2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested

Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings Habeas Corpus)
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was
lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on
the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the
proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the
court which rendered the decision.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as
required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered
by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish
the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the
existence of a legal ground for petitioners continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final
judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.

Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal
records.

Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined
and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held
under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of
a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioners
claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial
court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which
serves as the legal basis for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to
exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends
to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of
lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the
restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its
judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
Tijing vs. CA, 354 SCRA 17; GR No. 125901, March 8, 2001
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings Habeas Adoption: Custody of a minor)

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from
respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the
other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On
appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate
court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.

Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy
to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of his own free will.
People Vs. Sandiganbayan (211 SCRA 241 G.R. No. 101724)

July 3, 1992

Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October
28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced
Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint
questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976
of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del
Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject
herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his
application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte
preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent
contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion
was granted. The crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10
years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed.

Issue: Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.

Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the
crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the
commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on
March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period
for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive
application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To
apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to
his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished
under the law existing when it was committed.

PEOPLE VS BRACAMONTE (G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996)

FACTS:

On October 6, 1987, appellant Florentino Bracamonte, together with Manuel Sapon and Ernie
Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively
identified by Violeta Parnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovahs Witnesses and were
confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was
surprised to see three men emerge from inside the house. The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the Paranalas housemaid,
Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the
charges.

Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and Bracamonte were at large
until the latters arrest in October of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges
and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial
evidence that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldnt possible know him to merit
identification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamontes defense of alibi and Parnalas lack of personal affiliation with
Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.

RULING:

It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In
order that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that
the accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would
have been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case,
appellant Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the victims house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or
motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the
accused. Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala
should testify against him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in
order for there to be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must know
the latter personally. If this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since,
in most instances, the perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness degree of
closeness or familiarity with the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an
indispensable requirement for purposes of positive identification.

The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and
convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should
have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex
crime, the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the
number of killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

People vs. Jabinal (55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974)

Antonio J.

Facts:The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas
finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
validity of the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling
in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5,
1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was
without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent,
which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as
peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang and People
vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and
subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence,
of the law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS:

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm
subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the
basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang
and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system .
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a
firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which
no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

People vs Ferrer (G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, 27 December 1972)

FACTS:
Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag, together with five others, were charged with violation of R. A. No.
1700 or the Anti-Subversion Law which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and
other subversive associations, and punishes any person who knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar
subversive organization. Both accused moved to quash the informations on the ground that
the Anti-Subversion Law is a bill of attainder. The trial court agreed, and thus, dismissed the
informations against the two accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the Anti-Subversion Law partakes of the nature of a Bill of Attainder

HELD:
No. Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that No bill of attainder or ex port facto
law shall be enacted. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of
the judicial function.

When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What
it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term Communist Party of the Philippines issued solely for
definitional purposes. In fact, the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to any other organization having the same purpose and their successors. Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct.

Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force
deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a
foreign power.

As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the
nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a dragnet device whereby all who
participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically required that membership must be
knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been
acquired knowingly, willfully and by overt acts. The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the
unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by overt acts. This constitutes an element of
membership distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organizations unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organizations illegal objectives (People v. Ferrer, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14,
27 December 1972, 48 SCRA 382).