EU BREAKS TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO UK YET

AGAIN
The British Prime Minister has not been invited to EU
Summit talks this afternoon
Another Facts4EU.Org exclusive
Today the EU is holding another EU Council Summit, this time in the
tiny member state of Malta.
Malta currently holds the Presidency of the EU Council
On Tuesday, EU Council President Donald Tusk wrote to 27 EU leaders
excluding Theresa May ahead of todays summit in Valetta.
First Session Today EU28
Theresa May is only invited to the first session of this Summit, where the
EU28 will agree giving further financial and other aid to Libya in an attempt
to slow migration from Africa into the EU. The UK is needed for this
because it involves British money.
Second Session Today EU27, excluding the UK
However, the British PM is not invited to the second session, where the
EU27s leaders will talk about the forthcoming Summit in Rome to
celebrate the EUs 60th birthday.
Four Times A Wallflower
This is now the fourth time since the Referendum that the EU27 have held
Summits either fully or partly without the UK, despite the UK being a full
member and despite the UK being expected to continue to pay massive
contributions each month.
The EU insists that the UK continue to fulfil its Treaty obligations.
Last week, the pro-Remain Chancellor Phillip Hammond even told
them in Brussels:
"We will continue to abide by the rules, and the regulations and the laws, of
the European Union for so long as we are members. Of course we want to
strengthen our trade ties with the very many trade partners we have
around the world, but we're very mindful of our obligations under the treaty
and we will follow them precisely."
For 43 years the UK has subsidized the majority of other member states.
The UK has consistently paid in more than it gets back, year after year.
How is it possible that a senior member state of the EU is not allowed
to be involved in discussions for the major EU Summit and event
taking place in March?
THESE EU27 MEETINGS ARE NOT ABOUT BREXIT
In Bratislava in September the EU27 discussed terrorism, external
security, the Single Market, the EU-Turkey agreement, the European
Border and Coast Guard, and youth unemployment. The Bratislava
Roadmap will guide EU action over the next months, said President
Tusk. Yet the UK was excluded.
Today the EU27 will discuss the preparations for the Rome Summit,
celebrating 60 years since the birth of the EU. (In fact the EU didnt exist 60
years ago it was something else entirely - but we wont go into that now.)
Time to be more resolute
After 43 years of paying for a significant part of the costs of this disastrous
project, on what legal basis is the UK once again excluded from the
highest decision-making body, enshrined in the EU Treaties?
It is our firm prediction that the EU will never agree a deal with the UK
based on logic, reason, and commercial common sense.
We urge the government to toughen its stance. If we werent telling you
how the EU is failing to treat the UK as a full member, would you hear it
from the Government? Or from anyone else?
Its high time the Government called out the EU for failing to meet its
obligations
to a full, fee-paying member of its club.
PRESIDENT TUSK'S LETTER TO THE EU27
"United we stand, divided we fall": letter by President Donald
Tusk to the 27 EU heads of state or government on the future
of the EU before the Malta summi

The challenges currently facing the European Union are

more dangerous than ever before in the time since the
signature of the [1957] Treaty of Rome."
Donald Tusk, President of the EU Council
Mr Tusk invites the EU27 leaders to address 3 threats:
"The first threat, an external one, is related to the new
geopolitical situation in the world and around Europe."
"The second threat, an internal one, is connected with the
rise in anti-EU, nationalist, increasingly xenophobic
sentiment in the EU itself."
"The third threat is the state of mind of the pro-European
elites. A decline of faith in political integration, submission
to populist arguments as well as doubt in the fundamental
values of liberal democracy are all increasingly visible."
COMING TOMORROW
OUR EXCLUSIVE FACTS4EU.ORG SPECIAL REPORT HELD
OVER UNTIL TOMORROW
Unfortunately we had to postpone this from today, due to
lack of funds.
We'll blow another big EU myth out of the water - this time
on health
07.00am, 03 Feb 2017
114 MPs DELIBERATELY DEFY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
Editorial - Thur 02 Feb 2017
Lets cut through all the self-serving nonsense spouted by
Brexit-denying MPs
GENERAL ELECTIONS
The UKs electoral system is that of a representative
democracy
Every 5 years we directly elect a Member of Parliament to
represent our views
The MP is then expected to use his or her judgment when
voting on laws
We may not agree with all their decisions but we accept
this will be the case
THE EU REFERENDUM
Very rarely, Parliament asks the public to decide a
particular issue
This removes the issue from the realm of an MPs
particular opinions
On 23rd June the question was clear and so was the
answer
The majority of voters instructed MPs that they wished the
UK to leave the EU
The people decided, in a rare exercise of direct democracy
The whole point of a referendum is to decide a specific
issue. Parliament voted by a 6:1 majority to ask the people
to decide whether to remain in or leave the EU. The
people were told repeatedly, in writing, in speeches, and
in interviews that their decision would be enacted.
Yesterday in Parliament, 114 MPs defied the specific will of
the majority of the British people. There is no excuse for
this. No playing with words, nor any faux-sincere
expressions of heart-felt beliefs or conscience, nor any
nonsense about things which werent on the ballot paper
last night, can get around this fundamental fact.
When asked to enact the majority will of the British people
who had been asked a specific question, 114 elected
Members of Parliament refused to do so. Shame on them.
There is a deep-seated, anti-democratic, rotten element
within Parliament. We hope the British people, whether
they voted Leave or Remain, will express their disgust and
will take appropriate action the next time they go to the
ballot box.
COVERAGE OF WEDNESDAY'S ARTICLE 50
DEBATE
Brexit: Barrister Explains Why Article 50
May Never Be Triggered
Jul 4, 2016
A London law firm has started legal action to force a
parliamentary debate and vote on leaving the EU before Article
50 is triggered. Jolyon Maugham QC explains
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=em0Zuvxmqk4
Anna Soubry Article 50 debate
Jan 31, 2017
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbtixmflhnc
Anti Brexit MP Ken Clarke accuses party
of being anti-immigrant during Article 50
debate
Jan 31, 2017
Pro-Remain Conservative MP Ken Clarke delivered his defence
of the European Union in a speech to the House of Commons
on the first day of the Commons debate on the European Union
(notification of withdrawal) bill, allowing the government to
trigger article 50
He also accused the party of being "mildly anti-immigrant," an
astonishing claim for a serving MP to make about his own party
in any setting, never mind during a parliamentary debate.
Speaking on Tuesday afternoon, the former chancellor spoke
for nearly 20 minutes about why he would be voting against
the government's Brexit bill, citing his own staunch, long-
standing pro-EU views.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKNsxjY1PM4

Highlights of the Article 50 debate

Jan 31, 2017
Two days are set aside for a debate on the second reading of a
bill to approve the triggering of Article 50, to begin the formal
process of the UK leaving the EU.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U31XsbI9c9o
Article 50 Activation - Parliament Debate
Feb 1, 2017
Some of the debate of article 50, includes Alex Salmond, Ed
Milliband, Tim Farron and George Osborne.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LYurF0_ewkY

Bill Cash MP - The BREXIT Article 50 Bill

Feb 1, 2017
JOIN CENTIPEDES - https://www.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/

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Become A Patron - https://goo.gl/jUq5vL

Donations - https://goo.gl/LwUKre

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2dYQrbbkfA
DEEP DIVE- Brexit Briefings 8- Impact on Trade and Retailers Supply
Chains
http://www.deborahweinswig.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/Brexit-Briefings-8-Impact-on-the-Supply-
Chain-October-24-2016.pdf

EU Citizens & Brexit

Posted February 1, 2017 by WTB Solicitors
There is an uncertain destiny for our country at the
moment. Many citizens of the European Union living in the
United Kingdom are afraid about what will happen to the
free movement of people after Brexit and what their
situation will be.
We cant predict the future and tell you what will happen,
but our expert immigration solicitors can help you and
there are documents you can apply for to prove your right
to live in the UK if you are an European Economic Area
citizen or from Switzerland. These documents generally
depend on the time a person has been living the UK.
REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE
You can apply as a qualified person as long as youre
working, self-employed or looking for work. You need to
prove that you are qualified, fill in a form. This application
can be done online, by post or in person.
As everyones situation is different, there are other
options: if the qualified person belongs to your close
family circle, you might be able to apply as a family
member or as an extended family member if the
person is not in your close family.
This application has a cost of around 65.
PERMANENT RESIDENCE BEFORE 5
YEARS
In some circumstances you can get permanent residence
situation if you have been living in the UK for less than 5
years but you should always apply for the permanent
residence.
The situations might vary, but the minimum requisite is
that you have been living in the country for 2 years and
have been working here.
To find out more about the different options that you might
have you can visit the governments page
PERMANENT RESIDENCE AFTER 5 YEARS
You dont need a document to get the permanent
residence, but you can apply for one if you want to and
this might be beneficial to you once Brexit is implemented.
That document will allow you to prove that you have the
right to permanently live in the country and it will be the
first step to opt in for the British citizenship.
For this you need to fill in a form that you can obtain here
and follow the procedure and make sure that you tick all
the requirements.
If you need professional advise or help with the forms, you
can contact our solicitors by calling on 0161 224 3311.

Prove your
right to live in
the UK as an
EU citizen
There has been no change to the
rights and status of EU nationals*
in the UK, and UK nationals in the
EU, as a result of the referendum.
he decision about when to trigger Article
50 and start the formal process of leaving
the EU will be for the new Prime Minister.
The UK remains a member of the EU
throughout this process, and until Article
50 negotiations have concluded.
When we do leave the EU, we fully expect
 that the legal status of EU nationals living
in the UK, and that of UK nationals in EU
member states, will be properly protected.
The government recognises and values the
important contribution made by EU and
other non-UK citizens who work, study and
live in the UK.
I have lived in the UK for more than 5
years. What does the vote to leave
the EU mean for me?
EU nationals who have lived continuously
and lawfully in the UK for at least 5 years
automatically have a permanent right to
reside. This means that they have a right
to live in the UK permanently, in
accordance with EU law. There is no
requirement to register for documentation
to confirm this status.
EU nationals who have lived continuously
and lawfully in the UK for at least 6 years
are eligible to apply for British citizenship if
they would like to do so. The eligibility
requirements can be found here.
What if I have lived in the UK for less
than 5 years?
EU nationals continue to have a right to
reside in the UK in accordance with EU law.
EU nationals do not need to register for
any documentation in order to enjoy their
free movement rights and responsibilities.
For those that decide to apply for a
 registration certificate, there has been no
change to government policy or processes.
Applications will continue to be processed
as usual.
Non-EU family members of EU nationals
must continue to apply for a family permit
if they wish to enter the UK under EU law,
and they do not have a residence card
issued by a member state. There has been
no change to government policy or
processes, and applications will continue to
be processed as usual.
Extended family members of EU nationals
must continue to apply for a registration
certificate (if they are an EU national) or
residence card (if they are a non-EU
national) if they wish to reside in the UK.
There has been no change to government
policy or processes, and applications will
continue to be processed as usual.
Irish nationals enjoy separate rights, under
various pieces of legislation, which allow
Irish nationals residing in the UK to be
treated in the same way as British
nationals in most circumstances. There is
no change to this position.
Croatian nationals might continue to need
to apply for a registration certificate to be
allowed to work in the UK under the
transitional arrangements that were put in
place when Croatia joined the EU in 2013.
The type of registration certificate that
they might need will depend on whether
they need permission to work in the UK,
and what they will be doing. There has
been no change to government policy or
processes, and applications will continue to
be processed as usual.
Does the government plan to remove
EU nationals from the UK?
There has been no change to the right of
EU nationals to reside in the UK and
therefore no change to the circumstances
in which someone could be removed from
the UK.
As was the case before the referendum, EU
nationals can only be removed from the UK
if they are considered to pose a genuine,
present and sufficiently serious threat to
the public, if they are not lawfully resident
or are abusing their free movement rights.
For more information visit the UK Visas and
Immigration page.
*All references to EU nationals on this page
also cover European Economic Area and
Swiss nationals.

THE RIGHTS OF EU NATIONALS IN THE UK

PUBLISHED BY JEAN LAMBERT MEP, GREEN
PARTY MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT FOR LONDON
http://www.jeanlambertmep.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/FACTSHEET-
rights-of-EU-nationals-in-the-UK-FINAL.pdf

The referendum result- what happens now?

The important thing to remember is that
nothing will change immediately and the
UK is still a member of the EU. 27th Jan
2017
http://www.ed.ac.uk/files/atoms/files/eu_ref
erendum_faqs_27jan2017.pdf

Plan For Britain: Prime Minister's speech

on Brexit negotiating objectives

Prime Minister Theresa May set

out the Plan for Britain, including
the 12 priorities that the UK
government will use to negotiate
Brexit.

The government's
negotiating
objectives for
exiting the EU: PM
speech
A little over 6 months ago, the British
people voted for change.
They voted to shape a brighter future for
our country.
They voted to leave the European Union
and embrace the world.
And they did so with their eyes open:
accepting that the road ahead will be
uncertain at times, but believing that it
leads towards a brighter future for their
children and their grandchildren too.
And it is the job of this government to
deliver it. That means more than
negotiating our new relationship with the
EU. It means taking the opportunity of this
great moment of national change to step
back and ask ourselves what kind of
country we want to be.
My answer is clear. I want this United
Kingdom to emerge from this period of
change stronger, fairer, more united and
more outward-looking than ever before. I
want us to be a secure, prosperous,
tolerant country a magnet for
international talent and a home to the
pioneers and innovators who will shape the
world ahead. I want us to be a truly Global
Britain the best friend and neighbour to
our European partners, but a country that
reaches beyond the borders of Europe too.
A country that goes out into the world to
build relationships with old friends and new
allies alike.
I want Britain to be what we have the
potential, talent and ambition to be. A
great, global trading nation that is
respected around the world and strong,
confident and united at home.
A Plan for Britain
That is why this government has a Plan for
Britain. One that gets us the right deal
abroad but also ensures we get a better
deal for ordinary working people at home.
Its why that plan sets out how we will use
this moment of change to build a stronger
economy and a fairer society by embracing
genuine economic and social reform.
Why our new Modern Industrial Strategy is
being developed, to ensure every nation
and area of the United Kingdom can make
the most of the opportunities ahead.
Why we will go further to reform our
schools to ensure every child has the
knowledge and the skills they need to
thrive in post-Brexit Britain.
Why as we continue to bring the deficit
down, we will take a balanced approach by
investing in our economic infrastructure
because it can transform the growth
potential of our economy and improve the
quality of peoples lives across the whole
country.
Its why we will put the preservation of our
precious Union at the heart of everything
we do. Because it is only by coming
together as one great union of nations and
people that we can make the most of the
opportunities ahead. The result of the
referendum was not a decision to turn
inward and retreat from the world.
Because Britains history and culture is
profoundly internationalist.
We are a European country and proud of
our shared European heritage but we are
also a country that has always looked
beyond Europe to the wider world. That is
why we are one of the most racially
diverse countries in Europe, one of the
most multicultural members of the
European Union, and why whether we are
talking about India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
countries in Africa or those that are closer
to home in Europe so many of us have
close friends and relatives from across the
world.
Instinctively, we want to travel to, study in,
trade with countries not just in Europe but
beyond the borders of our continent. Even
now as we prepare to leave the EU, we are
planning for the next biennial
Commonwealth Heads of Government
meeting in 2018 a reminder of our unique
and proud global relationships.
A message from Britain to
the rest of Europe
And it is important to recognise this fact.
June the 23rd was not the moment Britain
chose to step back from the world. It was
the moment we chose to build a truly
Global Britain.
I know that this and the other reasons
Britain took such a decision is not always
well understood among our friends and
allies in Europe. And I know many fear that
this might herald the beginning of a
greater unravelling of the EU.
But let me be clear: I do not want that to
happen. It would not be in the best
interests of Britain. It remains
overwhelmingly and compellingly in
Britains national interest that the EU
should succeed. And that is why I hope in
the months and years ahead we will all
reflect on the lessons of Britains decision
to leave.
So let me take this opportunity to set out
the reasons for our decision and to address
the people of Europe directly.
Its not simply because our history and
culture is profoundly internationalist,
important though that is. Many in Britain
have always felt that the United Kingdoms
place in the European Union came at the
expense of our global ties, and of a bolder
embrace of free trade with the wider world.
There are other important reasons too.
Our political traditions are different. Unlike
other European countries, we have no
written constitution, but the principle of
Parliamentary Sovereignty is the basis of
our unwritten constitutional settlement. We
have only a recent history of devolved
governance though it has rapidly
embedded itself and we have little
history of coalition government.
The public expect to be able to hold their
governments to account very directly, and
as a result supranational institutions as
strong as those created by the European
Union sit very uneasily in relation to our
political history and way of life.
And, while I know Britain might at times
have been seen as an awkward member
state, the European Union has struggled to
deal with the diversity of its member
countries and their interests. It bends
towards uniformity, not flexibility.
David Camerons negotiation was a valiant
final attempt to make it work for Britain
and I want to thank all those elsewhere in
Europe who helped him reach an
agreement but the blunt truth, as we
know, is that there was not enough
flexibility on many important matters for a
majority of British voters.
Now I do not believe that these things
apply uniquely to Britain. Britain is not the
only member state where there is a strong
attachment to accountable and democratic
government, such a strong internationalist
mindset, or a belief that diversity within
Europe should be celebrated. And so I
believe there is a lesson in Brexit not just
for Britain but, if it wants to succeed, for
the EU itself.
Because our continents great strength has
always been its diversity. And there are 2
ways of dealing with different interests.
You can respond by trying to hold things
together by force, tightening a vice-like
grip that ends up crushing into tiny pieces
the very things you want to protect. Or you
can respect difference, cherish it even, and
reform the EU so that it deals better with
the wonderful diversity of its member
states.
So to our friends across Europe, let me say
this.
Our vote to leave the European Union was
no rejection of the values we share. The
decision to leave the EU represents no
desire to become more distant to you, our
friends and neighbours. It was no attempt
to do harm to the EU itself or to any of its
remaining member states. We do not want
to turn the clock back to the days when
Europe was less peaceful, less secure and
less able to trade freely. It was a vote to
restore, as we see it, our parliamentary
democracy, national self-determination,
and to become even more global and
internationalist in action and in spirit.
We will continue to be reliable partners,
willing allies and close friends. We want to
buy your goods and services, sell you ours,
trade with you as freely as possible, and
work with one another to make sure we are
all safer, more secure and more prosperous
through continued friendship.
You will still be welcome in this country as
we hope our citizens will be welcome in
yours. At a time when together we face a
serious threat from our enemies, Britains
unique intelligence capabilities will
continue to help to keep people in Europe
safe from terrorism. And at a time when
there is growing concern about European
security, Britains servicemen and women,
based in European countries including
Estonia, Poland and Romania, will continue
to do their duty.
We are leaving the European Union, but we
are not leaving Europe.
And that is why we seek a new and equal
partnership between an independent,
self-governing, Global Britain and our
friends and allies in the EU.
Not partial membership of the European
Union, associate membership of the
European Union, or anything that leaves us
half-in, half-out. We do not seek to adopt a
model already enjoyed by other countries.
We do not seek to hold on to bits of
membership as we leave.
No, the United Kingdom is leaving the
European Union. And my job is to get the
right deal for Britain as we do.
Objectives and ambitions
So today I want to outline our objectives
for the negotiation ahead. Twelve
objectives that amount to one big goal: a
new, positive and constructive partnership
between Britain and the European Union.
And as we negotiate that partnership, we
will be driven by some simple principles:
we will provide as much certainty and
clarity as we can at every stage. And we
will take this opportunity to make Britain
stronger, to make Britain fairer, and to
build a more Global Britain too.
Certainty and clarity
1. Certainty
The first objective is crucial. We will
provide certainty wherever we can.
We are about to enter a negotiation. That
means there will be give and take. There
will have to be compromises. It will require
imagination on both sides. And not
everybody will be able to know everything
at every stage.
But I recognise how important it is to
provide business, the public sector, and
everybody with as much certainty as
possible as we move through the process.
So where we can offer that certainty, we
will do so.
That is why last year we acted quickly to
give clarity about farm payments and
university funding. And it is why, as we
repeal the European Communities Act, we
will convert the acquis the body of
existing EU law into British law.
This will give the country maximum
certainty as we leave the EU. The same
rules and laws will apply on the day after
Brexit as they did before. And it will be for
the British Parliament to decide on any
changes to that law after full scrutiny and
proper Parliamentary debate.
And when it comes to Parliament, there is
one other way in which I would like to
provide certainty. I can confirm today that
the Government will put the final deal that
is agreed between the UK and the EU to a
vote in both Houses of Parliament, before it
comes into force.
A stronger Britain
Our second guiding principle is to build a
stronger Britain.
2. Control of our own laws
That means taking control of our own
affairs, as those who voted in their millions
to leave the European Union demanded we
must.
So we will take back control of our laws
and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice in Britain.
Leaving the European Union will mean that
our laws will be made in Westminster,
Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those
laws will be interpreted by judges not in
Luxembourg but in courts across this
country.
Because we will not have truly left the
European Union if we are not in control of
our own laws.
3. Strengthen the Union
A stronger Britain demands that we do
something else strengthen the precious
union between the 4 nations of the United
Kingdom.
At this momentous time, it is more
important than ever that we face the
future together, united by what makes us
strong: the bonds that unite us as a
people, and our shared interest in the UK
being an open, successful trading nation in
the future.
And I hope that same spirit of unity will
apply in Northern Ireland in particular over
the coming months in the Assembly
elections, and the main parties there will
work together to re-establish a partnership
government as soon as possible.
Foreign affairs are of course the
responsibility of the UK government, and in
dealing with them we act in the interests of
all parts of the United Kingdom. As prime
minister, I take that responsibility seriously.
I have also been determined from the start
that the devolved administrations should
be fully engaged in this process.
That is why the government has set up a
Joint Ministerial Committee on EU
Negotiations, so ministers from each of the
UKs devolved administrations can
contribute to the process of planning for
our departure from the European Union.
We have already received a paper from the
Scottish government, and look forward to
receiving a paper from the Welsh
government shortly. Both papers will be
considered as part of this important
process. We wont agree on everything,
but I look forward to working with the
administrations in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland to deliver a Brexit that
works for the whole of the United Kingdom.
Part of that will mean working very
carefully to ensure that as powers are
repatriated from Brussels back to Britain
the right powers are returned to
Westminster, and the right powers are
passed to the devolved administrations of
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
As we do so, our guiding principle must be
to ensure that as we leave the European
Union no new barriers to living and doing
business within our own Union are created,
That means maintaining the necessary
common standards and frameworks for our
own domestic market, empowering the UK
as an open, trading nation to strike the
best trade deals around the world, and
protecting the common resources of our
islands.
And as we do this, I should equally be clear
that no decisions currently taken by the
devolved administrations will be removed
from them.
4. Maintain the Common Travel Area
with Ireland
We cannot forget that, as we leave, the
United Kingdom will share a land border
with the EU, and maintaining that Common
Travel Area with the Republic of Ireland will
be an important priority for the UK in the
talks ahead. There has been a Common
Travel Area between the UK and the
Republic of Ireland for many years.
Indeed, it was formed before either of our
2 countries were members of the European
Union. And the family ties and bonds of
affection that unite our 2 countries mean
that there will always be a special
relationship between us.
So we will work to deliver a practical
solution that allows the maintenance of the
Common Travel Area with the Republic,
while protecting the integrity of the United
Kingdoms immigration system.
Nobody wants to return to the borders of
the past, so we will make it a priority to
deliver a practical solution as soon as we
can.
A fairer Britain
The third principle is to build a fairer
Britain. That means ensuring it is fair to
everyone who lives and works in this
country.
5. Control of immigration
And that is why we will ensure we can
control immigration to Britain from Europe.
We will continue to attract the brightest
and the best to work or study in Britain
indeed openness to international talent
must remain one of this countrys most
distinctive assets but that process must
be managed properly so that our
immigration system serves the national
interest.
So we will get control of the number of
people coming to Britain from the EU.
Because while controlled immigration can
bring great benefits filling skills
shortages, delivering public services,
making British businesses the world-
beaters they often are when the numbers
get too high, public support for the system
falters.
In the last decade or so, we have seen
record levels of net migration in Britain,
and that sheer volume has put pressure on
public services, like schools, stretched our
infrastructure, especially housing, and put
a downward pressure on wages for working
class people. As home secretary for 6
years, I know that you cannot control
immigration overall when there is free
movement to Britain from Europe.
Britain is an open and tolerant country. We
will always want immigration, especially
high-skilled immigration, we will always
want immigration from Europe, and we will
always welcome individual migrants as
friends. But the message from the public
before and during the referendum
campaign was clear: Brexit must mean
control of the number of people who come
to Britain from Europe. And that is what we
will deliver.
6. Rights for EU nationals in Britain,
and British nationals in the EU
Fairness demands that we deal with
another issue as soon as possible too. We
want to guarantee the rights of EU citizens
who are already living in Britain, and the
rights of British nationals in other member
states, as early as we can.
I have told other EU leaders that we could
give people the certainty they want
straight away, and reach such a deal now.
Many of them favour such an agreement
1 or 2 others do not but I want everyone
to know that it remains an important
priority for Britain and for many other
member states to resolve this challenge
as soon as possible. Because it is the right
and fair thing to do.
7. Protect workers rights
And a fairer Britain is a country that
protects and enhances the rights people
have at work.That is why, as we translate
the body of European law into our
domestic regulations, we will ensure that
workers rights are fully protected and
maintained.
Indeed, under my leadership, not only will
the government protect the rights of
workers set out in European legislation, we
will build on them. Because under this
government, we will make sure legal
protection for workers keeps pace with the
changing labour market and that the
voices of workers are heard by the boards
of publicly-listed companies for the first
time.
A Truly Global Britain
But the great prize for this country the
opportunity ahead is to use this moment
to build a truly Global Britain. A country
that reaches out to old friends and new
allies alike. A great, global, trading nation.
And one of the firmest advocates for free
trade anywhere in the world.
8. Free trade with European markets
That starts with our close friends and
neighbours in Europe. So as a priority, we
will pursue a bold and ambitious free trade
agreement with the European Union.
This agreement should allow for the freest
possible trade in goods and services
between Britain and the EUs member
states. It should give British companies the
maximum freedom to trade with and
operate within European markets and let
European businesses do the same in
Britain.
But I want to be clear. What I am proposing
cannot mean membership of the single
market.
European leaders have said many times
that membership means accepting the 4
freedoms of goods, capital, services and
people. And being out of the EU but a
member of the single market would mean
complying with the EUs rules and
regulations that implement those
freedoms, without having a vote on what
those rules and regulations are. It would
mean accepting a role for the European
Court of Justice that would see it still
having direct legal authority in our country.
It would to all intents and purposes mean
not leaving the EU at all.
And that is why both sides in the
referendum campaign made it clear that a
vote to leave the EU would be a vote to
leave the single market.
So we do not seek membership of the
single market. Instead we seek the
greatest possible access to it through a
new, comprehensive, bold and ambitious
free trade agreement.
That agreement may take in elements of
current single market arrangements in
certain areas on the export of cars and
lorries for example, or the freedom to
provide financial services across national
borders as it makes no sense to start
again from scratch when Britain and the
remaining Member States have adhered to
the same rules for so many years.
But I respect the position taken by
European leaders who have been clear
about their position, just as I am clear
about mine. So an important part of the
new strategic partnership we seek with the
EU will be the pursuit of the greatest
possible access to the single market, on a
fully reciprocal basis, through a
comprehensive free trade agreement.
And because we will no longer be
members of the single market, we will not
be required to contribute huge sums to the
EU budget. There may be some specific
European programmes in which we might
want to participate. If so, and this will be
for us to decide, it is reasonable that we
should make an appropriate contribution.
But the principle is clear: the days of
Britain making vast contributions to the
European Union every year will end.
9. New trade agreements with other
countries
But it is not just trade with the EU we
should be interested in. A Global Britain
must be free to strike trade agreements
with countries from outside the European
Union too.
Because important though our trade with
the EU is and will remain, it is clear that
the UK needs to increase significantly its
trade with the fastest growing export
markets in the world.
Since joining the EU, trade as a percentage
of GDP has broadly stagnated in the UK.
That is why it is time for Britain to get out
into the world and rediscover its role as a
great, global, trading nation.
This is such a priority for me that when I
became Prime Minister I established, for
the first time, a Department for
International Trade, led by Liam Fox.
We want to get out into the wider world, to
trade and do business all around the globe.
Countries including China, Brazil, and the
Gulf States have already expressed their
interest in striking trade deals with us. We
have started discussions on future trade
ties with countries like Australia, New
Zealand and India. And President-Elect
Trump has said Britain is not at the back
of the queue for a trade deal with the
United States, the worlds biggest
economy, but front of the line.
I know my emphasis on striking trade
agreements with countries outside Europe
has led to questions about whether Britain
seeks to remain a member of the EUs
Customs Union. And it is true that full
Customs Union membership prevents us
from negotiating our own comprehensive
trade deals.
Now, I want Britain to be able to negotiate
its own trade agreements. But I also want
tariff-free trade with Europe and cross-
border trade there to be as frictionless as
possible.
That means I do not want Britain to be part
of the Common Commercial Policy and I do
not want us to be bound by the Common
External Tariff. These are the elements of
the Customs Union that prevent us from
striking our own comprehensive trade
agreements with other countries. But I do
want us to have a customs agreement with
the EU.
Whether that means we must reach a
completely new customs agreement,
become an associate member of the
Customs Union in some way, or remain a
signatory to some elements of it, I hold no
preconceived position. I have an open
mind on how we do it. It is not the means
that matter, but the ends.
And those ends are clear: I want to remove
as many barriers to trade as possible. And I
want Britain to be free to establish our own
tariff schedules at the World Trade
Organisation, meaning we can reach new
trade agreements not just with the
European Union but with old friends and
new allies from outside Europe too.
10. The best place for science and
innovation
A Global Britain must also be a country
that looks to the future. That means being
one of the best places in the world for
science and innovation.
One of our great strengths as a nation is
the breadth and depth of our academic
and scientific communities, backed up by
some of the worlds best universities. And
we have a proud history of leading and
supporting cutting-edge research and
innovation.
So we will also welcome agreement to
continue to collaborate with our European
partners on major science, research, and
technology initiatives.
From space exploration to clean energy to
medical technologies, Britain will remain at
the forefront of collective endeavours to
better understand, and make better, the
world in which we live.
11. Co-operation in the fight against
crime and terrorism
And a Global Britain will continue to co-
operate with its European partners in
important areas such as crime, terrorism
and foreign affairs.
All of us in Europe face the challenge of
cross-border crime, a deadly terrorist
threat, and the dangers presented by
hostile states. All of us share interests and
values in common, values we want to see
projected around the world.
With the threats to our common security
becoming more serious, our response
cannot be to co-operate with one another
less, but to work together more. I therefore
want our future relationship with the
European Union to include practical
arrangements on matters of law
enforcement and the sharing of
intelligence material with our EU allies.
I am proud of the role Britain has played
and will continue to play in promoting
Europes security. Britain has led Europe on
the measures needed to keep our
continent secure whether it is
implementing sanctions against Russia
following its action in Crimea, working for
peace and stability in the Balkans, or
securing Europes external border. We will
continue to work closely with our European
allies in foreign and defence policy even as
we leave the EU itself.
A phased approach
12. A smooth, orderly Brexit
These are our objectives for the
negotiation ahead objectives that will
help to realise our ambition of shaping that
stronger, fairer, Global Britain that we want
to see.
They are the basis for a new, strong,
constructive partnership with the European
Union a partnership of friends and allies,
of interests and values. A partnership for a
strong EU and a strong UK.
But there is one further objective we are
setting. For as I have said before it is in
no ones interests for there to be a cliff-
edge for business or a threat to stability,
as we change from our existing
relationship to a new partnership with the
EU.
By this, I do not mean that we will seek
some form of unlimited transitional status,
in which we find ourselves stuck forever in
some kind of permanent political
purgatory. That would not be good for
Britain, but nor do I believe it would be
good for the EU.
Instead, I want us to have reached an
agreement about our future partnership by
the time the 2-year Article 50 process has
concluded. From that point onwards, we
believe a phased process of
implementation, in which both Britain and
the EU institutions and member states
prepare for the new arrangements that will
exist between us will be in our mutual self-
interest. This will give businesses enough
time to plan and prepare for those new
arrangements.
This might be about our immigration
controls, customs systems or the way in
which we co-operate on criminal justice
matters. Or it might be about the future
legal and regulatory framework for
financial services. For each issue, the time
we need to phase-in the new
arrangements may differ. Some might be
introduced very quickly, some might take
longer. And the interim arrangements we
rely upon are likely to be a matter of
negotiation.
But the purpose is clear: we will seek to
avoid a disruptive cliff-edge, and we will do
everything we can to phase in the new
arrangements we require as Britain and
the EU move towards our new partnership.
The right deal for Britain
So, these are the objectives we have set.
Certainty wherever possible. Control of our
own laws. Strengthening the United
Kingdom. Maintaining the Common Travel
Area with Ireland. Control of immigration.
Rights for EU nationals in Britain, and
British nationals in the EU. Enhancing
rights for workers. Free trade with
European markets. New trade agreements
with other countries. A leading role in
science and innovation. Co-operation on
crime, terrorism and foreign affairs. And a
phased approach, delivering a smooth and
orderly Brexit.
This is the framework of a deal that will
herald a new partnership between the UK
and the EU.
It is a comprehensive and carefully
considered plan that focuses on the ends,
not just the means with its eyes fixed
firmly on the future, and on the kind of
country we will be once we leave.
It reflects the hard work of many in this
room today who have worked tirelessly to
bring it together and to prepare this
country for the negotiation ahead.
And it will, I know, be debated and
discussed at length. That is only right. But
those who urge us to reveal more such as
the blow-by-blow details of our negotiating
strategy, the areas in which we might
compromise, the places where we think
there are potential trade-offs will not be
acting in the national interest.
Because this is not a game or a time for
opposition for oppositions sake. It is a
crucial and sensitive negotiation that will
define the interests and the success of our
country for many years to come. And it is
vital that we maintain our discipline.
That is why I have said before and will
continue to say that every stray word and
every hyped up media report is going to
make it harder for us to get the right deal
for Britain. Our opposite numbers in the
European Commission know it, which is
why they are keeping their discipline. And
the ministers in this government know it
too, which is why we will also maintain
ours.
So however frustrating some people find it,
the government will not be pressured into
saying more than I believe it is in our
national interest to say. Because it is not
my job to fill column inches with daily
updates, but to get the right deal for
Britain. And that is what I intend to do.
A new partnership
between Britain and
Europe
I am confident that a deal and a new
strategic partnership between the UK and
the EU can be achieved.
This is firstly because, having held
conversations with almost every leader
from every single EU member state;
having spent time talking to the senior
figures from the European institutions,
including President Tusk, President Juncker,
and President Schulz; and after my Cabinet
colleagues David Davis, Philip Hammond
and Boris Johnson have done the same
with their interlocutors, I am confident that
the vast majority want a positive
relationship between the UK and the EU
after Brexit.
And I am confident that the objectives I am
setting out today are consistent with the
needs of the EU and its member states.
That is why our objectives include a
proposed free trade agreement between
Britain and the European Union, and
explicitly rule out membership of the EUs
single market. Because when the EUs
leaders say they believe the 4 freedoms of
the single market are indivisible, we
respect that position. When the 27
member states say they want to continue
their journey inside the European Union,
we not only respect that fact but support
it.
Because we do not want to undermine the
single market, and we do not want to
undermine the European Union. We want
the EU to be a success and we want its
remaining member states to prosper. And
of course we want the same for Britain.
And the second reason I believe it is
possible to reach a good deal is that the
kind of agreement I have described today
is the economically rational thing that both
Britain and the EU should aim for. Because
trade is not a zero sum game: more of it
makes us all more prosperous. Free trade
between Britain and the European Union
means more trade, and more trade means
more jobs and more wealth creation. The
erection of new barriers to trade,
meanwhile, means the reverse: less trade,
fewer jobs, lower growth.
The third and final reason I believe we can
come to the right agreement is that co-
operation between Britain and the EU is
needed not just when it comes to trade but
when it comes to our security too.
Britain and France are Europes only 2
nuclear powers. We are the only 2
European countries with permanent seats
on the United Nations Security Council.
Britains armed forces are a crucial part of
Europes collective defence.
And our intelligence capabilities unique in
Europe have already saved countless
lives in very many terrorist plots that have
been thwarted in countries across our
continent. After Brexit, Britain wants to be
a good friend and neighbour in every way,
and that includes defending the safety and
security of all of our citizens.
So I believe the framework I have outlined
today is in Britains interests. It is in
Europes interests. And it is in the interests
of the wider world.
But I must be clear. Britain wants to remain
a good friend and neighbour to Europe. Yet
I know there are some voices calling for a
punitive deal that punishes Britain and
discourages other countries from taking
the same path.
That would be an act of calamitous self-
harm for the countries of Europe. And it
would not be the act of a friend. Britain
would not indeed we could not accept
such an approach. And while I am
confident that this scenario need never
arise while I am sure a positive
agreement can be reached I am equally
clear that no deal for Britain is better than
a bad deal for Britain.
Because we would still be able to trade
with Europe. We would be free to strike
trade deals across the world. And we would
have the freedom to set the competitive
tax rates and embrace the policies that
would attract the worlds best companies
and biggest investors to Britain. And if we
were excluded from accessing the single
market we would be free to change the
basis of Britains economic model.
But for the EU, it would mean new barriers
to trade with one of the biggest economies
in the world. It would jeopardise
investments in Britain by EU companies
worth more than half a trillion pounds. It
would mean a loss of access for European
firms to the financial services of the City of
London. It would risk exports from the EU
to Britain worth around 290 billion every
year. And it would disrupt the sophisticated
and integrated supply chains upon which
many EU companies rely.
Important sectors of the EU economy
would also suffer. We are a crucial
profitable export market for Europes
automotive industry, as well as sectors
including energy, food and drink,
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
agriculture. These sectors employ millions
of people around Europe. And I do not
believe that the EUs leaders will seriously
tell German exporters, French farmers,
Spanish fishermen, the young unemployed
of the Eurozone, and millions of others,
that they want to make them poorer, just
to punish Britain and make a political
point.
For all these reasons and because of our
shared values and the spirit of goodwill
that exists on both sides I am confident
that we will follow a better path. I am
confident that a positive agreement can be
reached. It is right that the government
should prepare for every eventuality but
to do so in the knowledge that a
constructive and optimistic approach to
the negotiations to come is in the best
interests of Europe and the best interests
of Britain.
Conclusion
We do not approach these negotiations
expecting failure, but anticipating success.
Because we are a great, global nation with
so much to offer Europe and so much to
offer the world.
One of the worlds largest and strongest
economies. With the finest intelligence
services, the bravest armed forces, the
most effective hard and soft power, and
friendships, partnerships and alliances in
every continent.
And another thing thats important. The
essential ingredient of our success. The
strength and support of 65 million people
willing us to make it happen.
Because after all the division and discord,
the country is coming together.
The referendum was divisive at times. And
those divisions have taken time to heal.
But one of the reasons that Britains
democracy has been such a success for so
many years is that the strength of our
identity as one nation, the respect we
show to one another as fellow citizens, and
the importance we attach to our
institutions means that when a vote has
been held we all respect the result. The
victors have the responsibility to act
magnanimously. The losers have the
responsibility to respect the legitimacy of
the outcome. And the country comes
together.
And that is what we are seeing today.
Business isnt calling to reverse the result,
but planning to make a success of it. The
House of Commons has voted
overwhelmingly for us to get on with it.
And the overwhelming majority of people
however they voted want us to get on
with it too.
So that is what we will do.
Not merely forming a new partnership with
Europe, but building a stronger, fairer,
more Global Britain too.
And let that be the legacy of our time. The
prize towards which we work. The
destination at which we arrive once the
negotiation is done.
And let us do it not for ourselves, but for
those who follow. For the countrys children
and grandchildren too.
So that when future generations look back
at this time, they will judge us not only by
the decision that we made, but by what we
made of that decision.
They will see that we shaped them a
brighter future.
They will know that we built them a better
Britain.
an 18, 2017
Prime Minister Theresa May set out the Plan for Britain,
including the 12 priorities that the government will use to
negotiate the UK's exit from the EU. Read the full speech:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeche...
Plan For Britain: Prime Minister's speech
on Brexit negotiating objectives
Jan 18, 2017
Prime Minister Theresa May set out the Plan for Britain,
including the 12 priorities that the government will use to
negotiate the UK's exit from the EU. Read the full speech:
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeche...
www.gov.uk/number10
www.twitter.com/Number10gov
www.facebook.com/10DowningStreet

https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rOkH7LCFCwA

UK Immigration Application for a document

certifying permanent residence or
permanent residence card under the EEA
Regulations This form is to be used for
applications made on or after 18 March
2016

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sy
stem/uploads/attachment_data/file/505032
/EEA_PR__03-16.pdf

EU & EEA NATIONALS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.

EEA RESIDENCE PERMIT. EEA RESIDENCE DOCUMENT

The European Economic Area (EEA) is made up of member

states of the European Union and European Free Trade Area.
Citizens of countries in the EEA can move freely between the
member states and live where they choose. EEA Nationals have
the right to take a job, seek employment, or set up a business
in any EEA country.

At the moment the EEA Member States are: Austria, Belgium,

Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania,Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom

If you are an EEA national from the above-listed countries, you

can generally enter the UK to study, work, establish a business
or reside in the UK as a self-sufficient EU national.

There is free movement of people, goods and services within

the area. So long as nationals of the countries are exercising
their freedoms under these the various treaties, they are not
strictly subject to United Kingdom immigration control, and
may work or set up in business without restriction.

These rights extend also to members of the households of EEA

nationals accompanying them to the United Kingdom.
Although it is not mandatory, EEA nationals may wish to apply
for residence permits in the United Kingdom as this enables
them to apply for indefinite leave to remain after five years of
continuous residence and subsequently naturalization.

Household members who are not EEA nationals themselves

should obtain EEA family permits before travelling to the
United Kingdom if they are travelling in this capacity.

Residence permits and documents may be obtained in the

United Kingdom but there are considerable delays in these
being issued due to the numbers involved and there being
widespread abuse of EEA law to circumvent United Kingdom
immigration controls.

Nationals and their immediate family members from European

Economic Area (EEA) countries can enter and work in the
United Kingdom without any restrictions, just like British
Citizens.

Rights of EU/EEA nationals and their family members

Nationals and their immediate family members from European

Economic Area (EEA) countries can enter and work in the
United Kingdom without any restrictions, just like British
Citizens.

In other words, Swiss nationals and EEA nationals have a right

to live and work in the United Kingdom. This is called a right of
residence.

EEA Nationals are allowed to bring their family members to any

EEA country. Family members can apply for a family permit that
proves they have the right to live in the UK. If a non-EEA family
member is accompanying the EEA member they must have an
 EEA Family Permit. In the UK non-EEA family members can
apply for a Residence Document that proves their right to live
with their family in the UK. We can advise on the correct
documentation needed for your situation.

An EEA national can apply for permission to live indefinitely in

the UK if they have been economically active in the UK in the
above-mentioned categories for at least five years.

In order to enter the UK, you will have to show your passport or
national identity card. When you arrive at major ports and
airports, you should use the separate channel marked 'EEA/EU'
where it is available. Immigration officers will check your
passport or national identity card to make sure that it is valid
and belongs to you.

As an EU/EEA national you can:

accept offers of work
work (whether as an employee, in self-employment or in
business)
set up a business
manage a company
set up a local branch of a company
study
reside in the UK as a self-sufficient person
Residence Certificate (formerly called Residence Permit)

A residence certificate simply confirms that you have a right to

live in the United Kingdom under European Community law.
You may optionally need to apply for a residence certificate if
your family members want to apply for a residence document.

A residence permit is nowadays valid indefinitely. If you work in

the UK continuously for 5 years, you may be entitled to
Settlement in the UK, that is to remain in the UK indefinitely.
 You will probably not be given a residence certificate if:
you are in the United Kingdom for a short visit
you are looking for work
you will work and live in the United Kingdom for less than three
months
you do not work in the United Kingdom and cannot support
yourself without help from public funds
The above options are not exhaustive as we treat every client's
case individually. Please do not hesitate to book a phone, Skype
or office consultation with us for a professional immigration
advice and possible further representation before the UK
Border Agency or the First Tier or Upper Tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (FTT/UTT IAC).
https://legalcentre.org/Post-Brexit-Immigration.html

We offer same day/instant Skype or phone consultations.

You can book your initial Skype or phone consultation with us

via the following link: Legal Centre Skype or Phone
Consultations

https://legalcentre.org/EU-and-EEA-
Nationals-and-Family-Members.html

Brexit
ISDA Brexit Briefings
On June 29, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association held a
webinar to discuss the potential implications of the UKs vote to leave
the European Union on the derivatives markets and broader financial
industry. A recording of the call and the presentation, featuring ISDA
executives and partners from law firm Linklaters, is available here.
On September 13, ISDA held a second webinar entitled Brexit:
Governing Law, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Clauses under the ISDA
MA. A recording of the call and materials from Linklaters are available
to members here.

ISDA Brexit FAQs December 2016

A long read version of these FAQs is available for ISDA members
HERE.
These FAQs address the possible UK position post-Brexit, i.e. after
conclusion of the exit process under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
There is still considerable uncertainty as to the format of the UKs
relationship with the European Union after conclusion of the exit
negotiations. Consequently, the responses to these FAQs involve an
assessment of the various outcomes of the exit negotiations and the
consequences of those outcomes and it is not possible in all cases to
give a definitive answer.
Market participants should take independent legal advice on the points
addressed in these FAQs December 2016.
Disclaimer: This page does not contain legal advice and merely is
intended as an information resource to assist market participants in
assessing the impact of the Brexit referendum and in planning for the
exit of the UK from the European Union (EU) following the referendum
of June 23, 2016 (Brexit referendum) and prior to the official notification
pursuant to Art.50 Lisbon Treaty. ISDA is organising a series of member
calls and meetings to discuss specific issues.
Contact: isdalegal@isda.org
Contractual points under ISDA documentation
1. Could Brexit constitute a Force Majeure, Impossibility or an Illegality
Termination Event under the ISDA Master Agreement?
A Force Majeure Termination Event requires a practical impediment to
payment/delivery which seems unlikely to occur, even if the UK does
not retain its passporting rights for investment services. An Illegality
Termination Event is a theoretical possibility if Brexit results in a total
loss of access for UK financial services firms to EU financial markets
and the consequence of this is for performance of a Transaction to
become illegal in the relevant EU member state. Such an outcome is
unlikely in respect of the performance of pre-existing contractual
obligations, but will depend on local law in the jurisdiction of
performance.

2. Could Brexit constitute a Tax Event Termination Event under the

ISDA Master Agreement?
The occurrence of a Tax Event depends on whether any withholding tax
is introduced which would affect the underlying Transactions, either as a
result of the change in domestic law in the UK or because an existing
exemption under certain EU laws ceases to apply to UK entities. The
occurrence of a Tax Event in these circumstances will depend on the
change in law or application of the exemption in question, which in turn
will depend on the outcome of the exit negotiations, and whether
withholding tax would affect payments made on the underlying
Transactions.

3. Could there be a breach of the representation under Section 3(a)(iii)

(No violation or Conflict) or Section 3(a)(iv) (Consents) as a
consequence of Brexit?
A breach of the no conflict with applicable law representation is unlikely
to arise as, assuming that this representation is true and accurate when
given and repeated pre-Brexit (including on entering into each new
Transaction), then existing Transactions will not cause a
Misrepresentation Event of Default simply by virtue of such
representations becoming untrue at a subsequent date as a result of
Brexit (if, for example, in the absence of passporting rights for UK
financial services firms, performance of a Transaction conflicts with local
law due to local authorisation requirement as to which, please refer to
the answer to Question 1 (Force majeure, Impossibility or Illegality
Termination Event)). The same is true of the representation on
consents in Section 3(a)(iv). Caution should be exercised in respect of
any novation or amendment of an existing Transaction to the extent this
is actually the entry into a new Transaction, at which point these
representations will be deemed to be repeated.

4. Could there be a Breach of Agreement under Section 5(a)(ii) in

respect of the obligations in Section 4(b) (Maintain authorisations) or
Section 4(c) (Comply with Laws) of the ISDA Master Agreement as a
consequence of Brexit?
It is unlikely that there would be a Breach of Agreement as a result of a
failure to maintain authorisations pursuant to Section 4(b) or a failure to
comply with law pursuant to Section 4(c) in the event of a loss of access
for UK financial services firms to the EU financial markets. This is
because the performance of pre-existing contractual obligations in
relation to Transactions ought not to be subject to local authorisation
requirements, although this will depend on local law in the jurisdiction of
performance. However, even if, post-Brexit, there were an obligation on
one party to seek authorisation locally in order to perform the
Transaction, the Illegality Termination Event would probably be available
to the party that had lost its passporting rights, which would, in
accordance with the hierarchy provisions in Section 5(c), prevail over
any possible Breach of Agreement Event of Default.

5. Could Brexit trigger an event of default or termination event under the

ISDA/FIA Client Cleared OTC Derivatives Addendum?
(i) In addition to the Events of Default/Termination Events under the
ISDA Master Agreement (which apply only to the Client under the
ISDA/FIA Client Cleared OTC Derivatives Addendum) covered in the
preceding Questions, it is theoretically possible that a Cleared
Transaction Illegality/Impossibility event (if specified as being
applicable) could be triggered by loss of the ability for UK financial
services firms to provide investment services cross-border into the EU.
However, this eventuality seems improbable for the same reasons as
outlined for an Illegality Termination Event under the ISDA Master
Agreement.
(ii) A CM Trigger Event could occur if any loss of passporting rights
causes the party which is the Clearing Member to be in default under
the rules of an EU CCP and that EU CCP formally declares such
Clearing Member to be in default of its rules, triggering its default
management process (or such process is triggered automatically as a
result of such a loss of passporting rights by the Clearing Member).
(iii) A CCP Default could occur if a UK CCP loses its rights to offer
clearing services pursuant to EMIR, is not granted recognition pursuant
to the third country provisions of EMIR (as to which see Question 19
(Clearing pursuant to EMIR by a UK CCP)) and the rules of that CCP
entitle Clearing Members to terminate their transactions with that CCP
(or such termination takes place automatically) as a result.

6. Could Brexit trigger any other provisions in the ISDA Master

Agreement/Credit Support Documents?
Market movements could trigger increased margin calls or trigger
provisions linked to ratings.

7. Does Brexit impact any of the provisions of the ISDA Definitions

booklets?
The eventual market impact may result in additional Credit Events
pursuant to the 2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions. Adverse
consequences for the financial markets may also result in the
occurrence of one or more of the Additional Disruption Events pursuant
to the 2002/2011 Equity Derivatives Definitions.

8. Should parties consider including any additional termination rights

based on Brexit?
(i) If, post-Brexit, parties are unable to perform cross-border
Transactions, they will probably be able to rely on the Illegality
Termination Event. To remove any uncertainty as to whether the law of
the place of performance constitutes an applicable law for such
purposes, parties to a 1992 ISDA Master Agreement may consider
including an Additional Termination Event covering this eventuality.
(ii) Parties may also wish to consider additional termination rights to
address the inability to clear derivative Transactions through EU CCPs
(in the case of UK entities) or UK CCPs (in the case of EU entities) or
the inability to report Transactions to UK/EU trade repositories (please
see Question 19 (EMIR clearing/reporting by UK CCPs/trade
repositories) and Question 20 (EMIR clearing/reporting by EU
CCPs/trade repositories)).

Choice of law, jurisdiction and recognition of judgments

9. What is the impact of Brexit on the parties choice of English law as
the governing law of the ISDA Master Agreement?
9.1 Will the Rome I and Rome II Regulations still apply post-Brexit?
(i) If proceedings are brought before an EU court: The Rome I[1] and
Rome II[2] Regulations continue to apply in the EU and so English law
clauses specifying the governing law of the contractual and non-
contractual obligations will continue to be recognised by EU courts, as
is currently the case. This is irrespective of the domicile of the parties.
(ii) If proceedings are brought before a UK court: The Rome I and Rome
II Regulations will no longer apply in the UK. In respect of a choice of
English law to govern contractual obligations, English common law will
apply and there is unlikely to be any change in approach from the status
quo. In respect of non-contractual obligations, the rules set out in Part III
of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 will
be applied by the English courts in determining the proper governing
law of non-contractual obligations. An express choice of English law to
govern non-contractual obligations is likely to be influential, but not
determinative, in this assessment.
9.2 Can the UK enact legislation replicating Rome I and Rome II
entirely so as to maintain the status quo?
The UK could enact the rules set out in Rome I and Rome II rules into
domestic legislation. There is some indication from the government that
this could be done as part of the adoption of rights acquis announced
by the Prime Minister at the Conservative Party Conference on 2
October 2016. The re-enactment would replicate the existing rules but
without the European Court of Justice (CJEU) having jurisdiction to
determine disputes about the new domestic legislation. However, the
legislation could require the CJEUs decisions to be taken into account.
9.3 Is it advisable for parties to continue to amend the governing law
clause of the ISDA Master Agreement to include an express choice of
law for non-contractual obligations?
There is no reason not to continue including a choice of law for non-
contractual obligations. This choice will be recognised by the EU courts
and is likely to be taken into account in the UK post-Brexit.
9.4 Is it advisable to change the governing law of the ISDA Master
Agreement to (i) New York law or (ii) the law of an EU member state?
Selecting New York law as the governing law (which would mean,
unless agreed otherwise, a choice of court in favour of New York courts)
is a possibility but there would be no real advantages in terms of the
recognition of judgments of the US courts by either the EU or the
English courts. It is not advisable to change to any other governing law
without legal advice as the ISDA Master Agreement has been drafted to
operate under the legal regimes of New York and English law. Any such
change from English law or New York law to a third country governing
law would also necessitate further consideration of the jurisdiction
clause, the application of ISDA commissioned netting and collateral
opinions and the requirement of any contractual recognition provisions
relating to bank resolution (see Question 24 (Additional provisions for
inclusion in the ISDA Master Agreement).

10. Will the jurisdiction clause of the ISDA Master Agreement still confer
jurisdiction on the English courts where the parties to the ISDA Master
Agreement are established in the EU?
Currently, EU courts are bound to respect jurisdiction clauses in favour
of another EU court on the basis of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.
Post-Brexit, this Regulation will no longer apply to the UK. Before the
English courts, the English law ISDA jurisdiction clause is likely to be
respected on the basis of English common law rules. In EU courts, the
UK will be a third country so recognition of an English exclusive
jurisdiction clause will depend on the national position and it is not
certain that an EU court would be obliged to decline jurisdiction in
favour of the English courts or, in respect of a non-exclusive jurisdiction
clause, to stay proceedings on the basis that the English courts are first
seised.

11. What is the impact of Brexit on arbitration clauses in an ISDA

Master Agreement which select England as the seat of arbitration?
None.
11.1 Where parties currently have an English governing law and
jurisdiction clause in their ISDA Master Agreement, is there merit in
inserting an English arbitration clause into the ISDA Master Agreement?
Possibly, for MiFID II equivalence.

12. What are the consequences of Brexit for the recognition and
enforcement of judgments where:
Please see materials for the September special webinar on the effect of
Brexit on the English choice of law and dispute forum clauses posted
HERE.

13. Are there any other factors which will determine the choice of
law/jurisdiction clause in an ISDA Master Agreement post-Brexit?
(i) There may be circumstances in which the recognition of third country
jurisdiction clauses by courts of a particular jurisdiction and/or
enforcement of judgments in such jurisdiction may lead the parties to
consider whether an alternative governing law/jurisdiction clause is
suitable. In this case, a careful analysis of the enforcement of netting,
and collateral, as well as how claims would be considered under a
different system of law would need to be undertaken.
(ii) Post-Brexit, UK entities relying on the MiFID II[3] equivalence regime
to conduct MiFID II business in the EU may have to offer clients the
ability to submit disputes to the jurisdiction or arbitral tribunal in an EU
member state.

14. What amendments can parties make to Section 13 (Governing Law

and Jurisdiction) to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding recognition of
English choice of law/jurisdiction clauses?
Parties may consider removing uncertainty as to the treatment of
Section 13(b) post-Brexit themselves by making any of the following
changes:
(i) inserting a fully exclusive jurisdiction clause without the current
references to the European legislation to avoid any question of whether
the clause elects for exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction in the EU;
(ii) inserting a fully non-exclusive jurisdiction clause which would also
remove any uncertainty as to exclusivity/non-exclusivity in the EU and
gives parties the maximum range of options to bring proceedings
against their counterparty where it has assets;
(iii) inserting an asymmetrical clause which provides for exclusivity for
proceedings commenced by one party but non-exclusivity for the other
party; or
(iv) inserting an arbitration clause which would be unaffected by the
UKs withdrawal from the EU.

Insolvency
15. How will English insolvency proceedings in respect of a UK entity
be recognised in the EU post-Brexit?
(i) The EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, the Credit Institution
Windingup Directive and the Insurance Company Winding-up Directive
will no longer cover the UK and the provisions in those instruments on
the recognition of English insolvency proceedings by an EU court would
no longer apply. Recognition of certain English insolvency proceedings
in the EU would consequently become more complicated.
(ii) In respect of recognition of EU insolvency proceedings by the UK
courts, in the absence continuity legislation retaining the provisions of
the above instruments, recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings
would fall back to the common law position.
(iii) The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (which adopt the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency) will apply in the UK
and provide for recognition of certain insolvency proceedings between
signatory states. However, only four of these are EU member states and
so it is of limited application within the EU.
Access to the EU financial markets
16. What is the impact of Brexit on the ability of financial services firms
established in the UK to enter into OTC derivatives with counterparties
established in the EU?
(i) Passporting rights: When the UK leaves the EU, the EU financial
services directives will no longer grant passporting rights to UK
investment firms and credit institutions or UK branches. UK
firms/branches wishing to enter into OTC derivatives with counterparties
in the EU would then be subject to the regulations in such EU member
state, many of which do not allow third country firms without a passport
to enter into derivatives with locally resident counterparties except on a
wholly unsolicited basis, or on the basis of narrowly defined local law
exemptions.
(ii) MiFID II/MiFIR: The UK may request an equivalence decision
pursuant to MiFID II[4]/MiFIR[5], which would allow UK firms to provide
investment services to eligible counterparties and professional clients in
the EU. The UK regime should, objectively, be equivalent for the
pursues of such an equivalence decision but in practice there is no
guarantee that one will be granted and there is still potential gap risk
due to the lengthy time period involved in making an equivalence
decision. However, not all of MiFID II is covered by the equivalence
regime, for example, dealings with retail clients and elective
professional clients are limited.
(iii) CRD IV[6]: CRD IV contains no provisions for third country
equivalence. In the absence of an agreement between the UK and the
EU to extend the CRD IV passport for banking services to the UK, a UK
credit institution would either have to provide services on a wholly
unsolicited basis, or on the basis of narrowly defined local law
exemptions, or would need to establish a subsidiary and obtain
authorisation in an EU member state to provide those services.
16.1 Will EU firms without a UK branch still be able to able to carry out
derivatives business in the UK?
The UK has a wide overseas persons exemption and it is possible that
OTC derivatives business could be conducted by EU firms with UK
counterparties on that basis.
16.2 Will EU firms still be able to carry out derivatives business through
a UK branch post-Brexit?
EU firms that carry on investment business from their UK branches will
likely need to re-apply for authorisation in the UK if the EU passport is
withdrawn.

EMIR
17. Will UK OTC derivatives counterparties still be required to comply
with the clearing, reporting and risk-mitigation requirements under
EMIR?
No, although it is likely that the UK will enact either continuity legislation
or similar rules.

18. What are the consequences of Brexit on the phase-in of the margin
rules under EMIR?
The EU margin rules derive from BCBS-IOSCO and so even in the
absence of continuity legislation post-Brexit, the UK is likely to
implement equivalent provisions, as has the US, Canada and
Switzerland, for example.

19. Will EU entities be able to satisfy the EMIR clearing obligation by

using a UK CCP or the EMIR reporting obligation using a UK trade
repository?
This depends on the negotiated position and any equivalence decision
granted to the UK under EMIR. Should an equivalence decision be
made, a UK CPP or UK trade repository would be able to apply to
ESMA for recognition under EMIR, which, if granted, would allow EU
counterparties to continue clearing and reporting through UK CCPs and
trade repositories.

20. Will UK entities be able to satisfy any applicable UK clearing

obligation by using an EU based CCP or the EMIR reporting obligation
using an EU based trade repository?
Recognition of EU CCPs and trade repositories by the UK will depend
on the rules on third country equivalence implemented by the UK, the
outcome of the exit negotiations and, potentially, any reciprocal
recognition of UK CCPs/trade repositories by the EU.

21. Are there any other issues in respect of the clearing obligation that
members should consider?
Members of one or more CCPs should review the rules of each of those
CCPs to determine whether Brexit is likely to result in them being in
breach of those rules.

22. Will compliance with UK clearing rules similar to those in EMIR be

sufficient as substituted compliance for Dodd-Frank clearing
obligations?
It would depend on the location of the CCP through which a party clears
its trade. If the CCP is located in the UK, there would need to be an
application to the U.S. to have determined that trades clearing through a
UK-based CCP would be deemed compliant with the Dodd-Frank
clearing obligations. Clearing through an EU-based CCP would
continue to be deemed compliant with the Dodd-Frank clearing
obligations.

Collateral
23. Are there any consequences of Brexit for parties which have
entered into the English law ISDA Credit Support Documents for
collateral arrangements which are currently financial collateral
arrangements under the Financial Collateral Directive?
The Financial Collateral Directive has been implemented in the UK
through the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations
(FCAR). Given the importance of the protections provided to
collateral-takers by the FCAR, and the risk of invalidity of certain
unregistered security interests in the absence of the FCAR, it is likely
that these regulations will be retained by continuity legislation.

Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive

24. Post-Brexit, what additional provisions will counterparties need to
include in their ISDA Master Agreements to address requirements
under the BRRD when facing an EU counterparty?
EEA credit institutions will need to include contractual recognition of
bail-in for the purposes of Article 55 of the EU Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) into English law governed ISDA Master
Agreements.

25. Are there any additional provisions which UK entities will need to
include in their ISDA Master Agreements when facing an EU
counterparty to address requirements under the UK bank recovery and
resolution regime (pursuant to the Banking Act 2009)?
The UK bank recovery and resolution rules currently include
requirements for contractual recognition of stays for non-EEA entities.
Post-Brexit, this rule may need to be extended to EEA entities. In the
absence of legislation effecting these changes, however, such
additional provisions will not be mandatory under English law (other
than the existing requirement for contractual recognition of stays for
non-EEA entities).

26. Is there any impact on the ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol,
ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol, the ISDA Resolution
Stay Jurisdictional Modular Protocol (the Stay Protocols) or the ISDA
2016 Bail-in Article 55 BRRD Protocol (Dutch, French, German, Irish,
Italian, Luxembourg, Spanish, UK entity version) (the Bail-in
Protocol)?
No, there is no current impact on those protocols.

Amendments to the ISDA Master Agreement

What amendments, if any, should market participants consider making
to their ISDA Master Agreement?
None immediately. However, there are amendments which parties may
consider making depending on the likely outcome of the exit
negotiations. Please see the answers to Question 8 (inclusion of
additional termination rights), Question 9.3 (choice of law for non-
contractual obligations), Question 9.4 (merits of amending the
governing law), Question 11.1 (insertion of arbitration clauses),
Question 13 (consideration of the jurisdiction clause), Question 14
(amendments to the jurisdiction clause), Questions 24 and 25 (BRRD
amendments).

[1] Regulation 593/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the

Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations
(Rome I).
[2] Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations (Rome II).
[3] The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Directive
2014/65/EU
[4] The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Directive
2014/65/EU.
[5] The Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation EU Regulation
600/2014
[6] The Capital Requirements Directive IV Directive 2013/36/EU.

http://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/legal-and-documentation/uk-
brexit/#_ftnref2

Rome II Regulation Applicable in

EU
by GIORGIO BUONO on JANUARY 11, 2009
Starting from today, 11 January 2009, Regulation
no. 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-
contractual obligations (Rome II) is applicable in
the Member States (see its Art. 32), excepting
Denmark.
In the comments to one of our previous posts, some
debate was raised as to the proper construction of
Art. 31 (Application in time) of the Regulation,
according to which the new regime applies to events
giving rise to damage which occur after its entry into
force. A very large majority of scholars (almost all the
published articles) takes the view that, for the purposes of
Art. 31, the date of entry into force coincides with the date
of application of the Regulation, so that it would be
applicable to events giving rise to damage occurring on or
after 11 January 2009.
Other elements, taken from the legislative process (see the
comments to the abovementioned post), would suggest the
opposite view that, following the ordinary rules set by Art.
254(1) of the EC Treaty, the Regulation entered into force
on 20 August 2007, thus applying to events occurred on or
after this previous date. The latter interpretation is shared
by the SCADplus (summary of EU legislation) webpage on
Rome II, which holds no official value, and is referred to
by Prof. Hartley in his article on the Rome II Reg.
(Choice of Law for Non-Contractual Liability: Selected
Problems Under the Rome II Regulation, in ICLQ (2008),
p. 899 ff., at footnote 2 on p. 899, quoting Prof. Morse in
Dicey and Morris).
Two others points are worth mentioning, as regards the
final provisions of Rome II:
1. according to Art. 29(2), the Commission is expected to
publish in the OJ the list of existing international
conventions to which one or more Member States are
parties at the time when this Regulation is adopted and
which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to non-
contractual obligations (mainly, the 1971 Hague
Convention on Traffic Accidents and the 1973 Hague
Convention on Products Liability): the deadline for
Member States to notify of such conventions was set to 11
July 2008. To my knowledge, the list has not yet been
published;
2. according to the review clause in Art. 30(2), not later
than 31 December 2008 the Commission was expected
to present a study on the situation in the field of the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations
arising out of violations of privacy and rights
relating to personality, taking into account rules
relating to freedom of the press and freedom of expression
in the media, and conflict-of-law issues related to Directive
95/46/EC []. Neither this study has been released, as
yet, as far as I know.
Readers are encouraged to report on first cases of
application of the new Regulation before national courts.

Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law

Applicable to Products Liability Entry into
force- 1-X-1977
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e102a194-
59b8-4d75-9c6f-d2bbfb81e4ff.pdf

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April

2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for
the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution
of terrorist offences and serious crime

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32016L0681&from=EN
The Rome II Proposal on the Law Applicable to Non-
Contractual Obligations ... Rome II Proposal1 On 22 July
2003 the ... the European Parliament and the Council
http://www.simons-
law.com/library/pdf/e/518.pdf

European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July

2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations (Rome II
http://www.tedioli.com/regulation_ec_864_
2007.pdf

WORKING DOCUMENT - European Parliament

non-contractual obligations (Rome II) ... European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic ...
Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to no
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri
/dv/836/836983/836983_en.pdf
European Communities No. 13 (2007) The Treaty of Lisbon
amending the Treaty Establishing the European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community,
http://www.eutruth.org.uk/lisbontreaty.pdf

UK CONSOLIDATED TEXTS OF THE EU TREATIES AS AMENDED BY

THE TREATY OF LISBON
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmen
t_data/file/228848/7310.pdf

Ministerfilescomplaintagainstcancellation
ofRathverdict
/#contentheader

TK | 3 FEBRUARY 2017
Prague,Feb2(CTK)CzechJusticeMinisterRobertPelikan
(ANO)hasfiledacomplaintagainstthecourtdecisiontocancel
theverdictinthecaseofformerinfluentialpoliticianDavid
Raththatfoundhimguiltyofcorruptionandsenttoprison,
JusticeMinistryspokeswomanTerezaSchejbalovatoldCTKon
Thursday.
TheSupremeCourt(NS)willassessthecomplaint.
TheRegionalCourtsentencedRath,formerSocialDemocrat
(CSSD)lawmaker(20062012),CentralBohemiagovernor
(20082012)andhealthminister(20052006),to8.5yearsin
prisonandtheforfeitureofsome20millioncrownsfor
corruptioninJuly2015.
ThePragueHighCourtcancelledtheverdictinthecaseofRath
andothertenpeopleduetotheunlawfuluseofwiretappingslast
autumn.ItreturnedthecasetotheRegionalCourtthatcannot
usethewiretappingrecordingsasevidenceinnewproceedings.
PelikanarguesinhiscomplaintthattheHighCourthadno
reasonforreturningthecaseforreappraisal.
Stateattorneysdonotagreewiththereasonsforcancellingthe
verdicteither.
Rathwasfoundguiltyofbriberylinkedtothemanipulated
ordersworth16millioncrowns.Theverdictwasbasedon
policewiretappingsandaconfessionbybusinesswomanIvana
Salacovawhowasalsochargedinthecase.
ThetrialofRathlastedtwoyearsandhedeliveredhisfinal
speechforthreedays.Rathpleadednotguiltyandappealedthe
verdict.
Copyright 2015 by the Czech News Agency (TK). All rights reserved.
Copying, dissemination or other publication of this article or parts thereof without the prior
written consent of TK is expressly forbidden. The Prague Daily Monitor is not
responsible for its content.
http://praguemonitor.com/2017/02/03/justice-minister-
files-complaint-against-cancellation-verdict-rath-case

REPEATEDEUROPEANREFERENDA:FROMMAASTRICHTTOLISBON

http://www.su.lt/bylos/mokslo_leidiniai/jmd/10_01_26_pried
as/jurgelionyte.pdf

REPEATED EUROPEAN REFERENDA: FROM MAASTRICHT TO ...

related to the European Union ...
documents/epern_no_16_ireland_08.pdf 12 Post Lisbon
Treaty Referendum,
Irelands Illegal REPEATED EUROPEAN REFERENDA: FROM
MAASTRICHT TO LISBON
Aurin Jurgelionyt
VDU PMDF Gedimino g. 44, LT-44240 Kaunas
Tel. +370 68610369, e-mail: a.jurgelionyte@pmdf.vdu.lt
The repeated referenda related to the European Union (EU)
deepening (on Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993 in Denmark, Nice
Treaty in 2001 and 2002 and Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and 2009) and
the recurrent success reasons, likely (presumptive) patterns is the
field neglected in respect of analysis.
Therefore the analysis will investigate the development of
argumentation and situation from the point of view of reasoned
choice. More profound investigation is prompted by observed
upsurge of criticism before the first referenda and emerging
opportunity to convince the voters in the second referenda when the
same voters are made again, and do not resist, to express their will
on the same issues. Usually the referenda is an instrument of to
solve issues by crossing the confrontation frontlines among political
parties. However, the EU issue is not the subject of dispute arising
between traditional parties it is rather a watershed among
parliamentary and non- parliamentary parties. Consequently, the
key role in the euro-referenda related to the integration deepening
is not with the parties (their position will be necessarily referred to
in some aspects) but with the government as a fundamental
authority in a country. For this reason the position and policy of the
latter will be the main focus in the subject of the analysis.
Key words: European Union, referenda, campaigns Introduction
The period between the Treaty of Maastricht that marked the birth of
the European Union until present is loaded with dynamic
developments, therefore citizens of the Member States were on
more than one occasion invited to take important decisions on
further destiny of the entire Union, and, at the same time, on
deepening the integration. There have been cases of outstanding
success (e.g., the Treaty of Amsterdam), and resounding failures
(the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe). The present
paper shall explore three critical cases, i.e., repeated referenda in
Denmark and Ireland following which the Treaties of Maastricht, Nice
and Amsterdam came into effect, even though only at the second
attempt
The Constitution of Denmark (Article 20) allows the signature of
international treaties subject to the approval of 5/6 of the members
of the Folketing or to the simple majority obtained by way of
referendum. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) did not obtain the
approval of the required parliamentary majority, therefore the
referendum was called for. Despite the achievement of the required
majority immediately before the second referendum, the
referendum was nevertheless held1, and the Treaty was finally
ratified only after the public approval. Incidentally, no referenda
were called in Denmark in relation to the ratification of the Treaties
of Nice and Lisbon.
Ireland is the only Member State of the EU that, according to its
Constitution, was obliged to call the referendum concerning this
Treaty. The citizens of Ireland are obliged to vote concerning
amendments of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland: this is
the only way, pursuant to Articles 29, 46 and 47 of the Constitution
of Ireland, to enforce the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland. After the
judgements of the Supreme Court were incorporated as part of the
constitutional doctrine, the granting of any new powers to the EU
institutions must be each time treated as an amendment to the Irish
Constitution2. On that basis the Irish in their first voting in 2001
rejected the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty of Lisbon later in June
2008 which for the time being slowed down the overall ratification
process. It was renewed only after the negotiations and repeated
referenda.
Thus in all these cases the Government proposed its citizens to vote
for the second time on the same issue. Therefore the principal
object of the present analysis is repeated referenda. The objective of
the analysis is to identify the reasons causing the different results of
the first and repeated referenda. For this purpose the present paper
will attempt to assess the impact of the evolution of argumentation,
when the new persuasion methods emerged following further
negotiations or as a result of conditions completely independent
from those, as well as the potential influence of the governments.
Based on the rational choice access the States and their
governments could have taken advantage of the failures at the
referenda to attain their own objectives.
1 Closa C. Why convene referendums? Explaining choices in EU
constitutional politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 14:8
December 2007: 13111332
2 Collins A. M., OReilly J. The Aplication of Community Law in Ireland
1973-1979. Common Market Law Review. 1990, No 27, p. 318-319
77
Although during the entire existence of the EU tens of referenda
have been convened, the issue of repeated referenda has been only
scantily investigated. Different authors (T. Worre3, C. Closa4, J.
OBrennan5, M. Franklin in his discussions with P. Svensson6, and
partly Schuck et al7 and others) in most cases dwell only upon one
country (Denmark or Ireland) and its issues.
First referenda: rational for and against
Almost two decades ago when the Danish at their referendum for
the first time dissaproved of the Treaty of Maastricht that proposed
the creation of the Economic and Monetary union in the future,
protection of the rights of EU citizens and a closer cooperation in the
areas of justice and internal affairs, it was then that they were loudly
referred to as eurocpetics8. The arguments at that time most often
referred to by the supporters of the Treaty were economic
advantages offered by the Treaty and the principle of subsidiarity.
The opponents arguments, however, were emotionally much
heavier. They claimed that the Treaty of Maastricht created threat to
the sovereignty of Denmark, its national identity and cultural
traditions. An what I smoreMoreover, also the threat to openess and
democracy.9
In principe, the Treaty of Nice is one of the most important
instruments for further development of the European Union. It was
anticipated in advance that any failure to ratify the Treaty will
prevent (at least temporatily) any further enlargement of the EU.
This was the question related to the elargement of the European
Union. Then all major political parties, most trade organisations and
different unassociated groups pronounced "yes" to the ratification of
the Treaty of Nice. Their main argument was that the Treaty is a
path to the enlargement of the EU and that such enlargement will
be beneficial to Ireland. Furthermore, the enlargement, in its own
turn, is an expression of solidarity with the Central and Eastern
Europe. On the other part, the first rejection of the Treaty of Nice
and the arguments of the small non-governmental parties were
related to the neutrality of Ireland itself and its military position, and
the growing resentment against lack of democracy in the EU.
Another item specifically identified and subjected to strict criticism
were the foreign, security and defence capacities of the EU with a
view to achieving the perception of their negative impacts upon the
Irelands neutrality.10
The Treaty of Lisbon is a compromise attempt after the failure of the
Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe. Efforts were devoted to
eliminate any obstacles not only in terms of its contents, but also as
to its ratification. Thus it was only Ireland that has to ratify the
Treaty by way of referendum and rejected it having called it
second-order.11 First, the YES campaign was assessed by
numerous experts as scanty and uninventive. The main arguments
on supporters part were delcaration of the feeling of commoness
with Europe and the statements that to support the Treaty meant to
approve the EU from which Ireland is benefitting. Meanwhile the
NO voters stongly believed that erosion of Irelands neutrality, end
of abortion control and the service in the European army are the
constitutent parts of the Treaty of Lisbon. Also, voters were
intimidated with higher taxes and the lessened role of the member
of the Commission for the Irish meant the deterioration of their
voice in Europe.12 Futhermore, opponents of the Treaty heavily
leaned on the argument that the text of the Treaty was
incomprehensible and argued: if you do not know what is written,
vote NO.13
3 Worre,Torben. First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the
Maastricht Treaty 1992 and 1993. J.Comm.Market Studies, 1995,
Vol.33, No.2
4 Closa, Op.cit.
5 OBrennan, John. Irelands Return to Normal Voting Patterns on
EU Issues: the 2002 Nice Treaty Referendum. European Political
Science, Spring 2003, p. 5-13
6 Franklin, M., McLaren L. Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition
to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht. Journal of
Common Market Studies, 32, 1994 ir Franklin M. N., Van Der Eijk C.,
Marsh M. Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public
Support For Europe in The Wake of Maastricht. West Europe Politics,
18 (3), 1995
7 Schuck, Andreas R.T., de Vreese, Claes H. Reversed Mobilization in
Referendum Campaigns. How Positive News Framing Can Mobilize
the Skeptics? International Journal of Press/Politics, 2009, vol.14,
No1, p.40-66
8 2 June 1992 YES 49.93 percent, NO 52.08 percent.:
http://www.c2d.unige.ch
9 Buch R., Hansen K. M. The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to
Euro 2000 Elections, Referendums and Attitudes. Scandinavian
Political Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, 2002
10 Gilland K. The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Ireland. Paper
presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for
Political Research. 22-27 March, 2002. Turin, Italy. Rasta:
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/
ws25/Gilland.pdf
11 TAIP 46,6 proc., NE 53,4 proc., altinis: Holmes M.
Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland.
Referendum Briefing Paper No 16, 12 June 2008.
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern_no_16_ireland_08.pdf
12 Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum, Research Findings September
2008. http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Publications/Post
%20Lisbon%20Treaty%20Referendum%20Research
%20Findings/post%20li sbon%20treaty%20referendum%20research
%20findings_sept08.pdf
13 Holmes, Op. cit.
78
Change in reasoning in repeated referenda
The objective to achieve some more favourable attitude towards a
deepened integration, even with all its drawbacks, for the purpose
of eliminating trade barriers required some political changes and
consessions in a number of areas. There were those who agrued
against the idea of the common currency, some opposed the
concept of the Central Bank, others opposed the common monetary
policy, etc. Next to them there were individual groups supportive
only of separate components of the Treaty.14 Efforts were required
to reconcile the two opposite positions. But in principle, in the
course of the public campaign, on the eve of the second
referendum, no new outstanding reasonings or arguments have
been expressed. The YES side continued to highlight the economic
benefit and the benefit brought about by subsidiarity, while the
"NO" side, apart from the threats referred to in relation to the first
referendum, found a new argument of the obvious lack of
democracy where citizens were asked for the second time answer
the same question (see Table 1).
Table 1. Change of argumentation before the referenda on the Treaty
of Maastricht in Denmark
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the article Buch R.,
Hansen K. M. The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000
Elections, Referendums and Attitudes. Scandinavian Political
Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, 2002.
In the process of the preparation for the second referendum
concerning the ratification of the Nice Treaty in Ireland, the main
arguments in favour of the Treaty were related to the preparation of
the enlargement of the EU and the claim that the enlargement will
be beneficial for the country. Furthermore, the enlargement of the
EU was conceived as a moral duty to demonstrate solidarity with the
Central and Eastern Europe that had suffered from the oppression of
the Soviet Union and, having liberated itself some ten years ago,
now is seeking to proceed along the path of democracy (see Table
2).
Table 2. Change of argumentation before the referenda on the Treaty
of Nice in Ireland
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the article Gilland K.
Irelands Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice, October 2002.
Referendum Briefining No 1, EPERN,
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/irelandno1.pdf
In assessing the preparation for the second referendum concerning
the Treaty of Lisbon and its outcomes the experts have claimed they
had identified two significant steps taken by the authorities of
Ireland.15 First, it was necessary in some form to identify the
electoral context so that the new referendum could grant to the
public a new mandate. The elections to the European Parliament
and the local elections held half a year ago well served the purpose.
Second move was to negotiate certain concessions and guarantees
that had not been available before. It was only in this context that
the Government felt entitled and justified to propose to the public to
repeatedly take a decision concerning the Treaty of Lisbon. Besides,
the referendum was held in the period of the economic crisis.16
Therefore, as maintained by some representatives from Ireland,
during the repeated referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon
Treaty the fear concerning the ratification was the main argument
exploited by the YES campaign.17 On the one hand,
14 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit.
15 Remiantis tiesioginiu susirainjimu su M. Holmes
16 Gibbon J. F. The Second Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in
the Republic of Ireland, 2nd October 2009. Referendum Briefining
Paper No 17, EPERN. Rasta: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-9.html
17 Lisbon victory not endorsement for hated Government, Socialist
Party. Rasta: http://www.socialistparty.net/index.php/lisbon/68-
other/260-lisbon-victory-not-endorsement-for-hated-
government.html
Treaty
Principal arguments FOR
Principal arguments AGAINST
Maastricht Treaty, 1992
Economic advantages; subsidiarity principle
Threat to the sovereignty of Denmark, its national identity and
cultural traditions;
threat to openess and democracy
Maastricht Treaty, 1993
Economic advantages; subsidiarity principle
 Threat to the sovereignty of Denmark, its national identity and
cultural traditions;
threat to openess and democracy;
it is non-democratic to invite the public to vote in respect of the
same issue repeatedly.
Treaty
Principal arguments FOR
Principal arguments AGAINST
The Treaty of Nice, 2001
Preparation for the EU enlargement that will be beneficial to
Ireland;
a sign of solidarity with the Central and Eastern Europe.
Threat to the national military neutrality; growing deficiency of
democracy in the EU; negative effects on Irelands neutrality.
The Treaty of Nice, 2002
Preparation for the EU enlargement that will be beneficial to
Ireland;
a sign of solidarity with the Central and Eastern Europe.
Threat to the national military neutrality; threat to the national
freedom and powers.
79
most of the Irish population was resentful that their first democratic
choice was challenged, disrespected, while at the same time in the
face of the crisis they felt scared and expected some assistance and
support from the EU. During the time following the first Irish
referendum the economic environment in the country changed
dramatically from the heights of the neo-liberal Celtic tiger to
the sharp descent to the bottom. An, in the opinion of experts, there
was a critical mass of the population that understood that at that
time Ireland was in need of the EU custody. The view was also
shared by the Head of the Government Brian Cowen who was
repeatedly warning his citizens that the repeated rejection of the
document at the referendum will adversely affect Irelands efforts to
recover after the deep-rooted recession and weaken its role in the
political arena of Europe (see Table 3).
Table 3. Change of argumentation before the referenda on the Treaty
of Lisbon in Ireland
Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the articles: Holmes
M. Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland.
Referendum Briefing Paper No 16, 12 June 2008.
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern_no_16_ireland_08.pdf
and Gibbon J. F. The Second Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in
the Republic of Ireland, 2nd October 2009. Referendum Briefining
Paper No 17, EPERN, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-9.html
For that purpose efforts were devoted to find some new arguments
(or repeat the updated versions of the old ones), also the new
methods (on-line social networks, etc.)18. Eventually the matters
that played a major role during the first referendum partly lost its
significance during the repeated one. The right-winged Libertas,
headed by Declan Ganley was given a clear message when the
party did not win a single mandate in the EP. And, on the contrary,
there were many other business leaders that looked much more
influential and had declared their support to the ratification of the
Treaty.19
Rational choice, development of results and the role of the
Government
Rational actors are often believed to play a major role in shaping the
preferences of the EU institutional policies20. Meanwhile, the results
of negotiations are attributed to the preferences of clear
intermediaries. Some authors project rational choice analysis as a
later stage in the negotiations concerning the Treaty, and subjects
ratification to the same logics. Hence the internal pressure emerges
from the impact of the internal institutional agreements and actors
upon the combination of negotiation preferences.
When analysing the most general reasons for the organisation of
referenda C. Closa21 identifies, among others, a rational decision of
governments as a tactical manoeuvre in negotiations. C.Closa
maintains that States use the argument to enhance their powers:
should the electorate in the referendum refuse to approve a
decision, the process of ratification will be suspended. On the other
hand, alternatively, a referendum may become a battlefield of the
States internal policy. Governments may tend to use as an
instrument to reinforce their electoral positions and weakening of
the opposition. Nevertheless, the first argument has been rejected
by Franklin et al who have considered the process of ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and claimed discerning a
probability that even without thinking too much about Europe
people actually were voting against the Government's policy22. Or,
seeing the Government inviting support us and vote YES, the
difficulties that the referendum in Denmark encountered should not
look surprising.23 Pending the repeated voting on the Nice Treaty
the popularity of the Government and its leader was rolling
18 OBrien C. Generation Yes campaigns on Facebook, Irish Times.
Rasta:
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2009/0928/breaking
37.html?via=rel
19 Gibbon, Op. cit.
20 Moravcsik, A. Preferences and power in the European
Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of
Common Market Studies, 1993, 31 (4): 44772.
21 Closa, Op.cit.
22 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit.
23 Franklin, 1994, Op. cit.
Treaty
Principal arguments FOR
Principal arguments AGAINST
The Treaty of Lisbon, 2008
 The feeling of commonness with Europe; to approve the Treaty
means approval of the EU from which Ireland substantially benefits.
Erosion of Irelands neutrality; end of abortion control; service in
the European army; higher taxes; diminishing of the influence by the
member of the Commission loss of a vote in Europe;
incomprehensible text of the Treaty.
The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009
Economic crisis and the fear not to receive any assistance from the
EU;
a repeated rejection will weaken the countrys role in the political
arena of Europe
Proposal to vote repeatedly for the same issue; loss of neutrality;
victory would be beneficial to the unpopular head of the
Government, rather than to the country.
80
down24, and before the Lisbon Treaty referendum there were
serious apprehensions that some Irish voters might choose to use
the referendum as a chance to vote against the unpopular
Government headed by B.Cowen.25
Authors researching the issue of referendum do not rule out a
possibility of a rational manipulation by governments in their
relations with Europe. It should be noted that following all three
failed referenda the respective governments managed to negotiate
certain concessions from the EU. These were the conscientious
moves from both sides in respect of the votes and expectation for
more favourable results. On the other hand, researchers analysing
the Danish referendum concerning the Maastricht Treaty claim that
the rejection of the Treaties by the citizens of the respective
countries largely strengthened the countrys positions in the
intergovernmental negotiations.26 At the 2002 referendum
concerning the Treaty of Nice 2002, the government announced
three major measures requisite for winning the referendum:
establishment of the European Forum; more stringent supervision of
European matters in the national Parliament of Ireland; the
Declaration of Sevilla.27 In relation to the Lisbon referendum
Ireland, as it has become customary in Europe, was granted a
number of different exemptions and concessions. Ireland has been
noted for having changed its opinion after Dublin managed to
secure certain guarantees in such sensitive areas as military
neutrality, the issue of abortions and taxation laws. The partners of
the Community granted to the Catholic Ireland certain guarantees
concerning laws on prohibition of abortions, its military neutrality
and taxation policy, and promised that all members of the
Community will continue having its Commissioner in Brussels.28
In the opinion of some authors it might look agreeable that the
situation evolving with the Maastricht Treaty is a consistent outcome
of the public campaign that prevented the population from
understanding and supporting the European project. Furthermore,
ironically, the Government made its own contribution to making the
"European project" difficult to market. The government parties were
struggling to introduce themselves as bringing benefits to their
States from the European cornucopia, and, on the other hand,
defending the national interest against the attacks from Brussels.29
This resulted in even more paradoxical situation where those better
informed about Europe were less willing to vote than those who
were much less informed.30
Similar conclusions were made by other authors who have shown
interest in the situation related to Ireland after the failed referenda
concerning the Nice and Lisbon Treaties. Both after the first
referendum concerning the Nice Treaty31, and the Lisbon
referendum32 and the rejection of the Treaties, the Irish
Government carried out the analysis of the situation and the results.
The authorities concluded that insufficient attention has been
devoted to the information and enhancement of awareness of
citizens in general, and the principal reason for the failure was the
deficiency in the knowledge and understanding of the Treaties which
determined the results of the voting. As the Irish, despite the
referendum, have always been known as well-disposed in respect of
the EU, although even among them there was a large share of
population that said NO at the referendum. This, in a way, meant
a situation completely opposite from that observed during the
Maastricht referendum in Denmark only because the Government
had not comprehended the situation it could lose the referendum in
the first case. Some experts have been claiming that the
Government had been seeking victory at both referenda; though in
the first referenda it failed to do its homework properly the
campaign was launched too late, the message to the voters was
overly obscure and the explanations of the project reached the
public not frequently enough.33
Conclusions
24 Gilland, Op. cit.
25 Gibbon, Op. cit.
26 Hobolt S. B. Direct Democracy and European Integration. Journal
of European Public Policy, January 2006
Franklin, 1995, Op. cit.
Franklin, 1994, Op. cit.
27Gilland, Op. cit.
28 Gibbon, Op. cit.
29 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit.
30 Sune K., Svensson P. The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The
Danish EC referendumo n June 1992. Electoral Studies, 12(2), 1993:
99-111.
31 Garry J., Marsh M., Sinnott R. Second-order versus Issue-
voting Effects in EU Referendums. Evidence from the Irish Nice
Treaty Referendums. European Unijon Politics, 2005, Volume 6 (2):
201-221
32 Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum, Research Findings September
2008, Op. cit.
33 On the basis of the direct correspondence with M. Holmes
81
The comparison of the three pairs of the first and the repeated
referenda allows a conclusion that in virtually all cases the evolution
of the argumentation was not prominent enough, with the same
arguments and same statements prevailing. Still an essential
difference could be noted a much more intensive activity of the
supporters of the Treaty. The first attempts that failed was an
incentive to get more mobilised, more frequently refer to the same
slogans and arguments, emphasise the same advantages that had
to be presented to the ordinary citizens in a more inventive but still
more comprehensible way. The opponents part looked much
weaker, as their emotionally loaded arguments worked well in
relation to the first referendum, having lost their effect at the
second. They virtually failed to find any new arguments, and the
main tool available to the opponents was their attempts to cause
anger among voters for being proposed to take a decision for the
second time about the same issue.
Still, the governments had their own reasoning in this case too: each
time before the second referendum the governments managed to
negotiate some concessions from the EU thus the lost referenda
were used to attain own objectives. Therefore the voting could be
presented to the public as a qualitatively new exercise. It could be
presumed that the first defeats suited the governments' purposes
specifically because of the concessions and the possibility to
strengthen their negotiation positions. This subject, however, is an
object of a wider-scope research and is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
On the other hand, not less important is the statement, that the
largest impact for the success of the repeated referendum
concerning the Lisbon Treaty was the general economic crisis and
the belief that Ireland alone will find it much more difficult to cope
with the consequences of the crisis. Irish economy was one of the
most rapidly declining economies in Europe. And it was specifically
billions of euro from the European structural funds and support to
Irish banks that significantly reduced the number of the opponents
of the Lisbon Treaty rendering their reasoning on the damage of the
Lisbon Treaty much less viable. The latter conclusion is rather an
exception in the overall context of the present paper.
References
1. Buch R., Hansen K. M. The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to
Euro 2000 Elections, Referendums and Attitudes. Scandinavian
Political Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, 2002.
2. Closa C. Why convene referendums? Explaining choices in EU
constitutional politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 14:8
December 2007.
3. Collins A. M., OReilly J. The Aplication of Community Law in
Ireland 1973-1979. Common Market Law Review. No 27, 1990.
4. Franklin, M., McLaren L. Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition
to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht. Journal of
Common Market Studies, 32, 1994.
5. Franklin M. N., Van Der Eijk C., Marsh M. Referendum Outcomes
and Trust in Government: Public Support For Europe in The Wake of
Maastricht. West Europe Politics, 18 (3), 1995.
6. Garry J., Marsh M., Sinnott R. Second-order versus Issue-
voting Effects in EU Referendums. Evidence from the Irish Nice
Treaty Referendums. European Unijon Politics, Volume 6 (2), 2005.
7. Gibbon J. F. The Second Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in
the Republic of Ireland, 2nd October 2009. Referendum Briefining
Paper No 17, EPERN. Rasta: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/1-4-2-9.html
8. Gilland K. The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Ireland. Paper
presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for
Political Research. 22-27 March, 2002. Turin, Italy. Rasta:
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/
jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/ws25/Gilland.pdf.
9. Hobolt S. B. Direct Democracy and European Integration. Journal
of European Public Policy, January 2006.
10. Holmes M. Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic
of Ireland. Referendum Briefing Paper No 16, 12
June 2008. Rasta:
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern_no_16_ireland_08.pdf.
11. Lisbon victory not endorsement for hated Government, Socialist
Part. Rasta:
http://www.socialistparty.net/index.php/lisbon/68-other/260-lisbon-
victory-not-endorsement-for-hated-
government.html.
12. Moravcsik, A. Preferences and power in the European
Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal
of Common Market Studies, 31 (4): 1993.
13. OBrennan, John. Irelands Return to Normal Voting Patterns on
EU Issues: the 2002 Nice Treaty Referendum.
European Political Science, Spring 2003.
14. OBrien C. Generation Yes campaigns on Facebook, Irish Times.
Rasta:
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2009/0928/breaking
37.html?via=rel
15. Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum, Research Findings September
2008. Rasta: http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/
documents/Publications/Post%20Lisbon%20Treaty%20Referendum
%20Research%20Findings/post%20lisbon%20t
reaty%20referendum%20research%20findings_sept08.pdf
16. Schuck, Andreas R.T., de Vreese, Claes H. Reversed Mobilization
in Referendum Campaigns. How Positive News
Framing Can Mobilize the Skeptics? International Journal of
Press/Politics, vol. 14, No1, 2009.
82
17. Sune K., Svensson P. The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The
Danish EC referendumo n June 1992. Electoral Studies, 12(2), 1993.
18. Worre,Torben. First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on
the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and 1993. J.Comm.Market Studies, Vol.
33, No. 2, 1995.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969

http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/englis
h/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES . ...
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions
/1_1_1969.pdf] ... Article 17 Consent to be Bound
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/il/pdf/1969%20Vienna
%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20Treaties-
pdf.pdf

Special Cases United Nations or a Party to the present Convention

shall be invited to nominate two conciliators
https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NS0/000/81/IMG/NS000081.pdf
?OpenElement

Ireland and the EU after the Lisbon Treaty Referendum ...

Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics at ... committed to
EU integration in contrast to the UK
http://www.faithineurope.org.uk/ireland.pdf
The Lisbon Treaty Referendum

On 12 June 2008, 53.4 per cent (862,415) of the Irish electorate

voted to reject the Lisbon Treaty and 46.6 (752,451) voted in favour.
All but ten electoral constituencies registered a majority. The turnout
was 53.1 per cent. This was the second time in eight years that the
Irish electorate had rejected a European treaty. Irelands national
consensus on Europe, a stable feature of domestic politics for over
35 years, was undermined. The referendum and result brought the
interconnection between politics within Ireland and the politics of
the EU arena sharply into focus. A decision of the Irish electorate
had implications, not just for Ireland, but for 26 other states and the
European institutions.

Opponents of the treaty were drawn from the right of the political
spectrum, notably Libertas and Coir (the Catholic right), and the left,
Sinn Fein, the Socialist Workers Party, the Peace and Neutrality
Alliance, the People's Movement and People before Profit. Some of
these groups were active in previous European referenda; Libertas,
led by a high-earning business entrepreneur, Declan Ganley, was
the new element in the No campaign. An array of uneasy bedfellows
from both ends of the political spectrum managed to capture the
political centre and overcome the combined forces of the major
political parties and key interest organisations. The farming
organisations, particularly the Irish Farmers' Association, and the
trade union movement were split, and this sent mixed messages to
their members. The No campaign was in train long before the Yes
campaign got off the ground and outperformed and outspent the Yes
campaign for the duration of the referendum.

The decision of the Irish electorate has implications for Irelands

relations with the EU, for Irelands partners in Europe and for the
future of the EU itself. Just what those implications are will emerge
over time.

Following the referendum, the Irish government, with a new Prime

Minister, had to begin immediately to chart a road-map for Ireland in
the EU in a post- Lisbon environment. Shocked at its failure to carry
the electorate

05 October 2007

The revised treaty

This is a republication of our original posting of June of this year, which
started as an analysis of the European Council "mandate", produced at
the June European Council in Brussels.

It is, at this stage, very much "work in progress" to which we are

continually adding, with a view to producing a comprehensive
document. When complete, we intend eventually to publish it as a .pdf
file on this blog, to enable easy downloading as a reference document.

Introduction

On 21/22 June - spilling over into the early hours of the 23rd - the heads
of states of governments of the European Union member states,
accompanied by their foreign affairs ministers, attended a meeting of
the European Council in Brussels, chaired by the German presidency.

Although widely trailed by the media and others as a "summit", it was no

more such than a meeting of the British Cabinet. The European Council
is a quasi-institution of the European Union, charged by Article 4 of the
Treaty of the European Union with providing the Union with "the
necessary impetus for its development" and with defining "the general
political guidelines thereof". In effect, the European Council is the
unofficial Cabinet of the government of the European Union.

Neither was the meeting convened to agree a treaty, much less sign up
to one. Its precise purpose was to consider (and agree) a proposal by
the German presidency for a draft "mandate" to instruct a subsequent
Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) on the content of a treaty,
ostensibly to replace the failed EU constitutional treaty.

In the event, the European Council did agree this "mandate" which ran
to 16 pages (not two as some media reports would have it), including
detailed footnotes. It was published on 23 June as Annex 1 to the The
presidency conclusions. Although it had no legal authority to do so, the
European Council then directed the IGC to "carry out its work in
accordance with the mandate", declaring that, "the present mandate will
provide the exclusive basis and framework for the work of the IGC".

Thus did the European Council hope that the mandate it has adopted
would become the template for the treaty to be negotiated by the IGC.
As of 5 October, it had been incorporated in a "provisional" draft treaty -
the second version to have been produced, ready for the IGC of 18-19
October. Then, in the early hours of the 19 October, the IGC summit in
Lisbon approved this draft with certain modifications.

This is our analysis of the documents so far produced.

1. Overview

Starting with the "mandate", the central feature of the document was to
instruct the removal of any reference to a constitution in the new treaty.
The new treaty produced from it has since been called as a "Reform
Treaty", amending rather than replacing the existing treaties, the Treaty
on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European
Community (TEC). The title "reform", however, is unofficial, without legal
status. The official title is the "Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community".
In short, the document will be called the "Lisbon Treaty", to be signed
on 13 December.

In producing the mandate and then the two draft treaties, the
"innovations" from the EU constitution were removed - leaving the
orginal treaties. The bulk of these so-called "innovations" (with some
additions) were then written up separately as "amendments" to form the
basis of the new treaty. When they are added to the existing treaties,
the resultant consolidated treaty will be the constitution in all but name,
with a few cosmetic changes and omissions.

As to the resultant treaties, it is propsed that the TEU will keep its
present name and the TEC will be called Treaty on the Functioning of
the Union. The word "Community" will throughout be replaced by the
word "Union"; it will be stated that the two Treaties constitute the
Treaties on which the Union is founded and that the Union replaces and
succeeds the Community.

One of the cosmetic changes is that the terminology for EU laws,

introduced by the constitution, such as "law" and "framework law" will be
abandoned. The existing "regulations", "directives" and "decisions"
nomanclature will be retained. Again, this is a cosmetic change - there
is no practical significance to it.
However, the change of nomanclature has been sufficient for the
government to assert that the constitution has been abandoned. This
was demonstrated by a question posed by William Hague, the shadow
foreign secretary, who challenged Miliband on the comments of Giscard
d'Estaing.

He had declared, of the European Council's "mandate" that: "This text

is, in fact, a re-run of a great part of the substance of the constitutional
treaty", adding, "the public is being led to adopt, without knowing it, the
proposals that we dare not present to them directly."

In was in the answer, however, that the government's strategy becomes

apparent, in holding the line against such assertions, maintaining that
the "mandate" is not a re-run of the constitution. Miliband refused to be
drawn on the Giscard statements, but instead referred directly to the
first clause of the "mandate", which "clearly states":

The constitutional concept, which consisted in repealing all existing treaties

and replacing them by a single text called "Constitution", is abandoned
"Not reformed," said Miliband, "not amended, but abandoned. The
constitutional treaty has been abandoned. That is not just my view, nor
is it just the view of our Prime Minister - it is the view of the 27 Heads of
Government who signed the document."

The exchange continued but it need not trouble us, as we have the
bones of the argument. It is developed by sleight of hand and relies on
the substitution of one word with another. To see how it works, we have
to note how Miliband refers, in the first instance, to the "constitutional
concept", calling in aid the "mandate" as his authority.

Now, this "concept" was an innovation in producing treaties. All previous

affairs had taken the form of amendments to the original Treaty of
Rome. It was these amendments, and only these, the formed the basis
of each subsequent treaty, until the constitutional treaty. Then, it was
decided to absorb all the treaties and the proposed amendments into
one consolidated text, which was to form the new treaty. That was the
"constitutional concept", as indeed the "mandate" indicates.

The trouble with that was people - many for the first time - were able to
see the full text and take on board how many powers had been ceded
to the EU. Not a few of the complaints over the text actually related to
powers handed over in previous treaties. Thus, the "colleagues"
decided to abandon this "concept" and revert to producing another
amending treaty, only this time they would call it a "reform treaty".

There we have the slight of hand. Miliband takes the phrase,

"constitutional concept" and changes one word, to produce
"constitutional treaty". In one fell swoop, the "treaty" has been
abandoned. Except that it has not.

Interestingly a similar tactic has been tried before by Tony Blair, when
he reported on the European Council. Then, he offered the first clause
of the "mandate" without even embellishing it, relying on his
showmanship and emphasis to slide the point past the House.

2. The symbolic issues

The crucial cosmetic omissions will be the removal of "state-like

symbols" from the new treaty, such as the EU flag, the anthem or the
motto "Strength in Diversity". These are entirely cosmetic. The EU will
continue to display its flag, it will continue to play it anthem at every
opportunity and parade its "motto".

Even then, the new draft is not to be entirely without symbolism. Added
to the the recitals will be the text of the first ricital of the the failed
constitution, to be inserted as a second recital into the Preamble. That
is as follows:

Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,
from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable
rights of the human person, freedom, democracy and the rule of law,
There will be no new Article on primacy of Union law, on the lines that
which appeared in the failed constitution. This, though, is largely an
academic distinction, as the IGC had been told to agree the following
Declaration:

The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case-law of

the EU Court of Justice, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on
the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States,
under the conditions laid down by the said case-law." In addition, the
opinion of the Legal Service of the Council (doc. 580/07) will be annexed to
the Final Act of the Conference.
In effect, primacy will continue as before but there will be no reference
to it in the treaties.

3. Institutional changes

All the institutional changes found in the failed EU constitution have

been lifted and placed in the new treaty. They have been integrated
partly into the TEU and partly into the Treaty on the Functioning of the
Union.

There is a new Title III, which gives an overview of the institutional

system and will set outs the following institutional modifications to the
existing system. This is to be found in the new Article 9:

the Articles on the Union's institutions,

the European Parliament (new composition)
the European Council (transformation into an institution)
creation of the office of President
introduction of the double majority voting system
new composition of the European Commission
strengthening of the role of its President
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs
The president is to be elected by EU leaders for a two-and-a-half-year
term will replace the current system in which EU leaders rotate into the
president's post every six months.

The original proposal of for a "double majority" voting system allows for
qualified majority voting to be carried with 55 percent of member states
representing 65 percent of the EU's population.

As a concession to the Poles, introduction will be delayed until 2014,

when it will be gradually phased in over three years.

The European Council

Much of the focus on the changes proposed has been on headline

issues such as the appointment of a full-time president and a "high
representative" to act as an EU foreign minister. Perforce, less attention
has been given to other changes in this "institutional changes" section.

These, Blair would have us believe, are simply changes of rules to

make the European Union "effective". More specifically, he told us:

This deal gives us a chance to move on, it gives us a chance to concentrate on the
issues to do with the economy, organised crime, terrorism, immigration, defence,
climate change, the environment, energy, the problems that really concern citizens in
Europe. And this is why it was important to get out of this bind into which we had got
with the constitutional treaty, to go back to making simple changes in our rules that
allow us to operate more effectively now we are in an enlarged European Union, but
most of all allow us to work effectively for the betterment of people inside the
European Union.
In the manner of the joke about the Lone Ranger and his sidekick Tonto,
however, the key to understanding what is going on is to ask, "who's
this 'us' paleface?"

To answer this, in paragraph 12 of the mandate we find the dense but

superficially anodyne statement that:
The institutional changes agreed in the 2004 IGC will be integrated partly
into the TEU and partly into the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union.
The new Title III will give an overview of the institutional system and will set
out the following institutional modifications to the existing system, i.e. the
Articles on the Union's institutions
The reference to the "2004 IGC" is of course the code for the EU
constitution and the important modification here is to the "Articles on the
Union's institutions".

To find these, we have to go to Article I-19 of the constitution, where we

see the definition of the "institutional framework" and a statement of its
aims. These are expressed in terms of the "Union" telling the institutions
that their aims are to: "promote its values; advance its objectives; serve
its interests, those of its citizens and those of Member States; and
ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and
actions".

Now, the crucial point here is that the first three of these objectives are
entirely new. And, of these, the third is especially important. It is to:
"serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of Member States".

However, this is but a curtain raiser to another short insert in paragraph

12, which states (by way of one of the institutional changes): "the
European Council (transformation into an institution)".

This is of huge significance. Originally set up in 1972 by Jean Monnet,

the European Council was presented, during its first meeting under
president Pompidou as a "fireside chat" between the heads of states
and governments of the then nine members of the EEC.

Indeed, the first meeting was in fact held in Pompidou's private salon,
with members lounging in armchairs and even sitting by the fire, but
Monnet had far greater ambitions for it. He styled it as nothing less than
a "provisional government" of Europe, its task being to steer Europe
though the "transition from national to collective sovereignty" (Memoirs,
p. 503).

However, as is the way with the incremental development of the

European Union, the European Council enjoyed a half-life outside the
treaties, acquiring the appellation "summit", and reported almost
universally as such by the media, growing from its origins as an informal
"fireside chat" to the full-blown monster that it is today.

But, while it remained, in treaty terms, an informal body, it was formally

recognised in the Nice Treaty (Article 4) which first defined its role as to
"provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development" and
to "define the general political guidelines thereof".

Thus, while it was seen as a meeting of heads of states and

governments (now assisted by foreign affairs ministers), the inference
being that they were representing their respective nations, the
European Council was being drawn into the treaty maw. Although not
yet a fully-fledged institution, it role was being more clearly defined as a
representative body of the European Union.

Now, with this proposed change, the European Council is being defined
fully as an institution. Furthermore, its aims have been set out, which it
shares with the Commission, the EU Parliament and the European
Court of Justice. It now will have developed into Monnet's "provisional
government", acting, to all intents and purposes, as the formal "cabinet"
of Europe.

The problem, of course, is that the members are still made up from the
heads of state and governments of the member states. But, rather than
representing their respective nations, they now act as a corporate body
an institution the aims of which are, in respect of the Union, to:
"promote its values; advance its objectives; serve its interests, those of
its citizens and those of Member States; and ensure the consistency,
effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions".

Crucially, the requirement to serve the interest of the Union comes first,
the "citizens" come second and the Member States come third. The
order is neither accidental nor without significance. The European
Council has to put the Union first. Tony Blair's "us" is the European
Union.

Serving the EU is, de facto, what the European Council already does,
but this is now to become de jure. That such an important change is
tucked into a paragraph of an obscure document which few will read
and fewer will understand is another of those dangerous and
deliberate obfuscations, designed to defeat easy analysis.

It also represents a very significant transfer of power from member

states, our leaders having been hijacked and impressed into the service
of the Union all the more dangerous because, as far as the media and
the general public is concerned, they are part of an invisible institution,
one that will, to them, remain a "summit".

4. Qualified Majority Voting

This is to be extended to 40 new areas - mainly in matters related to the

police and the judiciary. The UK has negotiated an opt-out from criminal
matters and police co-operation. The national veto will be maintained in
the fields of foreign affairs, defence, fiscal matters, and social security
and culture.

5. The foreign minister

The constitution's envisaged post of "foreign minister" has been

dropped in favour of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. He or she will also become vice-president of
the union, "double hatted" as a representative of both the Council and
the Commission.

There is a codicil to this appointment, with a declaration (which has no

legal effect) that the post will not affect "the responsibilities of the
member states, as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct
of their foreign policy or their national representation in third countries
and international organisations".

This is the BBC "take".

6. The Commission

From 2014, the Commission, will be reduced to 18 members, selected

on a system of rotation. As now, commissioners will to serve five-year
terms.

7. Legal personality

Lifted straight from the failed EU constitution, the European Union is to

be given the status of a legal person. There will also be a declaration
that: "the fact that the European Union has a legal personality will not in
any way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the
competences conferred upon it by the member states in the treaties."

However, according to Anthony Coughlan, Secretary of the Dublin-

based National Platform for EU Research, politically, the most important
thing the proposed new Treaty. It sets up a legally a new EU in the
constitutional form of a supranational European Federation and makes
us all real citizens of that State, owing obedience to its laws and loyalty
to its authority, in contrast to our notional or honorary EU "citizenship" at
present.

The legal personality gives the EU its own corporate existence for the
first time, separate from and superior to its Member States, just as the
USA is legally separate from and superior to states like California,
Kansas and New York, or Federal Germany is superior to Bavaria,
Saxony etc. Politically and legally, this is the core element of an EU
Constitution, which the Intergovernmental Conference is now being
established to draw up.

Up to now the European Union has not had a legal personality or

corporate existence in its own right. Only the European Community,
which makes supranational EC laws, possesses that. Properly speaking
therefore, there is thus no such thing as "EU" (European Union) law -
only "EC" (European Community) law.

At present the name "European Union", which derives from the 1992
"Maastricht Treaty on European Union", is a descriptive term for the
various forms of cooperation amongst the 27 EU Member States. These
forms of cooperation cover the area of supranational law constituted by
the European Community on the one hand, where the European
Commission proposes all the laws, and on the other hand cooperation
in the "intergovernmental" areas of foreign and home affairs, where
Member States have up to now retained their sovereignty and the
European Commission has no legislative role.

That is why the 1992 Maastricht Treaty is called the "Treaty ON

European Union" rather than "OF" Union. The proposed revised
constitutional treaty which the Intergovernmental Conference will now
draw up would be in effect the "Treaty OF European Union".

8. The Charter of Fundamental Rights

Britain has been allowed to opt out of a charter of human rights and the
charter will not become part of the treaty. This is to be added to the
treaty by way of a new protocol, which will undoubtedly become a
lawyer's paradise. The text is as follows:

The High Contracting Parties

Whereas in Article [xx] of the Treaty on European Union, the Union recognises the
rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

Whereas the Charter is to be applied in strict accordance with the provisions of the
aforementioned Article [xx] and Title VII of the Charter itself;

Whereas the aforementioned Article [xx] requires the Charter to be applied and
interpreted by the courts of the United Kingdom strictly in accordance with the
Explanations referred to in that Article;

Whereas the Charter contains both rights and principles;

Whereas the Charter contains both provisions which are civil and political in
character and those which are economic and social in character;
Whereas the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in the
Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create new rights or
principles;

Recalling the United Kingdom's obligations under the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally;

Noting the wish of the United Kingdom to clarify certain aspects of the application of
the Charter;

Desirous therefore of clarifying the application of the Charter in relation to the laws
and administrative action of the United Kingdom and of its justiciability within the
United Kingdom;

Reaffirming that references in this Protocol to the operation of specific provisions of

the Charter are strictly without prejudice to the operation of other provisions of the
Charter;

Reaffirming that this Protocol is without prejudice to the application of the Charter to
other Member States;

Reaffirming that this Protocol is without prejudice to other obligations of the United
Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, and Union law generally;

Have agreed upon the following provisions which shall be annexed to the Treaty on
European Union:

Article 1

1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice, or any court or
tribunal of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative
provisions, practices or action of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.

2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in [Title IV] of the Charter
creates justiciable rights applicable to the United Kingdom except in so far as the
United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.

Article 2

To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it
shall only apply in the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it
contains are recognised in the law or practices of the United Kingdom.
The version of the Charter as agreed in the failed constitution will be re-
enacted by the three Institutions and will be published in the Official
Journal of the European Union.

Again, however, this is largely an academic distinction. The mandate

states: "The Article on fundamental rights will contain a cross reference
to the Charter on Fundamental Rights, as agreed in the 2004 IGC,
giving it legally binding value and setting out the scope of its
application."
Effectively, therefore, the charter will become part of the Treaty and will,
therefore, apply in its entirety to EU law which, in turn, will apply to the
UK. Progressively, therefore, more and more elements of the charter
will apply to the UK.

This may be the most important part of the Reform Treaty as it will have
a retrospective effect on all EU law. Essentially it introduces both a "Bill
of Rights" plus the power of judicial review, i.e., the power to invalidate
laws that do not comply with the charter to the ECJ. It thus gives the
ECJ the power similar to that of the American Supreme Court, acquired
since the 14th Amendment was broadly interpreted, i.e., truly supreme
power.

9. Provisions on "democratic" principles

Other lifts from the failed constitution are those which the mandate
calls provisions on democratic equality, representative democracy,
participatory democracy and the citizens' initiative. Concerning national
parliaments, the mandate declared that their role will be further
enhanced.

The period given to national parliaments to examine draft legislative

texts and to give a reasoned opinion on subsidiarity will be extended
from 6 to 8 weeks (the Protocols on national Parliaments and on
subsidiarity and proportionality will be modified accordingly).

There will be a reinforced control mechanism of subsidiarity in the

sense that if a draft legislative act is contested by a simple majority of
the votes allocated to national parliaments, the Commission will re-
examine the draft act, which it may decide to maintain, amend or
withdraw. If it chooses to maintain the draft, the Commission will have,
in a reasoned opinion, to justify why it considers that the draft complies
with the principle of subsidiarity. This reasoned opinion, as well as the
reasoned opinions of the national parliaments, will have to be
transmitted to the EU legislator, for consideration in the legislative
procedure. This will trigger a specific procedure:

- before concluding first reading under the ordinary legislative

procedure, the legislator (Council and Parliament) shall consider the
compatibility of the legislative proposal with the principle of subsidiarity,
taking particular account of the reasons expressed and shared by the
majority of national parliaments as well as the reasoned opinion of the
Commission;

- If, by a majority of 55% of the members of the Council or a majority of

the votes cast in the European Parliament, the legislator is of the
opinion that the proposal is not compatible with the principle of
subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given further
consideration. (the Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality will be
modified accordingly).

A new general Article will reflect the role of the national parliaments.

This was highlighted by commission president Barroso in a speech at

the National Forum on Europe in Dublin, kick-starting his "Plan D of
dialogue and democracy. Then, he argued that the constitution went a
long way to resolving the democratic deficit, because:

It gives the European Parliament a much greater role in decision-

making, allowing it to amend and approve almost all new legislation. It
throws open the doors of the Council when it is acting as a legislator,
making it easier for citizens and national parliaments to monitor
government positions. In fact, participatory democracy acquires a new
status, with an entire title of the Constitution (Title VI) devoted to "The
Democratic Life of the Union".

the Constitution reconnects Europe with both citizens and national

parliaments. It gives citizens the right to invite the Commission to
introduce proposals on appropriate issues, if they can gather one million
signatures in a significant number of Member States. And it gives
national parliaments important new powers to enforce subsidiarity. They
will be given early warning of all new legislative proposals from the
Commission and the possibility to send them back for a rethink.

Now we see exactly the intention to re-introduce exactly the same

provisions and, not doubt, exactly the same claims will be made for
them.

Deconstructing these claims, we find again the use of that word

"reconnect". This is part of the self-deception delusion, even of the
lites , whereby the project was in the past somehow in tune with the
"needs of the citizen" but has lost its way and must now be brought
back on track. The lie is, of course, that the EU has ever "connected". It
has always been an lite project and, therefore, any suggestion of a
"reconnection" is a fraud.

10. A reference has been included to EU solidarity in the event of an

energy supply problem.

11. A reference to the qualification criteria for new EU members was

added (the Copenhagen criteria). The conditions for entry, therefore, will
become part of the Treaty.

12. Treaty revision procedures

Currently, treaty revision is accommodated by means of a single article,

Article 48, which deals with the convening of an IGC (precisely the
mechanism being currently used to amend the treaties). The existing
Article 48 will make it clear that the Treaties can be revised to increase
or reduce the competences conferred upon the Union.

However, the "mandate" also extracts two particularly contentious

provisions from the failed constitution, known as the "simplified revision
procedure" (Articles 444 & 445).

The first of the simplified procedures provides for the Council to remove
unanimous voting (the veto) from any provision in Part III of the (which
accounts for the bulk of the policies), and to substitute qualified majority
voting, without the inconvenience of convening an IGC. National
parliaments, however, are given the power to block any such change -
effectively a form of ratification - so the net effect of this is to sidelines
the IGC.

The second of the procedures alllows for the revisions of text, within
Part III, "on internal policies and actions of the Union", again without the
inconvenience of convening an IGC.

These two provisions represent a significant increase in the power of

the Union.

13. Voluntary withdrawal

There will be an article on voluntary withdrawal of a member state from

the union.

14. Common Defence Policy

On page 26, in the eighth numbered paragraph under the anodyne

heading: "Amendments to the EU Treaty Annex 1", this little gem:

8) In Article 11, insertion of a paragraph 1 reading as follows (the current text of

paragraph 1 being deleted):

1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall
cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security,
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a
common defence.
This is followed by a longer piece of text, which is reviewed below, but
this is the crucial piece.

Now, in what might be evidence of hurried drafting, this raises a slight

problem as the new paragraph of Article 11 actually replicates (in part)
Article 17 of the Treaty, which reads, in full:

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the
security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy
which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It
shall in that case recommend to Member States the adoption of such a decision in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
Presumably (although this is not stated), this paragraph will be deleted
the two passages can hardly stand in the same treaty.

What needs to be noted is the substantive difference, which is the

deletion of this phrasing:

should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to

Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements.
This is replaced by a longer passage (broken into two paragraphs for
ease of reading):

The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific procedures. It shall be
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting
unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of
legislative acts shall be excluded.

The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member
States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament
and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties.
We are back to the "devil in the detail". In the first passage, in the
existing treaties, we see that the decision rests at the discretion of the
European Council. But all it can do it make a recommendation to the
member states, which can chose to adopt such a decision "in
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." In the UK,
this would require, at the very least, the approval of Parliament.

What is happening, therefore, is that the decision process on the

"progressive framing of a common defence policy" is being re-framed,
taking it away from the member states. Instead, it becomes the sole
province of "the European Council and the Council", cutting out national
parliaments and any reference to "respective constitutional
requirements".
For sure, the decisions as EU level are still unanimous, but the fact is
that, having been national decisions, they now become European Union
decisions. Is this a small, technical point? Or does this represent a
significant transfer of power from the member states to the European
Union?

I suspect those who choose to see merely small textual changes of little
significance will continue to do so, but any rational assessment of what
is going is suggests that this is another small but significant step
towards a Common Defence Policy.

This is the game the EU has been playing ever since Maastricht, when
the policy was first introduced. Every treaty since, we have seen small,
subtle adjustments in wording, every change tightening the screw
slightly, bringing the "colleagues" slightly closer to their goal.

This change, this time, comes under the guise of a "Reform Treaty"
instead of an "EU Constitution". The name might change, but the
objective remains the same.

Documents
uk Irelands fiscal treaty referendum: ... EU treaties, the
treaty ... Lisbon treaties respectively. Second,

http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachmen
ts/pdf/2012/bn_ireland_fiscal_11may12-5070.pdf

Publication of the report on the second

referendum on the Lisbon Treaty
1/10/10
European Union, Press Releases, Ireland, 2010,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs today welcomed the publication of the report
Attitudes and Behaviour in the Second Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon
prepared by the Geary Institute and School of Politics and International
Relations at UCD.
"One year ago, the Irish people voted by a margin of two to one in favour of
ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. This was of fundamental importance to Irelands
future in Europe and represented a significant reversal of the result of the first
referendum in June 2008.
This report shows that the reasons underlying these different outcomes were
complex and should not be oversimplified. What is clear, however, is the belief
of most Irish people that the European Union is good for Ireland and that our
economic wellbeing is linked to our membership of the Union.
I am heartened that the research confirms that the availability of information
from a range of sources and informed public debate about the issues raised
by the Lisbon Treaty had a role in ensuring a positive outcome to the second
referendum. The report also analyses the significance of the guarantees
negotiated by the Government.
I would like to thank Professor Richard Sinnott, Johan Elkink and their team
for this valuable analysis. It contains insights that have relevance well beyond
the referendum campaigns themselves. It represents a valuable contribution
to my Departments ongoing work to communicate effectively with the public
on EU issues.
Note for Editors
Following the first Lisbon referendum in June 2008, the Government
commissioned comprehensive research to clarify the reasons underlying the
No vote. In light of the Yes vote in the second Lisbon referendum in October
2009 and using the 2008 research as a benchmark the Department of
Foreign Affairs commissioned follow-up research in order to identify the
lessons learned from the two referendum campaigns, in particular with a view
to guiding and focusing its efforts to communicate effectively with the public
on EU issues.
The report Attitudes and Behaviour in the Second Referendum on the Treaty
of Lisbon was commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) from
the Geary Institute and School of Politics and International Relations (UCD) at
a cost of 11,500. It is based on fieldwork commissioned by the DFA by way
of public tender from Millward Browne Lansdowne in November 2009 at a
cost of 30,253.
https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-
release-archive/2010/october/second-referendum-on-the-
lisbon-treaty/
Minister of State for European Affairs,
Dara Murphy TD travels to Bucharest
and Athens
30/1/17
MoS Dara Murphy, European Union, Press Releases, Ireland, Europe,
2017,

Minister of State for European Affairs, Dara Murphy TD travels to

Bucharest and Athens: "An opportunity to put forward Irelands
priorities on Brexit"
Minister of State for European Affairs, Dara Murphy TD, left today for a two-
day visit to Bucharest and Athens. The trip has been organised as part of the
Government's programme of engagement with EU partners, in advance of the
Brexit negotiations which are expected to begin no later than the end of
March.
Speaking before his departure the Minister said:
Ireland's preparations for the Brexit negotiations have been ongoing for two
years now.
We have deepened our analysis of the critical risks and opportunities and we
are crystal clear about our objectives for the forthcoming negotiations:
mitigating the impact on our economy, protecting the gains of the peace
process in Northern Ireland, maintaining the Common Travel Area and
securing the future of the EU with Ireland at its heart.
A fundamental part of our preparations in this preparatory phase is ensuring
that our EU partners understand our concerns and priorities. To this end, the
Government is pursuing an extensive programme of engagements with our
fellow EU Member States. My visit to Bucharest and Athens this week
presents an ideal opportunity to tease out the finer detail of these issues with
two important partners at the EU table.
The Minister continued:
This visit is also about listening as much as presenting our own issues. We
will be negotiating as part of one EU team when the process begins so it's
critical that we too have a sound appreciation of the different perspectives
around the table. Therefore, my programme in both cities present
opportunities for engagement with government ministers as well as
parliamentary committees so there is a breadth of understanding of the
concerns relating to Brexit, some of which we share with all Members of the
Union, and some of which are unique to Ireland.
I am also looking forward to an exchange of ideas on the future of the EU,
which will be the subject of some debate and discussion this week, when the
EU Heads of State and Government meet in Valletta, Malta to pave the way
for the 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome next month.
ENDS
Press Office
30 January 2017

Minister McHugh convenes Inter-

Departmental discussions on Human
Rights
25/1/17
Human rights, MoS Joe McHugh, United Nations, Press Releases,
Ireland, 2017,

Minister McHugh convenes Inter-Departmental discussions on Human

Rights

Minister of State for the Diaspora and International Development at the

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Joe McHugh, T.D., today chaired the
first meeting of 2017 of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Human Rights.
Speaking after the meeting, Minister McHugh said:
I was delighted to meet with members of the Inter-Departmental Committee
on Human Rights today and to be updated on some positive developments
since our last meeting in September.
I was particularly encouraged to hear of progress towards ratification of the
UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities following the
publication of the Disability (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill just before
Christmas. I underlined the importance of delivering on our commitment to
ratify this key Convention and I am confident from what I heard today that the
relevant Departments are determined to make this happen as soon as
possible.
I was also pleased to hear that the outstanding periodic reports in relation to
Irelands obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination will be finalised following a consultation
process with civil society before the summer.
This Committee provides an excellent framework for cross-Departmental
cooperation which is key to the development and delivery of Irelands foreign
policy priorities on human rights as set out in The Global Island.
At todays meeting, Minister McHugh underlined the centrality of human rights
to every aspect of the Governments work at home and abroad. The Minister
availed of the opportunity to brief on the finalisation of Irelands first National
Plan on Business and Human Rights which will facilitate the implementation of
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
The Committee discussed the status of reports from Ireland required under
United Nations and Council of Europe treaty obligations. Committee
members also provided updates on Irelands upcoming review under the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and Irelands
term as a first-time member of the Commission on the Status of Women from
2017 to 2021.
The establishment of the Inter-Departmental Committee is one of the
outcomes of the The Global Island: Irelands Foreign Policy for a Changing
World, which was launched in January 2015. The objective of the Committee
is to improve the coherence of the promotion and protection of human rights
in Irelands Foreign Policy. It is also mandated with assisting progress towards
ratification by Ireland of key international human rights treaties and reporting
to the United Nations and Council of Europe human rights monitoring bodies.
ENDS
Press Office
25 January 2017

Statement by Minister Flanagan on UK

 Supreme Court ruling
24/1/17
Minister Charles Flanagan, Press Releases, Great Britain, 2017,

Statement by Minister Flanagan on UK Supreme Court ruling

"I note this morning's judgement of the UK Supreme Court.
"I welcome the confirmation from the UK Government that it will proceed with
the triggering of Article 50 by the end of March at the latest. This provides
welcome certainty for the beginning of the negotiations between the UK and
the EU.
"The Government's preparations for the upcoming negotiations on the UK's
withdrawal from the EU have been extensive and comprehensive. These
preparations and our programme of engagement with our EU partners are
continuing and we will be ready for the challenging negotiations ahead.
"Our priorities in these negotiations remain our citizens, our economy,
Northern Ireland, our Common Travel Area and the future of the EU itself."
ENDS
Press Office
24 January 201

Minister Flanagan addresses EU

Ambassadors on Irelands preparations
for Brexit negotiations
20/1/17
Minister Charles Flanagan, Press Releases, Ireland, 2017,

Minister Flanagan addresses EU Ambassadors on Irelands preparations

for Brexit negotiations:
"Lets start as we should go on, in a positive and determined frame of
mind."
Government continues strategy of intensive engagement with EU partners
Minister emphasises Irelands place at the heart of the EU
Northern Ireland
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Charles Flanagan TD, addressed the
local EU Diplomatic Corps in Iveagh House today (Friday. His address to
ambassadors touched on the broad range of foreign policy challenges facing
the European Union but there was a strong focus on Brexit and preparations
for the Article 50 negotiations.
Engaging with EU partners at official and political levels is a key pillar of the
Government's response to, and preparation for, Brexit. The purpose of this
strategy is to ensure that Ireland's unique priorities not least in relation to
Northern Ireland and the Common Travel Area are understood by our
partners, with whom we will be negotiating as part of a team of 27 Member
States. To that end, since the UK referendum last June, Minister Flanagan
has spoken at least once with each and every Foreign Minister in the EU.
Further engagements are planned for the weeks ahead.
In addressing the local diplomatic corps from EU Member States, Minister
Flanagan set the Irish priorities for the upcoming negotiations: our economy
and trade, Northern Ireland and border issues, the Common Travel Area and
the future of the EU itself. He also emphasised the extent of Ireland's
preparedness, which began two years ago.
Speaking about the upcoming negotiations between the EU and the UK,
Minister Flanagan said:
"Process is important. But attitudes and atmosphere are more important. I
welcome the Prime Ministers assurance that the UK wishes to have a close
and friendly relationship with the Union, and wants an orderly process. If the
UK takes a constructive and pragmatic approach in setting its goals and
conducting the negotiations it should be met with a similar approach
from the EU side. It is manifestly in the interests of both the EU and the UK
that Brexit be managed sensibly, and that the future relationship between us
be close and mutually beneficial.
Minister Flanagan also stressed Irelands readiness for the negotiations
ahead, while underlining Irelands strong commitment to the EU, stating:
. . . Ireland is fully committed to the European Union. It should not be
necessary to say this. But in recent times some commentators have argued
that we should consider following the British example. Debate is always
healthy and there can be no taboos. But the arguments we have heard are
flimsy and misconceived . . . The Irish economy depends enormously on
our membership of the Single Market and of the Customs Union . . . The
consequence of leaving the European Union would inevitably be a
return to a greater dependence on the UK and, effectively, a return to the
sterling area without any of the input we have around the European table.
This would reverse the trend of the past forty years and the great strides we
have made in diversifying our economic and political relationships. It would
surely be politically inconceivable in a period when we are marking the
centenary of our passage to independence.
Speaking about the current political crisis in Northern Ireland and the potential
consequences for the Brexit negotiations, Minister Flanagan added:
The current political crisis in Northern Ireland, and the forthcoming Assembly
elections, have of course complicated the task of agreeing common
North/South objectives, certainly in the coming weeks and possibly months.
In the context of this temporary hiatus, the continuation of the all-island Civic
Dialogue assumes a particular significance. Sectoral meetings addressing
specific themes are under way and the second plenary takes place on
17 February . . . The work done to date in the North/South Ministerial Council
on shared priorities has demonstrated a considerable degree of emerging
consensus between Dublin and Belfast. I very much hope that a hotly
contested election will not damage that consensus. Both communities in
Northern Ireland can be assured that the Irish Government will be fair and
determined in working for the best possible outcome what works best for
Northern Ireland will also work best for us.
Concluding, Minister Flanagan emphasised the importance of the British
market for Irish companies and the unprecedentedly positive relationship with
the UK which will continue and is not in conflict with Irelands commitment to
the EU:
Finally, logic points to a future EU-UK relationship which will be mutually
beneficial. It will not be easy to achieve, and the road ahead may be bumpy.
But with goodwill and common sense I believe it is probable. The UK will
remain our closest neighbour, and the European Union will remain our
political and economic home.
CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Lunch of EU Heads of Mission, Dublin

Iveagh House, Friday 20 January 2017
Opening Remarks by Mr Charlie Flanagan TD
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
Ambassadors
I am very pleased to welcome you to Iveagh House today. I hope we can have
a free-flowing and open conversation about Brexit. But I thought it would first
be useful to set out some key issues as I see them.
Before I do so, may I say that I appreciate very much the role you are all
playing in keeping your capitals well-briefed on Irelands views. I am sure that
the context for the very positive discussions I have had and am having with all
of your Ministers owes a great deal to your analysis.
We now have a better idea of how the United Kingdom is going to approach
the forthcoming negotiations. Many of us have been calling for clarification of
British objectives for some time, so the Prime Ministers speech on Tuesday
was welcome in that regard. And she has confirmed that the Article 50
process will begin by the end of March. After months of speculation, we will
soon be able to get down to business.
Once the Prime Minister has invoked Article 50, it will be for the EU side to
take the steps set out in that Article. We agreed practical arrangements in
December which confirm the lead political role of the European Council and
the regular involvement of the General Affairs Council and Coreper.
Therefore, the views and wishes of the Member States will be decisive. And
the negotiating guidelines and mandate can be reviewed and adjusted as
need be. But the need for the Commission team, led by Michel Barnier, to be
an effective chief negotiator is also underscored. It will also be vital to respect
the role of the European Parliament for many reasons, not least of which is
that an EU-UK agreement will require its consent. All of the Institutions must
work constructively together.
Process is important. But attitudes and atmosphere are more important. I
welcome the British Prime Ministers assurance that the UK wishes to have a
close and friendly relationship with the Union, and wants an orderly process. If
the UK takes a constructive and pragmatic approach in setting its goals and
conducting the negotiations it should be met with a similar approach from the
EU side. It is manifestly in the interests of both the EU and the UK that Brexit
be managed sensibly, and that the future relationship between us be close
and mutually beneficial.
Continuing emphasis on the downsides and risks of failure, or imagining a
future of rivalry, will not build goodwill as effectively as demonstrating a steely
determination to succeed.
The United Kingdom, as the Unions neighbour, will continue to be a major
trading partner and an essential ally in the fight against crime and terrorism.
Equally, the European Union will continue to be the number one destination
for British exports, and to share with it the same broad values and concerns in
a turbulent and uncertain world. Each of us will benefit from the other being
 successful, outward looking, and a defender of liberal democracy.
Achieving this broad objective will be difficult and complex. There are clear
potential pitfalls. There must be clarity and agreement on the terms of
Britains departure from the Union. Linked to this will be discussion of a
shared political understanding of the framework for our future relationship.
The connection between these two sets of negotiations must be worked out.
It is also very likely that some sort of transitional arrangements, or
implementation period, will be required, but what kind of arrangements? How
long might they last? How would they be governed and structured? Then the
negotiation of a fully detailed trade agreement will be highly complex, and the
details of such agreements are always devilish.
We will therefore have:
The withdrawal process;
The new UK-EU relationship;
The in-between.
There is a tendency to think only of the future trade and economic
relationship, but there are many other difficult issues to address, such as
fisheries, civil aviation, energy, agriculture, possible British participation in EU
programmes and so forth. And that is without addressing the issues of
dispute resolution, budget contributions, migration, and the free movement of
people.
There will not be much time to reach the exit agreement under Article 50
less than two years in practice. And it is easy to imagine how difficult political
forces and some media voices could make the negotiations. So reaching
agreement is far from guaranteed.
Some in the UK believe that there is a desire on the EU side to punish them
as a result of a democratic decision to leave. This is just not true. I am sure
that everyone wants a fair and balanced outcome. Partnership between us is
in everyones interests. Equally, whether the UK makes a success of its new
status will depend mainly on its own decisions and efforts over time.
But, especially at a time when the Union itself is under strain, it would be
unreasonable for any country to expect to enjoy the rights and benefits of
membership without the duties and obligations. Im not a great golfer, but I
know full well that if I chose to resign from my golf club I could not expect to
turn up the next day and play for free, and enjoy all the clubhouse benefits
and privileges.
And while the Union is about much more than a narrow calculation of national
gains and losses, it must be the case that membership is more advantageous
than any kind of external relationship. The principle of a balance of rights and
obligations is fundamental for us on the EU side. What that will mean,
especially for a country outside the Single Market and Customs Union, will be
at the heart of the negotiations.
But we need to start in a positive and determined frame of mind.
Let me be very clear about Irelands approach.
We have more to lose than any other country from failure to agree, and more
to gain from success. But we know that this can best be achieved, not by
rhetoric, but by continuing to be a loyal and constructive member of the EU
team and ensuring that our partners understand our approach and
perspectives.
A member whose views carry weight because of the strength of our
relationship with the UK, but also because the strength of our commitment to
the EU. A member whose input is well-informed and constructive and whose
negotiating skills and excellent relations with our closest neighbour are
helpful.
In the negotiations, Ireland will have many of the same interests as others in
particular trade and economic but as you know very well, we have unique
and specific concerns in regard to the Good Friday Agreement and the Peace
Process, the Common Travel Area, the border and North/South co-operation. I
do not need to spell these out once again.
However, I want to repeat that the Government is pleased and encouraged at
the extent to which these concerns are understood and appreciated by our
partners, and by the universal desire to assist in addressing them
satisfactorily. Commissioner Barniers clear statement in December that Irish
issues would be a negotiating priority was very positive.
I also very much welcome the clear commitment of the British Government, as
repeated by the Prime Minister on Tuesday. We are talking to the UK and
working closely with the Commission and Council Secretariat to develop
concrete solutions, and to work out how they can be achieved in the
negotiations. Of course, the overall context will be determined by the broader
EU-UK agreement another reason for us to seek the best possible outcome.
The current political crisis in Northern Ireland, and the forthcoming Assembly
elections, have of course complicated the task of agreeing common
North/South objectives, certainly in the coming weeks and possibly months.
In the context of this temporary hiatus, the continuation of the all-island Civic
Dialogue assumes a particular significance. Sectoral meetings addressing
specific themes are under way and the second plenary takes place on 17
February.
The onset of the current political crisis in Stormont has demonstrated that the
Northern Ireland settlement remains fragile, and indeed underlines the case
we have been making that Brexit must not damage the Good Friday
Agreement.
I was in Belfast yesterday with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and
we agreed to keep in contact and work together during the election period.
The work done to date in the North/South Ministerial Council on shared
priorities has demonstrated a considerable degree of emerging consensus
between Dublin and Belfast. I very much hope that a hotly contested election
will not damage that consensus. Both communities in Northern Ireland can be
assured that the Irish Government will be fair and determined in working for
the best possible outcome what works best for Northern Ireland will also
work best for us.
In parallel with the Brexit negotiations, the work of the European Union will
carry on. There is a great deal to be done. Many weighty issues are on the
table. They include the deepening of the Single Market, trade negotiations
-though I regret the standstill on TTIP - the creation of a digital single market,
more effective action against terrorism, meeting the multifaceted challenge of
migration, future co-operation within the Treaty on security and defence.
There is the continuing need, still acute in many countries, to achieve
sustainable economic growth, financial stability and jobs. And I do not need to
tell you that we are living in uncertain and challenging times, in which
European solidarity in support of our interests in values is more important than
ever.
Making progress on these issues is important in itself. But it also is really
important that citizens see that the Union makes a tangible difference and
realise that the seductive rhetoric of populists is hollow.
This requires better communication, through all the channels now available,
which points to the achievements of the EU and its relevance at this
dangerous time in the world. The stability and certainty provided by the EU
may not be headline grabbing but they are essential to the quality of life of the
EUs citizens. Strong political leadership which avoids blame games and
takes decisions is vital.
The EU as a complex, broad and deep Union so often struggles to effectively
communicate both its big picture projects and the myriad small improvements
it makes to peoples lives. But we simply have to become far better at
communicating and connecting on the value of EU membership.
All Member States agree that now is not the time for grand gestures or bold
new institutional or Treaty initiatives. That makes strong and continued
delivery on current priorities all the more important. It is essential that the
Bratislava Process concludes in Rome in March with more than a simple
repetition of existing commitments.
We need a convincing narrative, based on solid achievements, that the Union
is continuing to make important progress.
No political entity or international organisation is perfect. The European Union
is inevitably complicated and often hard to understand making it an obvious
target for simplistic populists of all stripes. The economic and migration crises
have both put it under real strain. Its self-confidence has been buffeted. But
Ireland is fully committed to the European Union. It should not be necessary
to say this. But in recent times some commentators have argued that we
should consider following the British example.
Debate is always healthy and there can be no taboos. But the arguments we
have heard are flimsy and misconceived.
The suggestion that the UK is Irelands only partner within the Union is simply
untrue. Yes, we have often, but not always, worked with the UK. Its liberal
outlook and its negotiating weight will certainly be missed. Co-operation with
British colleagues comes easily to us. But over the last forty-four years
Ireland has built excellent relations with all other Member States.
All of you know that there are many issues of importance to all of your
countries on which we have made common cause. We are determined to
build on these partnerships and develop even further the excellent relations
we already have. That will be a matter of the highest priority for my
Department, for our mission network, and for Government as a whole over the
years ahead.
The Irish economy depends enormously on our membership of the Single
Market and of the Customs Union. This is true both for inward investors and
indigenous companies. It is simply inconceivable that we would have been
remotely as successful outside the Union The volume of Irish exports to the
twenty-six other Member States of the Union is now more than twice that to
Britain.
The consequence of leaving the European Union would inevitably be a return
to a greater dependence on the UK and, effectively, a return to the sterling
area without any of the input we have around the European table. This
would reverse the trend of the past forty years and the great strides we have
made in diversifying our economic and political relationships. It would surely
be politically inconceivable in a period when we are marking the centenary of
our passage to independence.
This is not to deny the very great continuing importance of the British market,
and of course our most positive relationship with the UK. That will continue.
It is why a close relationship between the EU and the UK, which places the
minimum possible barriers to continuing trade, is a key objective.
But we also recognise the importance of the continued diversification of our
export markets, especially for our indigenous companies. This has been a
long-term strategy, but work on delivering it needs to be intensified. This is a
priority for our State Agencies, our Embassies, and the whole of government,
including my own Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
I chair the Export Trade Council which brings together all relevant
Departments and agencies, and private sector representatives, and mitigating
the effects of Brexit in the short, medium and long term is at the top of the
agenda. The implementation of new cross-sectoral whole of government
strategies for Asia-Pacific and the Americas is a key challenge for me and my
Department but one we are embracing with gusto.
The arguments are not just economic. Our own experience of conflict on this
island gives us a particular appreciation of the value of peace. I do not
believe that the Irish people would wish to withdraw from the most successful
peace project in European history, and severely damage our capacity to work
with like-minded countries to promote our values and protect our interests.
Being a member of the European Union gives us an influence and a
perspective we could never otherwise have.
Finally, logic points to a future EU-UK relationship which will be mutually
beneficial. It will not be easy to achieve, and the road ahead may be bumpy.
But with goodwill and common sense I believe it is probable.
The UK will remain our closest neighbour, and the European Union will remain
our political and economic home.
I consider myself a proud European and I am delighted to have this
opportunity to engage with you today.
Thank you.
ENDS

Minister Flanagan Statement on Martin

McGuinness
19/1/17
Minister Charles Flanagan, Press Releases, Northern Ireland, 2017,

Minister Flanagan Statement on Martin McGuinness

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade has reacted to the announcement
by Martin McGuinness this evening that he will not be contesting the
forthcoming Assembly elections.
The decision of Martin McGuinness not to contest the forthcoming election to
the Northern Ireland Assembly will be received by many with an equal
measure of understanding and disappointment. While those of us who have
worked directly with Martin will wish him and his family well for the future, we
will also miss his positive contribution to political discourse on this island.
During his tenures as Minister for Education and deputy First Minister, Martin
was unstinting in his personal efforts to secure the stability of the power-
sharing institutions in Northern Ireland and to advance reconciliation between
the unionist and nationalist communities. As the holder of a joint office, he
fully recognised that his duty was to represent all of the people of Northern
Ireland. Through word and deed, Martin sought to reach out to those who
for understandable reasons would have regarded his past with fear, anger
and suspicion.
Martin and I come from very different, and indeed mutually critical, political
traditions. Yet, in the two and a half years that I worked directly with Martin, I
experienced a political leader who was determined to make the future of
Northern Ireland, and its people, so much better than its past. I hope that
Martins political legacy of a resilient and generous commitment to the
interlocking institutions of the Good Friday Agreement will encourage all of
Northern Irelands political parties to emulate his efforts to consolidate
partnership government.
I wish Martin and his family every happiness for the future.
ENDS
Press Office
19 January 2017
Statement to the Dil on Northern
Ireland by Minister Flanagan
Minister Charles Flanagan, TD - 17/1/17
Minister Charles Flanagan, Ireland, Northern Ireland Peace Process,
Speech, Northern Ireland, 2017 ,

Dil Statements on Northern Ireland

17 January 2017
Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Charles
Flanagan, TD
Check against delivery

Thank you, Ceann Comhairle.

I want to thank all Deputies for their contributions this afternoon. Northern
Ireland is a shared concern and a priority for all sides of this House and this
was reflected in the very strong consensus today on the imperative of
proceeding on the basis of the Good Friday Agreement.
The Government views as a solemn responsibility our role and mandate as
co-guarantor of the Agreement. As provided for in our Programme for
Government, we have been unstinting in our efforts to uphold the principles of
the Good Friday Agreement and to advance the full implementation of all its
provisions. This we will continue to do, working closely with the British
Government and all of the parties to the peace process.
This Governments engagement and commitment has been constant in
times of stability and in times of crisis but obviously there have been
intensified contacts with the parties and the British Government in recent
weeks by both the Taoiseach and I.
It has been increasingly clear in recent weeks that the situation was extremely
serious and the circumstances that led to the resignation of the deputy First
Minister on the 9th of January are to be regretted. Elections will now take
place on Thursday 2 March. In my conversation yesterday with the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland, we agreed that both Governments should
continue to work closely together in the weeks ahead, looking to the post-
election period, when a new power-sharing Executive will need to be formed
within a limited timescale.
The Assembly election campaign is now underway and on behalf of the
Government I have urged all parties in the election to be measured and
responsible in their rhetoric so that the political institutions of the Good Friday
Agreement will not be damaged in the longer-term. I will continue to underline
this imperative in the weeks ahead, in support of the institutions of the
Agreement, and the principles upon which it stands.
We must never forget that the Good Friday Agreement - and the political
institutions it provides for: the power-sharing Executive; the Assembly; and,
the North-South and East-West institutions - was finally achieved in 1998,
following decades of horrendous violence, murder, fear and social breakdown,
suffered in particular by both communities in Northern Ireland.
It is critical that, following the Assembly election, each of the institutions of the
Agreement can operate, deliver and deal again with the issues of concern for
people, and that this should happen smoothly and promptly.
I am pleased to report from my discussions with the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, that both Governments are agreed that there must be a
singular focus on supporting the devolved institutions of the Good Friday
Agreement.
Alternatives to devolved government such as direct rule - are not being
contemplated. This provides very important reassurance to all communities in
Northern Ireland that they can rely on the institutions of the Good Friday
Agreement and rightly expect their elected representatives to work together
through these institutions to address the issues faced by citizens.
A number of Deputies have rightly raised concern at the impact of current
situation for preparing for and dealing with Brexit. The interests of the island
as a whole and protecting the gains of the peace process have been and will
remain as two of the four major priorities for the Government in the upcoming
Brexit negotiations.
As the Taoiseach has already outlined, the All-Island Civic Dialogue is a
valuable part of our Brexit preparations. The ongoing sectorals and the
Plenary, which he and I will co-host on 17 February, are crucial opportunities
for people across the island to contribute their perspectives, experience and
ideas on how we might best deal with the challenges of Brexit.
I am pleased to announce that on 13 February, I will convene a sectoral
consultation on the human rights aspects of the Good Friday Agreement,
which are so central to the peace process, and must be protected and
sustained, regardless of the UKs status in the EU. The Civic Dialogue does
not of course replace the need for devolved institutions which allow Northern
Irelands particular interests and concerns to be represented by those with a
direct local mandate. The Northern Ireland Executive has a crucial role to play
not least in engagement with both Governments.
Brexit however it proceeds and we have heard some further detail on the
UK position from Prime Minister May today - presents some of the most
fundamental and challenging questions for our island, that we have seen in a
generation or more. Citizens in Northern Ireland would be understandably
aggrieved if their elected representatives could not deal with the critical
responsibility of representing and pursuing Northern Irelands unique
circumstances and interests in this seismic negotiation.
The formation of the Executive after the election, and the related re-starting of
the work of the North South Ministerial Council, is therefore not only a political
imperative for both Governments, it is also an onerous obligation on the
parties in Northern Ireland.
Another responsibility that weighs heavily on all of us is dealing with the
legacy of the past. Like many others, I am frustrated that we have still not
reached an outcome on the Stormont House Legacy Institutions more than
2 years on. I want to acknowledge that there has been positive work and
discussions ongoing over the last number of months but victims and survivors
deserve that we the two Governments and the Northern Ireland political
parties collectively finish the job.
Whatever happens in the weeks ahead, I want to assure all with a stake and
an interest in this, that the Irish Government will remain steadfast in its
determination and efforts to ensure that these legacy institutions are
established at the earliest possible opportunity.

Ceann Comhairle,
The issue of unimplemented elements of the Good Friday Agreement and the
successor Agreements has rightly been raised by several speakers today.
As Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, I was to the fore in the negotiations
in 2014 that led to the Stormont House Agreement, during which the
Government advocated for progress on outstanding commitments from
previous Agreements.
Several of these are referenced in the Stormont House Agreement including
provisions on the Irish language, the obligation to promote a culture of
tolerance, mutual respect and mutual understanding at every level of society
and new priorities for North South cooperation. Unfortunately, as the
Taoiseach has already said - these renewed commitments, have not been
adequately demonstrated and that is something which much be addressed if
the devolved institutions are to thrive.
In the two years since Stormont House, I have engaged with the Executive
parties and the British Government, as appropriate to support progress with
these outstanding commitments from previous Agreements. Indeed at the last
two meetings Review Meetings most recently in mid-December I have
specifically raised these issues so that these outstanding commitments, which
go to the heart of the Good Friday Agreement, remain on the political agenda.
[I might add that at that Review meeting on 14 December last there was a
very positive discussion involving the former First and deputy First Ministers
and the Secretary of State and myself; indeed the constructive quality of the
discussion provided no hint of the speed with which matters subsequently
unravelled within the Executive.]
Now, as voters in Northern Ireland are being asked to go to polls for the
second time in eight months, the parties need to be mindful of their heavy
responsibility to re-establish the devolved institutions on the far side of polling
day. A scorched earth approach to campaigning, that agitates and divides for
partisan purposes, will only hamper the essential task of all parties re-
engaging in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect in the democratic
institutions of the Good Friday Agreement.
In this regard, as a co-guarantor of that Agreement, the Irish Government will
continue to work with the British Government and the political parties to fulfil
the full promise of that Agreement and to advance political stability,
reconciliation and economic prosperity in Northern Ireland.

Ends

Taoiseach's Speech on the 30th Anniversary of the

Anglo Irish Agreement
https://ec-media.sndcdn.com/azumoirmuTE2.128.mp3?
f10880d39085a94a0418a7ef69b03d522cd6dfee9399eeb9a522099a
6dfab73ea545775261b7a4c033f38742dae83fa88b83df88144a736d
c3b50a9f8ca795dbaa6c64a502

TheLoomingBattletheSecondLisbonTreaty
ReferendumandtheProspectofGuaranteesBeingOffered
toIreland

Dr.GavinBarrett

With local and European Parliament elections now over, another

long-awaited electoral battle now looms - the second Lisbon
Treaty referendum, expected to happen by the end of October.
Next Thursday and Fridays European Council summit in
Brussels will constitute a vital step on the way. The Brussels
summit will see Ireland offered a three-part deal, fleshing out
the outline agreement reached at last Decembers European
Council meeting.
First, Ireland will be given legally-binding guarantees by all
member states that the Lisbon Treaty will affect neither
corporate taxation nor Irish neutrality, nor Irish constitutional
guarantees regarding the right to life, education and the family.
The form these guarantees will take will be that a so-called
decision of the heads of state or government meeting within
the European Council. Such a decision does not amend the EU
Treaties. Nor does it even constitute an EU law instrument. It is
a kind of simplified international treaty. For political reasons,
the guarantees in any such decision will contain no substantive
commitments going beyond what is already in the Lisbon Treaty
itself. Otherwise, other member states would have to ratify it
i.e., effectively reopen painful parliamentary debates on Lisbon.
Instead the guarantees will constitute a commitment in
international law merely copperfastening those commitments
already in the Treaties which were apparently not believed by
Irish no voters the first time around. The intention is that the
guarantees will eventually be given protocol - full EU treaty
law - status by the accession Treaty of the next State to join the
EU likely to be that of Croatia, well after Irelands Autumn
referendum.
The second element of the Brussels package at least as
important - is that the member states will give a political
undertaking to use the Lisbon Treaty rules to ensure there
continues to be a national from each member state in the
Commission,
Thirdly, non-legally binding confirmation will be provided of
the high importance attached by the EU to workers rights, and
possibly in relation to other issues as well.
It seems likely that a number of further unilateral declarations
might simultaneously be made by Ireland itself at Brussels. At
any rate, someform of response will be made to the surprise call
by Green leader John Gormley last March for Irish withdrawal
from the European Defence Agency - although it seems unlikely
that Irish withdrawal will now occur.
Reported difficulties this week in securing final agreement seem
due to a number of factors - including the Governments
political need that Brussels be seen to meet the concerns of the
Irish electorate, and the understandable wishes of other states
that Ireland not gain anything from negotiations that they
themselves have not. The problems seem unlikely to derail a
deal next week.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468594

With the Brussels package in its pocket, the intention is that the
Government introduce a bill for a new referendum, to be passed
by the Oireachtas before the Dil Summer recess. The bill is
likely to go beyond simply facilitating ratification. It may
contain provision for more Oireachtas control over
Governmental action at EU level, a move which might help
counter criticisms that a second Lisbon referendum is
undemocratic and merely involves the same issue being put
before the people as last June.
Will such an Autumn referendum succeed? The recent Irish
Times/TNS mrbi opinion poll offers hope, showing continued
hardening support for ratification of the Lisbon Treaty
accompanied by appropriate guarantees, with 54% of the
electorate pronouncing themselves in favour and only 28%
opposed. Disastrous economic developments have undoubtedly
played a role in this change in public opinion persuading many
that this country can ill afford to gamble with its position in the
EU at a time like this.
Last Junes referendum, however, was preceded by the
evaporation of a commanding opinion poll lead held by the yes
side in the final weeks of campaigning. What guidance do recent
local and European Parliament elections offer us as to whether
the same could occur to the yes campaign again in the Autumn
poll?
With Mary Lou McDonald and Kathy Sinnott losing their seats
in the European Parliament, and Declan Ganley deciding not to
involve himself in a second Lisbon campaign in the wake of his
election failure and that of Libertas generally, 11 of the 12 MEPs
from the Republic are now pro-Treaty. But too much cannot be
read into the European Parliament elections. In the first place,
thanks to the Supreme Court decision in the Coughlancase and
to Broadcasting Commission rules, 50% of broadcast media
time is guaranteed to anti-Treaty campaigners in a referendum
completely independently of electoral representativity. In other
words, an electoral mandate counts for precisely nothing insofar
as concerns the assignment of media time between sides in a
referendum campaign. Paradoxically, an unelected Mary Lou
McDonald could conceivably play a highly prominent role in
the media in the next referendum notwithstanding the loss of her
seat.
Secondly, Declan Ganleys non-participation in a second
campaign does not rule out his providing resources. A campaign
with Ganley himself absent but ensuring access to the kind of
finance which Libertas deployed in the first referendum would
make a major impact on the no side particularly given the
effective prohibition placed on Government pro-Treaty
expenditure imposed by the Supreme Court decision in the
McKennacase.
It must also be of concern that this second referendum campaign
will be led by the most unpopular government in the history of
the State, compelled to engage in rigorous and unpopular
budgetary action (supported by a political party demoralised in
the wake of very poor local election performance) The
Opposition too has now expended large sums on its June
election victory. The capacity and will of all concerned to
campaign effectively in a referendum, and more particularly, the
ability of the two sides to cooperate remains unproven. Nor does
the almost complete lack of consultation by the Government of
the Opposition to date in the negotiation of the Brussels
guarantees to be offered to Ireland next week augur particularly
well for a
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468594
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second campaign. In the circumstances, the reported intention of

the Government to involve civil society more heavily in the
yes campaign may yet be sorely needed.
It is perhaps worth making the point that the first Lisbon Treaty
referendum confirmed long-standing United States experience in
state-level plebiscites that voters in referendum seldom approve
of proposals they feel they do not understand. Pro- Lisbon
Treaty campaigners will have to hope that next weeks package
of guarantees is not exploited by Eurosceptical opposition to
create even more confusion of the scale identified in the
Milward Browne survey as having been so fatal in last Junes
referendum.
Dr.GavinBarrettisaseniorlecturerintheSchoolofLaw,
UniversityCollegeDublin,specialisinginthelawofthe
EuropeanUnion.
Aslightlyeditedversionofthispaperwaspublishedinthe
SundayBusinessPostof13June,2009.
Ifyouhavefoundthispaperofinterest,youmaywishtogoto
thegeneralSSRNsearchpageandfindotherpapersbythe
samewriterbyenteringhisfirstandlastnamesinthespaces
providedforthispurpose.

The Lisbon European

Reform Treaty Impact on
Asylum and Immigration
Policy
<em style="font-size: 12px;">European Union
4.</em>

European Union: MW 82

Summary

Introduction

1. This article describes the changes proposed in

the powers and procedures of the EU institutions
for deciding European policy on asylum and
immigration questions in the new European Reform
Treaty (The Lisbon Treaty), signed by Gordon Brown
in Lisbon on 18th October 2007. I also try to assess
how these changes will affect the UKs freedom of
manoeuvre in deciding its own policies in these two
areas.

2. The main focus of the article is on the ways in

which the Lisbon Treaty increases the powers of
the EU institutions to decide and enforce policy in
these two areas and how the UK will be affected by
these changes. The article does not enter into
much detail on the EUs current or likely future
proposals on asylum and immigration issues. This
may be the subject of a subsequent article. I
comment in the final section of the main report on
the case for the EU having powers to legislate on
these issues. But I express no views on the merits
of either the EUs or the UKs policies on asylum
and immigration.
(a) Main Characteristics of the Lisbon Treaty

3. The Lisbon Treaty, although very different in

form, is (except on foreign policy) virtually identical
on all matters of substance to the European
Constitution, which it replaces following the latters
rejection by French and Dutch voters in their
referendums in 2005.

4. The new Treaty transfers powers from the

Member States to the EU institutions in four main
ways:
The creation of new, or the expansion of existing,
EU powers to legislate (EU competences);
The substitution of Qualified Majority Voting
(QMV) for unanimity in all areas of policy, except
for taxation, social security, foreign policy, security
and defence, some key EU budgetary issues
(including the UKs budget rebate) and one specific
area of policy relating to asylum and immigration
controls;
Changes in the weighted voting system for
determining Qualified Majorities within the Council
of Ministers, which from 2014 onwards will make it
more difficult for Member States to form blocking
minorities to influence EU legislation;
The incorporation in the Treaty of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR), which contains 50
political, justicial, economic and social rights. This
will give the European Court of Justice (ECJ) wide
powers to interpret the standards to be followed by
the EU institutions in making EU law and by the
Member States in implementing it and in some
cases in their national law.

(b) Asylum and Immigration

(i) General

5. All the four types of Treaty change just described

will affect the future making and implementation of
EU policies relating to asylum and immigration,
which are now contained within a part of the Treaty
entitled The Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice. The new Treaty, however, also retains,
with some amendments (discussed in more detail
in the main report), the UKs two existing opt-
outs from both the Schengen agreement on the
removal of internal frontier controls and from the
asylum and immigration provisions of the Treaty of
Amsterdam.

(b) (ii) EU Competences in Asylum and Immigration

6. The Lisbon Treaty significantly widens the EUs

competences for asylum and immigration
questions. First, the Treaty now sets the EU the
specific aim of developing common policies for
both asylum and immigration (legal as well as
illegal) and accordingly empowers it to legislate for
uniform standards (as opposed to the minimum
standards provided for in the Amsterdam Treaty)
and for the gradual introduction of an integrated
management system for external borders.
Second, the Treaty widens the EUs power to
legislate to define all the rights of third country
immigrants legally resident in one Member State,
including their rights to move to and reside in other
Member States. Virtually, the only major policy
decision left in the hands of Member States is that
of deciding how many nationals from non-EU
countries it is prepared to admit directly from third
countries. In short, the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU
almost as much power over asylum and
immigration issues as the CAP gives it over
agricultural policy.

7. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty removes

restrictions in the Amsterdam Treaty on the ECJs
jurisdiction over asylum and immigration policy,
which effectively prevented immigration cases
from being brought before the ECJ until they had
been taken to the highest court in the Member
State concerned. Again, however, our opt out
provides that no ECJ judgements interpreting any
legislation passed under the asylum and
immigration sections of the Treaty would apply to
the UK, unless we had opted into those measures.
However, our opt-out would not necessarily protect
us from judgements, which might be made by the
ECJ on immigration and asylum rights, relying
solely on the provisions of the CFR.

(b)(iii) Qualified Majority Voting

8. The Lisbon Treaty removes all national vetoes

over all asylum and immigration decisions. In
December 2004 the UK agreed to give away the
vetoes over asylum and illegal immigration issues,
but did not agree to remove the veto on legal
migration questions. This too has now been given
up. From 2014 onwards the changes in the
Councils voting system will make it more difficult
for the UK to protect its interests in all policy areas
where QMV applies. These two changes could
significantly affect the UKs decisions on whether
to opt in to new legislation on asylum and
immigration. Whenever the UK decides to opt in, it
will therefore have to face the risk that it may be
outvoted during the negotiations on points it
regards as vital.

(b)(iv) The Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)

9. The CFR sets out 50 fundamental political,

juridical and economic and social rights, drawn
from a variety of sources, including the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Charter
states that its provisions are addressed to the
institutionsof the Union and to the Member
States only when they are implementing Union
law. The CFR itself is given the same status as a
Union Treaty, with the proviso that nothing in it
extends the competences of the Union.The CFR
contains a number of provisions, which might in
principle be invoked in relation to aspects of
asylum and immigration policy. For example,
Article 19(2), following the ECHR, prohibits
extradition to a State where there is a serious risk
of being subjected to death, torture or other
inhuman or degrading treatment. Other articles in
the CFR set out in more detail below could affect
Member States rights to impose restrictions on
immigrants being joined by spouses or other family
members and to discriminate against immigrants
in matters of social security, social housing etc.

10. The impact of these and other CFR provisions is

very difficult to assess, because their meaning will
ultimately depend on how the ECJ interprets them
in particular cases. In the case of the UK and
Poland the ECJ also has to interpret a Protocol they
negotiated on how it will apply in their courts and
how it might affect their national legislation. The
Protocol certainly does not provide an opt-out
from the CFR for the UK and Poland, but it does
appear to offer an assurance that the articles on
economic and social rights in its Title IV will be
interpreted cautiously by the ECJ. But the UK and
Poland will still be exposed to the risks of cases
against them being referred to the ECJ on the
grounds that, in implementing Union law, they
have infringed rights and principles embodied in
the CFR, though the UKs opt-out from asylum and
immigration legislation explicitly protects us from
ECJ judgements relating to legislation from which
we have opted out. Moreover, it is possible that the
ECJ could take the view that some CFR provisions
create directly effective rights, even in the
absence of EU legislation, and in this event the UK
and other Member States could face challenges on
the grounds that their national legislation or
practices breach these provisions.

(b)(v) Overall Assessment

11. The main impact of the Lisbon Treatys

provisions on the UKs policies on asylum and
immigration is that the UKs decisions on whether
or not to opt-in to new EU legislative proposals will
become more problematic now that all such
legislation will now be decided by QMV. HMG will
need to balance the potential advantages of co-
operating with other Member States against the
risk of being outvoted in the Council of Ministers.
We are likely to be faced with particularly awkward
decisions when the Commission proposes to
amend previous asylum or immigration or asylum
decisions we have previously opted into and we
dislike the amendments proposed. We may then be
faced with losing the benefits of our previous opt-
in. A possible amendment, recently aired by the
Commission, to amend the Dublin Convention to
provide for burden-sharing between Member States
in receiving immigrants is an example of this
dilemma.

12. However, even if the UK adopted a firm policy

of opting-out of all new EU legislation on asylum
and immigration matters, there are still other ways
in which the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty could
affect the UKs policy in these areas. First, as noted
above, the Treaty could lead to our courts referring
to the ECJ more cases involving appeals by asylum
seekers against decisions by the UK authorities to
refuse them admittance or to repatriate them.
Second, if we decide to opt out of any EU proposal
to define the rights of third-country residents
residing in one Member State to move to and
reside, we would be faced with a potentially
difficult negotiation with other Member States on
what access we would give to this category of
migrant. Last, but not least, the UKs general room
for manoeuvre on a range of immigration issues
could be narrowed if the ECJ decides that some of
the relevant rights contained in the CFR have
direct effects rights for immigrants or their
families.
The Lisbon European Union Reform TreatyImpact
on Asylum and Immigration Policy

Main Report

(a) General nature of the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty, agreed by Gordon Brown and

the other Heads of State and Government in Lisbon
on 18th October, is (except on foreign policy)
virtually identical on all matters of substance in
both language and meaning to the draft European
Constitution, which it replaces following the latters
rejection by French and Dutch voters in their
referendums in 2005. Open Europe
(www.openeurope.org.uk), an independent think-
tank, which is campaigning for a referendum on
the Lisbon Treaty, has estimated that 96% of the
provisions in the new Treaty correspond exactly to
provisions in the draft Constitution. In form the
Lisbon Treaty is much more difficult to read than
the draft Constitution, since it consists of a series
of amendments to the EUs two earlier treaties,
theTreaty on European Union ( the TEU) and the
Treaty establishing the European Community (the
TEC), though the latter is now renamed the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
In contrast, the draft Constitution was a self-
contained document.

2. The stated purpose of the Lisbon Treaty (and of

the Constitution) is to make the EU institutions
more efficient to enable the EU to cope more
easily with its enlargement from 15 Member States
to 27 currently and potentially to well over 30. The
authors of the Treaty interpret this remit to mean
that they should make it easier for the enlarged EU
to pass new legislation, although independent
research suggests more new EU legislation has
gone through at a faster rate, since the
enlargement of the EU to 25 and subsequently to
27.

3. The new Treaty proposes the following main

changes, which transfer powers from the Member
States to the EU institutions in a variety of different
ways: -
The creation of new, or the expansion of existing,
EU powers to legislate (EU competences).
The substitution of Qualified Majority Voting
(QMV) for unanimity and the introduction of the full
co-decision legislative procedure, giving the
European Parliament (EP) full powers of
amendment, to 61 new areas of policy. As a result,
unanimity is now reserved only for taxation, social
security, certain areas of employment law,
strategic foreign policy and defence decisions,
some key EU budgetary issues ( including the UKs
rebate) and one specific area of policy relating to
free movement of persons;
Changes in the weighted voting system for
determining qualified majorities within the Council
of Ministers, which from 2014 onwards will reduce
the ability of the UK and all other Member States,
except Germany, to form blocking minorities to
influence EU legislation. Open Europe has
estimated that the UKs ability to form a blocking
minority will be reduced by around 30%;
The reduction of the size of the Commission, so
that each Member State will be without a
Commissioner for 5 years in every 15;
The incorporation in the Treaty of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR), which contains 50
political, juridical, economic and social rights. This
will give the European Court of Justice (ECJ) wide
powers to interpret the standards to be followed by
the EU institutions in making EU law, by Member
States in implementing EU law and in some cases
in making or applying national law;
The so-called self-amending provisions in the
Treaty, which will allow the European Council to
substitute QMV for unanimity in any or all of the
areas where national vetoes remain at any time.
Under this procedure no Treaty ratification would
be required to endorse the European Councils
decision, though individual national Parliaments
would have a right to object;
 The creation of an outside President of the
European Council and of a European Foreign
Minister in all but name.

4. The single most important transfer of a new

competence to the EU in the Lisbon Treaty is
probably in relation to police and criminal law
matters as well as civil law, which, except for
asylum and immigration issues, had previously
been contained in the so-called Third Pillar.
Under the Third Pillar action in this area had in the
main been confined to facilitating co-operation
between police and juridical authorities in dealing
with cross-frontier crime. The EU was only given
limited powers to legislate and the roles of the
Commission, the EP and the ECJ were severely
restricted. The Treaty of Amsterdam carved out the
Visa, Asylum and Immigration provisions from
the Third Pillar and turned them into an EU shared
competence, giving the Commission a full role,
but requiring unanimity for most legislation and
restricting access to the ECJ.

5. Title IV of Part III of the Lisbon Treaty abolishes

the Third Pillar altogether and brings all co-
operation on police matters and on civil and
criminal law, together with Visas, Asylum and
Immigration, into a shared competence, now
entitled The Area of Freedom, Justice and Home
Affairs. In relation to criminal law Title IV gives the
EU extensive powers to harmonise national laws
dealing with the juridical rights of criminals and
victims and other aspects of criminal law
procedures, including the penalties to be applied
for specified serious crimes. The new Title also
envisages the creation of a European Public
Prosecutor and enables Europol to initiate criminal
investigations in any Member State. QMV now
applies to all these issues, as do the normal
legislative procedures with the full involvement of
the Commission, the EP and the ECJ. The changes
proposed in respect of asylum and immigration are
discussed in more detail below.

6. The opt-out negotiated by the UK and Ireland

from the Visa, Asylum and Immigration
provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty is now widened
to cover all the provisions in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice Title of the Lisbon Treaty. The
opt-out is largely identical in substance to that
contained in the Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty.
Both countries retain the right to opt-in to
individual legislative proposals put forward by the
Commission on a case-by-case basis. They also
continue to enjoy the same protection from the
consequences of any international treaty
negotiated by the EU and from any judgements by
the ECJ on the basis of legislative provisions from
which either or both countries have opted out.

7. There are, however, two differences of

substance from the Amsterdam Treaty Protocol.
First, an amendment to the Protocol makes it clear
that the right to opt out applies not just to entirely
new proposals from the Commission, but also to
proposals to amend existing measures based on
Title IV of Part III, which either or both of the UK
and Ireland have already opted into. Further
amendments then lay down a detailed procedure
for dealing with situations, in which the UK or
Ireland decides to opt-out of the amending
measure, but the Council takes the view that the
non-participation of the UK or Ireland makes the
application of the amending measure, side by side
with the original provisions, inoperable for other
Member States. At the end of the procedure, if
either the UK or Ireland stick to their decision not
to opt-in to the new measure, the original measure
is effectively annulled and the Council is free to go
ahead and adopt the amending measure without
the opting-out State(s).

8. Moreover, the Protocol further provides that the

Council can decide by QMV on a proposal from the
Commission that where, as a result of this
procedure, the UK or Ireland cease to participate in
an existing measure which they had previously
accepted, the non-participating state or states
shall bear the direct financial consequences, if
any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as a
result of the cessation of its participation in the
existing measure. There is no definition of what is
meant by direct costs. It is not even clear
whether this means direct costs incurred by the
EU institutions or (more probably) those incurred
by the other Member States. Since, in the
circumstances hypothesised, it is likely that an
opting-out state will also incur additional costs
from ending its participation in the original
measure, a fairer solution would have been to let
any costs lie where they fell.

9. The EUs policy-making on asylum and

immigration matters will also be significantly
affected by the move to more QMV, the changes in
the Councils weighted voting system, the
reduction in the size of the Commission and the
treaty status given to the CFR. The last of these
changes will be discussed in more detail in the next
section, but it may be helpful to comment on the
first three in more general terms at this point.
10. The importance of a move from unanimity to
QMV in the EUs legislative procedures cannot be
underestimated. The EUs legislative history shows
that virtually every proposal put forward under
QMV is eventually adopted, even if in some cases
in a heavily amended form and many years later.
Relatively fewer proposals requiring unanimity are
adopted, particularly in sensitive areas such as
direct taxation and social security.

11. When it becomes evident in early official-level

discussions of a Commission proposal, to which
QMV applies, that its eventual adoption is likely, a
band-wagon effect develops and each Member
State focuses on getting the proposal amended to
protect its own national interests. In this context
the size of QMV required and its obverse, the
number of votes required to make a blocking
minority, are crucial. Contrary to what the term
implies blocking minorities are rarely used to
block proposals altogether. Nor does the blocking
minority necessarily have to be formed by Member
States, which share the same interests. Rather the
existence of a blocking minority creates a
breathing space for the Member States in question
to persuade the Commission and the other Member
States (in particular the Member State holding the
Presidency) that their amendments are reasonable
and do not conflict with the main object of the
proposal.

12. Persuading the Commission to come on board

is particularly crucial, because it plays a pivotal
role in the negotiations in the Council of Ministers.
The Commission not only puts forward the initial
proposal, but also has the power to amend it both
to help the Council to reach a common position
and subsequently to broker a deal between the
Council and the EP. Having the Commissions
support for an amendment is crucial, because only
a proposal supported by the Commission can be
adopted by QMV; without Commission support the
Council can only amend a Commission proposal by
unanimity. Given the Commissions role, the
proposal to reduce the size of the Commission, so
that in 5 out of every fifteen years a Member State
will not be represented in it, is potentially
damaging to all Member States. There is very little
cross-departmental consultation between
Commission officials at levels below the
Commission itself. It is the full body of
Commissioners, which has to approve every new
legislative proposal and every subsequent
amendment to the original proposal. Significant
changes to legislation are quite often introduced in
the Commission itself as a result of behind the
scenes trading by individual Commissioners. One
of the Declarations attached to the Lisbon Treaty
commits the Commission to consult particularly
closely with the Member States not represented in
it on the preparation of new legislation. But at best
this will be a poor substitute for having ones own
Commissioner at the Commission table when
legislative decisions are taken.

13. The changes proposed in the Lisbon Treaty to

alter the weighted voting system to make it more
difficult for Member States to form a blocking
minority and to reduce the size of the Commission
are clearly intended to make it more difficult for all
Member States to hold up or amend EU legislation.
The UK is arguably particularly likely to suffer as a
result of these changes, because we have a
number of special interests and characteristics
which are not shared by many other Member
States, notably our system of common law,
(including our historic civil liberties), our general
preference for light-touch and permissive
legislation, our island status and the dominance of
financial services in our economy.

The UKs red lines.

14. The main argument now advanced by the

British Government against holding the referendum
promised before the last General Election is that
their success in protecting their red lines in the
negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty makes one
unnecessary. This argument is unconvincing. The
red lines(which relate to the national vetoes on
taxation, foreign policy and social security, to the
impact of the CFR and to the harmonisation of
criminal law) are in substance very little different
from those negotiated by Tony Blair in relation to
the draft Constitution and therefore pre-date the
promise of a referendum. One of the red lines,
the maintenance of unanimity voting on taxation,
was never seriously at risk in either the
negotiations on the European Constitution or on
the Lisbon Treaty. The new Treaty preserves
unanimity for legislation harmonising social
security, but allows the Council of Ministers (the
ordinary Council, not the European Council) to
remove this veto and the veto on the conditions of
employment of third country nationals without any
need for ratification by national Parliaments. The
provisions on foreign policy, although improved to
make it clear that Member States retain their
sovereign rights to determine their own foreign
policy, still allow QMV on several issues, including,
importantly, on any proposal submitted by the EUs
High Representative on Foreign and Security Policy.

15. The Protocol negotiated by the UK and Poland

in relation to the CFR is discussed in more detail
below. But it is in no sense an opt out from the
CFR. At best it appears to offer an assurance that
the CFR provisions on economic and social rights
will be interpreted cautiously by the EUs
institutions. But it is not clear that even this will be
binding on the ECJ, which has the last word.

16. The UKs opt out from any legislation under

provisions under the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice is genuine enough, but its existence in
no way weakens the case for a referendum. As
noted above, the obverse of the UKs right to opt
out is its right to opt-in to individual measures, (as
it has done four times in exercising its similar right
to opt-in to measures on asylum). The Government
can commit itself to opt-in to any proposals put
forward by the Commission to use the new criminal
law powers, as well as on asylum, immigration,
under Title IV of the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice provisions without even a vote in the House
of Commons. So for those British voters who are
opposed in principle to the EU having the power to
legislate on some or all of these matters the opt-
out provides no guarantee that the UK will not
accept EU jurisdiction and legislation in this
sensitive area.

17. In short, with the exception of the Title IV opt-

out, the red lines do very little to mitigate most
of the major shifts of power to the EU institutions
described in paragraph 3 above.
(b) Asylum and Immigration Policy

(I) EU competences in Asylum and Immigration

18. The Treaty of Amsterdam set goals for

achieving only minimum standards in relation to
the admission and treatment of asylum seekers
and did not envisage a common policy either for
asylum or for legal or illegal immigration issues.

19. The Lisbon Treaty, which, as noted above,

preserves the UK and Irish opt-outs in this area of
policy, widens the EUs competences in a number
of ways. First, Article 61(2) of the Treaty now sets
the EU the goal of framing:
A common policy on asylum, immigration and
external border controls, based on solidarity
between Member States, which is fair towards third
country nationals. For this purpose stateless
persons shall be treated as third country
nationals.

20. To achieve these goals Articles 63 and 63a

specify that the European Union shall: -
Develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary
protection and temporary protection with a view to
offering appropriate status to any third-country
national requiring international
protection.in accordance with the Geneva
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31
January 1967.
And (in relation to legal immigration) shall: -
Develop a common immigration policy aimed at
ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management
of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country
nationals residing legally in Member States, and
the prevention of, and enhanced measures to
combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in
human beings.

21. In keeping with this emphasis on common

policies, Article 62 of the Lisbon Treaty mandates
the adoption of a common policy on visas and
other short-stay residences and the gradual
establishment of an integrated management
system for external borders. Similarly, Article 63
of the Lisbon Treaty empowers the EU institutions
to legislate for a common European asylum
system based on uniform standards ( as
opposed to the minimum standards provided for
in the Amsterdam Treaty) in the following areas:-
A uniform status of asylum for nationals of third
countries;
A uniform status of subsidiary protection for
nationals of third countries, who, without obtaining
European asylum, are in need of international
protection;
A common system of temporary protection for
displaced persons in the event of a massive inflow;
Common procedures for the granting and
withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary
protection.

22. Article 63a follows the Amsterdam Treaty in

granting to the EU a power to legislate on
conditions of entry and residence and the
standards to be used by Member States in issuing
long-term visas and residence permits and also on
illegal and unauthorised residence, including
removal and repatriation of persons residing
without authorisation. It appears to go further
than Amsterdam in including a commitment to the
fair treatment of third-country nationals residing
legally in Member States, which is followed up in
Article 63a,2(b), which grants the EU a power to
adopt legislation on:-
The definition of the rights of third-country
nationals residing legally in a Member State,
including the conditions governing freedom of
movement and of residence in other Member
States

The Amsterdam Treaty had been limited to the last

part of this clause, dealing only with the conditions
governing freedom of movement and residence in
other Member States. The amended wording
appears to cover the possibility of EU legislation
defining third country residents rights in areas
such as access to social security and other social
and civil rights.

23. It is unclear at this stage whether these

references to common policies and uniform
standards will lead to significant changes in EU
policy or in the legislation already adopted. In
relation to the treatment of asylum-seekers, for
example, different Member States have in the past
applied more or less restrictive (or liberal)
interpretations of the Geneva Convention. The
minimum standards contained in the asylum
legislation adopted under the Amsterdam Treaty
(which the UK opted into) and also immigration
measures on e.g. Family Reunification and
Admission of Students (neither of which the UK
opted into) allow the Member States a degree of
freedom to maintain their differences of
interpretation and historic links with particular third
countries. There is a risk that these differences
would be removed entirely by the adoption of
common standards, which could be too restrictive
for some Member States and too liberal for others.
The Commission has already announced that it
wishes to move towards burden-sharing between
Member States in accepting asylum-seekers. If
such a move were agreed, it would increase the
pressure to adopt common standards, probably at
the most restrictive level.

24. Again, in relation to legal immigration, a

common European Green Card system, which
has been suggested by Signor Frattini, the member
of the Commission responsible for asylum and
immigration, would not necessarily accommodate
the economic needs of particular Member States to
attract immigrants with particular skills or their
historic links with particular third countries.

25. It is also unclear at this stage what is meant by

the development of an integrated management
system for external borders. If all that is meant is
co-operation and exchanges of information
between the Member States and perhaps financial
and material assistance of the type now being
given to the newer Member States, that would
seem uncontroversial. Detailed Commission
intervention or oversight by the Commission seems
neither acceptable nor desirable.

26. In addition to common policies on asylum and

immigration, Article 62,3, creates a specific power
to adopt by unanimity, after consulting the
European Parliament: -
Measures concerning passports, identity cards,
residence permits or any other such document,
where this is necessary to facilitate the free
movement of European citizens.

27. It is debatable how far this provision is entirely

new. Article 18 of the Section of the Amsterdam
Treaty, dealing with the rights of EU citizens, gave
the Council a general power to legislate, where the
Treaties did not otherwise provide the necessary
powers in order to facilitate the free movement of
EU citizens and their right to reside in other
Member States. This made no specific reference to
a power to legislate on travel or identity
documents. (The EU had, of course, already
introduced the common format for Member States
passports in the 1980s, now probably quite
uncontroversial). In its new position among the
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice provisions
the more explicit power would appear to be
covered by the UK/Ireland opt-out. EU legislation,
requiring Member States to have identity cards,
would clearly be controversial in the UK.

28. Article 63,a,3 empowers the EU to conclude

agreements with third countries:-
For the readmission to their countries of origin or
provenance of third-country nationals who do not
or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry,
presence or residence in. one of the Member
States.

29. Again, although the wording of this Article is

new, the substance is not, since the EU has already
negotiated four so-called Re-admission Agreements
with Hong Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka and Albania and
further agreements are under negotiation. These
were presumably based on the reference to
measures on the repatriation of illegal
immigrants in Article73k (3)(b) of the Amsterdam
Treaty. Neither the Amsterdam Treaty nor the new
wording in the Lisbon Treaty would give the EU an
exclusive power to negotiate Treaties on this
subject. It would in theory at least remain a
mixed competence, though, once the EU had
negotiated such an agreement with a particular
third country, the Member States power to do so
would fall away.

30. As noted above, the UK retains the right to opt

out of any international agreement negotiated by
the EU on any aspect of asylum and immigration
policy, if HMG wishes to do so. Articles 2 and 6 of
the UK and Irelands original opt out Protocol from
the Sections of the AmsterdamTreaty dealing with
asylum and immigration specify that no provision
of any international agreement concluded by the
Union pursuant to those Sections..shall be
binding upon or applicable in the UK or Ireland,
unless they opt-in to the agreements in question.
However, it is understood that the UK has
supported the four agreements referred to above
and will be covered by them.

31. Last but not least, the Lisbon Treaty repeals the
limitations in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which
effectively prevented immigration cases being
brought before the ECJ until they had been taken to
the highest court in the Member State concerned.
The ECJ will now have the same jurisdiction in
relation to asylum and immigration matters as it
has in relation to any of the traditional areas of EU
common policies. Again, however, Articles 2 and 6
of the UK and Irelands opt-out Protocol specify that
no decision by the ECJ shall be binding upon or
applicable in the UK or Ireland; and that no
such.decision shall in any way affect he
Community or Union acquis nor form any part of
Union law as they apply to the UK and Ireland,
except to the extent that they have opted into the
measures in question. The ECJ would, however, be
able to hear cases referred to it by lower level UK
courts relating to appellants on migration issues
where they could claim that the UK had breached
any EU asylum or immigration legislation, which
the UK had opted into or, if, as is possible, the ECJ
decides that relevant rights contained in the CFR
have direct effect. The removal of the limitations
on the ECJs jurisdiction could well lead to more
asylum cases being referred earlier by UK courts;
(under the Amsterdam Treaty only one UK asylum
case has reached the ECJ).

32. Leaving aside the effects of the UK/Ireland opt-

outs, the consequence of all these changes is that
virtually the only major policy decision left solely in
the hands of the Member States is, as stated in
Article 69b, 5, is that of deciding how many
nationals from non-EU countries it is prepared to
admit directly from countries. The ability of the
Member States to control the total volume of
immigration into their territories will, however, also
be constrained by how the EU exercises its right to
legislate on the right of third-country immigrants,
who are legally resident in one Member State, to
move to and reside in other Member States. This in
turn may be influenced by ECJ interpretations of
the CFR.

33. In short, the Lisbon Treaty gives the EU powers

to manage common policies on asylum and
immigration almost as extensive as they now have
over agriculture under the CAP.

(b)(ii) Asylum and Immigration: Qualified Majority

Voting
34. As previously proposed in the draft
Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty removes all national
vetoes over asylum and immigration decisions,
with the single exception, referred to above of
legislative proposals on passports, identity cards
etc. In December 2004 the UK agreed as part of a
scheduled review of the unanimity provisions of the
Amsterdam Treaty to give away the vetoes over
asylum and illegal immigration issues, (no doubt
because they had already conceded this in the
negotiations on the draft Constitution). But we did
not agree at that stage to remove the veto on legal
migration questions. This too has now been
conceded. In addition, as noted above, from 2014
onwards the changes in the Councils voting
system will make it more difficult for the UK to
protect its interests in all policy areas where QMV
applies. These two changes (and the shadow cast
by the CFR) will complicate the UKs exercise of its
right to opt-into new proposals on asylum and
immigration issues. The UK has to decide whether
to opt-into a new proposal within three months of it
being tabled by the Commission. Once it has
committed itself to opt-in, the UK cannot thereafter
back out of the negotiations if they take an
unwelcome turn. Whenever the UK opts-in, it will
therefore have to run the risk that it may be
outvoted during the negotiations on points it
regards as vital.

35. The UK is liable to be faced with some

particularly difficult decisions, when the
Commission makes proposals to amend EU
legislation, which the UK has opted into, because
of the punitive provisions for opting out now
introduced into the UKs opt-out Protocol (see
paragraphs 7-8 above). A potential example of this
emerged recently, when Signor Frattini outlined
possible Commission proposals to amend the
Dublin Convention, which contains the agreed EU
rules for determining which Member State is
responsible for handling asylum applications,
where the applicant has no particular connection
with any Member State. The existing Convention
allows the UK to send back about 100 immigrants
per month to the first Member State, which they
had entered. Signor Frattini now envisages a
system of burden-sharing to relieve countries such
as Italy and Malta, which currently receive large
numbers of immigrants arriving from North Africa.
If this proposal were tabled, the UK would have to
balance the benefits it receives under the existing
Convention against the risks of being required
either to contribute financially to Italy and Malta or
to take some of their immigrants. (The UKs
decision on whether or not to opt-into the
negotiations could, of course, be affected by the
attitude of other northern Member States towards
the burden-sharing proposals).

(b)(iii) The Charter of Fundamental Rights: possible

relevance to asylum and immigration.

36. The 50 fundamental political, juridical and

economic and social rights in the CFR are drawn
from a variety of sources. The political and juridical
rights come mainly from the European Convention
on Human Rights (the ECHR). The economic and
social rights come mainly from the European Social
Charter of 1996 and the Community Charter on the
Rights of Workers signed in 1961. Some provisions
are drawn from or influenced by the case law of
the ECJ itself, some are simply taken over from
other provisions in the Treaty and others come
partly or (in a very few cases) entirely from the
national legislation or traditions of Member States.

37. The Charter in its current text was adopted as a

political text in December 2000 simultaneously
with the agreement on the Treaty of Nice, but at
that stage had no legal force. It was incorporated
as Part II of the European Constitution after the UK
had dropped its resistance. Article 6 of the Lisbon
Treaty now states that the CFR shall have the
same legal value as the Treaty.

38. The CFR states in its preamble that it reaffirms

the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in
the Union and makes those rights more visible, but
does not create new rights or principles. Its
provisions are addressed to the institutions..of
the Union and to the Member States only when
they are implementing Union law. All the
addressees shall therefore respect the rights,
observe the principles and promote the application
thereof in accordance with their respective powers
and respecting the limits of the powers of the
Union as conferred on it in the other Parts of the
constitution. Article 1(2) of the CFR makes it clear
that the Charter does not extend the field of
application of Union law beyond the powers of the
Union or establish any new power or task for the
Union. The Treaty also contains an official
commentary on the Charter produced by a group
of lawyers acting under the aegis of the
Convention, which drafted the Constitution. Article
52 of the CFR states that this commentary shall
be given due regard by the courts of the Union and
the Member States. This formula, of course,
leaves the courts free to take a different view.
39. Two main concerns have been expressed about
incorporating the CFR into Union law. First, as
noted above, a number of its articles are based on
the provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and accordingly the ECJ
becomes an alternative forum to the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Article 52 of
the CFR gives an assurance that, insofar as the
CFR contains rights, which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope
of those rights will be the same as those laid down
by the latter and subject to the same qualifications
and limitations. This is reassuring as far as it goes.
However, Article 52 adds that: This provision shall
not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection. This addition seems likely to prove an
irresistible temptation to lawyers to take their
clients cases to the ECJ rather than the Strasbourg
Court, where there is an opening to do so.

40. Second, Title IV of the CFR (entitled

Solidarity) gives binding legal Second status to a
wish-list of very loosely-phrased social and
economic objectives, covering almost every aspect
of social, economic and labour market policies.
While few would quarrel with the general drift of
many of these provisions as broad aspirations,
their incorporation as fundamental rights in the
Charter will put the ECJ in the position of the final
arbiter of how they should be translated into
detailed policies. This is a function which has
hitherto and should more properly continue to be
carried out by democratically accountable
governments. How the ECJ interprets many of
these principles and rights could lead to
substantially increased transfers of resources from
Member States taxpayers to the beneficiaries or
impose other economic costs.

41. Ten Articles in the CFR contain provisions,

which on the face of it could be invoked in relation
to asylum or immigration issues. Nine of them
come from a list published by Open Europe in
their detailed commentary on the Lisbon Treaty;
the tenth (Article 34) is my own addition. They are
set out below, followed by a statement taken from
the official commentary on the sources from which
each provision has been taken. In some cases I
have added a comment on how the provision might
be invoked in relation to asylum and immigration
issues, usually on a worst-case hypothesis:-
Article 18:-The right to asylum shall be
guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the New
York Protocol of 31January 1967 relating to the
status of refugees and in accordance with the
Treaty establishing the European Community;
(Source:- Article 63 of the EC Treaty, now replaced
by Article 63 of the amended Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU (TFEU);
Article 19: - (1) Collective expulsions are
prohibited. (2) No one may be removed, expelled,
extradited to a State where there is a serious risk
that he or she would be subjected to the death
penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. (Sources: -Article 19(1)
is drawn from Article 4 of Protocol No 4 to the
ECHR; Article19 (2) incorporates case-law from the
European Court of Human Rights regarding Article
3 of the ECHR. Comment:-In principle, Article 19(2)
might be invoked to challenge repatriations based
on a Memorandum of Understanding about the
future treatment of those repatriated between a
Member State and /or the EU and a third country).
 Article 4: - No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or to other degrading treatment.
(Source: - Article 4 of the ECHR. Comment: - this
could be invoked alongside Article 19).
Article 9: -The right to marry and found a family
is guaranteed in accordance with the national laws
governing the exercise of these rights. (Source:
-Based on Article 12 of the ECHR).
Article 7: - Everyone has the right to respect for
his or her private and family life, home and
communications. (Source: -Article 8 of the ECHR.
Comment: - Both Articles 7 and 9 are both worded
somewhat more broadly than their ECHR
equivalents. It seems possible that either or both of
these articles could be invoked to challenge
specific barriers in EU legislation or imposed by
Member States to permitting the immigration of
spouses or intended spouses or other family
members from third countries).
Article 15(3) Nationals of third countries, who
are authorised to work in the territories of the
Member States are entitled to working conditions
equivalent to those of citizens of the Union.
(Source: - This paragraph is said by the official
commentary to be based on Article I37 (1)(g) of
the TEC and also on Article19 (4) of the 1961
European Social Charter. The official commentary
adds that this is a right, which falls under Article 52
(2) of the Charter and therefore has to be exercised
under the conditions and limits defined by that
Treaty provision. Comment: -The wording of the
CFR Article seems to go well beyond Article 137(1)
(g), which together with Article 137(2) merely
permits the Council of Ministers to legislate by
unanimity to set minimum standards on the
conditions of employment for third-country
nationals legally residing in Union territory. There
would seem to be some risk that the ECJ might
ignore the commentary and apply a more
extensive interpretation.
Article 21: - (1) Any discrimination based on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social
origin genetic features, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual
orientation shall be prohibited. (2) Within the scope
of application of the Treaty establishing the
European Community and of the Treaty on
European Union, and without prejudice to the
special provisions of those Treaties, any
discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall
be prohibited. (Sources: - Article 13 of the EC
Treaty and its equivalent in the Lisbon Treaty,
Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 11 on the
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
Comment: -According to the official commentary
the provision in paragraph 1 does not lay down a
sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-
ranging areas or create a power to enact anti-
discrimination laws. The implication of the
commentary appears to be that the ECJ would be
cautious in interpreting this provision except where
specific EU legislation had been adopted. However,
unlike the ECHR equivalent, this Article could be
combined with other CFR provisions to allow the
non-discrimination requirement to be applied to a
wide variety of EU policies, e.g. the social security
rights of short-term immigrants. It also looks
possible that a test case could be brought e.g.
challenging repatriation of an immigrant where this
was based on the grounds of promoting or
supporting terror in a political statement).
Article 34: - (2) and (3) Everyone residing and
moving legally within the European Union is
entitled to social security benefits and social
advantages in accordance with Union laws and
national laws and practices. (3)The Union
recognises and respects the right to social and
social housing assistance.in accordance with the
rules laid down by Union law and national laws and
practices. (Source: -The European Social Charter,
the Community Charter of Workers Rights and the
rules arising from Regulations No 1408/71 and
1612/68. Comment: This Article could be invoked,
together with the non-discrimination provision in
Article 31 to ask the ECJ to outlaw any form of
discrimination between citizens and even
temporary residents);
Article 45(2): - Freedom of movement and
residence may be granted, in accordance with the
Treaty establishing the European Community, to
nationals of third countries legally resident in the
territory of a Member State.. (Source: -Article63a
(2) b of the TFEU. Comment: - The official
commentary on this Article makes it clear that
since this right is based on another provision in the
body of the Treaty, the granting of this right
depends on the EU institutions exercising their
power to legislate on this matter. In this case the
UKs opt-out would protect it from any ECJ
judgement on this matter, assuming we opted out
of any proposal under Article 63a(2) b to define the
freedom of movement etc of third country
residents legally resident in other Member States
into the UK).
Article 47(2): -Everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law. Everyone shall have the
possibility of being advised, defended and
represented.. (Source: -Article 6(1) of ECHR.
Comment; -This provision might be used to
challenge Member States appeal systems for
dealing with immigration cases. Some of the
provisions of recent UK anti-terror legislation might
also be open to challenge under this provision).

42. The impact of these and other CFR provisions is

particularly difficult to assess, because their
meaning will ultimately depend on how the ECJ
interprets them in particular cases. There are
strong differences of view between expert
European lawyers on the significance of the
decision to give the CFR Treaty status. Some
(usually pro-European lawyers) argue that making
the CFR legally binding is unlikely to make much
difference to the judgements reached by the ECJ. I
understand that one commentator has even
described the Charter as a paper tiger. Lawyers,
who defend this view, point in particular to the
assertion in the CFR itself that it does not create
any new rights or principles, but only reaffirms
existing ones. They also point out correctly that the
protection of fundamental rights, in particular
those contained in the ECHR, has been a part of
the European legal system and recognised by the
ECJ for many decades. On the other side of the
argument, in 2005 Open Europe interviewed a
number of past and present judges and advocates-
general of the ECJ several of whom asserted that
the CFR would have a substantial impact on the
ECJs work-load and jurisprudence.

43. The argument that all the EU institutions have

already been long committed to the observance of
the human rights contained in the ECHR and that
the ECJ has been ready, where necessary to
enforce them is indisputable and to that extent the
simple incorporation of the ECHR'sprovisions in
the CFR is not an innovation. But in my view that
falls well short of justifying the claim that the CFR
will have little or no substantive effect on the
making and implementation of law within the EU.

44. The assertion in the preamble to the CFR that it

does not create new rights and principles itself
verges on the disingenuous, since the social and
economic rights and principles contained in Title IV
of the CFR previously had no status in EU law at all
and in past judgements the ECJ refused to take the
CFR into account when invited to do so, inter alia,
because it had no status. Moreover, thirteen of the
articles in the Charter are derived at least in part
from the ECJs own past jurisprudence, two Articles
are taken from the Schengen Treaty to which the
UK, Ireland and Denmark are not parties and
several Articles come from the 1996 European
Social Charter to which the UK and various other
Member States were never parties.

45. Even in relation to the rights taken over from

the ECHR, in some cases the wording has been
amended to widen the protection. In other cases
their inclusion within the CFR may implicitly widen
their scope For example, the non-discrimination
provisions in Article 21 of the CFR, quoted above,
are in part derived from Article 14 of the ECHR.
However, the application of the latter is explicitly
limited to the other political and juridical rights and
freedoms within the ECHR. Article 31 of the CFR
does not seem to be so limited. On the contrary,
the official commentary declares that it can be
applied to discriminations in all other areas of
Union law, including presumably economic and
social legislation.
46. So the CFR in practice requires the EUs
institutions and its Member States to comply with a
more extensive array of human rights than was
previously the case. This will have an impact in
three ways. First, the Commission, the Member
States acting in Council and the EP will all be
explicitly required to take all the CFRs provisions
into account , when legislating. There is a well-
founded expectation that Commission officials are
already busy preparing new legislation to
implement provisions in the CFR. Second, the
Member States are obliged to observe the CFR
when they are implementing EU law.

47. Third, litigants will be able for the first time

directly or indirectly through thir national courts to
ask the ECJ to interpret the provisions of the CFR
and to decide the how they apply to their particular
case. In the case of the economic and social rights
in Title IV, the ECJ, as noted above, would be
breaking new ground in such judgements.
Concerns have been expressed, for example, as to
whether the the derogation in the Working Time
Directive, which allows UK workers to agree
contractually with their workers to work for longer
than the 48 hours per week average specified in
the Directive may be open to challenge under
Article 31(2) of the CFR. But even in relation to the
rights taken over from the ECHR, the ECJ is
explicitly allowed under Article 52 of the CFR to
provide more extensive protection. Against this
background it is only realistic to expect that there
will be some judicial surprises in store.

48. It should also be noted that, although the CFR

applies to Member States only when they are
implementing EU law,, the definition of EU law
goes wider than the subordinate legislation
(Directives and Regulations) adopted by the
Council of Ministers and the EP and includes the
text of the Treaties themselves and therefore the
text of the CFR itself. Moreover, the ECJ has in a
number of policy areas evolved a doctrine of
direct effect, which they have used to infer the
existence of rights and obligations from the texts
of the Treaties even in the absence of subordinate
legislation. Two of the ECJ judges interviewed by
Open Europe in 2005 (former Judge Puissochet
and Judge Arestis) appear to envisage that the ECJ
may interpret some of the provisions of the CFR as
having such direct effects. For example,
European Court Judge George Arestis commented
that The EU Charter could be used to deliver
rights at work (i) as a legal source, by itself,
through the doctrines of direct and indirect
effect and (ii) as a basis for challenging national
law, which incorrectly or inadequately transposes
EU law.

49. The possibility that the ECJ may be able to

decide that some provisions in the CFR have direct
effect also seems to be borne out by the official
commentary on the Charter. This states that Article
52(5) draws a distinction between rights and
principles set out in the Charter. Article 52(5)
makes it clear that principles have to be
implemented through the legislative or executive
acts (adopted by the Union in accordance with its
powers and by the Member States only when they
implement Union law). Accordingly, the
commentary states, they become significant for
the Courts only when such acts are interpreted or
reviewed. They do not, however, give rise to direct
claims for positive action by the Unions
institutions or Member States authorities. This
statement appears to leave it open to the ECJ to
find that some of the rights in the CFR are
capable of giving rise to direct claims for positive
action by the Union or Member States.
Unfortunately, the commentary offers the reader
no clear guidance on how to distinguish
principles from rights in the CFR; and the word
principle only occurs in one of the six articles it
lists.

50. Some close observers of the ECJ discount the

risk of the ECJ finding that provisions in the CFR
have direct effect on the grounds that the ECJ has
become much more cautious in recent years both
in applying the doctrine of direct effect and,
more generally, in making radical judgements in
sensitive areas of economic and social policy. This
may be true in the short-term. But the ECJ, like the
Supreme Court of the United States, has
sometimes changed direction sharply following
changes in the zeitgeist or in the composition of
the Court itself. The possibility that the ECJ may
find that some provisions in the CFR have direct
effect can certainly not be ruled out. The notion
that fundamental rights need only be applied by
Member States, when they are implementing EU
law, will be unappealing to legal minds.

51. In relation to asylum and immigration (and to

the area of criminal law) the risks of UK policy
being overturned by adverse judgements from the
ECJ are clearly less than in other areas of EU policy,
because of our right to opt out of new legislation.
As noted in paragraph 6 above our opt-out Protocol
states (Article 2) that no decision by the Court of
Justice of the European Union interpreting any
measure from which we have opted out shall be
binding upon or applicable to the UK or Ireland.
However, the question arises whether this
immunity would in practice apply if the ECJ found
that either a Directive or a Member States
implementations of it were in breach of human
rights within the CFR. If a follow-up case against
the UK were referred to the ECJ by a UK court in
respect of UK practices, which were identical to
those of another Member State, which the ECJ had
already condemned, would the ECJ agree that the
UK need not uphold the human right in question,
because we had opted out of the Directive? Or
would they find a way of deeming it to be a
directly effective right? For that matter would the
British courts accept that a breach of the CFR by
the UK would be acceptable in these
circumstances? It is only fair to add that cases
involving the classical liberal and political and
juridical rights stemming from the ECHR could
already be brought to the UK courts under our own
Human Rights Act.

52. Any discussion of the CFR would be incomplete

without considering the Protocol negotiated by the
UK and Poland, which the UK Government has
claimed makes the incorporation of the CFR into
the Treaty acceptable to the UK. The text of the
Protocol is as follows:-
Article 1(1) The Charter does not extend the
ability of the Court Of Justice, or any Court or
tribunal of Poland or the United Kingdom to find
that the laws, regulations or administrative
provisions, practices or action of Poland or the
United Kingdom are inconsistent with the
fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it
reaffirms.
Article1(2) In particular, and for the avoidance of
doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates
justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United
Kingdom, except in so far as Poland or the United
Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national
law.
Article 2 To the extent that a provision of the
Charter refers to national laws and practices, it
shall only apply to Poland and the United Kingdom
to the extent that the rights or principles that it
contains are recognised in the law or practices of
Poland or of the United Kingdom.

53. The Protocol is obscurely worded and, like the

CFR itself, its interpretation will be decided by the
ECJ in dealing with any cases where a UK Court
refers a case to the ECJ. It is clear, however, that
the Protocol in no sense provides the UK or Poland
with an opt-out from any of the CFRs provisions.
The UK and Poland, like all other Member States,
will be exposed to the risk of cases being brought
against them on the grounds that, in implementing
Union law (defined broadly as explained in
paragraph 25 above) they have infringed rights
embodied in the CFR. The comments in the next
three paragraphs are inevitably more speculative.

54. The assurance in Article 1(1) of the Protocol

that the CFR does not extend the ability of either
the ECJ to find that the laws..etc of the UK or
Poland inconsistent with the fundamental rights,
freedoms and principles that it reaffirms seems to
be no more than a repetition of the assertion in the
preamble that the CFR does not create any new
rights and the implicit consequence that the courts
could already have made such findings on the
basis that the rights already existed either in the
ECHR or EU law or in Member States law.

55. Articles 1(2) and 2 of the Protocol do, however,

seem to go a little way beyond a mere clarification
of the meaning of the CFR. Article1 (2) appears to
indicate that nothing in Title IV of the CFR (entitled
Solidarity) will create directly justiciable rights
applicable in the UK or Poland, except to the extent
that the rights or principles it contains are already
recognised in the UK or Polish law. The implication
is that, unless UK (or Polish) law already recognised
such rights, they would only be crystallised to the
extent that future EU legislation formulated them
precisely. Since one of the main concerns in the UK
about the CFR has been about the impact of the
social and economic rights in Title IV, this
assurance may provide some limited comfort.
Second, Article 2 of the Protocol appears to
promise that where a provision in the CFR relies on
national laws and practices, the UK would not be
held to a stricter interpretation of the provision
than that implied by its own national laws and
practices.

56. Given the uncertainties about the impact of the

CFR, it should be stressed again that the final word
on its interpretation and that of the UK-Polish
Protocol rests with the ECJ alone. Most of the legal
experts interviewed by Open Europe rejected the
proposition that the Protocol created a special
regime for the UK and Poland and were more
generally sceptical that any safeguards, which the
Protocol may create for the UK and Poland, would
survive the scrutiny of the EC.

(b)(iv) Overall Assessment

57. The amendments made to the EUs asylum and
immigration regime by the Lisbon Treaty, in
particular the move to a common policy with
uniform standards, all to be adopted by QMV,
represent a significant shift of power from the
Member States to Brussels.

58. The need for some level of harmonisation of

asylum and immigration policy by the EU is a
logical development from the provision in the
Single European Act of 1985 that the internal
market comprised an area without internal
frontiers and that this entailed the removal of
frontier controls on traffic between Member States.
This stimulated the subsequent decision of most of
the Continental States to follow the example of
Germany and France by setting up the Schengen
Agreement. The difficulties of policing long internal
land frontiers both made it easier for the Schengen
countries to give up controls at their internal
frontiers and created a case for a harmonised
approach to controlling immigration at their
external frontiers. There seems no strong reason,
however, even for the Schengen countries, which
would justify moving to a full common policy on
asylum and immigration as proposed in the Lisbon
Treaty. The case for full harmonisation of law on
legal immigration seems particularly questionable.

59. Between 1985 and 1997 the UK government

disputed the majority interpretation of the Single
European Act as requiring some legislation for the
removal of internal frontier controls and in 1997
negotiated the opt-outs both from this requirement
and the Schengen agreement and the asylum and
immigration policy in the Amsterdam Treaty. Quite
apart from the political difficulty of removing our
frontier controls on arrivals from the EU, the UKs
decision is logical as long as we believe that our
airport and sea port controls are even partially
effective in helping our authorities to prevent
illegal immigration, tax evasion and illegal imports.

60. However, there are two reasons why the UK

needs some level of co-operation with our EU
partners to improve the effectiveness of our own
policies. The first is purely geographical, namely
that a significant proportion of asylum seekers or
refugees, who arrive in the UK, will have arrived via
one or more of the other Member States; so
exchanges of information and an arrangement on
which Member State should take responsibility for
which of these immigrants are highly desirable and
have been provided by the Dublin Convention. The
latter, as noted above, currently allows the UK to
return about 100 immigrants a month to other EU
Member States. The second reason is that at some
point the EUs commitment to free movement of
persons within the EU is likely to require some
agreement on whether and to what extent third-
country immigrants, who become legally resident
in one Member State should enjoy freedom of
movement and the right to reside in other Member
States. So far as the UK is concerned neither of
these requirements justifies our buying into full
common policies on asylum and immigration as
envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty.

61. The Lisbon Treatys amendments will, however,

make the UKs decisions on whether or not to opt-
in to new EU legislative proposals more
problematic, now that virtually all such legislation
will be decided by QMV. HMG will need to balance
the potential advantages of co-operating with
other Member States against the risk of being
outvoted in the Council of Ministers and take that
decision at a time when the final outcome of the
negotiations cannot be foreseen. The fact that the
ECJ will have full powers to adjudicate on how any
such legislation is implemented in this area will
also discourage opting in. As noted above, we may
be faced with the possibility of losing some or all of
the advantages of the Dublin Convention, if Signor
Frattini goes ahead with his proposals to amend it
to provide for burden-sharing between Member
States.

62. However, even if the UK adopted a firm policy

of opting-out of all new legislation on asylum and
immigration matters, there are still a number of
ways in which the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty
could affect the UKs policy. First, as noted above,
the Treaty could lead to the UK courts referring to
the ECJ more cases involving appeals from asylum
seekers and refugees against decisions by the UK
authorities to refuse them admittance or to
repatriate them, under the EU asylum legislation
we have opted into.. Second, even if we decide to
opt out of any EU-wide proposal to define the rights
of residents residing legally in one Member State to
move to and reside in other Member States, we
could be faced eventually with an awkward
negotiation with the other Member States on what
access we are prepared to give this category of
migrant.

63. Last but not least, the UKs room for

manoeuvre on asylum and immigration issues,
including the treatment of third-country residents,
could be narrowed, if the ECJ were to decide either
that some of the EU legislation, which we had
accepted, breached relevant provisions of the CFR
or that one or more of these provisions had direct
effect and that the UKs national law or practices
were therefore in breach of the CFR. Note

This report was prepared for Migrationwatch by a

consultant, Mr Geoffrey Fitchew, who was formerly
a senior Treasury official, working on European and
international financial questions and later Director
General for Financial Institutions and Company Law
in the European Commission (1986 to 1993).
Subsequently, he was Head of the European
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, dealing with all
aspects of European policy. He is strongly in favour
of Britains continued membership of the EU, but
was a supporter of the campaign against Britain
adopting the Euro. He also supports the current
campaign for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.
14 March, 2008
https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefingPaper/document
/82
tailored immigration system for
EEA citizens after Brexit
European Union: MW 396

https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/396
Summary
1. It is clear from the referendum result that the British public wants
net migration to be reduced substantially. The best way to do this,
following Brexit, would be through a widening of our present work
permit system to include European Economic Area (EEA) workers
offered highly skilled jobs.[1] There should be continued free
movement for European tourists, students, the financially self-
sufficient, business visitors and genuine marriage partners. A reform
of this kind would reduce EEA migration from its current level of
190,000 a year by about 100,000 annually. This paper outlines how
each of the components of the current system could be extended
and adapted for the post-Brexit era.
Introduction
2. We propose that EEA migration for work be brought into the UKs
existing work permit scheme while other categories would
effectively retain free movement. This would minimise economic
and social disruption while substantially cutting lower-skilled
migration. Around half of current non-British net migration (or
around 190,000 in the year to June 2016) comes from Europe[2] and
just over 70% of this is migration for work, of which 80% goes into
lower-skilled jobs.
The British immigration system
3. The British system contains five tiers:
Tier 1 is for highly qualified applicants in very limited
circumstances.
Tier 2 is a route for employers to bring in the skilled personnel
that they need.
Tier 3 is for unskilled workers but was never opened and
would remain closed.
Tier 4 (Study) would not apply to EU students who would have
visa-free access.
Tier 5 (Youth mobility and temporary workers) would need to
be expanded.
Tier 1
4. Tier 1 no longer allows migrants to come to the UK to look for
work. It has now been focussed on a small number of those with
exceptional talent, entrepreneurs and investors. It could easily be
expanded to include suitable applicants from the EEA. For more
detail, see Annex A.
Tier 2 General[3]
5. This is the crux of the issue since achieving a satisfactory level of
skilled immigration from the EU will be crucial to the new
arrangements. Fortunately, there is no reason why the
arrangements in paragraph 6 below should not be adapted to
include EEA citizens.
6. Currently, non-EEA nationals wishing to obtain a Tier 2 work
permit must have been offered a job at a minimum skill level of
National Qualifications Framework Level 6 or the job must appear on
the government Shortage Occupation List and pay a minimum
annual salary of 20,800. This route is currently capped at 20,700
per year, except for those switching into the category from Tier 4
(Student) visas and there is no limit for those paid above 155,300
per year. Applicants can extend their visa up to a maximum of five
years, as long as their total stay is no longer than six years.
Dependants can join family members and they also have the right to
work. If, after five years, the worker earns 35,000 he or she may be
entitled to permanent settlement. All approved employers can
recruit from outside the EEA if, after advertising the job locally
(including in the EEA), they cannot find a local worker. In March
2016, the government partially acted on recommendations made by
the MAC in December the previous year and announced that the
minimum salary threshold for experienced workers would be raised
from 20,800 to 25,000 in autumn 2016 and to 30,000 in April
2017. The minimum threshold for new entrants would remain at
20,800.[4]
7. It is clear that, in practice, Tier 2 has allowed employers to meet
their needs for skilled labour. During the first four and a half years of
its operation the annual cap for non-EEA Tier 2 workers of 20,700
did not bite at all. However, for the three months between June and
August 2015 the monthly cap was met. Some employers who were
denied a Certificate in the month that they applied would have had
the opportunity to apply again the following month. By November
2015, the number of applications had fallen back and all
applications were granted. Despite there being 20,700 places
available annually to businesses, in 2015 only 17,375 visas were
granted, 84% of the cap. Thus no employer in the UK has been
denied the right to bring in a worker where there was a requirement
due to a skills gap in the domestic workforce.
8. Bringing skilled workers into the existing Tier 2 route would
substantially reduce EU net migration by perhaps 100,000 a year.
This is because the vast majority of EU migration has been into
lower-skilled jobs. Only 273,000 (or 22%) of the 1.25 million EU
workers working in the UK who have arrived since 2006 would today
qualify for a Tier 2 work permit. Whether this route should be
capped would be a matter for decision. Our research suggests that
skilled EEA migration of around 25,000 to 30,000 a year would be
sufficient to ensure business has access to the skills its needs.[5]
Tier 2 Intra Company Transfer[6] (ICT)
9. This is a route designed to allow international firms to post their
staff in and out of the UK. As it currently operates for non-EEA
nationals, the worker must not be filling a role that a UK based
worker can fill as the route is not intended to replace settled
workers. An ICT can be granted on a short-term basis for those
required for less than 12 months, or on a longer term basis for up to
a maximum of five years (nine years maximum for staff earning
155,300 or more). (This threshold will be changed in April 2017 to
120,000). Currently, a short-term ICT must have a salary of
24,800 and a long term ICT must be paid at least 41,500. From
April 2017, all ICTs will be required to qualify under a single visa
category with a minimum salary threshold of 41,500. The
exception will be the Graduate Trainee category, where the
government is reducing the current salary threshold from 24,800 to
23,000. ICTs can bring their dependants with them but they are not
eligible for settlement. There is no cap on the number of ICT visa
grants. Short-term ICT workers cannot return to the UK within twelve
months. There were 37,000 ICT visas issued for main applicants in
2015, along with 24,000 for dependants. Short-term ICTs made up
nearly 60% of the total main applicants in 2015.[7] The ICT route
could be expanded to include EEA nationals without any cap but
subject to measures to prevent abuse.
Tier 3
10. This route (for unskilled workers) has been closed and should
remain so.
Tier 4 Students[8]
11. As it stands, non-EEA students must have been accepted on a
course, have an acceptable level of English language skills and be
able to demonstrate sufficient funds to cover maintenance. Visas
are granted for a maximum of five years at bachelors level and
eight years at PhD level. Visas can be extended, provided that the
applicant can demonstrate academic progression. Since we propose
maintaining visa free access for EEA students, no expansion of this
route, which currently applies only to non-EEA students, would be
needed.
Tier 5 Youth mobility and temporary workers
12. Tier 5 is for those allowed to work in the UK for a limited period
of time to satisfy primarily non-economic objectives. Tier 5 visas
represented 35% (42,200) of work visas in 2014 while there were
1,800 dependants. In 2013, the majority went to youth mobility
schemes (56%, or 23,500 visas), for people not over 30 years of age
to stay and work in the UK for at most two years. Most of the rest of
Tier 5 visas went to creative and sporting workers (20%),
government authorised exchanges (14%), religious workers (5%)
and charity workers (5%). These schemes could also be expanded
as necessary for EEA nationals.
Business Visitors
13. Britain issued 1.7 million visas for non-EEA business visitors in
2015.[9] In the same year there were 6.6 million visits to the UK
from the EU for the purpose of business.[10] We propose that visa-
free access be maintained for all visitors from EEA countries to the
UK. Thus the business visitor visa regime would remain applicable
only to non-EEA citizens; it is designed for people wishing to come
to the UK for work-related reasons for a short period. This includes
visitors such as actors and other film crew, overseas media
employees, academic visitors, and general business people wishing
to attend meetings etc. Business visitor visas are generally granted
for a maximum of six months and frequent business visitors can
apply for a multiple entry visit visa.
Tourist visas
14. Currently, tourists from countries that require a visa can apply
for a general visitor visa valid for up to six months.[11] Tourists must
show that they intend to leave at the end of their visit and have
enough money to cover the costs of their stay and their return
home. Around 7.7 million ordinary visitor visas were issued to non-
EEA nationals in 2015[12], while Britain received 17.6 million non-
business related visits from EU residents in 2015.[13] It is proposed
that visa-free access would be retained for tourists from EEA
countries.
Conclusion
15. Extending the UKs current immigration system to cover
migration for work from the EEA would cut annual net migration by
around 100,000 a year. Stakeholders are already familiar with this
system and it works reasonably well in ensuring that work migration
is driven by employers needs and benefits the UK. Meanwhile,
retaining visa-free access for tourists, students, the self-sufficient
and genuine marriage partners, alongside the continuation of skilled
EEA migration, would help Britain to maintain her rich cultural,
academic and commercial ties with Europe.
Annex A
The tier 1 route for non-EU migrants nowadays involves only small
numbers. It could easily be expanded to include suitable applicants
from the EU.
Table 1: Tier 1 visas by category for the year to September 2016.
Home Office visas and extensions data, published December 2016

.[14]
Tier 1 visas in year to September 2016 Main applicants
Dependants In-country extensions Dependant
extensions
Entrepreneur 814 1,727 1,347 1,272
Graduate Entrepreneur 162 22 540 165
Investor 200 353 554 1,001
Exceptional talent 253 107 142 86

a) Tier 1 Entrepreneur[15]
This category is designed to allow people to invest in the UK by
taking over or setting up a business. The route is open to
entrepreneurs with at least 50,000 in capital from a registered
venture capital firm, seed-funding competition or government
department or 200,000 of personal wealth which can include third
party backing to invest in a business that they will be actively
involved in running.
Applicants are granted leave to reside in the UK for three years and
four months and can switch into this category while already here in
the UK. The visa can be extended for an additional two years if the
applicant is already in this category and for three years if they are
switching into it from another category. Applicants can gain
settlement after having been in the UK for five years.[16] Crucially
there is no annual limit. Family members can also come as
dependants. Applicants may need to meet an English language
requirement if they are not from the USA, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia or one of 12 English-speaking Caribbean nations.[17]
Migrants can apply for accelerated settlement in the UK after three
years continuous residence if their business has created at least ten
new full-time jobs for persons settled in the UK, or if it has achieved
an income of at least 5 million. Also eligible are those who have
taken over or invested in an existing UK business, and their services
or investment have resulted in a net increase of 5 million in that
business' income.
The MAC conducted a review of this route in 2015 and made several
recommendations on how to improve it, to which the government
has yet to publish a detailed response.[18] Such changes could be
incorporated into any relaunch of the system to include EEA
nationals.
b) Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur[19]
This route is designed for graduates in the UK to stay on in order to
develop their business ideas. An individual must have been
identified and endorsed by an approved Higher Education (HE)
institution or UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) as having a genuine
and credible business idea. There is a limit of 2,000 places for the
year 2015/16, 1,900 for UK HE institutions to endorse graduates and
100 for UKTI to endorse overseas graduates.[20] Visas are granted
for an initial period of one year and can be extended for a further
year. Visa holders are allowed to participate in outside work.
Applicants must prove that they have 945 in savings if applying
from inside the UK, or 1,890 if applying from outside the UK and
that they meet an English language requirement. Dependants can
also apply to remain with family members. The graduate
entrepreneur visa does not lead to settlement and time spent in the
route does not count towards settlement through another route.
Visa holders may be also able to switch into a Tier 1 (Entrepreneur)
Visa (see above) at the end of two years if their business is
successful (they need only show 50,000 of investment funds) or
they can switch into Tier 2 (Skilled Work). The MAC reported in 2015
that the Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur scheme works well but has
made several recommendations to improve it further.[21] The
government has yet to publish a detailed response to the MACs
recommendations. Again this could be expanded to accommodate
applications from EEA nationals.
c) Tier 1 Investor[22]
Introduced in 2008, this category was designed to allow the entry of
high net worth individuals wishing to make a substantial financial
investment in the UK. The route is open to people with 2 million of
funding. The applicant does not have to meet English language
requirements nor show evidence of maintenance funds. The visa can
be granted for three years and four months and individuals can
switch into this category while already legally present in the UK. The
visa can be extended and the applicant is entitled to settle after
two, three or five years depending on the amount of their
investment and on condition that they continue to have no recourse
to public funds.[23] Again, there is no limit on numbers and
applicants can also being their dependants.
The total of 200 for the year to September 2016 was a sharp fall
from the 1,172 issued in 2014. This was probably the result of
changes which came into effect on 6th November 2014 following
recommendations made by the MAC in February that year.[24] The
investment requirement was raised from 1 million to 2 million.
Prospective grantees must also open a UK bank account before
making the application.[25] Investors are also no longer required to
"top-up" investments if the market value of the portfolio falls below
2 million, provided that the purchase price was 2 million. A 2015
immigration rule change requires extensive due diligence to be
undertaken on the source and origin of funds by UK banks.
d) Tier 1 Exceptional Talent[26]
This category is designed for exceptionally talented people who are
recognised in the fields of the arts, sciences and technology as
world leaders or promising leaders in their individual fields. The
government has made available 1,000 places which have been
allocated to five competent bodies, The Royal Society (250 places),
The Arts Council (250 places), The British Academy (150 places) The
Royal Academy of Engineering (150 places) and Tech City UK (200).
Each body is able to endorse applicants to enter the country for a
period of up to five years and four months. To ensure that places are
available across the year the endorsements occur in two phases.
There is no minimum income. The visa can be extended for an
additional five years and applicants are entitled to settle after five
years if they continue to work in their expert field and demonstrate
knowledge of language and life in the UK.[27] Applicants can
change jobs without telling the Home Office and can also bring their
dependants with them for the duration of their visa.
7 December, 2016

Notes

The EEA covers the 27 European Union countries plus Iceland,

Liechtenstein and Norway. Switzerland is not in the EEA but is part
of the Single Market and thus currently participates in the free
movement of people.
Office for National Statistics, Provisional Long-Term Migration
Estimates, published August 2016, URL:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationa
nd internationalmigrationltimestimates
Gov.uk, Tier 2 (General) Visa, URL: https://www.gov.uk/tier-2-
general
Written parliamentary statement by then-Immigration Minister
James Brokenshire, 24th March 2016, URL:
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions
atement/Commons/2016-03-24/HCWS660/
Migration Watch UK briefing paper, September 2016, URL:
https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/391
Gov.uk, Tier 2 (ICT) Visa, URL: https://www.gov.uk/tier-2-
intracompany-transfer-worker-visa

Brexit negotiation: Publication

of UK objectives
European Union: MW 395
Summary
1. There is a perfectly feasible way forward on immigration which
meets the main concerns of all participants, except for some
relating to new arrivals of low paid migrant workers. Early
publication of the UKs objectives (but not the strategy) would help
calm concerns without weakening our hand.
Introduction
2. In advance of the opening of negotiations there is widespread
uncertainty about the outcome on immigration. Some of this could
be dispelled if HMG were to outline their objectives as is now being
called for in Parliament. Indeed, many of them are unlikely to be a
cause of dispute. Publication need not affect possible linkage with
trade aspects although this is best avoided as there are no
concessions on immigration that could attract significant
concessions on trade.
3. Independent states do not normally negotiate their immigration
policies with other states. Indeed the Government have already
made it clear that UK immigration policy will be decided by the
British Government. However, given the extensive relationships that
have been built up over decades with Continuing EU member states,
it would make sense to reach an understanding on how each side
intends to proceed.
4. Accordingly, this paper considers the objectives that the UK
should select and their negotiability.
Objectives
5. The objectives should be as follows:
That the rights of EU citizens already in the UK should be
preserved provided that there is reciprocity for British citizens now
living elsewhere in the EU.
Visa free access should be preserved for EU tourists, genuine
students, business visitors and the self-sufficient (such as
pensioners) as they do not compete for work and have little impact
on the permanent population. This must be reciprocal.
Genuine marriage should not be restricted.
EU Nationals who wish to work in the UK should be brought
within the existing British scheme for work permits. This requires a
job offer, qualifications close to degree level, and a minimum salary
of 20,800 for new entrants to the labour force and, from April 2017,
30,000 a year for experienced workers. It would be for
consideration whether a cap was necessary.
Consideration might be given to a key workers scheme that
would permit access to less skilled workers who were essential to
particular sectors of our economy. The sectors could be selected by
the Migration Advisory Committee and the numbers would be
tapered to encourage employers to train replacements. A Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Scheme is also a possibility.
Intra Company Transfers (ICTs) should be unrestricted, save
for any measures required to prevent abuse.
There should be no access to income and housing benefits for
five years for EU citizens, as is currently the case for non EU
citizens. There is no reason for government to subsidise cheap
labour from abroad.
The Common Travel Area with Ireland should continue.
The overall package should take due account of the interests
of the devolved administrations (see below).
Juxtaposed controls at Calais and Dover are not a matter for
the EU but there should be an understanding with France that they
should be preserved.
Negotiability
6. All sides have an interest in minimising economic and social
disruption. There should, therefore, be no particular difficulty about
objectives a), b), c) and f).
7. It is also the case that a two way flow of skilled workers is
advantageous to all sides. This could be arranged by the inclusion of
EU citizens in the current UK work permit regime (d). In return, we
could accept that British citizens wishing to work in the EU would be
brought under the EUs Blue Card scheme.
8. The main bone of contention will be the denial of access by EU
workers to low paid jobs in the UK. This will be important to East
European members for political as well as economic reasons.
However, to grant this on any scale would be to fly in the face of the
referendum result. At a later stage it might be possible to offer a
scheme for agricultural workers provided that it was for seasonal
workers, was capped and was limited to a six month stay. A highly
selective key workers scheme might also be helpful (e).
9. As for the EU principle that free trade necessitates free
movement of people, it is clear that this has already been breached
by their agreements with the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.
Modalities
10. The present UK immigration system could, quite readily, be
expanded and adapted to include those EU citizens, mainly workers,
for which a measure of control would be needed. The details are
outside the scope of this paper.
The Devolved Administrations
11. The main concerns of the Devolved Administrations are for
tourists, students and skilled workers. The first two would not be
affected and any limit for skilled workers could be set at a level that
did not cause any difficulty for these administrations. For example,
the number of skilled Tier 2 work permits granted for firms in
Scotland is of the order of 2,500 a year. A key workers scheme could
also be applied to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
12. None of these broad objectives would come as any surprise to
our EU partners but they would provide a framework for taking the
dialogue forward, as well as reassurance to the many British people
concerned about uncontrolled immigration from the EU. Indeed, we
estimate that a system based on these ten points would see a
significant fall in EU net migration of the order of 100,000 each year.
There is therefore a good case for publishing the UKs objectives on
the lines summarised above.
30 November, 2016

Saturday, July 26, 2008

Second referendum? Don't go there

We've commissioned the leading Irish pollsters Red C to

look at how people in Ireland feel about the idea of a
second referendum

It looks like they would be made to force a second vote.

The key numeros are below:

- 71% oppose a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

Only 24% are in favour.

- Of those who expressed an opinion, 62% said they would

vote "no" in a second referendum, compared to 38% who
would vote "yes".

- 17% of those who voted "yes" in the recent referendum

would vote "no" in a second referendum, while only 6% of
those who voted "no" would now vote "yes". Perhaps most
significantly of all, those who did not vote last time would
vote more than two-to-one against in a second
referendum: 57% would vote "no" and 26% would vote
"yes".

- 67% agreed with the statement that "politicians in Europe

do not respect Ireland's no vote". Only 28% disagreed.

- 61% disagreed with the statement that "If all of the other
26 EU countries ratify the Treaty in their parliaments then
Ireland has to change its mind and support the Treaty."
Only 32% agreed.

- 53% said they would be less likely to vote for Brian Cowen
at the next election if he called a second referendum. In
particular, 43% of Fianna Fail voters said they would be less
likely to vote for him.

The full results of the poll are available at:

http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/redc.pdf
Recent EU Treaty Amendments and UK
Ratification
Recent EU Treaty Amendments and UK Ratification . ... Treaty
of Lisbon, ... The Treaty of Lisbon after the Second Irish
Referendum 8 October 2009 . 2 When was Article
researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/.../SN06503....

European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 CHAPTER 7

CONTENTS
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/7/pdfs/ukpga
_20080007_en.pdf
Denmark and the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty- How a Referendum
was avoided.
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_2189.pdf
IBEC and the Lisbon Treaty - scribd.com
The outcome of the next referendum will define Irelands
future ... Business needs the Lisbon Treaty for Ireland to
move ... for Transport 21 Briefing
https://www.scribd.com/document/20208114/IBEC-and-the-
Lisbon-Treaty

Article-50-EU-Treaty
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2723242/Article-50-EU-
Treaty.pdf
a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty ... vote in referendums
on the Lisbon Treaty. ... EU exit is 'imaginable' UK Prime
Minister David
http://www.eu-referendum.org/english/news/archive/2012.html

European Parliament votes

for a unified patent
scheme
11 December 2012 From the section Technology

Euro MPs have voted to introduce a unified patent

system.
The system would allow inventors to register their
innovation with a single European Union (EU) authority
rather than in each of its 27 member states, and is
designed to save time and money.
There would also be a unified patent-court system. The
move is due to be introduced in 2014.
But Spain and Italy continue to oppose the change, saying
the new regime would discriminate against their
languages.
The new rules would say applications and approvals need
only to be made available in one of three languages,
English, French and German.
At present, applicants are spending thousands of pounds
translating their paperwork into each country's native
language.
Italy and Spain suggest that as a result "commercial trade
in innovative products will be favoured for undertakings
which work in German, English or French".
But a senior adviser to the European Court of Justice has
advised that it reject their plea. A panel of judges has still
to consider the case.
Software patents
Eurochambres - an organisation that represents EU
countries' chambers of commerce - called the vote in
favour of the scheme a "breakthrough".
"[It] will significantly reduce administrative burdens and
boost European innovation," it said in a statement.
However, April - a French free software-advocacy group -
has warned the move could open the door to software-
patent litigation on a scale recently seen in the US.
It says the European Patent Office (EPO) has shown itself
willing to grant thousands of software patents - and
worries the EU could end up with a system in which
appeals against such judgements are decided according
to the EPO's own rules.
"MEPs voted in favour of a legally uncertain system that
does not not provide any checks and balances against
threats to innovation such as software patents," said
spokeswoman Jeanne Tadeusz.
"The European Patent Office will gain amazing powers,
even though its governance has been highly criticised,
especially with regard to its practice of granting software
patents, against the letter and the spirit of European patent
law."

Profit over human life

Farben Trial Roll 2

http://www.profit-over-life.org/pdf/roll_02.pdf

The Open Letter that the Irish Times wouldn't print Is Ireland
the Only Remaining Democracy in Europe? Why Brussels EU
Is Already Doomed
http://www.relay-of-life.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/2008_01_jan_18_irish_times.pdf
BBC TWO, January 2005

With a number of recent high profile Hollywood films such as

Schindler's List and The Pianist and iconic books such as The
Diary of Anne Frank it is easy to assume that everyone is
familiar with the Holocaust and Auschwitz.

Yet a recent BBC survey suggests that almost half the adult
population (45%) claim to have never even heard of
Auschwitz.

Amongst women and people aged under 35 the figure is even

higher at 60%.

Even among those who have heard of Auschwitz, 70% felt that
they did not know a great deal about the subject.

Most of them (76%) were unaware of its roots as a

concentration camp for Polish political prisoners; the majority
(74%) did not know that people other than Jews were killed
there and only a few recognised the name of the camp
commandant or knew who finally liberated the camp at the
end of the war.

The BBC's research informs a definitive new series which has

been made to mark the 60th anniversary of the liberation of
Auschwitz in January 2005.

Written and produced by Bafta Award-winning producer

Laurence Rees, Auschwitz: The Nazis & the 'Final Solution'
offers a unique perspective on the camp in which more than
one million people were ruthlessly murdered.

"We were amazed by the results of our audience research"

says series producer Laurence Rees. "It's easy to presume that
the horrors of Auschwitz are engrained in the nation's
collective memory but obviously this is not the case.

"We were particularly startled by the fact that less than 40%
of younger people have even heard of Auschwitz.

"The research reinforced the importance of making this series

and trying to ensure the atrocities that unfolded at Auschwitz
are never forgotten."

The series is the result of three years of in-depth research,

drawing on the close involvement of world experts on the
period, including Professors Sir Ian Kershaw and David
Cesarani.

It is based on nearly 100 interviews with survivors and

perpetrators, many of whom are speaking in detail for the first
time.
Sensitively shot drama sequences, filmed on location using
German and Polish actors, bring recently discovered
documents to life on screen, whilst specially commissioned
computer images give a historically accurate view of
Auschwitz-Birkenau at all its many stages of development.

"The name Auschwitz is quite rightly a byword for horror," says

Laurence Rees. "But the problem with thinking about horror is
that we naturally turn away from it.

"Our series is not only about the shocking, almost

unimaginable pain of those who died, or survived, Auschwitz.
It's about how the Nazis came to do what they did.

"I feel passionately that being horrified is not enough. We need

to make an attempt to understand how and why such horrors
happened if we are ever to be able to stop them occurring
again."

The BBC will be marking Holocaust Memorial Day (27 January

2005) with a number of other television and radio
programmes, including a live event on the day, an
international musical performance in and around the museum
of Auschwitz-Birkenau, and a documentary that traces one
woman's story of survival told through her grandson's eyes.

Notes to Editors

The research findings were based on a nationally

representative postal survey of 4,000 adults aged 16+
conducted by IPSOS RSL as part of their weekly Quest survey.

All respondents recruited were mailed a questionnaire to

complete covering a number of topics, with quota controls
imposed, within region, by age within sex and social class.

Fieldwork was conducted during February 2004.

For example, practice has revealed that

the Council of Ministers by its very nature
is not the best instrument for dealing with
matters of administration affecting all the
member-countries, and the many of its
functions in this sphere have already been
transferred to the Commission.
This trend will have to continue. As I see it,
the Commission should eventually be
empowered to take all measures necessary
for the implementation of the Treaty on its
own authority, without having to rely on
special and specific approval by the
Council of Ministers. Such reserve powers
of the Council of Ministers as may be
required during a period of transition
should be gradually reduced, and the
executive authority and competence of the
Commission should be limited only where
the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament jointly so decree.

The UK's European Union Bill

http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-111-uk-eu%20bill.pdf

New Consolidated version (TEU and TFEU) and inc Charter

(January 2017)

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jan/eu-consolidated-
treaties-inc-charter-2017.pdf

deficit- the failure to enshrine the publics right of access to

documents (Guide to EU decision-making and justice and
home affairs after the Lisbon Treaty
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-115-lisbon-treaty-
decision-making.pdf

lisbon-treaty AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 67 (ex Article 61
TEC and ex Article 29 TEU)

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/lisbon-treaty-jha.pdf

A 'new, positive and

constructive'
partnership with
the European Union
From:
Department for Exiting the European Union and The Rt
Hon David Davis MP
First published:
2 February 2017
Part of:
Brexit
The government has published its
plan for 'a new, positive and
constructive' partnership in the
mutual interest of the UK and the
EU.
The government has today published its
plan for a new, positive and constructive
partnership in the mutual interest of the
UK and the EU, with a White Paper
presented to Parliament.
The document, entitled The United
Kingdoms Exit from, and New Partnership
with, the European Union, mirrors the 12
principles set out by the Prime Minister to
guide EU exit negotiations in her speech at
Lancaster House on 17 January.
These include providing certainty and
clarity wherever possible, ensuring free
trade with European markets, controlling
immigration and taking control of our own
laws.
The paper highlights the mutual interest to
the UK and the EU of maintaining the
freest and most frictionless trade possible
in goods and services following UK exit.
It notes that in 2015, the UK exported
230 billion worth of goods and services to
the EU, while importing 290 billion worth
of goods and services from the EU.
It will be in the interests of both sides to
build a new strategic partnership, with an
ambitious and comprehensive free trade
agreement and a new customs agreement,
the document says.
The position the UK and EU will start from,
with a common regulatory framework with
the European Single Market, is
unprecedented.
It is not about bringing 2 divergent
systems together, but finding the best way
for the benefits of the common systems
and frameworks that currently enable UK
and EU businesses to trade with and
operate in each others markets to
continue when we leave the EU.
The paper also recognises the importance
of delivering a smooth, mutually beneficial
exit, avoiding a disruptive cliff-edge.
So a phased process of implementation of
new arrangements whether relating to
immigration controls, customs systems,
co-operation on criminal and civil justice
matters, or future regulatory and legal
frameworks for business will be in our
mutual self interest.
The White Paper notes that the time
needed to phase in new arrangements in
different areas may vary.
The document also confirms plans for a
separate White Paper on the Great Repeal
Bill, which will ensure certainty and
stability by transposing EU law into UK law,
wherever practical and appropriate, and
separate legislation in areas likely to be
affected by the outcome of the
negotiation, such as customs and
immigration.
Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union David Davis said:
The White Paper confirms the Prime
Ministers vision of an independent, truly
global UK and an ambitious future
relationship with the EU.
This is based on the 12 principles that will
guide the government in fulfilling the
democratic will of the people of the UK.
These 12 objectives amount to 1 goal: a
new, positive and constructive partnership
between Britain and the European Union,
that works in our mutual interest.
It is in the UKs interest for the EU to
succeed politically and economically. And
so we approach the negotiation to come in
a spirit of goodwill and working to an
outcome in our mutual benefit.

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-
new-positive-and-constructive-partnership-
with-the-european-union

Ensuring a
smooth transition
in the WTO as we
leave the EU

Last week the British Prime Minister Theresa May set out
her plan for Britains orderly departure from the European
Union. Britains transition in the WTO is an important and
necessary part of this process. Ensuring that goes
smoothly is one of the over-riding priorities of the Mission I
lead in Geneva.
British ministers in fact took the decision to begin our WTO
transition late last autumn. They concluded that
establishing the UKs independent position in the WTO
would not prejudge what kind of relationship the UK and
the EU would have in future. Nor would it prejudge when
the UK would leave the EU. The timing of the transition in
the WTO would be linked to whatever the UK and the EU
agreed in the Article 50 negotiations. This WTO process
was not an alternative to a negotiated exit from the EU, as
some claimed. On the contrary, it was a necessary
complement to it.
Given that was the case, ministers decided it was better
for the UK to get on with it, and with reassuring our trading
partners around the world that their trade will not be
disrupted. The Secretary of State for International Trade
duly notified Parliament in a Written Ministerial
Statement on 5 December 2016.
So what does this WTO transition mean in practice?
The UK is a full and founding member of the WTO. We
signed and ratified the 1994 Marrakech Agreement that
established the organisation. But we are also part of the
EUs Common Commercial Policy. Under the EU treaties,
Member States have agreed that the European
Commission will represent them on most things in the
WTO. As a full member of the WTO, the UK has its own
seat. As the UKs Permanent Representative to the WTO, I
attend meetings along with my 27 other Member State
colleagues. But for most WTO business, the Commission
speaks for all of us collectively.
Establishing the UKs separate position in the WTO is not
simply a matter of starting to speak up for the UK from one
day to the next. Every WTO member state has things
called schedules, lists which set out their commitments
their rights and obligations in the international trading
system. These cover trade in both goods and services.
WTO legal experts will tell you that, as a full member, the
UK already has its own schedules. But at the moment
these are shared with the other EU Member States.
Smoothly separating the UK from the EU schedules is the
best way we can reassure our WTO partners that their
trade with us will not be disrupted as we leave the EU.
Once we have our own schedules in the WTO, the UK will
be able to negotiate changes to the international trading
system as well, whether multilaterally (with the whole
membership of the WTO) or plurilaterally (with some of it).
A countrys WTO schedules also provide the baseline for
negotiating bilateral Free Trade Agreements.
There is a process in the WTO that allows the UK to
submit new schedules. But they can only be adopted or
certified and thus replace our existing EU schedules if
none of the WTOs other 163 members object to them. So
to minimise any grounds for objection, we plan to replicate
our existing trade regime as far as possible in our new
schedules. Before we take any formal steps in the WTO
we will hold extensive informal consultations with the WTO
membership. Every member will have an opportunity to
raise any issues or concerns with us before we proceed.
We intend to work closely with the EU during this process.
In the meantime the UKs WTO commitments will remain
as they are, as set out in the schedules with share with the
other EU Member States. While the UK remains a
member of the EU we will continue to respect and uphold
the EUs arrangements in the WTO.
Replicating our current EU trade regime will help ensure
that our transition in the WTO is as simple, technical and
uncontroversial as possible. It by no means precludes the
UK from taking control of its trade regime after we leave
the EU, and shaping it in the interests of the British
economy and the global trading system. Indeed, it is a
necessary precondition for doing just that.
What the UK is planning to do in the WTO has no
precedent. We want the membership to be comfortable
before we proceed, and we know that will take time and
patience. That is why we are starting now, so that we can
ensure our transition in the WTO will be as smooth and
seamless as possible, for everyone.
https://blogs.fco.gov.uk/julianbraithwaite/2017/01/23/ensuring-a-
smooth-transition-in-the-wto-as-we-leave-the-eu/

Foreign Office statement on what the

Presidential executive order on
inbound migration to the US means to
British nationals and dual nationals.
 The Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has today
held conversations with the US government and
as a result we can clarify that:
the Presidential executive order only applies to
individuals travelling from one of the 7 named
countries
if you are travelling to the US from anywhere
other than one of those countries (for instance,
the UK) the executive order does not apply to you
and you will experience no extra checks
regardless of your nationality or your place of
birth
if you are a UK national who happens to be
travelling from one of those countries to the US,
then the order does not apply to you even if you
were born in one of those countries
if you are a dual citizen of one of those countries
travelling to the US from OUTSIDE those
countries then the order does not apply to you
The only dual nationals who might have extra
checks are those coming from one of the 7
countries themselves for example a UK-Libya
dual national coming from Libya to the US.
The US has reaffirmed its strong commitment to
the expeditious processing of all travellers from
the United Kingdom.
Further information
Update (01/02/17)
Since issuing this advice we have received
further confirmation from the US government that
British passport holders (regardless of country of
birth or whether they hold another
passport/nationality) are not affected by the
executive order.
Read the FCOs travel advice for the USA for the
latest information on entry requirements for the
USA including temporary immigration measures.
If youre a non-British passport holder and are
unsure whether youre affected by these new
measures, you should contact the nearest US
embassy or consulate for advice.

Cut EU red tape:

support for the
COMPETE principles
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sy
stem/uploads/attachment_data/file/249969
/TaskForce-report-15-October.pdf
TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR
EUROPE
PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER ... Rome on 29
October 2004 and published in the Official ... B. Annexes to the
Treaty establishing a Constitutio

White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for

Europe Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs By Command of Her
Majesty September 2004
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/sep/uk-gov-wp-eu-
con.pdf

The United Kingdoms exit from and new partnership with the
European Union White Paper

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attac
hment_data/file/589191/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and
_partnership_with_the_EU_Web.pdf
The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_the_
EU_Print
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/589189/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partnership_with_t
he_EU_Print.pdf

TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR

EUROPE
PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER ... Rome on 29
October 2004 and published in the Official ... B. Annexes to the
Treaty establishing a Constitution

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_01_05_constitu
tion.pdf
WHITE PAPER ON EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE ... agreed on a
text for a Treaty establishing a Constitution for ... 2004. 13 See
Article 48 of the EU Treaty
http://www.eu-
newgov.org/database/DOCS/CLU2_D01_Almer_Rotkirch_Euro
pean_Governance.pdf
President Koen Lenaerts - The Court of
Justice in an Uncertain World
Dec 16, 2016
About the Speech

In his address, President Lenaerts addressed serious societal

challenges such as terrorism, mass migration and the fall-out
of the banking crisis, which have found their way on to the
docket of the European Court of Justice, each of which may be
seen as posing an existential threat to different aspects of the
EU project. He argued that in decisions of the Court,
consideration must be given to the long term values which
underpin the EU. He used the examples of the case-law of the
Court of Justice of the past few years among others the
Digital Rights, the Schrems case on data flows to third
countries, the Aranyosi and C?ld?raru cases on human rights
and detention, and the Gauweiler concerning the legality of the
decision by the European Central bank on Outright Monetary
Transactions, to illustrate how the Court has sought to uphold
common European values in dealing with the challenges
presented by these seminal cases.

About the Speaker

Koen Lenaerts has been President of the European Union Court

of Justice since October 2015. Prior to this appointment he was
Vice President and was a judge at the Court of Justice from
2003-2013. From September 1989 to October 2003, he was a
Judge at the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities. A professor at the College of Europe in Bruges
from 1984-1989, he studied law in the Catholic University of
Louvain in Belgium and in Harvard, where he was a classmate
of the future Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court, John
Roberts.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CnHN2x1Oe2I

Michel Martin, T.D. - Tackling the Crisis:

Ireland, Brexit and the Future of the
European Union
Dec 9, 2016
About the Speech

The UKs withdrawal from the EU presents Ireland with a

number of profound challenges, encompassing the future of
the Northern Irish border, British-Irish economic and trade
relations, and indeed the future relationship between Ireland
and the European Union itself. It also raises fundamental
questions about the future of European integration. In this
address to the IIEA, part of the IIEAs All Island Leaders Lecture
Series, Mr. Martin set out the Fianna Fil position on Brexit.

About the Speaker

Michel Martin is the leader of Fianna Fil, and has been

involved in local and national politics for over thirty years. His
was first elected to Cork Corporation in 1985, before entering
national politics in 1989, when he was elected TD for Cork
South Central. He also served as Lord Mayor of Cork from
1992-1993, and has occupied four cabinet posts, including:
Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008-2011), Minister for Enterprise,
Trade and Employment (2004-2008), Minister for Health (2000-
04) and Minister for Education (1997-2000).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jESlqRuLw0

Forget about cherrypicking your Brexit,

Ireland PM Kenny warns UK
Dec 2, 2016
Forget about cherrypicking your Brexit, Ireland PM Kenny warns
UK [2/12/2016]

Brexit
White Paper on the Treaty
establishing a Constitution
2004 pdf doc

EU leaders back
Libyans to curb new
migrant wave
Updated / Friday, 3 Feb 2017
Taoiseach Enda Kenny is among the European Union leaders in
Malta for the summit
This is the actual article body
European Union leaders placed a bet on Libya's
fragile government to help them prevent a new wave
of African migrants this spring, offering Tripoli more
money and other assistance to beef up its frontier
controls.
Meeting in Malta - in the sea lane to Italy where more
than 4,500 people drowned last year - the leaders
addressed legal and moral concerns about having
Libyan coastguards force people ashore by pledging
to improve conditions in migrant camps there.
"If the situation stays as is now, in a few weeks we
will have a humanitarian crisis and people will start
pointing fingers, saying Europe has done nothing,"
said Joseph Muscat, the prime minister of Malta,
which currently holds the presidency of the bloc.
"With this agreement... there is one first decent shot
in trying to get a proper management of migration
flows across the central Mediterranean."
Aid groups, however, accused the EU, of abandoning
humanitarian values and misrepresenting conditions
in Libya, where the UN-backed government of Fayez
al-Seraj has only a shaky and partial hold on the
sprawling desert nation.
Medecins Sans Frontieres, which works on the
ground, said the summit proved EU leaders were
"delusional" about Libya.
"Today was not about saving lives; it's clear that the
EU is ready to sacrifice thousands of vulnerable men,
women and children in order to stop them reaching
European shores."
The chaos in Libya has thwarted any hope of a quick
fix in the way that a controversial EU deal with Turkey
a year ago led to a virtual halt to a migrant route to
Germany via Greece along which more than a million
asylum seekers travelled in 2015.
Earlier, European Council chief Donald Tusk said that
the EU still views transatlantic relations as having top
priority, despite concerns among some leaders about
the Trump administration.
"I have no doubt that for all of us this is still the
highest political priority, to protect our relationship
with the United States against its enemies," Mr Tusk
told reporters at the European Union summit.
Mr Tusk's comments came after he ranked US
President Donald Trump with Russian aggression, a
more assertive China and Islamic extremism as
"threats" facing the bloc, in a letter to EU leaders
earlier this week.
Taoiseach Enda Kenny is among the European Union
leaders in Malta for the summit.
Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat, the summit's
host, said that among EU leaders today "obviously
there was some concern on some decisions taken"
by Mr Trump.
But he said there was "no sense of anti-
Americanism".
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the best way
for Europe to deal with the new administration was to
more strongly define its role in the world.

Meanwhile, Mr Kenny has said that he would

"consider", when he was in Washington for the St
Patrick's Day celebrations, whether or not to extend
an invitation to Mr Trump to Ireland.
Speaking to reporters in Malta, Mr Kenny said he was
"no stranger to controversy" and would consider the
issue when he travelled to the US in March.
"I'll consider that when I go to Washington, but I
wouldn't be afraid of any out-fall from it. But I'll
consider that when I get there."
He said he had been clear that he did not agree with
some of the policies of Mr Trump but he looked
forward to addressing Mr Trump directly, as well as
the US Vice-President Mike Pence, and House
Speaker Paul Ryan.
"We have lots of things to talk about."
Mr Kenny said there was a strong consensus among
EU leaders that they had to engage with the new US
administration.
Asked if he would support a move to block the
appointment of Ted Malloch, tipped as Mr Trump's
next American ambassador to the EU, Mr Kenny said
it was a matter for the US administration.
"Whoever it is he's the nominee from America, and
we have to deal with that."
Mr Malloch has been widely criticised for likening the
EU to the Soviet Union and predicting the collapse of
the euro.

The ECB plan will fail because it fails to

address the problem
Posted on Tuesday, September 11, 2012 by bill
.entry-meta
Last Thursday (September 6, 2012), the ECB released details of its
new program the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) which will
replace the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). The latter saw the
ECB buying Eurozone government debt in the secondary markets. In
the OMT Announcement the ECB declared it would set No ex ante
quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary
Transactions. The ECB decision to purchase unlimited volumes of
government debt means that any private bond trader that tries to
take a counter-position against any Eurozone government will lose.
It means that the central bank can set yields at wherever it wants
including zero. It means that all the mainstream economists are
wrong if they claim that deficits drive up interest rates to the point
that governments become insolvent because the private bond
markets will refuse to purchase their debt. But once you understand
the significance of that you also soon realise that the ECB rescue
plan will fail. Why? Because it doesnt address the core problem
that southern Europe is in depression and the only way out is for
budget deficits to expand. The ECB will buy unlimited government
bonds but only if they have succumbed to a fiscal austerity
package that ensures their growth prospects deteriorate even
further.

What is the ECB going to do?

The ECB will purchase short-maturity bonds (1 to 3 years) in the
secondary market. Essentially, the primary bond dealer will know
that they can easily off load any bond purchases in the secondary
market to the ECB.
The ECB will massage their action to make it look as though they
are only undertaking the purchases to help the operations of the
financial system rather than fund government deficits by claiming
that because the government debt markets are part of the overall
financial market transactions their purchases will improve the
monetary transmission mechanism which will, in their eyes, help
support the private demand for credit.
The logic of the action is that by buying large volumes of short-term
maturity bonds, the price rises and this drives down the yields. Bond
traders then are forced to purchase longer maturity government
bonds if they want higher yields which then drives prices up and
yields down.
Lower interest rates then are considered conducive to rising private
demand for credit which, in turn, will help stimulate private
investment spending and kick-start growth.
Their statement has some other significant points.
First, they are only going to purchase government bonds if the
nation is already undergoing a fiscal austerity program forced on it
by the Troika. The ECB say:
A necessary condition for Outright Monetary Transactions is strict
and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European
Financial Stability Facility/European Stability Mechanism (EFSF/ESM)
programme The involvement of the IMF shall also be sought for
the design of the country-specific conditionality and the monitoring
of such a programme.
By which you understand that the ECB decision is in denial of the
real problem a lack of growth. They are saying that they will keep
a member state alive so that it can die slowly. They know that if
such a nation is forced to deal with private bond markets to gain
funds to cover their budget deficit that the Eurozone will collapse.
The ECB also said that once the conditionality was satisfied that:
No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright
Monetary Transactions.
Which means it is a mega SMP scheme. While the whole
implementation plan is flawed (being conditional on fiscal austerity)
the announcement demonstrated categorically that currency issuing
authorities have not financial constraints. They can purchase
whatever is for sale in the currency they issue.
It also demonstrates that the currency issuer can always usurp any
market machinations attempted by private bond traders. The
conception that it is private bond markets that set yields and
governments have to live in fear of these markets and maintain
fiscal austerity is a lie.
Governments (currency-issuers) can run whatever deficits they
choose without worrying about what the private bond markets think
or do should they choose to exercise their authority over those
markets.
The current situation where governments issue debt into the private
sector to match their deficits $-for-$ is just an elaborate pretence as
well as being a very coordinated system of corporate welfare.
The ECB announcement clarifies all of those central Modern
Monetary Theory (MMT) propositions, although they didnt disclose it
in that way.
Further, the ECB said:
.. that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other
creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and
purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary
Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.
Which is a change from the PSI scandal where it exerted priority
creditor status.
They also provided a sop to the Germans who are hyperventilating
over the announcement. The ECB said that:
The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be
fully sterilised.
Which is another one of those myths that the mainstream
perpetuate to make themselves feel more comfortable.
The Securities Markets Program (SMP), which the OMT has replaced
also sterilised the ECB purchases. You can also learn about the
sterilising functions associated with the SMP from HERE (go to the
Ad-hoc communications tab on the page).
The OMT will work in a similar manner.
 For example on November 7, 2011, the ECB announced the
following fine-tuning operation a weekly event:
As announced by the Governing Council on 10 May 2010, the ECB
conducts specific operations in order to re-absorb the liquidity
injected through the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). In this
regard, the ECB will carry out a quick tender on 8 November at
11.30 in order to collect one-week fixed-term deposits with
settlement day on 9 November. A variable rate tender with a
maximum bid rate of 1.25% will be applied and the ECB intends to
absorb an amount of EUR 183 billion. The latter corresponds to the
size of the SMP
So the ECB buys the bond of some member state in the secondary
market (that is, after they have been issued by the government in
question in the primary tender market). The ECB just conducts an
electronic transfer and bank reserves rise (see more on this below).
The ECB then offer deposits to the banks (in this case with a
ceiling of 1.25 per cent yield) up to the volume of outstanding bond
purchases. So the banks swap reserves for an interest earning
account with the ECB.
This swap is referred to as the sterilisation operation and allegedly
neutralizes the bond purchases by draining the same amount of
money from the banking system.
Mainstream economists say that by draining the reserves, the
central bank has reduced the ability of banks to lend which then, via
the money multiplier, expands the money supply.
This is a common misunderstanding. What happens when a
government spends and issues a bond to cover that spending
(borrows back what it has spent)?
All that happens is that the banks reserves are reduced by the bond
sales but this does not reduce the deposits created by the net
spending. So net worth is not altered. What is changed is the
composition of the asset portfolio held in the non-government
sector.
The only difference between the Treasury borrowing from the
central bank and issuing debt to the private sector is that the
central bank has to use different operations to pursue its policy
interest rate target. If it debt is not issued to match the deficit then
it has to either pay interest on excess reserves (which most central
banks are doing now anyway) or let the target rate fall to zero (the
Japan solution).
There is no difference to the impact of the deficits on net worth in
the non-government sector.
The reality is that:
Building bank reserves does not increase the ability of the banks to
lend.
The money multiplier process so loved by the mainstream does not
describe the way in which banks make loans.
Inflation is caused by aggregate demand growing faster than real
output capacity. The reserve position of the banks is not functionally
related with that process.
So the banks are able to create as much credit as they can find
credit-worthy customers to hold irrespective of the operations that
accompany government net spending.
This doesnt lead to the conclusion that deficits do not carry an
inflation risk. As noted above, all components of aggregate demand
carry an inflation risk if they become excessive, which can only be
defined in terms of the relation between spending and productive
capacity.
It is totally fallacious to think that private placement of debt reduces
the inflation risk.
The following blogs might be of interest here Why history matters
and Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank
reserves is not inflationary and The complacent students sit and
listen to some of that.
In this case, the so-called sterilisation is just an example of smoke
and mirrors. The deposits that the banks make with the ECB do not
reduce their capacity to lend on iota.
On the same day (September 6, 2012), Eurostat published the
updated estimates for second-quarter GDP in the Eurozone Second
estimates for the second quarter of 2012 which showed that reL
GDP growth in the Eurozone decreased by 2 per cent compared to a
zero growth figure in the first-quarter. Both household consumption
and private investment growth were negative for the second
consecutive quarter.
OECD boss Angel Gurria told the EC Conference that I attended last
Thursday in Brussels that it was downgrading its estimates of
Eurozone growth for 2012 further from its already dire forecasts.
Southern Europe is in depression already with no end in sight.
There can be no sense in a solution that forced nations further into
depression and ensures that other nations that are bordering on that
state cross the line too. The OECD now estimates that Italy will
contract by 2.4 per cent in 2012. Greece has lost 20 per cent of its
GDP since the crisis began and the situation is getting worse by the
day.
The irony is that Germany think Mario Draghi is proposing wild
monetary prolifigacy whereas in fact he is part of the mainstream
neo-liberal elite.
As this crisis drags on and morphs into increasingly bizarre
outcomes, it is clear the one of the central culprits is the ECB itself.
It alone has the currency-issuing capacity to provide sufficient
demand to allow the region to grow again.
The crisis is about a lack of growth. The bond markets would not be
attacking governments one by one if their economies were
growing and unemployment was low and tax revenues were high.
The crisis is not about the particular policies of the member states.
It is clear that there were unsustainable structural policies
pursued by governments deregulation of the financial sector, not
enough regulative oversight of real estate markets (including
allowing private citizens to fund mortgages in foreign currencies), a
bias towards budget austerity (under the Stability and Growth Pact)
which meant that growth had to rely largely on private credit
expansion etc.
This behaviour of governments leading up to the crisis was based on
exactly the same logic that is driving the fiscal austerity that free
markets are best and government should have as small a footprint
as possible.
The neo-liberal policy positions that governments adopted and the
conservative design of the European Monetary Union were directly
responsible for making the Eurozone highly vulnerable to
perturbations in aggregate demand.
When the Eurozone experienced the large and rapid negative
demand shock in late 2007 it was obvious that a rapid response
from the currency-issuer was required to prevent the bond markets
from raising the alarm bells as the automatic stabilisers (tax
revenue collapse) drove the budget deficits up.
The fact that the ECB as part of the destructive Troika chose to
inflict a negative growth strategy on the region by forcing fiscal
austerity onto the weakest economies guaranteed that the problem
would morph into a full-blown crisis.
The fault lies squarely with the Weimar-obsessed ECB. The leading
officials should resign en masse and hand over the fiscal authority
to those who know how to make economies grow.
So while they have declared they will buy unlimited volumes of
government debt they will only do so if the member states are in
depression. It is no rescue plan at all.
And then you read this Financial Times article (September 9, 2012)
Global economy: Not so different this time which agonises for 2072
odd words about why growth is not more robust than it is but fails to
actually consider the obvious, preferring instead to argue within the
almost irrelevant confines set by the neo-liberals as a way to divert
our attention from the obvious.
The article thinks there is a crisis in central banking because:
the deeper central bankers delve to solve the developed
economies woes, the more some in the profession fret.
The dominant paradigm has successfully diverted our attention from
basic understandings such as spending equals income which
generates employment and that government policy can directly
influence spending it is called fiscal policy.
So if non-government spending is insufficient to drive growth at
levels that bring unemployment down, the obvious solution is that
fiscal policy has to fill the gap.
It is so obvious and simple that the neo-liberals have had to erect a
complex edifice theory and threat to undermine our acceptance of
that truth. So we get a litany of lies such that governments have to
borrow to fund the spending and that drives interest rates up,
undermines the future of our children and their children, is
inflationary, is wasteful, will create crippling tax burdens, will
undermine private incentive, will lead to a loss of our freedom, will
destroy our national prestige and damage our capacity to defend
ourselves and so it goes.
The more desperate they get the more stupid the scare statements
become. Inflation become hyperinflation; debt become crippling,
government provision of infrastructure becomes rampant socialism
and coervice fascism with the proponents of these ideas not
realising that socialism and fascism cannot really co-exist in the way
that educated individuals would use those terms.
But never mind the details like that only left-wing academics
(meaning all academics minus those who support free market ideas)
would try to divert our attentions from the impending totalitariansim
that the budget deficits foreshadow.
And never mind history either. If we dont like it that history fails to
support any of our ideas the answer is simple. We revise history
leaving our the uncomfortable bits and embellishing other bits to
the point that the real evidential basis is distorted or ignored.
The FT article suggests a few possible reasons why repeated
rounds of central bank communication and quantitative easing
have not brought about a strong recovery.
First, something structural has changed to hold back growth
perhaps related to savings behaviour or the changed distribution of
income between labour and capital.
Yes, the period in which real wages growth can be suppressed well
below productivity growth so that the profit share rises and gives
the financial markets increased access to real GDP at the expense of
the workers will have to be over. The redistribution of national
income towards profits which has characterised the neo-liberal
years meant that consumption growth had to come from credit
(debt accumulation) rather than real wages growth, which had long
been the way that aggregate demand grew.
In turn, this meant that for economic growth to continue, the private
domestic sector had to be coaxed (coerced, tricked use whatever
term you like to explain the way the financial engineers operates)
to accept ever-increasing volumes of credit. That strategy, in turn,
allowed governments to boast smaller deficits or burgeoning
surpluses.
All of which was clearly unsustainable and it was only a matter of
time before the crisis emerged. It is clear that private borrowers are
now unwilling to continue in that vein and that explains why credit
growth is weak and the private contribution to aggregate demand
growth is weak.
What it also means a point that is totally ignored by the FT article
and most other commentators who struggle to connect the dots is
that on-going budget deficits the norm before the credit binge
period will also be required to provide the necessary aggregate
demand to fill the gap left by the leakages from private saving.
Growth is weak or negative around the world because governments
think they can engage in fiscal austerity at a time when the private
sector is moving back to more conservative spending patterns.
There is not monetary policy mystery. Monetary policy is a poor
instrument for manipulating aggregate demand, especially when
there is little appetite for private borrowing.
Second, the FT say that the central bankers think that they have not
been aggressive enough given the new headwinds that economies
are facing. The problem is that monetary policy tools will not
significantly stimulate aggregate spending in the current
environment as noted above.
A lack of spending is the problem. Monetary policy can only
indirectly influence spending at the best of times and even then the
direction of influence is open to debate given the complex
distributional impacts of interest rate changes (for example,
creditors lose, debtors gain, fixed income recipients lose when rates
fall).
Third, the FT article says that it is possible that quantitative easing
simply does not work, which is more to the point. Please read my
blog Quantitative easing 101 for more discussion on this point.
The next several hundred words consider the usual myths of
liquidity traps, negative interest rates, reducing interest paid on
excess reserves, nominal GDP targetting to replace inflation
targetting and all the rest of these dead-end conversations that
avoid a focus on the obvious that the true problem is a lack of
fiscal policy enterprise by governments and a reliance on monetary
policy that is ill-equipped to provide the solution.
In relation to the ECBs latest announcement its Outright Monetary
Transactions program the FT article claims that it is:
extremely controversial, with the Bundesbank, Germanys
ultraconservative central bank, viewing them as being tantamount
to financing governments by printing banknotes. In addition, it sees
the danger that if things go wrong, the potentially unlimited bond
purchases may ultimately redistribute considerable risks among
various countries taxpayers in the eurozone.
In the last several days since the ECB made the announcement I
have read or heard on radio and TV many commentators, who
should know better claiming that the central bank is just printing
money to fund government spending. The same thing is said about
quantitative easing.
Anyone who understands what these policies actually do will know
that such statements designed to elicit fear among the community
particularly in Germany are fundamentally incorrect. They exhibit
such an advanced ignorance that I suggest the governments expand
their deficits initially by pushing more resources into primary and
secondary education.
A moments reflection on the data confirms that there is no
printing going on.
You can get regular updated data on the European monetary system
from the ECB Monthly Bulletins.
The following graph is shows the asset side of the ECBs Balance
 Sheet (data is available HERE) from Week 1 2007 to Week 35 2012
(the latest available). The broad balance sheet headings and sub-
components are:
Gold and gold receivables
Claims on non-euro area residents in foreign currency
Claims on euro area residents in foreign currency
Claims on non-euro area residents in euro
Lending to euro area credit institutions in euro
1 Main refinancing operations
2 Longer-term refinancing operations
3 Fine-tuning reverse operations
4 Structural reverse operations
5 Marginal lending facility
Credits related to margin calls
Other claims on euro area credit institutions in euro
Securities of euro area residents in euro
1 Securities held for monetary policy purposes
2 Other securities
General government debt in euro
Other assets
Some of the categories have been ignored because they are
miniscule in relative terms (check above list with legend in the
following graph if you want to clarify which items are not graphed).
It is obvious that there has been a significant expansion in the ECBs
balance sheet. Unlike the expansion of the US Federal Reserve
Banks balance sheet which has been driven mostly by its purchases
of risk-free US government bonds, the ECB has instead mostly
expanded the asset side of its balance sheet in two ways both of
which has involved the creation of riskier assets.
First, the now terminated Securities Markets Program (SMP) (the
indigo area), which has been active since May 2010 involved the
ECB purchasing government bonds of nations in the secondary
markets that the private bond traders were pricing as risky. The
relatively small volume of purchases had the effect of anchoring
yields in the member states under atack from the bond markets
although the size of the ECB commitment was not sufficient to
prevent the yields rising again in subsequent primary market bond
tenders.
Second, and much more significant has been the Longer-term
refinancing operations (LTRO) (the jade area) which have
accelerated substantially since the middle of 2011. These
operations involved the ECB lending at near zero interest rates (3-
year loans at 1 per cent) to the private banks which were struggling
to access alternative sources of finance. The aim was to ease the
credit restrictions in the economies in question.
The evidence is that the LTRO loans are mostly going to the Spanish
and Italian banks while the sterilising operations (offering 0.25 per
cent interest-bearing deposits) are mainly being taken up by the
German and Dutch banks (Source: Gros, D. (2012) The big easing,
CEPS commentary, CEPS, Brussels)
Some commentators have argued that the SMP and the LTRO have
exposed the ECB to increasing and dangerous credit risk. However,
the notion of risk in relation to the ECB is a misnomer given that it
cannot go broke. Please read my blog The ECB cannot go broke
get over it for more discussion on this point.
The point is that like the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England,
the Bank of Japan (for two decades), the ECB has expanded its
balance sheet substantially as it attempts to manage monetary
policy in the crisis.

Now consider the following graphs relating to the printing of

money.
The first graph shows the quantity of Euro banknotes issued by the
ECB (in thousands of Euros) since January 2002. The data is
available from the ECB Statistical Warehouse. The grey shaded area
is from May 2010 the date from which the SMP began and later the
LTRO.
The regular spikes in issuance coincide with December (Xmas) the
larger of the two spikes and July (Summer holidays) which makes
sense and is independent of the monetary policy initiatives that
have driven the expansion of the ECBs balance sheet.

The next graph shows the annual growth in banknotes issued by the
ECB since January 2008. The green bar is May 2010. Compare this
graph which the balance sheet graph above to verify that the
growth in banknotes has been orthogonal to the balance sheet
events.
So there is some printing going on regular and predictable and
dictated by the preferences of banking customers and the banks for
vault cash. The balance sheet expansion of the ECB (and the US
Federal Reserve) is not correctly or accurately described as printing
money. Quantitative easing is not printing money.
As I explain in this blog Quantitative easing 101 quantititave
easing (or credit easing in the ECB) are just asset swaps. The central
bank just swaps a reserve balance for a government bond. They get
an asset and give an asset.
Even central bankers themselves confuse the public on this point.
Remember the interview that Ben Bernanke gave Scott Pelley from
the US program 60 Minutes. The interview was largely a litany of
mainstream statements but at one point the Chairman gives the
game away to the interviewer Scott Pelley. Apart from Bernankes
very clear statement about how governments actually spend, the
interview reveals the confusion that the top banker has with the way
the modern monetary economy operates.
If you listen to the interview (the link will take you to the video and
the transcript) you will realise that at around the 8 minute mark
Bernanke starts talking about how the Fed (the US central bank)
conducts its operations.
Interviewer Pelley asks Bernanke:
Is that tax money that the Fed is spending?
Bernanke replied, reflecting a good understanding of what we call
central bank operations (the way the Fed interacts with the member
banks):
Its not tax money. The banks have accounts with the Fed, much the
same way that you have an account in a commercial bank. So, to
lend to a bank, we simply use the computer to mark up the size of
the account that they have with the Fed.
He then said:
Its much more akin to printing money than it is to borrowing.
The interview then asked:
Youve been printing money?
To which Bernanke replied:
Well, effectively. And we need to do that, because our economy is
very weak and inflation is very low. When the economy begins to
recover, that will be the time that we need to unwind those
programs, raise interest rates, reduce the money supply, and make
sure that we have a recovery that does not involve inflation.
So after getting the point correct that there is no financial constraint
on Federal government spending (in this central bank transactions)
which comprise the central bank making electronic entries into
accounts in the commercial banks things start to run of the rails.
He then completely confuses the public by claiming that this is
printing money. The central bank is always printing money (notes
and coins) to meet our circulation requirements but this has nothing
to do with it monetary operations. It is no wonder that the public is
confused.
Please read my blog Bernanke on financial constraints for more
discussion on this point.
The FT article seemingly realises it has run out of space and hasnt
mentioned hyperinflation. Redressing that obvious scripting error it
says that central banks might become more radical still by buying
bonds that would involve the introduction of credit risk on to their
balance sheet. Of-course, they conclude that:
While none of this is palatable, it is better than the really radical
ideas that may gain traction if economic malaise lingers, such as the
infamous helicopter drop A variant of this proposal is to finance
the spending of government temporarily, allowing it to cut taxes for
a period. This monetary financing of government is outlawed in
Europe for the good reason that when it has previously been tried
direct money-printing has ended in hyperinflation. An economy
cannot provide sufficient goods and services to match all the newly
minted cash at prevailing prices, and inflation takes hold.
Central banks have regularly bought treasury bonds to cover
deficits. Hyperinflation has not been the result. It is a lie to suggest
otherwise. Hyperinflations have been very special events which
special circumstances. Those circumstances are not remotely to be
seen in Europe at present.
As long as the government spending growth matched the growth in
real productive capacity there would be no serious inflation
emerging from the demand side.
The FT article concludes that:
The textbook is not providing the answers. When that happens more
radical options come to the surface.
It depends on which which book you are reading. The mainstream
macroeconomics textbooks have never accurately depicted how the
fiat monetary system worked. Rather they provided a litany of
theory aimed at advancing a particular ideological viewpoint which
claimed that self-regulating private markets delivered optimum
results and maximised wealth for all and that most government
activity is damaging.
Conclusion
The ECB plan will fail because it fails to address the problem. Growth
is needed desperately in Europe. Nations cannot reasonably
maintain unemployment rates above 20 per cent indefinitely. Youth
unemployment rates above 50 per cent are a time-bomb which will
undermine future prosperity and risk major social unrest.
Forcing nations into austerity packages which ensures they remain
in Depression indefinitely will not solve the problem.
The ECB would have been better accompany their announcement of
unlimited bond purchases with a plan to ensure growth is fostered
where it is needed most.
That is enough for today!

ECBs Outright Monetary Transactions programme is

compatible, in principle, with the TFEU If the
programme is implemented, its compatibility will
depend on certain conditions being met

http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/p
df/2015-01/cp150002en.pdf

The European Stability Mechanism May 2014

https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/e
vent/2014_05_05_presentation.pdf

Update on Prospects for the EU in 2004

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/200802051321
01/www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/CM6310,0.PDF
Strategic Partnership Agreement between the
European Union and its Member States, of the one
part, and Canada, of the other part Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union bind the United
Kingdom and Ireland as separate Contracting
Parties, part European Union
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
5368-2016-REV-2/en/pdf

How Irish statutes were made

The Database
Selected information on each bill is recorded in the
Database: the legislative body which initiated it; the dates
of the key stages; the decisions of the privy councils; and
the names of members associated with certain stages.

Only certain stages of bills are recorded in the Database.

The dates of these key stages, rather than detailed source
references, are given. The sources for legislation are
organised chronologically, and the date will normally be
enough to locate original entries. (Where necessary, the
Database gives precise archival references).
There are major differences in legislative procedure before
and after the session of 1783. These affect the treatment of
bills in the Database and the ways in which bills are
displayed.
The origins of bills and heads of bills (1692 to
1782)
Until the session of 1782 bills could only (under Poynings
Law) begin in the Irish privy council. However, informal
legislative initiatives, known as heads of bills, began
regularly in the houses of parliament. If they passed the
commons or lords they were presented to the chief
governor and were considered by the Irish privy council.
Most of these were turned into bills in the strict legal sense
(though often with amendments) and sent to the English
privy council just like bills which had begun in the Irish
privy council itself.
From bills to acts (1692 to 1782)
Once transmitted (to use the contemporary term) to the
English privy council all bills were afterwards treated in
the same manner, whether they had begun as heads of
bills or Irish privy council bills.

The reformed constitution (1783 to 1800)

Poynings Law was radically modified after 1782, as part of
the Irish constitutional settlement of that year. The act
governing the new procedures was 21 & 22 George III c.47
An act to regulate the manner of passing bills, and to
prevent delays in summoning of parliaments' sometimes
known as Yelvertons act (after the proposer Barry
Yelverton). It received the royal assent on 27 July 1782,
but did not take effect until the session of 1783.
From 1783 heads of bills no longer existed, and the Irish
privy council had no role in Irish legislation. The English
privy council retained powers to supervise Irish
legislation, but these were very rarely exercised.
From 1783 until the last session of the Irish parliament in
1800 all bills began in parliament, where they underwent
all stages before being transmitted directly to the English
privy council. On return they received the royal assent in
parliament.
Union with Ireland Act 1800
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/apgb/Geo3/
39-40/67/data.pdf
Gladstone and Ireland : ... Gladstone also tried to modify the
Act of Union and attempted to restore a parliament in Dublin,
which had been abolished in 1800
http://www.iisresource.org/Documents/0
A5_06_Gladstone_Ireland.pdf
Instrument as contemplated by Article 3(2) ... the United
States of America and the European Union signed 25 June ...
Ireland and the Government of the United States ...
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/aug/ireland-usa-
mlat.pdf
Under african Union The European Union and the
African Union ... Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/6
459808/KS-FQ-14-001-EN-C.pdf
The national flag is the tricolour of green, white
and orange. An bhratach tri dhath .i. uaine, bn,
agus flannbhui, an suaitheantas nisiunta.
constitution of ireland bunreacht na heireann
article 7 airteagal 7
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Historical_Informat
ion/The_National_Flag/The_National_Flag.pdf

Ireland and the European Union - Taoiseach

http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/15
94.pdf

Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council for

Local Government Services: England, Wales and
Northern Ireland

13 October 2010
PAY CLAIM 2011 2012

http://www.unitetheunion.org/uploaded/documents/
GreenBookPayClaim20111211-3632.pdf

European Policy Centre contributed to the inquiry into

enlargement of the European Union (EU) ... United Kingdom,
Ireland and Denmark in 1973
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3176_e
nlargement_of_the_eu.pdf

The EU referendum and

potential implications for
Northern Ireland
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/docume
nts/raise/publications/2016/eti/2116.pdf

The EU: Regionalization Trumps

Sovereignty
Tuesday, 20 August 2013
Item fulltext
It all began as a simple Coal and Steel Community between six European
nations after World War II. The scheme was supposed to help prevent further
war, or at least that is what its proponents claimed. In the decades since
1952, however, the first real supranational body has morphed into an
emerging super-state that will eventually obliterate national sovereignty, and
inevitably individual liberty, if left unchecked.

Today, 28 of Europes formerly sovereign national governments are rushing

full speed toward the imposition of a federal regime an unaccountable
transnational entity seeking to regulate and control virtually everything. There
is already a flag and an anthem. The plan is so far along that the European
Unions top leadership and national political leaders across the continent
openly boast that the so-called member states will inevitably be bound
together under a federal system run from Brussels. The timeline: as early as
2014.

EU Chiefs Seek Federal Government

Reiterating previous statements made over the years, former Maoist

revolutionary and current European Commission President Jos Manuel
Barroso declared in early May that a federal Europe would be a reality within
a few years. Whether the formerly sovereign member states use the
controversial single euro currency or not, Barroso announced, all of the 28 EU
governments will be ensnared in the project. According to Barroso and his
cohorts, it is all inevitable at this point.

Last year, during his state of the union speech, Barroso was explicit in
outlining where all of this was going. We will need to move toward a
federation of nation states. This is our political horizon, he declared, adding
that unavoidable changes to European treaties had to be made. This is
what must guide our work in the years to come.

While acknowledging more recently that today, at least, the idea of a federal
regime ruling over Europe may seem like political science fiction to many,
the commission chief echoed his previous predictions that a federation was
all but inescapable and coming soon. In the announcement, the former
communist said plans for the federalization of the continent would be unveiled
by next spring, prior to the 2014 elections for the so-called European
Parliament.

The process is already well under way, Barroso explained, pointing to the
emerging Eurozone fiscal union that he claimed would lead to intensified
political union between all of the formerly independent nations. This is about
the economic and monetary union but for the EU as a whole, the EC chief
said in a speech.

The Commission will, therefore, set out its views and explicit ideas for treaty
change in order for them to be debated before the European elections,
Barroso continued. We want to put all the elements on the table, in a clear
and consistent way, even if some of them may sound like political science
fiction today. They will be reality in a few years time. What purpose the
supposed debate will serve if the outcome is already pre-determined was
not made clear.

According to Barroso and other anti-sovereignty extremists plotting to foist an

all-powerful regime on Europe, the Eurozones adoption of a federal system in
fiscal and economic matters will eventually require complementary political
structures. So-called political union, the argument goes, would ultimately
ensnare every member state, regardless of whether or not it uses the euro,
because that is the end result of economic integration.

Further economic integration would transcend the limits of the

intergovernmental method of running the EU and the Eurozone in particular,
Barroso explained in some of the most explicit comments about the scheme
yet. We must remember that the present configuration of the euro area is
only temporary, since all member states but two [the U.K. and Denmark,
which have opt-outs] are destined to become full members of the Economic
and Monetary Union [EMU] under the Treaties.

Speaking during the opening speech at the Conference on the Blueprint for a
Deep and Genuine EMU, Barroso spent some time with the obligatory nod to
democracy and accountability. However, despite claiming to care about
what people think and harping on the need to have a debate, the
commission chief all but demanded that European nations give up all power
and authority to Brussels as soon as possible.

Fiscal union, banking union and political union; all three need to move
forward together, Barroso demanded, adding that the people essentially
would have to be brought along as well. Europes economic interdependence
so strikingly highlighted by the financial crisis calls for increased political
integration. We will not get away with half-hearted solutions anymore, and
half-integrated institutions will no longer do.

Member State Leaders Agree

EU chiefs are not the only ones pushing for the abolition of sovereignty via
economic, monetary, and political union. Indeed, some of the most fervent
advocates of the plot are actually national political leaders politicians who
would seemingly have the most to lose as authority continues flowing away
from Europes capitals and toward Brussels. At this rate, the EU is on the fast
track to collecting more power than even the U.S. federal government has
amassed, yet most of Europes national leaders are celebrating it.

In October of last year, for example, supposedly conservative German

Chancellor Angela Merkel currently under fire after a new book exposed
her previous work as a propagandist for the communist regime ruling East
Germany announced a push to give Brussels veto power over national
governments budgets. We have made good progress on strengthening fiscal
discipline with the fiscal pact but we are of the opinion, and I speak for the
whole German government on this, that we could go a step further by giving
Europe real rights of intervention in national budgets, she told the Bundestag
lower house.

Merkels plan, supported by more than a few European leaders, was

announced shortly after Barroso declared last year that Europe needed to
move toward a full-blown federation. Socialist French President Franois
Hollande, meanwhile, also claimed there was no choice but to march
toward a unified Europe. According to Hollande, at least, the destruction of
national sovereignty is destiny. Among the blocs political establishment, the
sentiment is widespread.

The EU Today

Already, according to differing methods of calculation in the various EU

member states, from six percent to 84 percent of the laws governing Europe
come from unelected bureaucrats in Brussels, according to estimates cited by
political leaders. In 2011, the EUs budget was more than $150 billion.
Between 2007 and 2013, Brussels spent well over $1 trillion, with
expenditures increasing each year. While the economic crisis has temporarily
put the brakes on ballooning spending, analysts expect the behemoth to
continue growing as soon as eurocrats believe people will tolerate it.

Right now, most of the funds flowing to the EU come from taxpayers via the
EU-mandated value added tax (VAT) and import duties collected by member
states. The EU, however, is seeking ways to start directly confiscating wealth
from citizens, too everything from a carbon tax to a financial-transaction
tax has been pushed, and it appears as though Brussels will not rest until its
bureaucrats are able to seize money straight from citizens without pesky
national-government middlemen.

So where does all that money go? Tens of billions are spent every year on
international wealth redistribution to meet EU convergence objectives.
Essentially, taxes are confiscated from people in richer countries to provide
investments in poorer ones, such as Romania and Bulgaria. More than $50
billion, meanwhile, goes to agricultural subsidies every year through the
Common Agricultural Policy, which purchases loyalty from farmers but
causes countless market distortions. (As an example, we could cite the butter
mountain of unwanted butter caused by EU subsidies to dairy farmers.)

In 2011, the latest year for which data is available from the European
Commission, the EU spent almost $70 billion on what it calls sustainable
growth. That includes spending on everything from social policy agenda
and economic intervention to spending on convergence objectives.

Other expenditures include $10 billion on administration; huge sums on pro-

EU propaganda; grants to agencies, national and local governments, and
universities; and subsidies to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
media outlets that serve as attack dogs against EU critics. As for security,
Europe also has a fledgling law-enforcement agency known as Europol and a
60,000-strong military rapid reaction force dubbed Eurocorps.

In terms of raw EU power exercised over formerly sovereign governments and

peoples, two recent examples illustrate the situation well.

Last spring, the EU came under fire from across the political spectrum when
the European Commission began pushing reforms to food-safety laws that
would regulate all plant reproductive material within the bloc. In essence,
under the original scheme, analysts said every seed variety on the continent
from those raised by home gardeners to seed stocks used by farmers
would have been declared illegal unless it was certified and registered by
the EU.

More recently, after two years of failed discussions between London and
Brussels over U.K. restrictions on welfare to immigrants, the EU announced
that it was hauling British authorities to the Luxembourg-based European
Court of Justice (which purported to allow bans on criticism of the EU in 2001)
to enforce its decrees. U.K. taxpayers must pay welfare to immigrants,
Brussels claims. Virtually all analysts even among the fiercest critics of
integration expect the EU to prevail in its own court.

How It Happened

For decades, the European project was sold as just a common market
aimed at increasing trade and prosperity. Everyone who suggested that
something bigger might be in the pipeline was immediately attacked as a
conspiracy theorist, fearmonger, or worse. In recent years, perhaps
convinced that there is no turning back at this point, EU officials and even
national leaders have been far more brazen about the agenda to smash
national sovereignty.

Not everybody was surprised by recent developments, though. The New

American magazine and its predecessor publications have been warning for
decades that the so-called European Project was eventually aimed at
abolishing national sovereignty on the continent ideas that were long
blasted as mere conspiracy theories by the very same forces that were
quietly working to build a federal Europe.

In 1989, three years before the EU was officially born, TNAs William Jasper
wrote a detailed expos entitled United States of Europe. That remarkably
prescient article highlighted the signs long ignored or downplayed by the
establishment media on both sides of the Atlantic of what was to come.
Today, in mid-2013, after many decades of scheming, the dream of a Europe
unified under a single authority is virtually a reality.

The current EU super-state, long sought by prominent internationalists at the

Council on Foreign Relations and its affiliates, took its first major leap forward
in 1952 with the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community. A powerful
supranational entity, the ECSC helped lay the foundations for what was to
come. In 1957, the six members of the community signed the Treaty of
Rome, creating the European Economic Community a scheme to use
economic integration as a step on the road to eventual political union.

Over the next three decades, other national governments were gradually
brought on board with lofty promises of peace, security, and prosperity. Then,
in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed by the 12 EEC member states,
creating the European Union and building the groundwork for the single euro
currency and the European Central Bank (ECB). A decade later, euro coins
and bills went into circulation in a dozen countries, leaving complete control
over monetary policy in the hands of the ECB.

In 2004, as Jaspers 1989 article foresaw, former communist countries began

to join the EU, too Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, and more. By 2007, Romania and Bulgaria had joined as well.
Today, there are 28 member states, and the EU is still seeking to expand the
number of countries under its yoke.

By 2004, when former communist nations were joining en masse, the real
agenda started coming out in the open when the then-25 member
governments signed the European Constitution. All but seven eventually
ratified the deeply controversial document, which aimed to replace all of the
treaties with a single document empowering the EU while making it far easier
for the super-state to impose its wishes on the peoples of Europe.

In 2005, however, French and Dutch voters overwhelming rejected the

scheme. That should have been the end of it. Of course, it was not. As has
become typical with the EU, the wishes of citizens proved to be no match for
proponents of ever-closer union. In 2007, as this writer reported for The New
American in 2009, the establishment unveiled its new strategy an approach
that would not require approval from most of the peoples of Europe.

Lisbon Treaty = Constitution

Enter the Lisbon Treaty, a repackaged version of the constitution, giving the
new and improved EU virtually unlimited powers in every field of life. The
Treaty of Lisbon is the same as the rejected constitution, boasted Valry
Giscard dEstaing, the former French president and the president of the
Constitutional Convention, in an open letter to several European newspapers
in 2007. Only the format has been changed to avoid referendums.
Everybody knew voters would never accept it.

While purporting to grant citizens rights to healthcare, a high level of

consumer protection, welfare, gender equality, education, and security, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union all but obliterates
traditional notions of individual, property, and parental rights. Allegiance to the
United Nations Charter and sustainable development is explicit.

The Lisbon Treaty is an attempt to construct a highly centralized European

Federation artificially, from the top down, out of Europes many nations,
peoples and States, without their free consent and knowledge, writes
Professor Anthony Coughlan in an analysis of the document for the Brussels
Journal, entitled These Boots Are Gonna Walk All Over You. The peoples of
Europe do not want this kind of highly centralized Federal European Union
whose most striking feature is that it is run virtually entirely by committees of
politicians, bureaucrats and judges, none of whom are directly elected by the
people.

Only Ireland held a referendum on the repackaged constitution.

Unsurprisingly, with polls showing that Europeans did not favor surrendering
more power to the EU but instead wanted strict limits, the Irish voted no.
Within 16 months, following a brazen pro-EU campaign waged with a
combination of propaganda and scaremongering amid a brutal economic
crisis, Ireland was forced to hold another vote. This time, the globalists
succeeded. Just one man was left in the way: Czech President Vclav Klaus.
Eventually, he was forced to sign, too.

Lisbon, which analysts estimate retained more than 95 percent of the failed
constitution, went into effect in December 2009. Now, as Barroso made clear,
the EU wants even more: more power, more money, more government, and
more Europe. Whether or not the people want it they dont, as recent polls
made perfectly clear matters little.

U.S. Role, Bilderberg, CFR, Atlantic Community

While Europeans have been spoon-fed propaganda about the integration

process for decades, with countless citizens naively believing that the EU
would help counter-balance American influence, the reality is that the U.S.
government has been supporting the development of the union from the start.
Major American tax-exempt foundations helped fund the effort, too.

Also key were establishment fronts such as the Council on Foreign Relations
and the Bilderberg conference, as Jaspers 1989 article documented
extensively. More recently, former EU Commissioner for Industry and
Bilderberg chair tienne Davignon admitted in a March 2009 interview with
the EU Observer that Bilderberg helped to create the single euro currency. All
along, the real goal was to bring the world closer toward centralized rule.

The U.S. government, long dominated by CFR types, was important as well.
After World War II, the Marshall Plan, for example, played a major role in
foisting todays regime on the peoples of Europe. Back in a 1947 speech,
then-U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall (CFR) strongly suggested that
European economic cooperation was a precondition for desperately needed
American aid after World War II.

The Committee of European Economic Cooperation, chaired by then-British

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, officially responded with a major report that
was ultimately transmitted approvingly by the State Department to President
Harry Truman. Signed by government representatives from Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and more, the committee
outlined efforts to create a customs union that could eventually lead to even
further cooperation. U.S. officials were pleased.

Members of Congress, especially Rep. Walter Judd (R-Minn.), tried to get

language in the statement of purpose for the original Marshall Plan bill of 1948
explicitly declaring that it was the policy of the United States to encourage the
economic unification and the political federation of Europe. In the end,
language calling for the development of economic cooperation was included
instead.

The next year, the political federation amendment was pursued again, with
the result being the addition of the sentence: It is further declared to be the
policy of the people of the United States to encourage the unification of
Europe. By 1951, Congress finally came out and said it openly, with a clause
included in the 1951 Mutual Security Act stating: to further encourage the
economic unification and the political federation of Europe.

The goals of U.S. government support for European integration were

explained in part decades ago, though largely ignored, by top U.S. officials.
On September 20, 1966, for example, then-Under Secretary of State George
Ball (CFR) testified before Congress on the State Departments view on
forming an Atlantic Community, essentially merging the United States with
Europe.

I find little evidence of any strong interest among Europeans for any
immediate move toward greater political unity with the United States, he
explained. They fear the overwhelming weight of U.S. power and influence in
our common councils.... We believe that so long as Europe remains merely a
continent of medium- and small-sized states there are definite limits to the
degree of political unity we can achieve across the ocean. (Emphasis added.)

In a letter sent to Congress by the State Department the next year, Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations William Macomber (CFR) reiterated the
administrations position. According to the congressional record, the State
Department wished to encourage our European allies to continue to seek
common solutions to their problems through European integration.

A number of subsequent events have demonstrated the advantages of

pursuing the policy which they outlined, that of seeking intensified cooperation
in NATO while supporting a stronger and more unified Europe, Macomber
explained. Recent actions by the European Economic Community to
consolidate and advance economic integration have brought into sight the
completion of a single economic system at the center of Europe.

Even today, the U.S. government continues to push European integration

whether the people want it or not. Consider the Obama administrations
outrageous statements surrounding the increasingly likely possibility of British
secession from the EU, with the U.S. president warning that Britain would
suffer severe economic losses if voters decide to withdraw from the union.
Among the threats: less trade, loss of jobs, and more.

Before that, Federal Reserve boss Ben Bernanke was demanding closer
European integration, too, calling for the creation of a central regime with
power over taxing and spending. If Europe had a single fiscal authority, that
would put them in a much closer situation relative to the United States,
Bernanke said during an August 2012 town hall meeting in Washington.
That would probably address many of the concerns, many of the problems
that they had.

Further Expansion

Ironically, critics of the EU point out, if the EU applied to join itself, it would not
qualify due to its undemocratic structure. Still, putting more formerly sovereign
nations under the EU regime remains a high priority, with some powerful
figures even seeking to expand EU rule well beyond Europes borders.

The most recent member to surrender its sovereignty is Croatia, where a tax-
funded propaganda and scaremongering campaign threatening peoples
pensions resulted in voters opting to join early last year. Other nations from
the former Yugoslavia are expected to join in the coming years.

Eventually, more than a few pro-EU expansionists hope to add Islamic Turkey,
a small piece of which is on the European continent. After that, there are
prominent voices calling for the union to expand into Africa, the Middle East,
and even Russia. In 2007, for example, then-U.K. Foreign Secretary David
Miliband proposed a version of the European Free Trade Association that
could gradually bring the countries of the Mahgreb, the Middle East and
Eastern Europe in line with the single market, not as an alternative to
membership, but potentially as a step towards it.

In the upper echelons of power within the EU and Russia, there are also
efforts under way to bring the Russian government into the fold amid the
march toward global governance. During a meeting late last year between
Russian and EU leaders, Bilderberg-selected European President Herman
Van Rompuy said: By working together, the EU and Russia can make a
decisive contribution to global governance and regional conflict resolution, to
global economic governance in the G8 and G20, and to a broad range of
international and regional issues. Russian heavyweights have also started
publicly calling for integration including political between the EU and
Russia.

Of course, the EU is not the only transnational entity at work usurping national
sovereignty on the continent. Founded in 1949, another prominent and
increasingly influential body, known as the Council of Europe, has ensnared
almost 50 national governments and 800 million people virtually every
country in Europe. The Strasbourg-based entity already has its own court,
dubbed the European Court of Human Rights, that imposes its controversial
social-engineering schemes on member states while doing little to uphold
genuine human rights. Among the members: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine,
Moldova, and more.

Where It Is Going

With the brutal economic crisis wreaking havoc across Europe, anti-
sovereignty extremists have seized the opportunity to accelerate the
integration process with promises of financial stability. Some of the most
stunning developments include the erection of a so-called banking union; the
creation of a perpetual bailout mechanism with virtually unlimited ability to
extract wealth from Europeans, dubbed a financial dictatorship by critics; the
replacement of elected national leaders in countries such as Italy and Greece
by EU-establishment stooges; and more. What former Soviet dictator Mikhail
Gorbachev approvingly described as the new European Soviet during a
2000 visit to Britain appears to be coming into view, according to analysts.

Even prominent officials are openly discussing the future of Europe as a bloc
where unaccountable Brussels makes the decisions. The Euro currency is
stable again. But the crisis has not gone away completely, of course, and we
have to continue to follow these new rules if we want to ensure that it does not
return, announced European Commission Vice-President for Inter-
institutional Affairs and Administration Maro efcovic in a speech to
Lithuanian lawmakers, adding that eurocrats will now be approving member
states budgets. Pooling sovereignty in this way would have been unthinkable
a few years ago, and yet now it is likely to be the model for future
development of the economic and monetary union.

Not everybody in the EU sees the new model as a viable scheme, however.
Firebrand U.K. Independence Party (UKIP) chief Nigel Farage, a member of
the rubber-stamp European Parliament, regularly attacks the EU as an
illegitimate regime filled with former communists and criminals. In his view,
the so-called European Project is destined for inevitable failure, and possibly
violence if EU leaders do not cease and desist in their efforts to abolish
national sovereignty and self-government.

Like Communism, this has all gone badly wrong, and the EU Titanic has now
hit the iceberg, MEP Farage said in an impassioned plea before Parliament
last year. It is a European Union of economic failure, of mass unemployment,
of low growth; but worst of all, its an EU with the economic prison of the
euro.... This now poses huge dangers to the continent. We face the prospect
of mass civil unrest, possibly even revolution in some countries that have
been driven to total and utter desperation.

Whether the EU will descend into violence and more severe chaos remains to
be seen. What is clear, however, is that the forces seeking to build global
government view European integration as a key stepping stone on the path to
world order and they are not likely to abandon their grandiose dream
without a fight. The planet is quietly being divided up into regional blocs ruled
by an unelected and unaccountable cabal, and with the destruction of na

New America How To Free Trade

Fake Free Trade New free trade agreements with
Pacific rim nations and the European Union would
lead to the end of our independent, constitutional
republic that has secured our rights since 1787.
http://www.thenewamerican.com/files/TNA2917.pdf

EuropeDeclaration
18April1951

ThefollowingCHARTEROFTHECOMMUNITY
wasmadeandsignedonsamedayaseurope's
foundingtreatyofparis,creatingtheeuropeancoal
andsteelcommunity.ThisDECLARATIONof
INTERDEPENDENCEaffirmsthateuropemust
bebuiltonsupranationalprinciplesandthefree
choiceofitscitizens.
The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, His
Royal Highness the Prince Royal of Belgium, the President
of the French Republic, the President of the Italian
Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of
Luxembourg, Her Majesty, the Queen of The Netherlands,
Considering that world peace can only be safeguarded by
creative efforts commensurate with the dangers
threatening it;
Convinced that the contribution that an organized and
invigorated Europe can bring to civilization is
indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations;
Conscious that Europe will not be constructed except by
concrete achievements establishing first of all the reality
of partnership, and by the establishment of common
bases for economic development;
Anxious to cooperate through the expansion of their
primary products in raising the standard of living and in
progressing in works of peace;
Resolved to transform their age-long rivalry through the
unification of their essential interests, and, by the
inauguration of an economic Community, to assemble the
initial basis for a broader and deeper Community of
peoples who had for centuries been opposed in bloody
conflicts, and to set the foundations of institutions capable
of providing a direction to a destiny that is henceforward
shared,
Have decided to create a European Coal and
Steel.Community
This work, that has just been confirmed by our signature,
we owe to the wisdom of our delegations and to the
perseverance of our experts. We are deeply grateful to
them.Even before the work was set in motion, the virtues
of the idea that inspired it had already aroused in our
countries and beyond its borders an extraordinary surge of
hope and confidence.In signing the treaty founding the
European Community for Coal and Steel Community, a
community of 160 million Europeans, the contracting
parties give proof of their determination to call into life the
first supranational institution, and consequently create the
true foundation for an organized Europe.This Europe is
open to all European countries that are able to choose
freely for themselves. We sincerely hope that other
countries will join us in our common endeavour.In full
awareness of the need to reveal the significance of this
first step by sustained action in other sectors, we have the
hope and the will in the same spirit that presided in the
elaboration of this Treaty, to bring the current projects now
in preparation to a successful conclusion. The work will be
pursued in conjunction with the existing European bodies.

These initiatives, each with their particular objective,

should rapidly take their place within the framework of a
European Political Community, the concept of which is
being elaborated in the Council of Europe. This should
result in the coordination and simplification of the
European institutions as a whole.All these efforts will be
guided by the growing conviction that the countries of free
Europe are inter-dependent and that they share a common
destiny. We will strengthen this sentiment by combining
our energies and our determination, and bringing our work
into harmony through frequent consultations and building
ever-increasing trust through our contacts.Herein lies the
significance of this day. We have no doubt its importance
will be understood by the public opinion of our countries
and by our parliaments, who are called to decide on its
ratification. The governments that together are
represented here will act to all as interpreters of our
common will to build a peaceful and prosperous Europe.
And together we will serve Europe.

The declaration was signed by Konrad Adenauer (West

Germany), Paul van Zeeland, Joseph Meurice (Belgium),
Robert Schuman (France), Count Sforza (Italy) Joseph Bech
(Luxembourg), Dirk Stikker and J. R. M. van den Brink (The
Netherlands).

Is the European Union a federal union or supranational

one?

The Schuman Proposal announced that the European Coal

and Steel Community is a 'first step for the European
federation'. The pooling of basic industrial production and
the setting up of the European Community 'will bring into
reality the first solid groundwork for a European
Federation vital to the preservation of world peace.'
But it is a union quite different from federal unions known
so far in history.
It had a founding purpose that had never been put into
practice before:
Most Federal Unions are based on common defence
against a potential enemy. They start with common
military policy and common foreign policy, sometimes
customs unions directed against a threat. The European
Union was based on a diametrically opposite purpose:
creating peace. It was based on anti-war principles. It
would change the destiny of regions .. long devoted to
manufacturing munitions of war.
It would make plain that war between France and
Germany was not only unthinkable but materially
impossible.

It would go far beyond that as it was 'vital for the

preservation of world peace.' It put in concrete form the
principles to build world peace and to save the world from
the 'war system' that saw war as the means to solve
political problems.
Was the aim to create a Super-State?
In Schuman's view classical federalism will create a Super
-State. Supranational links won't.

Was the European Community that Schuman created an

association of sovereign states or a federation or
something entirely new?
Schuman called the supranational 'a new stage in human
development.' It was the first time in history that such an
idea had been put into practical effect.
It provided a new innovation, a new instrument in political
science. It encourages the traditions, culture and
flourishing of national interests except those that might
lead to antagonism with neighbouring states and to war.
The national flourishes within the supranational.
Is the word 'federal' in the founding Treaty of Paris for the
European Coal and Steel Community?
No. But the word 'supranational' appears twice. It is the
first treaty in world history that is based on supranational
principles. The supranational concept and supranational
law is the main basis of subsequent EU development. The
European Union (which does not have a legal personality;
only the European Community does) is a mixture of
supranational elements that are subject to law and proper
democratic review and some intergovernmental elements
which do not.
How do classical federalism and supranationalism differ in
conception?
Federalism tries to coordinate and control by central
organisms specific areas of life. Lower decisions can be
decentralized. Supranationalism is much more specific in
its choice of sectors. They are chosen by common consent
as representing a means to arrive at common solutions to
common problems. The supranational management can
be relaxed once the problem is solved. It is more flexible
and aimed at helping nations live together rather than
creating a bureaucracy.
Will the European Union develop federal institutions like
the USA?
No. At present the budget of the EU institutions cost about
one and a quarter percent of GDP. American Federal
institutions take about TWENTY times as much.
Economically both the EU and the USA are about the same
size. The system of coordination and administration is
quite different. The number of European civil servants is
minimal -- equivalent to those that administer locally a
medium-sized town. The European system encourages
national government by strengthening self-discipline on
policies that are for the public good, such as common
standards, open markets, trade and development,
environment and cooperation and sound monetary policy.
These help long-term cooperation, essential for strategic
planning between partners in all walks of life.
Will nation states lose sovereignty?
No, quite the reverse. They have gained sovereignty by
the supranational method. A country like Portugal now has
a strong currency. It also has a say in the new world
currency, the euro. Its economy has been revitalised.
Democracy has been strengthened. Its people have free
movement around the EU. It has gained in inward
investment and the choice of goods and services for its
people. Its industries have means to cooperate with other
groups in a huge market and participate in exporting to
world markets more effectively. Most importantly of all, it
has its future and a vision for peace. It can make powerful
contributions based on its own history, culture, work and
intelligence. So can all member states of the European
Union.
How does the supranational guarantee real democracy?
The European Union is presently a mixture of
supranational law and intergovernmental agreement. The
supranational law element has been agreed only in certain
sectors. The supranational is a joint decision-making
system under the RULE OF LAW. Decisions are made
together with care after numerous aspects of them are
examined. These laws are scrutinized by Parliament
(democratic safeguard), the Economic and Social
Committee (safeguard by partners involved in economic
activity), the Court (legal safeguard and justice), the
Committee of Regions (geographic safeguards) and the
Court of Auditors (financial safeguards), not to mention
investigation by national parliaments and their
committees, various associations, companies, citizens and
the media. These provide means to guarantee the
objectivity of Community measures given the varied
cultures, histories but common values of the European
peoples. Such institutions have the power to modify and, if
necessary, stop legislative proposals if they don't feel that
that are just and equitable. Even any private citizen,
organization or company can object to any law if he or she
finds it unjust. Such powers are rarely found in any other
system whether national or federal.
Supranational law is a law binding democratic states by
majority vote of democratic government ministers
meeting in Council. It is a democracy at a higher level
than the state or the nation. It is very limited. A
supranational community acts only in certain sectors such
as coal and steel or the internal market. Furthermore, its
action is confined generally to commonly agreed law in
existing areas of common interest.
A SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITY IS A DEMOCRACY OF
DEMOCRACIES. It is aimed at supplying all citizens with a
maximum of liberty. It has already opened up freedoms to
citizens, associations and firms to an extent undreamed of
just a few short decades ago. It is a SUPERPOWER OF
DEMOCRACIES.
Supranational law has a democratising effect in improving
national democracies
Where it exists, supranational law has the effect of a
searchlight on national democratic law. All the other states
can be guardians that the common European law is
applied in any single member state. Furthermore any
citizen can complain to a court that the citizen's member
state or another member state is not applying law
equitably. His MEP can open an examination of it in
Parliament. Others institutions, including the European
Ombudsman, can examine any such case at the European
level. The European Community therefore embodies and
refines the best European values of liberty and democracy.
All this is done without creating bureaucratic federal
agencies and a powerful, sometimes overpowerful, federal
presidency.
In the USA -- to quote Woodrow Wilson-- 'The President is
at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man
as he can. His capacity will set the limit; and if Congress
be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the makers of
the Constitution. ... The initiative in foreign affairs, which
the President possesses without any restriction
whatsoever, is virtually the power to control them
absolutely.' (W Wilson's book: Government of the United
States). The US relies on checks and balances; the
European Community relies on mutual democratizing
control, democratic refinement of legislation and several
types of safeguard.

The European Union is in the process of transformation to

a more just form of democracy.
The European Community safeguards Europeans from
demagogic or populist control. Decisions of the EC bodies
are generally in the form of specific law. Two separate
bodies at the very least are required to make the decision
based on independent logic. These involve both European
values and national values. At the highest European level
it is not the states that take the initiative for joint action
but an independent body equivalent to an arbitrage and
strategic planning group: the European Commission. Its
purpose is to analyze impartially Europe's requirements
and propose solutions. Its proposals can be modified and
possibly rejected by the Council of Ministers, based on a
legal Opinion, usually in the form of communique or other
written form. In the treaties the Council of Ministers is not
alone with this power. Civil society has full right to the
same type of Opinions in its own domains. Equally the
Committee of Regions must also give its Opinion where
appropriate. This is shown by the fact that the European
Commission must submit its proposals to the Council,
Parliament and EcoSoc and Committee of Regions where
the treaty specifies. It does not have to submit the
proposal to any particular commune or golf club even
though they may be affected. That is because the four
bodies (Council, Parliament and the two Legal Consultative
Committees) are the legally charged bodies to investigate
repercussions for all citizens. Governments of European
democracies have not yet ensured that the Parliament, the
Committee of Regions, the Economic and Social
Committee (which the treaties say should be the
democratically elected body of 'organised civil society' are
legally, fairly and democratically elected.
The Commission is obliged by law not to act until it has
received the Legal Opinions of these bodies (Council,
Parliament and the two Legal Consultative Committees). It
does not have to wait for any comment from any borough,
commune or golf club, nor any small company or major
multinational company, even the largest in the European
Union. It can institute legislation on software without
asking Microsoft. Why? Because Microsoft and all other
software companies should be engaged in a permanent
dialogue through the appropriate body. In this case the
most appropriate body is the EcoSoc, a body for economic
and social interests, not the Parliament or the Council,
which deals with national matters.
What happens if the Commission proceeds before it has
received the Opinion of the EcoSoc? If any of the
procedures of justice in the treaty articles are not
respected, these institutions have access to the European
Court of Justice to modify or overthrow any such faulty and
incomplete legislation. European law is defined by the act
of publishing in the Commission's Official Journal. So far
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
Regions have not reached the level of maturity of the
Parliament. In the 1970s the Parliament took the matter to
Court because its was being ignored by the Council and a
subservient Commission. This resulted in direct elections
being implemented. Treaty articles had been ignored for
some three decades. Parliament has still a long way to go
before it fulfills the democratic requirements of the
founding treaties.
Note that this analysis describes how the treaties say the
Community should work. In practice States have yet to
unblock what are probably illegal constraints on full
democracy in the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of Regions to allow these key institutions to
play their allotted democratic role. The Maastricht process
also provided a mechanism for States to make
intergovernmental decisions without adequate democratic
control in areas such as justice and home affairs and
external relations. A proper functioning Community
system would have a much more powerful, just, balanced
and coherent internal and external policy. The Maastricht
three pillar system can be seen as an attempt by
governments to retain central powers that they do not
wish to place under democratic investigation and
supervision.
The democratic wellspring that Schuman opened in the
Community system will make it inevitable that eventually
governments, that is party politicians, will have to cede
the new areas of democracy that they are presently
blocking. Eventually there will be proper Europe-wide
elections for the EcoSoc and the Committee of Regions
with a subsequent increase in their moral authority and
influence. This will increase the efficiency of the whole EC,
boost the economy and save millions of Euros. It will also
vastly improve Community coherence through enhanced
mutual understanding.
What is the goal of a supranational Community?
Schuman said that the European Community was a means
to create a 'zone of peace'. It should be devoted externally
to 'works of peace'.
Was the Community directed against the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe?
As distinct from Schuman's work in the creation of NATO
which was a defensive alliance aimed at discouraging
Soviet expansion, the European Community was based on
quite different principles. There is nothing in the Schuman
Proposal that is aimed against any state. Quite the
reverse. It is open to all European states. On 9 May 1950
Schuman was asked if Russia was part of Europe. He
replied: 'Yes, of course.' (Mais oui). In April 1951 all the
signatory states of the founding treaty of the European
Community signed a document pledging that Europe
would be open to all other states on the basis of
supranational principles, which they called the 'TRUE
FOUNDATION' for Europe. It embodied the best expression
of our culture and history of liberty, democracy and
community.
What were the exact words of this pledge?
The Europe Declaration signed at the time of the EU's
founding Treaty of Paris said:
'By the signature of this Treaty, the participating
Parties give proof of their determination to create the first
supranational institution and that thus they are laying the
true foundation of an organised Europe. This Europe
remains open to all nations. We profoundly hope that
other nations will join us in our common endeavour.'
This visionary declaration of principles and lucid
judgement was signed by Konrad Adenauer (Germany),
Paul van Zeeland (Belgium) Robert Schuman (France)
Count Sforza (Italy) Joseph Bech (Luxembourg) and Dirk
Stikker (The Netherlands). It was made to recall future
generations to their historic duty of uniting Europe based
on liberty and democracy under the rule of law. Thus the
creation of a wider and deeper Europe is intimately bound
to the healthy development of the supranational or
Community system.
How can the supranational method help central and
eastern Europe?
Schuman said 'It is our duty to be ready' to receive these
countries into the Union. His method was not to create
complex negotiations but to identify a strong and vital
sector for supranational action. This would form for all
willing Europeans the strong backbone of a new
relationship around which unity could grow more rapidly.
Creating a Community was to help reform, he said, not the
other way around. A vibrant supranational community in
one sector would accelerate reform in other sectors and
consolidate the rule of law, democracy and justice. He
warned about leaving it too late to unify Europe.
Schuman spoke of 'reconstituting' the European
Community after the fall of the Soviet Union. Why?
The aim of the supranational method is to solve common
problems together treating partners equally. Joining a club
does not deal with central and eastern Europe equally. Nor
do long, technical and intricate discussions on the
pesticides and fish-farming engage Europe's most urgent
problem: long-term peace and security and freedom from
domination. Like the early coal and steel community, this
problem can best be tackled not by building armies but
merging common, most vital interests in a Community.
7. Political integration does not mean that the nation
should be dispossessed of sovereignty
It is not a question of a fusion of states in order to create
a super-state. Our European states are a historical reality.
It would be psychologically impossible to make them
disappear. Their diversity is even a very happy
circumstance and we do not want to bring them to a
common level or equalize them.
But a union, a cohesion and a coordination is necessary. ...
From the political point of view, a durable and developing
understanding, instituted between different countries,
must enhance the peace of our divided Europe.'
'Moreover, the idea of a federal government and that of a
federal parliament would imply, it seems to me, a majority
decision-making power binding the federated states. That
I judge would involve burning bridges, and committing
ourselves prematurely and imprudently on the road of
dispossessing our national sovereignty on points of vital
importance.
The close cooperation that is already instituted in the
European Communities, however, will lead us to consider
everything under the angle of the interest of shared
responsibility. We would get used to examine everything
from a point of view beyond that of the strictly national.
We will of course not neglect national considerations, but
we will necessarily find them again with equal significance
when we take a collective outlook. We will incorporate
them with others in the aspect of mutual interdependence.
Thus it is necessary in proceeding from the national alone,
to situate it as part of the whole where everything must
connect and be complete.
We will have to learn and understand the point of view of
our associate as much as the associate will have to make
the same effort as far as we are concerned.

8. The European bond promotes the common interest

We are not in the business, nor will ever be, of bartering
off our home country. Nor will we be forgetful of duties
that we owe towards her. However beyond every
homeland we recognize more and more distinctly the
existence of a common good, above the national interest.
In this common interest the individual interests of our
countries are fused and intermixed.
This idea of Europe will reveal to everybody the common
bases of our civilization and will create little by little the
bond similar to that which in ages past has forged our
home countries. It will be a force that will breach all
obstacles.

9. Europe must serve humanity

Europe has provided for mankind with a way to reach its
full potential growth. It is up to Europe to demonstrate this
new way, which, as opposed to subjugation, allows diverse
civilisations to flourish, while showing mutual respect for
each other.

Solidarity
10. European solidarity prefigures a worldwide solidarity of
the future
The law of solidarity of our peoples has become written
on our modern consciousness. We feel shoulder to
shoulder with each other in the preservation of peace, in
defence against aggression, in the fight against poverty,
with regard to international treaties, or safeguarding
justice or human dignity.
We have gained the conviction by the demonstration of
facts that nations, far from being able to be self-sufficient,
are interdependent and that the best way to serve one's
own land is to assure that it has the cooperation of others
by reciprocal efforts and pooling of resources.
The continents and the peoples depend more than ever
on each other. The political economy has become
inevitably a world economy.The consequence of this
interdependence is that the fortune or misfortune of one
people cannot leave others indifferent.
All are united for the better or the worse in a common
destiny.

School Report on Treaties

Where Governments have FAILED
DEMOCRACY PLEDGES AND DUTIES
1. Europe-wide elections with a single electoral statute for
all States are legally required in all Treaties since Paris,
1951. 'The Assembly shall .. consist of representatives of
the peoples united within the Community {and) be
elected by direct universal suffrage..' Treaty of Paris 1951,
articles #20, 21. Elections based on a single procedure
were to be agreed by all Member States, all democracies,
on the basis of the most democratic method. It is a
democratic duty at the European level. The Rome treaties
1957 reinforced this by telling the Parliament to draw up
proposals for a 'uniform procedure.'
2.Civil Society should elect representatives in the
Economic and Social Committee. (Nice Treaty, Rome, and
Paris). The treaties say: "The Committee shall consist of
REPRESENTATIVES of the various categories of economic
and social activity ... and REPRESENTATIVES of the general
public." Rome Treaties, articles, EAEC #165, EEC #193. IN
A DEMOCRACY, THE WORD, "REPRESENTATIVE," MEANS
THAT A PERSON IS ELECTED! Evidently, 'representative'
does not mean 'I will pick my buddy, and I will let you pick
your yesman, too.' The Treaty of Nice says Consultative
Committees should represent 'organised Civil Society' not
politicians.
3. All Council meetings should be OPEN to the public.
Schuman said: 'councils and committees should be under
control of public opinion,' Pour lEurope, p145.
Democracies should be at the service of the people.
Agreements should be made with their accord, p145. Why
should Councils be secret?
4. The European Commission should be independent of
governments, political parties and interest groups.
Members should be honest and competent and act as the
conscience of Europe, without political bias. Paris #9,
EAEC #126, EEC #157. The original Commission, the High
Authority, had co-opted members and provisions for
REDUCING the number of members, so they could not be
considered national nominees. Schuman wanted HALF of
the Commission to be co-opted by Commission members,
already chosen as being of proven independence,
honesty, European experience and good character.
5. Proper funds for JUSTICE for the deprived, persecuted
and victims of bureaucratic abuse. The Secretary General
of the Council of Europe says that there are about 90,000
cases outstanding. Where is your commitment to justice
and cutting the backlog? What use is a new Charter of
Rights with no judges?
6. Open up to public and press the 3000+ secret
committees. Ministerial committees (COREPER) deal with
citizens affairs and vital interests behind closed doors.
Then they breed hundreds of other secret subcommittees.
They proliferate more. What are you doing about costly
bureaucratic mistakes, besides trying to cover them up?
IF YOU DO NOT PASS THESE ELEMENTARY TESTS, THE
VOTERS WILL NOT ALLOW YOU TO GO TO THE NEXT CLASS
OR HAVE ANOTHER TREATY!
1. FAIL! LAZINESS! In more than half a century, you have
taken NO ACTION!! Why have the governments never
published single rules for a Europe-wide election? Each
State has its own rules, usually favouring big parties. This
DISTORTS MEP numbers, powers and politics in Parliament.
(The distorted Parliament is then supposed to elect a
politically biased Commission in the Lisbon Treaty
revisions!!) It took nearly 30 years before governments
held direct elections in 1979, specified in the SAME
ARTICLE of the Treaties of Paris, 1951, Rome, 1957, etc.
2. FAIL! Cheating! Members are still picked by
governments in secret illegally. All European NGOs
should be registered and then THEY vote on their
representatives. EcoSoc, Committee of Regions have real
legal powers in treaties. Their democratic Opinions should
have the same weight as Parliament's. Instead, they are
ignored because the nominees and yesmen/ women do
not have legal validity or moral authority as they are NOT
democratically elected by legal associations. Already, fifty
years ago, Schuman and Reuter said it was cheating to
pick members. Why don't you stop?? It's costing
consumers millions!
3. FAIL! Deceitful! Treaties say the Council is designed to
coordinate the activities of citizens. Why has it never
allowed citizens to hear its debates ? Should a Council of
democratic Ministers perpetuate SECRET government like
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR? Western democracy was
supposed to show 'the enslaved nations' authentic
democracy. The Council should not imitate fraudulent
Communists!
4. FAIL! Bullying! Why do you stack the Commission with
national politicians?? Commission Presidents like Hallstein,
Hirsch and Finet defended the Communities against de
Gaulle's undemocratic attacks. They weren't politicians.
Under the Lisbon Treaty only card-carrying party members
can become Commission President. Jean Monnet, Hirsch,
Hallstein, Davignon, Soames would be excluded. Only 2 %
of Europeans have cards. You are a political clique who are
BULLYING everyone else. The Lisbon treaty revision
discriminates against 98% of European citizens.
5. FAIL! You pocket the money for the needy! Why boast
of a great system of Justice, a model for the world, yet you
don't fund the judges? Europe's destitute ask
Governments: where did the money go? What do you call
people who promise one thing and do another?
6. FAIL! Conniving! People do not even know how many
secret committees you have to make deals behind their
backs! They regulate all citizens' interests! Most of these
secret committees should come under the DEMOCRATIC
authority of an elected EcoSoc, EP, CoR! Elected
representatives should oversee how tax-payers' money is
used on 'European' projects! If democrats fail, they get
sacked. Democrats fight fraud!
Conclusion

The intelligent person's Guide to European Treaties

Here are some questions citizens should bear in mind
during the coming discussions and debates on the
European Reform Treaty.
KEY THOUGHT: The surest way to solve the Treaty dilemma
is for the governments themselves to apply the present
treaties in their spirit and letter. They signed up to them.
They should respect them.
DEMOCRACY. Let us start with the founder of the European
Community system, French Prime Minster and Foreign
Minster, Robert Schuman, and his definition of Democracy.
It is at the service of the people and acting in agreement
with it See Schumans book, Pour lEurope, p55. Now, ask:
Is the EU applying this democracy today
OPEN MEETINGS. The Council of Ministers still meet behind
closed doors like the Supreme Soviet. Schuman called the
Soviet system and those of Peoples Democracies
counterfeit democracy. He did not exclude as counterfeit
some aspects of Western democracies that use sleight of
hand to avoid democratic debate and run the state by
technocrats and cliques of interest groups. At the
European Councils the most-experienced and clever
democratic leaders of 27 EU States meet to discuss in
secret the most urgent present problems and the most
vital future strategy. Why do these celebrated democrats
ban the media and the public so that their national
spokespersons can natter with their own national press
(off the record) giving their spin about what is happening
behind firmly closed doors? This is upside-down
democracy. Imagine a parliamentary chamber behind
closed doors where each MP had his spokesman to the
public! Europe must have a democratic foundation: the
councils, committees and other organs must be placed
under the supervision of public opinion. The words are
those of EUs founder, Robert Schuman, in Pour lEurope
p145. Why has Europe never had open government for the
debating chamber/council of ministers in more than half a
century? Why are the doors still closed when the Council
and its many, many committees discuss matters of vital
interest to the livelihoods of all 500 million European
citizens: climate change, energy policy, raw materials
shortages and population and immigration problems to
name but a few? Is this a service to the people? When did
they agree to secrecy?
PARLIAMENTARY DIRECT ELECTIONS. Direct Elections to
the European Parliament (EP) are required in the Treaty of
Paris, 1951, Article 21. After seizing power in 1958,
Charles de Gaulle asked his spokesman Alain Peyrefitte to
prepare a plan to 'chloroform' and suffocate the two
Treaties of Rome and the foundational Treaty of Paris that
created five democratic European institutions in the Coal
and Steel Community. (Cetait de Gaulle, vol 1, pp 66-74).
He persuaded the German Chancellor Adenauer and all
the other leaders (Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg) to block the treaty obligation for direct
elections to the European Parliament. European leaders,
so-called democrats, blocked direct elections for nearly
thirty years until 1979. The European Parliament only
forced governments to initiate direct elections when some
of the parliamentarians took these democratic
governments to the European Court and some British
parliamentarians created a scandal by boycotting the
European Parliament as not being democratic.

SINGLE ELECTORAL STATUTE. All three founding treaties

dating back more than half a century require that an
impartial, uniform procedure for the parliamentary
elections be applied, the same for all Member States. Why
have democratic governments never introduced it, far
less, applied it? Such decisions on who can vote, when,
where, and how the votes should be counted to elect MEPs
should not be made by party machines to divide up the
vote unfairly for their own gain. The majorities in the EP
often depend on how some big countries organise their
systems to gain the maximum number of MEPs at the
expense of other parties. The Single Electoral Statute is a
legal obligation to the people, repeated in all the treaties
up to the present Treaty of Nice, 2001

ELECTIONS TO THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES. De

Gaulle and the other leaders blocked the independent
elections of NGOs and associations to the Consultative
Committee, the Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
and the Committee of Regions. According to the present
Nice Treaty, the Economic and Social Committee consists
of representatives of organised civil society. Not so.
Politicians secretly pick their own members in the Council
of Ministers. Why are they not democratically elected? The
founding fathers (Reuter and Schuman, both eminent
lawyers) said that the secret manipulation of the
membership by governments was ILLEGAL. Civil society
should have powers equivalent to the Council according to
the founding treaties. Today the consultative committees
are becoming a useless appendix. These committees were
designed to ensure full employment by democratic
involvement of labour organisations; stable, strategic
investment by direct democracy of services and industrial
associations, and environmental and consumer interests
by full participation of those associations involved
specifically in the sectors touched by the Commissions
proposal. The appointees of the government politicians
have never, in more than fifty years, proposed a system of
representative democracy for organised civil society, as
required by the treaties.
http://schuman.info

ELECTIONS TO THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES. De

Gaulle and the other leaders blocked the independent
elections of NGOs and associations to the Consultative
Committee, the Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
and the Committee of Regions. According to the present
Nice Treaty, the Economic and Social Committee consists
of representatives of organised civil society. Not so.
Politicians secretly pick their own members in the Council
of Ministers. Why are they not democratically elected? The
founding fathers (Reuter and Schuman, both eminent
lawyers) said that the secret manipulation of the
membership by governments was ILLEGAL. Civil society
should have powers equivalent to the Council according to
the founding treaties. Today the consultative committees
are becoming a useless appendix. These committees were
designed to ensure full employment by democratic
involvement of labour organisations; stable, strategic
investment by direct democracy of services and industrial
associations, and environmental and consumer interests
by full participation of those associations involved
specifically in the sectors touched by the Commissions
proposal. The appointees of the government politicians
have never, in more than fifty years, proposed a system of
representative democracy for organised civil society, as
required by the treaties.

5. SECRET COMITOLOGY. Having crippled

representative democracy for business, labour and
consumer associations, the Council created its jungle of
secret committees of civil servants. The founding fathers
said that civil servants should not rule Europe; they are
there to serve democrats. One study on comitology
estimates there are 1500 comitology committees deciding
on every aspect of the citizens economic and social life.
They are nearly all closed, secret and often with no
published agenda. When is the Council going to change
from rule-by-civil-servants, whose mistakes have cost the
taxpayer millions of euros, to democracy and open
government?

6. HUMAN RIGHTS. The Council talks about including a

Charter on Human Rights. Are they serious? The Secretary
General of the Council of Europe says that there are about
100,000 cases outstanding at the Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg. Why? Because, he says, governments
refuse to provide the budget for lawyers to aid judges.
Last year, 10,000 cases from widows, the bereaved, the
tortured and abused complained about misdeeds of
governments and bureaucrats.

7 HOW SCHUMAN DESIGNED EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY TO

WORK

The Commission, a group of wise, impartial and

experienced, honest brokers (of any nationality), take
soundings on current European problems and strategic
challenges. They submit what they consider the most
impartial solution to deal with this in the form of a
proposal. This is sent to the Council of Ministers
(representing States who should open up a real national
debate, not keep it quiet), the European Parliament
(representing the peoples interest) and Consultative
Committees (like the Economic and Social Committee)
representing organized civil democracy in three sections:
industry and commerce; trades unions and employment
organisations; and thirdly, consumer and intermediaries
dealing with raising standards and lowering prices. These
three institutional bodies debate and vote Critical Opinions
about how the Proposal can be improved by taking into
account interests the Commission has overlooked. After
interactions between these three democratic
organisations, the Commission publishes in the Official
Journal the fairest version it sees as possible. If any
individual, organisation or nation State or European
institution considers that their interests are being ignored
or being unfairly treated, they have the right to take to
matter to Court, either the European Court in Luxembourg,
or by making a reference to it via a local court or tribunal.
Thus any citizen has multiple democratic pathways
(individual, local, regional, national, associative, political
and European) to defend his/her interests once the system
of five institutions is working properly.

The Treaty of Rome (1957)

The "British problem" and the enlargement of the EEC in

1973

Progress in European integration and

the enlargement to "the Europe of the Twelve" (1973-
1986)

The Treaties of Rome (1957)

The signing of the Treaties of Rome

On 25th March 1957, two treaties were signed in Rome

that gave birth to the European Economic Community
(EEC) and to European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom): the Treaties of Rome. The signatories of the
historic agreement were Christian Pineau on behalf of
France, Joseph Luns from the Netherlands, Paul Henri
Spaak from Belgium, Joseph Bech from Luxemburg,
Antonio Segni from Italy and Konrad Adenauer from the
Federal Republic of Germany. The Treaties were ratified by
National Parliaments over the following months and came
into force on 1st January 1958.

The Treaty establishing the EEC affirmed in its preamble

that signatory States were "determined to lay the
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe". In this way, the member States specifically
affirmed the political objective of a progressive political
integration.

In fact, the brand new institution was a customs union. As

a consequence, the EEC was colloquially known as
"Common Market". The member countries agreed to
dismantle all tariff barriers over a 12-year transitional
period. In view of the economic success that freer
commercial exchanges brought about, the transitory term
was shortened and in July 1968 all tariffs among the EEC
States were abrogated. At the same time, a common tariff
was established for all products coming from third
countries.

As a matter of fact, the common market meant exclusively

free circulation of goods. Free movement of persons,
capitals and services continued to be subject to numerous
limitations. It was necessary to wait until the Single
European Act, in 1987, when a definitive boost was given
to establish a genuine unified market. This brought about
the European Union Treaty in 1992.

The other essential agreement included in the Treaty of

Rome was the adoption of a Common agricultural policy
(CAP). Essentially, the CAP enacted a free market of
agricultural products inside the EEC and established
protectionist policies that guaranteed sufficient revenues
to European farmers, avoiding competition from third
countries' products by guaranteeing agricultural prices.
With the aim of financing the CAP, the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was
established in 1962. The CAP has continued absorbing
most of the community budget, and its reform has been
one of the most badly needed in recent years.

The Treaty of Rome also established the prohibition of

monopolies, some transport common policies, and the
grant of some commercial privileges to the colonial
territories of the member States.
The Treaty of Rome signified the triumph of a very realistic
and gradualist approach to building the EU. This method
was personified by Jean Monnet. The failure of the CED
demonstrated that tremendous obstacles lay in the path of
the final construction of a political union. Consequently,
the new strategy sought to adopt a process of integration
that gradually incorporated diverse economic sectors and
that established supranational institutions with
increasingly political competences.. The EEC from its birth
was based on a series of institutions: the European
Commission, the European Commission, the European
Assembly, later known as European Parliament, the Court
of Justice and the Economic and Social Committee, whose
competences were enlarged and modified in the diverse
agreements and treaties that succeeded the Treaty of
Rome.

To sum up, a process put in motion in which progressive

economic integration was paving the way to the long term
objective, the political union.

The Treaty that instituted the EURATOM tried to create the

conditions for developing a strong nuclear industry. It was
much less important than the treaty that brought into
existence the EEC and, in fact, when people speak about
the treaties of Rome refer, incorrectly, to the one which
established the EEC.

The "British problem" and the enlargement of the EEC in

1973

The absence of the United Kingdom constituted the main

political problem that the EEC had to face in its early
years. The British government refused to participate for
different reasons:

The importance of its commercial, political and, even,

sentimental bonds with its colonies and former colonies,
most of them integrated in the Commonwealth;
Its refusal to join a customs union. The British government
defended the establishment of a free trade area, in which
the internal customs rights were abolished, but national
governments would maintain their competences of
enacting their own tariffs with regard to third countries;

The fact that Britain was totally opposed to embarking on

a project whose long-term aim was to surrender the
sovereignty of national states to supranational European
institutions. In other words, the British were, and many of
them still remain, very far from the objective of an
European political union.

After negotiations to integrate Britain in the EEC broke

down, the British government proposed the foundation of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Sweden,
Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Portugal
joined to that new organisation. It fell far short of any
project of political integration, and constituted a mere
free trade area.

Shortly, Britain realized its mistake. Whereas the EEC

witnessed a spectacular economic growth, with growth
rates in the sixties clearly superior to those in America,
Great Britain continued its downward trend in relation to
the Continent.

Therefore, in August of 1961 the British Prime Minister

requested the beginning of negotiations on accession to
the EEC. However, after starting negotiations, the French
leader, Charles De Gaulle, in 1963 vetoed British
accession to the EEC. He was resolved to build up a
Europe of the homelands that would become a third
superpower between the USA and the USSR, and was
suspicious of the Britains close bonds with Washington. In
1967, when British Labour prime minister, Harold Wilson,
again requested to join the EEC, the French general once
more banned the accession of the United Kingdom.
Charles De Gaulle

De Gaulle, in spite of defending a strong Europe before

USA and USSR, never believed in a politically united
Europe. In his view, the national independence of France,
the country that he tried boldly to maintain in a role of
power, was an non-negotiable question. De Gaulle's
nationalism brought about the empty chair crisis in 1966
that kept paralysed the Community for seven months and
that, finally, concluded with the Commitment of
Luxemburg. France resumed its place in the Council in
return for keeping the unanimity vote when major
interests were at stake.

Only the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969, for reasons of

home affairs, opened up the possibility of British
accession.

After overcoming the tough opposition of a significant

section of the British public that claimed to maintain an
anti-European stance, negotiations came to an end in
1972. Eventually the United Kingdom joined the EEC.
Denmark and Ireland accompanied it. The Europe of the
Nine was born.

Edward Heath, British prime minister signs the accesion to

the EEC (1973)

The Norwegian people, contradicting their own

government's opinion, voted against entering the EEC.
Henceforth, Norway has since stayed apart from the
Community.

Progress in European integration and the enlargement to

the "Europe of the Twelve" (1973-1986)

The 1973 economic crisis put an end to a period of

impressive economic growth that European countries had
enjoyed for a long time. Unemployment, inflation and
crisis of traditional industrial sectors characterized the
economic landscape of the EEC in the second half of the
70es and early 80s. In spite of the fact that some
journalists coined the terms euroscepticism and
eurosclerosis to refer to an integration process that
seemed to fade, the fact was that, over these years,
important advancements took place. Not only was a
higher level of integration achieved, but the process of
enlargement proceeded.

These were the key advancements:

From 1975 the denominated European Council was

instituted as a periodical meeting of Heads of State or
Government. This was tobe the institution where major
long-term decisions would be agreed.

In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) came into

force. At the same time, the European Currency Unit
(ECU), direct predecessor of the Euro, was born. Member
countries' currencies were tied in a narrow 2.5% band of
fluctuation and national governments committed to
coordinate their monetary policies. It was the first
significant step toward monetary union.

First elections to the European Parliament by direct

universal suffrage were held in 1979.

The end of military dictatorships in Greece (1974),

Portugal (1974) and Spain (Franco died in 1975) 3. made
possible the accession of these nations. Greece, in 1981,
and Spain and Portugal, in 1986, became new members of
the EEC. The Community was enlarged toward the
Mediterranean Europe. Spain managed to accomplish an
old aspiration.

Spain's representatives signing the accesion to EEC (1986)

In 1984, a group of European MPs, chaired by the Italian

Altiero Spinelli, introduced in Parliament a project of Treaty
of the European Union. They intended to obtain the
approval of a new treaty that substituted the old one
signed in Rome and that constituted a great advancement
in the European integration. In spite of not being passed
by the governments, the schemes merit was that it
anticipated the debate on the main advancements that
would take place in the 90s.

Altiero Spinelli

In 1985, the three countries of the Benelux, France and

Germany signed the Schengen Agreement. Most of the
member States would join in subsequent years. It
constituted the beginning of an ambitious initiative to
guarantee the free movement of persons and the gradual
removal of frontiers among the community States.

In the second half of the 80s, the integration process

received an important political impulse, largely due to
Jacques Delors. A French socialist, he was elected
president of the European Commission in 1985. The first
step was the enacting of the Single European Act in 1986.

The Treaties Of Rome

Are Two Of The
Treaties Of The
European Union
Content starts here!
The first established the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the second established the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or
Euratom). They were the first international
organisations to be based on supranationalism, after
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
established a few years prior.
The treaties came into force on 1 January 1958 and
the EEC treaty has been amended on numerous
occasions (see Treaties of the European Union); It
has since been renamed from The Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community to
the The Treaty establishing the European
Community. However the Euratom treaty has seen
very little amendment due to the later sensitivity
surrounding nuclear power among the European
electorate.
In 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed, creating the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The
Treaty of Paris was an international treaty based on
international law, designed to help reconstruct the
economies of the European continent, prevent war
in Europe and ensure a lasting peace.

The original idea was conceived by Jean Monnet, a

senior French civil servant and it was announced by
Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in a
declaration on 9 May 1950. The aim was to pool
Franco-German coal and steel production, as these
two raw materials were the basis of the industry
(including war industry) and power of the two
countries. The proposed plan was that Franco-
German coal and steel production would be placed
under a common High Authority within the
framework of an organisation which would be open
for participation to other European countries. The
underlying political objective of the European Coal
and Steel Community was to strengthen Franco-
German cooperation and banish the possibility of
war.
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands began negotiating the treaty. The
Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed in Paris on
18 April 1951 and entered into force on 24 July 1952.
The Treaty expired on 23 July 2002, after fifty years,
as was foreseen. The common market opened on 10
February 1953 for coal, iron ore and scrap and on 1
May 1953 for steel.
Partly, in the aim of creating a federal Europe two
further communities were proposed, again by the
French. A European Defence Community (EDC) and
a European Political Community (EPC). While the
treaty for the latter was being drawn up by the
Common Assembly, the ECSC parliamentary
chamber, the EDC was rejected by the French
Parliament. President Jean Monnet, a leading figure
behind the communities, resigned from the High
Authority in protest and began work on alternative
communities, based on economic integration rather
than political integration.[1]
Supranationalism is strongest in the first pillar. Its
function generally corresponded at first to the three
European Communities (European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), European Economic Community
(EEC) and Euratom) whose organisational structure
had already been unified in 1965-67 through the
Merger Treaty. Later, through the Treaty of
Maastricht the word "Economic" was removed from
the EEC, so it became simply the EC. Then with the
Treaty of Amsterdam additional areas would be
transferred from the third pillar to the first. In 2002,
the ECSC (which had a life time of 50 years) ceased
to exist because the treaty which established it, the
Treaty of Paris, had expired.
In the CFSP and PJCC pillars the powers of the
European Parliament, the Commission and
European Court of Justice with respect to the Council
are significantly limited, without however being
altogether eliminated. The balance struck in the first
pillar is frequently referred to as the "community
method", since it is that used by the European
Community.
Origin
The pillar structure had its historical origins in the
negotiations leading up to the Maastricht treaty. It
was desired to add powers to the Community in the
areas of foreign policy, security and defence policy,
asylum and immigration policy, criminal co-
operation, and judicial co-operation.
However, some member-states opposed the addition
of these powers to the Community on the grounds
that they were too sensitive to national sovereignty
for the community method to be used, and that
these matters were better handled
intergovernmentally. To the extent that at that time
the Community dealt with these matters at all, they
were being handled intergovernmentally,
principally in European Political Cooperation (EPC).
As a result, these additional matters were not
included in the European Community; but were
tacked on externally to the European Community in
the form of two additional 'pillars'. The first
additional pillar (Common Foreign and Security
Policy, CFSP) dealt with foreign policy, security and
defence issues, while the second additional pillar
(JHA, Justice and Home Affairs), dealt with the
remainder.
Recent amendments in the treaty of Amsterdam and
the treaty of Nice have made the additional pillars
increasingly supranational. Most important among
these has been the transfer of policy on asylum,
migration and judicial co-operation in civil matters
to the Community pillar, effected by the Amsterdam
treaty. Thus the third pillar has been renamed Police
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, or
PJCC. The term Justice and Home Affairs is still used
to cover both the third pillar and the transferred
areas.
The Amsterdam Treaty meant a greater emphasis on
citizenship and the rights of individuals, an attempt
to achieve more democracy in the shape of
increased powers for the European Parliament, a
new title on employment, a Community area of
freedom, security and justice, the beginnings of a
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the
reform of the institutions in the run-up to
enlargement. Introduced the Charter of
Fundamental Human Rights. A greater emphasis on
the European Citizenship has been made. Prepared
the union to its eastward englargement.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND

DEFENSE POLICY
The European Security and Defence Policy or ESDP
is a major element of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy pillar of the European Union (EU)
and is the domain of EU policy covering defence and
military aspects. The ESDP is the successor of the
European Security and Defence Identity under
NATO, but differs in that it falls under the
jurisdiction of the European Union itself, including
countries with no ties to NATO.
Formally, the European Security and Defence Policy
is the domain of the Council of the European Union,
which is an intergovernmental body in which the
member states are represented. Nonetheless, the
High Representative of the Common Foreign and
Security Policyin the person of Javier Solanaalso
plays a significant role. In his position as Secretary
General of the Council, he prepares and examines
decisions to be made before they are brought to the
Council. He is based at and supported by the General
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.
Background
Earlier efforts were made to have a common
European security and defence policy. In 1948, the
Western European Union, a collective defence
organisation composed of Treaty of Brussels states
who were members of NATOwas founded. NATO
soon overshadowed the organisation in importance.
In the 1950s, a European Defence Community,
similar in nature to the European Coal and Steel
Community, was proposed but the French
parliament failed to ratify the treaty, and the project
was abandoned.
At the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, it
was agreed that the Western European Union (WEU)
would oversee the creation of a European Security
and Defence Identity within NATO structures.[2] The
ESDI was to create a European 'pillar' within NATO,
partly to allow European countries to act militarily
where NATO wished not to, and partly to alleviate
the United States' financial burden of maintaining
military bases in Europe, which it had done since
the Cold War.
Incorporation Of The
Petersberg Tasks And The
WEU In The EU
The European Union incorporated the same
Petersberg tasks within its domain with the
Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty signalled the
progressive framing of a common security and
defence policy based on the Petersberg tasks. In
1998, traditional British reluctance to such a plan
changed into endorsement after a bilateral
declaration of French President Jacques Chirac and
the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in St. Malo,
where they stated that "the Union must have the
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use
them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond
to international crises".
In June 1999, the Cologne European Council decided
to incorporate the role of the Western European
Union within the EU, eventually shutting down the
WEU. The Cologne Council also appointed Javier
Solana as the High Representative of the CFSP to
help progress both the CFSP and the ESDP.
EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE
The court was established in 1952, by the Treaty of
Paris (1951) as part of the European Coal and Steel
Community.[1] It was established with seven judges,
allowing both representation of each of the six
member States and being an unequal number of
judges in case of a tie. One judge was appointed
from each member state and the seventh seat
rotated between the "large Member States"
(Germany, France and Italy). It became an
institution of two additional Communities in 1957
when the Treaties of Rome established the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). [2][3]
When in 1993 the Maastricht Treaty created the
European Union, the name of the court did not
change like the other institutions, as its powers were
still primarily over the European Community pillar
of the union.[3]
[Edit]
Overview
The ECJ is the highest court of the European Union
in matters of Community law, but not national law.
It is not possible to appeal the decisions of national
courts to the ECJ, but rather national courts refer
questions of EU law to the ECJ. However, it is
ultimately for the national court to apply to
resulting interpretation to the facts of any given
case. This allows even the lowest of courts to refer
question of EU law for a decision, although only
courts of final appeal are bound to refer a question
of EU law when one is raised before it. The treaties
charge the ECJ with ensuring the consistent
application of EU law across the EU as a whole, in an
attempt to avoid different national courts
interpreting and applying in different way.
The Court Building In
Luxembourg
The court also acts as arbiter between the EU's
institutions and can annul the latter's legal rights if
it acts outside its powers.[1]
The judicial body is now undergoing strong growth,
as witnessed by its continually rising caseload and
budget. The Luxembourg courts received more than
1300 cases when the most recent data was recorded
in 2008, a record. The staff budget also hit a new
high of almost 238 million in 2009.[4]
Treaty Of Nice
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected From Nice
Treaty)
This article is about the EU treaty of 2001. For the
1892 treaty between Italy and France, see Treaty of
Nice (1892).Treaty of Nice
The Treaty of Nice (or Nice Treaty) was signed by
European leaders on 26 February 2001 and came
into force on 1 February 2003. It amended the
Maastricht Treaty (or the Treaty on European
Union) and the Treaty of Rome (or the Treaty
establishing the European Community). The Treaty
of Nice reformed the institutional structure of the
European Union to withstand eastward expansion, a
task which was originally intended to have been
done by the Amsterdam Treaty, but failed to be
addressed at the time.
The entrance into force of the treaty was in doubt
for a time, after its initial rejection by Irish voters in
a referendum in June 2001. This referendum result
was reversed in a subsequent referendum held a
little over a year later.
The Treaty provided for the creation of subsidiary
courts below the European Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance to deal with special areas of
law such as patents.
The Treaty of Nice provides for new rules on closer
co-operation, the rules introduced in the Treaty of
Amsterdam being viewed as unworkable, and hence
these rules have not yet been used. Provided a
double majority of Member States instead of QMV.
Further increased the EP powers and weighting in
commission votes.
https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/european-law/the-
treaties-of-rome-law-european-essay.php

COMMISSION DECISION of 23 July 2003

relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and

Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

(COMP/C.2-37.398 Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA

Champions League)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32003D0778&qid=148624407071
6&from=EN

Treaty on the European Union - Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union List of decision-making procedures by article
(updated 17/12/2009)
http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/docs/Legal_bases.pdf

A Union of law: from Paris to Lisbon

Tracing the treaties of the European Union

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Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . .
...............................................
. . . . . . . . . . e 1950s and 1960s: from the founding
treaties to the merger of the executives. . . . . . . e 1970s:
nancial and institutional treaties; the rst accession treaty .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . e 1980s: Single European Act and
accession treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e
1990s: Treaty on European Union and accession
treaties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Twenty- rst century
treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . From Paris to Lisbon: timeline of the
treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 4 . 5 . 6 10 12 14 17 21
3
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4
Foreword
is brochure traces the history of the European Union
through the treaties. It was published to accompany the
poster produced for the Historical series collection, e
treaties of the European Union, which you can nd in the
Council archives.
e booklet is aimed at academics and researchers but is
also for anyone who is interested in the history of
European integration.
e annex contains a chronological table of the treaties.
You can access the full text of the treaties at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu
If you like, you can e-mail comments or suggestions to us
at: dgf2.transparency@consilium.europa.eu
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Introduction
e treaties are the foundation of the European Union (EU).
ey are negotiated by the representatives of the
governments of the Member States and adopted by
common accord. ey are signed by all Member States and
rati ed in accordance with their own constitutional
requirements. ey enter into force only when this process
has been concluded and provided each step has been
completed.
If we look back over the history of the treaties, we can:
y see how the Union has evolved into an economic and
political community which is active in a growing number of
increasingly complex areas;
y see how Member States have responded, every step of
the way, to new internal and international challenges; and
y trace the development of a Union of peoples and states
for whom the rule of law is both a core value and a basic
aspiration.
5
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6
The 1950s and 1960s: from the founding treaties to the
merger of the executives
Following Robert Schumans declaration on 9 May 1950 in
which he called on France and Germany to pool the
production of coal and steel, the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed
on 18 April 1951 in Paris. A er rati cation by Belgium, the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands (the Inner Six), the treaty entered
into force on 23 July 1952 and would remain in force for 50
years. It expired on 22 July 2002.
e immediate objective of this rst treaty was to establish a
common market for coal and steel, which were strategic
raw materials at the time. It also aimed to lay the
foundations of an economic community which would
gradually become a political union. is treaty, which
established a High Authority, a Common Assembly, a
Special Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice, was the
basis for the institutions of the European Union as we now
know them.
Shortly a er the establishment of the ECSC, France
presented a proposal for supranational military
integration. And so, on 27 May 1952, the six ECSC
members met in Paris and signed the Treaty establishing
the European Defence Community (EDC). is treaty
provided for the establishment of a European army.
However, the French National Assembly refused to ratify it
and, on 30 August 1954, it adjourned discussions inde
nitely. e EDC Treaty did not therefore enter into force. Its
rejection meant that the related dra Treaty on the Statute
of the European Community was also aborted. e dra
treaty had been worked out by the ad hoc assembly of the
ECSC which, on 10 March 1953, presented it to the
governments of the Inner Six.
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A er the failure of the European Defence

Community, the economy became the focus of the
European project. Following a conference held in Messina
on 1 and 2 June 1955, a commit- tee chaired by the
Belgian Minister for Foreign A airs, Paul-Henri Spaak, was
tasked with modelling a European common market. e
committee produced two dra texts which were to become
known as the Treaties of Rome, a er the city in which the
Inner Six signed them on 25 March 1957. ey entered into
force on 1 January 1958.
Signing of the EEC and Euratom Treaties (Hall of the
Horatii and Curiatii at the Capitol in Rome, 25 March 1957)
e rst treaty established the European Economic
Community (EEC). e EEC Treaty extended the principles
established in the ECSC Treaty to new areas. It provided
for the establishment of a common market founded on the
free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, a
customs union and the introduction of common policies,
such as the agricultural policy and the trade policy. By
setting and achieving economic goals, the treaty sought to
contribute towards the construction of a political Europe.
In the preamble to the
7
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European Union

EEC Treaty, the signatories declared that

they were determined to lay the foundations of an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe.
e second treaty established the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC or Euratom). e objective of the EAEC
Treaty was to coordinate and pool Member States
research pro- grammes on the civilian use of nuclear
energy.
Italian poster celebrating the signing of the Treaties of
Rome
on 25 March 1957
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European Union
at same day, 25 March 1957, saw the signing of
the Convention on certain institutions common to the
European Communities. is convention established a
Common Assembly, a Court of Justice and an Economic
and Social Committee for the EEC, EAEC and ECSC.
e EEC Treaty arrangements for the association of overseas
countries and territories (1) were rendered applicable to
the Netherlands Antilles regarding petroleum products by
the Protocol on the Netherlands Antilles, which was signed
on 13 November 1962 in Brussels, and which entered into
force on 1 October 1964.
On 1 July 1967, a er the episode known as the empty
chair crisis, during which France boycotted the meetings
of the Council and of Council bodies, the rst major
institutional reform took place. e Treaty establishing a
Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, better known as the Merger Treaty, entered
into force, hav- ing been signed by the Inner Six in
Brussels on 8 April 1965. e three Communities would now
have a single Council, a single Commission and a single
budget. Article 4 of this treaty formalised the role of the
Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) by
providing that a committee consisting of the permanent
representatives of the Member States would be
responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for
carrying out the tasks assigned to it by the Council.
(1) Annex IV to the EEC Treaty: Overseas countries
and territories to which the provisions of Part Four of the
Treaty apply.
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The 1970s: nancial and institutional

treaties; the rst accession treaty
Institutional reforms continued during the 1970s and
nancial reforms were born.
Following a Council Decision on 21 April 1970 replacing
the system whereby the Commu- nities were funded by
contributions from Member States with that of own
resources, two treaties were signed.
y On 22 April 1970, the Treaty of Luxembourg, amending
certain budgetary provisions. It entered into force on 1
January 1971. It granted the European Parliament certain
budgetary powers and established two main kinds of own
resources: agricultural levies and customs duties (2).
y On 22 July 1975, the Brussels Treaty, amending certain
nancial provisions. It entered into force on 1 June 1977. It
gave the European Parliament the power to reject the
budget as a whole and to grant the Commission a
discharge for its implementation. It created the Court of
Auditors.
These two treaties amending the Treaty of Rome marked
the beginning of budgetary power-sharing between the
Council and the European Parliament.
e Treaty of 10 July 1975 amending certain provisions of
the Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment
Bank was also signed in Brussels and entered into force on
1 October 1977. In the context of an international
economic crisis, this treaty authorised the Board of
Governors of the European Investment Bank (EIB) to alter
the de nition of the unit of account and change the
method of converting units of account into national
currencies.
(2) Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom on the
replacement of nancial contributions from Member States
by the Communities own resources (21 April 1970).
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In the course of the same period, the Treaty

concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the EEC and the EAEC was signed on
22 January 1972 and entered into force on 1 January 1973.
A Council Decision of 22 January 1972 also provided for
accession to the ECSC. Meanwhile, following a negative
referendum result on 25 September 1972, Norway
withdrew from the accession process (3).
Edward Heath signing the UK Accession Treaty (Palais
dEgmont, Brussels, 22 January 1972)
(3) Council Decision of the European Communities of 1
January 1973 adjusting the documents concerning the
accession of the new Member States to the European
Communities.
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European Union

The 1980s: Single European Act and

accession treaties
From 1979, changes swept through the political regimes of
southern Europe. In order to stabilise restored democracy
in Greece and to bolster the Greek economy, the Treaty on
the Accession of Greece to the European Communities was
signed in Athens on 28 May 1979. It entered into force on
1 January 1981. Likewise, the Treaty on the Accession of
Spain and Portugal was signed in Madrid and Lisbon on 12
June 1985 and came into force on 1 Janu- ary 1986. e
Europe of the Six, then of the Nine and of the Ten,
henceforth became known as the Europe of the Twelve.
12
Copy of the Single European Act held in the Councils
archives
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European Union
Following the referendum held by the
government of Greenland on 23 February 1982, the
Greenland Treaty was signed on 13 March 1984, which
allowed Greenland to withdraw from the Community
treaties and gave it the status of an overseas territory.
On 17 February in Luxembourg and on 28 February 1986
in e Hague, the Twelve signed the Single European Act to
give fresh political and economic impetus to the European
integra- tion process. e act came into force on 1 July
1987. e then President of the Commission, Jacques
Delors, summed up the objectives of the Single European
Act as follows, in a speech before the European Parliament
in February 1987: To put it in a nutshell, the Single Act
means the obligation to proceed simultaneously with
creating the frontierless single market, greater economic
and social cohesion and a European research and
technology policy, with strengthening the European
Monetary System, making a start on creating a European
social area and carrying out signi cant environmental
action.
e Single European Act provided for an internal market to
be put in place and for the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital to be established by 1
January 1993. Com- munity powers were extended (on the
environment, research and technological develop- ment)
and the areas in which the Council could vote by quali ed
majority also increased. e European Parliament saw its
law-making powers strengthened with the creation of the
assent and cooperation procedures. is signalled the start
of a progressive increase, with each new treaty, in the
powers of the European Parliament as co-legislator with
the Council in tandem with an increase in the number of
areas where the Council could decide by quali- ed
majority rather than unanimously.
e Single European Act referred for the rst time to the
European Council. It included pro- visions on European
political cooperation (EPC) cooperation on foreign policy
which were kept separate from the provisions relating
to Community matters.
13
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14
The 1990s: Treaty on European Union and accession
treaties
Following two intergovernmental conferences (IGCs)
launched in Rome on 15 Decem- ber 1990, the Treaty on
European Union was signed on 7 February 1992 in
Maastricht. It entered into force on 1 November 1993.
e treaty created a European Union based on a structure of
three pillars: the three European Communities (EC), the
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and
cooperation in the elds of justice and home a airs (JHA).
Economic and monetary union (EMU) was launched under
the rst pillar. is culminated in the issuing of a single
currency, the euro, on 1 January 2002. Community powers
were extended in the areas of the environment, research,
industry and cohesion policy. Regarding law-making, the
creation of the co-decision procedure gave the European
Parliament the power to adopt legal acts jointly with the
Council. e assent and cooperation procedures were
extended to new areas, as was quali ed majority voting in
the Council. e Court of Auditors, established in 1975,
became the h European institution, and the Committee of
the Regions was set up.
Under the second pillar, the CFSP brought together and
developed the mechanisms and achievements of EPC,
sketching the outlines of a common security and defence
policy.
Under the third pillar (JHA), the treaty contains provisions
relating to controls at the external borders, combating
terrorism, the creation of Europol, the establishment of a
common asylum policy, combating illegal immigration and
judicial cooperation in criminal and civil cases.
In order to stimulate economic growth, the European
Investment Fund was set up by an act signed on 25 March
1993. It entered into force on 1 May 1994.
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e Treaty on the Accession of Austria, Finland and

Sweden was signed on 24 June 1994 in Corfu and entered
into force on 1 January 1995. As had happened in 1972,
Norway, which had also signed the treaty, withdrew from
the accession process following the referendum of 28
November 1994.
Family photo, Corfu European Council (24 June 1994)
On 29 March 1996, a new IGC was launched in Turin to
make preparations for a revision of the treaties as
provided for in Article N of the Treaty on European Union.
Upon its com- pletion, the Treaty of Amsterdam was
signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May
1999. It was intended to meet the need to adapt the
institutions and the decision-making process. It also
signalled the Member States desire to bring the Union
closer to citizens and, to that end, provided for measures
on transparency.
15
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European Union

16
Emphasis was also placed on sustainable development
and gender equality, while the prin- ciples of respect for
human rights, democracy and the rule of law were
enshrined as precon- ditions for accession to the EU.
e powers of the European Parliament were increased once
more with the extension of the co-decision procedure to
new areas and the possibility of approving or rejecting the
nomina- tion of the President-designate of the
Commission. Also, the CFSP was strengthened by the
creation of a High Representative (4) and the
establishment of closer links with the Western European
Union (WEU).
e Schengen acquis (comprising the Schengen Agreement
signed on 14 June 1985, the Schengen Convention
adopted on 19 June 1990 and several sets of
implementing measures) was incorporated into the EU
framework by means of a protocol annexed to the Treaty
of Amsterdam. is acquis consists of two major
components: harmonisation of external border controls
and enhanced police and judicial cooperation. It provided
for the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice.
Provisions on visas, asylum, immigration and judicial
cooperation on civil matters were transferred from the
third pillar to the rst and thus governed by the
Community method.
e treaty also de ned the conditions under which Member
States that intend to cooperate more closely with one
another might be authorised to do so.
(4) Position held by the Secretary-General of the Council.
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Twenty- rst century treaties

A declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam stated
that reinforcing the institutions ... is an indispensable
condition for the conclusion of the rst accession
negotiations. A new IGC was therefore held to revise the
treaties when accession negotiations with the candidate
countries of eastern and southern Europe were launched
in 1998. As a result, the Treaty of Nice was signed on 26
February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003.
It altered the EUs institutional arrangements with a view
to enlargement to 25 members. e Treaty on the Accession
of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia was signed
on 16 April 2003 in Athens. It entered into force on 1 May
2004.
Family photo on the occasion of the signing of the
Treaty of Nice (Nice, 26 February 2001)
A Declaration on the future of the Union, annexed to the
Treaty of Nice, provided for an IGC to be held in 2004.
Arrangements were made for a Convention on the Future
of the European Union during the Laeken European
Council in December 2001 in order to draw
17
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European Union

up a document that would provide a starting

point for discussions in the Intergovernmental Conference,
which will take the ultimate decisions. e convention,
chaired by Valery Giscard dEstaing, drew up and proposed
a dra Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. e
treaty, negotiated by a new IGC in 2003 and 2004, was
signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome. It was intended to
repeal the preceding treaties with the exception of the
Euratom Treaty and to replace them with a single,
constitutional text. However, following negative
referendum results on 29 May 2005 in France and on 1
June 2005 in the Netherlands, the rati cation process was
suspended.
In the interim, on 25 April 2005, the Treaty on the
Accession of Bulgaria and Romania was signed in
Luxembourg. It entered into force on 1 January 2007.
As it was not possible for the Constitutional Treaty to enter
into force, fresh negotiations were launched in 2007
leading to the signing on 13 December 2007, and the
entry into force on 1 December 2009, of the Treaty of
Lisbon.
18
Family photo on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty
on the Accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Luxembourg,
25 April 2005)
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European Union
e Treaty of Lisbon was intended to improve
institutional e ciency and to strengthen the democratic
nature of the Union. e Union was henceforth founded on
two treaties: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
which replaced the Treaty establishing the European
Community. e Euratom Treaty, which was also amended
by the Treaty of Lisbon, continued to exist for an inde nite
period (5).
e Treaty of Lisbon conferred legal personality on the EU
and created two new institutions: the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the European Council, with a President
elected for two and a half years. e system of pillars set up
by the Treaty of Maastricht was removed.
The rules on voting in the Council were amended with the
introduction of the dual- majority system (of Member
States and of population). e role of the European
Parliament as co-legislator with the Council was
strengthened as the co-decision procedure became the
ordinary legislative procedure. e treaty comprised a set of
measures aimed at strength- ening the democratic nature
of the Union. In addition to strengthening the powers of
the European Parliament, there were also provisions on
involving national parliaments in the decision-making
process and on citizen participation (for example through
the citizens initiative (6)). e Treaty of Lisbon gave the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union the
same legal value as the treaties.
For the rst time, provision was made for the possibility of
a Member State leaving the Union: Any Member State
may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with
its own constitutional requirements. (7)
e Treaty on the Accession of Croatia was signed on 9
December 2011 in Brussels. It is due to enter into force on
1 July 2013 (8).
Several amendments to the Treaty of Lisbon are currently
being discussed. To be continued ...
(5) e ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002.
(6) Article 11(4) TEU.
(7) Article 50(1) TEU.
(8) Provided that all the instruments of rati cation have
been deposited before that date.
19
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20
d
THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE TREATIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
19512011: 60 YEARS A UNION OF LAW
Lisbon: 13 December 2007

Nice: 26 February 2001

Amsterdam: 2 October 1997

acquis

Maastricht: 7 February 1992

Single Act: 17 and 28 February 1986

Rome: 25 March 1957
... an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe

Paris: 18 April 1951

13 December 2007 in Lisbon when the Treaty was signed

25 April 2005 in Luxembourg during the signing ceremony
for the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria
25 March 1957 in Rome during the signing ceremony for
the EEC and Euratom Treaties
The treatie
the foundation
18 April 1951: the Treaty of Paris establishes the ECSC:
Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign A airs Minister; Joseph
Bech, Luxembourg Foreign A airs Minister; Joseph Meurice,
Belgian Foreign Trade Minister; Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign
A airs Minister; Robert Schuman, French Foreign A airs
Minister; Konrad Adenauer, German Federal Chancellor
and Federal Foreign A airs Minister; Dirk Stikker,
Netherlands Federal Foreign A airs Minister; Johannes van
den Brink, Minister for Economic A airs of the Netherlands
d by the national p
e
es are
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s
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:
:


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11 Treaty of Accession of Croatia, 9 December 2011
ratification in progress
Lisbon Treaty, 1 December 2009 Treaty of Accession of
Bulgaria and Romania, 1 January 2007
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed on 29
October 2004
did not come into force
Treaty of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and
Slovakia,
1 May 2004 Treaty of Nice, 1 February 2003 Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1 May 1999 Treaty of Accession of Austria,
Finland and Sweden, 1 January 1995
Act amending the Protocol on the Statute of the EIB:
European Investment Fund,
1 May 1994
Treaty on European Union (TEU),
1 November 1993 Single European Act, 1 July 1987
Treaty of Accession of Spain and Portugal,
1 January 1986 Treaty on Greenland, 1 January 1985
Treaty of Accession of Greece, 1 January 1981
Treaty amending the Protocol on the Statute of the
European Investment Bank (EIB): Modi cation of the unit of
account; conversion method,
1 October 1977
Treaty amending certain nancial provisions,
1 June 1977
Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom,
1 January 1973
Treaty amending certain budgetary provisions: Own
resources,
1 January 1971
Treaty merging the executive bodies,
1 July 1967
Convention on the Netherlands Antilles,
1 October 1964
Convention on certain institutions common to the
European Communities: Assembly, Court of Justice,
Economic and Social Committee,
1 January 1958
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC),
1 January 1958
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC),
1 January 1958
Treaty establishing the European Defence Community,
signed on 27 May 1952
did not come into force
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC),
23 July 1952
expired on 23 July 2002
)
w
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,
,
23 / 61
18/12/2013
Union europeenne
KEY STAGES AND SIGNINGS
The European Union
The European Union
The European Union
DUFK L YHV
historical series
CHRONOLOGY AND ENTRY INTO FORCE
The European Union, 2011 ISBN 978-92-8243463-5
doi:10.2860/14747 QC-32-11-757-EN-P
From Paris to Lisbon: timeline of the treaties
Preliminary remarks:
y e original versions of the treaties and the respective
national instruments of rati ca- tion were deposited in the
archives of the Government of the Italian Republic
(Ministry of Foreign A airs, Diplomatic A airs O ce) unless
otherwise indicated under Further information.
y In addition to the above, Further information indicates
whether the document in ques- tion constitutes a founding
treaty, the addition of an annex to a treaty, the expiry of a
treaty, an unsigned dra treaty, the non-rati cation of a
treaty or exemptions provided for by the treaties.
y New authentic languages arising from the successive
enlargements are shown in bold when they rst appear as
authentic languages.
y e dates of rati cation by each Member State correspond
to the dates on which the instruments of rati cation or
accession were deposited.
y e signatories listed are the plenipotentiaries of their
respective states.
y Further information can be obtained from the database
of the Council of the European Unions Agreements O ce at
the following address: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
accords-recherche
y is timeline ends with the Treaty of Lisbon. Subsequent
treaties under discussion or in the process of rati cation
(9) are not included. ey will be included in a future
edition.
y A list of the ISO codes for all o cial languages of the
European Union is provided at the end of the brochure.
(9) For example the Treaty on the Accession of Croatia,
signed on 9 December 2011 in Brussels.
21
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22
1
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community Paris Treaty
Date and place of signature
18 April 1951, Clock Room, Quai dOrsay, Paris, France
Signatories
Konrad ADENAUER, Chancellor and Minister for Foreign
Affairs (DE)
Paul VAN ZEELAND, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Joseph
Meurice, Minister for Foreign Trade (BE) Robert SCHUMAN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (FR)
Carlo SFORZA, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Joseph BECH, Minister for Foreign Affairs (LU)
Dirk STIKKER, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jan VAN DEN
BRINK, Minister for Economic Affairs (NL)
Entry into force
23 July 1952
Authentic languages FR
Further information
Founding treaty
Expired on 23 July 2002
The original versions of the treaty and the national
instruments of ratification, as well as the successive
instruments of accession, were deposited in the archives
of the Government of the French Republic.
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2
Treaty establishing the European Defence Community
EDC Treaty
Date and place of signature
27 May 1952, Clock Room, Quai dOrsay, Paris, France
Signatories
Konrad ADENAUER, Chancellor and Minister for Foreign
Affairs (DE) Paul VAN ZEELAND, Minister for Foreign Affairs
(BE)
Robert SCHUMAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FR)
Alcide DE GASPERI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Joseph BECH, Minister for Foreign Affairs (LU) Dirk
STIKKER, Minister for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Entry into force
Did not enter into force
Authentic languages DE, FR, IT, NL
Further information
The original versions of the treaty and the national
instruments of ratification, as well as the successive
instruments of accession, were deposited in the archives
of the Government of the French Republic.
The draft EDC Treaty was linked to the draft treaty on the
statute of a European Political Community (EPC), adopted
by the ECSC ad hoc assembly on 10 March 1953
(submitted to the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the ECSC on
9 March 1953). The draft EPC Treaty was rendered void by
the rejection of the EDC.
23
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345
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
EEC Treaty (10) Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community EAEC Treaty or Euratom Treaty (11)
Convention on certain institutions common to the
European Communities
Date and place of signature
25 March 1957, Hall of the Horatii and Curiatii, Capitol,
Rome, Italy
Signatories
Paul-Henri SPAAK, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jean-Charles
SNOY ET DOPPUERS, Secretary-General of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Head of the Belgian delegation to the
Intergovernmental Conference (BE)
Konrad ADENAUER, Federal Chancellor; Walter HALLSTEIN,
State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office (DE)
Christian PINEAU, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Maurice
FAUR, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (FR)
Antonio SEGNI, President of the Council of Ministers;
Gaetano MARTINO, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Joseph BECH, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Lambert SCHAUS, Ambassador, Head of the Luxembourg
delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference (LU)
Joseph LUNS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Hans LINTHORST
HOMAN, Head of the Netherlands delegation to the
Intergovernmental Conference (NL)
Entry into force
1 January 1958
Authentic languages
DE, FR, IT, NL
Further information
EEC and Euratom: founding treaties
(10) Unlike the other protocols annexed to the EEC Treaty
from the outset, the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Economic Community was signed
in Brussels on 17 April 1957. In addition to the
amendments made to it by subsequent treaties, the
protocol was amended by the Council Decision of 24
October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the
European Communities (OJ L 319, 25.11.1988).
(11) e Protocol on the statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Atomic Energy Community, annexed to the
Euratom Treaty, was signed in Brussels on 17 April 1957.
24
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6
Convention of 13 November 1962 amending the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community with a
view to rendering applicable to the Netherlands Antilles
the special conditions of association laid down in Part Four
of that Treaty
Netherlands Antilles Convention
Date and place of signature
13 November 1962, Brussels, Belgium
Signatories
Henry FAYAT, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (BE)
Rolf LAHR, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (DE)
Jean-Marc BOEGNER, Ambassador, Head of the French
Delegation to the Conference (FR) Carlo RUSSO, Under-
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IT)
Eugne SCHAUS, Vice-President of the Government and
Minister for Foreign Affairs (LU) Hans VAN HOUTEN,
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NL)
Wim LAMPE, Minister Plenipotentiary for the Netherlands
Antilles
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 October 1964
OJ 150, 1.10.1964
Authentic languages
DE, FR, IT, NL
Further information
Under the convention, a protocol on imports of petroleum
products refined in the Netherlands Antilles was annexed
to the EEC Treaty.
25
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Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single

Commission of the European Communities
Merger Treaty (12)
Date and place of signature
8 April 1965, Brussels, Belgium
Signatories
Paul-Henri SPAAK, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs (BE) Kurt SCHMUECKER, Minister for
Economic Affairs (DE)
Maurice COUVE DE MURVILLE, Minister for Foreign Affairs
(FR)
Amintore FANFANI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Pierre WERNER, President of the Government, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (LU) Joseph LUNS, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (NL)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 July 1967
OJ 152, 13.7.1967
Authentic languages
DE, FR, IT, NL
(12) e Decision of the representatives of the
Governments of the Member States on the provisional
loca- tion of certain institutions and departments of the
Communities (OJ 152, 13.7.1967) was signed and entered
into force on the same days as the Merger Treaty.
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Treaty amending certain budgetary provisions of the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the
Treaty establishing a single Council and a single
Commission of the European Communities Treaty
amending certain budgetary provisions
Date and place of signature
22 April 1970, Alcide de Gasperi Building, European
Parliament, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Signatories
Pierre HARMEL, Minister for Foreign Affairs (BE) Walter
SCHEEL, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DE) Maurice
SCHUMANN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FR) Aldo MORO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Gaston THORN, Minister for Foreign Affairs and for
External Trade (LU) Hans DE KOSTER, Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 1971 OJ L 2, 2.1.1971
Authentic languages
DE, FR, IT, NL
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9
Treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom of
Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
European Economic Community and to the European
Atomic Energy Community
Treaty on the Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK to
the EEC and Euratom (13)
Date and place of signature
22 January 1972, Egmont Palace, Brussels, Belgium (14)
Signatories
Gaston EYSKENS, Prime Minister; Pierre HARMEL, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Jan VAN DER MEULEN, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative to the European Communities
(BE)
Jens Otto KRAG, Prime Minister; Ivar NRGAARD, Minister
for External Economic Affairs; Jens CHRISTENSEN,
Secretary General for External Economic Affairs, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (DK)
Walter SCHEEL, Minister for Foreign Affairs; H.-G. SACHS,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (DE)
Maurice SCHUMANN, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jean-Marc
BOEGNER, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (FR)
Jack LYNCH, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Patrick HILLERY,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Emilio COLOMBO, Prime Minister; Aldo MORO, Minister for
Foreign Affairs; Giorgio BOMBASSEI FRASCANI DE VETTOR,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (IT)
Gaston THORN, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jean
DONDELINGER, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to
the European Communities (LU)
(13) Regarding accession to the ECSC, see the Decision of
the Council of the European Communities of 22 January
1972 concerning the accession of the Kingdom of
Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Nor- way, and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to
the European Coal and Steel Community, OJ L 73,
27.3.1972 (Documents concerning the accession to the
European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark,
Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland).
(14) Due to the non-rati cation of the Accession Treaty by
Norway, the Accession Treaty and other documents
relating to accession were subject to the Council Decision
of the European Communities of 1 Janu- ary 1973
adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new
Member States to the European Communities, OJ L 2,
1.1.1973.
28
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Norbert SCHMELZER, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Tjerk

WESTERTERP, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Maan SASSEN, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to
the European Communities (NL)
Trygve BRATTELI, Prime Minister; Andreas CAPPELEN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Sren C. SOMMERFELT,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (Norway)
Edward HEATH, MBE, MP, Prime Minister, First Lord of the
Treasury, Minister for the Civil Service;
Alec DOUGLAS-HOME, KT, MP, Her Majestys Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs;
Geoffrey RIPPON, QC, MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 1973
OJ L 73, 27.3.1972 (Documents concerning the accession
to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark,
Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Authentic languages DA, DE, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL
Further information
Negative referendum result in Norway on 25 September
1972

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Treaty amending certain provisions of the Protocol on the
Statute of the European Investment Bank (15):
empowering the Board of Governors to alter the definition
of the unit of account and the method of converting sums
into national currencies
Date and place of signature
10 July 1975, Brussels, Belgium
Signatories
Willy DE CLERCQ, Minister of Finance (BE)
Per HKKERUP, Minister for Economic Affairs (DK)
Hans APEL, Federal Minister for Finance (DE)
Jean-Pierre FOURCADE, Minister for Economic Affairs (FR)
Charles MURRAY, Secretary, Department of Finance of
Ireland (IE)
Emilio COLOMBO, Minister for the Treasury (IT)
Jean DONDELINGER, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (LU)
Laurens J. BRINKHORST, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
(NL)
Michael PALLISER, KCMG, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 October 1977 OJ L 91, 6.4.1978
Authentic languages
DA, DE, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL
(15) e Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment
Bank was annexed to the EEC Treaty.
30
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Treaty amending certain financial provisions of the Treaties
establishing the European Economic Communities and of
the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single
Commission of the European Communities (16) Treaty
amending certain financial provisions
Date and place of signature
22 July 1975, Brussels, Belgium
Signatories
Renaat VAN ELSLANDE, Minister for Foreign Affairs and for
Cooperation with the Developing Countries (BE)
Niels ERSBLL, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (DK)
Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs (DE)
Jean-Marie SOUTOU, Ambassador of France, Permanent
Representative to the European Communities (FR)
Garret FITZGERALD, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Mariano RUMOR, Minister for Foreign Affairs, President-in-
Office of the Council of the European Communities (IT)
Jean DONDELINGER, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (LU)
Laurens J. BRINKHORST, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
(NL)
Michael PALLISER, KCMG, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 June 1977
OJ L 359, 31.12.1977
Authentic languages
DA, DE, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL
(16) e Decision of the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States of 5 April 1977 on the
provisional location of the Court of Auditors (OJ L 104,
28.4.1977) was signed on 5 April 1977 and entered into
force on 1 June 1977.
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12
Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the French
Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member
States of the European Communities) and the Hellenic
Republic concerning the accession of the Hellenic Republic
to the European Economic Community and to the
European Atomic Energy Community Treaty on the
Accession of Greece (17)
Date and place of signature
28 May 1979, Zappeion Palace, Athens, Greece
Signatories
Wilfried MARTENS, Prime Minister; Henri SIMONET, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Joseph VAN DER MEULEN, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative to the European Communities
(BE)
Niels Anker KOFOED, Minister for Agriculture; Gunnar
RIBERHOLDT, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to
the European Communities (DK)
Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Helmut SIGRIST, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative to the European Communities (DE)
Konstantinos KARAMANLIS, Prime Minister; Georgios
RALLIS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Georgios
CONTOGEORGIS, Minister without portfolio, responsible for
relations with the European Communities (EL)
Jean FRANOIS-PONCET, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Pierre
BERNARD-REYMOND, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs;
Luc DE LA BARRE DE NANTEUIL, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative to the European Communities (FR)
John LYNCH, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Michael
OKENNEDY, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Brendan DILLON,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (IE)
Giulio ANDREOTTI, President of the Council of Ministers;
Adolfo BATTAGLIA, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs; Eugenio PLAJA, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative to the European Communities (IT)
(17) For accession to the ECSC, see the Decision of the
Council of the European Communities of 24 May 1979 on
the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European
Coal and Steel Community, OJ L 291, 19.11.1979
(Documents concerning the accession of the Hellenic
Republic to the European Communities).
32
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Gaston THORN, President of the Government,

Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jean DONDELINGER,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (LU)
Chris VAN DER KLAAUW, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jan
LUBBERS, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (NL)
Peter CARRINGTON, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs; Donald MAITLAND, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative to the European Communities
(UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 1981
OJ L 291, 19.11.1979 (Documents concerning the
accession of the Hellenic Republic to the European
Communities)
Authentic languages
DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL
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Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities
Greenland Treaty
Date and place of signature
13 March 1984, Brussels, Belgium
Signatories
Leo TINDEMANS, Minister for External Relations of the
Kingdom of Belgium (BE)
Uffe ELLEMANN-JENSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Denmark; Gunnar RIBERHOLDT, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Representative of Denmark (DK)
Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Federal Republic of Germany (DE) Theodoros
PANGALOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic
Republic (EL)
Roland DUMAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French
Republic (FR)
Peter BARRY, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland (IE)
Giulio ANDREOTTi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Italian
Republic (IT)
Colette FLESCH, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (LU)
Wim VAN EEKELEN, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of
the Netherlands; H. J. Ch. RUTTEN, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands (NL)
Geoffrey HOWE, QC, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 1985 OJ L 29, 1.2.1985
Authentic languages
DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL
Further information
Under the Greenland Treaty, a Protocol on special
arrangements for Greenland was annexed to the EEC
Treaty.
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Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, the French Republic, Ireland, the Italian Republic,
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (Member States of the European
Communities) and the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portuguese Republic concerning the accession of the
Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the
European Economic Community and to the European
Atomic Energy Community Treaty on the Accession of
Spain and Portugal to the EEC and Euratom (18)
Date and place of signature
12 June 1985, Hall of Columns, Royal Palace, Madrid, Spain
Belem Palace, Lisbon, Portugal
Signatories
Wilfried MARTENS, Prime Minister; Leo TINDEMANS,
Minister for External Relations; Paul NOTERDAEME,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (BE)
Poul SCHLTER, Prime Minister; Uffe ELLEMANN-JENSEN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jakob Esper LARSEN,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (DK)
Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Gisbert POENSGEN, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative to the European Communities (DE)
Yannis HARALAMBOPOULOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Theodoros PANGALOS, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (with responsibility for EEC affairs); Alexandre
ZAFIRIOU, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the
European Communities (EL)
Felipe GONZLEZ MRQUEZ, Prime Minister; Fernando
MRAN LPEZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Manuel MARN
GONZLEZ, State Secretary for Relations with the
European Communities;
Gabriel FERRN DE ALFARO, Ambassador, Head of the
Mission of Spain to the European Communities (ES)
Laurent FABIUS, Prime Minister; Roland DUMAS, Minister
for External Relations; Catherine LALUMIRE, Delegated
Minister entrusted with European Affairs; Luc DE LA BARRE
DE NANTEUIL, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to
the European Communities (FR)
(18) Regarding accession to the ECSC, see the Decision of
the Council of the European Communities of 11 June 1985
on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portuguese Republic to the European Coal and Steel
Community, OJ L 302, 15.11.1985.
35
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Garret FITZGERALD, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Peter
BARRY, TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Andrew OROURKE,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (IE)
Bettino CRAXi, President of the Council of Ministers; Giulio
ANDREOTTI, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Pietro CALAMIA,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (IT)
Jacques F. POOS, Vice-President of the Government,
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Joseph WEYLAND,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the European
Communities (LU)
Ruud LUBBERS, Prime Minister, Minister for General
Affairs; Hans VAN DEN BROEK, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
H. J. Ch. RUTTEN, Ambassador, Permanent Representative
to the European Communities (NL)
Mrio SOARES, Prime Minister; Rui MACHETE, Deputy
Prime Minister; Jaime GAMA, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Ernni RODRIGUES LOPES, Minister for Finance and
Planning (PT)
Geoffrey HOWE, QC, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs; Michael BUTLER, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative to the European Communities
(UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 1986
OJ L 302, 15.11.1985 (Documents concerning the
accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese
Republic to the European Communities)
Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT
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Date and place of signature

15
Single European Act
17 February 1986 (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,
Spain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
United Kingdom), Luxembourg, Luxembourg
28 February 1986 (Denmark, Greece, Italy), The Hague,
the Netherlands
Signatories
Leo TINDEMANS, Minister for External Relations (BE)
Uffe ELLEMANN-JENSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DE)
Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs (DE)
Karolos PAPOULIAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Francisco FERNNDEZ ORDEZ, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (ES)
Roland DUMAS, Minister for External Relations (FR)
Peter BARRY, TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Giulio ANDREOTTI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Robert GOEBBELS, State Secretary, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (LU)
Hans VAN DEN BROEK, Minister for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Pedro PIRES DE MIRANDA, Minister for Foreign Affairs (PT)
Lynda CHALKER, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 July 1987
OJ L 169, 29.6.1987
Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT
Further information
Amended the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty and the
Euratom Treaty
37
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Date and place of signature
16
Treaty on European Union Treaty of Maastricht
7 February 1992, Council Chamber, Provincial Government
Buildings, Maastricht, the Netherlands
Signatories
Mark EYSKENS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Philippe
MAYSTADT, Minister for Finance (BE)
Uffe ELLEMANN-JENSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Minister for Economic Affairs
(DK)
Hans-Dietrich GENSCHER, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Theodor WAIGEL, Federal Minister for Finance (DE)
Antonios SAMARAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Efthymios
CHRISTODOULOU, Minister for Economic Affairs (EL)
Francisco FERNNDEZ ORDEZ, Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Carlos SOLCHAGA CATALN, Minister for Economic
Affairs and Finance (ES)
Roland DUMAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Pierre
BRGOVOY, Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs
and the Budget (FR)
Gerard COLLINS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Bertie
AHERN, Minister for Finance (IE)
Gianni DE MICHELIS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Guido
CARLI, Minister for the Treasury (IT)
Jacques F. POOS, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for
Foreign Affairs; Jean-Claude JUNCKER, Minister for Finance
(LU)
Hans VAN DEN BROEK, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Wim
KOK, Minister for Finance (NL)
Joo de Deus PINHEIRO, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jorge
BRAGA DE MACEDO, Minister for Finance (PT)
Douglas HURD, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs; Francis MAUDE, Financial
Secretary to the Treasury (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 November 1993 OJ C 191, 29.7.1992
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Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT
Further information
Established the Treaty on the European Union
Amended the EEC Treaty with a view to establishing the
European Community; amended the ECSC Treaty and the
Euratom Treaty
Exceptions from the application of the treaties:
Denmark and the UK did not participate in the third
stage of economic and monetary union (19).
Denmark did not participate in the elaboration and the
implementation of the European security and defence
policy and in particular in the measures adopted on the
basis of Title V of the EU Treaty which have defence
implications (20).
 (19) See in particular the two protocols annexed to the
EC Treaty by the Treaty on European Union: the Protocol on
certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Protocol on certain
provisions relating to Denmark.
(20) See in particular the Protocol on the position of
Denmark.
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Act amending the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Investment Bank empowering the Board of Governors to
establish a European Investment Fund
Act allowing the creation of a European Investment Fund
Date and place of signature
25 March 1993, Council, Brussels, Belgium
Signatories
Philippe DE SCHOUTHEETE DE TERVARENT, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative (BE) Gunnar RIBERHOLDT,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative (DK)
Jochen GRNHAGE, Deputy Permanent Representative
(DE)
Leonidas EVANGELIDIS, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative (EL)
Camilo BARCIA GARCA-VILLAMIL, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative (ES) Franois SCHEER, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative (FR)
Pdraig MAC KERNAN, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative (IE)
Federico DI ROBERTO, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative (IT) Jean-Jacques KASEL, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative (LU)
Ben BOT, Ambassador, Permanent Representative (NL)
Jose Cesar PAULOURO DAS NEVES, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative (PT) John KERR, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 May 1994
OJ L 173, 7.7.1994
Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT
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Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic,
Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
Portuguese Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland (Member States of the European
Union) and the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of
Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden,
concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the
Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the
Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union
Treaty on the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to
the EU
Date and place of signature
24 June 1994, Chapel of St George, Corfu, Greece (21)
Signatories
Jean-Luc DEHAENE, Prime Minister; Willy CLAES, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Philippe DE SCHOUTHEETE DE
TERVARENT, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Belgium to the European Union (BE)
Poul Nyrup RASMUSSEN, Prime Minister; Niels Helveg
PETERSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Gunnar RIBERHOLDT, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative of Denmark to the European Union (DK)
Helmut KOHL, Federal Chancellor; Klaus KINKEL, Federal
Minister for Foreign A airs and Deputy Federal Chancellor;
Dietrich VON KYAW, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative of Germany to the European Union (DE)
Andreas PAPANDREOU, Prime Minister; Karolos PAPOULIAS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Theodoros PANGALOS, Deputy
Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Felipe GONZLEZ MRQUEZ, President of the Government;
Javier SOLANA MADARIAGA, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Carlos WESTENDORP Y CABEZA, State Secretary for
Relations with the European Communities (ES)
(21) Due to the non-rati cation of the Accession Treaty by
Norway, the Accession Treaty and other docu- ments
relating to accession were subject to Decision 95/1/EC,
Euratom, ECSC of the Council of the European Union
adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new
Member States to the European Union, OJ L 1, 1.1.1995.
41
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42
douard BALLADUR, Prime Minister; Alain JUPP, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Alain LAMASSOURRE, Minister attached
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with special
responsibility for European Affairs; Pierre DE BOISSIEU,
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the
European Union (FR)
Albert REYNOLDS, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Dick
SPRING, Tnaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for
Foreign A airs; Padraic MCKERNAN, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the European
Union (IE)
Silvio BERLUSCONI, Prime Minister; Antonio MARTINO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Livio CAPUTO, State Secretary
for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Jacques SANTER, Prime Minister; Jacques F. POOS, Deputy
Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jean-Jacques
KASEL, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Luxembourg to the European Union (LU)
R. F. M. LUBBERS, Prime Minister; P. H. KOOIJMANS, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Ben BOT, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands to the European Union
(NL)
Gro Harlem BRUNDTLAND, Prime Minister; Bjrn TORE
GODAL, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Grete KNUDSEN,
Minister for Trade, Minister for Merchant Shipping; Eivinn
BERG, Head of the Delegation entrusted with the
negotiations (Norway)
Franz VRANITZKY, Federal Chancellor; Alois MOCK, Federal
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ulrich STACHER, Director
General, Federal Chancellery; Manfred SCHEICH, Head of
the Austrian Mission to the European Communities (AT)
Anibal CAVACO SILVA, Prime Minister; Jose DURO
BARROSO, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Vitor MARTINS,
State Secretary for European Affairs (PT)
Esko AHO, Prime Minister; Pertti SALOLAINEN, Minister for
Foreign Trade; Heikki HAAVISTO, Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Veli SUNDBCK, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
(FI)
Carl BILDT, Prime Minister; Margaretha af UGGLAS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ulf DINKESPIEL, Minister for
European Affairs and Foreign Trade; Frank BELFRAGE,
Secretary of State for European Affairs and Foreign Trade
(SE)
John MAJOR, Prime Minister; Douglas HURD, Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; David
HEATHCOAT-AMORY, Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 1995
OJ C 241, 29.8.1994 (Documents concerning the
accession)
Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV
Notes
Norway withdrew from the accession process following a
negative referendum held on 28 November 1994.
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Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and certain related acts Treaty of
Amsterdam
Date and place of signature
2 October 1997, Burgenzaal, Royal Palace, Amsterdam,
the Netherlands
Signatories
Erik DERYCKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs (BE)
Niels Helveg PETERSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DK)
Klaus KINKEL, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Deputy Federal Chancellor (DE)
Theodoros PANGALOS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Juan Abel MATUTES, Minister for Foreign Affairs (ES)
Hubert VDRINE, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FR)
Raphael P. BURKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Lamberto DINI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Jacques F. POOS, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Cooperation (LU) Hans
VAN MIERLO, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (NL)
Wolfgang SCHSSEL, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Vice Chancellor (AT)
Jaime GAMA, Minister for Foreign Affairs (PT)
Tarja HALONEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FI)
Lena HJELM-WALLN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (SE)
Douglas HENDERSON, Minister of State, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 May 1999
OJ C 340, 10.11.1997
Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV
43
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Notes
Exceptions from the application of the treaties:
At the time of integration of the Schengen acquis into
the framework of the European Union, Denmark is bound
by the Schengen acquis but the Schengen acquis does not
form part of the acquis communautaire as it applies to
Denmark (22). Denmark can opt out of the subsequent
adoption by the Council of measures pursuant to Title IV of
the EC Treaty. It may decide nonetheless to transpose into
its national law a Council decision to build on the
Schengen acquis under the provisions of Title IV of the EC
Treaty (23).
Ireland and the United Kingdom are not parties to the
agreements of the Schengen acquis; at the time of its
integration into the framework of EU law, the Schengen
acquis does not apply to them. However they may request
to take part in some or all of its provisions (24). They may
also opt into and participate in the adoption and
application of measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC
Treaty (25).
(22) See the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis
into the framework of the European Union, annexed to the
Treaty of Amsterdam.
(23) See the Protocol on the position of Denmark.
(24) See the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into
the framework of the European Union.
(25) See the Protocol on the position of the United
Kingdom and Ireland, annexed to the Treaty of
Amsterdam.
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Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts Treaty of Nice
Date and place of signature
26 February 2001, Salle de Bal, Palais Sarde, Alpes-
Maritimes Prefecture, Nice, France
Signatories
Louis MICHEL, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs (BE)
Mogens LYKKETOFT, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DK)
Joseph FISCHER, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Deputy Federal Chancellor (DE) Georgios PAPANDREOU,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Josep PIQU I CAMPS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (ES)
Hubert VDRINE, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FR)
Brian COWEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Lamberto DINI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Lydie POLFER, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Trade (LU) Jozias VAN AARTSEN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs (AT)
Jaime GAMA, Ministro de Estado, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (PT)
Erkki TUOMIOJA, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FI)
Anna LINDH, Minister for Foreign Affairs (SE)
Robin COOK, Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 February 2003 OJ C 80, 10.3.2001
Authentic languages
ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV
45
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46
21
Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic,
Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic
of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Member States of the
European Union) and the Czech Republic, the Republic of
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, concerning the accession of
the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic
of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta,
the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the
Slovak Republic to the European Union
Big Bang Enlargement Treaty
Date and place of signature
16 April 2003, Stoa of Attalos, Ancient Agora, Athens,
Greece
Signatories
Guy VERHOFSTADT, Prime Minister; Louis MICHEL, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (BE)
Vclav KLAUS, President; Vladimir PIDLA, Prime Minister;
Cyril SVOBODA, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs; Pavel TELIKA, Head of the delegation of
the Czech Republic for the negociations on
the accession to the European Union and Ambassador and
Head of the Mission of the Czech Republic to the European
Communities (CZ)
Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Prime Minister; Per Stig
MLLER, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DK)
Gerhard SCHRDER, Federal Chancellor; Joseph FISCHER,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Federal
Chancellor (DE)
Arnold RTEL, President; Kristiina OJULAND, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (EE)
Konstantinos SIMITIS, Prime Minister; Giorgos
PAPANDREOU, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Tassos
GIANNITSIS, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Jose Maria AZNAR LPEZ, President of the Government;
Ana PALACIO VALLELERSUNDI, Minister for Foreign Affairs
(ES)
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Jean-Pierre RAFFARIN, Prime Minister; Dominique

GALOUZEAU DE VILLEPIN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Nolle LENOIR, Minister attached to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, with responsibility for European Affairs (FR)
Bertie AHERN, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Brian COWEN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE) Silvio BERLUSCONI, Prime
Minister; Franco FRATTINI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Tassos PAPADOPOULOS, President; George IACOVIOU,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (CY)
Vaira VE-FREIBERGA, President; Einars REPE, Prime
Minister; Sandra KALNIETE, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Andris KESTERIS, Chief Negotiator for the Accession of the
Republic of Latvia to the European Union, Undersecretary
of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (LV)
Algirdas Mykolas BRAZAUSKAS, Prime Minister; Antanas
VALIONIS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (LT)
Jean-Claude JUNCKER, Prime Minister, Ministre dtat;
Lydie POLFER, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Trade (LU)
Peter MEDGYESSY, Prime Minister; Lszlo KOVCS, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Endre JUHSZ, Ambassador of the
Republic of Hungary to the European Union, Chief
Negotiator for the Accession of the Republic of Hungary to
the European Union (HU)
Edward FENECH ADAMI, Prime Minister; Joe BORG, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Richard CACHIA CARUANA, Head of the
Delegation entrusted with the negotiations (MT)
Jan Pieter BALKENENDE, Prime Minister; Jakob Gijsbert DE
HOOP SCHEFFER, Minister for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Wolfgang SCHSSEL, Federal Chancellor; Benita FERRERO-
WALDNER, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs (AT)
Leszek MILLER, Prime Minister; Wodzimierz
CIMOSZEWICZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Danuta
HBNER, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (PL)
Jose Manuel DURO BARROSO, Prime Minister; Antonio
MARTINS DA CRUZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs (PT) Janez
DRNOVEK, President; Anton ROP, Prime Minister; Dimitrij
RUPEL, Minister for Foreign Affairs (SI)
Rudolf SCHUSTER, President; Mikul DZURINDA, Prime
Minister; Eduard KUKAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Jn
FIGEL, Chief Negotiator for the Accession of the Slovak
Republic to the European Union (SK)
Paavo LIPPONEN, Prime Minister; Jari VILN, Minister for
Foreign Trade (FI)
Gran PERSSON, Prime Minister; Anna LINDH, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (SE)
Tony BLAIR, Prime Minister; Jack STRAW, Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 May 2004
OJ L 236, 23.9.2003 (Documents concerning the
accession) and OJ C 227 E, 23.9.2003 (Appendices to the
annexes to the act concerning the conditions of accession)
Authentic languages
ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL,
PL, PT, SK, SL, FI, SV
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48
22
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
Date and place of signature
29 October 2004, Hall of the Horatii and Curiatii, Capitol,
Rome, Italy
Signatories
Guy VERHOFSTADT, Prime Minister; Karel DE GUCHT,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (BE)
Stanislav GROSS, Prime Minister; Cyril SVOBODA, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (CZ)
Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Prime Minister; Per Stig
MLLER, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DK)
Gerhard SCHRDER, Federal Chancellor; Joseph FISCHER,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Federal
Chancellor (DE)
Juhan PARTS, Prime Minister; Kristiina OJULAND, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (EE)
Kostas KARAMANLIS, Prime Minister; Petros G. MOLYVIATIS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Jose Luis RODRGUEZ ZAPATERO, President of the
Government; Miguel Angel MORATINOS CUYAUB, Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (ES)
Jacques CHIRAC, President; Jean-Pierre RAFFARIN, Prime
Minister; Michel BARNIER, Minister for Foreign Affairs (FR)
Bertie AHERN, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Dermot AHERN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Silvio BERLUSCONI, Prime Minister; Franco FRATTINI,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Tassos PAPADOPOULOS, President; George IACOVIOU,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (CY)
Vaira VE-FREIBERGA, President; Indulis EMSIS, Prime
Minister; Artis PABRIKS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (LV)
Valdas ADAMKUS, President; Algirdas Mykolas
BRAZAUSKAS, Prime Minister; Antanas VALIONIS, Minister
of Foreign Affairs (LT)
Jean-Claude JUNCKER, Prime Minister, Ministre dtat; Jean
ASSELBORN, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Immigration (LU)
Ferenc GYURCSNY, Prime Minister; Lszlo KOVCS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (HU)
Lawrence GONZI, Prime Minister; Michael FRENDO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (MT)
Jan Pieter BALKENENDE, Prime Minister; Ben BOT, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Wolfgang SCHSSEL, Federal Chancellor; Ursula PLASSNIK,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs (AT) Marek BELKA,
Prime Minister; Wodzimierz CIMOSZEWICZ, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (PL)
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Pedro Miguel DE SANTANA LOPES, Prime Minister;

Antonio Victor MARTINS MONTEIRO, Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Portuguese Communities (PT)
Anton ROP, President of the Government; Ivo VAJGL,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (SI)
Mikul DZURINDA, Prime Minister; Eduard KUKAN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (SK)
Matti VANHANEN, Prime Minister; Erkki TUOMIOJA, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (FI)
Gran PERSSON, Prime Minister; Laila FREIVALDS, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (SE)
Tony BLAIR, Prime Minister; Jack STRAW, Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
Did not enter into force OJ C 310, 16.12.2004
Authentic languages
ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL,
PL, PT, SK, SL, FI, SV
49
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Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech

Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic Republic,
the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, Ireland, the
Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of
Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of
Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of
Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic,
the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic
of Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain And Northern Ireland (Member States of the
European Union) and the Republic of Bulgaria and
Romania, concerning the accession of the Republic of
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union
Treaty of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania
Date and place of signature
25 April 2005, Neumnster Abbey, Luxembourg,
Luxembourg
Signatories
Karel DE GUCHT, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Didier
DONFUT, State Secretary for European Affairs, attached to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BE)
Georgi PARVANOV, President; Simeon SAXE-COBOURG,
Prime Minister; Solomon PASSY, Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Meglena KUNEVA, Minister for European Affairs
(BG)
Vladimir MLLER, Deputy Minister for Union Affairs; Jan
KOHOUT, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the
European Union (CZ)
Friis Arne PETERSEN, Permanent Secretary of State; Claus
GRUBE, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Denmark to
the European Union (DK)
Hans Martin BURY, Minister with responsibility for
European Affairs; Wilhelm SCHNFELDER, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the
European Union (DE)
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Urmas PAET, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Vino

REINART, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Estonia to
the European Union (EE)
Yannis VALINAKIS, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Vassilis KASKARELIS, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of the Hellenic
Republic to the European Union (EL)
Miguel Angel MORATINOS CUYAUB, Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation; Alberto NAVARRO GONZLEZ,
Secretary of State for the European Union (ES)
Claudie HAIGNER, Minister with responsibility for
European Affairs, attached to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs; Pierre SELLAL, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of France to
the European Union (FR)
Dermot AHERN; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Noel TREACY,
Minister of State for European Affairs (IE)
Roberto ANTONIONE, Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs; Rocco Antonio CANGELOSI, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent
Representative of the Italian Republic to the European
Union (IT)
George IACOVOU, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Nicholas
EMILIOU, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cyprus to the
European Union (CY)
Artis PABRIKS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Eduards
STIPRAIS, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Latvia to the
European Union (LV)
Antanas VALIONIS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Albinas
JANUSKA, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(LT)
Jean-Claude JUNCKER, Prime Minister, Ministre dtat,
Minister for Finance; Jean ASSELBORN, Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration (LU)
Ferenc SOMOGYI, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Etele
BARTH, Minister without porfolio responsible for European
Union Affairs (HU)
Michael FRENDO, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Richard
CACHIA CARUANA, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Malta to the
European Union (MT)
Ben BOT, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Atzo NICOLA,
Minister for European Affairs (NL)
Hubert GORBACH, Vice Chancellor; URSULA PLASSNIK,
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs (AT)
Adam Daniel ROTFELD, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Jaroslaw PIETRAS, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(PL)
Diogo PINTO DE FREITAS DO AMARAL, Minister of State
and Foreign Affairs; Fernando Manuel de MENDONA
DOLIVEIRA NEVES, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(PT)
Traian BSESCU, President; Clin POPESCU-TRICEANU,
Prime Minister; Mihai-Rzvan UNGUREANU, Minister of
Foreign Affairs; Leonard ORBAN, Chief Negotiator with the
European Union (RO)
Boo CERAR, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (SI)
Eduard KUKAN, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Jozsef BERNYI,
State Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SK)
Eikka KOSONEN, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of the Republic
of Finland to the European Union (FI)
51
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52
Laila FREIVALDS, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Sven-Olof
PETERSSON, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Sweden to the European Union (SE)
John GRANT KCMG, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
European Union (UK)
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 January 2007
OJ L 157, 21.6.2005 (Documents concerning the
accession)
Authentic languages
BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT,
NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV
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24
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community
Treaty of Lisbon
Date and place of signature
13 December 2007, Monastery of the Hieronymites,
Lisbon, Portugal
Signatories
Guy VERHOFSTADT, Prime Minister; Karel DE GUCHT,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (BE)
Sergei STANISHEV, Prime Minister; Ivailo KALFIN, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (BG)
Mirek TOPOLNEK, Prime Minister; Karel
SCHWARZENBERG, Minister for Foreign Affairs (CZ)
Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN, Prime Minister; Per Stig
MLLER, Minister for Foreign Affairs (DK)
Angela MERKEL, Federal Chancellor; Frank-Walter
STEINMEIER, Deputy Federal Chancellor and Federal
Minister for Foreign Affairs (DE)
Andrus ANSIP, Prime Minister; Urmas PAET, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (EE)
Bertie AHERN, Taoiseach (Prime Minister); Dermot AHERN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (IE)
Konstantinos KARAMANLIS, Prime Minister; Dora
BAKOYANNIS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (EL)
Jose Luis RODRGUEZ ZAPATERO, President; Miguel ngel
MORATINOS CUYAUB, Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation (ES)
Nicolas SARKOZY, President; Franois FILLON, Prime
Minister; Bernard KOUCHNER, Minister for Foreign and
European Affairs (FR)
Romano PRODI, Prime Minister; Massimo DALEMA, Deputy
Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs (IT)
Tassos PAPADOPOULOS, President; Erato KOZAKOU-
MARCOULLIS, Minister for Foreign Affairs (CY)
Valdis ZATLERS, President; Aigars KALVTIS, Prime Minister;
Mris RIEKSTI, Minister for Foreign Affairs (LV)
Valdas ADAMKUS, President; Gediminas KIRKILAS, Prime
Minister; Petras VAITIEKNAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs
(LT)
Jean-Claude JUNCKER, Prime Minister; Jean ASSELBORN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (LU) Ferenc GYURCSNY, Prime
Minister; Kinga GNCZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs (HU)
Lawrence GONZI, Prime Minister; Michael FRENDO,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (MT)
Jan Pieter BALKENENDE, Prime Minister; Maxime
VERHAGEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs (NL)
Alfred GUSENBAUER, Federal Chancellor; Ursula PLASSNIK,
Federal Minister for European and International Affairs (AT)
53
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54
Donald TUSK, Prime Minister; Radosaw SIKORSKI, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (PL) Jose SCRATES, Prime Minister; Luis
Filipe AMADO, Minister for Foreign Affairs (PT)
Traian BSESCU, President; Clin POPESCU-TRICEANU,
Prime Minister; Adrian CIOROIANU, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (RO)
Janez JANA, President of the Government; Dimitrij RUPEL,
Minister for Foreign Affairs (SI)
Robert FICO, Prime Minister; Jn KUBI, Minister for Foreign
Affairs (SK)
Matti VANHANEN, Prime Minister; Ilkka KANERVA, Minister
for Foreign Affairs (FI)
Fredrik REINFELDT, Prime Minister; Cecilia MALMSTRM,
Minister for European Affairs (SE)
Gordon BROWN, Prime Minister; David MILIBAND,
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Entry into force and publication in the OJ
1 December 2009
OJ C 306, 17.12.2007
Authentic languages
BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, GA, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT,
NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV
57 / 61
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O cial languages of the Eur

Official langua
1
Bulgarian (
2
Spanish (espaol)
es
3
Czech (etina)
cs
4
Danish (dansk)
da
5
German (Deutsch)
de
6
Estonian (eesti keel)
et
7
Greek ()
el
8
English (English)
en
9
French (franais)
fr
10
Irish (Gaeilge)
ga
11
Italian (italiano)
it
12
Latvian (latvieu valoda)
lv
13
Lithuanian (lietuvi kalba) lt
14 Hungarian (magyar) hu
15 Maltese (Malti) mt
16 Dutch (Nederlands) nl
17 Polish (polski) pl
18 Portuguese (portugus) pt
19 Romanian (romn) ro
20 Slovak (slovenina) sk 21 Slovene (slovenina) sl
22 Finnish (suomi) fi
23 Swedish (svenska) sv
55
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56
General Secretariat of the Council
A Union of law: from Paris to Lisbon Tracing the treaties of
the European Union
Luxembourg: Publications O ce of the European Union
2012 55 pp. 17.6 x 25 cm
ISBN 978-92-824-3507-6 doi:10.2860/78263
59 / 61
18/12/2013

HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS

Free publications:
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);
at the European Unions representations or delegations.
You can obtain
their contact details on the Internet (http://ec.europa.eu)
or by sending a fax to +352 292942758.
Priced publications:
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu).
Priced subscriptions (e.g. annual series of the O cial
Journal of the European Union and reports of cases before
the Court of Justice of the European Union): via one of
the sales agents of the Publications O ce of the European
Union
(http://publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm
).
60 / 61
18/12/2013

Secrets and
Lies of the
Bailout
The federal rescue of Wall Street didnt fix
the economy it created a permanent bailout
state based on a Ponzi-like confidence
scheme. And the worst may be yet to come
By Matt Taibbi
January 4, 2013
It has been four long winters since the
federal government, in the hulking,
shaven-skulled, Alien Nation-esque form
of then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson,
committed $700 billion in taxpayer
money to rescue Wall Street from its own
chicanery and greed. To listen to the
bankers and their allies in Washington
tell it, you'd think the bailout was the
best thing to hit the American economy
since the invention of the assembly line.
Not only did it prevent another Great
Depression, we've been told, but the
money has all been paid back, and the
government even made a profit. No
harm, no foul right?
Wrong.
It was all a lie one of the biggest and
most elaborate falsehoods ever sold to
the American people. We were told that
the taxpayer was stepping in only
temporarily, mind you to prop up the
economy and save the world from
financial catastrophe. What we actually
ended up doing was the exact opposite:
committing American taxpayers to
permanent, blind support of an
ungovernable, unregulatable,
hyperconcentrated new financial system
that exacerbates the greed and
inequality that caused the crash, and
forces Wall Street banks like Goldman
Sachs and Citigroup to increase risk
rather than reduce it. The result is one of
those deals where one wrong decision
early on blossoms into a lush nightmare
of unintended consequences. We
thought we were just letting a friend
crash at the house for a few days; we
ended up with a family of hillbillies who
moved in forever, sleeping nine to a bed
and building a meth lab on the front
lawn.
How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform
But the most appalling part is the lying.
The public has been lied to so
shamelessly and so often in the course
of the past four years that the failure to
tell the truth to the general populace has
become a kind of baked-in, official
feature of the financial rescue. Money
wasn't the only thing the government
gave Wall Street it also conferred the
right to hide the truth from the rest of
us. And it was all done in the name of
helping regular people and creating jobs.
"It is," says former bailout Inspector
General Neil Barofsky, "the ultimate bait-
and-switch."
The bailout deceptions came early, late
and in between. There were lies told in
the first moments of their inception, and
others still being told four years later.
The lies, in fact, were the most important
mechanisms of the bailout. The only
reason investors haven't run screaming
from an obviously corrupt financial
marketplace is because the government
has gone to such extraordinary lengths
to sell the narrative that the problems of
2008 have been fixed. Investors may not
actually believe the lie, but they are
impressed by how totally committed the
government has been, from the very
beginning, to selling it.
THEY LIED TO PASS THE BAILOUT
Today what few remember about the
bailouts is that we had to approve them.
It wasn't like Paulson could just go out
and unilaterally commit trillions of public
dollars to rescue Goldman Sachs and
Citigroup from their own stupidity and
bad management (although the
government ended up doing just that,
later on). Much as with a declaration of
war, a similarly extreme and expensive
commitment of public resources, Paulson
needed at least a film of congressional
approval. And much like the Iraq War
resolution, which was only secured after
George W. Bush ludicrously warned that
Saddam was planning to send drones to
spray poison over New York City, the
bailouts were pushed through Congress
with a series of threats and promises
that ranged from the merely ridiculous to
the outright deceptive. At one meeting
to discuss the original bailout bill at 11
a.m. on September 18th, 2008 Paulson
actually told members of Congress that
$5.5 trillion in wealth would disappear by
2 p.m. that day unless the government
took immediate action, and that the
world economy would collapse "within
24 hours."
To be fair, Paulson started out by trying
to tell the truth in his own ham-headed,
narcissistic way. His first TARP proposal
was a three-page absurdity pulled
straight from a Beavis and Butt-Head
episode it was basically Paulson saying,
"Can you, like, give me some money?"
Sen. Sherrod Brown, a Democrat from
Ohio, remembers a call with Paulson and
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke.
"We need $700 billion," they told Brown,
"and we need it in three days." What's
more, the plan stipulated, Paulson could
spend the money however he pleased,
without review "by any court of law or
any administrative agency."
The White House and leaders of both
parties actually agreed to this
preposterous document, but it died in
the House when 95 Democrats lined up
against it. For an all-too-rare moment
during the Bush administration,
something resembling sanity prevailed in
Washington.
So Paulson came up with a more
convincing lie. On paper, the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was
simple: Treasury would buy $700 billion
of troubled mortgages from the banks
and then modify them to help struggling
homeowners. Section 109 of the act, in
fact, specifically empowered the
Treasury secretary to "facilitate loan
modifications to prevent avoidable
foreclosures." With that promise on the
table, wary Democrats finally approved
the bailout on October 3rd, 2008. "That
provision," says Barofsky, "is what got
the bill passed."
But within days of passage, the Fed and
the Treasury unilaterally decided to
abandon the planned purchase of toxic
assets in favor of direct injections of
billions in cash into companies like
Goldman and Citigroup. Overnight,
Section 109 was unceremoniously
ditched, and what was pitched as a
bailout of both banks and homeowners
instantly became a bank-only operation
marking the first in a long series of
moves in which bailout officials either
casually ignored or openly defied their
own promises with regard to TARP.
Congress was furious. "We've been lied
to," fumed Rep. David Scott, a Democrat
from Georgia. Rep. Elijah Cummings, a
Democrat from Maryland, raged at
transparently douchey TARP
administrator (and Goldman banker)
Neel Kashkari, calling him a "chump" for
the banks. And the anger was bipartisan:
Republican senators David Vitter of
Louisiana and James Inhofe of Oklahoma
were so mad about the unilateral
changes and lack of oversight that they
sponsored a bill in January 2009 to
cancel the remaining $350 billion of
TARP.
So what did bailout officials do? They put
together a proposal full of even bigger
deceptions to get it past Congress a
second time. That process began almost
exactly four years ago on January 12th
and 15th, 2009 when Larry Summers,
the senior economic adviser to
President-elect Barack Obama, sent a
pair of letters to Congress. The pudgy,
stubbyfingered former World Bank
economist, who had been forced out as
Harvard president for suggesting that
women lack a natural aptitude for math
and science, begged legislators to reject
Vitter's bill and leave TARP alone.
In the letters, Summers laid out a five-
point plan in which the bailout was
pitched as a kind of giant populist
program to help ordinary Americans.
Obama, Summers vowed, would use the
money to stimulate bank lending to put
people back to work. He even went so
far as to say that banks would be denied
funding unless they agreed to "increase
lending above baseline levels." He
promised that "tough and transparent
conditions" would be imposed on bailout
recipients, who would not be allowed to
use bailout funds toward "enriching
shareholders or executives." As in the
original TARP bill, he pledged that bailout
money would be used to aid
homeowners in foreclosure. And lastly,
he promised that the bailouts would be
temporary with a "plan for exit of
government intervention" implemented
"as quickly as possible."
The reassurances worked. Once again,
TARP survived in Congress and once
again, the bailouts were greenlighted
with the aid of Democrats who fell for
the old "it'll help ordinary people" sales
pitch. "I feel like they've given me a lot
of commitment on the housing front,"
explained Sen. Mark Begich, a Democrat
from Alaska.
But in the end, almost nothing Summers
promised actually materialized. A small
slice of TARP was earmarked for
foreclosure relief, but the resultant aid
programs for homeowners turned out to
be riddled with problems, for the
perfectly logical reason that none of the
bailout's architects gave a shit about
them. They were drawn up practically
overnight and rushed out the door for
purely political reasons to trick
Congress into handing over tons of
instant cash for Wall Street, with no
strings attached. "Without those
assurances, the level of opposition would
have remained the same," says Rep.
Raul Grijalva, a leading progressive who
voted against TARP. The promise of
housing aid, in particular, turned out to
be a "paper tiger."

HAMP, the signature program to aid poor

homeowners, was announced by
President Obama on February 18th,
2009. The move inspired CNBC
commentator Rick Santelli to go berserk
the next day the infamous viral rant
that essentially birthed the Tea Party.
Reacting to the news that Obama was
planning to use bailout funds to help
poor and (presumably) minority
homeowners facing foreclosure, Santelli
fumed that the president wanted to
"subsidize the losers' mortgages" when
he should "reward people that could
carry the water, instead of drink the
water." The tirade against "water
drinkers" led to the sort of spontaneous
nationwide protests one might have
expected months before, when we
essentially gave a taxpayer-funded blank
check to Gamblers Anonymous addicts,
the millionaire and billionaire class.
In fact, the amount of money that
eventually got spent on homeowner aid
now stands as a kind of grotesque joke
compared to the Himalayan mountain
range of cash that got moved onto the
balance sheets of the big banks more or
less instantly in the first months of the
bailouts. At the start, $50 billion of TARP
funds were earmarked for HAMP. In 2010,
the size of the program was cut to $30
billion. As of November of last year, a
mere $4 billion total has been spent for
loan modifications and other homeowner
aid.
In short, the bailout program designed to
help those lazy, job-averse, "water-
drinking" minority homeowners the one
that gave birth to the Tea Party turns
out to have comprised about one
percent of total TARP spending. "It's
amazing," says Paul Kiel, who monitors
bailout spending for ProPublica. "It's
probably one of the biggest failures of
the Obama administration."
The failure of HAMP underscores another
damning truth that the Bush-Obama
bailout was as purely bipartisan a
program as we've had. Imagine Obama
retaining Don Rumsfeld as defense
secretary and still digging for WMDs in
the Iraqi desert four years after his
election: That's what it was like when he
left Tim Geithner, one of the chief
architects of Bush's bailout, in command
of the no-stringsattached rescue four
years after Bush left office.
Yet Obama's HAMP program, as lame as
it turned out to be, still stands out as one
of the few pre-bailout promises that was
even partially fulfilled. Virtually every
other promise Summers made in his
letters turned out to be total bullshit.
And that includes maybe the most
important promise of all the pledge to
use the bailout money to put people
back to work.
THEY LIED ABOUT LENDING

Once TARP passed, the government

quickly began loaning out billions to
some 500 banks that it deemed
"healthy" and "viable." A few were cash
loans, repayable at five percent within
the first five years; other deals came due
when a bank stock hit a predetermined
price. As long as banks held TARP
money, they were barred from paying
out big cash bonuses to top executives.
But even before Summers promised
Congress that banks would be required
to increase lending as a condition for
receiving bailout funds, officials had
already decided not to even ask the
banks to use the money to increase
lending. In fact, they'd decided not to
even ask banks to monitor what they did
with the bailout money. Barofsky, the
TARP inspector, asked Treasury to
include a requirement forcing recipients
to explain what they did with the
taxpayer money. He was stunned when
TARP administrator Kashkari rejected his
proposal, telling him lenders would walk
away from the program if they had to
deal with too many conditions. "The
banks won't participate," Kashkari said.
Barofsky, a former high-level drug
prosecutor who was one of the only
bailout officials who didn't come from
Wall Street, didn't buy that cash-
desperate banks would somehow turn
down billions in aid. "It was like they
were trembling with fear that the banks
wouldn't take the money," he says. "I
never found that terribly convincing."
In the end, there was no lending
requirement attached to any aspect of
the bailout, and there never would be.
Banks used their hundreds of billions for
almost every purpose under the sun
everything, that is, but lending to the
homeowners and small businesses and
cities they had destroyed. And one of the
most disgusting uses they found for all
their billions in free government money
was to help them earn even more free
government money.
To guarantee their soundness, all major
banks are required to keep a certain
amount of reserve cash at the Fed. In
years past, that money didn't earn
interest, for the logical reason that banks
shouldn't get paid to stay solvent. But in
2006 arguing that banks were losing
profits on cash parked at the Fed
regulators agreed to make small interest
payments on the money. The move
wasn't set to go into effect until 2011,
but when the crash hit, a section was
written into TARP that launched the
interest payments in October 2008.
In theory, there should never be much
money in such reserve accounts,
because any halfway-competent bank
could make far more money lending the
cash out than parking it at the Fed,
where it earns a measly quarter of a
percent. In August 2008, before the
bailout began, there were just $2 billion
in excess reserves at the Fed. But by
that October, the number had ballooned
to $267 billion and by January 2009, it
had grown to $843 billion. That means
there was suddenly more money sitting
uselessly in Fed accounts than Congress
had approved for either the TARP bailout
or the much-loathed Obama stimulus.
Instead of lending their new cash to
struggling homeowners and small
businesses, as Summers had promised,
the banks were literally sitting on it.
Today, excess reserves at the Fed total
an astonishing $1.4 trillion."The money
is just doing nothing," says Nomi Prins, a
former Goldman executive who has
spent years monitoring the distribution
of bailout money.
Nothing, that is, except earning a few
crumbs of risk-free interest for the
banks. Prins estimates that the annual
haul in interest on Fed reserves is about
$3.6 billion a relatively tiny subsidy in
the scheme of things, but one that,
ironically, just about matches the total
amount of bailout money spent on aid to
homeowners. Put another way, banks
are getting paid about as much every
year for not lending money as 1 million
Americans received for mortgage
modifications and other housing aid in
the whole of the past four years.
Moreover, instead of using the bailout
money as promised to jump-start the
economy Wall Street used the funds to
make the economy more dangerous.
From the start, taxpayer money was
used to subsidize a string of finance
mergers, from the Chase-Bear Stearns
deal to the Wells FargoWachovia merger
to Bank of America's acquisition of
Merrill Lynch. Aided by bailout funds,
being Too Big to Fail was suddenly Too
Good to Pass Up.
Other banks found more creative uses
for bailout money. In October 2010,
Obama signed a new bailout bill creating
a program called the Small Business
Lending Fund, in which firms with fewer
than $10 billion in assets could apply to
share in a pool of $4 billion in public
money. As it turned out, however, about
a third of the 332 companies that took
part in the program used at least some
of the money to repay their original
TARP loans. Small banks that still owed
TARP money essentially took out
cheaper loans from the government to
repay their more expensive TARP loans
a move that conveniently exempted
them from the limits on executive
bonuses mandated by the bailout. All
told, studies show, $2.2 billion of the $4
billion ended up being spent not on
small-business loans, but on TARP
repayment. "It's a bit of a shell game,"
admitted John Schmidt, chief operating
officer of Iowa-based Heartland Financial,
which took $81.7 million from the SBLF
and used every penny of it to repay
TARP.
Using small-business funds to pay down
their own debts, parking huge amounts
of cash at the Fed in the midst of a
stalled economy it's all just evidence of
what most Americans know instinctively:
that the bailouts didn't result in much
new business lending. If anything, the
bailouts actually hindered lending, as
banks became more like house pets that
grow fat and lazy on two guaranteed
meals a day than wild animals that have
to go out into the jungle and hunt for
opportunities in order to eat. The Fed's
own analysis bears this out: In the first
three months of the bailout, as taxpayer
billions poured in, TARP recipients slowed
down lending at a rate more than double
that of banks that didn't receive TARP
funds. The biggest drop in lending 3.1
percent came from the biggest bailout
recipient, Citigroup. A year later, the
inspector general for the bailout found
that lending among the nine biggest
TARP recipients "did not, in fact,
increase." The bailout didn't flood the
banking system with billions in loans for
small businesses, as promised. It just
flooded the banking system with billions
for the banks.
THEY LIED ABOUT THE HEALTH OF
THE BANKS

T
he main reason banks didn't lend out
bailout funds is actually pretty simple:
Many of them needed the money just to
survive. Which leads to another of the
bailout's broken promises that
taxpayer money would only be handed
out to "viable" banks.
Soon after TARP passed, Paulson and
other officials announced the guidelines
for their unilaterally changed bailout
plan. Congress had approved $700
billion to buy up toxic mortgages, but
$250 billion of the money was now
shifted to direct capital injections for
banks. (Although Paulson claimed at the
time that handing money directly to the
banks was a faster way to restore
market confidence than lending it to
homeowners, he later confessed that he
had been contemplating the direct-cash-
injection plan even before the vote.) This
new let's-just-fork-over-cash portion of
the bailout was called the Capital
Purchase Program. Under the CPP, nine
of America's largest banks including
Citi, Wells Fargo, Goldman, Morgan
Stanley, Bank of America, State Street
and Bank of New York Mellon received
$125 billion, or half of the funds being
doled out. Since those nine firms
accounted for 75 percent of all assets
held in America's banks $11 trillion it
made sense they would get the lion's
share of the money. But in announcing
the CPP, Paulson and Co. promised that
they would only be stuffing cash into
"healthy and viable" banks. This, at the
core, was the entire justification for the
bailout: That the huge infusion of
taxpayer cash would not be used to
rescue individual banks, but to kick-start
the economy as a whole by helping
healthy banks start lending again.
The Scam Wall Street Learned From the
Mafia
This announcement marked the
beginning of the legend that certain Wall
Street banks only took the bailout money
because they were forced to they
didn't need all those billions, you
understand, they just did it for the good
of the country. "We did not, at that point,
need TARP," Chase chief Jamie Dimon
later claimed, insisting that he only took
the money "because we were asked to
by the secretary of Treasury." Goldman
chief Lloyd Blankfein similarly claimed
that his bank never needed the money,
and that he wouldn't have taken it if he'd
known it was "this pregnant with
potential for backlash." A joint statement
by Paulson, Bernanke and FDIC chief
Sheila Bair praised the nine leading
banks as "healthy institutions" that were
taking the cash only to "enhance the
overall performance of the U.S.
economy."
But right after the bailouts began, soon-
to-be Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner
admitted to Barofsky, the inspector
general, that he and his cohorts had
picked the first nine bailout recipients
because of their size, without bothering
to assess their health and viability.
Paulson, meanwhile, later admitted that
he had serious concerns about at least
one of the nine firms he had publicly
pronounced healthy. And in November
2009, Bernanke gave a closed-door
interview to the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, the body charged with
investigating the causes of the economic
meltdown, in which he admitted that 12
of the 13 most prominent financial
companies in America were on the brink
of failure during the time of the initial
bailouts.
On the inside, at least, almost everyone
connected with the bailout knew that the
top banks were in deep trouble. "It
became obvious pretty much as soon as
I took the job that these companies
weren't really healthy and viable," says
Barofsky, who stepped down as TARP
inspector in 2011.
This early episode would prove to be a
crucial moment in the history of the
bailout. It set the precedent of the
government allowing unhealthy banks to
not only call themselves healthy, but to
get the government to endorse their
claims. Projecting an image of soundness
was, to the government, more important
than disclosing the truth. Officials like
Geithner and Paulson seemed to
genuinely believe that the market's fears
about corruption in the banking system
was a bigger problem than the
corruption itself. Time and again, they
justified TARP as a move needed to
"bolster confidence" in the system and
a key to that effort was keeping the
banks' insolvency a secret. In doing so,
they created a bizarre new two-tiered
financial market, divided between those
who knew the truth about how bad
things were and those who did not.
A month or so after the bailout team
called the top nine banks "healthy," it
became clear that the biggest recipient,
Citigroup, had actually flat-lined on the
ER table. Only weeks after Paulson and
Co. gave the firm $25 billion in TARP
funds, Citi which was in the midst of
posting a quarterly loss of more than
$17 billion came back begging for
more. In November 2008, Citi received
another $20 billion in cash and more
than $300 billion in guarantees.
What's most amazing about this isn't
that Citi got so much money, but that
government-endorsed, fraudulent health
ratings magically became part of its
bailout. The chief financial regulators
the Fed, the FDIC and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency use a
ratings system called CAMELS to
measure the fitness of institutions.
CAMELS stands for Capital, Assets,
Management, Earnings, Liquidity and
Sensitivity to risk, and it rates firms from
one to five, with one being the best and
five the crappiest. In the heat of the
crisis, just as Citi was receiving the
second of what would turn out to be
three massive federal bailouts, the bank
inexplicably enjoyed a three rating the
financial equivalent of a passing grade.
In her book, Bull by the Horns, then-FDIC
chief Sheila Bair recounts expressing
astonishment to OCC head John Dugan
as to why "Citi rated as a CAMELS 3
when it was on the brink of failure."
Dugan essentially answered that "since
the government planned on bailing Citi
out, the OCC did not plan to change its
supervisory rating." Similarly, the FDIC
ended up granting a "systemic risk
exception" to Citi, allowing it access to
FDIC-bailout help even though the
agency knew the bank was on the verge
of collapse.
The sweeping impact of these crucial
decisions has never been fully
appreciated. In the years preceding the
bailouts, banks like Citi had been
perpetuating a kind of fraud upon the
public by pretending to be far healthier
than they really were. In some cases, the
fraud was outright, as in the case of
Lehman Brothers, which was using an
arcane accounting trick to book tens of
billions of loans as revenues each
quarter, making it look like it had more
cash than it really did. In other cases,
the fraud was more indirect, as in the
case of Citi, which in 2007 paid out the
third-highest dividend in America $10.7
billion despite the fact that it had lost
$9.8 billion in the fourth quarter of that
year alone. The whole financial sector, in
fact, had taken on Ponzi-like
characteristics, as many banks were
hugely dependent on a continual influx
of new money from things like sales of
subprime mortgages to cover up
massive future liabilities from toxic
investments that, sooner or later, were
going to come to the surface.
Now, instead of using the bailouts as a
clear-the-air moment, the government
decided to double down on such fraud,
awarding healthy ratings to these failing
banks and even twisting its numerical
audits and assessments to fit the
cooked-up narrative. A major component
of the original TARP bailout was a
promise to ensure "full and accurate
accounting" by conducting regular
"stress tests" of the bailout recipients.
When Geithner announced his stress-test
plan in February 2009, a reporter
instantly blasted him with an obvious
and damning question: Doesn't the fact
that you have to conduct these tests
prove that bank regulators, who should
already know plenty about banks'
solvency, actually have no idea who is
solvent and who isn't?
The government did wind up conducting
regular stress tests of all the major
bailout recipients, but the methodology
proved to be such an obvious joke that it
was even lampooned on Saturday Night
Live. (In the skit, Geithner abandons a
planned numerical score system
because it would unfairly penalize
bankers who were "not good at
banking.") In 2009, just after the first
round of tests was released, it came out
that the Fed had allowed banks to
literally rejigger the numbers to make
their bottom lines look better. When the
Fed found Bank of America had a $50
billion capital hole, for instance, the bank
persuaded examiners to cut that number
by more than $15 billion because of
what it said were "errors made by
examiners in the analysis." Citigroup got
its number slashed from $35 billion to
$5.5 billion when the bank pleaded with
the Fed to give it credit for "pending
transactions."
Such meaningless parodies of oversight
continue to this day. Earlier this year,
Regions Financial Corp. a company that
had failed to pay back $3.5 billion in
TARP loans passed its stress test. A
subsequent analysis by Bloomberg View
found that Regions was effectively $525
million in the red. Nonetheless, the
bank's CEO proclaimed that the stress
test "demonstrates the strength of our
company." Shortly after the test was
concluded, the bank issued $900 million
in stock and said it planned on using the
cash to pay back some of the money it
had borrowed under TARP.
This episode underscores a key feature
of the bailout: the government's decision
to use lies as a form of monetary aid.
State hands over taxpayer money to
functionally insolvent bank; state gives
regulatory thumbs up to said bank; bank
uses that thumbs up to sell stock; bank
pays cash back to state. What's critical
here is not that investors actually buy
the Fed's bullshit accounting all they
have to do is believe the government will
backstop Regions either way, healthy or
not. "Clearly, the Fed wanted it to attract
new investors," observed Bloomberg,
"and those who put fresh capital into
Regions this week believe the
government won't let it die."
Through behavior like this, the
government has turned the entire
financial system into a kind of vast
confidence game a Ponzi-like scam in
which the value of just about everything
in the system is inflated because of the
widespread belief that the government
will step in to prevent losses. Clearly, a
government that's already in debt over
its eyes for the next million years does
not have enough capital on hand to
rescue every Citigroup or Regions Bank
in the land should they all go bust
tomorrow. But the market is behaving as
if Daddy will step in to once again pay
the rent the next time any or all of these
kids sets the couch on fire and skips out
on his security deposit. Just like an
actual Ponzi scheme, it works only as
long as they don't have to make good on
all the promises they've made. They're
building an economy based not on real
accounting and real numbers, but on
belief. And while the signs of growth and
recovery in this new faith-based
economy may be fake, one aspect of the
bailout has been consistently concrete:
the broken promises over executive pay.

THEY LIED ABOUT BONUSES

T
hat executive bonuses on Wall Street
were a political hot potato for the
bailout's architects was obvious from the
start. That's why Summers, in saving the
bailout from the ire of Congress, vowed
to "limit executive compensation" and
devote public money to prevent another
financial crisis. And it's true, TARP did
bar recipients from a whole range of
exorbitant pay practices, which is one
reason the biggest banks, like Goldman
Sachs, worked so quickly to repay their
TARP loans.
But there were all sorts of ways around
the restrictions. Banks could apply to the
Fed and other regulators for waivers,
which were often approved (one senior
FDIC official tells me he recommended
denying "golden parachute" payments to
Citigroup officials, only to see them
approved by superiors). They could get
bailouts through programs other than
TARP that did not place limits on
bonuses. Or they could simply pay
bonuses not prohibited under TARP. In
one of the worst episodes, the notorious
lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paid
out more than $200 million in bonuses
between 2008 and 2010, even though
the firms (a) lost more than $100 billion
in 2008 alone, and (b) required nearly
$400 billion in federal assistance during
the bailout period.
Even worse was the incredible episode in
which bailout recipient AIG paid more
than $1 million each to 73 employees of
AIG Financial Products, the tiny unit
widely blamed for having destroyed the
insurance giant (and perhaps even
triggered the whole crisis) with its
reckless issuance of nearly half a trillion
dollars in toxic credit-default swaps. The
"retention bonuses," paid after the
bailout, went to 11 employees who no
longer worked for AIG.
Daily Beast: Don't Blame AIG for Hank
Greenberg's Lawsuit
But all of these "exceptions" to the
bonus restrictions are far less infuriating,
it turns out, than the rule itself. TARP did
indeed bar big cash-bonus payouts by
firms that still owed money to the
government. But those firms were
allowed to issue extra compensation to
executives in the form of long-term
restricted stock. An independent
research firm asked to analyze the stock
options for The New York Times found
that the top five executives at each of
the 18 biggest bailout recipients
received a total of $142 million in stocks
and options. That's plenty of money all
by itself but thanks in large part to the
government's overt display of support
for those firms, the value of those
options has soared to $457 million, an
average of $4 million per executive.
In other words, we didn't just allow
banks theoretically barred from paying
bonuses to pay bonuses. We actually
allowed them to pay bigger bonuses
than they otherwise could have. Instead
of forcing the firms to reward top
executives in cash, we allowed them to
pay in depressed stock, the value of
which we then inflated due to the
government's implicit endorsement of
those firms.
All of which leads us to the last and most
important deception of the bailouts:
THEY LIED ABOUT THE BAILOUT
BEING TEMPORARY

T
he bailout ended up being much bigger
than anyone expected, expanded far
beyond TARP to include more obscure
(and in some cases far larger) programs
with names like TALF, TAF, PPIP and
TLGP. What's more, some parts of the
bailout were designed to extend far into
the future. Companies like AIG, GM and
Citigroup, for instance, were given tens
of billions of deferred tax assets
allowing them to carry losses from 2008
forward to offset future profits and keep
future tax bills down. Official estimates
of the bailout's costs do not include such
ongoing giveaways. "This is stuff that's
never going to appear on any report,"
says Barofsky.
Citigroup, all by itself, boasts more than
$50 billion in deferred tax credits which
is how the firm managed to pay less in
taxes in 2011 (it actually received a
$144 million credit) than it paid in
compensation that year to its since-
ousted dingbat CEO, Vikram Pandit (who
pocketed $14.9 million). The bailout, in
short, enabled the very banks and
financial institutions that cratered the
global economy to write off the losses
from their toxic deals for years to come
further depriving the government of
much-needed tax revenues it could have
used to help homeowners and small
businesses who were screwed over by
the banks in the first place.
Even worse, the $700 billion in TARP
loans ended up being dwarfed by more
than $7.7 trillion in secret emergency
lending that the Fed awarded to Wall
Street loans that were only disclosed to
the public after Congress forced an
extraordinary one-time audit of the
Federal Reserve. The extent of this
"secret bailout" didn't come out until
November 2011, when Bloomberg
Markets, which went to court to win the
right to publish the data, detailed how
the country's biggest firms secretly
received trillions in near-free money
throughout the crisis.
Goldman Sachs, which had made such a
big show of being reluctant about
accepting $10 billion in TARP money,
was quick to cash in on the secret loans
being offered by the Fed. By the end of
2008, Goldman had snarfed up $34
billion in federal loans and it was
paying an interest rate of as low as just
0.01 percent for the huge cash infusion.
Yet that funding was never disclosed to
shareholders or taxpayers, a fact
Goldman confirms. "We did not disclose
the amount of our participation in the
two programs you identify," says
Goldman spokesman Michael Duvally.
Goldman CEO Blankfein later dismissed
the importance of the loans, telling the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that
the bank wasn't "relying on those
mechanisms." But in his book, Bailout,
Barofsky says that Paulson told him that
he believed Morgan Stanley was "just
days" from collapse before government
intervention, while Bernanke later
admitted that Goldman would have been
the next to fall.
Meanwhile, at the same moment that
leading banks were taking trillions in
secret loans from the Fed, top officials at
those firms were buying up stock in their
companies, privy to insider info that was
not available to the public at large.
Stephen Friedman, a Goldman director
who was also chairman of the New York
Fed, bought more than $4 million of
Goldman stock over a five-week period
in December 2008 and January 2009
years before the extent of the firm's
lifeline from the Fed was made public.
Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit bought
nearly $7 million in Citi stock in
November 2008, just as his firm was
secretly taking out $99.5 billion in Fed
loans. Jamie Dimon bought more than
$11 million in Chase stock in early 2009,
at a time when his firm was receiving as
much as $60 billion in secret Fed loans.
When asked by Rolling Stone, Chase
could not point to any disclosure of the
bank's borrowing from the Fed until more
than a year later, when Dimon wrote
about it in a letter to shareholders in
March 2010.
The stock purchases by America's top
bankers raise serious questions of
insider trading. Two former high-ranking
financial regulators tell Rolling Stone that
the secret loans were likely subject to a
1989 guideline, issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the heat of
the savings and loan crisis, which said
that financial institutions should disclose
the "nature, amounts and effects" of any
government aid. At the end of 2011, in
fact, the SEC sent letters to Citigroup,
Chase, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America
and Wells Fargo asking them why they
hadn't fully disclosed their secret
borrowing. All five megabanks
essentially replied, to varying degrees of
absurdity, that their massive borrowing
from the Fed was not "material," or that
the piecemeal disclosure they had
engaged in was adequate. Never mind
that the law says investors have to be
informed right away if CEOs like Dimon
and Pandit decide to give themselves a
$10,000 raise. According to the banks,
it's none of your business if those same
CEOs are making use of a secret $50
billion charge card from the Fed.
The implications here go far beyond the
question of whether Dimon and Co.
committed insider trading by buying and
selling stock while they had access to
material nonpublic information about the
bailouts. The broader and more pressing
concern is the clear implication that by
failing to act, federal regulators have
tacitly approved the nondisclosure.
Instead of trusting the markets to do the
right thing when provided with accurate
information, the government has instead
channeled Jack Nicholson and decided
that the public just can't handle the
truth.

A
ll of this the willingness to call dying
banks healthy, the sham stress tests, the
failure to enforce bonus rules, the
seeming indifference to public
disclosure, not to mention the shocking
lack of criminal investigations into fraud
committed by bailout recipients before
the crash comprised the largest and
most valuable bailout of all. Brick by
brick, statement by reassuring
statement, bailout officials have spent
years building the government's great
Implicit Guarantee to the biggest
companies on Wall Street: We will be
there for you, always, no matter how
much you screw up. We will lie for you
and let you get away with just about
anything. We will make this ongoing
bailout a pervasive and permanent part
of the financial system. And most
important of all, we will publicly commit
to this policy, being so obvious about it
that the markets will be able to put an
exact price tag on the value of our
preferential treatment.
The first independent study that
attempted to put a numerical value on
the Implicit Guarantee popped up about
a year after the crash, in September
2009, when Dean Baker and Travis
McArthur of the Center for Economic and
Policy Research published a paper called
"The Value of the 'Too Big to Fail' Big
Bank Subsidy." Baker and McArthur
found that prior to the last quarter of
2007, just before the start of the crisis,
financial firms with $100 billion or more
in assets were paying on average about
0.29 percent less to borrow money than
smaller firms.
By the second quarter of 2009, however,
once the bailouts were in full swing, that
spread had widened to 0.78 percent. The
conclusion was simple: Lenders were
about a half a point more willing to lend
to a bank with implied government
backing even a proven-stupid bank
than they were to lend to companies
who "must borrow based on their own
credit worthiness." The economists
estimated that the lending gap
amounted to an annual subsidy of $34
billion a year to the nation's 18 biggest
banks.
Today the borrowing advantage of a big
bank remains almost exactly what it was
three years ago about 50 basis points,
or half a percent. "These megabanks still
receive subsidies in the sense that they
can borrow on the capital markets at a
discount rate of 50 or 70 points because
of the implicit view that these banks are
Too Big to Fail," says Sen. Brown.
Why does the market believe that?
Because the officials who administered
the bailouts made that point explicitly,
over and over again. When Geithner
announced the implementation of the
stress tests in 2009, for instance, he
declared that banks who didn't have
enough money to pass the test could get
it from the government. "We're going to
help this process by providing a new
program of capital support for those
institutions that need it," Geithner said.
The message, says Barofsky, was clear:
"If the banks cannot raise capital, we will
do it for them." It was an Implicit
Guarantee that the banks would not be
allowed to fail a point that Geithner
and other officials repeatedly stressed
over the years. "The markets took all
those little comments by Geithner as a
clue that the government is looking out
for them," says Baker. That psychological
signaling, he concludes, is responsible
for the crucial half-point borrowing
spread.

The inherent advantage of bigger banks

the permanent, ongoing bailout they
are still receiving from the government
has led to a host of gruesome
consequences. All the big banks have
paid back their TARP loans, while more
than 300 smaller firms are still struggling
to repay their bailout debts. Even worse,
the big banks, instead of breaking down
into manageable parts and becoming
more efficient, have grown even bigger
and more unmanageable, making the
economy far more concentrated and
dangerous than it was before. America's
six largest banks Bank of America, JP
Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo,
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
now have a combined 14,420
subsidiaries, making them so big as to
be effectively beyond regulation. A
recent study by the Kansas City Fed
found that it would take 70,000
examiners to inspect such trillion-dollar
banks with the same level of attention
normally given to a community bank.
"The complexity is so overwhelming that
no regulator can follow it well enough to
regulate the way we need to," says Sen.
Brown, who is drafting a bill to break up
the megabanks.
Worst of all, the Implicit Guarantee has
led to a dangerous shift in banking
behavior. With an apparently endless
stream of free or almost-free money
available to banks coupled with a well-
founded feeling among bankers that the
government will back them up if
anything goes wrong banks have made
a dramatic move into riskier and more
speculative investments, including
everything from high-risk corporate
bonds to mortgagebacked securities to
payday loans, the sleaziest and most
disreputable end of the financial system.
In 2011, banks increased their
investments in junk-rated companies by
74 percent, and began systematically
easing their lending standards in search
of more high-yield customers to lend to.
This is a virtual repeat of the financial
crisis, in which a wave of greed caused
bankers to recklessly chase yield
everywhere, to the point where lowering
lending standards became the norm.
Now the government, with its Implicit
Guarantee, is causing exactly the same
behavior meaning the bailouts have
brought us right back to where we
started. "Government intervention," says
Klaus Schaeck, an expert on bailouts
who has served as a World Bank
consultant, "has definitely resulted in
increased risk."
And while the economy still mostly sucks
overall, there's never been a better time
to be a Too Big to Fail bank. Wells Fargo
reported a third-quarter profit of nearly
$5 billion last year, while JP Morgan
Chase pocketed $5.3 billion roughly
double what both banks earned in the
third quarter of 2006, at the height of
the mortgage bubble. As the driver of
their success, both banks cite strong
performance in you guessed it the
mortgage market.
So what exactly did the bailout
accomplish? It built a banking system
that discriminates against community
banks, makes Too Big to Fail banks even
Too Bigger to Failier, increases risk,
discourages sound business lending and
punishes savings by making it even
easier and more profitable to chase high-
yield investments than to compete for
small depositors. The bailout has also
made lying on behalf of our biggest and
most corrupt banks the official policy of
the United States government. And if
any one of those banks fails, it will cause
another financial crisis, meaning we're
essentially wedded to that policy for the
rest of eternity or at least until the
markets call our bluff, which could
happen any minute now.
Other than that, the bailout was a
smashing success.
_This article is from the January 17th,
2013 issue of Rolling Stone.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/new
s/secret-and-lies-of-the-bailout-
20130104

How Trump Filled The Swamp

Feb 3, 2017
Stephen MNUCHIN
Case Management Lessons Learned
from the Lone Pine Controversy in
the Zimmer MDL
http://www.iadclaw.org/assets/1/19/Toxic_Hazardous_Substances_Feb
ruary_2017.pdf

To Settle or not to Settle: The EU Highest

Court Confirms the Commissions
Approach in First Hybrid Cartel
Daniel Barrio, Yves Botteman
January 30, 2017
To settle or not to settle, that is the question. And an important one, as
confirmed by the EU Court of Justice (CoJ) in its judgement in Timab
Industries and Cie financire et de participations Roullier (CFPR) v European
Commission (C411/15). The ruling confirms the findings of the General
Court (GC) in its judgement of 2015 (T456/10) and upholds the almost 60
million fine imposed by the European Commission (EC) on Timab and its
parent company Roullier in 2010.
The present judgement is important because it corroborates the ECs
approach in tackling for the first time a so-called hybrid cartel. In such
cases, the EC runs two separate procedures in parallel, one settlement
procedure as introduced by Regulation 622/2008 (which modified Regulation
773/2004) for those parties wishing to settle a cartel investigation and a
second ordinary procedure under Regulation 773/2004 for the non-settling
parties. The CoJs judgement confirms that these two procedures are
separate and that parties who receive a range of fines by the EC in the
context of settlement discussions cannot reasonably rely on these figures if
they decide to drop out of the settlement procedure and follow the standard
administrative procedure.
The ECs Investigation
In 2010, the EC closed its first hybrid cartel investigation by fining six groups
of animal feed phosphate producers (a total of 12 companies) an amount of
175,647,000 for operating a price-fixing and market sharing cartel for over 30
years. The hybrid nature of the investigation lies in the fact that the EC had to
run two parallel but separate procedures for the same cartel after Timab
abandoned the settlement discussions.
During those discussions the EC informed Timab that it would impose a range
(minimum and maximum) of potential fines of 41 million to 44 million for its
participation in a single and continuous infringement in the cartel from 1978 to
2004. Unhappy with that assessment, Timab decided to drop out of the
settlement negotiations and dispute the duration of their involvement in the
cartel by following the ordinary administrative procedure pursuant to
Regulation 773/2004. After having had access to the ECs file, formally
replied to the Statement of Objections (SO) and attended a hearing, Timab
was able to successfully disprove its participation in the cartel for the period of
1978 to 1993.
Paradoxically, and as what must have come as a surprise to Timab, the EC
imposed a fine of 59,850,000 for Timabs participation in the cartel from 1993
to 2004. That is, almost 20 million more than the range of potential fines the
EC had indicated during the settlement discussions for a shorter period of
time (15 years). The increase was due to the fact that most of the reductions
envisaged by the EC during the settlement discussions referred to the period
from 1978 to 1993, which was ultimately disproven by Timab during the
ordinary procedure.
The Action for Annulment Before the GC
Timab lodged an action for annulment before the GC against the ECs
decision, in essence arguing that (i) the EC penalised Timab for having
withdrawn from the settlement procedure by imposing a higher fine than
initially foreshadowed and that (ii) the EC should be bound by the range of
potential fines notified to Timab during the settlement discussions pursuant to
Article 10(a)(2) of Regulation 773/2004. As explained in detail in our previous
briefing, the GC was not convinced by Timabs arguments, rejecting all of its
claims.
As to the first argument, the GC disputed the allegation that the EC penalised
Timab for withdrawing from the settlement discussions. The GC examined in
detail the method followed by the EC in calculating the amount of the fine
outside of the settlement procedure and the ECs adherence to the rules set
out in the 2006 Fining Guidelines. The GC found that the EC correctly applied
those rules and confirmed that the difference in the amount of the fines
imposed was due to the fact that the reductions envisaged by the EC during
the settlement discussions mainly applied to the period of 1978 to 1993, which
was successfully disputed by Timab. Aside from a 10% reduction for entering
into settlement, the initial reductions foreseen during the settlement
discussions included 1) a 35% reduction for mitigating circumstances granted
for allowing the EC to extend the duration of Timabs participation in the cartel
(that is, from 1978 to 1993) pursuant to the 2006 Guidelines and 2) a 17%
reduction according to the Leniency Notice. These initial reductions went
from 52% during the settlement discussions to a mere 5% in the context of the
ordinary procedure. This decrease was further exacerbated by the fact that
Timabs average annual sales, upon which the fines and reductions were
calculated, were higher for the period from 1993 to 2004 than from 1978 to
2004, largely due to an increase in the undertakings activity and geographical
spread during said period.
Regarding the argument put forward by Timab that the EC is bound by the
range of potential fines as indicated during the settlement negotiations, the
GC draws a clear line in the sand by stating that the [EC] is not bound by the
range indicated during the discussions as part of the settlement procedure.
The GC further clarifies that in the standard administrative procedure, the EC
is only bound by the statement of objections which does not set a range of
fines and that the range notified during the settlement procedure is irrelevant,
since it is an instrument specific to that procedure, it would therefore be
illogical, and even inappropriate that the [EC] be required to apply, or to refer
to, a range of fines falling within the scope of another procedure now
abandoned.
The Appeal to the CoJ and the Principle of Legitimate Expectations
Dissatisfied with the assessment of the GC, Timab asked the CoJ to set aside
the judgement and to refer the case back in order to reduce the amount of the
fine. In essence, Timabs complaints remained the same: the EC should not
have imposed a higher fine during the ordinary procedure than the range of
potential fines indicated during the settlement discussions, especially since
the relevant period was 15 years shorter than initially considered. The CoJ
confirms the approach adopted by the EC and the GC in calculating the fines
imposed on Timab and further sheds light on Timabs claim that their
legitimate expectations have been thwarted by the EC and the GC when they
imposed a fine different than initially envisaged.
In this regard, the CoJ recalls that the principle of legitimate expectations is
among the fundamental principles of EU law and that any economic operator
may rely on it if an EU institution has given precise assurances which caused
it to entertain justified expectations. The CoJ clarifies, however, that at the
procedural stage preceding the adoption of the final decision either in
settlement or during the ordinary procedure the EC cannot give to the
participants in the cartel any precise assurance as to any reductions or
immunity from fines. The CoJ also points out that the settlement procedure is
an alternative administrative procedure with special features such as an
indication of a likely range of fines; if an undertaking does not put forward a
proposal for settlement, the procedure leading to the final decision is
governed by the general provisions of Regulation 773/2004 and the EC is only
bound by the SO which does not set a range of fines. Moreover, the CoJ
indicates that when Timab withdrew from the settlement discussions they had
all the information required to foresee that disputing their involvement for the
period of 1978 to 1993 may have had an effect on the reductions applied to
that period pursuant to the 2006 Fining Guidelines and the Leniency Notice.
To Settle or not to Settle: Lessons from the First Hybrid Cartel
The settlement procedure was introduced in 2008 as a means of increasing
the efficiency in dealing with complex cartel cases. Whilst cartel settlements
have proven to be a success, with 18 cartel cases settled to date,
commentators have argued that the proliferation of hybrid cartels undermines
these achievements by reducing the ECs efficiency. In this sense, the
present judgement is welcome in that it draws a clear line between the
settlement and the ordinary procedure which may discourage potential settling
parties from pulling their guns too quickly and rush to the standard procedure.
On a more practical note, not only does this judgment confirm the ECs
approach in dealing with 'hybrid cartels,' but it also teaches us some important
lessons: whilst there may be a case for dropping the settlement discussions
and engaging with the EC on the basis of the standard procedure, this should
be done by means of a calculated risk, taking into account not only the
relevant rules on fines and available reductions, but also how the factual
arguments put forward in defense would affect the outcome. It also teaches
us that the world of 'hybrid cartels' is either black or white, we settle or we
dont, but we cannot expect to have the benefits of both.
N.B.: Other hybrid cartel cases are: Canned mushrooms (2016), Steel
abrasives (2016), Euro Rate Derivatives (2016) and Yen Rate Derivatives
(2015).
http://www.steptoe.com/resources-detail-11763.html

Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending

Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement
procedures in cartel cases (Text with EEA relevance
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32008R0622&from=EN

Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating

to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Text with EEA relevance
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32004R0773&from=EN
What Happens in Vegas Stays in Vegas: the
EU General Courts Ruling in Timab v.
Commission
June 12, 2015
It was only a matter of time before the European courts heard a case on
hybrid cartel proceedings. In a hybrid case, the European Commission (EC)
must run two types of administrative proceedings at the same time for the
same cartel. One is a settlement proceeding, which enjoys the procedural
benefits of Regulation 622/2008 on the conduct of settlement procedures in
cartel cases (the Settlement Regulation). The other is a good old-fashioned
standard proceeding under Regulation 773/2004 on the conduct of
proceedings by the EC pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU. As Timab Industries and Cie financire et de
participations Roullier (CFPR) found out on appeal against the EC decision
imposing fines (T-456/10), the General Court (GC) considers that what
happens in settlement proceedings stays in settlement proceedings.
The Beginning of the Proceedings
On the basis of the Kemira groups immunity application, in February 2004 the
EC conducted dawn raids at a number of animal feed phosphate (AFP)
facilities in Belgium and France. Among the raided companies was Timab, a
subsidiary of the Roullier group. As is normally the case, leniency
applications began rolling into the EC. Timabs application was the third and
final application after the raid. In its application, Timab included information
that, among other things, indicated that it may have been participating in the
cartel from 1978 2004, whereas the EC had only had evidence that the
cartel had been operating since 1993.
Internally, the EC decided that the case was a good one for the settlement
procedure. Therefore, in February 2009 it notified all of the undertakings
including Timab of this fact and gave everyone two weeks to inform the EC
in writing if they were willing to take part in settlement discussions. Everyone
responded positively. Therefore, the EC began having individual, bilateral
meetings with each of the undertakings.
During the bilateral meetings, the EC shared the substance of its objections
and its evidence in support of those objections. Following the meetings, the
EC calculated the range of potential fines for each undertaking. Timab was
notified that its range was 41 44 million. This amount included: (i) a 17%
reduction under the leniency notice and (ii) a 35% reduction for mitigating
circumstances under the Fining Guidelines for allowing the EC to extend the
duration of Timabs participation in the cartel due to evidence in its leniency
application.
The Great Divide
As prescribed by the Settlement Regulation, the EC gave the undertakings
time to formally commit to follow the settlement procedure. They were
required to show this commitment by submitting settlement submissions that
captured the results of the settlement discussions, acknowledged their
participation in an Article 101 TFEU infringement, and their liability. Everyone
except Timab submitted proposals in time. Timab withdrew from the
settlement procedure. Thereafter, the EC had to run a hybrid case against
Timab.
The EC sent out Statements of Objection (SO). All of the undertakings that
were settling replied to their respective SOs confirming that the document
corresponded to their respective proposals. Thus, their commitment to the
settlement procedure was unquestioned. Timab was now subject to standard
proceedings. It had access to the file and a hearing. It also submitted a
Reply to the SO in which, among other things, it disputed having participated
in a single infringement before 1993.
In July 2010, the EC issued two decisions. One was addressed to the settling
undertakings. The other was addressed to Timab. In its decision, Timab was
fined 59.85 million, which was significantly higher than the range of fines
that the EC offered during the settlement discussions.
General Courts Judgment: Two Distinct Procedures
Timab challenged the ECs decision. The various legal arguments boil down
to the fact that the EC imposed on Timab, an undertaking that did not settle, a
fine that was greater than the maximum amount the EC envisaged during the
settlement discussions ( 59.85 million vs 41 44 million).
The General Court (GC) starts the substantive portion of its judgment with
some history. The settlement procedure was created in 2008. The idea
behind it is to simplify and speed up cartel cases and reduce the number of
cases that is brought to the European Courts. In theory, this would mean that
DG Competition (DG COMP) can handle more investigations than would
otherwise be the case. In return for accepting a more streamlined process,
the EC gives settling undertakings a 10% reduction on the amount of the fine
that would have been imposed if they had used the standard process. To be
clear, the GC states, [t]he settlement procedure is an alternative to the
adversarial standard administrative procedure, distinct from it, and
presenting certain special features, such as an advance statement of
objections and the notification of a likely range of fines.
General Courts Judgment: What about the Fine?
The settlement procedure and the standard procedure are two separate
procedures. That said, the EC is bound by the principle of non-discrimination
and the Fining Guidelines regardless of which of the two procedures applies.
Therefore, the EC cannot discriminate between settling undertakings and non-
settling undertakings in the same cartel (except where the procedures
deviate, e.g. the 10% reduction for settling).
The GC takes a close look at the figures used to calculate the likely range of
Timabs fine and its final fine and concludes that the EC has not discriminated
against the undertaking. It points out that in Timabs SO, the EC stated that
the company had taken part in a cartel from 1978 to 2004. Subsequently,
after (among other things) receiving Timabs reply to the SO where it denied
having taken part in any infringement pre-1993, the EC could not rely on the
evidence that Timab had given in its leniency application. The EC had
therefore concluded that the company participated in the cartel from 1993 to
2004. At the same time, this resulted in the EC reducing Timabs leniency
rebate from 17% to 5%. The GC also found it logical that Timab would no
longer receive 35% off for mitigating circumstances for helping the EC extend
the duration of the infringement well before 1993. In addition to losing these
reductions, the GC goes through the analysis to show how it was not malice
on the part of the EC, but rather a higher average annual sales figure during
the infringement period 1993-2004 than during the period 1978-2004 that
caused the fine to go up. All of the factors led the EC to depart significantly
from the 41-44 million range, despite of the fact that the duration of the
infringement had significantly decreased.
Timab v. EC: Does it Make a Difference?
Few would argue that undertakings that engage in settlement discussions with
the EC do so with anything but good intentions. There are discussions about
the fact that the EC settlement procedure is not a negotiation, although there
is the possibility of doing a certain amount of fact sculpting during the
settlement discussions. Regardless, the settlement procedure could provide
an interesting tool for certain undertakings. With the knowledge that the EC
must calculate a fine more or less in the same manner irrespective of the
applicable procedure, a savvy (dishonest?) undertaking could agree to
engage in settlement discussions simply to find out what type of fine it should
expect at the end of the proceedings. With the range in hand, the undertaking
is in a better position to calculate the risk/benefit of staying in the settlement
procedure or jumping ship and moving back to the adversarial, traditional
procedure. To be sure, Timab got unlucky. And this is a dangerous game to
play, since as the GC says anything can happen before the final decision is
issued.
http://www.steptoe.com/resources-detail-10523.html
European Commission
Competition Agreements, decisions and concerted
practices European market for animal feed
phosphates Decision finding an infringement of
Article 101 TFEU
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7
d0f130d6f86fc92b359f4a688bd1b8461380d46d.e34KaxiLc3eQc40L
axqMbN4PahiPe0?
text=&docid=164323&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=858543
Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008
amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct
of settlement procedures in cartel cases (Text with EEA relevance)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32008R0622&from=EN
Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating
to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Text with EEA relevance)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32004R0773&from=EN
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to
Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (Text with EEA relevance)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:52006XC0901(01)&from=EN
Steel Abrasives (Only the English text is authentic) CARTEL
PROCEDURE Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 and Commission
Regulation (EC) 773/2004 Article 7 Regulation (EC) 1/2003 Date-
25/05/2016
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39792/397
92_2737_3.pdf
Art. 7 Settlement Decision, Published on the website: 25/05/2016
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39792/397
92_2603_3.pdf
Memorandum of Understanding on U.S.-China Development
Cooperation
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/9-24-15-
Final%20MoU%20on%20Development%20Cooperation%20-
%20USAID-MoFCOM-%20Clean.pdf
Third U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on
Cybercrime and Related Issues
Joint Summary of Outcomes
Thursday, December 8, 2016
Yesterday, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, together with Chinese State
Councilor and Minister of the Ministry of Public Security Guo
Shengkun, co-chaired the third U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue
on Cybercrime and Related Issues. The dialogue aims to review the
timeliness and quality of responses to requests for information and
assistance with respect to cybercrime or other malicious cyber
activities and to enhance pragmatic bilateral cooperation with regard to
cybercrime, network protection and other related issues.
Both sides endorse the establishment of the dialogue mechanism as
beneficial to bilateral communication and enhanced cooperation, and
believe that further solidifying, developing and maintaining the dialogue
mechanism and continuing to strengthen bilateral cooperation in
cybersecurity is beneficial to mutual interests.
The outcomes of the third dialogue are listed as below:
 1. Combatting Cybercrime and Cyber-Enabled Crime. Both
sides re-commit to cooperate on the investigation of cyber crimes and
malicious cyber activities emanating from China or the United States
and to refrain from cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property with the
intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial
sectors. To that end, both sides:
Plan to continue the mechanism of the Status Report on U.S./China
Cybercrime Cases to evaluate the effectiveness of case cooperation.
Affirm that both sides intend to focus cooperation on hacking and
cyber-enabled fraud cases, share cybercrime-related leads and
information with each other in a timely manner, and determine priority
cases for continued law enforcement cooperation. Both sides intend to
continue cooperation on cases involving online distribution of child
pornography. Both sides seek to expand cyber-enabled crime
cooperation to counter Darkweb marketplaces illicit sale of synthetic
drugs and firearms.
Seek to provide concrete and timely updates on cases brought within the
ambit of the dialogue.
Exchanged views on existing channels of multilateral cooperation, and
intend to continue exchanges regarding this topic.
2. Network Protection. Both sides acknowledged the network
protection seminar held in August 2016 in China, and believe that
enhancing network protection is beneficial to both sides. Both sides
suggest holding regular network protection working-level meetings,
either remotely or in-person, the next of which should be planned for
2017. Both sides seek to promote the protection of our respective
networks through multiple methods. To that end, both sides:
Plan to enhance network hygiene by promoting the cleaning and
patching of malware infections in our respective networks and
promoting best network protection practices.
Propose to engage in regular reciprocal sharing of malicious IP
addresses, malware samples, analytic products, and other network
protection information, and to develop standard operating procedures
to guide network protection cooperation.
Seek to assess the effectiveness of information shared and provide
substantive feedback to each side regarding the utility of that
information.
Plan to provide Principals with regular summaries of network
protection cooperation.
Intend to continue discussion on future cooperation concerning
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, and to provide timely assistance
on cybersecurity incidents impacting critical infrastructure.
Intend to hold, as early as possible in 2017, a U.S.-China government
and technology company roundtable to discuss cybersecurity issues of
mutual concern.
3. Misuse of Technology and Communications to Facilitate
Violent Terrorist Activities. Both sides acknowledged the seminar
on misuse of technology and communications to facilitate violent acts of
terrorism held in November 2016 in China, and decided to continue
cooperation on information sharing in countering the use of the Internet
for terrorist and other criminal purposes. Both sides will consider
holding a second seminar in 2017.
4. Hotline Mechanism. Both sides welcomed the launch of the U.S.-
China Cybercrime and Related Issues Hotline Mechanism, and decided
to continue to use the hotline in accordance with the Work Plan. Both
sides will conduct routine review of the use of the hotline.
5. Dialogue Continuity. Both sides recommend that the dialogue
continue to be held each year, and that the fourth dialogue occur in
2017.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-us-china-high-level-joint-
dialogue-cybercrime-and-related-issues
Senators Call On Treasury Department To
Review ChemChinas Acquisition of
Syngenta
Senators Also Urge Treasury to
Include USDA, FDA in CFIUS Review
Process
WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. Senator Debbie
Stabenow (D-MI), ranking member of the U.S.
Senate Agriculture Committee, today led a
bipartisan letter co-signed by U.S. Senators
Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH),
and Joni Ernst (R-IA) members of the Senate
Agriculture Committee calling on the U.S.
Department of the Treasury to review China
National Chemical Corporations (ChemChina)
proposed acquisition of Syngenta for any
potential effects on U.S. national security and
the American food system.
While this Committee has not reached any
conclusions regarding the proposed purchase
of Syngenta by ChemChina, we believe that
any foreign acquisition of an important U.S.
agricultural asset should be reviewed closely
for potential risks to our food system, the
Senators said. It is not unreasonable to
suggest that shifts in company governance;
operational strategy; or financial health
particularly in light of the magnitude of this
leveraged transactioncould have
consequences for food security, food safety,
biosecurity, and the highly competitive U.S.
farm sector as a whole.
Pointing to growing investment from abroad
in U.S. agriculture, the Senators also urged
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew to include both
the United States Department of Agriculture
and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) when reviewing foreign
acquisitions of major U.S. agriculture assets.
The full text of the letter to Treasury follows.
Dear Secretary Lew:
As members of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, we write
to you regarding China National Chemical
Corporations (ChemChina) proposed
acquisition of Syngenta, a Switzerland-based
crop protection and seed company with
significant operations in the United States.
Despite the two companies reported intent to
voluntarily file for review with the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS), chaired by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, we respectfully request that
CFIUS exercise its authority to review this
transaction to assess any potential
ramifications the purchase may have for
American national security, with a specific
focus on the potential effects on food security
and the safety of our food system.
There is shared sentiment among lawmakers,
military officials, and everyday Americans
that protecting the safety and resiliency of
our food system is core to American national
security. Notwithstanding this widely held
conviction, the composition of the CFIUS
today does not include representation from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
as formal components of its process for
reviewing foreign investments in critical
American assets, including agricultural
assets.
Constituents have approached us with
concerns over this transaction, citing the
2013 CFIUS review of the Shuanghui-
Smithfield acquisition. The most common
reflection on that experience is that growing
foreign investment in U.S. agricultureand
the prognosis of more to comeshould be
met with a careful review process that
captures the issues most relevant to
safeguarding the American food system
going forward.
To that end, we believe that it is imperative
that both the USDA and the FDA be included
in the CFIUS for purposes of reviewing and
making decisions on this proposed
acquisition by ChemChina.
While this Committee has not reached any
conclusions regarding the proposed purchase
of Syngenta by ChemChina, we believe that
any foreign acquisition of an important U.S.
agricultural asset should be reviewed closely
for potential risks to our food system. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that shifts in
company governance; operational strategy;
or financial healthparticularly in light of the
magnitude of this leveraged transaction
could have consequences for food security,
food safety, biosecurity, and the highly
competitive U.S. farm sector as a whole.
The risk of negative outcomes is heightened
to the extent that an acquired U.S.
agricultural asset becomes in some part
governed by a foreign government with clear
strategic interests. In fact, the potential for
unpredictable behavior from global farm
sector participants is a great challenge for
the United States as the importance of trade
to American agriculture continues to grow
and food systems become more integrated.
For instance, nonmarket behavior due to
state-ownership could lead to inconsistent or
seemingly arbitrary treatment of U.S. farm
products in key export markets, particularly
when company governance includes
governments of countries with which the
United States exchanges a high volume of
trade.
We support the mission of CFIUS to safeguard
our national security. At the same time, it is
important that the tools and processes used
to review foreign investments in critical U.S.
assets accurately reflect the full range of
national security challenges our country
faces today and in the future. Thank you for
your consideration of our request and views
on this important matter.

Senators Call
On Treasury
Department To
Review
ChemChinas
Acquisition of
Syngenta
Senators Also Urge
Treasury to Include
USDA, FDA in CFIUS
Review Process
WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S. Senator Debbie
Stabenow (D-MI), ranking member of the U.S.
Senate Agriculture Committee, today led a
bipartisan letter co-signed by U.S. Senators
Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH),
and Joni Ernst (R-IA) members of the Senate
Agriculture Committee calling on the U.S.
Department of the Treasury to review China
National Chemical Corporations (ChemChina)
proposed acquisition of Syngenta for any
potential effects on U.S. national security and
the American food system.
While this Committee has not reached any
conclusions regarding the proposed purchase
of Syngenta by ChemChina, we believe that
any foreign acquisition of an important U.S.
agricultural asset should be reviewed closely
for potential risks to our food system, the
Senators said. It is not unreasonable to
suggest that shifts in company governance;
operational strategy; or financial health
particularly in light of the magnitude of this
leveraged transactioncould have
consequences for food security, food safety,
biosecurity, and the highly competitive U.S.
farm sector as a whole.
Pointing to growing investment from abroad
in U.S. agriculture, the Senators also urged
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew to include both
the United States Department of Agriculture
and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) when reviewing foreign
acquisitions of major U.S. agriculture assets.
The full text of the letter to Treasury follows.
Dear Secretary Lew:
As members of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, we write
to you regarding China National Chemical
Corporations (ChemChina) proposed
acquisition of Syngenta, a Switzerland-based
crop protection and seed company with
significant operations in the United States.
Despite the two companies reported intent to
voluntarily file for review with the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS), chaired by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury, we respectfully request that
CFIUS exercise its authority to review this
transaction to assess any potential
ramifications the purchase may have for
American national security, with a specific
focus on the potential effects on food security
and the safety of our food system.
There is shared sentiment among lawmakers,
military officials, and everyday Americans
that protecting the safety and resiliency of
our food system is core to American national
security. Notwithstanding this widely held
conviction, the composition of the CFIUS
today does not include representation from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
as formal components of its process for
reviewing foreign investments in critical
American assets, including agricultural
assets.
Constituents have approached us with
concerns over this transaction, citing the
2013 CFIUS review of the Shuanghui-
Smithfield acquisition. The most common
reflection on that experience is that growing
foreign investment in U.S. agricultureand
the prognosis of more to comeshould be
met with a careful review process that
captures the issues most relevant to
safeguarding the American food system
going forward.
To that end, we believe that it is imperative
that both the USDA and the FDA be included
in the CFIUS for purposes of reviewing and
making decisions on this proposed
acquisition by ChemChina.
While this Committee has not reached any
conclusions regarding the proposed purchase
of Syngenta by ChemChina, we believe that
any foreign acquisition of an important U.S.
agricultural asset should be reviewed closely
for potential risks to our food system. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that shifts in
company governance; operational strategy;
or financial healthparticularly in light of the
magnitude of this leveraged transaction
could have consequences for food security,
food safety, biosecurity, and the highly
competitive U.S. farm sector as a whole.
The risk of negative outcomes is heightened
to the extent that an acquired U.S.
agricultural asset becomes in some part
governed by a foreign government with clear
strategic interests. In fact, the potential for
unpredictable behavior from global farm
sector participants is a great challenge for
the United States as the importance of trade
to American agriculture continues to grow
and food systems become more integrated.
For instance, nonmarket behavior due to
state-ownership could lead to inconsistent or
seemingly arbitrary treatment of U.S. farm
products in key export markets, particularly
when company governance includes
governments of countries with which the
United States exchanges a high volume of
trade.
We support the mission of CFIUS to safeguard
our national security. At the same time, it is
important that the tools and processes used
to review foreign investments in critical U.S.
assets accurately reflect the full range of
national security challenges our country
faces today and in the future. Thank you for
your consideration of our request and views
on this important matter.

http://www.agriculture.senate.gov/newsroom/dem/press/release/sen
ators-call-on-treasury-department-to-review-chemchinas-
acquisition-of-syngenta-

Two Questions and Partial

 Answers About What a Trump
Administration Could Mean for
CFIUS
By Stephen Heifetz and Alexis Early on November 16, 2016
Posted in CFIUS Foreign Investment Reviews & FOCI Mitigation
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) is a powerful tool of the executive branch. CFIUS
effectively can impose conditions on, block, or even unwind
foreign investments in U.S. companies. But the tool has been
wielded, thus far, only to safeguard U.S. national security.
Two common questions about CFIUS, in view of the coming
Trump administration, are:
Can President Trump cause CFIUS to reconsider
transactions that CFIUS previously has cleared?
Can President Trump cause CFIUS to consider trade
and other economic issues, rather than focusing exclusively on
national security, when deciding whether to clear a deal?
As for the first question, applicable law is reasonably clear:
CFIUS can reconsider cases that it previously cleared only if
(i) the parties to the deal provided inaccurate information to
CFIUS or (ii) the parties to the deal materially and intentionally
breached obligations that CFIUS required as conditions to
clearing the deal.
For those wagering big bucks on CFIUS clearances, this legal
answer is no ironclad guarantee that Trump will leave those
deals alone. Its not clear that Trump will care a lot about
standard legal interpretations of CFIUS rules. Further, Trump
could utilize non-CFIUS authorities, such as the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, to block or condition deals
even those that have cleared CFIUS.
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/ieepa.pdf

The Presidents powers are vast, and in the international realm

the judiciary and legislature may be hard-pressed to stop a
determined President.
It does seem very unlikely, though, that President Trump
would take an action so audacious, and one that would be so
unsettling to the business community, as blocking or
unwinding deals that CFIUS already has cleared. So it seems
a good bet that those deals will be undisturbed, even though
Trump theoretically could disturb them.
The answer to the second question whether Trump can
cause CFIUS to consider trade and economic issues, in
addition to traditional national security issues is less clear.
The Trump administration could try to effectuate changes to
CFIUS deliberative process in two ways: (1) by pushing
Congress to enact amending legislation broadening CFIUS
reviews to include considerations such as economic security;
and/or (2) by pushing CFIUS, whether via Executive Order or
some informal mechanism, to broaden its considerations to
include the same types of factors.
There is an argument that it is impermissible for the President
to cause CFIUS to consider economic security, without
amending the legislation, since such considerations were
rejected by Congress during the last round of amendments to
the CFIUS statutory framework. Again, though, Trump might
not care about these legal arguments. If the President sought
to force change in CFIUS processes, its not clear that a court
or anyone else could stop him.
I recently told several people that I thought Trump was unlikely
to prioritize changes to the CFIUS process. And then I saw the
following Congressional Quarterly reporting (paywall) about a
Trump trade action plan:
In a Trump administration, CFIUS also would take into
consideration whether the home country of a foreign buyer
would allow a similar acquisition by a U.S. company. The plan
makes specific reference to Chinese companies buying firms
in America although the Chinese government restricts foreign
purchases of its companies.
And I remembered that my track record predicting Trump-
related matters is very bad. At least Im not alone in that.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS)
CFIUS is an inter-agency committee authorized to review transactions that
could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person (covered
transactions), in order to determine the effect of such transactions on the
national security of the United States. CFIUS operates pursuant to section
721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) (section 721) and as
implemented by Executive Order 11858, as amended, and regulations at 31
C.F.R. Part 800.

The CFIUS process has been the subject of significant reforms over the past
several years. These include numerous improvements in internal CFIUS
procedures, enactment of FINSA in July 2007, amendment of Executive Order
11858 in January 2008, revision of the CFIUS regulations in November 2008,
and publication of guidance on CFIUSs national security considerations in
December 2008. Further information about each of these reforms is available
via the links below.

Process Overview
Composition of CFIUS
Filing Instructions
CFIUS FAQs
Legislation
Executive Order
Regulations
Guidance
Reports and Tables
Speeches and Other News

If you have questions or concerns please contact CFIUS at: E-

Mail: CFIUS@treasury.govPhone: (202) 622-1860
Issues Guidance on Information Reporting Safe Harbor
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-17-09.pdf
TN Visa Category Faces Uncertain Future
Lynda Zengerle, Elizabeth Laskey LaRocca, and Dana Delott
November 15, 2016
Throughout the campaign season, President-Elect Trump vowed to re-
negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he
characterized as the worst trade deal in history. Mr. Trump has threatened
US withdrawal from NAFTA, absent satisfactory renegotiation with Mexico and
Canada, our NAFTA partners. This threat has serious implications for the TN
(Trade NAFTA) immigration category. With a new and radically changed
administration, employers need to reduce their exposure to immigration risks
associated with sudden changes in policy.
TN: Canadian and Mexican Temporary Professional Workers
The TN temporary immigration category is available exclusively to citizens of
Canada and Mexico. The category is further limited to a designated list of
professional occupations.
The TN category is widely utilized by US businesses. Companies with offices
in the US and Canada and/or Mexico often rely on the TN category for key
members of their workforce. The advantages of the TN category include an
abbreviated application process, unlimited extensions and no annual limit or
cap on utilization.
NAFTA Uncertain Under Trump, Assess TN Alternatives
The future of NAFTA is uncertain under a President Trump. Thus far,
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has stated that he is ready to discuss
and renegotiate NAFTA. Mexican Foreign Minister Claudia Ruiz Massieu has
confirmed Mexicos willingness to modernize NAFTA, but not renegotiate. In
light of this, companies which rely on the TN category should evaluate long
term options and plan for the possibility that the TN category could be
changed or eliminated, permanently or temporarily.
Primary Alternative Options
Permanent Residence: Unique Commuter Option
There is no limit on the number of years a person can hold TN status. Thus,
there are many foreign nationals who have worked in the US in TN status for
many years. Some of these individuals alternate between working in the US
and working in Canada or Mexico. With the uncertainty brought on by a
Trump administration, both for the TN category and US immigration in
general, it is time to consider permanent immigration options for these long
term employees.
US permanent residence (green card) status via employer sponsorship is
typically a lengthy process. However, for native-born citizens of Mexico and
Canada, the outlook and time frames are more favorable than for nationals of
India and China. Additionally, there is a unique provision in the law which
allows a US permanent resident to reside in a foreign contiguous territory and
commute to a job in the US. Thus, it is possible for an employee to reside in
Canada or Mexico as a US permanent resident, provided the individual
commutes to a job in the US.
H-1B: Cap Timing Hurdles
The H-1B temporary professional worker category is a potential option for
many current TN employees. Almost all designated TN positions require a
bachelors or higher level degree as a prerequisite. Thus, these positions
often fit neatly into the H-1B category requirements.
The primary hurdle for employers considering the H-1B category is the annual
limit or cap. Cases filed for first-time, cap-subject beneficiaries can only be
filed during the first five business days of April annually. Companies should
identify their H-1B candidates by January each year, so ample time remains
for H-1B petition preparation. Complicating matters further, the H-1B cap limit
is not sufficient to meet the demand in this category. Thus, the US Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts a lottery each year to select the
cases which will go forward. Cases which are not selected are rejected. It is
not uncommon to have to pursue this category over more than one cap
season, as the volume of filings is typically more than twice the annual
numerical limit.
L-1: Intracompany Transferees
The L-1, intracompany transferee, category is another option which may be
available to TNs. The L-1 is appropriate for some of the TN employees
working for multinational companies. Executives and high- level managers
fall within L-1(A); specialized and advance knowledge employees fall within L-
1(B).
As the L-1 category is reserved for transferees, that is, employees who have
worked for the company abroad for at least one full year in the last three years
prior to coming to the US, planning is required. Decisions about employee
relocation, to and from the US, should include an analysis of the implications
of the timing on L-1 eligibility.
E-1/E-2: Not an Option
While both Canada and Mexico are currently able to utilize the E-1 (Treaty
Trader) and E-2 (Treaty Investor) categories, these, too are tied to NAFTA.
NAFTA is the treaty underlying the E-1 and E-2 categories for Canada and
Mexico. Thus, the fate of these categories is also dependent upon the fate of
NAFTA.
Permanent Residence Provides Greater Stability
Both the H-1B and L-1 categories have been the target of substantial criticism
in recent years. Both categories have seen restrictions and enhanced
compliance changes, such as the addition of USCIS visits to the employment
site. These categories have limits on the maximum period of stay. Ultimately,
long term employment of foreign nationals requires employers to pursue
green card options. US Permanent Residents have far more security than
those in temporary categories and are indefinitely eligible to live and work in
the US.
We are available to address further questions about the TN visa and available
alternatives. Please contact Lynda Zengerle at +1 202 429 8170, Liz
LaRocca at +1 202 429 1351, or Dana Delott at +1 202 429 6498.
Citizens of Canada or Mexico seeking temporary
entry under NAFTA to engage in business activities
at a professional level. (Section heading revised
10/16/08; 73 FR 61332 ) (Section heading revised
effective 11/12/04; 69 FR 60939 )(Section heading
revised effective
a) General. Under Section 214(e) of the Act, a citizen of Canada
or Mexico who seeks temporary entry as a business person to
engage in business activities at a professional level may be
admitted to the United States in accordance with the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

(b) Definitions . As used in this section, the terms:

Business activities at a professional level means those

undertakings which require that, for successful completion, the
individual has a least a baccalaureate degree or appropriate
credentials demonstrating status as a professional in a
profession set forth in Appendix 1603.D.1 of the NAFTA.

Business person , as defined in the NAFTA, means a citizen of

Canada or Mexico who is engaged in the trade of goods, the
provision of services, or the conduct of investment activities.

Engage in business activities at a professional level means the

performance of prearranged business activities for a United
States entity, including an individual. It does not authorize the
establishment of a business or practice in the United States in
which the professional will be, in substance, self-employed. A
professional will be deemed to be self-employed if he or she will
be rendering services to a corporation or entity of which the
professional is the sole or controlling shareholder or owner.

Temporary entry , as defined in the NAFTA, means entry without

the intent to establish permanent residence. The alien must
satisfy the inspecting immigration officer that the proposed stay
is temporary. A temporary period has a reasonable, finite end
that does not equate to permanent residence. In order to
establish that the alien's entry will be temporary, the alien must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspecting immigration
officer that his or her work assignment in the United States will
end at a predictable time and that he or she will depart upon
completion of the assignment. (Paragraph (b) revised 1/9/98; 63
FR 1331 )
(c) Appendix 1603.D.1 to Annex 1603 of the NAFTA. Pursuant to
the NAFTA, an applicant seeking admission under this section
shall demonstrate business activity at a professional level in one
of the professions set forth in Appendix 1603.D.1 to Annex 1603.
The professions in Appendix 1603.D.1 and the minimum
requirements for qualification for each are as follows: 1/

Appendix 1603.D.1 (Annotated)

-- Accountant--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

C.P.A., C.A., C.G.A., or C.M.A.

-- Architect--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

state/provincial license 2/ .

-- Computer Systems Analyst--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree; or Post-Secondary Diploma 3/ or Post Secondary
Certificate 4/ and three years' experience.

-- Disaster relief insurance claims adjuster (claims adjuster

employed by an insurance company located in the territory of a
Party, or an independent claims adjuster)--Baccalaureate or
Licenciatura Degree and successful completion of training in
the appropriate areas of insurance adjustment pertaining to
disaster relief claims; or three years experience in claims
adjustment and successful completion of training in the
appropriate areas of insurance adjustment pertaining to disaster
relief claims.

-- Economist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Engineer--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

state/provincial license

-- Forester--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

state/provincial license

-- Graphic Designer--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree;

or Post-Secondary Diploma or Post-Secondary Certificate and
three years experience.

-- Hotel Manager--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree in

hotel/restaurant management; or Post-Secondary Diploma or
Post-Secondary Certificate in hotel/restaurant management and
three years experience in hotel/restaurant management.

-- Industrial Designer--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree;or Post-Secondary Diploma or Post-Secondary
Certificate, and three years experience.

-- Interior Designer--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

Post-Secondary Diploma or Post-Secondary Certificate, and
three years experience.

-- Land Surveyor--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree or

state/provincial/federal license.

-- Landscape Architect--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree.

-- Lawyer (including Notary in the province of Quebec)-L.L.B.,

J.D., L.L.L., B.C.L., or Licenciatura degree (five years); or
membership in a state/provincial bar.

-- Librarian--M.L.S., or B.L.S. (for which another

Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree was a prerequisite).

-- Management Consultant--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree; or equivalent professional experience as established by
statement or professional credential attesting to five years
experience as a management consultant, or five years
experience in a field of specialty related to the consulting
agreement.

--Mathematician (including Statistician)--Baccalaureate or

Licenciatura Degree. 5/ (Footnote added effective 11/12/04; 69
FR 60939 )

-- Range Manager/Range Conservationist--Baccalaureate or

Licenciatura Degree.
-- Research Assistant (working in a post-secondary
educational institution)--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Scientific Technician/Technologist 6/ --Possession of (a)

theoretical knowledge of any of the following disciplines:
agricultural sciences, astronomy, biology, chemistry,
engineering, forestry, geology, geophysics, meteorology, or
physics; and (b) the ability to solve practical problems in any of
those disciplines, or the ability to apply principles of any of those
disciplines to basic or applied research. (Footnote redesginated
as 6/, previously 5/ effective 11/12/04; 69 FR 60939 )

-- Social Worker--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.-

Sylviculturist (including Forestry Specialist)--Baccalaureate or
Licenciatura Degree.

-- Technical Publications Writer--Baccalaureate or

Licenciatura Degree, or Post-Secondary Diploma or Post-
Secondary Certificate, and three years experience.

-- Urban Planner (including Geographer)--Baccalaureate or

Licenciatura Degree.

-- Vocational Counselor--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree.

--MEDICAL/ALLIED PROFESSIONALS

-- Dentist--D.D.S., D.M.D., Doctor en Odontologia or Doctor

en Cirugia Dental or state/provincial license.

-- Dietitian--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

state/provincial license.

-- Medical Laboratory Technologist (Canada)/Medical

Technologist (Mexico and the United States) 7/ --Baccalaureate
or Licenciatura Degree; or Post-Secondary Diploma or Post-
Secondary Certificate,and three years experience. (Footnote
redesignated as 7/, previously 6/, effective 11/12/04; 69 FR
60939 )
-- Nutritionist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Occupational Therapist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree; or state/provincial license.

-- Pharmacist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree; or

state/provincial license.

-- Physician (teaching or research only)--M.D. Doctor en

Medicina; or state/provincial license.

-- Physiotherapist/Physical Therapist--Baccalaureate or
Licenciatura Degree; or state/provincial license.

-- Psychologist--state/provincial license; or Licenciatura

Degree.

-- Recreational Therapist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura

Degree.

-- Registered nurse--state/provincial license or Licenciatura

Degree.

-- Veterinarian--D.V.M., D.M.V., or Doctor en Veterinaria; or

state/provincial license.

--SCIENTIST

-- Agriculturist (including Agronomist)--Baccalaureate or

Licenciatura Degree.

-- Animal Breeder--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Animal Scientist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Apiculturist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Astronomer--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Biochemist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Biologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree. 8/
(Footnote added effective 11/12/04; 69 FR 60939 )

-- Chemist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Dairy Scientist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Entomologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Epidemiologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Geneticist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Geochemist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Geologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Geophysicist (including Oceanographer in Mexico and the

United States)--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Horticulturist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Meteorologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Pharmacologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Physicist (including Oceanographer in Canada)-

Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Plant Breeder--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Poultry Scientist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Soil Scientist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Zoologist--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

--TEACHER

-- College--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- Seminary--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

-- University--Baccalaureate or Licenciatura Degree.

(d) Classification of citizens of Canada or Mexico as TN

professionals under the NAFTA --(1) Citizens of Mexico . A
citizen of Mexico who seeks temporary entry as a business
person to engage in business activities at a professional level
may be admitted to the United States in accordance with NAFTA
upon presentation of a valid passport and valid TN nonimmigrant
visa at a United States Class A port-of-entry, at a United States
airport handling international traffic, or at a United States pre-
clearance/pre-flight station. (Paragraph (d) revised effective
1/1/04; 69 FR 11287 )

(2) Citizens of Canada . A citizen of Canada seeking temporary

entry as a business person to engage in business activities at a
professional level shall make application for admission with a
Department officer at the United States Class A port-of-entry, at
a United States airport handling international traffic, or at a
United States pre-clearance/pre-flight station.

(3) Documentation . Upon application for a visa at a United

States consular office, or, in the case of a citizen of Canada
making application for admission at a port-of-entry, an applicant
under this section shall present the following:

(i) Proof of citizenship . A Mexican citizen applying for admission

as a TN nonimmigrant must establish such citizenship by
presenting a valid passport. Canadian citizens, while not
required to present a valid passport for admission unless
traveling from outside the Western hemisphere, must establish
Canadian citizenship.

(ii) Documentation demonstrating engagement in business

activities at a professional level and demonstrating professional
qualifications . The applicant must present documentation
sufficient to satisfy the consular officer (in the case of a Mexican
citizen) or the Department officer (in the case of a Canadian
citizen) that the applicant is seeking entry to the United States to
engage in business activities for a United States employer(s) or
entity(ies) at a professional level, and that the applicant meets
the criteria to perform at such a professional level. This
documentation may be in the form of a letter from the
prospective employer(s) i n the United States or from the foreign
employer, and must be supported by diplomas, degrees or
membership in a professional organization. Degrees received by
the applicant from an educational institution not located within
Canada, Mexico, or the United States must be accompanied by
an evaluation by a reliable credentials evaluation service which
specializes in evaluating foreign educational credentials. The
documentation shall fully affirm:

(A) The Appendix 1603.D.1 profession of the applicant;

(B) A description of the professional activities, including a brief

summary of daily job duties, if appropriate, in which the applicant
will engage in for the United States employer/entity;

(C) The anticipated length of stay;

(D The educational qualifications or appropriate credentials

which demonstrate that the Canadian or Mexican citizen has
professional level status; and

(E) The arrangements for remuneration for services to be

rendered.

(e) Procedures for admission. A citizen of Canada or Mexico

who qualifies for admission under this section shall be provided
confirming documentation and shall be admitted under the
classification symbol TN for a period not to exceed three years.
The conforming document provided shall bear the legend
"multiple entry." The fee prescribed under 8 CFR 103.7(b)(1)
shall be remitted by Canadian Citizens upon admission to the
United States pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
NAFTA. Upon remittance of the prescribed fee, the TN applicant
for admission shall be provided a DHS-issued receipt on the
appropriate form. (Paragraph (e) revised 10/16/08; 73 FR 61332
) (Paragraph (e) revised effective 1/1/04; 69 FR 11287 )

(f) Reserved. (Paragraph (f) removed and reserved effective

1/1/04; 69 FR 11287 )

(g) Readmission.

(1) With a Form I-94. An alien may be readmitted to the United

States in TN classification for the remainder of the authorized
period of TN admission on Form I-94, without presentation of the
letter or supporting documentation described in paragraph (d)(3)
of this section, and without the prescribed fee set forth in 8 CFR
103.7(b)(1) , provided that the original intended professional
activities and employer(s) have not changed, and the Form I-94
has not expired. (Paragraph (g) revised 10/16/08; 73 FR 61332
).

(2) Without a valid I-94. If the alien seeking readmission to the

United States in TN classification is no longer in possession of a
valid, unexpired Form I-94, and the period of initial admission in
TN classification has not lapsed, then a new Form I-94 may be
issued for the period of validity that remains on the TN
nonimmigrant's original Form I-94 with the legend "multiple
entry" and the alien can then be readmitted in TN status if the
alien presents alternate evidence as follows:

(i) For Canadian citizens, alternate evidence may include, but is

not limited to, a fee receipt for admission as a TN or a previously
issued admission stamp as TN in a passport, and a confirming
letter from the United States employer(s).

(ii) For Mexican citizens seeking readmission as TN

nonimmigrants, alternate evidence shall consist of presentation
of a valid unexpired TN visa and evidence of a previous
admission.

(h) Extension of stay --(1) Filing. A United States employer of a

citizen of Canada or Mexico who is currently maintaining valid
TN nonimmigrant status, or a United States entity (in the case of
a citizen of Canada or Mexico who is currently maintaining valid
TN nonimmigrant status and is employed by a foreign
employer), may request an extension of stay, subject to the
following conditions: (Paragraph (h) revised 10/16/08; 73 FR
61332 ) (Paragraph (h) revised effective 1/1/04; 69 FR 11287 )

(i) An extension of stay must be requested by filing the

appropriate form with the fee provided at 8 CFR 103.7(b)(1) , in
accordance with the form instructions with USCIS.

(ii) The beneficiary must be physically present in the United

States at the time of the filing of the appropriate form requesting
an extension of stay as a TN nonimmigrant. If the alien is
required to leave the United States for any reason while the
petition is pending, the petitioner may request that USCIS notify
the consular office where the beneficiary is required to apply for
a visa or, if visa exempt, a DHS-designated port-of-entry where
the beneficiary will apply for admission to the United States, of
the approval.

(iii) An extension of stay in TN status may be approved by

USCIS for a maximum period of three years.

(iv) There is no specific limit on the total period of time an alien

may be in TN status provided the alien continues to be engaged
in TN business activities for a U.S. employer or entity at a
professional level, and otherwise continues to properly maintain
TN nonimmigrant status.

(2) Readmission at the border . Nothing in paragraph (h)(1) of

this section shall preclude a citizen of Canada or Mexico who
has previously been admitted to the United States in TN status,
and who has not violated such status while in the United States,
from applying at a DHS-designated port-of-entry, prior to the
expiration date of the previous period of admission, for a new
three-year period of admission. The application for a new period
of admission must be supported by a new letter from the United
States employer or the foreign employer, in the case of a citize n
of Canada who is providing prearranged services to a United
States entity, which meets the requirements of paragraph (d) of
this section, together with the appropriate filing fee as noted in 8
CFR 103.7(b)(1) . Citizens of Mexico must present a valid
passport and a valid, unexpired TN nonimmigrant visa when
applying for readmission, as outlined in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section.

(i) Request for change or addition of United States employers --

(1) Filing at the service center . A citizen of Canada or Mexico
admitted into the United States as a TN nonimmigrant who
seeks to change or add a United States employer during the
period of admission must have the new employer file a Form I-
129 with appropriate supporting documentation, including a
letter from the new employer describing the services to be
performed, the time needed to render such services, and the
terms of remuneration for services. Employment with a different
or with an additional employer is not authorized prior to Dep
artment approval of the request. (Paragraph (i) revised effective
1/1/04; 69 FR 11287 )

(2) Readmission at the border . Nothing in paragraph (i)(1) of

those section precludes a citizen of Canada or Mexico from
applying for readmission to the United States for the purpose of
presenting documentation from a different or additional United
States or foreign employer. Such documentation shall meet the
requirements prescribed in paragraph (d) of this section. The fee
prescribed under 8 CFR 103.7(b)(1) shall be remitted by
Canadian citizens upon admission to the United States pursuant
to the terms and conditions of the NAFTA. Citizens of Mexico
may present documentation from a different or additional United
States or foreign employer to a consular officer as evidence in
support of a new nonimmigrant TN visa application.

(3) No action shall be required on the part of a citizen of Canada

or Mexico in TN status who is transferred to another location by
the same United States employer to perform the same services.
Such an acceptable transfer would be to a branch or office of the
employer. In a case of a transfer to a separately incorporated
subsidiary or affiliate, the requirements of paragraphs (i)(1) and
(i)(2) of this section will apply.

(j) Spouse and unmarried minor children accompanying or

following to join.

(1) The spouse or unmarried minor children of a citizen of

Canada or Mexico admitted in TN nonimmigrant status, if
otherwise admissible, may be admitted initially, readmitted, or
granted a change of nonimmigrant status or an extension of his
or her period of stay for the same period of time granted to the
TN nonimmigrant. Such spouse or unmarried minor children
shall, upon approval of an application for admission,
readmission, change of status or extension of stay be classified
as TD nonimmigrants. A request f or a change of status to TD or
an extension of stay of a TD nonimmigrant may be made on the
appropriate form together with appropriate filing fees and
evidence of the principal alien's current TN status. (Paragraph (j)
(1) added 10/16/08; 73 FR 61332 ; previous paragraph (j)(1)
redesignated as paragraph (j)(2))

(2) The spouse or unmarried minor children of a citizen of

Canada or Mexico admitted in TN nonimmigrant status shall be
required to present a valid, unexpired TD nonimmigrant visa
unless otherwise exempt under 8 CFR 212.1. (Redesignated as
paragraph (j)(2) and revised, previously paragraph (j)(1),
10/16/08; 73 FR 61332 )

(3) The spouse and unmarried minor children of a citizen of

Canada or Mexico admitted in TN nonimmigrant status shall be
issued confirming documentation bearing the legend "multiple
entry." There shall be no fee required for admission of the
spouse and unmarried minor children. (Redesignated as
paragraph (j)(3) and revised, previously paragraph (j)(2),
10/16/08; 73 FR 61332 )

(4) The spouse and unmarried minor children of a citizen of

Canada or Mexico admitted in TN nonimmigrant status shall not
accept employment in the United States unless otherwise
authorized under the Act. (Redesignated as paragraph (j)(4) and
revised, previously paragraph (j)(3), 10/16/08; 73 FR 61332 )

(k) Effect of a strike. (1) If the Secretary of Labor certifies or

otherwise informs the Director of USCIS that a strike or other
labor dispute involving a work stoppage of workers is in
progress, and the temporary entry of a citizen of Mexico or
Canada in TN nonimmigrant status may adversely affect the
settlement of any labor dispute or the employment of any person
who is involved in such dispute, the United States may refuse to
issue an immigration document authorizing the entry or
employment of such an alie n. (Paragraph (k) revised 10/16/08;
73 FR 61332 )

(2) If the alien has already commenced employment in the

United States and is participating in a strike or other labor
dispute involving a work stoppage of workers, whether or not
such strike or other labor dispute has been certified by the
Department of Labor, or whether USCIS has been otherwise
informed that such a strike or labor dispute is in progress, the
alien shall not be deemed to be failing to maintain his or her
status solely on account of past, present, or future participation
in a strike or other l abor dispute involving a work stoppage of
workers, but is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(i) The alien shall remain subject to all applicable provisions of

the Immigration and Nationality Act and regulations promulgated
in the same manner as all other TN nonimmigrants;

(ii) The status and authorized period of stay of such an alien is

not modified or extended in any way by virtue of his or her
participation in a strike or other labor dispute involving a work
stoppage of workers; and

(iii) Although participation by a TN nonimmigrant alien in a strike

or other labor dispute involving a work stoppage of workers will
not constitute a ground for removal, any alien who violates his or
her status or who remains in the United States after his or her
authorized period of stay has expired will be subject to removal.

(3) If there is a strike or other labor dispute involving a work

stoppage of workers in progress but such strike or other labor
dispute is not certified under paragraph (k)(1) of this section, or
USCIS has not otherwise been informed by the Secretary that
such a strike or labor dispute is in progress, Director of USCIS
shall not deny a petition or deny entry to an applicant for TN
status based upon such strike or other labor dispute.

(l) (Paragraph (l) removed effective 1/1/04; 69 FR 11287 )

Footnotes

1/ A business person seeking temporary employment under this

Appendix may also perform training functions relating to the
profession, including conducting seminars.

2/ The terms "state/provincial" and "State/provincial/federal

license" mean any document issued by a state, provincial, or
federal government, as the case may be, or under its authority,
but not by a local government, that permits a person to engage
in a regulated activity or profession.

3/ "Post Secondary Diploma" means a credential issued, on

completion of two or more years of post secondary education, by
an accredited academic institution in Canada or the United
States.

4/ "Post Secondary Certificate" means a certificate issued, on

completion of two or more years of post secondary education at
an academic institution, by the federal government of Mexico or
a state government in Mexico, an academic institution
recognized by the federal government or a state government, or
academic institution created by federal or state law.

5/ The term "Mathematician" includes the profession of Actuary.

An Actuary must satisfy the necessary requirements to be
recognized as an actuary by a professional actuarial association
or society. A professional actuarial association or society means
a professional actuarial association or society operating in the
territory of at least one of the Parties. (Added effective 11/12/04;
69 FR 60939 )

6/ A business person in this category must be seeking temporary

entry for work in direct support of professionals in agricultural
sciences, astronomy, biology, chemistry, engineering, forestry,
geology, geophysics, meteorology or physics. (Footnote
redesignated as 6/, previously 5/ effective 11/12/04; 69 FR
60939 )

7/ A business person in this category must be seeking temporary

entry to perform in a laboratory chemical, biological,
hematological, immunologic, microscopic or bacteriological tests
and analyses for diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of diseases.
(Footnote redesignated as 7/, previously 6/ effective 11/12/04;
69 FR 60939 )

8/ The term "Biologist" includes the profession of Plant

Pathologist. (Added effective 11/12/04; 69 FR 60939 )
https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-
0-11261/0-0-0-17197/0-0-0-21051.html
Court Addresses Substantial
Transformation Standard for Country of
Origin Under the Trade Agreements Act
December 20, 2016
The US Court of International Trade (CIT) recently addressed what constitutes
substantial transformation for purposes of determining country of origin
(COO) for US government procurement purposes under the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA). Energizer Battery, Inc. v. United States, 2016
WL 7118538 (Ct. Intl. Trade 2016). The case is one of first impression for the
CIT, which has jurisdiction to review final determinations of US Customs and
Border Protection (CBP).1 The opinion provides additional guidance on the
interpretation and application of the TAA for government procurement
purposes. Previous Steptoe advisories on application of the TAA for
government procurement purposes can be found here.
The CIT case involved a second generation (Generation II) military flashlight
produced by Energizer. The case came before the CIT on a challenge by
Energizer to a CBP ruling that the country of origin of the Generation II
flashlight was China, which would make the flashlight ineligible for
government procurement under the TAA. The issue with respect to the
Generation II flashlight focused primarily on whether assembly in the US of
components, virtually all of which according to the CBP, were of Chinese
origin, constituted substantial transformation. The Court, after conducting a de
novo review of the record before it,2 also concluded China was the country of
origin of the Generation II flashlight for government procurement purposes.
The CIT first observed judicial interpretations of substantial transformation for
purposes of government procurement under the TAA have been few and far
between, and therefore looked to decisions construing language identical to
the TAA in cases arising in other customs areas such as marking. The court
noted the test for substantial transformation is fact specific and looks at
whether the article underwent a process such that a new and different article
[has] emerge[d], having a distinctive name, character, or use. (Citation
omitted). It also observed that [c]ourts have primarily focused on changes in
use or character in assessing whether there has been substantial
transformation, and a change in name is the least compelling of the factors.
The CIT also observed that in assessing whether there has been a change in
character, some courts have looked to the essence of the completed article
to determine whether an imported article has undergone a change in
character as a result of post-importation processing. It also noted that when
the post-importation processing consists of assembly, courts have been
reluctant to find a change in character, particularly when the imported articles
do not undergo a physical change. With respect to change in use, it stated
courts have found that such a change occurred when the end-use of the
imported product was no longer interchangeable with the end-use of the
product after postimportation processing, but that when the end-use was
predetermined at the time of importation, courts have generally not found a
change in use. Finally, it pointed out that courts have considered various
subsidiary or additional factors, such as the extent and nature of operations
performed, value added during post-importation processing, a change from
producer to consumer goods, or a shift in tariff provisions. However, it also
observed there is no uniform or exhaustive list of those factors and
consideration of them is not consistent, noting that some courts have
distinguished minor manufacturing, or simple assembly, from more complex
processes.
With respect to the Generation II flashlight, the CIT found the assembly
operations in the US did not result in substantial transformation, primarily
because the post-importation assembly operations [did] not result in a
change in the shape or material composition of any imported component . . .
[such that] there is no change in character as a result of Energizers assembly
operations. The CIT also held that the imported components did not undergo
a change in name or use when they were assembled in the US. With respect
to the latter, the court rejected Energizers argument that its assembly process
was transformative because none of the . . . components could function as a
flashlight at the time of importation and all of them became integral parts of a
new commercial product. Significantly, the court noted that where, as with the
Generation II flashlights, components are imported in a pre-fabricated form
with a predetermined use, the assembly of those articles into a final product,
without more, may not rise to the level of substantial transformation. The
court also found the post-importation processing was not sufficiently complex
as to constitute substantial transformation.
Finally, the CIT also rejected Energizers reliance on the US share of
production costs (there, 45%) as supporting its position that the US operations
resulted in substantial transformation. It noted this was a subsidiary factor
and suggested that those costs were attributable of approximately seven
minutes of labor.
The CITs decision points to three important considerations in concluding
country of origin for government procurement compliance under the TAA.
First, the court confirmed the analysis of substantial transformation in judicial
(and CBP), decisions in other contexts (such as determinations of the country
of imported goods for marking purposes), are relevant to the analysis of COO
for government procurement purposes. Indeed, the CBP often looks to its
prior decisions involving country of origin for marking purposes when
assessing substantial transformation of similar products for government
procurement purposes under the TAA.
Second, the CITs analysis makes clear that certain assembly operations may
not be enough to establish substantial transformation. For example, an
assembly operation involving relatively simple operations or, as with the
Generation II flashlight, input parts (or subassemblies), already shaped and
committed for use only in the finished product, may not be sufficient to
establish substantial transformation. Accordingly, companies should assess
assembly operations with an objective and critical eye in assessing whether
such operations are sufficiently complex to change the character of the input
items. Again, past CBP rulings and judicial decisions that analyze assembly
similar operations to those under consideration can be important in the
analysis of whether a particular process is likely to constitute substantial
transformation for government procurement purposes. This analysis could
include examination of the actual, physical steps in the relevant assembly
operation, including their complexity and required level of expertise.
Finally, the CIT explicitly embraced the traditional name, character and use
test for substantial transformation. Unlike other country of origin regimes, for
example, the Buy American Act, this test does not expressly include a
percentage of local value added or content standard to establish COO for US
government procurement purposes. As noted above, the CIT in Energizer
Battery described the value added during post-importation processing as a
subsidiary factor in its analysis. Thus, the percentage of costs associated
with US-based activity in the total cost of an item while relevant, may not be
dispositive.
For more information regarding this subject, please contact Tom Barletta, at
+1 202 429 8058, or Paul Hurst, at +1 202 429 8089, in Steptoes
Government Contracts practice in our Washington office, or Greg McCue, at
+1 202 429 1376, in Steptoes Customs practice, also in our Washington
office.

-----
1
The US Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to make such
determinations under 305(b)(1) of the TAA and that authority is delegated to
CBP.
2
See 19 USC 1581(e): The Court of International Trade shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review any final
determination of the US Secretary of the Treasury under section 305(b)(1) of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. See also 28 USC 2640(a)(3): (a) The
Court of International Trade shall make its determinations upon the basis of
the record made before the court in the following categories of civil actions:
(3) Civil actions commenced to review a final determination made under
section 305(b)(1) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
How Switzerland Can Prepare for Brexit
Der Bund
December 1, 2016
Simon Hirsbrunner authored an article titled How Switzerland Can Prepare
for Brexit for the Swiss daily newspaper Der Bund. The December 1 article
argues that Switzerland has an interest in advocating a return of the United
Kingdom to the European Free Trade Association - EFTA. This would ensure
the continuity of good trading conditions for Switzerland and the UK, and
moreover, the UK would be able to negotiate for access to the existing
network of trade agreements between the EFTA states and a range of third
countries.
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/fi
nance/ch-brexit-economic-impact-switzerland.pdf

Brexit and Cross-Border Underwriting- Status Quo, Expectations

of necessary changes Amendments

http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/European
%20Captive%20Forum%20presentation%20-Brexit
%2009.11.16.pdf

Europe after Brexit- A proposal for a continental partnership by

Jean Pisani-Ferry, Norbert Rottgen, Andr Sapir, Paul Tucker,
Guntram B. Wolff1 [Embargoed until August 29, 19-00 CET] 25
August 2016
http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/EU-UK-
20160829-final-1.pdf
THE UK IS NOT THE SICK MAN OF EUROPE, AS
YOU WERE TOLD
EU report shows UK governments percentage spend
on health
significantly exceeds EU average
We bust yet another Remainer myth, in another exclusive
Facts4EU.Org report
Using official EU figures, we can now show that this is not the case
and it hasnt been for the 10 years for which data is available.
Buried in a major 102-page document from a Eurostat news item last
week, the EU reported the proportion of total expenditure that each
member state government spends on health. This is the main measure for
determining the priority that a government puts on its health sector.
Before the Referendum, EU-loving politicians, think-tanks, and
newspapers all told voters that the UK was lagging behind the EU
average in health spending. This was all part of the EU is better and
helps to make us better message.

This document shows the UK comes 4th out of the 28 countries, in the
EUs league table.
According to the EU, the UK spends 17.3% of total government
expenditure on health. This is ahead of 23 other EU member states
including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and all the Scandinavian
countries. The average for the EU28 is just 13.3%.
In addition, Eurostat data shows that the UK governments percentage was
significantly higher than the EU average for every one of the last 10
years for which data is available.
Prior to the Referendum, Britons were receiving the opposite message.
Even now, Brexit-denying MPs continue to stand up in Parliament on a
daily basis and pretend that voters were systematically lied to by the Leave
campaign.
Time for Brexit-denying MPs to stop the lies and start being positive
The overwhelming body of evidence shows that it was the Remain
campaign that lied. We will continue to give examples of this, because the
public needs to know the truth so that we can all unite behind a positive
Brexit Britain.
MALTA DECLARATION', YESTERDAY 03 FEB 2017
"These objectives shall be underpinned by the necessary resources. In line
with the Valletta Action Plan, the European Union is strengthening the
mainstreaming of migration within its Official Development Assistance for
Africa, which amounts to 31 billion during this financial period."
"Some of the actions referred to above can be funded within projects
already under way, notably projects funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa
as appropriate, which mobilises 1.8 billion from the EU budget and 152
million from Member States' contributions."
"To cover the most urgent funding needs now and throughout 2017, we
welcome the Commission's decision to mobilise as a first step an
additional 200 million for the North Africa window of the Fund and to give
priority to migration-related projects concerning Libya

YESTERDAYS EU SUMMIT WILL BE EXPENSIVE

EU deal with Libya adds to existing EU costs of Merkels
immigration policy
Yesterday the EU Council of the leaders of the 28 member states met
in Malta to discuss new arrangements for Libya, in order to stem the
flow of migrants into the EU.
The measures agreed for the Libyan government have not yet been fully-
costed, but here is what the EU said in their so-called Malta Declaration
last night :

Buy American Act